



WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

The general Military Situation at the opening of the Spring Campaign of 1864.—Richmond and Atlanta, held by the Armies of Lee and Johnston, were the Helmet and Shield of the Confederacy.—The Progress of the National Arms thus far had been in the West.—Importance of the Victories of Vicksburg and Chattanooga.—The Exhaustion of the Confederate Strength forbids offensive Operations on a large Scale by the Confederate Armies.—Comparison of the Operations during the Last Stage of the War to those of a Siege.—President Davis's Conduct of his Western Army.—Lack of Unity in Military Operations had been a great Fault on both Sides.—U. S. Grant is made Lieutenant General of the Armies of the United States.—He is ordered to Washington to receive his Commission.—His Letter to General Sherman, and Sherman's Reply.—General Sherman succeeds to Grant's former Command, and General J. B. McPherson to Sherman's.—Sherman goes to Nashville, and accompanies Grant thence to Cincinnati.—Lieutenant General Grant's Theory of prospective Operations.—Sherman's Tour of Observation.—Composition of his Army.—His Preparations for the Atlanta Campaign.—He orders the People of Tennessee to supply their own Rations.—He is ready for movement May 6th.—Review of General Thomas's Operations during the Winter.—Difficult Task assigned to General Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army.—His Correspondence with Bragg.—Can have no Re-enforcements for a Defensive Campaign.—While Johnston and Bragg discuss, Sherman moves against Dalton.—McPherson's Movement through Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca.—His Attack is delayed, and Hood is sent to Resaca.—Sherman moves his entire Army against Resaca.—Johnston evacuates Dalton.—The Battles of May 14th and 15th.—Johnston, again flanked, abandons Resaca, and, crossing the Oostenaula, retreats to Cassville.—Jeff. C. Davis's Division occupies Rome, Sherman's forces, in the mean time, advancing against Cassville.—Johnston consults with his Corps Commanders; Hardee advises Battle, Hood and Polk a Retreat.—Johnston, May 20th, crosses the Etowah.—Sherman follows May 23d, and, avoiding Allatoona, moves to the right against Dallas.—He finds the Enemy in his front, May 25th, at New Hope Church.—The Battle of New Hope Church.—Sherman develops toward the Left.—Battles of May 27th and 28th.—Sherman, continuing the Movement to the Left, secures the Railroad at Ackworth, June 6th, fortifies Allatoona as a secondary Base, and is re-enforced by Blair's Corps and Long's Cavalry.—Johnston also shifts his Position, and occupies Kenesaw in Sherman's Front.—Sherman hears of Morgan's Defeat in Kentucky, and of Forrest's Victory over Sturgis in Mississippi.—Lieutenant General Polk is killed June 14, and Pine and Lost Mountains are abandoned by the

Enemy.—The new Confederate Line around Kenesaw.—“Villainously bad” Weather delays Sherman.—Hooker is attacked by Hood and repulsed, June 22, near the Kulp House.—Sherman assaults the Confederate Position at Kenesaw, June 27, without success.—He extends his Right toward Marietta, and on July 2 threatens Turner's Ferry on the Chattahoochee.—The next Day Johnston abandons Kenesaw.—Sherman crosses in the Attempt to strike the Enemy, while destroying the Chattahoochee.—He secures three Crossings above Johnston's Tête de Pont, and destroys the Roswell Factories.—Johnston crosses on the night of July 9th, and takes Position on Peach-tree Creek.—The Situation at this Stage of the Campaign.—Rousseau's Raid on the West Point Railroad.—Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee July 17th.—The same day Johnston is removed from command and succeeded by Hood.—The Battle of Peach-tree Creek, July 20.—The Battle of the 22d.—General McPherson's Death.—Stoneman's and McCook's Raids.—Sherman gives Howard command of the Army and Department of the Tennessee, and transfers that Army to the west of Atlanta.—Hooker's Resignation.—The Battle of July 28th.—Sherman extends his Lines toward East Point.—His Objective the Macon Railroad.—Hood sends Wheeler North.—Kilpatrick's Raid.—The Siege abandoned, August 25th; the Twentieth Corps guards the Chattahoochee Bridge, and the rest of Sherman's Army moves against Jonesborough and the Macon Road.—The Battles of Jonesborough, August 31st and September 1st.—Hood evacuates Atlanta on the morning of September 2d.—General Sherman occupies the City, and orders the Inhabitants to Leave.—The Exodus.—Correspondence between Generals Sherman and Hood.

IN the four last chapters we have passed round the skirts of that central field in which, during the summer and autumn of 1864, the fate of the attempted Southern Confederacy was decided. From the eastern coast of Florida to the Missouri River our survey has ranged—embracing within its scope the brief Florida campaign of General Seymour, begun February 6th, 1864, and terminating on the 20th in the disastrous battle of Olustee; General Sherman's successful expedition to Meridian, February 3–26, 1864; General Banks's operations against the coast of Texas, September 5th, 1863–January 12th, 1864; the ill-advised and mismanaged Red River expedition in the spring of 1864; the military operations in Arkansas, January 8, 1863–May 2, 1864; and Rosecrans's campaign against Price in September and

October, 1864. From a chronological stand-point this survey ought perhaps to have included the siege of Charleston in the summer of 1863, and the operations of Admiral Farragut against the forts in Mobile Bay, August, 1864. We have determined otherwise, and shall treat of these operations in other connections—those against Mobile as a preliminary part of the campaign which finally resulted in the capture of that city, and the siege of Charleston in connection with Sherman's march from Atlanta to Goldsborough.

We turn, therefore, immediately to the consideration of Sherman's campaign against Johnston, terminating, after four months of strategical manœuvring, in the capture of Atlanta.

The spring of 1864 opened a new era for the armies of the Union. The war against the rebellion had now been going on for three years. Secretary Seward's prophetic period had already been multiplied by twelve, and still two great armies protected the Confederacy—covering Richmond, its head, and Atlanta, its heart. The helmet of the rebellion was Lee's Army of Northern Virginia; the shield before its heart was Johnston's Army of the Tennessee. To crush the one or pierce the other would be a death-blow. Thus far the Army of Northern Virginia had protected Richmond against the successive approaches of McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker, and, after the repulse of the last, had boldly reversed the order of movement and invaded Pennsylvania, almost touching the Susquehanna in its northward march. This audacity had met its rebuke at Gettysburg, but Lee's army had resumed the defensive and still defied attack. Whatever progress had been made by the national arms had been in the West. The possession of the Mississippi had severed the western from the eastern half of the Confederacy. West of that river Kirby Smith's armies were secure from attack, not so much by their own strength as by the wastes of Texas—a sort of American Russia—from which, while they could safely whisper "Moscow" to any invader, they could not advance north of the Arkansas without disaster. Between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian range of mountains the waves of conflict had fluctuated, swaying northward and southward under the varying conditions of the war. President Davis was partial to an aggressive system of warfare. At an earlier period the invasion of the Northwestern States with a large army was practicable, and disorganized the plans of the Federal generals for pushing the war southward. Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was the last of these attempts which assumed formidable proportions. Its only success had been in the delay which it occasioned in the progress of the Union army. The secure possession of Chattanooga at the close of 1863 stayed this tendency of the war to fluctuate northward. After that the Confederate invasions were undertaken only with cavalry; flying tempests they were, sometimes violent in their ravages, but the work which they accomplished was of little military importance. These petty storms were soon past, and their wreck obliterated. It is true that, even after the capture of Nashville, Hood's army advanced northward to Nashville, but it was a desperate resort, and, as we shall soon see, illustrated at the same time its danger and its folly. But, beaten back to the mountains of Northern Georgia, the Army of the Tennessee still presented a bold front, covering the central and vital portion of the Confederacy. From Richmond to Atlanta, and on the coast from Wilmington to Mobile, the outside barriers of the Confederacy stood.¹ But let this outward shell be broken, even at a single strong point, and the whole structure must crumble into ruin. For the three past years had nearly exhausted the internal resources of the rebellion. Nearly all the strength and wealth sustaining it had been drawn to the surface. Very few able-bodied men were

¹ The following extract from Lieutenant General Grant's Official Report shows very clearly the relative situation of the Confederate and Federal forces in May, 1864:

"At the date when this report begins the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi north of that stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than 80,000 effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one half, or 40,000 men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston Rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fortress Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders in March, 1864, shows, by red lines, the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

"Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

"The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly entrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly entrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force, under Forrest, in Northeast Mississippi; a considerable force of all arms in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee, and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

"These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign."

left at home; there was no reserved force upon which to draw, in any event. Money no longer remained a standard for the valuation of property. Gardens were now the Southern treasury; those who shared the possession of these, who were producers of any thing which sustained life, were rich to the extent of their producing power, and all others lived upon them—the soldiers by a legitimate claim, and non-combatants by the claim of necessity. The theory of the war from this time was strictly that of a siege; it had been that from the beginning, but not by so strict a construction of the term. To the garrison one problem was presented, What would be the best disposition of its forces for *defense*? Offensive operations on the part of the Confederate armies were henceforth unwise: in the first place, they could result in no material advantage, and, in the second, they involved a too rapid and extensive waste of force. Early's Shenandoah campaign, and Hood's advance to Nashville, will furnish illustrations of the folly of offensive operations in these later stages of the war. They were like sallies from a besieged fort, made by a force necessary to the defense of the fort, and at the same time insufficient to raise the siege. Certainly—whatever may have been the final result—the contest would have been prolonged if, on the part of the Confederates, a wise policy, one purely defensive, had been adopted from the commencement of the Atlanta campaign. The Confederate executive does not seem to have appreciated the full importance of the situation which was now presented. No measures were taken to secure unity of operation. To no single mind was given the control of military movements. President Davis conducted the Western campaigns, as he had done for the year past, after a very whimsical manner. By the pressure of popular opinion he had been compelled to give General Johnston command of the Army of the Tennessee, but he gave him little support, and at the first opportunity relieved him of the command. Not until it was too late was the general control of all the armies given to General Lee.

But, while the Confederate government conducted the war upon its former method, adhesion to the theories of the past was no longer suffered on the part of the general government. It is not necessary, nor would it be altogether just, to criticise with a great degree of harshness the Federal conduct of the war during these three years now concluded. The United States was not at all eminent as a military nation at the commencement of the war. The graduates of the Military Academy at West Point had not been trained in the face of war, as are European students. Besides, the study of the campaigns on the Continent of Europe during the last century, while it might have prevented very many blunders which were actually committed on both sides, would, in many important respects, have been inapplicable, on account of the peculiar topographical features of the campaigns of our civil war, and the extended area over which they were conducted. For two years, at the least, the war thus became a series of costly experiments. Then came the winnowing of our generals, and much of the chaff was blown away, though not all. A few military leaders had exhibited characteristics which entitled them to the more prominent positions in the army. Pre-eminent above all others was General Grant, who had not only been most successful, but had shown rare knowledge of men, remarkable common sense, and a persistence of purpose which was unconquerable. Gradually his sphere of control had been extended, until in 1864 he commanded all the armies in the West except that of the Gulf.² But still the general disposition of all the armies was subject to General Halleck at Washington. Now, without criticising Halleck's generalship, it is clear that there were several reasons why it was impossible for *any* officer in his position—whatever his military capacity—to wisely control all the military movements in so extensive a conflict. In the first place, his management *must* be simply theoretical. For Halleck had no large practical experience in war. In the Mexican War, for some successful skirmishing with the enemy he had been breveted captain. He had graduated at West Point the third in his class, and for a year was an assistant professor of engineering at the Academy. He had published some important military works. In this Civil War he had not fought a single battle, and the only march he had made was that of his Western Army to the evacuated fortifications at Corinth. Without practical experience, he must resort to theory; and frequently his theories were based upon insufficient premises. In the second place, his distance from the actual fields of conflict, and his subsequent ignorance of the circumstances which must regulate the military operations of his subordinates, led him either to make great mistakes in cases where he gave positive and peremptory orders, or to fall into the exactly opposite error of letting campaigns manage themselves in such a manner that no one could be strictly and fully responsible for their being undertaken or for their results. He assumed too much when he exercised positive and responsible control; and in cases where he was negative, and left every thing to the discretion of his subordinates, as in the case of the Red River expedition, there was no unity of action, and no absolute control by any one. The only exception to this military anarchy was in General Grant's command, simply because to him was surrendered the most complete control of the armies in his vast department. Here was a partial solution of the difficulty. Why not make an entire solution by giving to General Grant control of all the armies of the United States under the President? The voice of the people was loud and universal in favor of this; and the Thirty-eighth Congress, before the close of its first session, revived, for this purpose, the grade of lieutenant general. On the 2d of March, Grant, having been assigned to this grade

² Sherman suggested to Grant (January 4, 1864), in connection with the Red River expedition, that he ought to have the entire command of the Mississippi Valley. In a letter of that date, he says: "There is no doubt the whole matter would be simplified if you had command of the Mississippi Valley below Cairo. I think, if you were to name the subject to General Halleck, that he would order it, for its propriety is better known to him than to any other. Admiral Porter's command extends to and below New Orleans, and ours should also."

GRANT RECEIVING HIS COMMISSION AS LIEUTENANT GENERAL.



by the President, was confirmed by the Senate in executive session. Two days after, General Grant, then in Nashville, was ordered to report in person at Washington. This order was to him an assurance of his confirmation; and his first feeling upon receiving it seems to have been one of generous gratitude to his faithful subordinates who had so ably seconded the enterprise for which he was now to receive the highest reward which it was in the power of the people and the government to bestow.¹

General Washington alone had previously been honored with the full title conferred upon General Grant. In 1798 our relations with France threatened war, and at this crisis Washington was made lieutenant general. In another year, if he had lived, he would have been made full general. After General Scott's unsuccessful campaign for the Presidency, the grade of lieutenant general *by brevet* was conferred upon him. The latter, by the provisions of the bill promoting General Grant to the full grade, was still to retain his "rank, pay, and allowances."

At one o'clock on the afternoon of the 9th of March, General Grant was received by the President in the cabinet chamber at Washington, and received his commission. There was no pomp, no gathering of the populace, no splendid celebration of the honor conferred. The President was there with his cabinet; General Halleck, the retiring general-in-chief; General Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff; Colonel Comstock, his chief engineer; the President's private secretary, Mr. Nicolay, and the Honorable Owen Lovejoy, of Illinois. The only other person forming a part of the group was General Grant's eldest son, a boy of fourteen years. President Lincoln having presented General Grant to the cabinet, addressed him thus:

"GENERAL GRANT,—The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission constituting you lieutenant general in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country here-in trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

General Grant's response was equally brief. He replied:

"MR. PRESIDENT,—I accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."²

¹ Before starting for Washington he writes thus to General Sherman:

"DEAR SHERMAN,—The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately *in person*, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation. I start this morning to comply with the order.

"While I have been eminently successful in this war in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

"There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given to you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you can not know as well as I.

"I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

"The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.

"Your friend,
U. S. GRANT, Major General."

Sherman's reply, written near Memphis March 10th, is equally characteristic. He says:

"DEAR GENERAL,—I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th instant. I will send a copy to General McPherson at once.

"You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions.

"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

"I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson was in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

"Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible ray of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed ever since.

"I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype Washington—as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be—but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Savior.

"This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts—no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you would help me out, if alive.

"My only point of doubts was in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but, I confess, your common sense seems to have supplied all these.

"Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come West: take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead sure; and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and the Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work.

"Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.

"Your sincere friend,
W. T. SHERMAN."

² The bill for reviving the grade of lieutenant general was presented to Congress by the Hon. E. B. Washburne, of Illinois. It was slightly amended, and was passed under the following form:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the grade of lieutenant general be, and the same is hereby revived in the Army of the United States of America; and the President is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of the army, to be selected during war from among those officers in the military service of the United States; not below the grade of major general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability; and who, being commissioned as lieutenant general, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President, to command the armies of the United States.

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the lieutenant general appointed as is hereinbefore pro-

vided shall be entitled to the pay, allowances, and staff specified in the fifth section of the act approved May 28, 1798; and also the allowances described in the sixth section of the act approved August 23, 1842, granting additional rations to certain officers; *Provided*, That nothing in this bill contained shall be construed in any way to affect the rank, pay, or allowances of Winfield Scott, lieutenant general by brevet, now on the retired list of the army."

"General Orders, No. 98.

"War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, March 12, 1864.

"The President of the United States orders as follows:

"1st. Major General Halleck is, at his own request, relieved from duty as general-in-chief of the army, and Lieutenant General U. S. Grant is assigned to the command of the armies of the United States. The headquarters of the army will be in Washington, and also with Lieutenant General Grant in the field.

"2d. Major General Halleck is assigned to duty in Washington as chief of staff of the army, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant General commanding. His orders will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

"3d. Major General W. T. Sherman is assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas.

"4th. Major General John B. McPherson is assigned to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

"5th. In relieving Major General Halleck from duty as general-in-chief, the President desires to express his approbation and thanks for the zealous manner in which the arduous and responsible duties of that position have been performed.

"By order of the Secretary of War.
D. E. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adj. General."

General Sherman's new command consisted of four departments, with their armies, those of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and Arkansas.

The Army of the Ohio, now under the command of Major General John M. Schofield, consisted of the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps. Longstreet having joined Lee, the Ninth Corps was sent to re-enforce the Army of the Potomac. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, those of M. S. Hascall and J. D. Cox, took the field, the other three being retained to garrison Kentucky and East Tennessee.

The Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, commanded by General Thomas, consisted of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Corps, commanded respectively by Generals O. O. Howard, John M. Palmer, and Joseph Hooker. The Fourth Corps comprised three divisions, under Stanley, John Newton, and Wood; the Fourteenth three, under Jeff. C. Davis, R. W. Johnson, and Baird; and the Twentieth three, under A. S. Williams, Geary, and Butterfield.⁴

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"From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy, and his numerical strength, were far inferior to ours; but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

"The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes, and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable, and conducive to the happiness of the people both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."—*Lieut. General Grant's Official Report.*

³ From a letter written by Lieutenant General Grant to Sherman, dated Washington, April 4, 1864, it appears that, in conjunction with the operations of his own and Sherman's armies, he intended that an attack should be made on Mobile. We give those portions of this letter which bear upon Western operations:

"It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre. . . . I have sent orders to Banks by private messengers to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, and return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed 4000 men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than 25,000 men. To this I will add 5000 men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early. . . .

"You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. . . . I know you will have difficulties to encounter getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it."

⁴ Several changes had taken place in the Army of the Cumberland since the battle of Chattanooga. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated, forming the Twentieth, and General Slocum had, as a consequence, been displaced, and transferred to Vicksburg. Howard, who had commanded the Eleventh, relieved General Granger in command of the Fourth Corps. Phil Sheridan had been relieved of his command (second division, Fourth Corps), and had been succeeded by John Newton.

The Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville, Alabama, commanded by McPherson, comprised the Fifteenth, and portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, under Logan, G. M. Dodge, and Frank P. Blair, Jr. The remainder of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps was at Memphis and Vicksburg, under Hurlbut and Slocum, or absent on the Red River expedition. The Fifteenth Corps comprised four divisions, under Osterhaus, Herron, Morgan L. Smith, and John E. Smith; the Sixteenth three, under Ransom, Corse, and T. W. Sweeny; and the Seventeenth two, under C. R. Woods and M. D. Leggett.

The cavalry in the Army of the Ohio consisted of McCook's division, in the Army of the Cumberland of Kilpatrick's and Garrard's, and in the Army of the Tennessee of Edward McCook's brigade.

The Department and Army of Arkansas, under General Steele, was in May assigned to General Canby's trans-Mississippi division. Steele's army, therefore, must be counted out of the forces engaged in the Atlanta campaign.

General Sherman immediately prepared for active operations. On the 25th of March he set out on a general tour of inspection through his department, consulting with McPherson, Thomas, and Schofield. The value of the possession of Chattanooga was now manifest. This position was the central buttress of the Federal position. On its left East Tennessee was firmly grasped by Schofield's army; on its right the Tennessee River was guarded by a line of garrisons, which permitted the access northward of cavalry only. In the rear were two good and reliable lines of railway communication from Nashville and Memphis. During the season of navigation the Tennessee River affords a third line. Having arranged with his subordinates the disposition of their several armies—how many should take the field, and how many be retained for garrison duty—Sherman returned to Nashville. At this time the citizens of Tennessee in his rear were in large measure sustained by stores which they shared with the army. Finding that this double want could not be supplied with safety to the army, he issued orders cutting off the supply of the citizens, and leaving them to other sources of relief.¹ The 1st of May was the time fixed for the completion of preparations, and by that time the store-houses of Chattanooga contained provisions for thirty days, and the ammunition trains were fully supplied. The veteran regiments, whose time had expired, and who had been released on furlough, now returned with their ranks filled by new recruits.

Sherman had intended to move against the enemy with 100,000 men of all arms, and 250 guns. His actual force on the 1st of May was 98,797 men and 254 guns. The Army of the Cumberland, numbering 60,773 men, with 130 guns, constituted three fifths of his entire command. The Army of the Tennessee numbered 24,465, with 96 guns, and that of the Ohio 13,559, with 28 guns. Sherman's whole force was distributed as follows among the three armies of the service: the infantry of the three armies numbered 88,188 men; the artillery 4450, with 254 guns; the cavalry 6149.²

To General Johnston, of the Confederate army, who had succeeded Bragg at the close of 1863, was assigned a difficult task. With an army half as large as that opposing him,³ he was to resist the approach of the latter to Atlanta. His forces were concentrated at Dalton, which he had strongly fortified. President Davis having given Johnston the command of the army much against his will,⁴ did not support him by any considerable re-enforcements. Yet he

¹ "At first," he says, in his report, "my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course."

On May 5th Sherman writes to President Lincoln: "We have worked hard with the best talent of the country, and it is demonstrated that the railroad can not supply the army and the people too. One or the other must quit, and the army don't intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us. The issues to citizens have been enormous, and the same weight of corn or oats would have saved thousands of the mules, whose carcasses now cumber the roads, and which we need so much."

"We have paid back to Tennessee ten for one of provisions taken in war. I will not change my orders, and I beg of you to be satisfied that the humor is partly wrong and partly right; and to test it, I advise you to tell the bearers of it to hurry to Kentucky, and make up a caravan of cattle and wagons, and come over the mountains by Cumberland Gap and Somerset, to relieve their suffering friends, on foot, as they used to do before a railroad was built. Tell them that they have no time to lose. We can relieve all actual suffering by each company or regiment giving of their savings. Every man who is willing to fight or work gets a full ration; and all who won't fight or work should go away, and we offer them free passage in the cars."

² Sherman evidently did not intend to be encumbered with baggage. April 11 he writes to Thomas: "When we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one change of clothing on our horses, or to be carried by the men, and on pack-animals by company officers. Five days' bacon, twenty days' bread, and thirty days' salt, sugar, and coffee. Nothing else but arms and ammunition in quantity proportioned to our ability. Even this will be a heavy encumbrance, but is rather the limit of our aim than what we can really accomplish. . . . Look well to our supply of beef cattle on the hoof, and salt in large excess of the rations. Encourage drills by brigades and divisions, and let the recruits practice at the target all the time."

³ Johnston's effective force at the commencement of the Atlanta campaign numbered about 48,000 men, one tenth cavalry. The following are the official returns from his army from December 31, 1863, to June 30, 1864:

| | Present for Duty. | Aggregate Present. | Aggregate Present and Absent. |
|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| December 31, 1863 | 42,439 | 57,428 | 98,215 |
| January 31, 1864 | 41,553 | 55,059 | 88,457 |
| February — " | 37,789 | 48,010 | 79,071 |
| March 31, " | 42,125 | 55,113 | 85,953 |
| April 30, " | 43,887 | 63,807 | 96,863 |
| May " | Wanting. | | |
| June 30, " | 54,085 | 77,441 | 137,192 |

We have estimated his army at 48,000, because, in addition to the forces included in the returns for April 30, there were some 4000 cavalry scattered northward, which were afterward recalled.

⁴ According to the following account of Henry S. Foote (*War of the Rebellion*, p. 356), it appears that Davis's hostility to Johnston began at an early period of the war, or, at any rate, before Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War, was displaced by Seddon. This author, Confederate representative from Tennessee, says:

"Just about the time I was laboring most assiduously to relieve the Department of War of Mr. Benjamin by calling forth, as far as it might be in my power to do so, co-operative responses from the people, an occurrence took place in social life in Richmond which had much effect, not only upon the fate of Mr. Benjamin, but which, in the sequel, had much influence also upon the course of public events. I chanced to be invited to a dinner-party, where some twenty of the most prominent members of the two houses of the Confederate Congress were congregated, including the speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, and others of equal rank. General

called loudly for an advance into Tennessee. Of course this would have proved immediately ruinous. Johnston, therefore, wisely declined to attempt any offensive movement, and spent the winter in preparation for the assault which he knew he must meet in the spring. During the winter desertions from his army were frequent. General Thomas reports that they averaged thirty per day, nearly all of whom desired to take the amnesty oath, and to comply with General Grant's orders in regard to deserters.¹

Partly as a demonstration in favor of Sherman's Meridian expedition, and partly to prevent Johnston from re-enforcing Longstreet in East Tennessee, Thomas had moved against Dalton in the latter part of February, 1864. Palmer, with Johnson's and Baird's divisions, occupied Ringgold on the 22d. That night he reported to Thomas that he had reliable information that Johnston had dispatched Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions to the relief of Polk in Alabama. This information was not correct; but, to test the enemy's strength, the next day, Davis's division having joined the two others at Ringgold, and Craft's, of the Fourteenth Corps, with Matthias's brigade, of the Fifteenth Corps, and Long's cavalry brigade, having been sent to cooperate with Palmer, Johnston's advanced outposts beyond Tunnel Hill were attacked and driven in. Dalton is covered on its western side by Rocky Face Ridge, which runs north and south, and through which, at the pass called Buzzard Roost, passes the road from Ringgold. East of the Ringgold Road and in front of Rocky Face Ridge lies Tunnel Hill, which was occupied by Thomas on the 24th. On the 25th an attempt was made against Buzzard Roost Pass; but the enemy, contrary to anticipation, was found in full strength, and, after becoming satisfied of this, Thomas withdrew his forces to the vicinity of Ringgold. His loss in this reconnoissance was 17 killed and 255 wounded.

As soon as Johnston assumed command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, both the President and Secretary Seddon urged an offensive campaign. "The relative forces," reports Johnston, "including the moral effect of the affair of Missionary Ridge, condition of the artillery horses and most of those of the cavalry, and want of field transportation, made it impracticable to effect the wishes of the executive." Immediately after Thomas's reconnoissance, General Johnston, on the 27th of February, suggested to President Davis, through General Bragg, that "preparations for a forward movement should be made without farther delay." In reply, Bragg (March 4th) desired him to prepare for such a movement. He then reminded Bragg that these preparations, by the regulations of the War Department, were not left to commanders of troops, but to officers receiving orders directly from Richmond. On the 18th of March Johnston received a letter from Bragg, sketching a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used by the former. He replied to this letter, suggesting modifications, and urging that the re-enforcements named should be sent immediately to Dalton. General Bragg on the 21st telegraphed to Johnston: "Troops can only be drawn from other points for advance. Upon your decision of that point farther action must depend." Johnston believed that the enemy would be prepared for a movement sooner than he himself could. He wished to be prepared for the defensive as well as the offensive. From Bragg's dispatch it was evident that there were troops which might be sent to the Army of the Tennessee, but that these would not be sent for a defensive campaign. Johnston, on the 22d, explained his view of the situation to General Bragg, showing the probability of Sherman's advancing first, and urging the necessity of preparing for defensive as well as for offensive movements. No notice whatever was taken of this appeal. On the 25th Johnston renewed his request for re-enforcements, "because the enemy was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours was less than it had been then." The only response which he received was the arrival of 1400 men, under Brigadier General Mercer, on the 2d of May, after Sherman's preparations had already been completed. Considering that Johnston might have been supported, it seems strange that, in the face of an advance, the success or

Joseph E. Johnston was also an invited guest. While the banquet was proceeding, Mr. Benjamin's gross acts of official misconduct becoming the subject of conversation, one of the company turned to General Johnston, and inquired whether he thought it even possible that the Confederate cause could succeed with Mr. Benjamin as war minister. To this inquiry General Johnston, after a little pause, emphatically responded in the negative. This high authority was immediately cited in both houses of Congress against Mr. Benjamin, and was in the end fatal to his hope of remaining in the Department of War. Mr. Davis, after the sending in of his nominations for cabinet appointments, under the permanent Constitution, for nearly four weeks, in order to have it in his power to persuade the Senate to confirm Mr. Benjamin as Secretary of War, in the event of his being re-nominated, ultimately relinquished this object in despair, that body, however accommodating it was in general to executive fancies, having been found unwilling to participate in the terrible responsibility of such an act. Mr. Benjamin was finally nominated for the Department of State, and was confirmed, by a very small majority, for that place, where he had it in his power, both abroad and at home, to perpetrate more barefaced acts of corruption and profligacy than any single individual has ever been known to commit in the same space of time in any part of Christendom. I will here remark, in passing, that this frank and manly declaration of General Johnston rendered both Mr. Davis and Mr. Benjamin alike hostile to him, and he was fated to experience the effect of their malevolence on more than one subsequent occasion previous to his ultimate deprivation of command.

¹ This order, No. 10, was issued by General Grant at Chattanooga, December 12, 1863, and was freely distributed among the Confederate soldiers. Its terms were as follow:

"I. All deserters from the enemy coming within our lines will be conducted to the commander of division or detached brigade who shall be nearest the place of surrender.

"II. If such commander is satisfied that the deserters desire to quit the Confederate service, he may permit them to go to their homes, if within our lines, on taking the following oath:

"I do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of states thereunder, and that I will in like manner abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so far as not yet repealed, modified, or held void by Congress or by decision of the Supreme Court, and that I will in like manner abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court, so help me God.

"III. Deserters from the enemy will at once be disarmed, and their arms turned over to the nearest ordnance officer, who will account for them.


"IV. Passes and rations may be given to deserters to carry them to their homes, and free passes over military railroads and on steam-boats in government employ.

"V. Employment at fair wages will, when practicable, be given to deserters by officers of the quartermaster and engineer departments.


"VI. To avoid the danger of recapture of such deserters by the enemy, they will be exempt from military service in the armies of the United States."



THE ADVANCE SIGNAL-STATION NEAR RINGGOLD, GEORGIA.



RINGGOLD, GEORGIA.




BUZZARD'S ROOST PASS.

pulse of which was so important to the Confederacy, he should have been left for three months with an army half as large as that which he confronted. On the 4th of May he asked for a portion of Polk's command, and was informed that this request would be granted.¹

While the Confederate officials were disputing, Sherman had been preparing to advance. By the 1st of May, as we have before shown, he was ready to move and to strike. From Ringgold, the advanced front of the Federal army, to Atlanta was nearly one hundred miles, across a difficult country, but not so difficult as that over which Rosecrans had advanced from Murfreesborough to Chattanooga. Atlanta, the heart of Georgia, and of the Confederacy itself, was not only the principal Confederate granary, but was also the centre of a manufacturing district which supplied the Southern armies with cannon, ammunition, clothing, and equipments. To reach this point—the local objective of the campaign—three rivers had to be crossed, the Oostenaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee. Ringgold lies amid the mountains of

¹ General Bragg, after he was relieved from the command at Chattanooga, was called to Richmond, where President Davis, whose especial favorite he was, placed him in a position very similar to that which had been occupied by the Federal General Halleck at Washington. Certainly the management of the one was only paralleled, in the annals of war, by that of the other.

Taylor's Ridge, on the road from Chattanooga to Dalton. Ten miles distant, by the road from Ringgold, is Buzzard's Roost, in Rocky Face Ridge, about four miles northwest of Dalton. The enemy held Dalton, strongly fortified, the ridge covering it, and strong outposts on the road to Ringgold. His position was almost impregnable. Sherman's command on May 7th was situated thus: On the right, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, lay the Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson; the Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas, held the centre, at and near Ringgold, more directly confronting the enemy; and under Schofield, on the Georgia border, and on the road from Cleveland southward to Dalton, which runs east of Rocky Face Ridge, was the Army of the Ohio. We have said that Atlanta was the local objective of Sherman's campaign; the *vital* objective, however, was Johnston's army at Dalton. The obvious policy of the Federal commander was to force a battle upon his opponent at the earliest stage of the campaign. Johnston's equally obvious policy—a difficult one to be pursued under the circumstances—was to evade a general engagement, opposing as obstinate resistance as was possible in his front consistent with the protection of his communications with Atlanta.



GEARY'S ASSAULT ON DUG GAP.

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, and on the same day Grant telegraphed to Sherman, reminding him that the time for his advance against Johnston had come. Sherman neither intended, nor did Johnston expect, an assault on the position covering Dalton—Buzzard's Roost Pass, which was obstructed by abatis, and flooded by means of dams across Mill Creek. Probably in no campaign of the war did the two opposing commanders so completely fathom each other's purposes, or so carefully estimate the possibilities, the one for attack and the other for defense. Sherman, on the 6th of May, with his largest army, that of the Cumberland, menaced Rocky Face Ridge with such vigor that it would seem as if an attempt like that made five months before against Missionary Ridge was to be repeated against the formidable position held by Johnston at Buzzard's Roost. Schofield threatened at the same time the enemy's right flank. McPherson's army, from Lee and Gordon's Mill, was thrown to the left and rear, moving by way of Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, eighteen miles south of Dalton, on the Atlanta Railroad. With this flanking column McPherson was ordered to break the railroad to the extent of his opportunity, and then to retire to Snake Creek Gap and there fortify himself.¹


On the first day of the campaign Thomas occupied Tunnel Hill. Two days afterward Schofield closed upon Johnston's right, and Thomas renewed his demonstration upon Rocky Face with such vigor that Newton's division, of Howard's (Fourth) corps, carried a portion of the ridge; but, upon a farther advance, the crest was found too well protected by rock epaulements to hope for success in gaining the gorge. Geary's division, of Hooker's corps, in the mean time made a reconnoissance up a precipitous ridge south of Buzzard's Roost; but, though the men fought their way well up to the enemy's intrenchments on the crest, they could not gain possession of the Gap. But these movements were only demonstrations. Upon McPherson's flank movement through Snake Creek Gap Sherman had made the success of his plan to depend. But Johnston, who had expected this method of attack, had sent Canty's brigade to Resaca two days before the attack in his front had been developed. For weeks, also, he had been preparing roads in his rear, upon

which his own troops could move more rapidly than Sherman's flanking columns. McPherson had reached Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, with Logan's and Dodge's corps, preceded by Kilpatrick's division of cavalry. Debouching from the gap, McPherson found Resaca occupied by Canty's brigade. If he had made an immediate attack his success would have been certain; but he over-estimated the enemy's strength both in position and numbers. While he was waiting before Resaca, and unable to get upon the railroad above or below the town, the position in his front was strengthened. On the afternoon of the 9th, Johnston, warned by Canty of this movement on Resaca, promptly dispatched to the latter point three infantry divisions under General Hood. The orders which McPherson had received had not been so explicit, perhaps, as to cover the precise case now presented for his consideration. His discretion must supply the place of definite orders. His force, over 20,000 strong, was largely superior to that of the garrison defending Resaca. The manifest intent of his orders would have favored an attack, and the probability of success, even now, was unquestionably in his favor; but there was much to be said on the other side. He was detached from the main body of the army, and the easy approaches from Dalton toward his left and rear suggested the possibility that he might be cut off and defeated. He took the safer of the alternatives offered him, and fell back to Snake Creek Gap. In doing so he probably made a mistake. Rocky Face Ridge had perfectly covered his rear during the movement. He could now easily withstand any assault which might be made on his left if he had refused that flank toward the ridge. Even if he had taken such a position without making an attack, he could have held it until he received support. But the decisive advantage gained over the enemy by his flank movement had been thrown away by his failure to attack on the 9th. The attack would have been made if General Logan had been in command, or if he had been in the advance instead of Dodge. McPherson's wagon train, which ought never to have entered the Gap at all, offered serious obstructions to the march of columns which might be sent to his support. Sherman confesses himself "somewhat disappointed at the result"² of his plans, but imputes no blame to McPherson. On the 11th he withdrew his army from Johnston's front, and followed McPherson, leaving only Howard's corps and a small infantry force to keep up the demonstration against Dalton. On the night of the 12th Johnston abandoned Dalton, and moved his whole army to a position

¹ This Snake Creek Gap movement seems to have been originally suggested by General Thomas. The latter, in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga to consult about the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sherman that if he would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through Buzzard's Roost Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole force through Snake Creek Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole force through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force him either to retreat toward the east through a difficult country, poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack me, in which latter event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his communications before he could be made aware of my movement. General Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying-point for the two wings . . . to operate from."

² The following is a part of the instructions given to McPherson: "I am in hopes that Garrard's cavalry will be at Villanow as soon as you. . . . But, in any event, his movement will cover your right rear, and enable you to leave all encumbrances at Ship's Gap or at Villanow, as you deem best. I hope the enemy will fight at Dalton, in which case he can have no force there that can interfere with you; but should his policy be to fall back along the railroad, you will hit him in flank. Do not fail, in that event, to make the most of the opportunity, by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it. In either event you may be sure the forces north of you will prevent his turning on you alone."

² Sherman's Report.



BUILDING THE RAILROAD NEAR RESACA.

covering Resaca on the west. In the mean time Polk had reached Johnston with Loring's division. Polk, Hardee, and Hood were now the corps commanders of the Confederate Army of Tennessee.

Dalton, evacuated by the enemy, was immediately occupied by Howard, who pressed on in pursuit. Sherman's columns, following upon each other's heels through Snake Creek Gap, had the advantage of Johnston in point of time. But this was counterbalanced by the more practicable and shorter route taken by the Confederates. On the 12th Sherman moved upon Resaca, McPherson on the direct road, preceded, as in his former advance, by Kilpatrick's cavalry; Thomas closed in upon McPherson's left, and Schofield upon the left of Thomas. But it was not until the 14th that Sherman was prepared to attack, and by that time he was confronted by the whole force of the enemy, who occupied the forts of Resaca behind Camp Creek, Polk's left resting on the Oostenaula, Hardee holding the centre, and Hood the right, extending northeastwardly around Resaca to the Connesauga. Loring's division, added to those already at Resaca under Hood, had on the 13th delayed Sherman's advance, thus giving time for the disposition of Hardee's and Polk's troops, then just arriving. Johnston's foresight and promptness had saved his army.¹

Sherman now repeated against Resaca the strategic movement which had forced the enemy from Dalton; but there was this difference, that he now proceeded to threaten the enemy's communications with a lighter column, keeping almost his entire army in the enemy's front. General Sweeny's division of the Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) crossed the Oostenaula by pontoons at Lay's Ferry and threatened Calhoun, and Garrard's cavalry division moved from its position at Villanow across the same river lower down, to destroy the railroad between Calhoun and Kingston. While these movements were in progress, Sherman attacked Johnston at Resaca, pressing him at all points during the afternoon of May 14th. Thomas, in the centre, pressed through Camp Creek Valley, sending Hooker across the creek. On the right and centre, however, the enemy successfully resisted Schofield and Thomas, and at nightfall Hood advanced from his intrenchments, and recovered a portion of the ground which the Federals had gained in the morning. McPherson's attack on Polk was more successful, the latter being driven from his position, which, commanding the Confederate bridges across the river, was immediately occupied with Federal artillery. Johnston had already given orders to Hood to attack the next morning, when he was informed of the movement by Sweeny menacing Calhoun, and of Polk's misfortune. He countermanded the orders, and sent Walker's division to Calhoun. The next day there was skirmishing along the entire front, developing on Hood's line into a severe battle in the afternoon. It appears that Walker had reported no movement on Calhoun, and Hood had been again ordered to attack, but that when the latter was prepared to do so, intelligence was received by Johnston indicating that the Federal right was crossing the river in his rear, and the order to attack was again countermanded. One of Hood's divisions—A. P. Stewart's—not being aware of this, attacked Schofield by this time had closed down upon Hood's right, and Hooker, advancing, drove the enemy from several hills, capturing four guns and many prisoners. That night Johnston abandoned Resaca, and, crossing the Oostenaula southward, burned the railroad bridge behind him. Sherman's troops entered on the morning of the 16th just in time to save the turnpike bridge, and the whole army started in pursuit, Schofield moving by blind roads to the left, Thomas in Johnston's immediate rear, and McPherson by Lay's Ferry. In the operations around Resaca the Federal loss was between 4000 and 5000 killed and wounded. At Resaca Sherman reported to Grant that he had 1000 prisoners and eight guns.

General Sherman was now entering upon the third stage of the campaign. Johnston retreated to Cassville, four miles north of Kingston.² At Calhoun on the 16th, Hardee, bringing up the Confederate rear, skirmished with Howard's column. At Adairsville, farther south, there was a fight between Polk's cavalry, under Jackson, and the advance of Thomas's army, under General Newton. Polk and Hood, on the 18th, took the road from Adairsville to Cassville, while Hardee took that to Kingston. Sherman's left and centre had been delayed, Thomas having to build additional bridges across the Oostenaula, and Schofield making a detour across the two tributaries of that river—the Connesauga and Coosawattie. On the 17th the three Federal armies moved southward by different roads, and the division of Jeff. C. Davis meanwhile marched westwardly to Rome, where, meeting no resistance, it captured eight or ten heavy guns, together with some valuable mills and founderies.

On the 19th it appeared as if the enemy would make a stand at Cassville. French's division, of Polk's command, had arrived from the south, and Johnston, intrenched upon a ridge in the rear of the town, confidently ordered an advance against Thomas, who was moving southward from Adairsville. Hood, on the right, moved two miles in execution of this order, but, being deceived by the report that a Federal column was marching from

¹ "Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the 14th of May we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, and his right on some chestnut hills to the north of the town."—*Sherman's Report*.

² Johnston thus explains his continued retreat: "The fact that a part of Polk's troops were still in the rear, and the great numerical superiority of the Federal army, made it expedient to risk battle only when position or some blunder of the enemy might give us counterbalancing advantages. I therefore determined to fall back slowly until circumstances should put the chances of battle in our favor, keeping so near the United States army as to prevent its sending re-enforcements to Grant; and hoping, by taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. I also expected it to be materially reduced before the end of June by the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments which had not re-enlisted."



SHERMAN'S ARMY ENTERING RESACA.

Canton to the rear and right of Cassville, he withdrew his troops to resist the approach of this fictitious column. The Federal army in the mean while concentrated about Cassville, and attacked Johnston's intrenched position with artillery. On the evening of the 19th the Confederate commanders differed as to the policy which ought now to be adopted. Hood and Polk thought that the Federal artillery would render the position untenable on the morrow, and urged immediate retreat across the Etowah River. Hardee, whose position Johnston thought much weaker than Polk's or Hood's, was still confident of his ability to hold it. Johnston inclined to Hardee's opinion, but the other commanders "were so earnest and unwilling to depend upon the ability of their corps to hold the ground," that retreat was determined upon, and on the 20th the Confederate army crossed the Etowah—"a step," reports Johnston, "which I have regretted ever since." This movement, without a battle, abandoned the whole of Etowah Valley to the Federal army. Here Sherman gave his troops rest, while supplies could be brought forward for the next stage of the campaign.

But the period of rest was brief. On the 23d of May, taking supplies in its trains for twenty days, and leaving a garrison at Rome and Kingston, Sherman's army crossed the Etowah. Satisfied that Johnston would attempt to hold Allatoona Pass, just south of the river, the Federal commander did not attempt even a demonstration against that position, but leaving the railroad, moved to the right for Dallas, southwest of Allatoona. Johnston, who had not stopped at Allatoona, but continued his retreat to the range of hills north of and covering Dallas and Marietta, detected Sherman's whole plan from the start, and concentrated his army near New Hope Church, where three roads met—from Ackworth on the north, Dallas on the southwest, and Marietta on the east. Hood's corps was posted with its centre at the church, while Polk and Hardee extended the line eastward across the Atlanta Road. Sherman's army, after crossing the Etowah, moved in three columns in the accustomed order—Schofield on the left, Thomas in the centre, and McPherson on the right. McPherson, crossing the Etowah near Kingston, joined by Davis's division from Rome, was ordered to move *via* Van Wert to a point south of Dallas. Thomas advanced *via* Euharley and Burnt Hickory, and Schofield by the road from Cassville.

Thomas's advance, under Hooker, approached New Hope Church on the 25th, and encountered the enemy's cavalry. Geary's division skirmished up to the Confederate line held by Hood, and Hooker's other divisions being well in hand by 4 P.M., Sherman ordered a bold push to be made for the cross-roads. A severe battle was fought in this position, Stewart's division by night being finally driven back to the church, but still retaining the main position. Sherman now occupied several days in deploying up to the enemy's well-intrenched lines, which extended from New Hope Church to a point north of Marietta. McPherson was pushed close up to Dallas, Thomas still confronted Hood, and Schofield was ordered to move around to the left, in order to reach and turn Johnston's right flank. Garrard's cavalry operated with McPherson, and Stoneman's with Schofield, McCook's guarding the Federal rear. The movement of the whole army was now gradually to the left, proceeding slowly over difficult, densely-wooded ground. In the course of this development there were several sharp encounters with the en-

emy, the results of which sometimes favored one side and sometimes the other. On the 27th Howard's corps assailed Cleburne's division, and was repulsed, Johnston reports, "with great slaughter."¹ In this action, and the battle of New Hope Church, Johnston estimates his own loss as 900, and that of Sherman as 6000. On the 28th the enemy attacked McPherson while the latter was on the point of closing up on Thomas. "Fortunately," says Sherman, "our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse." The enemy's loss in this attack was nearly 3000, and McPherson's not more than one tenth of that number. There were ten days of this undecisive work (May 25th-June 4th), when Sherman determined to leave Johnston in his intrenchments, and move eastward to Ackworth, on the railroad.² The roads leading back to Ackworth and Allatoona Pass were now in his possession, and he had rebuilt the railroad bridge across the Etowah and occupied the pass with his cavalry. When, on the 6th of June, he had established himself at Ackworth, he fortified and garrisoned Allatoona Pass, making it a secondary base of supplies.

Johnston, adapting his movements to those of Sherman, transferred his whole army to a point on the railroad north of Marietta, where Kenesaw on his right, Pine Mountain in the advanced centre, and Lost Mountain on his left, interposed a natural barrier to a direct approach from the north.³ While the Confederate army was intrenching itself in this formidable position, Sherman repaired the railroad in his rear, and brought forward to his camp an abundant supply of provisions. He also received re-enforcements. General Blair, with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps (10,500 men)


¹ Howard reports his loss as "very heavy, being upward of 1400 killed, wounded, and missing in General Wood's division alone." He adds, "Though the assault was repulsed, yet a position was secured near Pickett's Mills of the greatest importance to the subsequent movement of the army, and it has been subsequently ascertained that the enemy suffered immensely in the action, and regarded it as the severest attack made during the eventful campaign."

² Sherman writes to General Halleck, Grant's chief of staff, from "Near Dallas," May 28: "The enemy discovered my move to turn Allatoona, and moved to meet us here. Our columns met about one mile east of Pumpkin-vine Creek, and we pushed them back about three miles, to the point [New Hope Church] where the road forks to Allatoona and Marietta. Here Johnston has chosen a strong line, and made hasty but strong parapets of timber and earth, and has thus far stopped us. My right is Dallas, centre about three miles north, and I am gradually working round by the left to approach the railroad any where in front of Ackworth. Country very densely wooded and broken; no roads of any consequence. We have had many sharp, severe encounters, but nothing decisive. Both sides duly cautious in the obscurity of the ambushed ground."

In a letter to Halleck, May 29, he thus alludes to the enemy's attack on McPherson the day before:

"With the intention of working to my left toward the railroad east of Allatoona, I ordered General McPherson . . . to withdraw his army and take General Thomas's present position, while all of General Thomas's and General Schofield's armies will be moved farther to the east, working round the enemy to the left. The enemy, who had observed, etc., . . . massed against General McPherson and attacked him at 4½ P.M. yesterday, but was repulsed with great slaughter and at little cost to us. The enemy fled back to his breastworks on the ridge, leaving in our hands his dead and wounded. His loss, 2500, and about 300 prisoners. General McPherson's men being covered by log breastworks, like our old Corinth lines, were comparatively unhurt, his loss not being over 300 in all."

³ "Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in another peak called Brusby Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain, and beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain form a triangle—Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base—covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending."—*Sherman's Report.*



LOST MOUNTAIN AT SUNRISE.

that had been on furlough, and Colonel Long's brigade of cavalry, arrived at Ackworth June 8th. This accession supplied the gaps which had been made in the original army by losses in battle and the detachments from garrison at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona Pass.¹ On the 9th the army moved to Big Shanty, a station on the railroad midway between Ackworth and Kenesaw. A triangular mountain fortress, of nature's construction, here confronted Sherman. Even war could not quench in Sherman his love of nature, nor interrupt "communion with her visible forms." "The scene," he says, "was enchanting—too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it." Just beyond the Chattahoochee lay Atlanta—the object of the campaign.

While waiting before Kenesaw, Sherman received intelligence from General S. G. Burbridge, who had been left in command of the forces in Kentucky, that the Confederate General Morgan had entered that state through Pound Gap, June 4; that on the 9th he had been brought to battle and defeated with a loss of 600 prisoners; that on the 12th he had been again defeated, losing 500 killed and 400 prisoners, besides the wounded; and that his forces were scattered, demoralized, and being "pursued and picked up in every direction." Here also Sherman heard of Sturgis's defeat by Forrest, narrated in a previous chapter, and ordered a second expedition against Forrest to proceed immediately from Memphis.

Sherman paused for a brief moment and carefully scrutinized the Confederate position. He found that the enemy's line extended two miles in length, "more than he could hold with his force."² He had moved his armies close up by the 11th, McPherson on the left of the railroad toward Marietta, Schofield away to the right against Lost Mountain, and the larger army, under Thomas, confronting Pine and Kenesaw Mountains. It was

Sherman's object to break the line between Pine and Kenesaw. Flank movements, at this distance from his base, were too serious affairs to be attempted until they were plainly seen to be necessary. For more than 20 days Sherman tried the enemy's lines in front by cannonade, skirmish, and assault. On the 14th of June, General Polk, commanding the Confederate centre on Pine Mountain, four miles southwest of Kenesaw, was killed by a cannon-ball,¹ and was succeeded by General Loring, who immediately withdrew from his advanced position, and on the 19th Johnston's line was contracted, abandoning Pine and Lost Mountains. Hood's right rested on the Marietta Road, Loring held the centre, now transferred to Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee extended across the Lost Mountain and Marietta Road on the left. A division of militia had in the mean time been sent to Johnston by Governor Brown. This division, commanded by General Gustavus W. Smith, was employed to guard the crossings of the Chattahoochee, to prevent the surprise of Atlanta by Federal cavalry. "The whole country," Sherman (June 23) writes to Halleck, "is one vast fort, and Johnston must have fully 50 miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries."

Sherman pressed on through the forests and difficult ravines, and finally came upon the enemy's new position, of which Kenesaw was the salient, Hood thrown back to cover Marietta, and Hardee to cover the railroad to the Chattahoochee. During these operations the weather, according to Sherman's report, "was villainously bad." Rain fell almost without pause for three weeks, making mud gullies of the narrow roads, and preventing a gen-

¹ "It was on the afternoon of June 14th that Johnston, Hardee, and Polk rode out from their quarters to make some telescopic observations of the Federal position. At the time there was a brisk artillery fire going on between the two armies, but no engagement of the infantry. The generals, dismounting, walked to the front, where some of the enemy's artillerists, observing the party, fired. Their aim was too successful. One of the projectiles struck General Polk on the left arm, about the elbow, passed through his body, considerably mangling it, and carried off the right arm. He died on the spot, and his remains were immediately taken to Marietta, and thence to Atlanta, where funeral services were performed on the 15th."—*Southern Generals*, p. 419.


² The losses in Sherman's command during the month of May are not stated in his report. Thomas reports his own loss during this time as 8774. ² *Sherman's Report*.



CREST OF PINE MOUNTAIN, WHERE GENERAL POLK FELL.



VIEW OF KENESAW FROM LITTLE KENESAW.



MAP OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

eral movement; but the Federal lines with every opportunity were advanced closer to the enemy. It will be seen that Sherman had not accomplished his purpose of penetrating the Confederate line, but had only thrown it in upon itself, contracting and strengthening it. Johnston had seen the mistake of his original position, and had corrected it in time to prevent disaster. On the 21st Hood was shifted to Hardee's left, while at the same time Sherman was developing his right flank southward of Kenesaw. The next day, Hooker, having advanced his line, with Schofield on his right, was suddenly attacked by Hood near the Kulp House, southwest of Marietta. Hood appears to have gained some advantage at first, falling thus unexpectedly upon Williams's division of Hooker's corps and Hascall's of Schofield's, and driving them back; but he was checked upon reaching the main line, and himself driven back in confusion, leaving behind his dead, wounded, and many prisoners.¹

Sherman now determined to assault Kenesaw. It was a bold and Sherman-like thing to do, and certainly failure could not have been reckoned in-

evitable.¹ The order was given on the 24th, and executed on the 27th. Two points were selected on the enemy's left centre—one at Little Kenesaw, in McPherson's front, the other a mile farther south, in front of Thomas. On the appointed day, after a vigorous cannonade, the armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland leaped forward to their terrible work, their assault falling mainly on Loring's and Hardee's corps. With a loss of less than 500 men the Confederate position was maintained, and McPherson and Thomas were completely repulsed, losing altogether 3000 men, including General Harker, Colonel Dan. McCook, Colonel Rice, and other valuable officers. Success in this assault would have been decisive of the campaign; it would have cut the enemy in two, prevented his retreat, and exposed him to defeat in detail. But the assault was not a success.² Sherman gives the following explanation of his reasons for making this assault:

"Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault or turn the enemy's position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And

¹ General Thomas gives the following account of this affair:
"Williams's division of Hooker's corps skirmished itself into a position on the right of Geary's division, the right of Williams resting at Kulp's House, on the Powder Spring and Marietta Road. About 4 P. M. the enemy, in heavy force, attacked Knipe's brigade in its advanced position, before his men had time to throw up any works, and persisted in the assault until sundown, when they withdrew, their ranks hopelessly broken, each assault having been repelled with heavy loss."

¹ Perhaps the explanation of Sherman's hope of success is to be found in his dispatch to Halleck, June 25th, which says: "I shall aim to make him [Johnston] stretch his line until he weakens it, and then break through."

² General Harker commanded a brigade of Newton's division of Howard's (Fourth) corps. He led one column of the assault in Howard's front, and Wagner another. Palmer's (Fourteenth) corps at the same time assaulted on Howard's right. In regard to the result, Howard reports: "My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, can not be carried by direct assault; the exceptions are when some one of the above conditions are wanting, or where the defenders are taken by surprise. The strength of such a line is of course increased by well-arranged batteries. Notwithstanding the probabilities against success, it is sometimes necessary to assault strong works, as has occurred in several instances during this campaign."


Colonels Dan. McCook and T. J. Mitchell (commanding brigades of Jeff. C. Davis's division) led the assaulting columns of Palmer's corps. McCook fell, dangerously wounded, and subsequently died at his home in Ohio.



CHARLES G. HARKER.



DANIEL MCCOOK.



HOWARD'S CORPS CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE

I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would *not* assault fortified lines. All looked to me to out-flank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan that promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breastworks. . . . Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim that it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them."¹

After this repulse there was but one resource left—another flank movement. On the night of July 2d, McPherson, in front of Kenesaw, was relieved by Garrard's cavalry, and thrown around the right of the army, with instructions to advance to Nickajack Creek, and threaten Turner's Ferry, where the railroad in Johnston's rear crossed the Chattahoochee. The Confederate commander at once saw the meaning of this movement, and on the morning of the 3d Thomas found no enemy in his front. A view of the Federal skirmishers on the top of Kenesaw was the first sight which greeted Sherman's eyes at daybreak. Thomas moved forward in pursuit by the railroad, and at 8 30 A.M. Sherman in person entered Marietta just as the enemy's cavalry left the place. He hoped to strike the enemy in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee. Drawing Logan from McPherson's column to Marietta, the remainder of the Army of the Tennessee, with that of the Ohio, were ordered to cross the Nickajack, and attack the enemy in flank and rear.² Johnston, however, had covered his movement with great care, having constructed a strong *tête de pont* at the Chattahoochee, opposing also an advanced intrenched line at the Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles south of Marietta, his flanks resting behind Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. On the 5th of July this advanced position was abandoned on account of Sherman's threatening movements toward Turner's Ferry. Logan had been returned to McPherson, and Thomas was moving on Smyrna, when the enemy fell back to his *tête de pont*. The Confederate cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee, Wheeler observing the river for twenty miles above, and Jackson for the same distance below. There was skirmishing between the two armies until the 9th, Thomas's and McPherson's commands touching the river above and below the enemy, with Schofield's in reserve. While these operations were going on, Schofield had been withdrawn to Smyrna, and sent across the Chattahoochee at the mouth of Soap Creek (July 7th). This movement was successfully accomplished, Schofield surprising the Confederate guard, capturing a gun, laying a pontoon bridge across the river, and establishing himself on commanding ground on the east bank. At the same time Garrard's cavalry moved to Rosswell, farther up the river, where he destroyed the factories which had for years supplied cloth to the Confederate armies. A facetious owner of one of these mills, intent upon having his joke, even if he lost his factory, displayed a French flag above the building.³ Having destroyed these works, Garrard secured a shallow ford, and held it until the arrival of an infantry division from Thomas's army. McPherson's whole army was soon transferred to this quarter from the Nickajack. Howard's corps, of Thomas's army, had also built a bridge at Powers's Ferry, two miles below the mouth of Soap Creek, crossed over and occupied a position on Schofield's right. These movements, securing three points of crossing the Chattahoochee above the enemy, and also a position on the east bank, from which good roads ran to Atlanta, threatened to leave Johnston at his *tête de pont* at Turner's Ferry, and turning his flank, to bring Sherman's army into Atlanta forthwith. Johnston, seeing this, followed his cavalry across the Chattahoochee on the night of the 9th, and took up a position on Peach-tree Creek and the river below,

¹ Sherman gives a similar explanation to Halleck shortly after the assault. He says: "The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it. The enemy, and our own army and officers, had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind any thing like a parapet, why, every body would deploy, throw up counter works, and take it easy, leaving it to the 'old man' [meaning Sherman] to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one fourth more vigor (mathematically), I would have put the head of George Thomas's whole army right through Johnston's deployed line, on the best ground for 'go ahead,' while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck so early, the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle would have all been in our favor, on account of our superiority in numbers and initiative."


As to the possibility of success if Harker and McCook had not fallen, General Thomas is the original authority. He reports to Sherman just after the assault: "Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks, and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the enemy from his works."

² "If you ever worked in your life," writes Sherman to McPherson on the evening of July 3, "work at daybreak to-morrow on the flank, crossing Nickajack somehow, and the moment you discover confusion pour in your fire. You know what a retreating mass across pontoon bridges means. Feel strong to-night, and make feints of pursuit with artillery. I know Johnston's withdrawal is not strategic, but for good reasons after he crosses the Chattahoochee; but his situation with that river behind him is not comfortable at all. . . . I don't confine you to any crossing, but press the enemy all the time in flank till he is across the Chattahoochee."

To Thomas, at the same time, he writes:

"The more I reflect, the more I know Johnston's halt is to save time to cross his material and men. No general such as he would invite battle with the Chattahoochee behind him. I have ordered McPherson and Schofield, at any cost, and work night and day, to get the enemy started in confusion toward his bridges. I know you appreciate the situation. We will never have such a chance again, and I want you to impress on Hooker, Howard, and Palmer the importance of the most intense energy of attack to-night and in the morning, and to press with vehemence, at any cost of life and material. Every inch of his line should be felt, and the moment there is a give, pursuit should be made by day with lines, and by night with a single head of column and section of artillery to each corps following a road. Hooker should communicate with McPherson by a circuit if necessary, and act in concert. You know what loss would ensue to Johnston if he crosses his bridges at night in confusion, with artillery thundering at random on his rear."

³ This joke might easily have cost the perpetrator his life. Sherman writes to Garrard, July 7: "I will see as to any man in America hoisting the French flag, and then devoting his labor and capital to supplying armies in open hostility to our government, and claiming the benefit of his neutral flag. Should you, under the impulse of anger, natural at contemplating such perfidy, hang the wretch, I approve the act beforehand." He adds: "I repeat my orders that you arrest all people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor, and let them foot it, under guard, to Marietta, whence I will send them by cars to the North. . . . The poor women will make a howl. Let them take along their children and clothing, providing they have the means of hauling, or you can spare them. We will retain them until they can reach a country where they can live in peace and security."



VIEW OF ATLANTA FROM THE SIGNAL STATION NORTH OF THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.

covering Atlanta. Thus was abandoned to Sherman all of Georgia between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochee Rivers. In the pursuit of Johnston to the Chattahoochee, 2000 prisoners were taken.

And here let us halt to review what has already been accomplished in the two months since Sherman opened the attack upon Johnston at Buzzard's Roost. Johnston had been *driven* south of the Chattahoochee; he had not retreated from strategic motives, though his retreat had been conducted with so great skill and so little waste of force that it places him in the foremost rank of Confederate generals. No great battle had been fought in the campaign, which had been a series of sieges. Assaults there had been on both sides, and in these the loss had been severe, falling mainly upon the assailants. Johnston's losses altogether had been, according to his own report, about 10,000 in killed and wounded, and 4700 from other causes. This does not include deserters, which probably numbered 2500 at the lowest, thus bringing the total loss to about 20,000. This loss had been just about covered by re-enforcements. Sherman's losses it is difficult to estimate exactly. In the Army of the Cumberland the casualties for May and June amounted to 14,521, as reported by General Thomas. Supposing the loss in McPherson's and Schofield's commands to have been in proportion, we have a total of 25,000 for the casualties of battle. These losses, and others from sickness and detachment of troops for garrison, had been made up for by re-enforcements, so that the two armies, in respect of numbers, were now nearly the same as at the opening of the campaign. In the first stage of his advance, Sherman had it in his power to compel Johnston to fight a battle upon conditions which involved the destruction of the Confederate army. It is wonderful that Johnston should have left Snake Creek Gap unguarded, but it is still more wonderful that, once having gained access through this pass to the enemy's rear, McPherson did not appreciate his advantage, and push it to the utmost. If he had done so, and had been promptly supported, Johnston's army must have been ground to powder. No such opportunity again offered. But, notwithstanding this disappointment, the fact that Johnston could hold no position north of the Chattahoochee was really a conclusive argument that he could not hold Atlanta. Sherman's sole weakness was his long line of communications; but this was so well protected that, although Johnston, after crossing the Etowah, had sent five successive detachments of cavalry to destroy it, none of these had succeeded.

Sherman's army was now within sight of Atlanta, only eight miles intervening. Atlanta is the centre of the entire network of railroads in Georgia. From it start three railway lines of communication. The road running north to Chattanooga was occupied in its entire length by Sherman. Eastward, through Decatur, another road runs to Augusta, and thence to Charleston. The road running south divides into two branches at East Point, six miles from Atlanta; one running southeastwardly through Macon to Savannah, the other southwestwardly through West Point and Opelika to Montgom-

ery, and thence with slight interruption to Pensacola. To destroy this latter or West Point Road, an expedition had been prepared, and General Rousseau had been assigned to its command. As early as the 10th of April, General Sherman, believing that Johnston would finally fall back beyond the Chattahoochee, had had this raid in view. The time for its operation had now come. On the 10th of July, when it was ascertained that Johnston had crossed the river, Rousseau started from Decatur, Alabama, with 2500 cavalry and two pieces of artillery.¹ No time more favorable could have been selected for the expedition. A. J. Smith was occupying Forrest's cavalry in Mississippi; expeditions were out inland from Vicksburg and Baton Rouge, and Canby was understood to be threatening Mobile. Rousseau's force consisted of the following cavalry regiments—the Fifth Indiana, Fifth Iowa, Second Kentucky, Fourth Tennessee, and Ninth Ohio. The party possessed 1000 Spencer repeating-rifles. At the crossing of Coosa River, on the 13th, a ferry-boat was captured, and a part of the command having crossed and effected a lodgment on the south bank, it was attacked by General Clanton with two regiments of Alabama cavalry. This Confederate detachment was routed after a few hours' skirmishing by an attack in flank, and Rousseau proceeded to Talladega on the railroad to Selma. Here a camp of about 700 conscripts was dispersed. The West Point Railroad was first struck at Chehaw Station, where the enemy was again encountered under Clanton, but was obliged to retire after a loss of 40 killed and a large number of

¹ The following instructions to Rousseau were dispatched by Sherman June 30th:


"The movement that I want you to study and be prepared for is contingent on the fact that General A. J. Smith defeats Forrest, or holds him well in check, and after I succeed in making Joe Johnston pass the Chattahoochee with his army, when I want you to go in person, or to send some good officer, with 2500 good cavalry well armed, and a sufficient number of pack-mules loaded with ammunition, salt, sugar, and coffee, and some bread or flour, depending on the country for forage, meat, and corn-meal. The party might take two light Rodman guns, with orders, in case of very rapid movements, to cut the wheels and burn the carriages, taking sledges along to break off trunnions and wedge them into the muzzles. The expedition should start from Decatur [Alabama], move slowly to Blountsville and Ashville, and, if the way is clear, cross the Coosa at the Ten Islands, or the railroad bridge, destroying it after their passage, then move rapidly for Talladega or Oxford, and then to the nearest ford or bridge over the Tallapoosa. That passed, the expedition should move with rapidity on the railroad between Tuskegee and Opelika, breaking up the road and twisting the bars of iron. They should work on that road night and day, doing all the damage possible, toward and including Opelika. If no serious opposition offer, they should threaten Columbus, Georgia, and then turn up the Chattahoochee to join us between Marietta and Atlanta, doing all the mischief possible. No infantry in position should be attacked, and the party should avoid all fighting possible, bearing in mind, for their own safety, that Pensacola, Rome, the Etowah, and my army are all places of refuge. If compelled to make Pensacola, they should leave their horses, embark for New Orleans, and come round to Nashville. Study this well, and be prepared to act on orders when the time comes. Selma, though important, is more easily defended than the route I have named."

On July 2d the following dispatch was sent to Rousseau:

"Now is the time for the raid to Opelika. . . . Forrest is in Mississippi, and Roddy has also gone there. All other rebel cavalry is here."

On July 6th the order was repeated as follows:

"That cavalry expedition must now be off, and must proceed with the utmost energy and confidence. Every thing here is favorable, and I have official information that General A. J. Smith is out from Memphis with force enough to give Forrest full occupation. Expeditions inland are also out from Vicksburg and Baton Rouge, as well as against Mobile. If managed with rapidity, the expedition can not fail of success, and will accomplish much good."



wounded. At Opelika a large quantity of stores was captured, and the railroad was obliterated. From this point, on the 19th, Rousseau began to return to Marietta, where he arrived by way of Carrollton and Villa Rica on the 22d. He had destroyed 30 miles of the railroad toward Montgomery, three miles toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. His entire loss had been 12 killed and 30 wounded. He brought in 400 mules and 300 horses.

After having collected an abundant supply of stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, and strengthened the railroad guards and garrisons in the rear, General Sherman, on the 17th, crossed the Chattahoochee, a matter of no small difficulty, effected, as it was, in the face of an army 50,000 strong. Schofield was already across in an impregnable position, and was ordered to New Cross Keys. Thomas crossed at Powers's and Paice's Ferries, and was to move by way of Buckhead; and McPherson was instructed to move straight from Rosswell to a point east of Decatur on the Augusta Railroad. Garrard's cavalry acted with McPherson, while Stoneman and McCook watched the rivers and roads below the railway.

At this most critical stage of the campaign, General Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, was relieved of his command. He received at 10 o'clock P.M. on the 17th a telegram from Secretary Seddon, the purport of which was that, as he had failed to arrest the Federal approach to the vicinity of Atlanta, and had expressed no confidence in his ability to defeat or repulse General Sherman, he would immediately turn the army over to General Hood.¹ Johnston, at Hood's request, continued to give orders until

¹ "Besides the causes of my removal alleged in the telegram announcing it," reports General Johnston, "various other accusations have been made against me—some published in newspapers in such a manner as to appear to have official authority, and others circulated orally in Georgia and Alabama, and imputed to General Bragg. The principal are, that I persistently disregarded the instructions of the President; that I would not fight the enemy; that I refused to defend Atlanta; that I refused to communicate with General Bragg in relation to the operations of the army; that I disregarded his entreaties to change my course and attack the enemy; and gross exaggerations of the losses of the army."

"I had not the advantage of receiving the President's instructions in relation to the manner of conducting the campaign. But as the conduct of my predecessor, in retreating before odds less than those confronting me, has apparently been approved; and as General Lee, in keeping on the defensive and retreating toward Grant's objective point, under circumstances like mine, was adding to his great fame, both in the estimation of the administration and people, I supposed that my course would not be censured. I believed then, as I do now, that it was the only one at my command which promised success."

"I think that the foregoing narrative shows that the Army of Tennessee did fight, and with at least as much effect as it has ever done before."

"The proofs that I intended to hold Atlanta are the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defenses was going on vigorously, the communication on the subject made by me to General Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town. That the public workshops were removed and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by General Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated the intention to abandon the place than the sending the wagons of an army to the rear on a day of battle proves a foregone determination to abandon the field."

"While General Bragg was at Atlanta, about the middle of July, we had no other conversation concerning the army there than such as I introduced. He asked me no questions regarding its operations, past or future; made no comments upon them nor suggestions, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that Atlanta would not be defended. He told me that the object of his journey was to confer with Lieutenant General Lee, and communicate with General E. K. Smith in relation to re-enforcements for me. He talked much more of affairs in Virginia than in Georgia, asserting, what I believed, that Sherman's army outnumbered Grant's, and impressed me with the belief that his visits to me were unofficial."

And here it is proper to consider General Hood's estimate of the Atlanta campaign. In the first place, he estimates General Johnston's effective force on the 6th of May, 1864, as 70,000 men. For this statement there is no authority whatsoever. "The South," he says, "had been denuded of troops to fill the strength of the Army of the Tennessee. Mississippi and Alabama were without military support, and looked for protection in decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia." Here again Hood is belied by all testimony. Forrest, whose assistance Johnston asked for, was kept in Mississippi by orders from Richmond, and not permitted to attack Sherman's communications. Besides putting Johnston's force nearly 20,000 higher than it really was, Hood says that "re-enforcements were within supporting distance." These re-enforcements were absolutely refused in a defensive campaign on Johnston's part, and no other campaign was possible.

Hood then goes on to reprimand Johnston's retreat. "In such condition," he says, "was that splendid army when the active campaign fairly opened. The enemy, but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, commenced his advance. The Confederate forces, whose faces and hopes were to the north, almost simultaneously commenced to retreat. They soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of mountains running across the line of march, and deep rivers, are stands from which a well-directed army is not easily driven or turned. At each advance of the enemy, the Confederate army, without serious resistance, fell back to the next range or river in the rear. The habit to retreat soon became a routine of the army, and was substituted for the hope and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one column to menace in front and one to threaten in rear. The usual order to retreat,

the afternoon of the 18th, placing his troops on the position which he had selected near Peach-tree Creek. He also fully explained to Hood the plans

not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. Those retreats were always at night. The day was consumed in hard labor. Daily temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to fight. The men became travelers by night and laborers by day. They were ceasing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for seventy-four days and nights, that noble army, which, if ordered to resist, no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from a battle-field, continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, and their flag waving only in retreat or in partial engagements. At the end of that time, after descending from the mountains, where the last advantage of position was abandoned, and camping without fortifications on the open plains of Georgia, the army had lost 22,750 of its best soldiers. Nearly one third was gone, no general battle fought, much of our state abandoned, two others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command, by loss of officers, men, and tone, seriously diminished. These things were the inevitable result of the strategy adopted. It is impossible for a large army to retreat in the face of a pursuing enemy without such a fate. In a retreat the losses are constant and permanent. Stragglers are overtaken, the fatigued fall by the wayside, and are gathered by the advancing enemy. Every position by the rear-guard, if taken, yields its wounded to the victors. The soldiers, always awakened from rest at night to continue the retreat, leave many of their comrades asleep in trenches. This is the time for desertion. The losses of a single day are not large. Those of seventy-four (74) days will embrace the strength of an army. If a battle be fought and the field held at the close, however great the slaughter, the loss will be less than to retreat in the face of an enemy. There will be no stragglers. Desertions are in retreat, rarely, if ever, on the field of battle. The wounded are gathered to the rear, and soon recover, and in a few weeks the entire loss consists only of the killed and permanently disabled, which is not one fifth of the apparent loss on the night of the battle. The enemy is checked, his plans deranged, territory saved, the campaign suspended or won. If a retreat still be necessary, it can then be done with no enemy pressing and no loss following. The advancing party loses nothing but its killed and permanently disabled. Neither stragglers nor deserters thin its ranks. It reaches the end of its march stronger for battle than when it started. The army commanded by General Sherman and that commanded by General Johnston, not greatly unequal at the commencement of the campaign, illustrate what I have written. General Sherman, in his official report, states that his forces when they entered Atlanta were nearly the same in number as when they left Dalton. The Army of Tennessee lost twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fifty (22,750) men, nearly one third of its strength. I have nothing to say of the statement of losses made by General Johnston in his official report, except to state that, by his own figures, he understates his losses some thousands; that he excludes the idea of any prisoners, although his previous official returns show more than seven thousand (7000) under the head of 'absent without leave;' and that the returns of the army while he was in command, corrected and increased by the records of the army which has not been fully reported to the government, and the return signed by me, but made up under him, as soon as I assumed command, show the losses of the Army of Tennessee to be what I have stated, and a careful examination of the returns with the army will show the losses to be more than stated."

Hood's own statements belie him. He says Johnston lost 22,750 men. He gives him at the outset 70,000. This would leave 47,250. The re-enforcements during this period amounted to nearly 20,000; so that Hood should have had about as fair a start as Johnston had had. But how does Hood estimate the force which he received from Johnston? He says: "Its effective strength was, infantry, 33,750; artillery, 3500; cavalry, 10,000; with 1500 Georgia militia . . . making a total of 47,250 men." This is sufficient reason for doubting the reliability of General Hood's estimates. For, by his calculation, Johnston had received only about 500 additional men since the commencement of the campaign. The official documents tell a different story.

And here let us submit the report made by Mr. Wigfall in the Confederate Senate, March 16, 1865:

"MR. PRESIDENT,—I return the Report of General Hood, with a recommendation from the Committee on Military Affairs that it be printed. I am instructed by the committee to say that this recommendation would not have been made had the House not already ordered it to be published. No action of the Senate can now keep the report from the public, however desirable it might be. Indeed, having been sent to both houses in open session by the President without any warning as to 'its tendency to induce controversy' or cause 'prejudice to the public service,' as in the case of General Johnston's Report, the damage was already done—if damage should result from its contents being made known. The official report of the Secretary of War at the beginning of this Congress contained an attack upon General Johnston. It was sent to us by the President in open session, and published by order of Congress. General Johnston's Report, which contained his defense against this attack, was asked for promptly, but was withheld for months. It was finally sent to us in secret session, with a protest against its publication. A report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee while under the command of General Hood is asked for, and we receive this paper in open session as soon as it can be copied. No word of warning as to its character is given."

"Much of it is but a repetition of the charges made by the late Secretary of War, and, if they can be sustained, it is manifest that our present disasters are not to be attributed to General Johnston's removal, but to his ever having been appointed. It follows, too, that he should not be continued in his present command. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine into the correctness of these charges. The Senate did not ask for a review of General Johnston's campaign, but for a report of the operations of the army while under the command of General Hood. Though uncalled for, it is before us and the people, and I propose to give it a fair and calm consideration."

"In reviewing the review, I shall refer to the official 'Field Returns' on file in the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, made and signed by Colonel Mason, A. A. G., and approved by General Johnston, and not to those with the army, revised and 'corrected,' which I have never seen. The field returns on file here are, or should be, duplicates of those with the army, which are made up from the returns of the corps commanders. Not having the honor of a personal acquaintance with Colonel Falconer, I do not know what reliance is to be placed on his corrections of official documents. I do know Colonel Mason and General Johnston, and I do not believe either capable of making a false or fraudulent return."

"General Hood, in his review, gives the effective total of General Johnston's army 'at and near Dalton' to be 70,000 on the 6th of May, 1864. These returns appear to have been made tri-monthly, on the 1st, 10th, and 20th of each month. The last official 'field return,' previously to the 6th of May, on file in the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, is of the 1st of May. It shows his effective total to be 40,913 infantry and artillery and 2974 cavalry, amounting in all to 43,887. This return shows, however, that two brigades of cavalry, under the command of General Johnston, were in the rear recruiting their horses, the effective total of which is not given. General Johnston, in his report, estimates his cavalry at this time at 'about 4000,' which would make the effective total of these brigades 1026, which, added to the 2974 'at Dalton,' makes the 4000. Estimating his cavalry there at 4000, it is obvious that from the official returns he had but 44,913 effective total 'at and near Dalton' on the 1st of May, the date of the last return before the 6th of that month. The official records show, then, that General Hood over-estimated General Johnston's forces 'at and near Dalton' by 25,087 men."

"If General Hood, by the term 'at or near Dalton,' refers to the forces after this date received by General Johnston from General Polk, he is again in error as to numbers. It was not till the 4th of May that General Polk was ordered to 'move with Loring's division and other available forces at your command, to Rome, Georgia, and thence unite with General Johnston.' On the 6th, the day on which General Hood says this army 'lay at and near Dalton, waiting the advance of the enemy,' General Polk telegraphs to General Cooper from Demopolis: 'My troops are concentrating and moving as directed.' On the 10th, at Rome, he telegraphs the President: 'The first of Loring's brigade arrived and sent forward to Resaca; the second just in; the third will arrive early to-morrow morning. * * * French's brigade was to leave Blue Mountain this morning. The others will follow in succession; Ferguson will be in supporting distance day after to-morrow; Jackson's division thirty-six hours after.' Yet General Hood asserts that four days before this the army was 'assembled' at and near Dalton, and 'within the easy direction of a single commander.' The last of these re-enforcements joined General Johnston at New Hope Church the 26th of May, nearly three weeks after they were alleged to be 'at and near Dalton,' and amounted to less than 19,000 men. If none was lost by sickness, desertion, or the casualties of battle, which is not probable, General Johnston had at New Hope about sixty-four thousand men on the 26th of May, instead of seventy thousand, at Dalton, on the 6th. A difference of six thousand; not very great, it is admitted, yet it shows General Hood to be not quite accurate in his estimates."

"General Hood asserts that General Johnston lost twenty-two thousand seven hundred men in his retreat, and offers to prove that by the record. At New Hope he had about sixty-four thousand men. The field returns of the 10th of July, the last made while the army was under his command, shows, at Atlanta, 40,656 infantry and artillery, and 10,276 cavalry—50,932—say 51,000. Deduct this from 64,000, and it leaves 13,000 loss in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, instead of 22,700, as alleged by General Hood. General Johnston does not give the losses of his cavalry for want of reports. He had 4000 at Dalton, and received 4000 (Polk's) at Adairsville on the 17th of May—8000. At Atlanta he had 10,276, showing that he had recruited his cavalry 2276 over and above his losses. Leaving out his cavalry, he had at Atlanta, 10th of July, 40,656 infantry and artillery. At New Hope he had, of all arms, 64,000. Of these, 8000 were cavalry, supposing it not to have increased by recruiting up to that time. That gives him 56,000 infantry and artillery. At Atlanta he had, of these arms, 40,656, which deduct from the 56,000, and it shows his losses to be, in infantry and artillery, 15,344."

upon which he had proposed to conduct the defense of Atlanta. In the first place, he had proposed to attack Sherman while crossing the creek, where success would be of the greatest advantage, since, in that event, both the creek and the river would intercept the Federal retreat. If he failed in this attack, his design had been to keep back the enemy by means of intrenchments constructed between the Marietta and Decatur Roads until the arrival of the state troops which had been promised by Governor Brown at the end of the month. These intrenchments he would line with the state militia which he already had, while with his main army he would attack Sherman in flank whenever the latter should approach Atlanta.

The Confederate army was now posted on high ground on the west bank of Peach-tree Creek, extending from Turner's Ferry to the Augusta Road. McPherson, on the 18th, reached a point seven miles east of Decatur, and, with Garrard's cavalry, broke up four miles of the road. Schofield the same day reached Decatur. On the 19th McPherson turned into Decatur, Schofield following a road to the right leading toward Atlanta, while Thomas, by numerous bridges, crossed Peach-tree Creek in the face of the enemy. Hood had disposed his troops so that Cheatham's (formerly Hood's) corps on the right would cut off Thomas from Schofield and McPherson. Hardee held the centre, and Stewart (commanding Polk's old corps) the left. These two

"Under repeated orders from the War Department, General Johnston had before this time sent off three regiments. Supposing them to average two hundred effective total, they would amount to six hundred each; deduct that amount from the 15,344, and it leaves but 14,744 total loss in killed, wounded, deserters, stragglers, and prisoners of his infantry and artillery. From this amount deduct 10,000 killed and wounded, and we have 4744 lost from all other causes in these arms. But it appears that the cavalry had increased 2276. Deduct this from the 4744, and his losses in all arms, except in killed and wounded, amount to but 2468.

"We have, then, a loss by desertion, and straggling, and prisoners of only some 2500 from the 'digging and retreating' policy. The demoralization of the army could not have been as great as General Hood supposes, or its losses from these causes would have been greater. The 'working by night and traveling by day' would seem, too, not to be a very bad policy where the army has confidence in its leader.

"General Hood asserts that a retreating army must lose more by straggling and desertion, if it does not fight, than it would in killed and wounded if it does. He attempts to show this by what he regards well-established principles, and not by figures. Napier differs from General Hood on this point. In discussing the losses of Massena from the Torres Vedras, he says: 'It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible.'

"General Hood also insists that the army at Atlanta was greatly demoralized by the loss of men and officers, and by constant falling back. I do not recollect any general officer, except General Polk, who was killed while Johnston was in command; there may have been others, but certainly not many. What were his losses in general officers from Atlanta to Nashville? His march from Jonesborough to the Tennessee line was a retreat, and from Nashville to Tupelo; yet he lost by desertion but 300, and left the army in fine spirits. The demoralization of Johnston's army can not be accounted for on this theory. But was it demoralized? It fought well when he first took command. His disasters around Atlanta are not attributed by him to a want of spirit in the men, but to incompetency in the officers. He could not have his orders executed. I incline to the opinion that he is mistaken as much as to his facts as he is in his theory.

"General Hood insinuates that General Johnston attempts to dodge an acknowledgment of his full losses by 'excluding the idea of prisoners,' and charges that his official returns show more than 7000 under the head of 'absent without leave.' This is a very grave charge against an officer and a gentleman. General Hood should know that the usual, if not only mode of stating the loss of prisoners is in a marginal note opposite the column of 'absent without leave.' It can never be other than an approximate estimate; for no general can know how many of his 'absent without leave,' after a battle, have gone voluntarily to the enemy, and how many have been captured. General Hood should know also that the absent and prisoners of an army are continued on its rolls from time to time, as the 'Field Returns' are made out, without reference to a change of commanders, and that it is very possible, therefore, that a part, or even the whole, of the 7000 prisoners may have been lost when the army was under the command of General Bragg. The rout at Missionary Ridge had occurred before General Johnston took command. This is a matter, however, which especially concerns General Hood. The field return of the 10th of July shows a loss of not quite 7000 prisoners (6994). Opposite General Hood's corps is this note: '238 officers and 4597 men, prisoners of war, are reported among the "absent without leave."' This shows that, out of not quite 7000 prisoners of war, nearly 5000 (4835) were captured from his corps. He knows whether they were lost by him under Johnston, or by some one else under Bragg. For the accuracy of the statement, he, and not General Johnston, is responsible. The returns of the army is only a consolidation of the returns of the corps commanders.

"But if there were 7000 prisoners taken during the retreat from Dalton, how does he account for the fact shown by the official returns that General Johnston had, at Atlanta, on the 10th of July, leaving out his killed and wounded, within 2500 men of the number put under his command previously? How can this excess of loss in prisoners over his total loss (except in killed and wounded) be explained? Upon no other hypothesis than that his army increased by recruiting more rapidly than it decreased by straggling and loss of prisoners. The morale of the army, then, could not have been very bad—at least not as bad as it is supposed by General Hood to have been. Nor could the people of the territory which General Johnston was 'abandoning' have lost all confidence in him. It must have been from them that his recruits were gathered.

"It is alleged that at Dalton 'the enemy was but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, and inferior in spirit and confidence.' The army which is described as 'inferior in spirit and confidence' to Johnston's was the one which had lately routed it at Missionary Ridge, under Bragg. An army flushed with victory is not usually wanting 'in spirit and confidence.' Did the presence of Johnston cause them to doubt their future success? What infused 'spirit and confidence' in the Army of Tennessee? Was it the consciousness that it, at last, had a commander who, careless of his own blood, was careful of that of his men, who knew when to take them under fire and how to bring them out, and whose thorough soldiery would save them from ever being uselessly slaughtered by being led to battle except when some good purpose was to be accomplished or some brilliant victory achieved? If the 'discipline and organization' of the army were as perfect as described, who produced it? For four months it had been under the control of Johnston. What evidence has General Hood to sustain his assertion that at Dalton the enemy was but little superior to us in numbers? He relies upon Sherman's statement that he was as strong at Atlanta as when the campaign opened. His army at Missionary Ridge was estimated at 80,000. He was afterward re-enforced by the army from Knoxville and the troops from North Alabama, besides others. Our scouts reported that he had been re-enforced with at least 30,000 men. General Sherman told General Govan, or said in his presence, that he had commenced the campaign with 110,000. I have never heard it estimated at less than 90,000 infantry and artillery. In July General Wheeler estimated it at between 65 and 70,000. The Northern papers, about that time, admitted his losses to be 45,000. His cavalry was estimated by General Wheeler at not less than 15,000. Johnston, in the mean time, under orders of the War Department, sent off two brigades and received one.

"General Hood charges that General Johnston did not intend to hold Atlanta. As evidence of this, he says that no officer or soldier believed it, and that General Johnston had thrown up no intrenchments in front of his lines opposite Peach-tree Creek. If General Johnston intended, as he says he did, to strike the head of Sherman's columns as soon as they appeared across Peach-tree Creek, and before they were intrenched, or had time even to deploy into line of battle, what use had he for field-works? They would have been in his way if erected, and his men would have been uselessly fatigued in constructing them. Not having been present, I can not speak of the opinion of the army. But, admitting the fact, I submit that the opinion of the army is not always evidence of the intentions of the general. Is it not possible, too, that General Hood may have mistaken his own opinion for that of the army? The evidence that General Johnston did intend to hold the place is given in his report. In addition, it may be added that he held New Hope for a fortnight, and only left it because the enemy left their intrenchments confronting it, moving to the railroad and to the rear. He then held a position in front of Kenesaw for a month, and left that, at last, because, by extending his intrenchments, Sherman had got nearer to Atlanta by several miles than we were. In all the fighting we had been successful, and that in positions frequently prepared for defense in a few hours. Is it probable, then, that General Johnston would not have attempted to hold a place fortified already to his hand under the direction of the Engineer Bureau, and previously inspected by Major General Gilmer, the chief engineer of our army? Why had he been strengthening it from the 5th of July, with all the labor he could command, if he did not intend to defend it, in the event of his failing to crush the enemy at Peach-tree Creek? Why was he strengthening it at the very moment of his removal? If the position was as weak as described by General Hood, why did Sherman not attempt to carry it by assault?"

were ordered by Hood to attack Thomas at one P.M. on the 20th, before the latter could fortify himself. But the Federal movement threatened to flank Hood's right, and must be met by an extension of Cheatham's corps in that direction. This led to a displacement of Hardee's and Stewart's original line to close up the interval. In these manoeuvres much time was consumed, and it was not till four P.M. that the attack was made. Hood's left corps, under Stewart, advanced toward Buckhead, and struck the Federal line at a point where a gap had been left between Thomas and Schofield, and which Sherman was trying to fill. The blow was sudden, and fell upon Newton's division on the road, Hooker's corps to the south, and Johnson's division of Palmer's corps. Johnson was well intrenched; Newton had hastily thrown up a line of rail breastworks in his front; but Hooker's corps was entirely uncovered, and fought on comparatively open ground. The assault was partially successful at first, Stewart gaining a temporary work in his front. But Newton's division, though exposed on the left, repelled every charge of the enemy. The battle then swayed toward the Federal right against Hooker and Johnson, who yielded not a foot of ground, and after a severe battle, which lasted until sundown, the enemy was hurled back to his works.¹ Thomas's loss was heavy, amounting to 1600 in killed and wounded, the greatest number of casualties being in Hooker's corps. The Confederate loss must have been still heavier. Five hundred dead were left upon the field, and 1000 severely wounded, and 360 Confederate prisoners were captured. Sherman estimates the loss of the enemy at 5000.²

A task had devolved upon General Hood to which his faculties were inadequate; it was a task which might have discouraged the most skillful general the world ever saw. Johnston had understood its difficulty, and had met the emergency in the only possible way which either military science or military experience suggested. His removal from command was a denunciation of his method of conducting the campaign. Hood, who, while a brave soldier, was no general, adopted an exactly opposite method. It was his well-known habit to fight battles and disregard strategy, and for this reason he had been assigned to the command. If Sherman could have made the appointment himself, he could not have more certainly or more completely served his own purpose. Hood was the commander, and Hood's theory of war was the policy which secured for him the opportunity for which he had been waiting, and out of which Johnston had all along been cheating him.

General Hood, having failed in his first plan, proceeded to execute the second, which involved an attack on McPherson. The movement of the latter to Hood's right, if not checked, would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. Thus, on the morning of the 22d, Sherman, to his surprise, found the Confederate works on Peach-tree Creek abandoned, and pushed his whole line up close to Atlanta. Hood in the mean time was constructing new fortifications, and, leaving Cheatham and Stewart to defend the city, had ordered Hardee to move south with his corps during the night of the 21st on the McDonough Road. This movement had for its object the turning of McPherson's flank. Wheeler's cavalry moved on Hardee's right, and both were to attack at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. Hardee's success would be followed by an attack of Cheatham on Thomas, and then, as the engagement became general, by a movement from the centre.

These combinations led to the battle of July 22. McPherson had the night before crossed the Augusta Railroad two miles west of Decatur, after severe skirmishing, and Blair, on the left of the road, had pushed forward and seized a commanding eminence not two miles distant from Atlanta. The general advance of Sherman's line on the morning of the 22d had been contracted and strengthened. Dodge's (Sixteenth) corps, on Logan's right, had been in this way displaced, and was sent around to Blair's left, to strengthen the commanding position which had been gained the previous night. Sherman in the morning had supposed that Atlanta was abandoned; but before noon Thomas and Schofield found the enemy well intrenched in their front, covering the city, and away to the left about eleven o'clock was heard the fire of musketry and artillery. In a moment Hood's design was fathomed; but it was already too late to completely avert the danger which threatened McPherson.

Sherman was at the Howard House at this time, on Thomas's left. Here McPherson met him and Schofield, and described the condition of affairs on his flank. Sherman had proposed to extend to the right, and was, therefore, not desirous to gain on the left. But the nature of the position gained by Blair led him to send Dodge to strengthen that point. This point having been settled, McPherson started from the Howard House to return to his army, reports having already reached him of an attempt on his left. The sound of musketry, increasing in volume and accompanied by artillery, led Sherman to order an advance from the right and centre, and to hold as large a portion of Schofield's corps as possible in reserve to await developments. About half an hour after McPherson's departure, his adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, rode up with the sad and startling intelligence that his commander was either dead or a prisoner; that, riding from Sherman's headquarters to Dodge's column, and having dismissed his orderlies and staff officers on various errands, he had passed into a narrow path leading off from the extreme left of his line, and a few minutes later a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and McPherson's horse had come out riderless, with two wounds. "The suddenness of this calamity," says General Sherman, "would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thought."³ General Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, was ordered

¹ Thomas's Report.

² General Hood attributes the failure of the attack to delay, and to Hardee's failure "to push the attack as ordered."

³ Two days after this event, it was reported as follows by General Sherman to Adjutant General Thomas:



JAMES B. MCPHERSON.

to take command of the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman instructed Logan that he did not wish to gain ground on the left, but that the Augusta Railroad must be held at all hazards.

Hardee had swung around and struck the left flank of Sherman's army, his movement being covered by dense woods. Enveloping Blair's division, the attack was extended to the rear until it reached Dodge's corps in motion. There was between Blair and Dodge an interval of half a mile. The last order ever given by McPherson was that Colonel Wangelin's brigade, of Logan's corps, should cross the railroad and occupy this gap. The order had been obeyed, and its execution checked the enemy's advance. Wheeler's cavalry at the same time, having taken a wider circuit, broke in upon Decatur, capturing a portion of the trains there stationed, and driving the rest toward the Chattahoochee. Hardee had been checked, but Stewart's corps, on his left, attacked in front, sweeping across a portion of the hill which Blair was fortifying, capturing the intrenching party with its tools, and bearing down upon G. A. Smith's division, which was driven back upon that of Leggett, who still obstinately clung to the crest. Smith's line was now formed with its right touching Leggett, and the left refused, facing southeast. This position was firmly held for four hours, unmoved by the assaults of the enemy. On the extreme left Hardee had captured six guns, and Smith, in refusing his left, had abandoned two more. Hood still persisted in the attempt to turn Sherman's left flank. There was a lull at four P.M., during which the enemy felt his way to the railroad, and, suddenly breaking forth upon a regiment, which, with a section of artillery, had been advanced as a sort of picket, captured two more guns.

"It is my painful duty to report that Brigadier General James B. McPherson, United States Army, Major General of Volunteers, and commander of the Army of the Tennessee in the field, was killed by a shot from ambush about noon yesterday. At the time of this fatal shot he was on horseback, placing his troops in position near the city of Atlanta, and was passing by a cross-road from a moving column toward the flank of troops that had already been established on the line. He had quitted me but a few minutes before, and was on his way to see in person to the execution of my orders. About the time of this sad event the enemy had sallied from his intrenchments of Atlanta, and by a circuit had got to the left and rear of this very line, and had begun an attack which resulted in serious battle; so that General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant knight and gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's; and this army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate its honor and integrity.

"History tells of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith, and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, never spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect; those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry; and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth. I feel assured that every patriot in America, on hearing this sad news, will feel a sense of personal loss, and the country generally will realize that we have lost not only an able military leader, but a man who, had he survived, was qualified to heal the national strife which has been raised by designing and ambitious men. His body has been sent North in charge of Major Willard, Captains Steele and Giles, his personal staff."

Advancing and driving back Lightburn's brigade, which held that portion of the line, he captured two full batteries, one of them 20-pounder Parrotts. By this advance of the enemy, Wood's and Harrow's divisions of Logan's corps were separated. It was important that the position should be recovered. Batteries were moved from Schofield's line to a commanding position enfilading the enemy, and while these poured in their continuous fire, Logan and a portion of Schofield's force drove the enemy from the field, recapturing the two batteries. Thus terminated the battle of the 22d. Sherman reports his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners as 3722, and estimates that of the enemy as 8000. In this battle the Confederate general W. H. T. Walker was killed.

This day ended Sherman's operations east of Atlanta. Garrard's cavalry, whose absence had materially assisted Hood on the 22d, had been employed in the destruction of the Augusta Railroad 42 miles east of Atlanta. This movement, together with Rousseau's operations on the West Point Road, left the enemy but a single line of uninterrupted communication, that by the Macon Railroad. In order to reach this remaining road Sherman determined to transfer his army to the west of Atlanta. Rousseau, upon his return to Marietta with 2000 cavalry, was ordered to relieve Stoneman on the Chattahoochee, and to the latter was given the command of his own and Garrard's division, amounting to 5000 men. General E. M. McCook, with his own and Rousseau's cavalry, had a force 4000 strong. With these commands Stoneman and McCook were ordered to make a concerted movement against the Macon Road, while Sherman was extending his army on the right toward East Point. In respect of numbers, the cavalry designated for this expedition was sufficient for the accomplishment of its object against any opposition which it was possible for the enemy to make. Stoneman was to move by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and McCook by the right to Fayetteville, and on the night of the 28th the two bodies were to effect a junction on the Macon Road near Lovejoy's, far south of Atlanta, and break it effectually. At the very moment of starting Stoneman begged permission, after executing the orders already given him, to proceed with his own proper command to Macon and Andersonville, and release the Union prisoners there confined. "There was something most captivating in the idea," reports Sherman, "and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success." He therefore consented.

The expedition proved a failure. There seems to have been no attempt on Stoneman's part to effect a junction at Lovejoy's with Garrard and McCook. Garrard soon returned. McCook went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to a point near Rivertown, where he crossed, and moving on Palmetto Station, tore up a section of the West Point Road. Thence he advanced to Fayetteville, where he destroyed about 500 wagons belonging to the enemy. Pushing on to the railroad at Lovejoy's, he burned the dépôt and destroyed a portion of the road. In the mean time the enemy was ac-



SCENE OF MCPHERSON'S DEATH.




O. O. HOWARD.

cumulating forces around him, and, receiving no tidings from Stoneman, he moved south and west to Newman, on the West Point Road, where he encountered a body of infantry on the way from Mississippi to Hood's army. This body, delayed by the break at Palmetto, together with the cavalry which had been pursuing McCook, completely surrounded the latter and compelled him to fight. McCook cut his way out with great difficulty, losing 500 men. Stoneman, disregarding all the instructions which he had received, seems never to have come near Lovejoy's. Keeping east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, he sent detachments eastward, which succeeded in inflicting great damage upon the railroad, burning the bridges over Walnut Creek and the Oconee. With his main force he appeared before Macon. He made no attempt upon the town, however, nor did he proceed toward Andersonville, but began to retrace his steps, closely followed by various detachments of Confederate cavalry under General Iverson. He was soon hemmed in by the enemy; and giving his consent to two thirds of his command to escape, with the remainder and a section of light guns he occupied the enemy. A brigade under Colonel Adams returned to Sherman almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on its way back, and, being scattered, a large number were killed and captured. Stoneman surrendered himself, and the small portion of his command which remained with him. Very much was sacrificed in this expedition, and very little was gained, as the breaks made in the Macon Road were of such a character as to be easily repaired.

On the 27th of July, one week after the battle of Peach-tree Creek, the Army of the Tennessee was moved from its position on the left, around Schofield and Thom-

as, to the west side of Proctor's Creek, where it prolonged the Federal line southward on the hills northwest of Atlanta—a position exactly opposite to that occupied by this army in the battle of the 22d. By orders of the Pres-





SHERMAN IN COUNCIL DECIDES TO RAISE THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA

ident, given at Sherman's suggestion, General O. O. Howard had been, on the 27th, assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Stanley succeeding to the command of the Fourth Corps. This appointment led to General Hooker's departure from Sherman's army. Howard was a junior officer as compared with Hooker, and the latter resented his promotion on the ground that, in the natural course, he should himself have been preferred. Hooker therefore threw up his command of the Twentieth Corps, and was succeeded by General H. W. Slocum. General Sherman had very properly considered that a good department commander must be selected, and for this purpose he preferred Howard to either Logan or Hooker, whom also he wished to retain in their present positions on account of their eminent efficiency as corps commanders.¹

¹ The following letter, addressed by Sherman to Halleck, August 16, 1864, fully explains this affair:

"It occurs to me that, preliminary to a future report of the history of this campaign, I should record certain facts of great personal interest to officers of this command.

"General McPherson was killed by the musketry fire at the beginning of the battle of July 22. He had in person selected the ground for his troops, constituting the left wing of the army, I being in person with the centre, General Schofield. The moment the information reached me, I sent one of my staff to announce the fact to General John A. Logan, the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee, with general instructions to maintain the ground chosen by Gen-

Dodge, with the Sixteenth Corps, took a position just west of Proctor's Creek on the evening of the 27th. The next morning, Blair, with the Sev-

eral McPherson if possible, but, if pressed too hard, to refuse his left flank, but, at all events, to hold the railroad and main Decatur Road; that I did not propose to move or gain ground by that flank, but rather by the right, and that I wanted the Army of the Tennessee to fight it out unaided. General Logan admirably conceived my orders and executed them; and, if he gave ground on the left of the Seventeenth Corps, it was properly done by my orders; but he held a certain hill by the right division of the Seventeenth Corps, the only ground on that line the possession of which by an enemy would have damaged us by giving a reverse fire on the remainder of the troops. General Logan fought that battle out as required, unaided save by a small brigade sent by my orders from General Schofield to the Decatur Road, well to the rear, where it was reported the enemy's cavalry had got into the town of Decatur, and was operating directly on the rear of Logan; but that brigade was not disturbed, and was replaced that night by a part of the Fifteenth Corps next to General Schofield, and General Schofield's brigade brought back so as to be kept together on its own line.

"General Logan managed the Army of the Tennessee well during his command, and it may be that an unfair inference might be drawn to his prejudice because he did not succeed to the permanent command. I am forced to choose a commander, not only for the army in the field, but of the Department of the Tennessee, covering a vast extent of country, with troops much dispersed. It was a delicate and difficult task, and I gave preference to Major General O. O. Howard, then in command of the Fourth Army Corps in the Department of the Cumberland. Instead of giving my reasons, I prefer that the wisdom of the choice be left to the test of time. The President kindly ratified my choice, and I am willing to assume the responsibility. I meant no disrespect to any officer; and hereby declare that General Logan submitted with the grace and dignity of a soldier, gentleman, and patriot, resumed the command of his corps proper (Fifteenth), and enjoys




EZRA'S CHURCH.

enteenth Corps, extended the line south and west to Ezra Church, on the Bell's Ferry or Lickskillet Road; and Logan came in on Blair's right, his own right being refused along a well-wooded ridge south of the road. By 10 A.M. on the 28th Howard's army was in position, and was rapidly fortifying itself with breastworks of rails and logs. From that time until noon there was heavy artillery firing from the Confederate position. Evidently Hood was about to repeat the tactics of the 22d. Lieutenant General S. D. Lee, who on the 25th had relieved General Cheatham of the command of Hood's former corps, was ordered to advance and attack Howard's right, and cover the Lickskillet Road. The attack about noon fell upon the corps of General Logan, who fought alone the battle which ensued. Several assaults were made by Cheatham until 4 P.M., but were each repulsed with great loss to the enemy. Logan's loss was less than 700. But when Cheatham abandoned the field he left 642 killed, which were counted and buried, besides many others buried but not counted. Sherman estimates the Confederate loss in this battle of the 28th as "not less than 5000." He had anticipated this attack, and had made dispositions which, but for his ignorance of the topography on his right rear, must have converted Cheatham's repulse into a disastrous rout. Up to this point Hood had been acting upon the plans which General Johnston had formed, but it is very doubtful whether the latter general would have executed them in the same manner. Certainly Johnston would not have attacked Howard's army on the 28th, knowing

the love and respect of his army and of his commanders. It so happened that on the 28th of July I had again thrown the same army to the extreme right, the exposed flank, where the enemy repeated the same manœuvre, striking in mass; the extreme corps deployed in line, and refused as a flank the Fifteenth, Major General Logan, and he commanded in person, General Howard and myself being near; and that corps, as heretofore reported, repulsed the rebel army completely, and next day advanced and occupied the ground fought over and the road the enemy sought to cover. General Howard, who had that very day assumed his new command, unequivocally gave General Logan all the credit possible; and I also beg to add my unqualified admiration of the bravery and skill, and, more yet, good sense that influenced him to bear a natural disappointment, and do his whole duty like a man. If I could bestow upon him substantial reward, it would afford me unalloyed satisfaction; but I do believe, in the consciousness of acts done from noble impulses, and gracefully admitted by his superiors in authority, he will be contented. He already holds the highest commission known in the army, and it is hard to say how we can better manifest our applause.

"At the time of General Howard's selection, Major General Hooker commanded the Twentieth Army Corps in the Army of the Cumberland, made up for his special accommodation out of the old Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, whereby Major General Slocum was deprived of his corps command. Both the law and practice are and have been to fill the higher army commands by selection. Ranks or dates of commission have not controlled, nor am I aware that any reflection can be inferred, unless the junior be placed immediately over the senior; but in this case General Hooker's command was in no manner disturbed. General Howard was not put over him, but in charge of a distinct and separate army. No indignity was offered or intended; and I must say that General Hooker was not justified in retiring. At all events, had he spoken or written to me, I would have made every explanation and concession he could have expected, but could not have changed my course, because then, as now, I believed it right, and for the good of our country and cause.


"As a matter of justice, General Slocum, having been displaced by the consolidation, was deemed by General Thomas as entitled to the vacancy created by General Hooker's voluntary withdrawal, and has received it."



DEAD BROOK AFTER THE BATTLE OF EZRA'S CHURCH.

SHERMAN'S ARMY DESTROYING THE MOON RAILROAD BETWEEN ROSS AND BEAVER AND JONSBORO, GA.





ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

that the latter was intrenched. Half a dozen of such battles would have left Hood without an army. At any rate, no farther attempt was made by General Hood to oppose Sherman's extension by flank southward. As the Federal army developed toward East Point, the enemy, without attacking, extended his intrenched line in the same direction.

By the 1st of August the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps had advanced beyond the Lickskillet Road. On that day Schofield's army was transferred to Howard's right, Palmer's corps, of the Army of the Cumberland, following. Palmer took a position below Utoy Creek, and Schofield extended the line to near East Point. Here a question of rank arose between Schofield and Palmer, the former being instructed by General Sherman to give orders to the latter. This difficulty finally (on the 6th of August) led to Palmer's resignation, General Jeff. C. Davis succeeding him in command of the Fourteenth Corps.

By this extension of his army southward, Sherman compelled Hood to lengthen the line of defense; and while Schofield attempted to turn the Confederate left, and reach the Macon Road, Thomas and Howard pressed vigorously on Hood's right and centre. But, though the enemy's line was fifteen miles long, extending from Decatur around to below East Point, it could easily be held by militia, and was so well masked by the shape of the ground that it was impossible for Sherman to discover its weak points. It was beginning to be evident that, in order to reach the Macon Road, the whole of Sherman's army would have to be transferred to the east and south of Atlanta. An attempt was first made to destroy the city by means of four 4½-inch rifled guns, which on the 10th arrived from Chattanooga. These did good execution, but Hood was not willing to abandon the city so long as he could keep the forts, and the battering down of every building in Atlanta would not have altered his determination.

In the mean time Hood had dispatched Wheeler, with a cavalry force 4500 strong, against the railroad in Sherman's rear. This, without frightening the Federal commander, who had no immediate cause for concern as to supplies, greatly enhanced his opportunity for offensive operations. It then seemed possible that, without moving the entire army, a raid might be made by Kilpatrick which should break up the Macon Road. Kilpatrick started out and broke the road to West Point, and then advanced to Jonesborough, on the Macon Road, where he encountered and defeated a portion of the Confederate cavalry under Ross, and held the railroad for five hours, doing it sufficient damage to give the enemy about ten days' work in repairing it. A brigade of Confederate infantry, with Jackson's cavalry, put a stop to his work here. Moving east, he again encountered the enemy at Lovejoy's, and, after defeating him and capturing four guns and a large number of prisoners, returned to Sherman's army by way of Decatur.


Not satisfied with what had been accomplished in this raid, Sherman, on the night of August 25th, raised the siege of Atlanta. General A. S. Williams,¹ with the Twentieth Corps, was ordered back to hold the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the remainder of the army, with 15 days' rations, was set in motion toward a position on the Macon Road, at or near Jonesborough. On the first night of the movement, Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, drew out from the extreme left to a position west of Proctor's Creek, and Williams moved back, as ordered, to the Chattahoochee, both movements being effected without loss. The next night the Army of the Tennessee moved south, well toward Sandtown, and the Army of the Cumberland to a position south of Utoy Creek, Schofield remaining in position. Only one casualty occurred in this second stage of the army's progress. A third movement, on the 27th, brought Howard's command to the West Point Road, above Fairburn, Thomas's army to Red Oak, Schofield at the same time closing in on the left. The 28th was spent in the destruction of the West Point Road, a break being made of over 12 miles.

The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows the ridge dividing the Flint from the Ocmulgee River, and between East Point and Jonesborough makes a wide bend to the east. It was against this ridge that the Federal army moved on the 29th—Howard toward Jonesborough on the right; Thomas, in the centre, toward Couch's, on the Fayetteville Road, and Schofield on the left. As soon as Hood learned of this movement of Sherman, which, if successful, would compel the evacuation of Atlanta, he sent (on the 30th) Lee's and Hardee's corps to Jonesborough. To Hardee was given the command, Hood remaining with Stewart's corps in Atlanta, intending, in case of Hardee's success, to attack in flank. Hood does not seem to have been aware of the extent of the operation which Sherman was conducting, and supposed that Hardee, at Jonesborough, would encounter a force inferior to his own.

The battle of Jonesborough was fought on the 31st of August. Sherman was making dispositions to advance Schofield's and Davis's corps to Rough and Ready, between Atlanta and Jonesborough, when Hardee, coming out of the latter place, attacked Howard in his intrenched position. Hardee was well aware of the importance of this battle, and fought his troops with desperate obstinacy for two hours, when he withdrew from the field thoroughly beaten, having lost 1400 killed and wounded.²

While the battle had been in progress, Stanley's and Schofield's, and a portion of Davis's corps, had struck the railroad at several points, and were engaged in its destruction. A splendid opportunity was now offered for the destruction of Hardee's command. Sherman saw this, and ordered his three corps to turn against Jonesborough. Howard was to occupy Hardee while Thomas and Schofield moved down upon him from the north, destroying the railroad on their march. What was done must be done on the 1st of September. By noon of that day Davis's corps reached Howard's left, and faced southward across the railroad. Blair was then with the Seventeenth

¹ Williams commanded the Twentieth Corps until Slocum should arrive from Vicksburg.
² Sherman estimates Hardee's loss as 2500. We have followed General Hood's report.



CONFEDERATE PRISONERS BEING CONDUCTED FROM JONESBOROUGH TO ATLANTA.



EXODUS OF CONFEDERATES FROM ATLANTA

Corps, and Kilpatrick's cavalry thrown across the road south of Jonesborough. About 4 P.M. Davis assaulted the enemy's lines across the open, sweeping all before him, and capturing the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander. Repeated orders were sent hurrying up Schofield and Stanley, but, owing to the difficult nature of the country, these two corps did not arrive until night rendered farther operations impossible; and during the night the enemy retreated southward.

During the same night, at 2 A.M. on the morning of September 2, the sound of heavy explosions was heard from the direction of Atlanta, 20 miles distant, indicating the evacuation of that place by General Hood. Without regarding these tokens, Sherman pressed on the next morning in pursuit of Hardee, but found it impossible to intercept his retreat. On the 2d Slocum entered Atlanta, followed by the whole army on the 7th. In this last movement of his army General Sherman had captured 3000 prisoners and 16 guns. His loss had been 1500 men.

In the mean time Wheeler's raid on Sherman's communications had been productive of little damage. He had broken the railroad near Calhoun, but had been checked by Colonel Laibold at Dalton until Steedman could arrive from Chattanooga, when he was headed off into East Tennessee. Finally, Rousseau, Steedman, and R. S. Granger, with their combined forces, drove him out of Tennessee.

"Atlanta is ours," telegraphed Sherman to Washington on the 3d of September, "and fairly won." The loss of this position by the Confederates was an irreparable misfortune. The wall which had hitherto protected the Cotton States was now obliterated. The victory electrified the nation; it was felt to be the consummation of the triumphs won at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and its political effect in the loyal states can not be too highly estimated. President Lincoln wrote a letter of thanks to Sherman and his army. "The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that have signalized the campaign must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation." Lieutenant General Grant, before Petersburg, on the 4th, ordered a salute to be fired in honor of the victory "with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy." On the 12th, General Sherman received from the President a commission making him a major general in the regular army.¹

Sherman's outlook from Atlanta was magnificent. Though he had lost over 30,000 men in the numerous battles of the campaign, his army was as large as when he set out four months before. The Confederate loss must have been nearly equal to Sherman's.² G. A. Smith's militia had been sent to Griffin, and Hood now confronted Sherman with an army of 40,000 men of all arms. The next objective, if Hood attempted to cover Georgia, was Macon—103 miles east of Atlanta. But Sherman determined to give his army a brief period of rest before another advance. The Army of the Cumberland went into camp about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur.³ At the latter point was also stationed Garrard's cavalry division, while Kilpatrick's, at Sandtown, guarded the western flank. To strengthen the railroad in the rear, two divisions—Newton's, of the Fourth, and Morgan's, of the Fourteenth Corps—were dispatched to Chattanooga, and Corse's division, of the Fifteenth Corps, to Rome. A new and more compact system of fortifications was also constructed about Atlanta, which town Sherman now proposed to make exclusively a military post.

To carry out this design, every thing in Atlanta, except churches and dwelling-houses, was burned. On the 4th of September Sherman issued an order commanding the inhabitants of the town to leave at once. "I am not willing," said Sherman, "to have Atlanta encumbered by the families of our enemies; I want it a pure Gibraltar, and will have it so by the first of October."⁴ This order was a surprise to the citizens, and doubtless occasioned them much hardship. But Sherman had broken through the protecting walls of the Confederacy, and now resolved that the people of the Cotton States should feel the heavy hand of war. He would not acknowledge the impunity of treason. The city authorities and General Hood protested against the order as unnecessary and cruel. But Sherman's reply crushed all the meaning out of their words, brought them face to face with the war demon whom they themselves had invoked, and laughed to scorn their weak and impudent claims.⁵ A cessation of hostilities was agreed upon between

¹ Lieutenant General Grant says in his official report:

"General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skillful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by any thing in history."

² Hood reports his loss in battle, since he assumed the command on the 17th of July, as 5247. It was probably, however, much higher than that. Indeed, in the four severe battles of July 20th, 22d, and 28th, and September 1st, the casualties could not have been less than 10,000. We can place no confidence in Hood's official estimates.

³ Several changes now took place in the army, in consequence of the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments. "The Army of the Tennessee was consolidated into two corps, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, respectively commanded by Major General P. J. Osterhaus and Brigadier General Thomas E. G. Ransom; the former comprising the four divisions of Brigadier Generals Charles R. Woods, William B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Corse; the latter those of Major General Joseph A. Mower, and Brigadier Generals Miles D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith, with the First Alabama Cavalry and the First Missouri Engineer regiment, having in charge a large pontoon-bridge train. This organization was effected by transferring all the troops of the Seventeenth Corps remaining on the Mississippi to the Sixteenth Corps, breaking up the detachment of the latter corps in the field, and transferring Ransom's division, now commanded by Brigadier General Giles A. Smith, and Corse's division to the Seventeenth Corps. Major Generals Logan and Blair were temporarily absent, engaged in the important political canvass then in progress. Major General Schofield returned to the headquarters of the Department of the Ohio, at Knoxville, to give his personal attention to affairs in that quarter, leaving Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox in command of the Twenty-third Corps. The cavalry was reorganized so as to consist of two divisions, under Brigadier Generals Garrard and Judson Kilpatrick."—*Boeman's Sherman and his Campaigns.*

⁴ Dispatch to General Halleck, September 9, 1864.

⁵ We quote the correspondence which followed, as given in Bowman's "*Sherman and his Campaigns.*"

"On the 11th of September, the town authorities addressed the following petition to General Sherman, praying the revocation of his orders:

Sherman and Hood, to continue for ten days following the 12th of September. During this time 446 families were removed south from Atlanta, comprising 1644 persons, of whom 860 were children and 79 servants. During the same period arrangements were made between Hood and Sherman for the mutual exchange of 2000 prisoners.

"SIR,—The undersigned, mayor and two members of Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfully, to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta.

"At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss; but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that it will involve, in the aggregate, consequences appalling and heart-rending.

"Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others now having young children, and whose husbands are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say, 'I have such a one sick at home; who will wait on them when I am gone?' Others say, 'What are we to do? we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or to rent any—no parents, friends, or relatives to go to.' Another says, 'I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much.' We reply to them, 'General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General Hood will take it from there on.' And they will reply to that, 'But I want to leave the railway at such a point, and can not get conveyance from there on.'

"We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people had retired South, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now starving in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? And how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter nor subsistence—in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them, if they were willing to do so?

"This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering can not be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.

"We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered the subject in all its awful consequences, and that, on more reflection, you, we hoped, would not make this people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred—surely none such in the United States; and what has this helpless people done that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

"We do not know, as yet, the number of people still here. Of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.

"In conclusion, we must earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

E. E. RAWSON, Councilman.

L. C. WELLS, Councilman.

"To this General Sherman replied, in full and clear terms, on the following day:

"GENTLEMEN,—I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

"Now I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later war will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting until the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I can not discuss this subject with you fairly, because I can not impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You can not qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

"War is cruelty, and you can not refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you can not have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submit to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national government, and, instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals can not resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a government and those who insist on war and its desolation.

"You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable; and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope to live more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your land, or any thing you have; but we do want, and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have; and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we can not help it.

"You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be, that the South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen, in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very differently—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and I believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.

"But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come you may call upon me for any thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your home and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta."

"As soon as his arrangements were completed, General Sherman wrote to General Hood, by a flag of truce, notifying him of his orders, and proposing a cessation of hostilities for ten days from the 12th of September, in the country included within a radius of two miles around Rough and Ready Station, to enable him to complete the removal of those families electing to go to the south. Hood immediately replied on the 9th, acceding to the proposed truce, but protesting against Sherman's order. He concluded:

"Permit me to say, the unprecedented measure you propose transcends in studied and iniquitous cruelty all acts ever before brought to my attention in this dark history of the war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing you are expelling from homes and firesides wives and children of a brave people."