

Jonesboro', Georgia. We assaulted the enemy's entrenched position in the edge of woods, moving in line of battle through an open, difficult swamp, across an open field, under the severest artillery and musketry fire, flank and front

It became necessary to reform the line, after crossing the swamp, and finding it almost impossible to get my men forward through the fire, I deemed it necessary to give them the encouragement of my example (as, indeed, I had previously done, especially on the seventh of August), and so rode in front of my colors, and caused them to be successfully planted on the enemy's works, jumping my horse over them, at the time they were filled with the enemy, being the first man of our army over the enemy's works. I was almost instantly struck from my horse, inside of the enemy's works, while cheering on my men, being severely wounded by shell and bullet. I however, held the works, and retained command for some minutes, until I was taken to the rear, in a semi-conscious state.

The detachment lost in this battle :

Commissioned officers wounded .....	3
Enlisted men wounded .....	30
"    "    killed .....	10
"    "    missing .....	7
<hr/>	
Total .....	50

A large number of prisoners were also captured by the Eighteenth regulars, in this battle.

The casualties in this detachment, during the Atlanta campaign, from May 2, 1864, to September 2, 1864, were as follows :

Commissioned officers wounded .....	10
Enlisted men wounded .....	166
"    "    killed .....	38
"    "    missing .....	17
<hr/>	
Total.....	231

I should be derelict in my duty, did I not most earnestly recommend for brevets the following meritorious and gallant officers, for distinguished bravery and conduct on the field of battle, viz.:

Captain G. W. Smith, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain R. B. Hull, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

Captain W. J. Fetterman, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain Ansel B. Deuten, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain Anson Mills, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry and skill on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain A. S. Burt, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

First Lieutenant Thos. B. Burrows, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for gallantry on the first of September, 1864, when he was severely wounded.

First Lieutenant James Powell, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the first of September, 1864, when he was severely wounded.

First Lieutenant Frederick Phisterer, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for good conduct and great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864.

First Lieutenant Wm. H. Bisbee, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same, for great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same, for good conduct and great gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

First Lieutenant Alfred Townsend, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864, where he was severely wounded.

I am, General, very respectfully,  
Your obedient servant,  
L. M. KELLOGG,  
Captain, Eighteenth United States Infantry.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 15, 1864. }

GENERAL: I have heretofore, from day to day, by telegraph, kept the War Department and the General-in-Chief advised of the progress of events, but now it becomes necessary to review the whole campaign, which has resulted in the capture and occupation of the city of Atlanta.

On the fourteenth day of March, 1864, at Memphis, Tennessee, I received notice from General Grant, at Nashville, that he had been commissioned Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, which would compel him to go East, and that I had been appointed to succeed him as commander of the Division of the Mississippi. He summoned me to Nashville for a conference, and I took my departure the same day, and reached Nashville, *via* Cairo, on the seventeenth, and accompanied him on his journey eastward as far as Cincinnati. We had a full and complete understanding of the policy and plans for the ensuing campaign, covering a vast area of country, my part of which, extended from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. I returned to Nashville, and on the twenty-fifth began a tour of inspection, visiting Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; Chattanooga, Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. During this visit I had interviews with Major-General McPherson,

commanding the Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville, Major-General Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, and Major-General Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged, in general terms, the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns and garrisons, and fixed the first day of May as the time when all things should be ready. Leaving these officers to complete the

details of organization and preparation, I returned to Nashville on the second of April, and gave my personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville abundantly supplied, and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased demands of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East Tennessee, more especially in the region round about Chattanooga, had forced the commanding officers of posts to issue food to the people. I was compelled to stop this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies and the people too, and, of course, the army had the preference, but I endeavored to point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course. At once the storehouses at Chattanooga began to fill, so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at different points.

During the month of April I received from Lieutenant-General Grant a map, with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured, and made part of this report. Subsequently I received from him notice that he would move from his camps about Culpepper, Virginia, on the fifth of May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at Nicholasville, Kentucky, and Columbus, Tennessee. On the twenty-seventh of April I put all the troops in motion toward Chattanooga, and the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the Army of the Cumberland fifty thousand men; that of the Tennessee thirty-five thousand, and that of the Ohio fifteen thousand men. These figures were approximated, but never reached; the Army of the Tennessee failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi, resulting from the unfavorable issue

of the Red River expedition. But on the first of May the effective strength of the several armies for offensive purposes was about as follows:

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS  
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	54,568
Artillery.....	2,377
Cavalry.....	3,828

Total.....	60,773
Guns.....	130

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJOR-GENERAL M'PHERSON  
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	22,437
Artillery.....	1,404
Cavalry.....	624

Total.....	24,465
Guns.....	96

ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJOR-GENERAL SCHOFIELD  
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	11,183
Artillery.....	679
Cavalry.....	1,697

Total.....	13,559
Guns.....	28

Grand aggregate number of troops, ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven; guns, two hundred and fifty-four.

About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness. These armies were grouped on the morning of May sixth as follows: That of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton.

The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry (Wheeler's), and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's and Polk's, the whole commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate Army. I estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about ten thousand, and the infantry and artillery at about forty-five or fifty thousand men.

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky-Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lay the railroad and wagon-road. It was narrow, well obstructed by abatis, and flooded by water, caused by dams across Mill Creek. Batteries also commanded it in its whole length, from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the further end, like a traverse, directly across its debouché. It was, therefore, necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy had a strong line of works behind Mill Creek, so that my attention

was at once directed to the south. In that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen (18) miles below Dalton. Accordingly, I ordered General McPherson to move rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mill, via Ship's Gap, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap, directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to make a bold attack. After breaking the railroad well, he was ordered to fall back to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek, and stand ready to fall upon the enemy's flank when he retreated as I judged he would. During the movement, General Thomas was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while General Schofield pressed down from the north.

General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the seventh, occupying Tunnel Hill, facing the Buzzard-Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition and pushing the enemy's cavalry well through the Gap; General McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the eighth, completely surprising a brigade of cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it, and on the ninth General Schofield pushed down close on Dalton, from the north, while General Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rokey-Face Ridge, pushing it almost to a battle. One division, General Newton's, of the Fourth corps, General Howard's, carried the ridge, and turning south toward Dalton, found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulments, to enable him to reach the gorge or pass. Another division, General Geary's, of the Twentieth corps, General Hooker's, also made a bold push for the summit, to the south of the pass, but the narrow road as it approached the summit was too strongly held by the enemy to be carried. This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering his left flank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell back and took strong position near the west end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the tenth ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps, the Fourteenth, General Palmer's, leaving General Howard with the Fourth corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the same route, and on the eleventh the whole army, excepting General Howard's corps, and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west side of Rocky-Face Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we

moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their fortified lines and occupied a ridge of "bald" hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the fourteenth of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp creek, occupying the forts of Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry, in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the Sixteenth corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down toward Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad below Calhoun, and above Kingston, if possible, and with the main army I pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp creek near its mouth, and made a lodgement close to the enemy's works, on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp creek Valley, threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down to it close on Resaca.

General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the fifteenth, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned.

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca

another four-gun battery and a good lot of stores.

General McPherson during the sixteenth, got across at Lay's ferry. General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Foe's and Fields' ferries across the Conasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which form the Oostanaula. On the seventeenth all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders, a division, General Jeff. C. Davis, along the west bank of Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division, in the advance, had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions—General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston, to be in close support. On the nineteenth, the enemy was in force about Cassville, with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him, again he retreated in the night-time across the Etowah river, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river.

Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days rest, and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the means of crossing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the twenty-third put the army in motion for Dallas.

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas, *via* Van Wert. General Davis' division moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road *via* Euharley and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General Thomas' left.

General Thomas' head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory,

and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had detected the move, and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the twenty-fifth of May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin-vine creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance, until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas about four miles.

It was near four o'clock p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and, by my order, made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads meet, from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church; but, having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well intrenched, substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed toward our left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear.

Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work toward our left, and, when all things were ready, to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in the reports of subordinate commanders. On the twenty-eighth, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on Dallas.

Fortunately our men had erected good breast-works, and gave the enemy a terrible and

bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, I renewed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the first of June, and, by pushing our left well around, we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. Both of those commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass.

Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the fourth of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Ackworth, and reached the railroad on the sixth of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison, and as soon as, the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail.

At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the eighth of June, with two divisions of the Seventeenth corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

On the ninth of June our communications in the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the north-east, terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain and beyond it in the distance Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal-stations. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending.

The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war, but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full two miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

By the eleventh of June our lines were closed up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the fourteenth, and on the morning of the fifteenth Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the seventeenth, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.

From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town.

During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villainously bad, and the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow, wooded roads mere mud-gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing, galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.

General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw, and working his left forward, General Thomas swinging, as it were on a grand left-wheel, his left on Kenesaw, connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all

the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown road. On the twenty-second General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right. The enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Williams' division of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division of General Schofield's army.

The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish lines (an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception), yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the "Kulp House." Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the "Kulp House," and upon studying the ground, I had no alternative, in my turn, but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines.

All looked to me to "outflank." An army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either part, it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the twenty-fourth of June, I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the twenty-seventh, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnaissance; one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and the other about a mile further south by General Thomas' troops. The hour was fixed, and all the details given in Field Orders, number twenty-eight, of June twenty-fourth. On the twenty-seventh of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded; our aggregate loss being near three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced

good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly, and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.

It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strongly on the enemy's left; and on the first of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and to rapidly throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack creek and Turner's ferry across the Chattahoochee, and I also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July second, and the effect was instantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top. General Thomas' whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and turned south, in pursuit toward the Chattahoochee. In person I entered Marietta at half-past eight o'clock in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. General Logan's corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong *tete du pont* at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta.

Here General Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottonwood creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the fourth of July we pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack creek and about Turner's ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Pace's ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve; the enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee. Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the fifth demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee river, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

To accomplish this result I judged it would

be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, and accordingly I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna Camp-ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the seventh of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle-bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the factories which had supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woollen factory, the nominal owner displayed the French flag, which was not respected, of course. A neutral, surely, is no better than one of our own citizens, and we do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses.

General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and as I contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest up to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General McPherson's whole army. About the same time General Howard had also built a bridge at Powers' ferry, two miles below General Schofield, had crossed over and taken a position on his right. Thus during the ninth we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee, above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta, and Johnston abandoned his *tete du pont*, burned his bridges, and left us undisputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochee, at daylight on the tenth of July.

This was one, if not the chief, object of the campaign, viz: the advancement of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee, but Atlanta lay before us, only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed, with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, &c., and more especially its railroads, which converge there from the four great cardinal points. But the men had worked hard and needed rest, and we accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency, I had collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about two thousand strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa, at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika. There is but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of

trade and travel between Georgia and Alabama and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to break it up effectually and thereby cut off Johnston's army from that source of supply and reinforcement.

General Rousseau, commanding the District of Tennessee, asked permission to command the expedition, and received it. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochee, and as I had begun to manoeuvre on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the tenth of July. He fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General Clanton en route; he passed through Talladega, and reached the railroad on the sixteenth, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that place. Also three miles of the branch toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. He then turned north, and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the twenty-third, having sustained a trifling loss—not to exceed thirty men.

The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoochee until the sixteenth of July, but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons, and improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river, to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance, I ordered it to commence on the seventeenth; General Thomas to cross at Powers' and Pace's ferry bridges, and to march by Buckhead; General Schofield, already across at the mouth of Soap's creek, to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta road, at some point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railroad. On the seventeenth the whole army advanced from their camps and formed a general line along the old Peach-tree road.

Continuing on a general right wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railroad on the eighteenth, at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry, and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division of the Fifteenth corps, broke up a section of about four miles, and General Schofield reached the town of Decatur.

On the nineteenth, General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur, and General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree creek in force by numerous bridges, in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy in more or less force, and skirmished heavily.

On the twentieth all the armies had closed in, converging toward Atlanta, but as a gap existed

between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the twentieth, about four p. m., the enemy sallied from his works in force, and fell in line of battle against our right centre, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road; of General Hooker's corps next south, and General Johnson's division of General Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail piles which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's whole corps was uncovered, and had to fight on comparatively open ground, and it, too, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his intrenchments. The action in front of General Johnson was comparatively light, that division being well intrenched. The enemy left on the field over five hundred dead, about one thousand wounded severely, seven stands of colors, and many prisoners. His loss could not have fallen short of five thousand, whereas ours was covered by one thousand five hundred killed, wounded, and missing; the greater loss fell on General Hooker's corps, from its exposed position.

On the twenty-first we felt the enemy in his intrenched position, which was found to crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of Peach-tree creek, his right beyond the Augusta road to the east, and his left well toward Turner's ferry on the Chattahoochee, at a general distance from Atlanta of about four miles.

On the morning of the twenty-second, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest; but General Johnston had been relieved of his command, and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept across the strong and well-finished parapet of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta, until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two miles' radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished redoubts, which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta; and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle-trenches, abatis, and *chevaux de frise*.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the railroad, with the Fifteenth corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General Blair on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its right, but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth corps, General Dodge, was thrown out of line by the

Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield near the Howard house. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the Seventeenth corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position, and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank.

About ten a. m., I was in person, with General Schofield, examining the appearance of the enemy's lines opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by, known as the Howard house, where General McPherson joined me. He described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division of General Blair's corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by General McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. The General remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated a movement of the enemy on that flank, he mounted and rode away with his staff. I must here also state that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta road, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ulfauhatchee rivers, tributaries of Ocmulgee, and General McPherson had also left his wagon-train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments commanded by Colonel, now General Sprague. Soon after General McPherson left me at the Howard house, as before described, I heard the sounds of musketry to our left rear, at first mere pattering shots, but soon they grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time the sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could longer be entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior force on our left flank, while he held us with his forts

in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily transmitted orders to all parts of our centre and right to press forward and give full employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12:30 p. m. of the twenty-second, his Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, rode up and reported that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless, having two wounds. The suddenness of this terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I instantly despatched a staff officer to General John A. Logan, commanding the Fifteenth corps, to tell him what had happened; that he must assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before.

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and by a wide circuit to the east had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and his right had swung around until it hit General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of the rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outward. A space of wooded ground of near half a mile, intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured, but the last order ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel Wangelin's) of the Fifteenth corps across from the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across on the double-quick, and checked the enemy. While Hardee attacked in flank, Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but fortunately their attacks were not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps, who was somewhat "in air," and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the apex of the hill, which was the only part that was deemed essential to our future plans. General Dodge had caught and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely, capturing

many prisoners. Smith (General Giles A.) had gradually given up the extremity of his line and formed a new one, whose right connected with General Leggett, and his left refused, facing south-east. On this ground and in this order the men fought well and desperately for near four hours, checking and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four p. m. had almost given up the attempt. In the meantime, Wheeler's cavalry unopposed (for General Gerrard was absent at Covington by my order), had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel, now General Sprague, covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of General Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of six guns, with its horses (Murray's), of the Regular Army, as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger, in a narrow, wooded road in that unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes. He also got two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described. About four p. m., there was quite a lull, during which the enemy felt forward on the railroad and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the two guns; he then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at that point, which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's order to the extreme left. The other brigade, General Lightburn, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder, about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which, a twenty-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General Wood's and General Harrow's divisions of the Fifteenth corps, that were on the right and left of the railroad. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, I ordered certain batteries of General Schofield to be moved to a position somewhat commanding, by a left flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight and the woods beyond, to prevent his reinforcing. I also sent orders to General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the Fifteenth corps regain its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Wood, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the

parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. The whole was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet, but at last the enemy gave way and the Fifteenth corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of view and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the twenty-second, which cost us three thousand seven hundred and twenty-two killed, wounded, and prisoners.

But among the dead was Major-General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had sent it, in charge of his personal staff, back to Marietta, on its way to his Northern home. He was a noble youth of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his reputation and that of his veteran army, and avenged the death of his comrade and commander. The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded, and about a thousand well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at three thousand two hundred and forty, of which number two thousand two hundred were from actual count, and of these he delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce, sent in by him (the enemy) eight hundred bodies. I entertain no doubt that in the battle of July twenty-second the enemy sustained an aggregate loss of full eight thousand men. The next day General Garrard returned from Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges at Ucofauhatchee and Yellow rivers, besides burning a train of cars, a large quantity of cotton (two thousand bales), and the depots of stores at Covington and Conyers' station, and bringing in two hundred prisoners and some good horses, losing but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having, therefore, sufficiently crippled the Augusta road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in Atlanta.

Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. I first ordered the Army of the Tennessee to prepare to vacate its line and to shift by the right, below Proctor's creek, and General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta road. About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about two thousand good cavalry, but of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sandtown, I shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered

all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road, simultaneous with the movement of the Army of the Tennessee toward East Point. To accomplish this, I gave General Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an effective force of full five thousand men, and to General McCook I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison of the Eighth Indiana cavalry, in the aggregate about four thousand. These two well-appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz., July twenty-eighth, they were to meet on the Macon road near Lovejoy's, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this joint cavalry could whip all Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise fully accomplish its task, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet me, and explained the movement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of perfect success. At the very moment, almost, of starting, General Stoneman addressed me a note asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and Anderson, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There was something most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road, he might attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its proper flank of the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is prisoner of war at Macon, but I know that he despatched General Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but for some reason unknown to me, he went off toward Covington and did not again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard remained there until the twenty-ninth, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's cavalry and occupying their attention, but hearing nothing from General Stoneman, he moved back to Conyers', where, learning that General Stoneman had gone to Covington and south on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east, which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of Walnut creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main force appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, or in approaching Andersonville, but retired in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave consent to two thirds of

his force to escape back while he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about seven hundred men, and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adams, came in almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered, many were captured and killed, and the balance got in mostly unarmed and afoot, and the General himself surrendered his small command, and is now a prisoner at Macon. His mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.

General McCook, in the execution of his part, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto station of the West Point road, where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion toward Campbelltown, which regiment fulfilled its duty, and returned to camp by way of, and escorting back, the pontoon-bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta. These he burned to the number of five hundred, killing eight hundred mules, and carrying along others, and taking two hundred and fifty prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it at Lovejoy station at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and finding his progress east too strongly opposed, he moved south and west, and reaching Newnan, on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in, and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures, and cut his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men, among them a most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skirmishers on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed and got to Marietta, without further loss.

General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole, the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale, that I knew the damages would soon be repaired.

Pursuant to the general plan the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines near the Decatur road during the night of July twenty-sixth, and on the twenty-seventh moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's creek, and south, to pro-

long our line due south, facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the United States, Major-General Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made *en echelon*, General Dodge's corps, Sixteenth, on the left, nearest the enemy, General Blair's corps, Seventeenth, next to come up on its right, and General Logan's corps, Fifteenth, to come up on its right, and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as much ground due south from the flank already established on Proctor's creek as was consistent with a proper strength. General Dodge's men got into line in the evening of the twenty-seventh, and General Blair's came into line on his right early on the morning of the twenty-eighth, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra Church, near some large open fields by the poor-house, on a road known as the Bell's ferry or Lickskillet road. Here the Fifteenth corps, General Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About ten a. m., all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after awhile assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men construct them is wonderful, and is something new in the art of war. I rode along his whole line about that time, and as I approached Ezra Church there was considerable artillery firing, enfilading the road in which I was riding, killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field to where General Howard was standing in the rear of the Fifteenth corps, and walked up to the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith, to see if the battery which enfiladed the main road and line of rail-piles could not be disposed of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned to where General Howard was, and remained there until twelve o'clock. During this time there was nothing to indicate serious battle save the shelling by one, or at most two, batteries from beyond the large field in front of the Fifteenth corps.

Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated his game of the twenty-second, I had, the night before, ordered General Davis' division of General Palmer's corps, which, by the movements of the Army of the Tennessee, had been left, as it were, in reserve, to move down to Turner's ferry, and thence toward Whitehall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line, hoping that in case of an attack this division would in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. I explained it to General Howard, and bade him expect the arrival of such a force in case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon. General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier-General Morgan commanded the division which

road near Calhoun. I could not have asked anything better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, and this detachment left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my orders for the time being, and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about five thousand cavalry, and to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the eighteenth to the West Point road, and break it good near Fairburn; thence to proceed across to the Macon road, and tear it up thoroughly; to avoid as far as possible the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me in better position to take full advantage of the result.

General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, and broke the West Point road, and afterward reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross' cavalry and got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry which had been despatched below Jonesboro' in cars was run back, and disembarked, and with Jackson's rebel cavalry, made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east, and made a circuit, and struck the railroad about Lovejoy's station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which he returned by a circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the twenty-second. After an interview with General Kilpatrick, I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of the whole army. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders were at once notified to send their surplus wagons, encumbrances of all kinds, and sick, back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement would begin during the night of the twenty-fifth. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on our extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's creek. The Twentieth corps, General Williams, moved back to the Chattahoochee. This movement was made without loss, save a few things left in our camps by thoughtless officers or men. The night of the twenty-sixth the movement continued, the Army of the Tennessee drawing out and moving rapidly by a circuit, well toward Sandtown and across Camp creek, the Army of the Cumberland below Utoy creek, General Scho-

field remaining in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell from the enemy. The third movement brought the Army of the Tennessee on the West Point railroad, above Fairburn, the Army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield closed in near Digs and Mins. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. Twelve and one half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, with logs, rock, and earth intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move the next day eastward by several roads. General Howard on the right toward Jonesboro', General Thomas, the centre, by Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's mills. An inspection of the map will show the strategic advantages of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge or "divide" between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. Therefore, the position I have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first "objective." It gave me "interior lines," something our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I was anxious for once to get the inside track, and therefore my haste and desire to secure it.

The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the twenty-ninth. General Thomas, on the centre, encountered little opposition or difficulty save what resulted from the narrow roads, and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point, and came into position toward Rough-and-Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, had a greater distance to move. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short delay occurred, and some cannonading and skirmishing, but General Howard started them again, and kept them moving, passed the Renfro place on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day, but he wisely and well kept on and pushed on toward Jonesboro', saved the bridge across Flint river, and did not halt until darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the morning of August thirty-first, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth corps and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act

offensively or defensively, as the case called for.

I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as soon as I learned that General Howard had passed Renfro's, I directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis' corps, to move General Stanley's corps in connection with General Schofield's toward Rough-and-Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' corps to feel for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough-and-Ready. These movements were progressing during the thirty-first, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesboro' and attacked General Howard in position described. General Howard was admirably situated to receive him, and repulsed the attack thoroughly. The enemy attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and after a contest of over two hours, withdrew, leaving over four hundred dead on the ground, and his wounded, of which about three hundred were left in Jonesboro', could not have been much less than two thousand five hundred. Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesboro' about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about four p. m., the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro'; that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough-and-Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General Stanley of General Thomas' army, had also got the road below General Schofield and was destroying its working south, and that General Baird of General Davis' corps had struck it still lower down within four miles of Jonesboro'.

Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesboro', General Howard to keep the enemy busy while General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. I also ordered the troops as they moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because we had it then and I did not know but that events might divert our attention. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear, the north. General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesboro'. I expected the whole army would close down on Jonesboro' by noon of the first of September. General Davis' corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was on time, and deployed, facing south, his right in connection with General Howard, and his left on the railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the Rough-and-Ready road, and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro', to act against that flank along with General Kilpatrick's cavalry. About

four p. m., General Davis was all ready, and assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hurry up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy was gone, and had retreated south. About two o'clock that night the sounds of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These continued for about an hour, and again about four a. m. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer us, and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless, at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at Jonesboro', I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's station, in a strong, entrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a branch of Walnut creek to the right, and a confluent of the Flint river to his left. We pushed close up and reconnoitered the ground, and found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville roads.

Rumors began to arrive through prisoners captured that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September first; that Hood had blown up his ammunition-trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us, and which were yet unexplained; that Stewart's corps was then retreating toward McDonough, and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success already gained. Accordingly I ordered the work of destroying railroad to cease, and the troops to be held in hand, ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

General Jeff. C. Davis' corps had been left above Jonesboro', and General Garrard's cavalry was still further back, and the latter was ordered to send back to Atlanta and ascertain the exact truth and the real situation of affairs. But the same night, viz.: of September fourth, a courier arrived from General Slocum, reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and had retreated on the McDonough road. General Slocum had entered and taken possession on the second of September.

The object of my movement against the rail-

road was, therefore, already reached and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the fourth for the Army to prepare to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the fifth we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesboro; five miles, where we remained a day. On the seventh we moved to Rough-and-Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland grouped round about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean and healthy camps.

I have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations to our rear, further than that he broke the road about Calhoun and then made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laibold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into East Tennessee, and made quite a stay at Athens; but on the first show of pursuit, he kept on north across the Little Tennessee; and crossing the Holston near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over toward Sequatchee and McMinville. Thence he seems to have gone to Murfreesboro and Lebanon, and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the property of citizens, but has injured us but little, the railroads being repaired about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued toward Florence, and out of the State by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger; but what amount of execution they have done to him is not yet reported. Our roads and telegraph are all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed. It is proper to remark in this place, that during the operation of this campaign, expeditions were sent out from Memphis and Vicksburg to check any movements of the enemy's forces in Mississippi upon our communications. The manner in which this object was accomplished reflects credit upon Generals A. J. Smith, Washburn, Slocum, and Mower; and, although General Sturgis' expedition was less successful than the others, it assisted us in the main object to be accomplished.

I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges—those of the Oostanula, the Etowah, and Chattahoochee—are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time, almost out of material improvised on the spot.

Colonel W. W. Wright, who has charge of the "construction and repairs," is not only a

most skilful, but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the Quartermasters and Commissaries, bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind.

Colonel L. C. Easton, Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief Commissary, have also succeeded, in a manner surprising to all of us, in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant-General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign.

Captain T. G. Baylor, Chief Ordnance Officer, has in like manner kept the army well supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions. My own personal staff has been small but select.

Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, has filled the office of Chief of Artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. Hittoe, Chief Medical Inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen the wounded removed from the field of battle, cared for, and afterward sent to proper hospitals in the rear with more promptness, system, care, and success, than during this whole campaign, covering over one hundred days of actual battle and skirmish.

My Aides-de-Camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. M. Dayton and Captain J. C. Audenried have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders day and night to distant points of our extended lines, with an intelligence and zeal that ensured the perfect working of machinery covering from ten to twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery or explanation of an order would have produced confusion; whereas, in great measure owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks through a difficult country of over a hundred and thirty-eight miles in length, without confusion or trouble.

Captain Dayton has also fulfilled the duties of my Adjutant-General, making all orders and carrying on the official correspondence.

Three Inspectors-General completed my staff. Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, who has since been assigned the command of a division of the

Sixteenth corps, at the request of General Dodge; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Warner, of the Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ewing, Inspector-General of the Fifteenth corps and Captain Thirteenth United States Regulars.

These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance to me in handling these large armies.

My three "armies in the field" were commanded by able officers, my equals in rank and experience. Major-General George H. Thomas, Major-General J. M. Schofield, and Major-General O. O. Howard. With such commanders I had only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot overestimate their services to the country, and must express my deep and heartfelt thanks that, coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist.

I now enclose their reports, and those of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, a perusal of which will fill up the sketch which I have endeavored to make. I also submit tabular statements of our losses in battle by wounds and sickness; also, lists of prisoners captured, sent to the rear, and exchanged; also, of the guns and materials of war captured, besides the important country, towns, and arsenals of the enemy that we now "occupy and hold."

All of which is respectfully submitted.

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General Commanding.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,  
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION,  
OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 9, 1864.

*General J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball & Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I enclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly. You style the measure proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself, very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted.

Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You, yourself burned houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day, fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable, because they have stood in the way of your

forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every cannon shot and many musket-balls from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a brave people.

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from the scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history.

In the name of common sense I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You, who in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war, who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance sergeant, and seized and made prisoners of war, the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians.

Long before any overt act was committed by the, to you, hateful Lincoln Government, you tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion in spite of themselves, falsified the vote of Louisiana, turned loose your pirates to plunder unarmed ships, expelled Union families by thousands, burned their homes, and declared by an act of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received.

Talk thus to Marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southron among you. If we must be enemies let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it will be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our backs, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

ETH. B. WADE, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,  
September 12, 1864.

*Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commander Military Division of the Mississippi:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the ninth instant,

with its enclosure, in reference to the women, children, and others, whom you have seen proper to expel from their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close this correspondence, and without your expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that while "the interest of the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have dropped the subject. But you have chosen to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence. I see nothing in your communication, which induces me to modify the language of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "pre-eminent in the dark history of war, for studied and ingenious cruelty." Your original order was stripped of all pretence; you announced the edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the United States." This alone, you offered to us and the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God and man. You say that "General Johnston himself, very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is due to the gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded aspersion upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered and extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens, who desired to flee from your fraternal embrace. You are unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the defence of Jonesboro' by General Hardee, or of Atlanta by myself. General Hardee defended his position in front of Jonesboro' at the expense of injury to the houses, an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilized nations. No inhabitant of either town was expelled from his home and fireside by either General Hardee or myself, and therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of either of us. I feel no other emotion than pain in reading that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling of Atlanta without notice, under the pretence that I defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town that every cannon-shot, and many musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred thousand living witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far above and miles

beyond my lines of defence. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the assertion, that they, for several weeks, unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discursive. It opens a wide field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to me. I am only a General of one of the armies of the Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with you the cause of the present war, or the political questions which led to or resulted from it. These grave and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge my country with "daring and badgering you to battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first gun was fired on either side. You say we insulted your flag. The truth is we fired upon it and those who fought under it when you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes and Indians. The truth is, we expelled by force of arms insolent intruders, and took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claim to dominion over masters, slaves and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with unanimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the unbiassed will of those States, and all others, to determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and labors daily by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separated herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed, or admiration for heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our country, and swept the seas in

defiance of your navy, around the whole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of, but on the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies, and many well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by acts of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods sold and delivered." The truth is, Congress gave due and ample time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestered the property of our enemies in retaliation for their acts declaring us traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power extended, either in their country or our own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts, known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city, drive men, women and children from their houses at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the claim that this is an act of "kindness to these families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping edict covering all the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the defenceless, by assuming that you have done them a kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southron." And because I characterize what you call kindness as being real cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God, and you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and children from what you call kindness, is a "sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You come into our country with your army avowedly for the purpose of subjugating free white men, women and children; and not only intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever attained by that race in any country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to sacrifice everything for the peace and honor of the South, and refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between myself, my country, and my God.

You say "let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is, for myself, and, I believe, for all true men, aye and women and children, in my country, we will fight you to death. Better die a thousand deaths than to submit to live under you or your Government and your negro allies.

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the ninth September, I close this correspondence with you, and notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his Almighty aid in defence of justice and right.

Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,  
General.

F. H. WIGFALL,  
Aide-de-Camp.

THE CITIZENS' PETITION.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11

Major-General W. T. Sherman:

SIR: The undersigned, mayor and two members of council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfully, to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve, in the aggregate, consequences appalling and heartrending. Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy, others now having young children, and whose husbands are either in the army, prisoners or dead. Some say: I have such a one sick at home; who will wait on them when I am gone? Others say: What are we to do? we have no homes to go to, and no means to buy, build, or to rent any—no parents, friends or relatives to go to. Another says: I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much. We reply to them, General Sherman will carry your property to Rough-and-Ready, and General Hood will take it thence on. And they will reply to that: But I want to leave the railroad at such a point, and cannot get conveyance from there on. We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses to accommodate the people; and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? and how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter or subsistence—in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them, if they were willing to do so? This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, a

the suffering, cannot be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration. We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter; but though it might be that you had not considered the subject in all its awful consequences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make that people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred; surely none such in the United States; and what has this helpless people done, that they are at once to be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts and exiles, and to subsist on charity? We do not know, as yet, the number of people still here. Of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer period, and who might not need assistance at any time. In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider that order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES M. CALHOUN,  
Mayor.

E. E. RAWSON,

L. C. WELLS,  
Councilmen.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA.,  
September 12, 1864. }

*James M. Calhoun, Mayor. E. E. Rawson, and  
L. C. Wells, representing the City Council of  
Atlanta :*

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the eleventh, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions, of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have Peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have years of military operations from this quarter, and, therefore,

deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is not consistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that *my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away*, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have *peace and a division of our country*. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to preserve it, it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of *Union*. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army at once become your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know, those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and its desolation. You might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your land, or anything you have; but we do want, and will have, a *just obedience to the laws of the United States*. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better for you.

I repeat, then, that by *the original compact*

of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., long before Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I, myself, have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now, that war comes home to you, you feel very different—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent carloads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good-people, who only ask to live in peace at their old homes, and under the government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect an early success.

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from any quarter. Now, you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours in haste,  
W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major-General.

GENERAL LOGAN'S REPORTS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,  
BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., July 24. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following summary of the result of the battle of the twenty-second ult:

Total loss in killed, wounded and missing, three thousand five hundred and twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery. We have buried and delivered to the enemy under a flag of truce sent in by them, in front of the Seventeenth Army Corps, one thousand of their killed; the number of their dead in front of the Fourth division of the same corps, including those on ground not now occupied by our troops, General Blair reports will swell the number of their dead on his front to two thousand. The number of dead buried in front of the Fifteenth corps, up to this hour, is three hundred and sixty; and the commanding officer reports at least as many more are unburied. The number of dead buried in front of the Six-

teenth corps was four hundred and twenty-two. We have over one thousand of their wounded in our hands—a larger number of wounded having been carried off during the night, after the engagement, by them. We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now; also captured five thousand stand arms. The attack was made on our line seven times, and was seven times repulsed. Hood's, Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged us. We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank. We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.

Our total loss is 3,521; the enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried or delivered to them, 3,220; total prisoners sent north, 1,017; total prisoners wounded in our hands, 1,000; estimated loss of enemy, at least 10,000.

Very respectfully,  
Your obedient servant,  
JNO. A. LOGAN,  
Major-General.

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,  
Commanding Military Division of Mississippi.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,  
BEFORE ATLANTA, July 29, 1864. }

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I moved my command in position on the right of the Seventeenth Army Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, on the night and morning of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth instant, and during my advance in line of battle to a more desirable position we were met by the rebel infantry from Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a desperate and determined attack at half-past eleven o'clock A. M., on the twenty-eighth.

My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown in front of them. The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced, and lasted until about three o'clock in the afternoon. During that time six successive charges were made, which were six times gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.

Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously, but each time with like result. The most of the fighting occurred on Generals Harrow's and Smith's fronts, which formed the centre and right of the command. The troops could not have displayed more courage nor greater determination not to yield. Had they shown less they would have been driven from their position. Brigadier-Generals Wood's, Harrow's, and Smith's division commands are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the assaults. My thanks are due to Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reinforcements at a time when they were much needed.

My losses are fifty killed, four hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and fifty-three missing; aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. There were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets captured. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of seventy-three wounded, who have been removed to hospitals, and are being taken care of by our surgeons. Five hundred and sixty-five rebels, up to this time, have been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied. Large numbers were undoubtedly carried away during the night, as the enemy did not withdraw until nearly daylight. The enemy's loss could not have been, in my judgment, less than six or seven thousand.

I am, very respectfully,  
 Your obedient servant,  
 JOHN A. LOGAN,  
 Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. CLARK,  
 Assistant Adjutant-General.

The endorsement upon the above report is as follows :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE }  
 TENNESSEE, BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., July 29, 1864. }

In forwarding the within report I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troops engaged. I never saw better conduct in battle. The General commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps, though ill and much worn, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one man. His officers, and in fact all the officers of this army that commanded my observation, co-operated promptly and heartily with him.

O. O. HOWARD,  
 Major-General.

GENERAL THOMAS' ORDER.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, }  
 July 26, 1864. }

The Major-General commanding the army congratulates the troops upon the brilliant success attending the Union arms in the late battles. In the battle of the twentieth instant, in which the Twentieth corps, one division of the Fourth corps, and part of the Fourteenth corps were engaged, the total Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was one thousand seven hundred and thirty-three. In front of the Twentieth corps there were put out of the fight six thousand rebels; five hundred and sixty-three of the enemy were buried by our own troops, and the rebels were permitted to bury two hundred and fifty. The Second division of the Fourth corps repulsed seven different assaults of the enemy, with light loss to themselves, and which must have swelled the number of dead buried by the rebels to beyond three hundred. We also captured seven stands of colors. No official report has been received of the part taken in the battle by the Fourteenth corps. In the battle of the twenty-second instant the total Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was three thousand five hundred, and ten pieces of artillery. The

rebel loss in prisoners captured was three thousand two hundred. The known dead of the enemy in front of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth corps and one division of the Seventeenth corps was two thousand one hundred and forty-two. The other divisions of the Seventeenth corps repulsed six assaults of the enemy before they fell back, and which will swell the rebel loss in killed to at least three thousand. The latest reports state that we buried over three thousand two hundred rebels killed in this fight. There were captured from the enemy in this battle eighteen stands of colors and five thousand stands of arms.

By command of  
 Major-General THOMAS.  
 W. D. WHIPPLE,  
 Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL HOWARD'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE }  
 TENNESSEE, EAST POINT, GA., }  
 September 9, 1864. }

General Field Orders No. 10.

It is with pride, gratification and a sense of Divine favor that I congratulate this noble army upon the successful termination of the campaign.

Your officers claim for you a wonderful record—for example, a march of four hundred miles, thirteen distinct engagements, four thousand prisoners, and twenty stands of colors captured, and three thousand of the enemy's dead buried in your front.

Your movements upon the enemy's flank have been bold and successful; first upon Resaca, second upon Dallas, third upon Kenesaw, fourth upon Nickajack, fifth, via Roswell, upon the Augusta railroad, sixth upon Ezra Church, to the south-west of Atlanta, and seventh upon Jonesboro' and the Macon railroad. Atlanta was evacuated while you were fighting at Jonesboro'.

The country may never know with what patience, labor and exposure, you have tugged away at every natural and artificial obstacle that an enterprising and confident enemy could interpose. The terrific battles you have fought may never be realized or credited, still a glad acclaim is already greeting you from the Government and people, in view of the results you have helped to gain, and I believe a sense of the magnitude of the achievements of the last hundred days will not abate, but increase with time and history.

Our rejoicing is tempered, as it always must be, by the soldier's sorrow at the loss of his companions-in-arms. On every hillside, in every valley, throughout your long and circuitous route, from Dalton to Jonesboro', you have buried them.

Your trusted and beloved commander fell in your midst; his name, the name of McPherson, carries with it a peculiar feeling of sorrow. I trust the impress of his character is upon you

all, to incite you to generous actions and noble deeds.

To mourning friends, and to all the disabled in battle, you extend a soldier's sympathy.

My first intimate acquaintance with you dates from the twenty-eighth of July. I never beheld fiercer assaults than the enemy then made, and I never saw troops more steady and self-possessed in action than your divisions which were then engaged.

I have learned that for cheerfulness, obedience, rapidity of movement, and confidence in battle, the Army of Tennessee is not to be surpassed, and it shall be my study that your fair record shall continue, and my purpose to assist you to move steadily forward and plant the old flag in every proud city of the rebellion.

O. O. HOWARD,  
Major-General.

SAMUEL L. TAGGART,  
Assistant Adjutant-General

ORDER OF GENERAL LOGAN.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }  
EAST POINT, GA., September 11, 1864. }

*Officers and Soldiers of the Fifteenth Army Corps :*

You have borne your part in the accomplishment of the object of this campaign—a part well and faithfully done.

On the first day of May, 1864, from Huntsville, Alabama, and its vicinity, you commenced the march. The marches and labors performed by you during this campaign will hardly find a parallel in the history of the war. The proud name heretofore acquired by the Fifteenth corps, for soldierly bearing and daring deeds, remains untarnished, its lustre undimmed. During the campaign you constituted the main portion of the flanking column of the whole army. Your first move against the enemy was around the right of the army at Resaca, where, by your gallantry, the enemy were driven from the hills and his works on the main road from Villanow to Resaca. On the retreat of the enemy, you moved on the right flank of the army, by a circuitous route, to Adairsville; in the same manner from there to Kingston and Dallas, where, on the twenty-third of May, you met the veteran corps of Hardee, and, in a severe and bloody contest, you hurled him back, killing and wounding over two thousand, besides capturing a large number of prisoners. You then moved round to the left of the army by way of Ackworth, to Kenesaw Mountain, where again you met the enemy, driving him from three lines of works, and capturing over three hundred prisoners. During your stay in front of Kenesaw Mountain, on the twenty-seventh of June, you made one of the most daring, bold, and heroic charges of the war, against the almost impregnable position of the enemy on the Little Kenesaw. You were then moved by way of Marietta, to Nickajack creek, on the right of our army; thence back to the extreme left by way of Marietta and Roswell, to the Augusta rail-

road, near Stone Mountain, a distance of fifty miles, and after effectually destroying the railroad at this point, you moved by way of Decatur to the immediate front of the rebel stronghold, Atlanta. Here, on the twenty-second day of July, you again performed your duty nobly, as patriots and soldiers, in one of the most severe and sanguinary conflicts of the campaign. With hardly time to recover your almost exhausted energies, you were moved again around to the right of the army, only to fight the same troops against whom you had so recently contended; and the battle of the twenty-eighth of July, at Ezra Chapel, will long be remembered by the officers and soldiers of this command. On that day it was that the Fifteenth corps, almost unaided and alone, for four hours contested the field against the corps of Hardee and Lee. You drove them discomfited from the field; causing them to leave their dead and many of their wounded in your hands. The many noble and gallant deeds performed by you on this day will be remembered among the proudest acts of our nation's history. After pressing the enemy closely for several days, you again moved to the right of the army, to the West Point railroad, near Fairburn. After completely destroying the road for some distance, you marched to Jonesboro, driving the enemy before you from Pond creek, a distance of ten miles. At this point you again met the enemy, composed of Lee's and Hardee's corps, on the thirty-first of August, and punished them severely, driving them in confusion from the field, with their dead and many wounded and prisoners left in your hands. Here again, by your skill and true courage, you kept sacred the reputation you have so long maintained, viz.: "The Fifteenth corps never meets the enemy but to strike and defeat him." On the first of September, the Fourteenth corps attacked Hardee. You at once opened fire on him, and by your co-operation his defeat became a rout. Hood, hearing the news, blew up his ammunition trains, retreated, and Atlanta was ours.

You have marched during the campaign, in your windings, the distance of four hundred miles; have put *hors de combat* more of the enemy than your corps numbers; have captured twelve stands of arms, two thousand four hundred and fifty prisoners, and two hundred and ten deserters. The course of your march is marked by the graves of patriotic heroes, who have fallen by your side; but, at the same time, it is more plainly marked by the blood of traitors, who have defied the Constitution and laws, insulted and trampled under foot the glorious flag of our country. We deeply sympathize with the friends of those of our comrades-in-arms who have fallen; our sorrows are only appeased by the knowledge that they fell as brave men, battling for the preservation and perpetuation of one of the best governments of earth. "Peace be to their ashes."

You now rest for a short time from your la-

bors. During your respite prepare for future action. Let the country see, at all times, by your conduct, that you love the cause you have espoused; that you have no sympathy with any who would by word or deed assist vile traitors in dismembering our mighty republic or trailing in the dust the emblem of our national greatness and glory. You are the defenders of a government that has blessed you heretofore, with peace, happiness and prosperity. Its perpetuity depends upon your heroism, faithfulness and devotion.

When the time shall come to go forward again, let us go with the determination to save our nation from threatened wreck, and hopeless ruin, not forgetting the appeal from widows and orphans that is borne to us upon every breeze, to avenge the loss of their loved ones who have fallen in the defence of their country. Be patient, obedient, and earnest, and the day is not far distant when you can return to your homes with the proud consolation that you have assisted in causing the old banner to again wave from every mountain, and over every town and hamlet of our once happy land, and hear the shouts of triumph ascend from a grateful people, proclaiming that once more we have one flag and one country.

JOHN A. LOGAN,  
Major-General Commanding.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }  
MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 8. }

*Special Field Orders, No. 68.*

The officers and soldiers of the Armies of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee, have already received the thanks of the nation through its President and Commander-in-chief; and it remains now only for him who has been with you from the beginning, and who intends to stay all the time, to thank the officers and men for their intelligence, fidelity and courage displayed in the campaign of Atlanta.

On the first day of May our armies were lying in garrison, seemingly quiet, from Knoxville to Huntsville, and our enemy lay behind his rocky-faced barrier at Dalton, proud, defiant and exulting. He had had time since Christmas to recover from his discomfiture on the Mission Ridge, with his ranks filled, and a new commander-in-chief, second to none of the Confederacy in reputation for skill, sagacity and extreme popularity.

All at once, our armies assumed life and action, and appeared before Dalton; threatening Rocky Face we threw ourselves upon Resaca, and the rebel army only escaped by the rapidity of its retreat, aided by the numerous roads with which he was familiar, and which were strange to us.

Again he took post at Allatoona, but we gave him no rest, and by a circuit toward Dallas, and a subsequent movement to Ackworth, we gained the Allatoona Pass. Then followed the eventful

battles about Kenesaw, and the escape of the enemy across the Chattahoochee river.

The crossing of the Chattahoochee and breaking of the Augusta road was most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in the art of war. At this stage of our game, our enemies became dissatisfied with their old and skilful commander, and selected one more bold and rash. New tactics were adopted. Hood first boldly and rapidly, on the twentieth of July, fell on our right at Peachtree Creek, and lost.

Again, on the twenty-second, he struck our extreme left, and was severely punished; and finally again, on the twenty-eighth, he repeated the attempt on our right, and that time must have been satisfied, for since that date he has remained on the defensive. We slowly and gradually drew our lines about Atlanta, feeling for the railroads which supplied the Rebel army, and made Atlanta a place of importance.

We must concede to our enemy that he met these efforts patiently and skilfully, but at last he made the mistake we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall. Instantly our cavalry was on his only remaining road, and we followed quickly with our principal army, and Atlanta fell into our possession as the fruit of well-concerted measures, backed by a brave and competent army.

This completed the grand task which had been assigned us by our Government, and your General again repeats his personal and official thanks to all the officers and men composing this army, for the indomitable courage and perseverance which alone could give success.

We have beaten our enemy on every ground he has chosen, and have wrested from him his own Gate City, where were located his foundries, arsenals and workshops, deemed secure on account of their distance from our base, and the seeming impregnable obstacles intervening. Nothing is impossible to an army like this, determined to vindicate a Government wherever our flag has once floated, and resolved to maintain them at any and all cost.

In our campaign many, yea, very many of our noble and gallant comrades have preceded us to our common destination, the grave; but they have left the memory of deeds, on which a nation can build a proud history. McPherson, Harker, McCook, and others, dear to us all, are now the binding links in our minds, that should attach more closely together the living, who have to complete the task which still lies before us in the dim future.

I ask all to continue as they have so well begun, the cultivation of the soldierly virtues that have ennobled our own and other countries. Courage, patience, obedience to the laws and constituted authorities of our Government; fidelity to our trusts, and good feeling among each other; each trying to excel the other in the practice of those high qualities, and it will then require no prophet to foretell that our

country will in time emerge from this war purified by the fires of war, and worthy its great founder, Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major-General, Commanding.

THE DESPATCH FROM GENERAL GRANT.

CITY POINT, VA., September 4,—9 P. M.

*Major-General Sherman:*

I have just received your despatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have just ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amidst great rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT,  
Lieutenant-General.

All the corps, regiments and batteries composing the army may, without further orders, inscribe Atlanta on their colors. By order of  
Major-General SHERMAN.

L. M. DAYTON,  
Aid-de-Camp.

By command of Major-General THOMAS.  
ROBERT H. RAMSEY,  
A. A. G.

Doc. 40.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, PA.  
CORRECTION OF OFFICIAL REPORTS.

TULLAHOMA, December 30, 1863.

DEAR GENERAL: Your favor of the twenty-third has been received. I enclose a copy of a letter which I send to General Meade by the mail of to-day. I wish you would try to see Meade after he gets my letter, and talk this matter over, and learn what he intends to do. He must write to the Secretary of War on the subject.

My corps is together again, Geary having been ordered to Bridgeport and Stevenson. I feel confident that everything will work out right in the end, and I am very anxious you should return to the corps before the spring campaign opens. I will endeavor to give you a position more agreeable to you than the one you have held heretofore. So don't make arrangements which will take you away.

Williams has gone on leave.

Please let me hear from you.

Yours truly,

H. W. SLOCUM.

To Brigadier-General GEORGE S. GREENE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL SLOCUM.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH CORPS, }  
December 1863. }

*Major-General George G. Meade Commanding  
Army of the Potomac.*

GENERAL: I enclose herewith the report of General T. H. Ruger, of operations of the First

division, Twelfth corps, at the battle of Gettysburg, together with the report of the brigade and regimental commanders. General Ruger with a large portion of his division was ordered to New York city soon after the battle, and immediately after his return from New York, the corps was ordered to this department. The reports of General Williams and myself were delayed with the hope of receiving General Ruger's report in time to forward it with them. I deeply regret the necessity which compelled me to send my report and that of General Williams unaccompanied by any report of the operations of the First division, for although an account of the operations of this division was given in the report of General Williams who commanded the corps during the battle, I think the absence of Ruger's report may account for some of the errors contained in your report as to the operations of the Twelfth corps.

I enclose a letter from General Williams calling my attention to these errors, to which I respectfully invite your attention, and if anything can be done at this late day to correct these errors, I trust you will do it. Your report is the official history of this important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our Government, our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each corps, division and brigade of your army. If you have inadvertently given to one division the credit of having performed some meritorious service, which was in reality performed by another division, you do an injustice to brave men, and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your official report is an indisputable fact.

You give great credit to Lockwood's brigade for services on the evening of July second, but state that this brigade was a portion of the First corps, while it never at any time belonged to that corps, but was a portion of the Twelfth corps, and was accompanied in its operations on the evening of July second, by General Williams in person. A portion of this brigade (the One Hundred and Fiftieth New York) is still in General Williams' division. I copy the following statement from your report: "During the heavy assault on our left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements; during their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, advanced and occupied part of the line. On the morning of the third, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary reinforced by Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth corps, main-

back to Sherman. General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi river. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the fifth of June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile bay. On the eighth of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the ninth, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the twenty-third. The total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then *en route* from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans' forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the twenty-sixth day of September, Price attacked Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri river, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans' cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue, and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains, and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September twentieth, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the twenty-third attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the twenty-fourth. Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the twenty-seventh, and on the same day cut the

Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the thirtieth one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until the next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the first of October, but without success. On the morning of the second he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the first, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the third he moved toward Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy the salt works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the second of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly entrenched position around the salt works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command, and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GA., October 10—noon.

"Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa river, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN,  
"Major-General.

"Lieutenant-General GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: "I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi river, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachian, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September twelfth, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11 A. M.

"Your despatch of October tenth received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee river. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT,  
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GA., October 11—11 A. M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN,  
"Major-General.

"Lieutenant-General GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11:30 P. M.

"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT,  
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi river. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain, General Sherman sent the Fourth corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga, to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General

Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the fourteenth of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army—the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi river—northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah river, and the occupation of Savannah on the twenty-first of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile, and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, *via* Broad river, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (Colonel Third United States Colored Cavalry), captured, on the twenty-seventh of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black river, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad river and debarked at Boyd's Neck, on the twenty-ninth of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked, in a strongly-fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse, with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the sixth of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah railroad, between the Coosawatchie and Talifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, contin-

ued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the twenty-sixth of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgement on the north side of the Tennessee river, near Florence. On the twenty-eighth Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On the second of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On the fourth the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats becoming disabled, were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the fifth the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee river, above Johnsonville, moving toward Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the fifth General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-third corps, reached Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry re-mounted.

On the nineteenth General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back toward Nashville, for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the thirtieth, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon, until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General Schofield fell back toward Nashville. This left the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned—so that General Thomas' whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up, and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the second of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was

crossing the Tennessee river, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the thirtieth of November.

On the morning of the fifteenth December General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas' despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the twenty-eighth of December our advance forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee river. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas' report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from Memphis on the twenty-first December. On the twenty-fifth he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English car-

bines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the twenty-eighth he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence, turning to the south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, and destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January fifth.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the thirteenth of November, he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the eighteenth, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia—destroy the salt works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the twelfth of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's force wherever he met them. On the sixteenth he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners, and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear river was such that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the coöperation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. I immediately commenced the