

One hundred and seventy-eight waist belts.
 One hundred and eighty-one waist-belt plates.
 One hundred and sixty-six bayonet scabbards.
 Three hundred and sixty-four cap pouches.
 Two hundred and thirty-one gun slings.
 Of the above:

Two 12-pounder guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major-General Milroy at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, December, 1864.

One 12-pounder howitzer, carriage and limber, was captured by Colonel Palmer from the command of the rebel General Lyon, near Huntsville, Alabama.

Two 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major-General Steedman, near Decatur, Alabama.

Three 12-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers; one 10-pounder Parrott rifle and carriage; one 3-inch wrought iron rifle and carriage, United States, were captured at Columbia, Tennessee.

All the remaining artillery and carriages, and all the small arms and accoutrements were captured before Nashville, on the fifteenth and sixteenth December, 1864.

The larger number of ammunition chests captured were filled with ammunition in good condition, and six wagons loaded with similar ammunition were captured before this place.

I am informed that there are, in addition to what are reported above, four guns and carriages now at Pulaski, Tennessee, and three or four guns in the Duck river at Columbia, Tennessee, all captured from the enemy or abandoned by him in his retreat to the Tennessee river.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. MORDECAI,

Capt. Ord., Chief Ord. Dep't. Cumberland.

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,
 Commanding Department Cumberland,
 Eastport, Mississippi.

Doc. 44.

CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
 GOLDSBORO, N. C., April 4, 1865. }

GENERAL: I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months, connected with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as clear an understanding of the late campaign as the case admits of. The reports of the subordinate commanders will enable you to fill up the picture.

I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was enabled to leave in the West an army under Major-General George H. Thomas of sufficient strength to meet emergencies in that quarter, while in person I conducted another army, composed of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth corps, and

Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to the Atlantic slope, aiming to approach the grand theater of war in Virginia by the time the season would admit of military operations in that latitude. The first lodgement on the coast was made at Savannah, strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a good sea-port, with its navigable stream inland. Near a month was consumed there in refitting the army, and in making the proper disposition of captured property, and other local matters, but by the fifteenth of January I was all ready to resume the march. Preliminary to this General Howard, commanding the right wing, was ordered to embark his command at Thunderbolt, transport it to Beaufort, South Carolina, and thence by the fifteenth of January make a lodgement on the Charleston railroad, at or near Pocotaligo. This was accomplished punctually, at little cost, by the Seventeenth corps, Major-General Blair, and a depot for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.

The left wing, Major-General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major-General Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, with a depot of supplies at Pureysburg, or Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah river. General Slocum had a good pontoon bridge constructed opposite the city, and the "Union Causeway" leading through the low rice fields opposite Savannah was repaired and "corduroyed," but before the time appointed to start, the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge, and overflowed the whole "bottom," so that the causeway was four feet under water, and General Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the Savannah river. He moved up to Sister's Ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was near three miles wide, and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week of February.

In the mean time General Grant had sent me Grover's division of the Nineteenth corps to garrison Savannah, and had drawn the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield, from Tennessee, and sent it to reinforce the commands of Major-Generals Terry and Palmer, operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.

On the eighteenth of January I transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, imparted to him my plans of operations, and instructed him how to follow my movements inland, by occupying in succession the city of Charleston and such other points along the sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. The combined naval and land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had, on the fifteenth of January, captured Fort Fisher and the rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river, giving me an additional point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already resolved in

my own mind, and had so advised General Grant, that I would undertake at one stride to make Goldsboro, and open communication with the sea by the Newbern railroad, and had ordered Colonel W. W. Wright, Superintendent of Military Railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern, and to be prepared to extend the railroad out from Newbern to Goldsboro by the fifteenth of March.

On the nineteenth of January all preparations were complete and the orders of march given. My Chief Quartermaster and Commissary, Generals Easton and Beckwith, were ordered to complete the supplies at Sisters' Ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise, looking for my arrival at Goldsboro, North Carolina, about the fifteenth March, and opening communication with me from Morehead City.

On the twenty-second of January I embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where I held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, United States Navy, and Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, and next day proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the twenty-fourth to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth corps, Major-General Blair, was encamped. The Fifteenth corps was somewhat scattered—Wood's and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, John E. Smith marching from Savannah by the coast road, and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the storms and freshet in the river. On the twenty-fifth a demonstration was made against the Combahee ferry and railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, merely to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against our supposed *objective*, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitered the line in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water stood in the swamps, for a breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one to twenty feet. Not having the remotest intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by seeming preparation to cross over, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest our advance on Charleston. On the twenty-seventh I rode to the camp of General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tullafuiney and Coosawhatchie rivers, and directed those places to be evacuated, as no longer of any use to us. That division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep up the feints already begun, until we should with the right wing move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie about Rivers' or Broxton's bridge.

On the twenty-ninth I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become sufficiently free of the flood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in motion, and that he was already approaching Sisters' ferry, whither a gunboat, the Pontiac, Captain Luce, kindly furnished by Admiral Dahlgren, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the meantime three divisions of the Fifteenth corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its

wagons and was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one corps, the Seventeenth, along the Salkehatchie, as high up as Rivers' bridge, and the other, the Fifteenth, by Hickory hill, Loper's cross-roads, Anglesey post-office, and Beaufort's bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo, feigning at the Salkehatchie railroad bridge and ferry, until our movement turned the enemy's position, and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.

The Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps drew out of camp on the thirty-first of January, but the real march began on the first of February. All the roads northward had, for weeks, been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled trees were removed, and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the second of February the Fifteenth corps reached Loper's cross-roads, and the Seventeenth was at Rivers' bridge. From Loper's cross-roads I communicated with General Slocum, still struggling with the floods of the Savannah river at Sisters' ferry. He had two divisions of the Twentieth corps, General Williams, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his pontoons the cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Beaufort's bridge, by way of Lawtonville and Allandale, Kilpatrick to Blackville via Barnwell, and General Slocum to hurry the crossing at Sisters' ferry as much as possible, and overtake the right wing on the South Carolina railroad. General Howard, with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie and push rapidly for the South Carolina railroad, at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at Rivers' and Beaufort's bridges. The Seventeenth corps was ordered to carry Rivers' bridge, and the Fifteenth corps Beaufort's bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skilfully by Mower's and Giles A. Smith's divisions of the Seventeenth corps, on the third of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder-deep. The weather was bitter cold, and Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgement below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it in confusion and disorder toward Branchville. Our casualties were one officer and seventeen men killed, and seventy men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina railroad at Midway, Bamberg (or Lowry's station), and Graham's station. The Seventeenth corps, by

threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge, and Walker's bridge below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy railroad track. From the seventh to the tenth of February this work was thoroughly prosecuted by the Seventeenth corps from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the Fifteenth corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the meantime General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned toward Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to be drawn needlessly into a serious battle. This he skillfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterward at Williston and Aiken. General Williams, with two divisions of the Twentieth corps, marched to the South Carolina railroad at Graham Station on the eighth, and General Slocum reached Blackville on the tenth. The destruction of the railroad was continued by the left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the eleventh of February all the army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnson's station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand, Aiken and Augusta on the other.

We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The Seventeenth corps crossed the south fork of Edisto river at Binnaker's bridge and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the Fifteenth corps crossed at Holman's bridge and moved to Poplar Springs in support. The left wing and cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders to cross the South Edisto at New and Guignard's bridges, move to the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, and there await the result of the attack on Orangeburg. On the twelfth the Seventeenth corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one division (Giles A. Smith's) close up to Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Giles Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by four P. M. the whole corps was in Orangeburg and had begun the work of destruction on the railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the fourteenth; and without wasting time or labor on Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no longer hold, I turned all the column's strength on Columbia. The Seventeenth corps followed the State

road, and the Fifteenth crossed the North Edisto from Poplar Springs at Schilling's bridge, above the mouth of "Cawcaw Swamp" creek, and took a country road which came into the State road at Zeigler's. On the fifteenth, the Fifteenth corps found the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree bridge (across Congaree creek), with a *tête-de-pont* on the south side, and a well-constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. Woods, who commanded the leading division, succeeded, however in turning the flank of the *tête-de-pont* by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and following up the retreating enemy promptly, he got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree river in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled our camps from a battery on the east side of the Congaree above Granby. Early next morning (February sixteen) the head of column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point. It was burned by the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front we could see people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass' battery was firing at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots at the unfinished State House walls, and a few shells at the railway depot, to scatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that we needed. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed General Howard not to cross directly in front of Columbia, but to cross the Saluda at the Factory, three miles above, and afterward Broad river, so as to approach Columbia from the north. Within an hour of the arrival of General Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of the left wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda at Zion church, and thence to take roads direct for Winnsboro, breaking up *en route* the railroads and bridges about Alston.

General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the Factory, on the sixteenth, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across Broad river, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's brigade, of Wood's division, Fifteenth corps. Under cover of this brigade, a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the seventeenth. I was in person at this bridge, and at eleven A. M. learned that the Mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage, and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone,

Twenty-fifth Iowa infantry, commanding third brigade, First division, Fifteenth corps. About the same time a small party of the Seventeenth corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. In anticipation of the occupation of the city, I had made written orders to General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy, absolutely, all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, depots, and machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and in company with General Howard rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it. Bales were piled everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the Court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day the Fifteenth corps passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The Seventeenth did not enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry did not come within two miles of the town.

Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smoldering fires, set by Hampton's order, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which, by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about four A. M., when the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Woods, and others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestations of a silly "Roman stoicism," but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been im-

prisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina. During the eighteenth and nineteenth, the arsenal, railroad depots, machine shops, foundries, and other buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and destroyed down to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro.

At the same time the left wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, breaking up the railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across Broad river on the Spartanburg road, the main body moving straight for Winnsboro, which General Slocum reached on the twenty-first of February. He caused the railroad to be destroyed up to Black-stakes depot, and then turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba river. The Twentieth corps reached Rocky Mount on the twenty-second, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the twenty-third. Kilpatrick's cavalry followed, and crossed over in a terrible rain during the night of the twenty-third, and moved up to Lancaster, with orders to keep up the delusion of a general movement on Charlotte, North Carolina, to which General Beauregard and all the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was also aware that Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, was aiming to make a junction with Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsboro. From the twenty-third to the twenty-sixth we had heavy rains, swelling the rivers and making the roads almost impassable. The Twentieth corps reached Hanging Rock on the twenty-sixth, and waited there for the Fourteenth corps to get across the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the river, that the pontoon bridge broke, and General Davis had very hard work to restore it and get his command across. At last he succeeded, and the left wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.

In the mean time, the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro, and thence turned for Peay's ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, the Seventeenth corps moving straight on Cheraw, via Young's bridge, and the Fifteenth corps by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges. From this latter corps, detachments were sent into Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad depot, stores, &c. A small force of mounted men under Captain Duncan was also despatched to make a dash and interrupt the railroad from Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry, and after a sharp night skirmish on Mount Elon, was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's creek, which delayed the right wing about the same length of time as the left wing had been at the Catawba.

On the second of March, the leading division of the Twentieth corps entered Chesterfield,

skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the next day about noon the Seventeenth corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee and burning the bridge at that point. At Cheraw we found much ammunition and many guns, which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry and returned, having only broken up in part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw.

Without unnecessary delay, the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw and the left wing and cavalry at Sneedsboro. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the Fourteenth corps, moving by Love's bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued unfavorable and roads bad, but the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps reached Fayetteville on the eleventh of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear river, burning the bridge. During the march from the Pedee General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the ninth of March his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton, detecting this, dashed in at daylight, and gained possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp, and everything save some prisoners, whom the enemy carried off, leaving their dead on the ground.

The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the United States arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry United States arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined, by the First regiment Michigan engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy, was here destroyed, or cast into the river.

Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been reinforced by Cheatham's corps from the West, and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear river ahead of me, and could,

therefore, complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke in North Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skillful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had dispatched to Wilmington, from Laurel Hill church, two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and on the morning of the twelfth of March the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and General Schofield, at Newbern, my despatches to the effect that on Wednesday, the fifteenth, we would move for Goldsboro, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro, which I expected to reach about the twentieth. The same day the gunboat Eolus, Captain Young, United States Navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear river, one opposite the town, the other three miles below.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to and beyond Averysboro. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro. In like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro, and to hold four divisions light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion. The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmires. Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed, to admit the passage of wheels. Still time was so important that punctually, according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear river on Wednesday, the fifteenth of March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank-road that day to Kyle's landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear guard, about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an entrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward Goldsboro, through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest that Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow,

swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in hopes to hold me, to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro. Hardee's force was estimated at twenty thousand men. It was necessary to dislodge him, that we might have the use of the Goldsboro road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was therefore ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

The Twentieth corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery, armed as infantry (Rhett's), posted across the road, behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's), by a circuit to his left, that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which rapidly retreated back to a second line, better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery (Winniger's), well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, Chief of Artillery of Twentieth corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division over this ground, General Williams captured three guns and two hundred and seventeen prisoners, of whom sixty-eight were wounded and left in a house near by, with a rebel officer, four men, and five days' rations. One hundred and eight rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced, he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis' (Fourteenth) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by McLaws' rebel division furiously, and though it fought well and hard, the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that next morning he was gone, having retreated in a miserable, stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry followed to and through Averysboro, developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South river at a mill-dam to our right, and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Averysboro, at twelve officers and sixty-five men

killed, and four hundred and seventy-seven wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (one hundred and eight), left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South river, and took the Goldsboro road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the mean time the wagon trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column, and camped the night of the eighteenth with him on the Goldsboro road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro, about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro road. Howard was at Lee's store, only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward, to where the two roads came together and became common to Goldsboro.

All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro road, which goes by way of Falling creek church. I also left Slocum, and joined Howard's column with a view to open communications with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Terry from Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling creek church, with one regiment forward to the crossroads near Cox's bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry (Dibbrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive station, and with the remaining three divisions of the Fifteenth corps come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro on the twenty-first; and Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders

were at once despatched to Schofield to push for Goldsboro, and to make dispositions to cross Little river, in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to General Terry, to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Blair, to make a night march to Falling creek church; and at daylight the right wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports, I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March eighteenth, and first encountered Dibrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns, and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole Confederate army, he promptly deployed the two divisions of the Fourteenth corps, General Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the Twentieth corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery, and massed on the left. In this position the left wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none.

Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the nineteenth, General Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth corps, which reinforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right wing found rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day, before. This body of cavalry was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the Fifteenth corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsboro road, interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution, until he

had made strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by four p. m. of the twentieth a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his entrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro, holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets and swampy obstructions.

Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the twenty-first of March. On the same day General Schofield entered Goldsboro with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got possession of the Neuse river at Cox's bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a brigade across, so that the three armies were in actual connection, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.

On the twenty-first a steady rain prevailed during which General Mower's division of the Seventeenth corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and it might be let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general attack by our skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position, of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the twenty-second pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle.

General Slocum reports the losses of the left wing about Bentonville at nine officers and one hundred and forty-five men killed, fifty-one officers and eight hundred and sixteen men wounded, and three officers and two hundred and twenty-three men missing, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, one thousand two hundred and forty-seven. He buried on the field one hundred and sixty-seven rebel dead, and took three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners.

General Howard reports the losses of the right wing at two officers and thirty-five men killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men wounded, and one officer and sixty men missing; total, three hundred and ninety-nine. He also buried one hundred rebel dead, and took one thousand two hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.

The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was one thousand six hundred and forty-six.

I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left wing during the afternoon of the nineteenth; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons.

Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the twenty-first, and had full possession of Goldsboro, the real "objective," with its two railroads back to the seaports of Wilmington and Beaufort, North Carolina. These were rapidly being repaired by strong working parties directed by Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Railroad Department. A large number of supplies had already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the twenty-second, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the following day all the armies to move to the camps assigned to them about Goldsboro, there to rest and receive the clothing and supplies of which they stood in need. In person I went on the twenty-second to Cox's bridge to meet General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into Goldsboro, where I found General Schofield and his army. The left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and the right wing followed on the twenty-fourth, on which day the cavalry moved to Mount Olive station, and General Terry back to Faison's. On the twenty-fifth the Newbern railroad was finished, and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from the depot at Morehead City full supplies for the army.

It was all-important that I should have an interview with the General-in-chief, and presuming that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General Schofield in chief command, and proceeded with all expedition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, reaching General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the twenty-seventh of March. I had the good fortune to meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the Army of the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world, from which I had been in a great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I reëmbarked on

the navy steamer *Bat*, Captain Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and returned via Hatteras Inlet and Newbern, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsboro during the night of the thirtieth. During my absence full supplies of clothing and food had been brought to camp, and all things were working well.

I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to Goldsboro, but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate commanders and of staff officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be forwarded and filed with this report. I cannot even, with any degree of precision, recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and material of war captured and destroyed. In general terms we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro, with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my Chief Engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast, from Savannah to Newbern, North Carolina, with its forts, dock-yards, gunboats, &c., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished on the twenty-first of March by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro.

In conclusion, I beg to express in the most emphatic manner my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities won," and I therefore commend all, generals, staff, officers, and men, for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them "to the front."

I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA,
ARMY OF THE OHIO,
GOLDSBORO, N. C., April 3, 1865. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command since January 1, 1865, the date of my last report, addressed to Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of the Cumberland, under whose command I was then serving.

On the second of January, 1865, I marched with the Twenty-third Army Corps from Columbia, Tennessee, and arrived at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, on the eighth, under orders to embark my troops at that point, and, move to Eastport, Mississippi. But before the embarkation had commenced, I received, January fourteenth, an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding, through the Chief of Staff of the Army, to move with the Twenty-third Army Corps to Annapolis, Maryland. Accordingly the movement was commenced on the following day. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by rail to Washington, District of Columbia, and Alexandria, Virginia, a second order from Washington having changed the destination from Annapolis.

Although in midwinter, and weather unusually severe, even for that season, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. By the thirty-first of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.

At Alexandria great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for several weeks. Meanwhile I met the Lieutenant-General commanding at Fortress Monroe, and went with him to the mouth of Cape Fear river to consult with Rear-Admiral Porter and Major-General Terry relative to future operations. On my return to Washington an order was issued from the War Department creating the Department of North Carolina, and assigning me to its command.

My instructions from the Lieutenant-General commanding, as well as those received from you, through Major-General Foster, made the ultimate object of my operations the occupation of Goldsboro, the opening of railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, the accumulation of supplies for your army, and the junction of my force with your main army at or near Goldsboro. Wilmington was made my first objective, because it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City, in the event of our junction being made at Goldsboro, as designed, and because its possession by us would be of great value to you in case the movement of the enemy's main army or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of your army at some point further south than Goldsboro.

As soon as it became possible to navigate Potomac I started from Alexandria with Third division, Twenty-third Army Corps, under command of Major-General J. D. Cox, reached the mouth of Cape Fear river on the ninth of February, and landed upon the peninsula near Fort Fisher.

Major-General A. H. Terry, with about a thousand men, then held a line across the peninsula about two miles above the fort, and occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear river and off the coast, covering the flanks of General Terry's line.

The enemy occupied Fort Anderson, on the west bank, with a collateral line running across a large swamp about three fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson, running across the peninsula from Cape Fear river to Masonboro sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonboro sound, above the fort, or passing around the swamp which covered his right.

The force I then had seemed too small for an extended movement as either of those mentioned, but time being important, I determined to make the attempt without waiting for the arrival of more of my troops. On the eleventh of February I pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's division, and drove in the enemy's pickets, and entrenched a new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. I then made preparation to send a fleet of men in boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's position, while a force composed of General Cox's and General Ames' divisions was to march along the beach in the night to the point where the boats were to land, haul them across the beach into the sound, and cross the latter to the main land in rear of Hoke's position. The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the execution of the plan impossible. On the night of February fourteenth I attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides, caused by the heavy sea and wind, made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when our movement would have been discovered by the enemy before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's work, the attempt was abandoned, and I turned attention to the enemy's right, where I would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea. General Cox and General Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of General Couch's division, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road, until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and adjacent works. Here two brigades were entrenched to occupy the enemy, v

General Cox, with his other two brigades and General Ames' division, started around the swamp covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works on both sides of the river during the night of February nineteenth, and fell back behind Town creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. We thus gained possession of the main defences of Cape Fear river and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.

On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to Town creek, behind which he was found intrenched, and had destroyed the only bridge. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior to General Terry's. General Ames' division was recrossed to the east bank and joined General Terry on the night of the nineteenth.

On the twentieth General Cox crossed Town creek below the enemy's position, by the use of a single flat boat found in the stream, and by wading through swamps reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery, three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilmington without opposition.

General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force, so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed. On the twenty-first General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick river, which he had attempted to destroy, put a portion of his troops on to Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early on the morning of February twenty-second, and General Terry pursued the enemy across North-east river.

Our total loss in the operations from February eleventh to the capture of Wilmington was about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was not less than one thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners; fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our hands.

It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the cordial and constant coöperation of the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, so far as the nature of the operations would admit.

Having no rolling stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon transportation, I was compelled to operate from Newbern alone

for the capture of Goldsboro. I had already sent to Newbern about five thousand troops belonging to the various corps of your army, and directed Brigadier-General I. M. Palmer to move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force toward Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in repairing the railroad. As soon as Wilmington was secured, I also sent General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Army Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear inlet by sea, to Morehead City, to reinforce the column moving from Newbern. On the twenty-fifth, finding that General Palmer had not moved, as was expected, I sent Major-General Cox to take command at Newbern and push forward at once.

General Couch's division, which had nearly completed its debarkation when Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and that division, with General Cox's, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Reilly, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. It was not until March sixth that I was able to obtain wagons enough, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.

On the sixth, General Couch started with the two divisions, Second and Third of the Twenty-third corps, and marched, via Onslow and Richland's, for Kinston. On the same day I went by sea to Morehead City, and joined General Cox beyond Newbern on the eighth. General Cox had advanced to Wise's forks, about one and a half miles below South-west creek, and the railroad was in rapid process of reconstruction.

The force in front of General Cox, which appeared to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind South-west creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been reinforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men.

The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between General Carter's and General Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by General Ruger's division, which was just arriving upon the field. There was no engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured from Colonel Upham, was insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that

reinforcements were arriving as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, I directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the ninth, the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On the tenth, the enemy having been largely reinforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by General Ruger's division, a portion of that division having been rapidly transferred from the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, also a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse, and burned the bridge. Our loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded; that of the enemy probably about fifteen hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Couch effected his junction with General Cox on the following day.

Having no pontoon train I was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired, or the pontoons which had just arrived from the North could be brought by rail from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the fourteenth, the enemy having abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, which was concentrating to oppose your advance from Fayetteville.

Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston I put a large force of troops to work upon the railroad, in aid of the construction corps under Colonel Wright, rebuilt the wagon bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward supplies preparatory to a further advance.

I moved from Kinston on the morning of the twentieth, and entered Goldsboro with but slight opposition on the evening of the twenty-first.

The portion of my command which had remained at Wilmington, under Major-General Terry, moved from that point March fifteenth, reached Faison's depot on the twentieth, and in compliance with your orders, moved from that point to Cox's bridge, and secured the crossing of the Neuse on the twenty-second. Your plans for the concentration of your entire army about this place having been fully accomplished on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth, I then had the honor of reporting to you in person, and uniting my troops to their old comrades in arms after a separation of near five months, marked by unparalleled marches and brilliant achievements, which will ever furnish bright pages in military history, and it is hoped proved

decisive in their results upon the present rebellion.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL BARRY'S REPORT.

ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }
MISSISSIPPI, GOLDSBORO, N. C., March 31, 1865. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of the artillery of the armies under your command during the Carolina campaign of February and March, 1865.

In consideration of the peculiarities of the campaign, involving long and rapid marches over bad roads, and at an inclement season of the year, the same precautions which were so advantageously taken for your Savannah campaign of last autumn were again observed. The number of guns was reduced to one per thousand effective bayonets, and each artillery carriage was provided with eight draught animals.

The whole number of field batteries was sixteen, comprising sixty-eight guns, which were distributed and of calibres as follows:

	20-pounders. Parrots.	12-pounders.	8-inch rifles.	Total.
RIGHT WING.				
Fifteenth Army Corps.....	4	10	4	18
Seventeenth Army Corps.....		4	10	14
LEFT WING.				
Fourteenth Army Corps.....		8	8	16
Twentieth Army Corps.....		8	8	16
Cavalry division.....			4	4
Total.....	4	30	34	68

Including the reserve supply, each gun was furnished with three hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition.

A careful and critical personal inspection, made a few days preceding our departure from Savannah, satisfied me that in all essentials the artillery was in excellent condition for any kind of work. The result fully justified these expectations. During the whole march the artillery supplied itself, unaided by infantry or cavalry, with provisions for its officers and men, forage for its animals, and to a great extent with fresh horses and mules captured in the country. A tabular statement is appended to this report, showing the extent to which this unusual artillery service was performed.

No gun or artillery carriage of any description was abandoned, disabled, or at any time even a temporary impediment to the march of the infantry columns—a fact the more credita-

ble to the artillery, since in many places the roads were of the worst possible description.

Although the nature of your operations did not, except at the battles of Averysboro and Bentonville, call for any general use of artillery, yet in support of skirmish lines, brushing away cavalry, and covering the crossings of several difficult and important rivers, it was advantageously used at the following times and places, namely :

January twenty, 1865, Pocotaligo, Seventeenth Army Corps.

January twenty-two, 1865, Combahee, Fifteenth Army Corps.

January twenty-nine, 1865, Robertsville, Twentieth Army Corps.

February one, 1865, Hickory Hill, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February two, 1865, Lawtonville, Twentieth Army Corps.

February two, 1865, Whippy Swamp, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February three, 1865, "Store" at Duck creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February six, 1865, Little Salkehatchie, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February nine, 1865, Binnaker's bridge, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February eleven, 1865, North Edisto, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February fifteen, 1865, Congaree creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February sixteen, 1865, Columbia, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps.

February seventeen, 1865, Broad river, Fifteenth Army Corps.

March sixteen, 1865, Little Rockfish creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

At the battle of Averysboro, March sixteen, the batteries of the Twentieth corps were promptly and judiciously posted by Major Reynolds, the Chief of Artillery of that corps, and by the precision and rapidity of their fire did most excellent service in dislodging the enemy from his intrenched line, and the consequent capture of three of his guns.

At the battle of Bentonville, March nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one, it was the fortune of the artillery to play a more conspicuous part. The batteries of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps were hotly engaged on the nineteenth, and after the first temporary advantage gained by the enemy, in which the Nineteenth Indiana battery, not by any fault of its own, lost three of its guns (one of which was recaptured next day), they poured in a fire so steady, rapid and effective, that all of the enemy's frequently repeated assaults were successfully repulsed. On the twentieth, and particularly on the twenty-first, the batteries of the Fifteenth corps lent most efficient aid in advancing our own lines, in repelling the enemy's assaults, and in inflicting heavy loss upon him. Both of these fields of battle gave abundant proof of the precision of our artillery fire.

The following tabular statements will exhibit the amounts of provision and forage, and the number of animals captured by the unaided labors of the artillery, the casualties among officers, enlisted men, and animals, the expenditure of ammunition, and the number of guns lost by us and captured from the enemy :

Provisions, Animals, Forage, &c.

BY WHAT BATTERIES PROCURED	FLOUR.	CORN MEAL.	BACON.	BEEF, &c.	POTATOES.	CORN.	HAY AND FODDER.	HORSES.	MULES.
	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.		
Twentieth Army corps...	8,000	10,000	25,000	50,000	50,000	350,000	300,000	96	602
Fourteenth Army corps.	3,000	5,200	4,360	8,065	219,920	91,800	53	85
Fifteenth Army corps.	4,900	5,700	23,000	2,300	37,440	499,000	90,000	50	63
Seventeenth Army corps	2,000	3,200	18,000	218,000	106,000	50	33
	17,900	24,100	70,860	60,365	87,440	1,284,920	587,800	249	783

Casualties.

	OFFICERS.				ENLISTED MEN.				HORSES.		MULES.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Fourteenth Army corps.....	1	4	6	1	25
Twentieth Army corps.....	1	14	1	3
Fifteenth Army corps.....	5	3
Seventeenth Army corps.....	1	1	1
Cavalry Division.....	1	1	13	10
	1	7	27	19	35	3

Expenditure of Ammunition.

COMMAND.	NO. OF ROUNDS.
Fourteenth Army corps.....	1,007
Twentieth Army corps.....	832
Army of Tennessee.....	1,665
Total.....	3,504

Guns Captured and Lost.

PLACE.	CAPTURED FROM ENEMY.		LOST BY US.
	No. of Guns.	No. of Guns.	
Columbia.....	43	
Cheraw.....	25	
Fayetteville.....	26	
Averysboro.....	3	
Benton's.....	2	
Total.....	97	2	

Of these all were serviceable, and about four-fifths were field guns of recent and approved pattern.

If to the operations of your armies, the legitimate fruits of which they really are, be credited the guns captured at Charleston and Wilmington, (excluding from the number of the latter those captured at Fort Fisher and the other forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river), the total artillery captured during the past ten months by troops under your immediate command will exceed seven hundred guns.

Throughout the campaign, the ammunition, fuses, and primers proved unusually good and reliable, the only fault observed being sand cracks and insufficient bursting charges in a few of the twenty-pounder Parrott projectiles, want of care in the screwing of the Bohrman fuse in forty-two-pounder projectiles, and insufficient bursting charges in many of the Hotchkiss three-inch shell and case shot. Ammunition and fuses received from St. Louis arsenal appear to be more complained of (especially the fuses) than that received from other places.

In conclusion, I am gratified to be able to commend the officers and men for attention to their duties in preparation for the field, and for good conduct after entering it; for the details of which I respectfully invite attention to the sub-reports which will be laid before you.

The services of the following-named officers give evidence of industry, intelligence, and gallant conduct, and entitle them to notice and reward:

Major Osborn, First New York artillery, Chief of Artillery, Army of Tennessee; Major Reynolds, First New York artillery, Chief of Artillery, Twentieth Army Corps; Major Waterhouse, First Illinois Artillery, Chief of Artillery, Seventeenth Army Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Ross, First Michigan artillery, Chief of Artillery, Fifteenth Army Corps; Major Houghtaling, First

Illinois artillery, Chief of Artillery Fourteenth Army Corps.

I respectfully ask that each of these officers who have also served faithfully and creditably through the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, be recommended for promotion by brevet.

The officers of my staff, Major Dickson, Inspector of Artillery; Captain Marshall, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Merritt, and Lieutenant Verplanck, Aides-de-camp, at all times performed cheerfully and well the duties with which they were charged.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

WILLIAM F. BARRY,
Brev. Maj.-Gen., Chief of Artillery.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Wheeler to General Howard.

GRAHAMS, S. C., February 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to propose that if the troops of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens I will discontinue burning cotton.

As an earnest of the good faith in which my proposition is tendered, I leave at this place about three hundred bales cotton, unharmed, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a million, and in our currency one and a half millions. I trust my having commenced will cause you to use your influence to ensure the acceptance of the proposition by your whole army.

I trust that you will not deem it improper for me to ask that you will require the troops under your command to discontinue the wanton destruction of property not necessary for their sustenance.

Respectfully, General.

Your obedient servant,

J. WHEELER,
Major-General, C. S. A.

Major-General O. O. HOWARD,
United States Army, Commanding, &c.

Answered by General Sherman.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, February 8, 1865.

GENERAL: Yours, addressed to General Howard, is received by me. I hope you will burn all cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it; and it has proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will.

As to private houses, occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General J. WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry Corps, Confederate Army.

General Sherman to Wade Hampton.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, February 24, 1865. }

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after capture, and labelled "Death to all foragers." One instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty, "near a ravine eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feastersville, I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about a thousand prisoners, captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a war-right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions, therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, or punish with wholesale murder.

Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war; but they were to be expected; and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war-right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life.

I am, with respect,

Your obedient servant

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General United States Army.

Lieutenant-General WADE HAMPTON,

Commanding Cavalry Forces, C. S. A.

Wade Hampton to General Sherman.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }
February 27, 1865. }

GENERAL: Your communication of the twenty-fourth inst. reached me to-day. In it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties are "murdered" after capture. You go on to say that you have "ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner;" that is to say, you have ordered a number of Confederate soldiers to be "murdered." You characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your own country, where it seldom dares to express itself in vindication of truth, honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you guilty of murder, if your order is carried out. Before dismissing this portion of your letter, I beg to assure you, that for every soldier of mine "murdered" by you, I shall have exe-

cuted at once *two* of yours, giving, in all cases, preference to any officers who may be in my hands.

In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers, I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me authorize the killing of prisoners after capture, and I do not believe my men killed any of yours except under circumstances in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper they *should* kill them. It is a part of the system of the thieves whom you designate as your foragers to fire the dwellings of those citizens whom they have robbed. To check this inhuman system, which is justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain in force so long as you disgrace the profession of arms by allowing your men to destroy private dwellings.

You say that I cannot, of course, question your right to forage on the country. "It is a right as old as history." I do not, sir, question this right. But there is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable—the right that every man has to defend his home, and to protect those who are dependent on him; and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country, who can fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their homes, and insulting their women.

You are particular in defining and claiming "war-rights." May I ask if you enumerate among these the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice; to burn that city to the ground after it had been surrendered by the inhabitants, who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is always accorded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwelling-houses of citizens after robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than these—crimes too black to be mentioned.

You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offences against humanity and the rules of war. You fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning, after its surrender by the mayor, who demanded protection to private property; you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses; and in more than one household there is an agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but with all his barbarity he always respected the persons of his female captives. Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.

In conclusion, I have only to request that whenever you have any of my men "murdered" or "disposed of"—for the terms seem synonymous with you—you will let me hear of it, that I may know what action to take in the matter.

In the mean time I shall hold fifty-six of your men as hostages for those whom you have ordered to be executed.

I am yours, &c.,

WADE HAMPTON,

Lieutenant-General

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, U. S. A.

Doc. 45.

GENERAL PLEASANTONS NARRATIVE.

MILWAUKEE, WIS., October 15, 1865.

To the Honorable B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War :

MY DEAR SIR: Agreeably to your request, I submit for the consideration of your honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of the prominent facts that came under my observation during the campaigns in which I was engaged in the late war of rebellion, and which had any bearing on their success or failure.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-62. It was most unfortunate, that with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies.

The highest military authorities have laid down, that in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form one fourth to one sixth of the infantry which compose it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necessary duties assigned to each in time of war, that it may fairly be said no army is fit to take the field unless these two arms are properly organized, and bear the proper proportion to each other with respect to numbers. And it is also a strong fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the more closely these proportions are observed throughout the campaign, the greater will be the success, and the greater will be the confidence reposed by the troops of the different arms in each other, which greatly tends to lighten their most arduous duties. It is a vicious organization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service, for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their numbers.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the pay-rolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas—were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring, before our army had started in pursuit.

Does any one now assert that those obstacles

could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army?

So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry, that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the Army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and from what has since been done I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring; in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced on us. McClellan dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that by placing his army on a peninsula, with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cavalry ride completely round his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's Landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim that a General who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows.

While the cavalry arm was thus neglected in the organization of the army, the infantry force, which was upward of one hundred and thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions until the army entered the field in the spring, when the corps formation was adopted; but so indifferently, however, that the command of the corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than that of Brigadier-General. This carelessness of assignment, by rendering every high officer uncertain of the position he held, was a fruitful source of the jealousies and dissensions that afterward occurred among the commanders in this army, and which did so much to retard and frustrate the best-devised plans that were attempted to be executed, and taken in connection with the useless superabundance of artillery with which at that time the army was supplied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy and enterprise, in the army, which is so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General Hooker was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into a corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service, that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick City.

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SURRENDER OF GENERAL JOHNSTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
In the Field, City Point, Virginia, May 9, 1865. }

GENERAL.—My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the first of April, when the Army of the Ohio, Major-General J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsboro', with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to the sea at Wilmington and Morehead City; Major-General A. H. Terry, with the Tenth corps, being at Faison's depot; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, was encamped to the right and front of Goldsboro', and the Army of Georgia, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Brevet-Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march from Savannah, or in replenishing clothing and stores necessary for a further progress.

I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States that the tenth of April would be the earliest possible moment at which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possible limit in order to fulfil that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge, we were limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot-eight-and-a-half-inch gauge already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major-General Terry at Wilmington, and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judicious use was made of these, and such industry displayed in the railroad management by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and Colonel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, that by the tenth of April our men were all reclothed, the wagons reloaded, and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.

In the meantime Major-General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry operating from East Tennessee in connection with Major-General George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my orders of January twenty-one, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, had reached the railroad about Greensboro', North Carolina, and had made sad havoc with it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying *en route* bridges, culverts, depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the break in the railroad down to the Catawba bridge.

This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Major-General J. H. Wilson, also in command

of the cavalry corps organized by himself under Special Field Orders No. —, of October twenty-four, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, at Gaylesville, Alabama, had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tennessee; but the roads being too heavy for infantry, General Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the Confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able to receive as yet his full and detailed reports, which will in due time be published and appreciated. Lieutenant-General Grant, also in immediate command of the armies about Richmond, had taken the initiative in that magnificent campaign which, in less than ten days, compelled the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the entire rebel army of Virginia under command of General Lee.

The news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsboro' on the sixth of April. Up to that time my purpose was to move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh and striking straight for Burksville, thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in Virginia had changed the whole military problem, and in the expressive language of Lieutenant-General Grant, "the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston" became the "strategic points." General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and my task was to capture or destroy the latter. Johnston at that time, April six, had his army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing between me and Raleigh. I estimated his infantry and artillery at thirty-five thousand, and his cavalry from six thousand to ten thousand. He was superior to me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on the tenth of April.

At daybreak of the day appointed all the heads of columns were in motion straight against the enemy, Major-General H. W. Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield; Major-General O. O. Howard making a circuit by the right and feigning up the Weldon road, to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west side of the Neuse river, and aiming to reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Schofield followed General Slocum in support.

All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsboro', more or less cavalry, with the usual

rail barricades, which were swept before us as chaff, and by ten A. M. of the eleventh the Fourteenth corps entered Smithfield, the Twentieth corps close at hand. Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse river, and, having his railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than we could pursue. The rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary to pass even ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible Major-General Slocum got up his pontoons and crossed over a division of the Fourteenth corps. We there heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, which was announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of my armies but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of Armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that held them so long in check, and their success gave new impulse to finish up our task. Without a moment's hesitation we dropped our trains and marched rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place at 7:30 A. M. of the thirteenth in a heavy rain. The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to Durham's station, the Fifteenth corps following as far as Morrisville station, and the Seventeenth corps to Jones' station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railroad as a line of retreat, by Hillsboro', Greensboro', Salisbury, Charlotte, &c., I had turned the other columns across the bend of that road toward Ashboro' (See Special Field Orders number fifty-five.) The cavalry, Brevet Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding, was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit to the "Company's Shops," in Alamance county; Major-General O. O. Howard to turn to the left by Hackney's cross-roads, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence and Ashboro'; Major-General H. W. Slocum to cross Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills; Major-General J. M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with his spare force to follow an intermediate route.

By the fifteenth, though the rains were incessant and the roads almost impracticable, Major-General Slocum had the Fourteenth corps, Brevet Major-General Davis commanding, near Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, with the Twentieth corps, Major-General Mower commanding, in support, and Major-General Howard had the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps stretched out on the roads toward Pittsboro'; while General Kilpatrick held Durham's Station and Chapel Hill University.

Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from Hillsboro' to Greensboro', he himself at Greensboro'. Although out of place as to time, I here invite all military critics who study the problems of war to take their maps and compare the position of my army on the

fifteenth and sixteenth of April, with that of General Halleck about Burksville and Petersburg, Virginia, on the twenty-sixth of April, when, according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the task of "cutting off Johnston's retreat." Major-General Stoneman at the time was at Statesville, and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and Charlotte. It may be that General Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there is nothing in their past history to show it, or it may be that General Halleck can inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save and except in this single instance, when he knew the enemy was ready to surrender or disperse, as advised by my letter of April eighteen, addressed to him when Chief of Staff at Washington city, and delivered at Washington on the twenty-first instant by Major Hitchcock, of my staff.

Thus matters stood at the time I received General Johnston's first letter and made my answer of April fourteenth, copies of which were sent with all expedition to Lieutenant-General Grant and the Secretary of War, with my letter of April fifteenth. I agreed to meet General Johnston in person at a point intermediate between our pickets on the seventeenth at noon, provided the position of the troops remained *statu quo*. I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh.

Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We had no iron except by taking up that on the branch from Goldsboro' to Weldon. Instead of losing by time I gained in every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear and improve the condition of our wagon-roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed, and we be forced to make the race of nearly two hundred miles to head off or catch Johnston's army, then retreating toward Charlotte.

At noon of the day appointed I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although we had been interchanging shots constantly since May, 1863.

Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that further war on the part of the Confederate troops was folly; that the cause was lost; and that every life sacrificed after the surrender of Lee's army was the highest possible crime. He admitted that the terms conceded to General Lee were magnanimous and all he could ask, but he did want some general concessions that would enable him to allay the natural fears and anxiety of his followers, and enable him to maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastations inevitably to result from turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the State.

He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the Confederate armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed to deal finally or authoritatively in regard to any other, but it did seem to me that there was presented a chance for peace that might be deemed valuable to the Government of the United States, and was at least worth the few days that would be consumed in reference.

To push an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his inability to cope with me were cowardly and unworthy the brave men I led.

Inasmuch as General Johnston did not feel authorized to pledge his power over the armies of Texas, we adjourned to meet next day at noon. I returned to Raleigh and conferred freely with all my general officers, every one of whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and dissolving army back toward Georgia, almost over the very country where we had toiled so long. There was but one opinion expressed, and if contrary ones were entertained they were withheld, or indulged in only by that class who shun the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest, and fiercest when danger is past. I again met General Johnston on the eighteenth, and we renewed the conversation. He satisfied me then of his power to disband the rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command—namely, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia.

The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were lest their States were to be dismembered and denied representation in Congress, or any separate political existence whatever, and that the absolute disarming his men would leave the South powerless and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.

President Lincoln's message of 1864; his amnesty proclamation; General Grant's terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefits of that proclamation to all officers above the rank of colonel; the invitation to the Virginia legislature to reassemble in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the approval of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, then on the spot; a firm belief that I had been fighting to re-establish the Constitution of the United States; and last, and not least, the general and universal desire to close a war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen the "memorandum" of April eighteen, signed by myself and General Johnston.

It was designed to be, and so expressed on its face, as a mere "basis" for reference to the President of the United States and constitutional commander-in-chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the military power of the Confederacy, which had threatened the na-

tional safety for years. It admitted of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into an usurpation of power on my part. I have my opinions on the questions involved, and I will stand by the memorandum; but this forms no part of a military report. Immediately on my return to Raleigh I despatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock, to Washington, enjoining him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would be sure to infest him by the way, and to say nothing to anybody until the President could make known to me his wishes and policy in the matter.

The news of President Lincoln's assassination on the fourteenth of April (wrongly reported to me by telegraph as having occurred on the eleventh) reached me on the seventeenth, and was announced to my command on the same day in Special Field Orders No. 56. I was duly impressed with its horrible atrocity and probable effect upon the country; but when the property and interests of millions still living were involved, I saw no good reason to change my course, but thought rather to manifest real respect for his memory by following after his death that policy which, if living, I feel certain he would have approved, or at least not rejected with disdain.

Up to that hour I had never received one word of instruction, advice, or counsel as to the "plan or policy" of Government looking to a restoration of peace on the part of the rebel States of the South. Whenever asked for an opinion on the points involved, I had always evaded the subject. My letter to the mayor of Atlanta has been published to the world, and I was not rebuked by the War Department for it.

My letter to Mr. N— W—, at Savannah, was shown by me to Mr. Stanton before its publication, and all that my memory retains of his answer is that he said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently "emphatic, and could not be misunderstood."

Both these letters asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and messages, when the people of the South had laid down their arms and submitted to the lawful power of the United States, *ipso facto* the war was over as to them; and furthermore that if any State in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the United States, "cease war," elect senators and representatives to Congress, if admitted (of which each house of Congress alone is the judge), that State became instantanous as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for this expression, though it was universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton, in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expenses of the war, and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of the government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity of bringing the war

to a close as soon as possible for financial reasons.

On the evening of April twenty-three Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead City with despatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsboro', was notified, so as to be ready in the morning for an answer. At six o'clock A. M. on the twenty-fourth Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of his coming over our exposed road for prudential reasons.

I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved, without reasons assigned, and I was ordered to give the forty-eight hours' notice, and resume hostilities at the close of that time, governing myself by the substance of a despatch then enclosed, dated March third, twelve noon, at Washington, District of Columbia, from Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied by any part of the voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York journals of the twenty-fourth of April. That was the first and only time I ever saw that telegram, or had one word of instruction on the important matter involved in it; and it does seem strange to me that every bar-room loafer in New York can read in the morning journals "official" matter that is withheld from a general whose command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.

Within an hour a courier was riding from Durham's Station toward Hillsboro' with notice to General Johnston of the suspension of the truce, and renewing my demand for the surrender of the armies under his immediate command (see two letters, April twenty-four, six A. M.), and at twelve noon I had the receipt of his picket officer.

I therefore published my Orders No. 62 to the troops terminating the truce at twelve M. on the twenty-sixth, and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that hour on the routes prescribed in Special Field Order No. 55, April fourteen, from the positions held April eighteenth.

General Grant had orders from the President, through the Secretary of War, to direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the troops, and he approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me or express a wish to assume command. All things were in readiness, when, on the evening of the twenty-fifth, I received another letter from General Johnston asking another interview to renew negotiations.

General Grant not only approved, but urged me to accept, and I appointed a meeting at our former place at noon of the twenty-sixth, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was delayed by an accident to his train, but at two P. M. arrived. We then consulted, concluded and signed the final terms of capitulation. These were taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General

Grant, and met his immediate approval and signature. General Johnston was not even aware of the presence of General Grant at Raleigh at the time.

Thus was surrendered to us the second great army of the so-called Confederacy, and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and challenge the instance during the past four years where an armed and defiant foe stood before me that I did not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I ever insulted or struck a fallen foe. The instant the terms of surrender were approved by General Grant, I made my Orders No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate commanders his share of the work, and with General Grant's approval, made Special Field Orders No. 66, putting in motion my old army (no longer required in Carolina) northward for Richmond. General Grant left Raleigh at nine A. M. of the twenty-seventh, and I glory in the fact that during his three days' stay with me I did not detect in his language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and affection that have existed between us throughout all the varied events of the past war, and though we have honestly differed in opinion in other cases, as well as this, still we respected each other's honest convictions.

I still adhere to my then opinions, that, by a few general concessions, "glittering generalities," all of which in the end must and will be conceded to the organized States of the South, this day there would not be an armed battalion opposed to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States. Robbers and assassins must in any event result from the disbanding of large armies, but even these should be and could be taken care of by the local civil authorities without being made a charge on the national treasury. On the evening of the twenty-eighth, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army commander and delegated to him the authority necessary for his future action, I despatched my headquarters wagons by land along with the Seventeenth corps, the office in charge of General Webster from Newbern to Alexandria, Virginia, by sea, and in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah, to direct matters in the interior of South Carolina and Georgia. I had received across the rebel telegraph wires cipher despatches from General Wilson at Macon, to the effect that he was in receipt of my Orders No. 65, and would send

General Upton's division to Augusta, General McCook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the surrender of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by the terms of the surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for his horses in South-west Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing, sugar, coffee, &c., by way of Augusta, Georgia, whence he could get it by rail.

I therefore went rapidly to Goldsboro' and Wilmington, reaching the latter city at ten A. M. of the twenty-ninth, and the same day embarked for Hilton Head in the blockade-runner *Russia*, Captain A. M. Smith. I found General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding Department of the South, at Hilton Head, on the evening of April thirtieth, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and small stores he could spare for General Wilson, and to open up a line of certain communication and supply with him at Macon. Within an hour the captured steamboats *Jeff Davis* and *Amazon*, both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the Savannah river, were being loaded, the one at Savannah and the other at Hilton Head. The former started up the river on the first of May, in charge of a very intelligent officer (whose name I cannot recall) and forty-eight men, all the boat could carry, with orders to occupy temporarily the United States arsenal at Augusta, and to open up communication with General Wilson at Macon, in the event that General McCook's division of cavalry was not already there. The *Amazon* followed next day, and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders for a brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneux, to follow by a land march to Augusta as its permanent garrison. Another brigade of infantry was ordered to occupy Orangeburg, South Carolina, the point furthest in the interior that can at present be reached by rail from the sea-coast (Charleston).

On the first of May I went on to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined me, and the arrangements ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated.

At Savannah I found the city in the most admirable police, under direction of Brevet Major-General Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified joy to hear that, so far as they were concerned, the war was over. All classes, Union men as well as former rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political conditions to be attached to their future state. Anything at all would be preferable to this dread uncertainty.

On the evening of the second of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time, received the New York papers of April twenty-eighth, containing Secretary Stanton's despatch of nine A. M. of the twenty-seventh of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's, from Richmond, of nine P. M. of the night before, which seems to have been rushed with

extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the twenty-eighth. You will observe from the dates that these despatches were running back and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and there published, while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting, to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi river. Not one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the Government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.

The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April twenty-fourth) been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Mr. Stanton, of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.

In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army would not fight, but, if pushed, would "disband" and "scatter" into small and dangerous guerrilla parties as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the South was abandoned; that the negro was free; and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were withheld from the public with a seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography of the South, entitled my opinions to at least a decent respect.

Although this despatch (Mr. Stanton's of April twenty-seventh) was printed "official," it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph, headed "Sherman's truce disregarded."

I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent him supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry out in Western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and paroling of prisoners made by General Johnston's capitulation of April twenty-sixth, and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace or war; but as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate generals to disobey my "orders," I explained to General Gillmore that I would no longer confuse him or General Wilson with "orders" that might conflict with those of the Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.

It now becomes my duty to paint, in justly severe characters, the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's despatch of April twenty-sixth to the Secretary of War,

embodied in his to General Dix of April twenty-seventh.

General Halleck had been Chief of Staff of the army at Washington, in which capacity he must have received my official letter of April eighteenth, wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensboro' were "pushed" it would "disperse," an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from Washington to Richmond to command the new military division of the James, in assuming charge of which, on the twenty-second, he defines the limits of his authority to be the "Department of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina as may not be occupied by the command of Major-General Sherman." (See his General Orders No. 1). Four days later, April twenty-sixth, he reports to the Secretary that he has ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, to invade that part of North Carolina which was occupied by my command, and pay "no regard to any truce or orders of" mine. They were ordered to "push forward, regardless of any orders save those of Lieutenant-General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat." He knew at the time he penned that despatch and made those orders, that Johnston was not retreating, but was halted under a forty-eight hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrender his command and prevent its dispersion into guerrilla bands, and that I had on the spot a magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required by the occasion.

The plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burksville and Danville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. When he contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made by competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone himself and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I was bound in honor to defend and maintain my own truce and pledge of faith, even at the cost of many lives.

When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.

As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as Chief of Staff or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts contained in his despatch to the Secretary? No, he did not. If the Secretary of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and escape? No orders or instructions to catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever came to me; but on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he should effect an escape from the country, if made "unknown" to him. But even on this point I enclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmington on the twenty-fifth of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis' move-

ments, designed doubtless to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch their treasure for their own use.

I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the twenty-sixth, and had acted on it before General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I don't believe a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck or anybody has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my command.

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's despatch is wherein he goes out of his way, and advises that my subordinates, Generals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.

This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's truce disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the New York papers of April twenty-eighth.

During the night of May second, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the Department of the South, I began my return to meet my troops then marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the third we ran into Charleston harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection; also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullafinny camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false doctrine is again preached in our Union.

We left Charleston on the evening of the third of May, and hastened with all possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the fourth. I immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensboro' reported about thirty thousand (30,000) already made, and that the greater part of the North

Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers, but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About eight hundred (800) of the rebel cavalry had gone south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be encouraged to go and stay; they would be a nuisance to any civilized government, whether loose or in prison.

With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." When to the number of men surrendered at Greensboro' are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts, I have no doubt fifty thousand (50,000) armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation made near Durham's station, North Carolina, on the twenty-sixth of April, and that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.

On the fifth of May I received and here submit a further despatch from General Schofield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide the military remedy.

[By telegraph]

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1865.

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. I hope the Government will make known its policy in the organ of State governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done; the people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite settlement.

What is to be done with the freedmen is the question of all, and is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too soon, for he will probably undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from you freely when you have time to write.

I will send your message to Wilson at once.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Major-General.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Morehead City.

I give this despatch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters

with the military, and how almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act a purely military part.

There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal with no other sort. The marshals and sheriffs with their *posses* (of which the military may become a part), are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and marauders. But I will not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject, but instance the case to show how difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of the rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel embarrassed by them.

General Schofield, at Raleigh, has a well-appointed and well-disciplined command, is in telegraph communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all strategic points.

In like manner General Gillmore is well situated in all respects except as to rapid communication with the seat of the general Government. I leave him also with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department; and General Wilson has in the very heart of Georgia the strongest, best-appointed, and best-equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of Savannah river that simplifies his military problem, so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.

I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for any "orders" they may have received from me, and the President of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and willing to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past, and I shall confine my attention to the army composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, unless the Commanding General of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.

At four P. M. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on the James river, opposite Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march toward Alexandria.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

