

CHAPTER VI.

MEMPHIS.

GRAND JUNCTION, fifty-two miles west of Memphis, and one hundred and fifty-four south from Cairo, is the junction of the Memphis and Charleston with the Mississippi Central Railway. Ninety-nine miles from Memphis, and a hundred and two from Grand Junction, the latter road joins the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway at Grenada. An army operating from Memphis as a base, and holding in force Corinth, Holly Springs, and some such point as Hernando, on the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway, are in a position to defend West Tennessee from the Tennessee River to the Mississippi, and to take the offensive against an enemy protecting Northern Mississippi.

No sooner was Corinth occupied, and the semblance of a pursuit of the enemy ended, than General Halleck ordered General Buell to march with the Army of the Ohio by Huntsville and Stevenson on Chattanooga, Tennessee, and seize the key of the debouches from the mountain region of the centre; while General Grant, again restored to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was left in command of the District of West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and General Pope's troops were sent back to Missouri. The enemy was concentrated at Tupelo, Mississippi, forty-nine miles below Corinth, on the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, under the command of General Braxton Bragg, who had relieved Beauregard in consequence of the latter's illness.

On the 9th of June, at Chewalla, Sherman received General Halleck's orders to march with his own division and Hurlbut's Fourth division to Grand Junction, to repair the Memphis and

Charleston Railway west of that point, and then to assume the duty of guarding the road against any attempt of the enemy to interrupt its operations. Sending forward Denver's third brigade of the fifth division, and the whole of Hurlbut's division in advance, to repair the bridges on the road, Sherman marched on the 11th with the remainder of his command, reached Grand Junction on the night of the 13th, and, finding no water there, occupied La Grange, three miles further west, on the morning of the 14th. While engaged here in repairing two pieces of broken trestle-work, he sent Veatch's brigade, of Hurlbut's and Morgan L. Smith's brigade of his own division, to Holly Springs to clear his flanks of the enemy. After driving a small force of the enemy out of the town, and as far south as Lamar, the detachment remained two days at Holly Springs, and then rejoined the main body. On the 21st, Sherman marched from Holly Springs; on the 23d, three miles west of Lafayette, met a railway train from Memphis; and on the 25th, having built two long sections of trestle-work at La Grange, two large bridges at Moscow, and two small ones at Lafayette, was able to report his task accomplished, and the railway in running order from Memphis to Grand Junction. His force was then disposed so as to protect the line of the railway, Hurlbut's division at Grand Junction and La Grange, his own at Moscow and Lafayette.

On the 29th of June, in accordance with instructions received by telegraph from General Halleck, leaving one regiment and a section of artillery at each of these points, Sherman marched on Holly Springs, twenty-five miles equidistant from La Grange and Moscow, to co-operate with Hamilton's division, of Rosecrans' corps, which he was informed would reach there at a given time. Concentrating at Hudsonville by converging roads, the two divisions reached the Coldwater, five miles from Holly Springs, early on the morning of the appointed day. Denver's brigade, and the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, the latter two hundred strong, were sent forward, and drove the enemy, consisting of about fifteen hundred cavalry, through and beyond the town of Holly Springs. Nothing was

heard of Hamilton, who had approached within nineteen miles of Holly Springs and then retired to Corinth ; but, on the 6th, orders were received from General Halleck to fall back to the railway and protect it, and the command accordingly returned to its former position.

Early in July, upon the appointment of General Halleck as general-in-chief of the Armies of the United States, the Department of the Mississippi was broken up, and General Grant was assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, embracing the theatre of his previous operations. That officer taking advantage of the period of inactivity which now followed, turned his attention to the condition of the country occupied by his command. Memphis in particular was in a sad plight. Nearly all of its young men were in the rebel army, many of its old men had fled upon the approach of the Union troops, or in anticipation of such an event, and in their places appeared a horde of unscrupulous traders, eager to make money in any legitimate way, and deeming any way legitimate that brought them large profits. They struck hands with other men of the same stamp whom they found in Memphis ready for their use, and the city became a nest of contraband trade. Commerce and war are mortal foes. Wherever they meet or cross each other's path, one of them must die. If the trader's gold is stronger than the soldier's honor, the soldier's honor trails in the dust, war grows languid, barter dulls the sword, treason flourishes, and spies reign. If the soldier spurns the bribe, in whatever innocent shape it may creep, trade perishes, merchants walk the streets idly, or crowd the headquarters uselessly, store-houses gape vacantly or turn into hospitals, women and children starve, and the provost-marshal is king. And these things are necessarily so. War itself is so cruel that those means are most truly humane which tend to bring the contest soonest to a close, regardless of every intermediate consideration apart from its object. The general must think only of his army.

On 15th of July, from Corinth, General Grant sent tele-

graphic orders to Sherman, to march at once, with his own and Hurlbut's division, to Memphis, relieve Brigadier-General Hovey in command of that place, and send all the infantry of Wallace's division to Helena, Arkansas, to report to General Curtis. Accordingly, on Monday, July 21st, Sherman assumed command of the district of Memphis, stationing his own division in Fort Pickering, and Hurlbut's on the river below, and on the 24th sent the other troops to Helena.

General Grant had strongly impressed upon him the necessity of immediately abating the evils and disorders prevailing within the limits of his new command. He was to put Memphis in a thorough state of defence. With regard to civil matters, his instructions were few. When the head of a family had gone South, the family must be made to follow. The quartermaster was to seize, and rent for account of whom it may concern, all buildings leased or left vacant and belonging to disloyal owners. All negroes working for the United States were to be registered, and an account kept of their time, so that an adjustment could afterwards be made with their owners, if the Government should decide on taking that course. It will be remembered that the Government had not yet declared, or even adopted, any definite policy with respect to the slaves in the country occupied by our forces.

Memphis was a camp of the Confederate Army, was captured by the United States Army, and was occupied and held by it as a military post. In a country, or in any part of it, held by an army in time of war, whether offensively or defensively, there is no law but the law of war. The law of war is the will of the commander. He is accountable only to his superiors. Nothing exists within the limits of his command, except by his choice. With respect to his army, he is governed by the Articles of War and the army regulations; with regard to all others, his power is unlimited, except to the extent that it may be abridged or controlled by the instructions of his Government.

Sherman permitted the mayor and other civil officers of the city to remain in the exercise of their functions, restricting

them to the preservation of law and order among the citizens, and the lighting and cleaning of the streets, and confining the action of the provost-marshal and his guards to persons in the military service and to buildings and grounds used by the army. The expenses of the local government were to be defrayed by municipal taxes. Sherman held that all persons who remained in Memphis were bound to bear true allegiance to the United States, and, therefore, did not always exact an oath of loyalty; that they must make their choice at once between the rebellion and the Union; and that if they stayed and helped the enemy in any way, they were to be treated as spies. He required no provost-marshal's passes for inland travel, but restricted it to the five main roads leading from the city, and stationed guards on them to minutely inspect all persons and property going in or out. No cotton was allowed to be bought beyond the lines and brought in, except on contracts to be paid at the end of the war, so that the enemy might get no aid therefrom. Gold, silver, and treasury notes, when sent into the Confederate lines in exchange for cotton, always found their way, as he knew, sooner or later, voluntarily or by force, into the Confederate treasury, and were used to buy arms for the Confederate army in the British colonies. He, therefore, absolutely prohibited their use in payment. He forbade the exportation of salt, because it was used to cure bacon and beef, and thus to mobilize the Confederate army. A strict search was also made for arms and ammunition, which were often employed by the rapacious and unscrupulous traders as a means of accomplishing their ends. All able-bodied male negroes were required to work, either for their masters or for the Government, and the women and children, as well as the feeble, he refused to support or feed; but in no case did he permit any intimidation or persuasion to be used, with those who chose to leave their masters, to compel or induce them to return. With regard to all these subjects, he preferred not to meddle with details or individual cases, but laid down full, clear, and precise rules, in the form of written instructions for the guidance of his subordinates, and left the execution to

them. His constant endeavor was to apply severe and exact justice to all, and to avoid the entanglements and anomalies of exceptions in favor of particular persons. Shortly afterwards, when the Government issued orders removing the military restrictions imposed on the purchase of cotton, Sherman yielded a ready acquiescence, but at once addressed strong remonstrances on the subject to the authorities at Washington, assuring them that the measure would greatly strengthen the hands of the Confederate forces. He also turned his attention to the depredations of the guerrillas who had hitherto infested the district, harbored and assisted by the more evil-disposed of the inhabitants, protected against capture by the vicinity of a large friendly army, and secured against punishment by threats of retaliation upon the persons of our prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy. A guerrilla is a person who, alone or in company with a few comrades, wages war within or behind the lines of an enemy, for the purpose of inflicting incidental injury upon the persons or property of isolated persons or parties belonging to the opposing forces, adhering to the cause, or not adhering to the cause, of the army by which the guerrilla is sustained. He is careless as to the means he employs and the persons against whom he employs them. He wears no uniform. Robbery, arson, and murder he commits as a soldier. When in danger of capture, he throws away his arms and becomes a citizen. When captured, he produces his commission or points to his muster-roll, and is again a soldier. A few guerrillas endanger the lives and property of the thousands of non-combatants from whom they cannot be distinguished by the eye. The rebel government and the rebel commanders seem to have considered every thing justifiable that could be done by them in connection with the war: so they justified guerrillas and upheld them. Sherman regarded them as wild beasts, hunted them down and destroyed them. Where Union families were harassed, he caused the families of secessionists to be punished. Where steamboats, engaged in peaceful commerce, were fired upon, he caused the property of secessionists to be destroyed, and he finally an-

nounced that, for every boat attacked by guerrillas, ten secession families should be exiled from the comforts of Memphis. If, however, the inhabitants would resist the guerrillas, he would allow them to bring in produce and take out supplies. Thus, order and quiet were, for the time being, restored throughout the limits of his command.

During the fall several important expeditions were sent out from Memphis. Early in September, Hurlbut moved with his division to Brownsville, for the purpose of threatening the flank of any force moving from the line of the Tallahatchie against General Grant's position at Bolivar; while, at the same time, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith with his brigade, a battery of artillery, and four hundred cavalry under Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, moved to Holly Springs, destroyed the road and railway bridges over the Coldwater, and then returned, having held in check and diverted the enemy's forces assembling at Holly Springs to threaten Grant's communications, and by destroying the bridges having prevented the enemy from harassing the flank of a column moving eastward from Memphis.

In the latter part of October, General Grant summoned General Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, to arrange the plan of the coming campaign. Grant's army occupied, substantially, the line from Memphis eastward along the Chattanooga railway to Corinth. The Army of the Potomac remained inactive in Western Maryland; the Army of the Ohio, having defeated Bragg's invasion by the decisive victory at Richmond, Kentucky, held the passive defensive; and in Missouri, General Curtis was preparing to resist invasion from Arkansas. The great work before the Army of the Tennessee was the capture of Vicksburg. But the enemy, about forty thousand strong, under Lieutenant-General Pemberton, must first be dislodged from the line of the Tallahatchie, which they held in force, with all the fords and bridges strongly fortified. Grant was to move his main army direct from Jackson by Grand Junction and La Grange, following generally the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railway. Sherman was to move

out of Memphis with four brigades of infantry on the Tehulahoma road, to strike the enemy at Wyatt's simultaneously with Grant's arrival at Waterford. Major-General C. C. Washburne, over whom Grant had been authorized to exercise command in case of necessity, was instructed by Sherman to cross the Mississippi with above five thousand cavalry from Helena, Arkansas, and march rapidly on Grenada, to threaten the enemy's rear. Precisely on the day appointed, the three columns moved as indicated. While Pemberton was intent in preparations to meet Grant and Sherman behind his fortifications, he learned that Washburne, with a force of which he could not conjecture the size, source, or destination, had crossed the Tallahatchie, near the mouth of the Yallabusha, and was rapidly approaching the railways in his rear. There was no time to hesitate. Abandoning his works, Pemberton relinquished the line of the Tallahatchie without a battle, and hastily retreated on Grenada.

During the fall, and in preparation for the movement on Vicksburg, a sufficient number of the regiments called out by the President, after the failure of the summer campaign in Virginia, reported to General Sherman, to swell his division to six brigades; and by persistent and repeated applications he finally succeeded in adding the only organized battalion of his own regular regiment, the Thirteenth Infantry, under the command of Captain Edward C. Washington. Early in November, the division, which in the latter part of October had been renumbered as the First Division of the Army of the Tennessee, was organized as follows:

The first brigade, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, consisted of the Sixth Missouri, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fourth Ohio, *One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois*.

Second brigade, Colonel John A. McDowell, of the Sixth Iowa; Sixth Iowa, Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, and *One Hundredth Indiana*.

Third brigade, Brigadier-General James W. Denver; Forty-

eighth Ohio, Fifty-third Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, *Ninety-seventh Indiana*, and *Ninety-ninth Indiana*.

Fourth brigade, Colonel David Stuart, of the Fifty-fifth Illinois; Fifty-fifth Illinois, Fifty-seventh Ohio, *Eighty-third Indiana*, *One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois*.

Fifth brigade, Colonel R. P. Buckland of the Seventy-second Ohio; Seventy-second Ohio, *Thirty-second Wisconsin*, *Ninety-third Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois*.

Sixth, or reserve brigade; the *Thirty-third Wisconsin*, and *One Hundred and Seventeenth Illinois*.

Besides these regiments of infantry, there were attached to the division, and unassigned to brigades, seven batteries of light artillery, and the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson. The new regiments are designated in italics.

Early in the winter of 1862, the organization of army corps commenced in the Army of the Potomac, just before its spring campaign was introduced in the West. In December, the troops serving in the Department of the Tennessee were designated as the Thirteenth Army Corps, and Major-General Grant as the commander. He immediately subdivided his command, designating the troops in the district of Memphis as the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps, to be commanded by Major-General Sherman, and to be organized for active service in three divisions. Sherman assigned Brigadier-General Andrew J. Smith to the command of the first division, consisting of the new brigades of Burbridge and Landrum; Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to the second division, including the brigades of Colonel Giles A. Smith, Eighth Missouri, and David Stuart, Fifty-fifth Illinois, formerly the first and fourth brigades; and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan to the third division, comprising the new brigades of Osterhaus and Colonels Lindsay and De Courcey. The other brigades remained as the garrison of Memphis.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG.

GENERAL GRANT directed General Sherman to proceed with the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps to the mouth of the Yazoo River, and there disembark and attempt the capture of Vicksburg from the north side, while he himself, with the left wing, should move on Jackson, against the enemy from the rear, and, uniting the two columns, proceed to invest the place, in the event of the first part of the plan proving impracticable.

Before entering upon the duty now confided to him, Sherman issued the following characteristic orders, dated Memphis, December 18, 1862 :

"I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses to the sick alone, will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.

"II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and invoice it to Captain A. R. Eddy, chief quartermaster at Memphis.

"III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back

to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.

"IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quartermaster, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.

"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.

"VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies."

Sherman embarked at Memphis on the 20th of December, 1862, two days later than the time originally designated, having been delayed by the great want of steamboat transportation.

The three divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, and Morgan, reported a grand aggregate of thirty thousand and sixty-eight officers and men of all arms for duty. At Helena his force was increased by the division of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, twelve thousand three hundred and ten strong, comprising the brigades of Brigadier-Generals C. E. Hovey, John M. Thayer, Wyman, and Frank P. Blair, Jr. The place of rendezvous was at Friar's Point, on the left bank of the Mississippi, below Helena. The fleet reached Milliken's

Bend on the night of the twenty-fourth. On Christmas day Brigadier-General Burbidge landed with his brigade of A. J. Smith's division, and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas railway for a long distance near the crossing of the Tensas; and without waiting for his return, Sherman pushed on to a point opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, landed on the west bank, and sent Morgan L. Smith with his division to break up the same road at a point eight miles from Vicksburg. On the 26th, the transports, led and convoyed by the gunboat fleet, under Acting Rear Admiral D. D. Porter, ascended the old mouth of the Yazoo about twelve miles. Of the transport fleet, Morgan's division led the advance, followed in order by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith. By noon on the 27th, the entire command had disembarked on the south bank of the river, near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, a small stream, which, rising near the town of Vicksburg, finds its way across the bottom land about midway between the bluffs and the river. The clay bluffs, which are about three hundred feet high, and very steep, recede from the Mississippi on the north side of the town, and follow the course of the river at a distance of about four miles, the intermediate space being an alluvial swamp, full of lagoons, bayous, and quicksands, and covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a dense undergrowth of tangled vines. The Yazoo was very low, and its banks were about thirty feet above the water. On reaching the point of debarkation, De Courcey's, Stuart's, and Blair's brigade, were sent forward in the direction of Vicksburg about three miles, and as soon as the whole army had disembarked it moved out in four columns, Steele's above the mouth of Chickasaw bayou; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of Steele's division, below the same bayou; Morgan L. Smith's on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg, with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou about a mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it, and A. J. Smith's division on the main road.

All the heads of columns met the enemy's pickets, and drove them towards Vicksburg. During the night of the

27th, the ground was reconnoitred as well as possible, and it was found to be as difficult as it could possibly be from nature and art. Immediately in front was a bayou, passable only at two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, which were perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of beach or table-land, on which were constructed a series of rifle-pits and batteries, and behind that a high abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle-trenches, and the crowns of the principal hills presented heavy batteries. The county road leading from Vicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot of these hills, and served the enemy as a covered way along which he moved his artillery and infantry promptly to meet the Union forces at any point at which they attempted to cross this difficult bayou. Nevertheless, that bayou, with its levee parapet backed by the lines of rifle-pits, batteries, and frowning hills, had to be passed before they could reach firm ground, and meet their enemy on any thing like fair terms.

Steele, in his progress, followed substantially an old levee back from the Yazoo to the foot of the hills north of Thompson's Lake, but found that in order to reach the hard land he would have to cross a long corduroy causeway, with a battery enfilading it, others cross-firing it, with a similar line of rifle-pits and trenches before described. He skirmished with the enemy on the morning of the 28th, while the other columns were similarly engaged; but on close and critical examination of the swamp and causeway in his front, with the batteries and rifle-pits well manned, he came to the conclusion that it was impossible for him to reach the county road without a fearful sacrifice of life.

On his reporting that he could not cross from his position to the one occupied by the centre, Sherman ordered him to retrace his steps and return in steamboats to the southwest side of Chickasaw bayou, and support Morgan's division. This he accomplished during the night of the 28th, arriving in time to support him, and take part in the assault of the 29th.

Morgan's division were evidently on the best of existing ways from Yazoo to firm land. He had attached to his trains the pontoons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the ford or crossing, which was known to be in his front, and by which the enemy's picket had retreated.

The pontoon bridge was placed during the night across a bayou, supposed to be the main bayou, but which turned out to be an inferior one, and it was therefore useless; but the natural crossing remained, and Morgan was ordered to cross with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of the hill by a determined assault.

During the morning of the 28th a heavy fog enveloped the whole of the country. General Morgan advanced De Courcey's brigade and engaged the enemy: heavy firing of artillery and infantry was sustained, and his column moved on until he encountered the real bayou, which again checked his progress, and was not passed until the next day.

At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the bayou was a narrow sand strip with abattis thrown down by the enemy on our side, having the same deep boggy bayou with its levee parapet and system of cross-batteries and rifle-pits on the other side.

To pass it in the front by the flank would have been utter destruction, for the head of the column would have been swept away as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank. While reconnoitring it on the morning of the 28th, during the heavy fog, General Morgan L. Smith was shot in the hip by a chance rifle-bullet, and disabled, so that he had to be removed to the boats, and thus at a critical moment was lost one of the best and most daring leaders, a practical soldier and enthusiastic patriot. Brigadier-General David Stuart, who succeeded to his place and to the execution of his orders, immediately studied the nature of the ground in his front, saw all its difficulties, and made the best possible disposition to pass over his division as soon as he should hear General Morgan engaged on his left.

To his right General A. J. Smith had placed General Bur-

bridge's brigade of his division, with orders to make rafts and cross over a portion of his men, to dispose his artillery so as to fire at the enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect of a diversion.

Landrum's brigade of A. J. Smith's division occupied a high position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed well forward into the tangled abattis within three-fourths of a mile of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the town of Vicksburg.

The boats still lay at the place of debarkation, covered by the gunboats and four regiments of infantry, one of each division. Such was the disposition of Sherman's forces during the night of the 28th.

The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts seven miles above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluff near Snyder's house, called Drumgould's Bluff; his left the fortified town of Vicksburg; and his line connecting these was near fourteen miles in extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated and skilful officers.

Sherman's design was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the centre near Chickasaw Creek, at the head of a bayou of the same name, and once in position, to turn to the right, Vicksburg, or left, Drumgould's. According to information then obtained he supposed the organized force of the enemy to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reinforced at the rate of about four thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada, or Rosecrans those of Bragg in Tennessee.

Nothing had yet been heard from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south; or of General Banks, who was supposed to be ascending the Mississippi, but who in reality had but very recently reached New Orleans, and was engaged in gathering his officers there and at Baton Rouge, and in regulating the civil details of his department. Time being all-important, Sherman then determined to assault the hills in

front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th,—Morgan's division to carry the position to the summit of the hill, Steele's division to support him and hold the county road. General A. J. Smith was placed in command of his own first division, and M. L. Smith's second division, with orders to cross on the sand-spit, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the further side, or carry at all events the levee parapet and first line of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan. It was nearly noon when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him, and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was also near at hand. All the troops were massed as closely as possible, and the supports were well on hand.

The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's works; but here met so withering a fire from the rifle-pits, and cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the columns faltered, and finally fell back to the point of starting, leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

General Morgan at first reported that the troops of his division were not at all discouraged, though the losses in Blair's and De Courcey's brigades were heavy, and that he would renew the assault in half an hour.

Sherman then urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack, though it had to be made across a narrow sand-bar, and up a narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor of Morgan, or a real attack, according to its success. During Morgan's progress, he crossed over the Sixth Missouri, covered by the Thirteenth Regulars deployed as skirmishers up to the bank of the Bayou, protecting themselves as well as possible by fallen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharpshooters that showed a mark above the levee. All the ground was completely swept beforehand by the artillery, under the immediate supervision of Major E. Taylor, chief of artillery. The Sixth Missouri crossed rapidly by companies, and lay

under the bank of the Bayou with the enemy's sharpshooters over their heads within a few feet, so near that these sharpshooters held out their muskets and fired down vertically upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and make a road up it; but it was impossible, and after the repulse of Morgan's assault, Sherman ordered General A. J. Smith to retire this regiment under cover of darkness, which was successfully done, though with heavy loss.

Whilst this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across the Bayou in his front, and Landrum pushed his advance through the close abattis and entanglement of fallen timber close up to Vicksburg. When the night of the 29th closed in we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a repulse. During the night it rained very hard, and our men were exposed to it in the miry, swampy ground, sheltered only by their blankets and rubber ponchos, but during the following day it cleared off, and the weather became warm.

After a personal examination of the various positions, Sherman came to the conclusion that he could not break the enemy's centre without being too much crippled to act with any vigor afterwards. New combinations having therefore become necessary, he proposed to Admiral Porter that the navy should cover a landing at some point close up to the Drumgould's Bluff batteries, while he would hold the present ground, and send ten thousand choice troops to attack the enemy's right, and carry the batteries at that point; which, if successful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo River, and place Sherman in communication with General Grant. Admiral Porter lent his hearty concurrence to this plan, and it was agreed that the expeditionary force should be embarked immediately after dark on the night of the 31st of December, and under cover of all the gunboats, proceed before day slowly and silently up to the batteries; the troops there to land, storm the batteries, and hold them. Whilst this was going on, Sherman was to attack the enemy below, and hold him in check, preventing reinforcements going up to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move all his force thither.

Steele's division and one brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division were designated and embarked; the gunboats were all in position, and up to midnight every thing appeared favorable.

The assault was to take place about four A. M. Sherman had all his officers at their posts, ready to act on the first sound of cannonading in the direction of Drumgould's Bluff; but about daylight he received a note from General Steele, stating that Admiral Porter had found the fog so dense on the river, that the boats could not move, and that the expedition must be deferred till another night. Before night of January 1, 1863, he received a note from the admiral, stating that inasmuch as the moon would not set until twenty-five minutes past five, the landing must be a daylight affair, which in his judgment would be too hazardous to try.

Thus disappeared the only remaining chance of securing a lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and Black rivers, from which to operate upon Vicksburg and the railway to the east, as well as to secure the navigation of the Yazoo River.

One third of the command had already embarked for this expedition, and the rest were bivouacked in low, swampy, timbered ground, which a single night's rain would have made a quagmire. Marks of overflow stained the trees from ten to twelve feet above their roots. A further attempt against the centre was deemed by all the brigade and division commanders impracticable.

It had now become evident to all the commanders that for some cause unknown to them, the co-operating column under General Grant had failed. A week had elapsed since the time when it should have reached the rear of Vicksburg, yet nothing was heard from it. Sherman accordingly decided to abandon the attack and return to Milliken's Bend, which had a large extent of clear land, houses for storage, good roads in the rear, plenty of corn and forage, and the same advantages as any other point for operating against the enemy inland, on the river below Vicksburg, or at any point above where he might attempt to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi River.

On the morning of the 2d of January, the troops and *materiel* were embarked, and at 3 o'clock that afternoon the last of the transports, under convoy and protection of the gunboats, passed out of the Yazoo. At the mouth of that river, General Sherman met and reported to Major-General McClernand, who had come down on the steamer "Tigress," with orders to assume command of the expedition. On arriving at Milliken's Bend, on the 4th of January, 1863, Sherman at once relinquished the command to General McClernand, and announced the fact to the army in the following farewell order:

"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by Gen. G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own 'corps,' I desire to express to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, the capturing of Vicksburg; but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement, in which others were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.

"We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify, and having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have

hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity."

The disgraceful surrender of Holly Springs, on the 20th of December, with its immense depot of supplies, essential to the movement of the column under General Grant, had delayed the march of that officer, and unexpectedly demanded his attention in another quarter, while the enemy was thus enabled to concentrate for the defence of Vicksburg, behind positions naturally and artificially too strong to be carried by assault. Thus it was that the expedition under Sherman failed. In an official communication, written after the capture of Vicksburg, General Grant says: "General Sherman's arrangement as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, last December, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side from the attack, afterwards, I saw the impossibility of making it successful."

CHAPTER VIII.

ARKANSAS POST.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLERNAND brought with him an order, issued by the War Department, dividing the Army of the Tennessee into four separate army corps, to be known as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and to be respectively commanded by Major-Generals John A. McClernand, William T. Sherman, Stephen A. Hurlbut, and James B. McPherson, while General Grant was to retain command of the whole. The army corps had now become the unit of administration and of field movements. Completely organized, generally possessing within itself all the elements of a separate army, its commander was enabled to dispose promptly of the great mass of administrative details without the necessity of carrying them up to general headquarters, to breed delay and vexation and to distract the mind of the general-in-chief from the essential matters upon which his mind should have leisure to concentrate its energies.

Immediately on assuming command, General McClernand assigned Brigadier-General George W. Morgan to the immediate command of his own corps, the Thirteenth, composing the left wing, and consisting of A. J. Smith's division and Morgan's own division, now to be commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus.

Sherman's Fifteenth Corps, which was to constitute the right wing, comprised the First Division, under the command of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, and the Second Division, temporarily under the command of Brigadier-General David Stuart, in the absence of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith.

Steele's first division was now organized as follows :

First brigade, Brigadier-General Frank P. Blair—Thirteenth Illinois, Twenty-ninth Missouri, Thirty-first Missouri, Thirty-second Missouri, Fifty-eighth Ohio, Thirtieth Missouri.

Second brigade, Brigadier-General C. E. Hovey—Seventeenth Missouri, Twenty-fifth Iowa, Third Missouri, Seventy-sixth Ohio, Thirty-first Iowa, Twelfth Missouri.

Third brigade, Brigadier-General John M. Thayer—Fourth Iowa, Thirty-fourth Iowa, Thirtieth Iowa, Twenty-sixth Iowa, Ninth Iowa, infantry.

Artillery—First Iowa, Captain Griffiths ; Fourth Ohio, Captain Hoffman, and First Missouri horse artillery.

Cavalry—Third Illinois, and a company of the Fifteenth Illinois.

The second division, formerly Sherman's fifth division, of the Army of the Tennessee, consisted of the following named troops :

First brigade, Colonel G. A. Smith, commanding—Eighth Missouri, Sixth Missouri, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Thirteenth United States.

Second brigade, Colonel T. Kilby Smith, commanding—Fifty-fifth Illinois, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Fifty-fourth Ohio, Eighty-third Indiana, Fifty-seventh Ohio, infantry.

Artillery—Companies A and B, First Illinois Light Artillery, and Eighth Ohio battery.

Cavalry—Two companies of Thielman's Illinois battalion, and Company C, Tenth Missouri.

On the 4th of January, 1863, the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth and one hundred and seventeen below Little Rock. This fort was a very strong bastioned work, constructed by the rebels at the head of a horse-shoe bend, on an elevated bluff which here touches the river and defines for some distance its left bank. The work has four

bastion fronts, inclosing a space about one hundred yards square, and a line of rifle-pits extended three-quarters of a mile across a neck of level ground to a bayou on the west and north. In the fort three heavy iron guns, one three-inch rifled gun, and four six-pounder smooth bores were mounted at the salients and flanks, and six twelve-pounder howitzers and three-inch rifles were distributed along the rifle-pits. The garrison consisted of about five thousand men, under Brigadier-General T. J. Churchill, of the Confederate army. He was ordered by Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the rebel forces in Arkansas, to hold the post "till all are dead."

The expedition was suggested by General Sherman, and the idea was promptly adopted by General McClelland. Its object was to employ the troops, which would otherwise have remained idly waiting for the full development of the combinations against Vicksburg, in opening the way to Little Rock; thus placing the Arkansas River under the control of the Union armies, and putting an end to the dangerous detached operations carried on from that point against our communications on the Mississippi. The former river traversing and nearly bisecting Arkansas from northwest to southeast, is the key to the military possession of the State.

The expedition moved up the White River through the cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hindman, where the troops began to disembark at five o'clock on the afternoon of January 9th. By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. Sherman's Fifteenth Corps took the advance, and was to pass round the rear of the enemy's works, and form line with his right resting on the river above the fort. The Thirteenth Corps, under Brigadier-General Morgan, was to follow, and connecting with General Sherman's right, complete the investment on the left. The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position, Steele on the right, resting on the bayou, Stuart next, A. J. Smith's division on Stuart's

left, and Osterhaus's division on the extreme left near the river. During the night of the 9th and the following day Colonel D. W. Lindsay's brigade of Osterhaus's division had landed on the right bank of the river below Notrib's farm, and marching across the bend had taken up a position and planted a battery on that bank above the fort, so as to effectually prevent the succor of the garrison, or its escape by water.

Admiral Porter kept up a furious bombardment until after dark. Early on the morning of the 11th, Sherman moved his corps into an easy position for assault, looking south, across ground encumbered by fallen trees and covered with low bushes. The enemy could be seen moving back and forth along his lines, occasionally noticing our presence by some ill-directed shots which did us little harm, and accustomed the men to the sound of rifle-cannon. By ten A. M. Sherman reported to General McClernand in person that he was all ready for the assault, and only awaited the simultaneous movement of the gunboats. They were to silence the fort, and save the troops from the enfilading fire of its artillery along the only possible line of attack.

About half-past twelve notice was received that the gunboats were in motion. Wood's Battery, Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, was posted on the road which led directly into the Post; Banett's Battery B, First Illinois Artillery, was in the open space in the interval between Stuart's and Steele's divisions, and Steele had two of his batteries disposed in his front. Sherman's orders were, that as soon as the gunboats opened fire all his batteries in position should commence firing, and continue until he commanded "cease firing," when, after three minutes' cessation, the infantry columns of Steele's and Stuart's divisions were to assault the enemy's line of rifle-pits and defences.

The gunboats opened about one P. M., and our field-batteries at once commenced firing, directing their shots at the enemy's guns, his line of defences, and more especially enfilading the road which led directly into the fort, and which separated Morgan's line of attack from Sherman's. The gunboats could

not be seen, and their progress had to be judged by the sound of their fire,—at first slow and steady, but rapidly approaching the fort and enveloping it with a storm of shells and shot. The field-batteries continued their fire rapidly for about fifteen minutes, the enemy not replying, when Sherman, having withdrawn the skirmish line, ordered the firing to cease and the columns to advance to the assault. The infantry sprang forward with a cheer, rapidly crossed the hundred yards of clear space in their immediate front, and dashed into a belt of ground about three hundred yards wide, separating them from the enemy's parapets, slightly cut up by gulleys and depressions, and covered with standing trees, brush, and fallen timber. There they encountered the fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry, well directed from their perfect cover. The speed of our advance was checked, and afterwards became more cautious and prudent. By three P. M. Sherman's lines were within one hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, and flanking him on our right, and completely enveloping his position. The gunboats could be seen close up to the fort, the admiral's flag directly under it. All artillery fire from the fort had ceased, and only occasionally could be seen a few of the enemy's infantry firing from its parapets; but the strongest resistance continued in our immediate front, where the enemy's infantry was massed, comparatively safe from the gunboats, which were compelled to direct their fire well to the front, lest it should injure our own troops. A brisk fire of musketry was kept up along our whole front with an occasional discharge of artillery through the intervals of the infantry lines until four P. M., when the white flag appeared all along the enemy's lines. Sherman immediately ordered General Steele to push a brigade down the bayou on his right, to prevent the escape of the enemy.

Simultaneously with Sherman's assault, Burbridge's brigade with the One Hundred and Eighteenth Illinois and Sixty-ninth Indiana, of Landrum's, and the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, dashed forward under a deadly fire quite to the enemy's intrenchments; the Sixteenth

Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Orr, with the Eighty-third Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, of Burbridge's brigade, and the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio, Colonel D. French, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, being the first to enter the fort. Presenting himself at the entrance of the fort, General Burbridge was halted by the guard, who denied that they had surrendered, until he called their attention to the white flag, and ordered them to ground their arms.

Colonel Lindsay, as soon as a gunboat had passed above the fort, hastened with his brigade down the opposite shore, and opened an oblique fire from Foster's two twenty, and Lieutenant Wilson's two ten pounder Parrott's, into the enemy's line of rifle-pits, carrying away his battle-flag and killing a number of his men.

The fort had surrendered. With cheers and shouts our troops poured into the works.

As soon as order could be restored, Brigadier-General A. J. Smith was assigned to the command of the fort itself, and Brigadier-General David Stuart to the charge of the prisoners and the exterior defences.

Our entire loss in killed was 129 ; in wounded, 831 ; and in missing, 17 ; total, 977. Sherman's corps lost 4 officers and 75 men killed, and 34 officers and 406 men wounded ; making a total of 519.

General Churchill, in his official report, dated Richmond, May 6, 1863, to Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the Department of Arkansas, states that his loss "will not exceed — killed, and 75 or 80 wounded." He estimates the Union force at 50,000, his own at 3,000, and our loss at from 1,500 to 2,000.

By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men, including three entire brigades of the enemy, commanded respectively by Colonels Garland, Deshler, and Dunnington ; seventeen pieces of cannon ; three thousand serviceable small-arms ; forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition ; and five hundred and sixty-three animals.

After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed

the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th, in obedience to orders received from Major-General Grant, they returned to Milliken's Bend. Sherman had been in favor of taking advantage of a rise in the Arkansas to threaten Little Rock, and force all scattered bands of the enemy to seek safety south of that river ; but General McClermand was unwilling to take so great a responsibility in addition to that he had already incurred, by entering upon so important an enterprise without orders.

In noticing the services of the subordinate commanders, General McClermand remarks : " General Sherman exhibited his usual activity and enterprise ; General Morgan proved his tactical skill and strategic talent ; while Generals Steele, Smith, Osterhaus, and Stuart, and the several brigade commanders displayed the fitting qualities of brave and successful officers."

At Napoleon, Sherman was joined by the brigade of Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, which had been on the way to join General Rosecrans ; but that officer having just defeated Bragg in the desperate and decisive action of Stone River, no longer needed reinforcements. Ewing's command was assigned to Morgan L. Smith's second division, as the third brigade of that division. The effective force of the Fifteenth Corps was now fifteen thousand nine hundred and nine men of all arms.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG.

ON the 19th of January, Sherman proceeded with his corps to Young's Point, opposite Vicksburg, and reported to Grant. Here he was joined by the division of Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, consisting of Mower's, Buckland's, and Woods' brigades. From the moment of taking personal command of the army at Milliken's Bend, General Grant became convinced that Vicksburg could only be taken from the south. He immediately caused work to be prosecuted on the canal begun the previous summer by Brigadier-General Thomas Williams, under the orders of Major-General Butler, with the view of effecting an artificial cut-off across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, through which transports, troops, and supplies might safely pass to the river below the enemy's batteries at that place. Somewhat later he also caused a channel to be cut through the west bank into Lake Providence, with the design of passing down through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers; and a third canal through the Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater by means of which troops might enter the Tallahatchie, and thence descending the Yazoo, land on the high ground above Haines' Bluff. For various reasons, none of these plans succeeded.

While the gunboats and troops sent through Yazoo Pass were delayed near Greenwood at the junction of the Yallahusha and Tallahatchie, where the rebels had taken advantage of a bend in the river to construct a formidable work, Admiral Porter reconnoitred still another route. Seven miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, Steele's bayou empties into

that river ; thirty miles up Steele's bayou, Black bayou enters it from Deer Creek, six miles distant ; ascending Deer Creek eighteen miles, Rolling Fork connects it with the Big Sunflower River, ten miles distant ; and descending the Big Sunflower forty-one miles, you again enter the Yazoo, sixty miles from its mouth. By taking this course, the troops and gunboats would reach a strong position between Haines' Bluff and Greenwood ; the enemy's forces at the latter point would be placed between two strong columns of the Union army, and would be compelled to fall back on Vicksburg ; one of the most important sources of supplies would be lost to the enemy, and a valuable line of operations gained for us. Satisfying himself by a personal reconnoissance, in company with Admiral Porter, that the chances of success were sufficient to warrant so important an undertaking, on the 16th of March, General Grant ordered General Sherman to take Stuart's second division of the Fifteenth Corps, open the route, in co-operation with the gunboats, and seize some tenable position on the east bank of the Yazoo, whence to operate against Vicksburg and the forts at Haines' Bluff. Sherman started immediately with the Eighth Missouri regiment, and a detachment of pioneers, to open the bayou, and the next morning was followed by the remainder of the troops, who, in order to economize transportation, ascended the Mississippi to Eagle's Bend, where Steele's bayou approaches within a mile of the river, connected with it by Mud bayou, and there disembarking, marched across by land to Steele's bayou. The 18th and the forenoon of the 19th were spent in bridging Mud bayou, which was greatly swollen by a crevasse. Marching to Steele's bayou, but one transport was found there, and the three following days were spent in transporting the troops up the bayou, in such boats as became available. At the mouth of Black bayou the troops were transferred from the steamers to coal barges and taken in tow by a tug. Admiral Porter had started on the 14th of March with the gunboats *Louisville*, Lieutenant-Commander Owen ; *Cincinnati*, Lieutenant-Commanding Bache ; *Carondelet*, Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy ; *Mound City*, Lieuten-

ant-Commanding Wilson ; *Pittsburgh*, Lieutenant-Commanding Hoel, four mortar-boats, and four tugs. The fleet easily passed up Steele's bayou, which, though very narrow, contained thirty feet of water ; but Black's bayou was found to be obstructed by fallen and overhanging trees, which had to be pulled out by the roots and pushed aside before the gunboats could pass, and the frequent bends were so abrupt that the boats had to be heaved around them, with hardly a foot of room to spare. Twenty-four hours were occupied in going four miles into Deer Creek. The gunboats entered Deer Creek safely, and pushed their way through the overhanging branches of cypress and willow, with which it was obstructed, at the rate of about a mile an hour at first, gradually diminishing as the difficulties increased, to half a mile an hour. When within seven miles of the Rolling Fork, the Confederate agents and some of the planters forcibly compelled the negroes to cut down immense trees directly across the Creek, for the purpose of delaying the advance. Removing these artificial obstructions, in addition to the natural ones, with almost incredible labor, when within three miles of Rolling Fork, smoke was discovered in the direction of the Yazoo, and information reached Admiral Porter that the enemy was advancing with five thousand men, to dispute his progress. The *Carondelet*, Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy, was sent ahead to hold the entrance to Rolling Fork, and on the night of the 20th March found the gunboats within eight hundred yards of that stream, with only two or three trees and a narrow lane of willows between them and open navigation. The next morning about six hundred of the enemy, with a battery of field-pieces, made their appearance, and began to annoy the fleet by sharpshooters, and to fell trees in front and rear. Sherman had not yet arrived. The road lay along the banks of the bayous, and he had found the banks overflowed below Hill's plantation on Deer Creek, at the head of Black bayou, so that the troops had to be transported twenty-eight miles to the mouth of Black bayou, on two small steamers, there transferred to a single coal-barge, and towed by a small tug two miles, to the

first dry ground. The wooden transports encountered the same difficulties that met the iron-clad gunboats, without the same means of overcoming them. It was a slow process. Sherman was now at Hill's plantation, with only three regiments. But upon receipt of a note from Admiral Porter, stating his condition, on the morning of the 21st, Colonel Smith, with the Sixth and Eighth Missouri and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois regiments of his brigade, was at once sent forward, and by a forced march of twenty-one miles over a terrible swamp road, succeeded in reaching the gunboats, to find them almost completely surrounded by the entire force sent out by the enemy through the Yazoo, and unable to move in either direction. The creek was so narrow that the broad-side guns were quite useless, and only one bow-gun could be brought to bear by either of the gunboats, and the steep banks required this to be fired at too great an angle to have much effect. The enemy had established a battery of fifteen guns in front. Colonel Smith disposed his force to protect the fleet, and prevent the felling of trees in the rear. On the morning of the 22d, after removing about forty of the felled trees, the enemy appeared in large force in rear of the gunboats, and opened fire with artillery. The gunboats replied, and soon drove them off. The enemy then attacked Colonel Smith's brigade, and after a sharp skirmish, was again repulsed. When the firing began, Sherman, who had by great exertions succeeded in getting up the remainder of Colonel Giles A. Smith's brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth Regulars and One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, as well as the Eighty-third Indiana, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Fifty-fourth and Fifty-seventh Ohio, of Colonel T. Kilby Smith's brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, was advancing with them by a forced march, having led the troops by candlelight through the dense canebrake, and was six miles distant. Hearing the guns, he pressed rapidly forward in the direction of the sound, and arrived just in time to meet and disperse the enemy, who were preparing to pass round the rear of the boats, and again dispute their movement. The

fleet was saved. The expedition might now have been continued, but officers and men of army and navy were alike exhausted; the army had not brought rations for so long a work, and the navy provision-boat was too large to get through; moreover, the enemy had had time to prepare, and full indications of the direction and progress of the movement. There was nothing to do but to return. All of the 22d and 23d, and part of the 24th of March, was consumed in tediously retracing the route to Hill's plantation. The enemy, kept at bay by the army, did not molest the gunboats further. At Hill's the expedition rested on the 25th, and on the 26th the fleet passed down, and in accordance with orders received from General Grant, Sherman returned with his troops to Young's Point.

"The expedition failed," says General Grant, "more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectually checkmate further progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."

Admiral Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the want of means of moving the troops through the bayous as the chief difficulty; "for," he remarks, "there were never yet any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant and Sherman to forward an expedition for the overthrow of Vicksburg." He continues: "The army officers worked like horses to enable them to accomplish what was desired. . . . No other general could have done better, or as well, as Sherman, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of transportation."

General Grant now determined to march his army by land to New Carthage, twenty-three miles below Milliken's Bend, to run the transports past the batteries or through the canal,

should the latter course prove feasible, to cross the river, and to attack Vicksburg from the south. The movement was commenced by McClernand's Thirteenth Army Corps on the 29th of March. New Carthage was found to be an island, in consequence of the breakage of the levees, and the march had to be continued twelve miles further to Perkins' plantation. The roads were found to be level, but very bad, and the movement was necessarily slow. Over these roads the supplies of ordnance and provisions had to be transported thirty-five miles in wagons.

On the night of the 16th April, Acting Rear-Admiral Porter, who had entered with alacrity and energy into the general's plans, ran the Vicksburg batteries with his fleet and three transports carrying stores, and protected by hay and cotton. One of the transports only was lost, though all the boats were frequently struck. A few days later, five more transports, similarly prepared, and towing twelve barges, ran the batteries safely, a sixth being sunk, and half the barges disabled. The crews of the transports consisted of volunteers from the army, picked out of many hundreds of officers and men of the army, who offered themselves for this dangerous service. The limited amount of water transportation available below Vicksburg now rendered it necessary for the army to march by a circuitous route, avoiding the flooded lands, thirty-five miles further to Hard Times, thus lengthening the line of communication with Milliken's Bend to seventy miles. The final orders of General Grant for the movement, issued on the 20th of April, gave McClernand's Thirteenth Corps the right, McPherson's Seventeenth Corps the centre, and Sherman's Fifteenth Corps the left, and directed the army to move by the right flank, no faster, however, than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them. On the 26th of April, when it was discovered that the march must be continued below New Carthage, General Grant sent orders to General Sherman to wait until the roads should improve, or the canals be finished; and, on the 28th, he notified Sherman that the following day was fixed upon for attacking Grand Gulf, and suggested that

a simultaneous feint on the enemy's batteries on the Yazoo, near Haines' Bluff, would be most desirable, provided it could be made without the ill-effect on the army and the country of an apparent repulse. The object was to make as great a show as possible, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent from Vicksburg to the assistance of the forces which would have to be encountered at Grand Gulf. "The ruse," says General Grant, "succeeded admirably." In his official report, dated May 21st, 1863, convinced that the army could distinguish a feint from a real attack by succeeding events, and that the country would in due season recover from the effect, Sherman gave the necessary orders, embarked Blair's second division on ten steamboats, and about 10 A. M. on the 29th April, proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, Captain Breese, with the Choctaw and De Kalb, iron-clads, and the Tyler, and several smaller wooden boats of the fleet, already with steam up, prepared to co-operate in the proposed demonstration against Haines' Bluff.

The expedition at once proceeded up the Yazoo in order; lay for the night of April 29th at the mouth of Chickasaw bayou, and early next morning proceeded to within easy range of the enemy's batteries.

The gunboats at once engaged the batteries, and for four hours a vigorous demonstration was kept up. Towards evening, Sherman ordered the division of troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, and seemingly prepare to assault; but he knew full well that there was no road across the submerged field that lay between the river and the bluff. As soon as the troops were fairly out on the levee, the gunboats resumed their fire, and the enemy's batteries replied with spirit. The enemy could be seen moving guns, artillery, and infantry back and forth, and evidently expecting a real attack. Keeping up appearances until night, the troops were re-embarked. During the next day similar movements were made, accompanied by reconnoissances of all the country on both sides of the Yazoo.

While there, orders came from General Grant to hurry for-

ward to Grand Gulf. Dispatching orders to the divisions of Steele and Tuttle at once to march for Grand Gulf *via* Richmond, Sherman prolonged the demonstration till night, and quietly dropped back to his camp at Young's Point. No casualties were sustained, except one man of the Eighth Missouri, slightly wounded.

In the mean time, as many of the Thirteenth Army Corps as could be got on board the transports and barges were embarked, and were moved down to the front of Grand Gulf, for the purpose of landing and storming the enemy's works as soon as the navy should have silenced the guns. Admiral Porter's fleet opened at eight A. M. on the 29th of April, and gallantly kept up a vigorous fire at short range for more than five hours; by which time General Grant, who witnessed the engagement from a tug-boat, became convinced that the enemy's guns were too elevated to be silenced, and his fortifications too strong to be taken from the water-front. He at once ordered the troops back to Hard Times, there to disembark and march across the point to the plain immediately below Grand Gulf. During the night, under cover of the fire of the gunboats, all the transports and barges ran safely past the batteries. They were immediately followed by the fleet, and at daylight, on the 30th, the work of ferrying the troops over to Bruinsburg was commenced. The Thirteenth Corps was started on the road to Port Gibson as soon as it could draw three days' rations, and the Seventeenth Corps followed as fast as it was landed on the east bank. The enemy was met in force near Port Gibson at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of May, was driven back on the following day, was pursued across the Bayou Pierre, and eight miles beyond the north fork of the same bayou, both which streams were bridged by McPherson's corps; and on the 3d of May, with slight skirmishing all day, was pushed to and across the Big Black River, at Hankinson's Ferry. Finding here that the enemy had evacuated Grand Gulf, and that we were already fifteen miles from that place on the direct road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, General Grant halted his army to wait for wagons, supplies and Sherman's corps,

and went back to Grand Gulf in person, to move the depot of supplies to that point.

Sherman reached Young's Point on the night of May 1st. On the following morning, the second division, now commanded by General Blair, moved up to Milliken's Bend to garrison that place until relieved by troops ordered from Memphis for that purpose; and at the same time, General Sherman himself, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, took up the line of march to join General Grant. They reached Hard Times at noon on the 6th, crossed the Mississippi to Grand Gulf during the night and the following day, and on the 8th marched eighteen miles to Hankinson's Ferry, relieving Crocker's division and enabling it to join McPherson's corps. General Grant's orders for a general advance had been issued the day previous, and the movement had already begun. McPherson was to take the right-hand road by Rocky Springs and Utica to Raymond, and thence to Jackson; McClermand, the left-hand road, through Willow Springs, keeping as near the Black River as possible; Sherman to move on Edwards' Station, and both he and McClermand to strike the railroad between Edwards' Station and Bolton. At noon on the 10th, Sherman destroyed the floating bridge over the Big Black and marched to Big Sandy; on the 11th he reached Auburn, and on the morning of the 12th encountered and dispersed a small force of the enemy endeavoring to obstruct the crossing of Fourteen Mile Creek. Pausing for the pioneers, to make a new crossing in lieu of a bridge burned by the enemy's rear-guard, towards evening Sherman met General Grant on the other side of Fourteen Mile Creek, and was ordered to encamp there, Steele's division towards Edwards' Depot and Tuttle's towards Raymond. During the night, news was received that McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, had the same day met and defeated two brigades of the enemy at Raymond, and that the enemy had retreated upon Jackson, where reinforcements were constantly arriving, and where General Joseph E. Johnston was hourly expected to take personal command.

Determining to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no enemy in his rear, if it could be avoided, General Grant at once changed his orders to McClelland and Sherman, and directed them to march upon Raymond. On the 13th, McPherson moved to Clinton, Sherman to a parallel position at Mississippi Springs, and McClelland to a point near Raymond. Having communicated during the night, so as to reach their destination at the same hour, on the 14th, Sherman and McPherson marched fourteen miles, and at noon engaged the enemy near Jackson. At this time McClelland occupied Clinton, Mississippi Springs, and Raymond, each with one division, and had Blair's division of Sherman's corps near New Auburn, and had halted, according to orders, within supporting distance. The enemy marched out with the bulk of his forces on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from Jackson, while a small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance from the city, on the Mississippi Springs road, and endeavored by unusual activity, aided by the nature of the ground, to create the appearance of great strength, so as to delay Sherman's advance until the contest with McPherson should be decided.

During the day it rained in torrents, and the roads, which had been very dusty, became equally muddy, but the troops pushed on, and about 10 A. M. were within three miles of Jackson. Then were heard the guns of McPherson to the left, and the cavalry advance reported an enemy in front, at a small bridge at the foot of the ridge along which the road led.

The enemy opened briskly with a battery. Hastily reconnoitring the position, Sherman ordered Mower's and Mattheis's, formerly Woods', brigades of Tuttle's division, to deploy forward to the right and left of the road, and Buckland's to close up. Waterhouse's and Spohrer's batteries were placed on commanding ground and soon silenced the enemy's guns, when he retired about half a mile into the skirt of woods in front of the intrenchments at Jackson. Mower's brigade followed him up, and he soon took refuge behind the intrenchments.

The stream, owing to its precipitous banks, could only be passed on the bridge, which the enemy did not attempt to destroy, and forming the troops in similar order beyond the bridge, only that Mower's brigade, from the course he took in following the enemy, occupied the ground to the left of the road, and Matthie's brigade to the right, the two batteries in the centre, and Buckland's brigade in reserve.

As the troops emerged from the woods in their front, and as far to their left as they could see, appeared a line of intrenchments, and the enemy kept up a brisk fire with artillery from the points that enfiladed the road. In order to ascertain the nature of the flanks of this line of intrenchments, Sherman directed Captain Pitzman, acting engineer, to take the Ninety-fifth Ohio, and make a detour to the right, to see what was there. While he was gone Steele's division closed up. About one P. M. Captain Pitzman returned, reporting that he found the enemy's intrenchments abandoned at the point where he crossed the railroad, and had left the Ninety-fifth Ohio there in possession. Sherman at once ordered General Steele to lead his whole division into Jackson by that route, and as soon as the cheers of his men were heard, Tuttle's division was ordered in by the main road. The enemy's infantry had escaped to the north by the Canton road, but we captured about two hundred and fifty prisoners, with all the enemy's artillery (eighteen guns), and much ammunition and valuable public stores. Meanwhile, after a warm engagement, lasting more than two hours, McPherson had badly defeated the main body of the enemy, and driven it north. The pursuit was kept up until nearly dark.

Disposing the troops on the outskirts of the town, in obedience to a summons from General Grant, Sherman met him and General McPherson near the State-house, and received orders to occupy the line of rifle-pits, and on the following day to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and all the property belonging to the enemy. Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th of May, Steele's division was set to work to destroy the railroad and property to

the south and east, including Pearl River Bridge, and Tuttle's division to the north and west. The railroads were destroyed by burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of four miles east of Jackson, three south, three north, and ten west.

In Jackson the arsenal buildings, the government foundry, the gun-carriage establishment, including the carriages for two complete six-gun batteries, stable, carpenter and paint shops, were destroyed. The penitentiary was burned, as is supposed, by some convicts who had been set free by the Confederate authorities. A valuable cotton factory was also burned to the ground, as machinery of that kind could so easily be converted into hostile uses; and the United States could better afford to compensate the owners for their property, and feed the poor families thus thrown out of employment, than to spare the property. Other buildings were destroyed in Jackson by some mischievous soldiers, who could not be detected, including the Catholic church and the Confederate hotel—the former accidentally, and the latter from malice.

Immediately on entering Jackson, General Grant had ordered McClernand with his corps and Blair's division of Sherman's corps to face towards Bolton, and march by roads converging near that place to Edward's Station. McPherson was also directed to retrace his route to Clinton and follow McClernand. Early on the morning of the 16th, hearing that Pemberton, with a force estimated by the enemy at ten batteries of artillery and twenty-five thousand men, was taking up positions to attack him, General Grant, who had intended to leave one division of the Fifteenth Corps a day longer in Jackson, ordered Sherman to bring up his entire command at once, and move with all possible dispatch until he should come up with the main body near Bolton. At the same time McClernand was ordered to move from the position reached on the night of the 15th, near Bolton, upon Edward's Station, and McPherson was ordered to join him.

Sherman received his orders at ten minutes past seven A. M. In an hour his advance division, Steele's, was in motion, Tuttle's followed at noon, and by night the corps had marched twenty

miles to Bolton. During the day the main body met the enemy in strong force at Champion Hills, and after a terrible contest of several hours' duration, fought chiefly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, and Logan's and Quimby's divisions of McPherson's corps, defeated him, capturing a large number of guns and prisoners, and cutting off the whole of Loring's division from Pemberton's army. That night Sherman was ordered to turn his corps to the right and move on Bridgeport, where Blair's division was to join him. On the morning of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson continued the pursuit along the railroad, the former in advance. In a brilliant affair, Lawler's brigade, of Carr's division, McClernand's corps, stormed the enemy's works on the east bank of the Big Black, defending the crossing of that stream, and captured the entire garrison, with seventeen guns. The enemy immediately burned the bridge over the Big Black, and thus finally isolated his forces on the west bank. At noon, Sherman reached Bridgeport, where Blair met him with his division and the pontoon train, which was the only one in the entire army. With trifling opposition the pontoon bridge was laid by night, and Blair's and Steele's divisions passed over, followed by Tuttle's division in the morning. During the night of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson bridged the Big Black, and by eight A. M., on the 18th, began to cross, the former on the Jackson and Vicksburg road, the latter above it. McClernand marched to Mount Albans and there turned to the left, on the Baldwin's Ferry road. McPherson came into the same road with Sherman, and turned to the left, where, as will be presently seen, the latter turned to the right, at the fork of the Bridgeport road, within three and a half miles of Vicksburg.

Starting at daybreak, Sherman pushed rapidly forward, and by half-past nine A. M., of May 18th, the head of his column reached the Benton road and commanded the Yazoo, interposing a superior force between the enemy at Vicksburg and the forts on the Yazoo. Resting a sufficient time to enable the column to close up, Sherman pushed forward to the point

where the road forks, and sending out on each road the Thirteenth Regulars to the right, and the Eighth Missouri to the left, with a battery at the fork, awaited General Grant's arrival. He very soon came up, and directed Sherman to operate on the right, McPherson on the centre, and McClermand on the left. Leaving a sufficient force on the main road to hold it till McPherson came up, Sherman pushed the head of his column on this road till the skirmishers were within musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg. Here he disposed Blair's division to the front, Tuttle's in support, and ordered Steele's to follow a blind road to the right till he reached the Mississippi. By dark his advance was on the bluffs, and early next morning he reached the Haines' Bluff road, getting possession of the enemy's outer works, camps, and many prisoners left behind during their hasty evacuation, and had his pickets up within easy range of the enemy's new line of defences. By eight A. M. of May 19th we had encompassed the enemy to the north of Vicksburg, our right resting on the Mississippi River, within view of our fleets at the mouth of the Yazoo and Young's Point; Vicksburg was in plain sight, and nothing separated the two armies but a space of about four hundred yards of very difficult ground, cut up by almost impracticable ravines and the enemy's line of intrenchments. Sherman ordered the Fourth Iowa Cavalry to proceed rapidly up to Haines' Bluff and secure possession of the place, it being perfectly open to the rear. By four P. M. the cavalry were on the high bluff behind, and Colonel Swan, finding that the place had been evacuated, dispatched a company to secure it. Communication was opened with the fleet at Young's Point and the mouth of the Yazoo, and bridges and roads made to bring up ammunition and provisions from the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, to which point supply-boats had been ordered by General Grant. Up to that time, Sherman's men had literally lived upon the country, having left Grand Gulf May 8th with three days' rations in their haversacks, and having received little or nothing from the commissary until the 18th.

The three corps being in position, and Vicksburg as completely invested as our strength admitted, and, relying upon the demoralization of the enemy, in consequence of his repeated and disastrous defeats outside of the works, General Grant ordered a general assault to take place at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th. At that hour, Blair's division moved forward, Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades on the right of the road, and Kilby Smith's brigade on the left, with artillery disposed on the right and left to cover the point where the road enters the enemy's intrenchments. Tuttle's division was held on the road, with Buckland's brigade deployed in line to the rear of Blair and the other two brigades under cover. At the appointed signal the line advanced, but the ground to the right and left was so impracticable, being cut up in deep chasms, filled with standing and fallen timber, that the line was slow and irregular in reaching the trenches. The Thirteenth Infantry, on the left of Giles Smith, reached the works first, and planted its colors on the exterior slope; its commander, Captain Washington, was mortally wounded, and five other officers, and seventy-seven men, out of two hundred and fifty, killed or wounded. The Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel Spooner, and the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Eldridge, attained the same position nearly at the same time, held their ground, and fired upon any head that presented itself above the parapet; but it was impossible to enter. Other regiments gained position to the right and left close up to the parapet; but night found them outside the works, unsuccessful. As soon as darkness closed in, Sherman ordered them back a short distance, where the formation of the ground gave a partial shelter, to bivouac for the night. McClermand and McPherson only succeeded in gaining advanced positions under cover.


Spending the 20th and 21st in placing the artillery in commanding positions, in perfecting communications, and in bringing up supplies to the troops—who, having now been marching and fighting for twenty days on about five days' rations from the commissary department, were

beginning to suffer for want of bread—on the afternoon of the latter day, General Grant issued orders for a second assault to be made simultaneously, by heads of columns, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 22d of May. The three corps commanders set their time by his. Precisely at the appointed hour, and simultaneously along the whole front, the assault commenced.

In Sherman's corps, Blair's division was placed at the head of the road, Tuttle's in support, and General Steele was to make his attack at a point in his front about half a mile to the right. The troops were grouped so that the movement could be connected and rapid. The road lies on the crown of an interior ridge, rises over comparatively smooth ground along the edge of the ditch of the right face of the enemy's bastion, and enters the parapet at the shoulder of the bastion. No men could be seen in the enemy's works, except occasionally a sharpshooter, who would show his head and quickly discharge his piece. A line of picked skirmishers was placed to keep them down. A volunteer storming party of a hundred and fifty men led the column, carrying boards and poles to bridge the ditch. This, with a small interval, was followed in order by Ewing's, Giles Smith's, and Kilby Smith's brigades, bringing up the rear of Blair's division. All marched by the flank, following a road by which the men were partially sheltered, until it was necessary to take the crown of the ridge and expose themselves to the full view of the enemy. The storming party dashed up the road at the double-quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio leading, while the artillery of Wood's, Barrett's, Waterhouse's, Spoor's, and Hart's batteries kept a concentric fire on the bastion constructed to command this approach. The storming party reached the salient of the bastion, and passed towards the sally-port. Then rose from every part commanding it a double rank of the enemy, and poured on the head of the column a terrific fire. It halted, wavered, and sought cover. The rear pressed on, but the fire was so hot that very soon all followed this example. The head of the column crossed

the ditch on the left face of the bastion, and climbed up on the exterior slope. There the colors were planted, and the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from the flank fire. The leading brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that point, the next brigade of Giles Smith was turned down a ravine, and, by a circuit to the left, found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet about three hundred yards to the left of the bastion; while the brigade of Kilby Smith deployed on the further slope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, they kept up a constant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet.

About two P. M., General Blair having reported that none of his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire encountered by Ewing's, but that Giles Smith had got a position to the left in connection with General Ransom, of McPherson's corps, and was ready to assault, Sherman ordered a constant fire of artillery and infantry to be kept up to occupy the attention of the enemy in his front, while Ransom's and Giles Smith's brigades charged up against the parapet. They also met a staggering fire, before which they recoiled under cover of the hill-side. At the same time, while McPherson's whole corps was engaged, and having heard from General Grant General McClelland's report, which subsequently proved inaccurate, that he had taken three of the enemy's forts, and that his flags floated on the stronghold of Vicksburg, Sherman ordered General Tuttle at once to send to the assault one of his brigades. He detailed General Mower's, and while General Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing could be heard all down the line to his left, Sherman ordered their charge, covered in like manner by Blair's division deployed on the hill-side, and the artillery posted behind parapets within point-blank range. General Mower carried his brigade up bravely and well, but met a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault, with a similar result. The colors of the leading regiment, the Eleventh Missouri, were planted by the side of those of Blair's



Frank P. Sharp
Major General Commanding
17th A. C.

storming party, and there remained till withdrawn, after night-fall, by Sherman's orders. General Steele, with his division, made his assault at a point about midway between the bastion and the Mississippi River. The ground over which he passed was more open and exposed to the flank fire of the enemy's batteries in position, and was deeply cut up by gulleys and washes, but his column passed steadily through this fire, and reached the parapet, which was also found to be well manned and defended by the enemy. He could not carry the works, but held possession of the hill-side till night, when he withdrew his command to his present position. The loss in Sherman's corps in this attack was about six hundred killed and wounded.

In the mean while portions of each of the storming columns on McPherson's and McClernand's fronts planted their columns on the exterior slope of the parapet, where they kept them till night. But the assault had failed. The enemy's works were naturally and artificially too strong to be taken in that way. The enemy was able to maintain at each point assailed, and at all simultaneously the full force the position admitted; and the nature of the ground was such that only small columns could be used in the assault.

General Grant now determined to undertake a regular siege. The troops worked diligently and cheerfully. On the evening of the 3d of July the saps were close to the enemy's ditch, the mines were well under his parapet, and every thing was in readiness for a final assault. Meanwhile the investing force had been strengthened by Landrum's division from Memphis; Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under Major-General C. C. Washburne; Herron's division from Arkansas, and two divisions of the Ninth Corps, under Major-General John G. Parke, from the Department of the Ohio. By the 25th of June, our intrenchments being now as formidable against a sortie as the enemy's works were against assault, and there being more troops than were needed for the investment, General Grant placed Sherman in command of the Ninth Corps at Haines' Bluff, Landrum's division, and one division each from

the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth corps, and assigned to him the duty of watching the movements of Johnston, who had collected a large army at Jackson, and was apparently about to attack the rear of the investing force, with the design of raising the siege. Our position was a strong one. The Big Black covered us from attack, and would render Johnston's escape in the event of defeat impossible. Nevertheless the condition of affairs with his army was so desperate that he moved from Jackson on the 29th of June; but while he was making reconnoissances to ascertain the best point for crossing the river, on the 4th day of July, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.

General Grant in his official report of the siege, dated July 6th, thus alludes to Sherman's operations while guarding the rear: "Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where Johnston has made a stand."

Johnston occupied the lines of rifle-pits covering the front of Jackson with four divisions of Confederate troops, under Major-Generals Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge, and a division of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, observing the fords.

After toiling for nearly two months in the hot and stifling trenches, without pausing to share the general outbreak of joy for the national triumph which crowned their labors, Sherman's men marched fifty miles in the heat and dust through a country almost destitute of water, to meet the enemy.

The advance of his troops appeared before the enemy's

works in front of Jackson on the 9th of July, and on the 12th had invested that place, until both flanks rested upon Pearl River. Constant and vigorous skirmishing was kept up in front, while a cavalry expedition was sent off to the east of Jackson to destroy the railroads, until the night of the 16th of July. Sherman now had all his artillery in position, and a large ammunition train for which he had been waiting had arrived during the day. Learning this fact, and perceiving the impossibility of longer maintaining his position, Johnston having previously removed the greater portion of his stores, marched out of Jackson the same night, and destroyed the floating-bridges over the Pearl River. Early on the morning of the 17th, the evacuation was discovered, and Sherman's troops entered and occupied the city. Johnston continued the retreat to Morton, thirty-five miles east of Jackson. Two divisions of our troops, with the cavalry, followed as far as Brandon, through which place they drove the enemy's cavalry on the 19th. General Sherman at once sent out expeditions in all quarters, to thoroughly and permanently destroy all the bridges, culverts, embankments, water-tanks, rails, ties, and rolling-stock of the railways centring in Jackson. Our loss during the operations before Jackson was about one thousand in all; the enemy's was estimated by General Johnston at 71 killed, 504 wounded, and about 25 stragglers. We took 764 prisoners on entering the city. Leaving a small garrison in Jackson, Sherman returned to the line of the Big Black, to recuperate.

Thus terminated, in one hundred and nine days from its first inception, a campaign which resulted in the surrender of an entire army of thirty-seven thousand prisoners, including fifteen general officers; the discomfiture and partial dispersion of a second large army under a leader of approved skill; the capture of Vicksburg; the opening of the Mississippi River; and the division of the rebellion in twain.

Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant remarks: "The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and dispersion of Johnston's army entitle General Sherman to

more credit than usually falls to the lot of one man to earn. His demonstration at Haines' Bluff, in April, to hold the enemy about Vicksburg, while the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi; his rapid marches to join the army afterwards; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the first attack; his almost unequalled march from Jackson to Bridgeport, and passage of Black River; his securing Walnut Hills on the 18th of May, attest his great merit as a soldier."

The army now rested.

CHAPTER X.

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG.

IMMEDIATELY after the surrender, while waiting for the movement of his columns, Sherman seized a few moments to write these hasty lines to his friend Admiral Porter :—

“I can appreciate the intense satisfaction you must feel at lying before the very monster that has defied us with such deep and malignant hate, and seeing your once disunited fleet again a unit; and better still, the chain that made an inclosed sea of a link in the great river broken forever. In so magnificent a result I stop not to count who did it. It is done, and the day of our nation's birth is consecrated and baptized anew in a victory won by the united Navy and Army of our country. God grant that the harmony and mutual respect that exists between our respective commanders, and shared by all the true men of the joint service, may continue forever and serve to elevate our national character, threatened with shipwreck. Thus I muse as I sit in my solitary camp out in the wood far from the point for which we have justly striven so long and so well, and though personal curiosity would tempt me to go and see the frowning batteries and sunken pits that have defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many of our early comrades in the enterprise, I feel that other tasks lie before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting anchor, and despite the heat and the dust and the drought, I must again into the bowels of the land to make the conquest of Vicksburg fulfil all the conditions it should in the progress of this war. Whether success attend my efforts or not, I know that Admiral Porter will ever accord to me the

exhibition of a pure and unselfish zeal in the service of our country.

"Though further apart, the navy and army will still act in concert, and I assure you I shall never reach the banks of the river or see a gunboat but I will think of Admiral Porter, Captain Breese, and the many elegant and accomplished gentlemen it has been my good fortune to meet on armed or unarmed decks of the Mississippi Squadron."

There was now a lull in the war. After the great struggles which closed the summer campaign of 1863, the combatants relaxed their grasp for a moment, to breathe. The Army of the Potomac rested upon the Rapidan. The Army of the Cumberland, gathered for the leap, lay in front of Tullahoma. The Army of the Tennessee reposed on the banks of the river it had won. Steele was sent to occupy Little Rock. Ord with the Thirteenth Corps, went to New Orleans. By the remainder of Grant's army the interval was spent in reorganizing and recuperating. The Fifteenth Corps was reorganized so as to consist of four divisions. The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and Colonel J. A. Williamson, of the Fourth Iowa. The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, comprised the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith and J. A. D. Lightburn. The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, consisted of three brigades, under Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower, and R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood, of the Twelfth Iowa. The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, included the brigades led by General J. M. Corse, Colonel Loomis, of the Twenty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. R. Cockerell, of the Seventieth Iowa. Major-General Frank P. Blair was temporarily relieved from duty with the corps, and Major-General Steele's division accompanied that officer to Arkansas.

We may now avail ourselves of the lull to glance briefly at General Sherman's correspondence, during this period and the

campaign just ended, relating to other matters than the movements and battles of his corps.

While the new levies of 1863 were being raised, in a letter to the governor of his native State he took occasion to urge the importance of filling up the ranks of the veteran regiments rather than raising new ones. "I believe," he said, "you will pardon one who rarely travels out of his proper sphere to express an earnest hope that the strength of our people will not again be wasted by the organization of new regiments, whilst we have in the field skeleton regiments, with officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, who only need numbers to make a magnificent army.

"The President of the United States is now clothed with a power that should have been conferred just two years ago, and I feel assured he will use it. He will call for a large mass of men, and they should all be privates, and sent so as to make every regiment in the field equal to one thousand men. Time has convinced all reasonable men that war in theory and practice are two distinct things. Many an honest patriot, full of enthusiasm, zeal, and thirst for glory, has in practice found himself unequal to the actual requirements of war, and passed to one side, leaving another in his place; and, now, after two years, Ohio has in the field one hundred and twenty-six regiments, whose officers *now* are qualified, and the men of which would give tone and character to the new recruits. To fill these regiments will require fifty thousand recruits, which are as many as the State could well raise. I therefore hope and pray that you will use your influence against any more new regiments, and consolidation of old ones, but fill up all the old ones to a full standard. Those who talk of prompt and speedy peace know not what they say."

Reverting to the enlarged scope of the war, and its probable future, he continues: "The South to-day is more formidable and arrogant than she was two years ago, and we lose far more by having an insufficient number of men than from any other cause. We are forced to invade—we must keep the war South; they are not only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in

pride and spirit. Admitting that our armies to the front are equal to the occasion, which I know is not the case, our lines of communication are ever threatened by their dashes, for which the country, the population, and character of the enemy are all perfectly adapted.

"Since the first hostile shot the people of the North has had no option, they must conquer or be conquered. There can be no middle course. I have never been concerned about the copperhead squabbings; the South spurns and despises this class worse than we do, and would only accept their overtures to substitute them in their levies, in the cotton and corn-fields, for the slaves who have escaped. I do not pretend, nor have I ever pretended to foresee the end of all this, but I do know that we are yet far from the end of war. I repeat that it is no longer an open question; we *must* fight it out. The moment we relax, down go all our conquests thus far. I know my views on this point have ever been regarded as extreme, even verging on insanity; but for years I had associated with Bragg, Beauregard, and extreme Southern men, and long before others could realize the fact that Americans would raise their hands against our consecrated government, I was forced to know it, to witness it. Two years will not have been spent in vain if the North now, by another magnificent upheaving of the real people, again fill the ranks of your proven and tried regiments, and assure them that, through good report and evil report, you will stand by them. If Ohio will do this, and if the great North will do this, then will our army feel that it has a country and a government worth dying for. As to the poltroons, who falter and cry quits, let them dig and raise the food the army needs—but they should never claim a voice in the councils of the nation."

A general order, issued from the adjutant-general's office, directed that all regiments which had fallen below one half their maximum strength should be consolidated by reducing the number of companies, and mustering out such of the field and staff officers as should thereby be rendered super-numerary. Strictly carried out, the effect of this order would

have been to reduce a very large proportion of the regiments composing the army to the condition of feeble battalions, with impaired powers for the assimilation of recruits, and with the loss of many of the ablest and bravest officers. In many cases this actually occurred. To the policy of this order, Sherman felt called upon to object. "If my judgment do not err," he wrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, "you have the power to save this army from a disintegration more fatal than defeat.

"You will pardon so strong an expression, when I illustrate my meaning; and if I am in error I shall rejoice to know it.

"The Act of Congress, known as the 'Conscript Bill,' though containing many other provisions, was chiefly designed to organize the entire available military strength of the nation, and provide for its being called out to the assistance of the armies now in the field. These armies are composed in great part of regiments which, by death in battle, by disease, and discharges for original or developed causes, have fallen far below the minimum standard of law, and many even below 'one-half of the maximum strength.' Yet all these regiments, as a general rule, have undergone a necessary and salutary purgation. Field-officers have acquired a knowledge which they did not possess when first called to arms by the breaking out of the war; they have learned how to drill, to organize, to provide for and conduct their regiments. Captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals, have all been educated in the dear but necessary school of experience, and begin to have a knowledge which would enable them to make good companies, had they the proper number of privates. We had all supposed the conscript law would furnish these privates, and that at last we would have an army with a due proportion of all grades. The receipt of General Orders No. 86 dispels this illusion, and we must now absolutely discharge the colonels and majors, and assistant-surgeons of all regiments below the standard of 'one-half the maximum.' This will at once take the very life out of our army. The colonels and majors of our reduced

regiments are generally the best men, and are the fruit of two years' hard and constant labor. Then the *ten* companies must be reduced to *five*, and of course there will be discharged in each regiment—field and staff, three; captains, five; lieutenants, ten; sergeants, twenty; corporals, forty; aggregate, seventy-eight. So that each regiment will be reduced in strength by seventy-eight of its chosen and best men. Extend this to the whole army, for the army is now or must soon fall below the standard, and the result will be a very heavy loss, and that confined to the best men.

“Then, after regiments are made battalions, and again are restored to their regimental organization, will come in a new set of colonels, majors, captains, etc., etc., and what guarantee have we but the same old process of costly elimination will have to be gone over? . . . A new set of colonels and majors, and a strong infusion of new captains and lieutenants, will paralyze the new organization. The army is now in about the right condition to be re-enforced by recruits—privates; but if this consolidation is effected, I have no hesitation in saying that my army corps is and will be paralyzed by the change. It will be all loss and no gain. Regiments will lose their identity, their pride, their *esprit*. If there be no intention to enlarge the present volunteer army, I admit that consolidation is economical and right; but when we all feel the armies must be filled up, it does seem strange we should begin by taking out of our small but tried regiments some of the very best materials in them, especially their colonels.”

To a lady whose sight and hearing were shocked by the conduct and language of some of the troops, and who took occasion to represent the matter at length, he replied, defending his men against the charges of misconduct, which, as in all other portions of the army, were continually brought against them in terms so vague and general that no civil magistrate would have given them an instant's thought; and himself against the allegation that he tolerated irregularities.

"Mrs. Z—— has fallen into a common error in saying it was useless to complain of a whole regiment to Brigadier-General Smith or Major-General Sherman. We naturally demanded more specific complaint against incendiary acts than a mere vague suspicion that the —— did all iniquitous things, when twenty other regiments were camped round about Memphis, six thousand vagabonds and refugees hanging about, and the city itself infested by gangs of thieves and incendiaries, turned loose upon the world, and sheltered in their deeds of darkness by charging them upon soldiers. Neither General Morgan L. Smith or myself ever failed to notice a specific complaint against any soldier of our command, if accompanied by reasonable proofs; but we did, and rightfully too, resent a mere general charge, that every fire originating from careless chimneys, careless arrangement of stove-pipes, and the designing acts of wicked incendiaries, should without even an attempt at proof be charged to the ——.

That regiment is one of the bravest and best disciplined in our service, and being composed mostly of young and energetic men from the city of ——, is somewhat famous for its acts of fun, frolic, mischief, and even crime, with a perfect skill in evading detection and pursuit. They are lawless and violent, and, like all our volunteer soldiers, have for years been taught that the people, the masses, the majority, are 'king,' and can do no wrong. They are no worse than other volunteers, all of whom come to us filled with the popular idea that they must enact war, that they must clean out the secesh, must waste and not protect their property, must burn, waste, and destroy. Just such people as Mrs. Z—— have taught this creed, sung this song, and urged on our men to these disgraceful acts; and it is such as Morgan L. Smith and W. T. Sherman who have been combating this foul doctrine. During my administration of affairs in Memphis, I know it was raised from a condition of death, gloom, and darkness, to one of life and comparative prosperity. Its streets, stores, hotels, and dwellings were sad and deserted as I entered it, and

when I left it, life and business prevailed, and over fourteen hundred enrolled Union men paraded its streets, boldly and openly carrying the banners of our country. No citizen, Union or secesh, will deny that I acted lawfully, firmly, and fairly, and that substantial justice prevailed with even balance. I do feel their testimony better than the hearsay of any would-be notoriety."

To General Steele, while temporarily detached from the main body of his command, Sherman thus wrote respecting the destruction of the enemy's property:—

"I most heartily approve your purpose to return to families their carriages, buggies, and farming tools, wherewith to make a crop. War at best is barbarism, but to involve all—children, women, old and helpless—is more than can be justified. Our men will become absolutely lawless unless this can be checked. The destruction of corn or forage and provisions in the enemy's country is a well-established law of war, and is as justifiable as the destruction of private cotton by the Southern Confederacy. *Jeff. Davis*, no doubt, agrees that they have a right to destroy their people's cotton, but the guerrillas do not stop to inquire whose cotton they burn; and I know, as you know, the Confederate Government claim the war-right to burn *all* cotton, whether belonging to their adherents or to Union men. We surely have a similar right as to corn, cotton, fodder, &c., used to sustain armies and war. Still, I always feel that the stores necessary for a family should be spared, and I think it injures our men to allow them to plunder indiscriminately the inhabitants of the country."

Near Jackson, Miss., at a house called "Hurricane," formerly occupied as a residence by Jefferson Davis's brother, Joseph Davis, some men of Ewing's division discovered, in a garret, only reached through a trap-door in the ceiling, a box of letters and papers. By the time the box reached Sherman's headquarters, whither it was forwarded, many of the contents had

been abstracted, but the remainder were found to consist of letters addressed to Jefferson Davis by various persons during the preceding ten years. After attempting to arrange them in convenient shape for examination, Sherman found the task too great a tax on his time, and early in August forwarded them to the adjutant-general's office at Washington.

The circumstances which form the groundwork of some of Whittier's finest verses are thus related, in an official dispatch to the secretary of war, dated August 8th, 1863:—

"I take the liberty of asking, through you, that something be done for a young lad named Orion P. Howe, of Waukegan, Illinois, who belongs to the Fifty-fifth Illinois, but is at present at his home wounded. I think he is too young for West Point, but would be the very thing for a midshipman. When the assault at Vicksburg was at its height, on the 19th of May, and I was on foot near the road which formed the line of attack, this young lad came up to me wounded and bleeding, with a good healthy boy's cry: 'General Sherman, send some cartridges to Colonel Walmbourg, the men are all out.' 'What is the matter with my boy?' 'They shot me in the leg, but I can go to the hospital; send the cartridges right away.' Even where we stood, the shot fell thick, and I told him to go to the rear at once, I would attend to the cartridges, and off he limped. Just before he disappeared over the hill, he turned, and called, as loud as he could, 'Calibre 54.'

"I have not seen the boy since, and his colonel, Walmbourg, on inquiry, gives me his address as above, and says he is a bright intelligent boy, with a fine preliminary education.

"What arrested my attention then, was—and what renews my memory of the fact now, is—that one so young, carrying a musket-ball wound through his leg, should have found his way to me on that fatal spot, and delivered his message, not forgetting the very important part, even, of the calibre of the musket, which you know is an unusual one.

"I'll warrant that the boy has in him the elements of a man,

and I commend him to the Government as one worthy the fostering care of some one of its national institutions."

On the 14th of August he received from the War Department a commission as brigadier-general in the Regular Army of the United States, dating from the 4th of July, 1863, and thus acknowledged his indebtedness to General Grant for this new honor :—

"I had the satisfaction to receive last night the appointment as brigadier-general in the regular army, with a letter from General Halleck very friendly and complimentary in its terms. I know that I owe this to your favor, and beg to acknowledge it, and add, that I value the commission far less than the fact that this will associate my name with yours and McPherson's in opening the Mississippi, an achievement the importance of which cannot be over-estimated.

"I beg to assure you of my deep personal attachment, and to express the hope that the chances of war will leave me to serve near and under you till the dawn of that peace for which we are contending, with the only purpose that it shall be honorable and lasting."

President Lincoln had at the same time conferred on General Grant himself a commission as major-general in the regular army from the same date; and Meade for Gettysburg, and McPherson for Vicksburg, had also been added to the list of the regular brigadier-generals. To understand the nature of the compliment thus bestowed by the Government upon its faithful servants, it must be remembered that the major-generals of the regular army number but five, and the brigadier-generals but nine.

It has been alleged in some of the newspapers of the day, that while the army was encamped at Young's Point, General Sherman handed to General Grant a written protest against the proposed movement on Grand Gulf, and the statement has been coupled with such a show of circumstances as to

obtain ready credence in many quarters. In fact, General Sherman never protested, either in writing or verbally, against any movement ever proposed or adopted by General Grant; and throughout the entire campaign these two commanders acted together in perfect harmony and cordiality; the commander-in-chief freely and constantly availing himself of Sherman's advice, the subordinate promptly and faithfully carrying out the orders of his superior. But the movement on Grand Gulf was not Sherman's plan. It was the conception of General Grant's own mind, and was adopted by him, against the opinion, though with the full consent and support of the Executive. Sherman considered the north front of Vicksburg the true point of attack, and the line of the Yallahusha the best base of operations. On the 8th of April he frankly expressed this opinion to General Grant in the following communication:

"I would most respectfully suggest that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of campaign.

"My own opinions are—

"1st. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the other grand armies.

"2d. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas, supplies collected while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened *via* Des Ark, on the White and Madison, on the St. Francis rivers.

"3d. That as much of Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchee rivers as can be regained and fortified be held, and the main army be transported thither by land or water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

"4th. That the line of the Yallahusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black above Canton, and, lastly, where the Vicks-

burg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river. The capture of Vicksburg would result.

"5th. That a force be left in this vicinity not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point. This force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff, or Yazoo City.

"The chief reason for operating *solely* by water was the season of the year, and high-water in Tallahatchee and Yallahusha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold and make crops.

"I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant simply read them, and simply give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve."

And he added in conclusion:—

"Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as though conceived by myself."

CHAPTER XI.

THE MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA AND THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

WHILE Sherman's corps was resting on the Big Black, the situation of affairs in the central region became such as to require the concentration of all available troops for operations in that theatre of war. Rosecrans had in August expelled the enemy from Middle Tennessee, and, by the 9th of September, by a brilliant series of flank movements, had compelled Bragg to evacuate his strong fortified position at Chattanooga, and fall back behind the Lookout and Mission mountains. Burnside had, at the same time, driven the rebels from East Tennessee, and had occupied Knoxville and Cumberland Gap. Having lost the Mississippi, the enemy was now endeavoring to save Tennessee, and was bringing troops from the east and from the west to reinforce Bragg, so as to enable him to take the offensive, and drive the Union army to the Ohio. Longstreet's corps was on its way from Virginia, and Loring's division had arrived from Johnston's army.

On the 13th September, orders were sent from Washington to Burnside to move down the Tennessee towards Chattanooga, and to Hurlbut at Memphis and Grant and Sherman at Vicksburg, to send all their available forces to Corinth and Tusculumbia to co-operate with Rosecrans, in case Bragg should attempt to turn his right flank and invade Tennessee. On the 23d, Howard's eleventh corps and Slocum's twelfth corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac, united under the command of Major-General Hooker, and ordered to Nashville.

On the 22d, having received a telegram from General Grant, directing him to detail one division to march to Vicksburg, and there embark for Memphis, Sherman dispatched Osterhaus with his first division. At four o'clock that afternoon it was on the march, and embarked the next day. On the 23d, Sherman was called in person to Vicksburg, and instructed to prepare to follow with his whole corps, except Tuttle's third division, which was to be left with General McPherson to guard the line of the Big Black, and to be replaced in the Fifteenth Corps by John E. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, consisting of three brigades, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Matthias, Colonel G. B. Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. J. Alexander, Fiftieth Illinois. This division was already on the way, and, by the 27th, at the earliest moment when it was possible to procure steamboat transportation, Sherman followed in person, with Morgan L. Smith's second division, and Ewing's fourth division. Owing to the low stage of water in the river and the scarcity of wood on the banks, the last of the fleet did not reach Memphis until the 4th of October. There Sherman found orders from the general-in-chief, General Halleck, to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, with all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston railway, to Athens, Alabama, and thence report for orders to General Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. He was substantially to follow the railway eastwardly, repairing it as he moved, looking to his own lines for supplies, and was in no event to depend for them upon Rosecrans, the roads in whose rear were already overtaxed to meet the wants of his own army. Osterhaus' first division was already in front of Corinth, and John E. Smith's, styled the third, at Memphis, moving out by rail, but the capacity of the railroad was so limited that it was soon found that animals and wagons could be moved more rapidly by the common road, and the whole of Ewing's fourth division moved in the same manner.

On the 11th of October, having put in march the rear of the column, Sherman started for Corinth by railway, in a special

train, escorted by the battalion of the Thirteenth Regular Infantry, and reached Collierville station at noon. The Sixty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel D. C. Anthony, was at that moment gallantly defending the post against the attack by the rebel General Chalmers with a force of nearly three thousand cavalry and eight field-guns, and Sherman's escort arrived just in time to assist in his defeat. The next day Sherman reached Corinth, and ordered General Frank P. Blair, who had again reported to him at the outset of the march, and whom he had assigned to duty as his second in command, to take charge of the advance, and push forward to Iuka with the first and second divisions of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith, while he himself remained behind a few days to push forward the troops as they came up, and to direct the repairs. On the 19th, he reached Iuka, and on the following day, in accordance with a previous agreement with Rear-Admiral Porter, two gunboats and a decked coal-barge reached Eastport to assist in crossing the Tennessee. While the repairs of the railway were progressing, Sherman ordered General Blair to push forward with the two divisions under his command, and drive the enemy, consisting of Roddy's and Ferguson's cavalry brigades, and a number of irregular cavalry, in all about five thousand strong, under the command of Major-General Stephen D. Lee, beyond Tuscumbia. After a short engagement, Blair drove the enemy from his front, and entered Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

In the mean time, on the 19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans, endeavoring to concentrate his scattered columns in the presence of the enemy, had been attacked by Bragg, had fought the bloody battle of Chickamauga, had retreated to Chattanooga, and was there practically invested. On the 18th of October, Major-General Grant, who had been sent for some time before, arrived at Louisville, and in pursuance of orders issued by the War Department on the 16th, and delivered to him by the secretary of war in person, assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, comprising the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and the three large armies operating therein. Upon his

recommendation, the secretary of war immediately issued orders assigning Major-General Thomas to the command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Major-General Sherman to that of the Department of the Tennessee. Sherman received these orders at Iuka, on the 25th of October, accompanied by instructions from General Grant to retain personal command of the army in the field. Investing Major-General McPherson, at Vicksburg, with full authority to act in his stead in regard to the State of Mississippi, and conferring upon Major-General Hurlbut a similar authority as to West Tennessee, he at once published the following instructions for the guidance of the officers and soldiers of his department in their relations with the citizens :—

“All officers in command of corps and fixed military posts will assume the highest military powers allowed by the laws of war and Congress. They must maintain the best possible discipline, and repress all disorder, alarms, and dangers in their reach. Citizens who fail to support the Government have no right to ask favors and protection ; but if they actively assist us in vindicating the national authority, all commanders will assist them and their families in every possible way. Officers need not meddle with matters of trade and commerce, which by law devolve on the officer of the Treasury Department ; but whenever they discover goods contraband of war being conveyed towards the public enemy, they will seize all goods tainted by such transactions, and imprison the parties implicated ; but care must be taken to make full records and report such case. When a district is infested by guerrillas, or held by the enemy, horses and mules, wagons, forage, etc., are all means of war, and can be freely taken, but must be accounted for as public property. If the people do not want their horses and corn taken, they must organize and repress all guerrillas or hostile bands in their neighborhood.

“It is represented that officers, provost-marshals, and others in the military service, are engaged in business or speculation on their own account, and that they charge fees

for permits and passes. All this is a breach of honor and law. Every salaried officer of the military service should devote every hour of his time, every thought of his mind, to his Government, and if he makes one cent profit beyond his pay, it is corrupt and criminal. All officers and soldiers in this department are hereby commanded to engage in no business whatever, save their sworn duty to their Government.

"Every man should be with his proper corps, division, brigade, and regiment, unless absent, sick, wounded, or detached by a written order of a competent commander. Soldiers when so absent must have their descriptive rolls, and when not provided with them the supposition is that they are improperly absent. Mustering officers will see that all absentees not away by a written order from their proper commander are reported on the muster-rolls as deserters, that they may lose their pay, bounty, and pensions, which a generous Government and people have provided for soldiers who do their whole duty. The best hospitals in the world are provided for the wounded and sick, but these must not be made receptacles for absentees who seek to escape the necessary exposures and dangers of a soldier's life. Whenever possible, citizens must be employed as nurses, cooks, attendants, stewards, etc., in hospitals, in order that enlisted men may be where they belong—with their regiments. The medical inspectors will attend to this at once. The general commanding announces that he expects the wounded and sick to have every care possible; but this feeling must not be abused to the injury of the only useful part of an army—a soldier in the field.

"In time of war and rebellion, districts occupied by our troops are subject to the laws of war. The inhabitants, be they friendly or unfriendly, must submit to the controlling power. If any person in an insurgent district corresponds or trades with an enemy, he or she becomes a spy; and all inhabitants, moreover, must not only abstain from hostile and unfriendly acts, but must aid and assist the power that protects them in trade and commerce."

Major-General Blair was placed in immediate command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, and Brigadier-General George M. Dodge was summoned from Corinth to organize and assume command of a picked column of eight thousand men from the Sixteenth Army Corps, and with it to follow Sherman eastward as rapidly as possible. Having made these dispositions, Sherman pushed forward with the advance of his troops.

On the 27th of October, General Blair being, as has been already seen, at Tuscumbia, with the first and second divisions, Sherman ordered General Ewing, with the fourth division, to cross the Tennessee, by means of the gunboats and scow, as rapidly as possible, at Eastport, and push forward to Florence; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated down the Tennessee over the Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent to headquarters at Iuka, bearing this short message: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek. Put your command towards Bridgeport till you meet orders." Instantly the order of march was reversed, and all the columns directed to Eastport, the only place where the crossing of the Tennessee was practicable. At first the troops had only the gunboats and coal-barge, but two transports and a ferry-boat arrived on the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with all the vigor possible. Sherman crossed in person, and passed to the head of the column on the 1st of November, leaving the advance division of Osterhaus, now become the rear, to be conducted by General Blair to Rogersville and the Elk River. This stream was found impassable, and there was no time to bridge it or to cross in boats, so that no alternative remained but to ascend the Elk to the stone bridge at Fayetteville, where the troops crossed and proceeded to Winchester and Decherd. At Fayetteville, having received orders from General Grant to repair to Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps, leaving Brigadier-General Dodge's detachment of the Sixteenth Corps at Pulaski and along the railroad from Columbia to Decatur, to protect it, Sherman instructed General Blair to follow in order with the second and first divisions of Morgan L. Smith and

Osterhaus, by way of Newmarket, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, while he himself should conduct the third and fourth divisions of John E. Smith and Ewing, by Decherd. Sherman reached Bridgeport on the night of the 13th, reported by telegraph to General Grant, was immediately summoned to his headquarters, left on the first boat, and on the morning of the 15th of November rode into Chattanooga.

Previous to this, on the night of the 27th of October, Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, had rapidly thrown a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee. On the following morning, before the enemy could recover from his surprise, Hooker with his two corps had crossed, seized the heights rising from Lookout Valley at its outlet to the river, emerged into the valley, and taken up positions defending the road over which he had marched, and the roads leading to and connecting the ferries; and thus two lines of supplies had been gained at the moment when, after more than ten thousand horses and mules had perished in supplying half rations to the troops over seventy miles of terrible roads, the remaining animals were so reduced that they could not have supplied the army a week longer. After vainly endeavoring to regain the advantage thus lost, Bragg detached Longstreet to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee, and in order to compel the rebel commander to retain all his force, as well as to recall the troops he had sent away, it was Grant's intention to attack Missionary Ridge the moment Sherman should arrive with his army and trains. The constraint imposed by the immediate presence of the enemy in his strong positions, with his cavalry constantly threatening our exposed and heavily-tasked communications, was severely felt, and the anxiety for Burnside's safety was acute.

Sherman was to cross the Tennessee, effect a lodgment on the end of Missionary Ridge, and with a part of his command demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton. By General Grant's orders, pontoons had already been prepared for laying a bridge over the Tennessee, and all other necessary arrangements perfected.

Ordering Ewing to march, with his fourth division leading the advance, by way of Shell Mound to Trenton and to demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, but to be prepared rapidly to change direction on Chattanooga, Sherman got in a small boat at Kelly's, rowed down to Bridgeport, there put his troops in motion, and, on the afternoon of the 20th, upon arriving at General Hooker's headquarters, received General Grant's orders for a general attack the following morning. But the third division of John E. Smith was the only one in position; Osterhaus' first and Morgan L. Smith's second division were slowly making their way over a terrible road from Shell Mound to Chattanooga; and Ewing's fourth division had not left Trenton. Learning these facts, General Grant postponed the attack.

On the 21st, Morgan L. Smith's second division crossed the bridge at Brown's Ferry, in spite of frequent accidents to that frail structure, and Ewing reached the head of the bridge with his fourth division, but was unable to cross by reason of its breakage, in spite of repeated attempts to repair it, until the 23d. The bridge having again broken, leaving Osterhaus still on the left bank, at Brown's Ferry, Sherman then proposed to the general-in-chief to go into action with the three divisions already with him, supported by Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, while Osterhaus' first division should report to General Hooker, and act with him against Lookout Mountain. On the same day, Morgan L. Smith's and John E. Smith's divisions being behind the hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman caused Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, with his second brigade of the former division, to march under cover of those hills to a point opposite the North Chickamauga, there to man the pontoon boats; at midnight to drop silently down to a point above the South Chickamauga, land, move along the river, capture the enemy's pickets along its banks; and then to re-embark, drop quickly down below the mouth of the Chickamauga, take position there on the left bank, and dispatch the boats to the opposite side for reinforcements. This having been done, the remainder of Morgan

Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but Sherman now found himself on two high points, with a deep depression between them, and a third hill immediately over the tunnel, which was his chief objective. The ground gained, however, was so important that nothing could be left to chance, and it was therefore fortified during the night. One brigade of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line facing southeast.

The enemy felt Sherman's right flank about four P. M., and a sharp engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off. Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Tupper, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois. Just as Sherman himself had crossed the bridge, General Howard had appeared, having come with three regiments from Chattanooga along the east bank of the Tennessee, connecting Sherman's new position with that of the main army in Chattanooga. The three regiments were attached temporarily to General Ewing's right, and General Howard returned to his corps at Chattanooga. As night closed, Sherman ordered General Jefferson C. Davis to keep one brigade at the bridge, one close up to the main body of the Fifteenth Corps, and one between the two. Heavy details were kept at work on the intrenchments until morning.

During the night the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and the camp-fires revealed to the enemy, and to the army in Chattanooga, Sherman's position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight, orders came from General Grant to attack the enemy at dawn of day, with notice that General Thomas would attack in force early in the morning. Accordingly, before light, Sherman was in the saddle, and, attended by all his staff, rode to the extreme left of his position, near Chickamauga, thence up the hill held by General Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing.

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as was possible by the dim light of morning, he saw that his line of attack was in the direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank. A valley lay between him and the next hill of the series, and this latter presented steep sides; the one to the west partially cleared, the other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The further point of the hill was held by the enemy with a breast-work of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and mounting two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, giving a plunging fire on the ground in dispute. The gorge between, through which several roads and the railway tunnel pass, could not be seen from Sherman's position, but formed the natural citadel where the enemy covered his masses, to resist the contemplated movement to turn his right and endanger his communications with the depot at Chickamauga.

The brigades of Colonel Cockerell, of Ewing's division, Colonel Alexander, of John E. Smith's, and General Lightburn, of Morgan L. Smith's divisions, were to hold their hill as the key point; General Corse, with as much of his brigade of Ewing's division as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from the right centre; General Lightburn was to dispatch a regiment from his position to co-operate with General Corse; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse, and Colonel Loomis, of Ewing's division, in like manner, to move along the west base, supported by Matthias' and Baum's brigades, of John E. Smith's division, in reserve.

The sun had already risen before General Corse had completed his preparations, and his bugle sounded the "forward." The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on the right centre, with the Twentieth Ohio, Colonel Jones, moved down the face of the hill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within about eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he called

his reserves, and asked for reinforcements, which were sent, but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach. As soon as General Corse had made his preparations he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more than an hour, giving and losing ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith steadily gained ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Calander had four of his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Wood his battery of Napoleon guns on General Lightburn's; and two guns of Dillon's battery were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. The day was bright and clear. The columns of the enemy were streaming towards Sherman, and the enemy's artillery poured its concentric fire upon him from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of his position. All Sherman's batteries directed their fire as carefully as possible to clear the hill to the front without endangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about ten A. M., when General Corse received a severe wound, and was carried off the field, and the command of the brigade, and of the assault at that key-point, devolved on Colonel Wolcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right; and at about two P. M. General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be severe on the hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered Colonel Baum's and General Matthias' brigades across the fields to the disputed summit. They moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Wolcott, but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of the hill. The enemy at the time being massed in great strength in the tunnel gorge, moved a large force, under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of this

command. The two reserve brigades of John E. Smith's division, being thus surprised, and exposed as they were in the open ground, fell back in some disorder to the lower end of the field, and reformed. This movement, seen from Chattanooga, five miles distant, gave rise to the report that Sherman was repulsed on the left. The enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of the brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the hill. About three P. M., a white line of musketry fire in front of Orchard Knoll, extending further right and left and front, and a faint echo of sound, satisfied Sherman that General Thomas was moving on the centre. The attack on the left had drawn vast masses of the enemy to that flank, so that the result on the centre was comparatively assured.

The advancing line of musketry fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared behind a spur of the hill, and could no longer be seen, and it was not until night closed that Sherman knew that Thomas had swept across Missionary Ridge, and broken the enemy's centre.

The victory was won, and pursuit was the next step. Sherman ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel the tunnel, which was found vacant, save by the commingled dead and wounded of both armies.

The reserve of General Jefferson C. Davis was ordered to march at once, by the pontoon bridge across the Chickamauga at its mouth, and push forward for the depot. General Howard had reported to Sherman, in the early part of the day, with the remainder of his corps, the Eleventh, and had been posted to connect the left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis at four A. M. The Fifteenth Army Corps was to march at daylight. But General Howard found the repairs too difficult, and all were compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new pontoon bridge. By eleven A. M., Jefferson C. Davis' division appeared at the depot, just in time to see it in flames. He entered with one brigade, and found the enemy occupying two hills partially in-

trenched just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away. Corn-meal and corn, in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two pounder rifled guns with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks, chesses, etc., destined for the invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, were found burning and broken. A good supply of forage for the horses, and meal, beans, and the like, for the men, were also discovered in good condition.

Pausing but a short while, Sherman pressed forward, the road lined with broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head of his column emerged from a dense, miry swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the retreating army. The fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that our troops could not move. Here Sherman was overtaken by General Grant.

At daylight the march was resumed, and at Greysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, the Fourteenth Corps of General Palmer was met on the south bank. From him Sherman learned that General Hooker was on a road still further south. His guns could be heard near Ringgold. As the roads were filled with all the troops they could accommodate, Sherman then turned to the east to fulfil another part of the general plan, by breaking up all communications between Bragg and Longstreet.

General Howard was ordered to move to Parker's Gap, and thence send a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council Ground, and there destroy a large section of the railway which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most successfully and completely performed that day. The division of General Jefferson C. Davis was moved up close to Ringgold, to assist General Hooker, if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps held at Greysville, to take advantage of circumstances. About noon a message came from General Hooker, saying that he had had a hard fight at the mountain pass just beyond Ringgold, and wanted Sherman to come forward and turn the position. Howard, by passing through Parker's Gap towards Red Clay, had already done so. Sherman therefore rode

forward to Ringgold, to find that the enemy had fallen back to Tunnel Hill, abandoned the valley of Chickamauga and the State of Tennessee, and was descending the southern slopes, whose waters flow to the Atlantic and the Gulf.

At Ringgold Sherman again met General Grant, and received orders, after breaking up the railroad between that point and the State line, to move slowly back to Chattanooga.

On the following day, the Fifteenth Corps effectually destroyed the railroad from a point half-way between Greysville and Ringgold, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to Greysville, consented that, instead of returning to Chattanooga, Sherman might send back his artillery, wagons, and impediments, and make a circuit to the north as far as the Hiawassee River.

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair, with two divisions of the Fifteenth Army Corps, by way of Julian's Gap; all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another effectual break was made in the Cleveland and Dalton road. On the 30th, the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated in haste, leaving the bridge but partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee.

The losses in Sherman's own corps during this brief campaign were as follows: Osterhaus' first division, 87 killed, 344 wounded, and 66 missing; M. L. Smith's second division, 10 killed, 90 wounded, and 2 missing; John E. Smith's third division, 89 killed, 288 wounded, and 122 missing; Ewing's fourth division, 72 killed, 535 wounded, and 21 missing; total, 258 killed, 1,257 wounded, and 211 missing. The loss in Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps was small. Bushbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps lost 37 killed, 145 wounded, 81 missing; total, 263. Among the killed were Colonels Putnam of the Ninety-third Illinois, O'Meara of the Ninetieth Illinois, Torrence of the Thirtieth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel Taft of the Eleventh Corps, and Major Bushnell of

the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers ; while in the list of wounded appeared the names of Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, J. M. Corse, and Matthias ; Colonel Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois ; Colonel Wangeline, Twelfth Missouri Volunteers ; Lieutenant-Colonel Patridge, Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers ; Major P. J. Welch, Fifty-sixth Illinois Volunteers ; and Major M. Allen, Tenth Iowa Volunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa, was reported missing.

The army which eight days before had lain besieged, and barely subsisting behind the Missionary range, had shaken off its enemy, broken his strength and his spirit, pushed his shattered forces out of reach, and was returning to its camps holding the keys of the whole central region, and of the gates of Georgia.

CHAPTER XII.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE.—REORGANIZING.

It was General Grant's desire to continue the pursuit, but Burnside was closely beleaguered at Knoxville and Longstreet was steadily pushing his approaches. The commander-in-chief had instructed Burnside to hold on to the last. "I can hardly conceive," he wrote, "the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did it at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat."

On the 3d of December, according to General Burnside's report, the supplies would be exhausted. Elliott's division of cavalry had already started for Knoxville, and Granger had been ordered thither with the Fourth Corps. Finding that the latter moved slowly and without energy, on the 28th of November, General Grant decided to send Sherman with his command, and accordingly gave him orders to take Granger's troops and his own, and go with all possible dispatch to the relief of the besieged garrison.

A large part of Sherman's command had marched from Memphis, had gone into battle immediately on arriving at Chattanooga, and had had no rest since. In the late campaign officers and men had carried no luggage or provisions. The week before, they had left their camps, on the right bank of the Tennessee, with only two days' rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight, each officer and man, from the commanding general down, having but a single blanket or overcoat. They had now no provisions, save what had been gathered by the road, and were ill-supplied for such a march.

Moreover, the weather was intensely cold. But twelve thousand of their fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in a mountain town eighty-four miles distant: they needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough. Without a murmur, without waiting for any thing, the Army of the Tennessee directed its course upon Knoxville.

On the night of November 28th, General Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and at dawn the army passed the Hiawassee, and during the day marched to Athens, a distance of fifteen miles. Granger, who was then near the mouth of the Hiawassee, was at first ordered to join the main column at Kingston; but on reaching Athens, Sherman sent him directions to meet him at Philadelphia. The small force of cavalry which was, at the time of the receipt of General Grant's orders, scouting near Benton and Columbus, overtook the column at Athens during the night.

On the 2d of December, the army moved rapidly north, towards Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 A. M., the cavalry passed to the head of the column, and was ordered to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too large to be dislodged by a cavalry dash, and darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry arrived on the ground. The enemy evacuated the place in the night, destroying the pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of provisions, four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge being gone, Sherman was forced to turn east, and trust to the bridge at Knoxville.

It was now all-important that General Burnside should have notice of Sherman's approach, and but one more day of the time remained. Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of December 2d, Sherman sent an aid-de-camp forward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry,

ordering him to select the best material of his command, to start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life and horseflesh. The distance to be travelled was about forty miles, and the roads villanous. Before day the cavalry marched. At daylight the Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia to the Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, where the maps represented the river as very shallow ; but it was found impossible to ford it, as the water was, in some places, five feet deep, and freezing cold, and the stream was two hundred and forty yards wide. A bridge was indispensable. Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, who accompanied Sherman, undertook to superintend the work, and with only such tools as axes, picks, and spades, working partly with crib-work and partly with trestles made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown, by dark of December 4th the bridge was completed, and by daylight of the 5th the Fifteenth Corps, General Blair, was over, and General Granger's corps and General Davis' division were ready to pass ; but the diagonal bracings were imperfect, for want of proper spikes, and the bridge broke, causing delay.

General Blair had been ordered to march out on the Marysville road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on a parallel road abreast of him. At the fork of the road a messenger rode up to General Sherman, bringing a few words from General Burnside, dated December 4th, stating that Colonel Long had arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and all was well there ; that Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were symptoms of a speedy departure.

As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a good ford for his wagons and horses at Davis, seven miles from Morgantown, and had made a bridge of the wagons left by Vaughn at Loudon. He marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th, all the heads of column communicated at Marysville, where an officer of General Burnside's staff arrived with the news that Longstreet had, the night before, retreated on the Rutledge, Rodgersville, and

Bristol roads, towards Virginia; and that General Burnside's cavalry was on his heels; and with word that the general desired to see General Sherman in person as soon as he could come to Knoxville. Ordering all the troops to halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which were directed to move forward to Little River and report to General Burnside, on the morning of December 6th Sherman rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and there met General Burnside.

The siege had been already raised. Longstreet had hurled three brigades against the works, and met with a bloody repulse. The intelligence of Bragg's defeat, and the arrival of Colonel Long's cavalry, as the forerunners of the army known to be marching for the relief of the besieged garrison, had shown Longstreet the necessity of prompt movement, and he had taken the only line of retreat that continued practicable. General Burnside now asked for nothing but General Granger's command, and suggested to Sherman, in view of the large force he had brought from Chattanooga, that he should return with due expedition to the line of the Hiawassee, lest Bragg, re-enforced, might take advantage of his absence to assume the offensive.

In the following communication General Burnside took occasion to express his thanks for the timely relief :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Knoxville, December 7, 1863.

"Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding, etc. :

"GENERAL—I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville; and I am satisfied your approach served to raise the siege.

"The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command but the corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section; and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the force immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby rendering the

position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army.

"In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

"I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General commanding."

Having seen the forces of General Burnside move out of Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in, Sherman put his own command in motion to return.

General Howard was ordered to move, by way of Davis' Ford and Sweetwater, to Athens, with a guard formed at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which the enemy had retaken after the passage of the army up the river. General Jefferson C. Davis moved to Columbus on the Hiawassee by way of Madisonville, and the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Telire Plains, in order to cover a movement of cavalry across the mountain into Georgia to overtake a wagon train of the enemy's which had escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from General Howard that the enemy still held Charleston, Sherman directed General Ewing's division on Athens, and went in person to Telire with General Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th, all the troops were in position, holding the rich country between the Little Tennessee and the Hiawassee. The cavalry under Colonel Long passed the mountains at Telire, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond Murphy, when, deeming his further pursuit of the wagon train useless, he returned on the 12th to Telire. Sherman then ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which point he had previously ordered the corps of General Howard.

On the 14th of December, all of the command lay encamped along the Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual state of affairs, Sherman received orders


to leave on the line of the Hiawassee all the cavalry and proceed to Chattanooga with the balance of his command. Leaving at Charleston the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel Long, re-enforced by the Fifth Ohio cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, which was the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army Corps, with the remainder Sherman moved by easy marches by way of Cleveland and Tynus Depot into Chattanooga. There he received orders from General Grant to transfer back to the appropriate commands the Eleventh Corps of General Howard and the division of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps to its new field of operations in Northern Alabama.

In closing his report of the memorable campaign thus closed, Sherman wrote to General Grant:—

“It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since our departure from the Big Black, until the present moment.

“In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to my command for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur, without a moment's rest. After a march of over four hundred miles, without stop for three successive nights, we crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than one hundred miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the whole country.

“It is hard to realize the importance of these events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity, but as I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better



W. H. W. Wilson

Q. O. Howard
May 1861

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body of soldiers in America than it, or who have done more or better service. I wish all to feel a just pride in its real honors. To General Howard and his command, to General Jefferson C. Davis and his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of commanders and fidelity of command. The brigade of Colonel Buschbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill in connection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage almost amounting to rashness: following the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

"In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalrous traits of the soldier.

"General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear-guard near Greysville, at nightfall. I must award to this division the credit of the best order during our marches through East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to the right and left gave some reasons for disordered ranks.

"I must say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments who have so long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so much usefulness and credit to the public service, namely: Colonels J. R. Cockerell, Seventieth Ohio volunteers; J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth Illinois; C. E. Wolcott, Forty-sixth Ohio; J. A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa; G. B. Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois; J. J. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana."

Taking advantage of the inactivity at Chattanooga, Sherman now turned his attention to his own immediate department, and returned to Memphis and Vicksburg to inspect and reorganize his command. He reached Memphis on the 10th of January.

While preparing for future military operations, it was necessary for him to meet and dispose of many questions of a civil nature presented to him by his subordinates. With regard to the treatment of the inhabitants of a conquered country, he wrote on the 24th January, 1864, to Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general at department headquarters at Huntsville :—

“The Southern people entered into a clear compact of government, but still maintained a species of separate interests, history, and prejudices. These latter became stronger and stronger, till they have led to a war which has developed fruits of the bitterest kind.

“We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people of the South have prejudices, which form a part of their nature, and which they cannot throw off without an effort of reason or the slower process of natural change. Now, the question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies all in the South who differ from us in opinion or prejudice,—kill or banish them? or should we give them time to think and gradually change their conduct, so as to conform to the new order of things which is slowly and gradually creeping into their country?

“When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we are compelled to use force, because all reason and argument cease when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them, because otherwise they might be used against us.

“In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwellings used by women, children, and non-combatants. So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices can in no wise influence the war, and, therefore, should not be noticed.

But if any one comes out into the public streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or banished, either to the rear or front, as the officer in command adjudges. If the people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence with parties in hostility, they are spies, and can be punished with death, or minor punishment.

"These are well-established principles of war, and the people of the South, having appealed to war, are barred from appealing to our Constitution, which they have practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide *its* rules and laws.

"The United States, as a belligerent party claiming right in the soil as the ultimate sovereign, have a right to change the population; and it may be, and is, both politic and just, we should do so in certain districts. When the inhabitants persist too long in hostility, it may be both politic and right we should banish them and appropriate their lands to a more loyal and useful population. No man will deny that the United States would be benefited by dispossessing a single prejudiced, hard-headed, and disloyal planter, and substituting in his place a dozen or more patient, industrious, good families, even if they be of foreign birth. I think it does good to present this view of the case to many Southern gentlemen, who grew rich and wealthy, not by virtue alone of their industry and skill, but by reason of the protection and impetus to prosperity given by our hitherto moderate and magnanimous Government. It is all idle nonsense for these Southern planters to say that they made the South, that they own it, and that they can do as they please,—even to break up our Government and to shut up the natural avenues of trade, intercourse, and commerce.

"Whilst I assert for our Government the highest military prerogatives, I am willing to bear in patience that political nonsense of slave-rights, State-rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, and such other trash, as have deluded the Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshed, and the foulest crimes that have disgraced any time or any people.

"I would advise the commanding officers at Huntsville, and such other towns as are occupied by our troops, to assemble the inhabitants and explain to them these plain, self-evident propositions, and tell them that it is for them *now* to say whether they and their children shall inherit the beautiful land which by the accident of nature has fallen to their share. The Government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all rights which they choose to enforce in war,—to take their lives, their homes, their lands, their every thing; because they cannot deny that war does exist there; and war is simply power, unrestrained by Constitution or compact. If they want eternal war, well and good: we will accept the issue and dispossess them and put our friends in possession. I know thousands and millions of good people who, at simple notice, would come to North Alabama and accept the elegant houses and plantations now there. If the people of Huntsville think differently, let them persist in war three years longer, and then they will not be consulted. Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience, they could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war. Very well. Last year they could have saved their slaves, but now it is too late: all the powers of earth cannot restore to them their slaves, any more than their dead grandfathers. Next year their lands will be taken,—for in war we can take them, and *rightfully* too,—and in another year they may beg in vain for their lives. A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequences. Many, many people, with less pertinacity than the South, have been wiped out of national existence."

On the 26th, in a hasty reply to a letter from a citizen, on the same subject, with special reference to the treatment of slavery, the cultivation of abandoned plantations, and the proposed calling of a convention of the people of Tennessee, he wrote:

"Slavery is already dead in Tennessee.

"The moment a negro cannot be bought and sold, or when

“Encourage the militia in all manner of ways. I know the poorer classes, the working men, are Union, and I would not mind the croaking of the richer classes. Their power is passing from their hands, and they talk of the vulgarity of the new regime ; but such arguments will be lost on you. Power and success will soon replace this class of grumblers, and they will gradually disappear as a political power.”

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MERIDIAN RAID.—A NEW COMMAND.

McPHERSON's seventeenth corps was still at Vicksburg: part of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, with Smith's and Grierson's divisions of cavalry, at Memphis. Lieutenant-General Polk, who commanded the Confederate forces in Mississippi, was at Meridian with French's division, and had Loring's division at Canton; Forrest was, with twenty-five hundred irregular cavalry, in the northern part of the State; Cash's and Whitfield's brigades of cavalry patrolling from Yazoo City, along the Big Black to Port Gibson; and Wirt Adams' brigade doing similar duty in the rear of Port Hudson and Baton Rouge.

To the Army of the Tennessee was assigned by General Grant the duty of keeping open the Mississippi River and maintaining intact our control of the east bank.

Sherman decided to do this by occupying prominent points in the interior with small corps of observation, threatening a considerable radius; and to operate against any strong force of the enemy seeking to take a position on the river, by a movable column menacing its rear. To destroy the enemy's means of approaching the river with artillery and trains, he determined to organize a large column of infantry and move with it to Meridian, effectually breaking up the Southern Mississippi railway; while a cavalry force should move from Memphis to meet him, and perform the same work with respect to the Mobile and Ohio railway.

Brigadier-General William Sovy Smith, chief of cavalry on General Grant's staff, was placed in command of all the cavalry

of the department, and instructed to move with it from Memphis on or before the 1st of February, by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, and Columbus, to Meridian, a distance of two hundred and fifty miles, so as to reach that place by the 10th. General Smith was specially instructed to disregard all small detachments of the enemy and all minor operations, and striking rapidly and effectually any large body of the enemy, to be at his destination precisely at the appointed time. Simultaneously the Eleventh Illinois Volunteers and a colored regiment, under Colonel Coates, of the former regiment, with five tin-clad gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander Owen, were sent up the Yazoo to ascend that stream and its tributaries as far as possible, so as to create a diversion and protect the plantations on the river ; and Brigadier-General Hawkins was directed to patrol the country in the rear of Vicksburg towards the Big Black, and to collect some fifty skiffs, by means of which detachments of two or three hundred men might be moved at pleasure through the labyrinth of bayous between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, for the purpose of suppressing the depredations of the horde of guerillas then infesting that region.

Having made all these arrangements, Sherman himself, with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Hurlbut, two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps under McPherson, and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, marched from Vicksburg on the 3d of February. The expedition moved out in two columns, Hurlbut's corps by Messenger's, McPherson's along the railway. The former met the enemy at Joe Davis' plantation, the latter at Champion Hills, on the 5th, and for eighteen miles kept up a continual skirmish, without delaying the march of the troops, and entered Jackson the same night ; thus entirely disconcerting the enemy's plan, which was at that moment in process of execution, of concentrating at that place Loring's and French's divisions, and Lee's division of cavalry. On the 6th, both columns being united, and McPherson taking the lead, crossed the Pearl River on a pontoon

bridge captured from the enemy the day before ; on the 7th marched into Brandon ; on the 8th reached Live Creek, five miles west of Morton ; and on the 9th entered Morton, where McPherson's corps halted to destroy the railways for five miles around, and Hurlbut took the advance. From this point the troops moved by easy marches, with no greater opposition than the annoyance of foraging parties and stragglers by the enemy's cavalry hovering on the flanks, through Hillsboro' and Decatur to the Tallahatchie River, twenty-five miles west of Meridian, where the road was found obstructed by felled trees. Leaving the trains under sufficient guard, Sherman pushed on over these obstructions for the Ocktibeha River, where he found the bridge burning ; but in two hours the troops had built a new one, and at three and a half o'clock on the afternoon of the same day entered Meridian, with slight opposition. French's and Loring's divisions, of the Confederate troops, with General Polk in person, had evacuated the place during the morning and the preceding night, Lee's cavalry covering their retreat ; and all the locomotives and cars, except one train found burning, had been removed towards Mobile and Selma. It was evidently impossible to overtake the enemy before they should cross the Tombigbee. The army therefore rested on the 15th, and on the 16th commenced the destruction of the railways centring in Meridian. The depots, storehouses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments in the town were burned, and during the next five days, with axes, sledges, crowbars, clambars and fire, Hurlbut's corps destroyed on the north and east sixty miles of ties and iron, one locomotive, and eight bridges ; and McPherson's corps, on the south and west, fifty-five miles of railway, fifty-three bridges, 6,075 feet of trestle-work, nineteen locomotives, twenty-eight steam-cars, and three steam saw-mills. Thus was completed the destruction of the railways for one hundred miles from Jackson to Meridian, and for twenty miles around the latter place, in so effectual a manner that they could not be used against us in the approaching campaigns.

The cavalry, under General W. Sovy Smith, had not arrived. As was afterwards learned, that officer had not left Memphis until the 11th of February; and had proceeded no further than West Point, from which place he turned back on the 22d, and rapidly retraced his steps to Memphis.

Ascertaining that the enemy's infantry had crossed the Tombigbee on the 17th of February, and hearing nothing of Smith, on the 20th General Sherman ordered McPherson to move slowly back on the main road, while he himself, with Hurlbut's corps and the cavalry, marched north, to feel for Smith. Sherman moved through Marion and Muckalusha-Old-Town to Union, whence he dispatched Colonel Winslow with three regiments of cavalry to Philadelphia and Louisville, fifty miles distant, towards Columbus, on the road by which Smith was expected to come; while the main body moved to Hillsboro', where, on the 23d, it was joined by McPherson's corps. On the 24th the army continued the march on two roads, and on the 25th and 26th crossed the Pearl River at Ratchcliffe Ferry and Edwards' Station, and bivouacked near Canton, leaving a division at the crossing to look for the cavalry. From Louisville, Colonel Winslow sent out two scouts to seek for Smith, and, swinging round through Kosciusko as ordered, rejoined the army at Canton, without news of the missing cavalry. The return march was unmolested.

About one thousand white refugees, four hundred prisoners, five thousand negroes, three thousand animals, and a large number of wagons, were brought in by the troops on their return. Our total loss was in killed, twenty-one; wounded, sixty-eight; missing, eighty-one; total, one hundred and seventy. During the entire expedition, the army subsisted chiefly upon the stores belonging to the enemy, and such as were found in the country. In spite of the failure of the cavalry, the isolation of Mississippi, which was the main object of the expedition, was accomplished, and after marching from three hundred and sixty to four hundred and fifty-three miles, and driving the enemy out of the State, within four weeks the army returned in better health and condition than when it

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started, confident in itself, and schooled for the trying campaigns before it.

On the 28th of February, leaving the army at Canton, Sherman went to Vicksburg; thence sent back orders to Hurlbut to come in on the 3d of March, and at once proceeded to New Orleans, to confer with General Banks and Admiral Porter, in regard to the details of the combined movement up the Red River.

General Banks had asked General Sherman for a force of ten thousand men, to leave Vicksburg on the 7th of March, and remain with him thirty days, and Sherman had promised to comply with this request. His idea was for a heavy column, supported by the iron-clad gunboats, to move up the Red River during high-water to Alexandria, and thence, if the gunboats could pass the rapids as far as Shreveport, to fortify and hold in force one or the other of those places; and thus to perform for the west bank of the river the same service, in preventing any large body of the enemy from reaching the Mississippi, that the destruction of the railroads and the occupation of the line of the Big Black was expected to accomplish on the east bank. General Banks now informed him that he would in person march on the 5th or 7th from Franklin, Louisiana, up the Bayou Teche, with a picked force of seventeen thousand men, and would reach Alexandria by the 17th of March, and requested that the troops from the Army of the Tennessee and Admiral Porter's fleet should meet him there at that time. Simultaneously, Steele was to move from Little Rock on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with ten thousand men.

Sherman at once returned to Vicksburg, and on the 6th of March gave the necessary instructions to Brigadier-General A. J. Smith, who had been previously directed to organize and command the expedition, which was to consist of seven thousand five hundred men of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, and twenty-five hundred men of McPherson's seventeenth corps. General Smith was to report to General Banks, and obey his orders. He was to move up the river on transports, while the

troops from the Department of the Gulf marched by land. The duration of his absence was not to extend beyond thirty days. At the end of that time he was to return to Vicksburg, gather up all the detachments, equipage, and transportation of the Sixteenth Corps, and conduct the troops under his command belonging to that corps to Memphis, where he was told he would probably find orders to join the Army of the Tennessee at Huntsville or Bridgeport.

We need not follow the steps of this expedition in detail. General Smith landed at Simmesport, on the west bank of the Atchafalaya, on the 13th of March, took Fort De Russy by assault on the 14th, and reached Alexandria on the 16th. The advance-guard of the cavalry of the Army of the Gulf arrived the same day, and the main body of that army several days later. The river was very high. The head of the column left Alexandria on the 27th. The army marched from Grand Ecore, where it had halted, on the 6th of April;—the main body by land; one division under General T. Kilby Smith on transports accompanying Admiral Porter, who started on the same day, aiming to reach Springfield Landing on the 10th, where General Banks undertook to be at that time. On the 8th, General Banks was met near Mansfield, and his attenuated column beaten in detail, by an inferior but concentrated force of the enemy, under General E. Kirby Smith. The army retreated in considerable disorder to Pleasant Hill, thirty-five miles distant, and there on the 9th again encountered the enemy, checked his pursuit, and routed him. The next day General Banks continued the retreat to Grand Ecore. Admiral Porter and General Smith reached Springfield Landing at the appointed time, heard of the disaster, and returned, with difficulty, to Grand Ecore. Here the army waited nearly three weeks, when having been re-enforced by all the available troops in the Department of the Gulf, General Banks continued the retreat to Alexandria. The river had fallen. The gunboats and transports could not pass the rapids. By means of a dam, constructed at the suggestion and under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, Fourth Wisconsin Cavalry,

the water in the river was raised sufficiently to allow the boats to descend, and on the 14th of May the army marched on Simmesport. On the 21st it reached Morganza Bend, on the west bank of the Mississippi. General Smith at once embarked his command and returned to Vicksburg, after an absence of just two months and a half, instead of the thirty days originally agreed upon.

In the mean while, nearly ten thousand veteran volunteers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, and the local garrisons, had been furloughed for thirty days, on condition of re-enlisting, and had returned with the ranks of their regiments swelled by recruits. Early in March, Veatch's division of the Sixteenth Corps had been ordered to report to General Dodge at Huntsville.

On the 4th of March, at Nashville, Major-General Grant received telegraphic orders to report in person at Washington. Congress had passed an act authorizing the appointment of a lieutenant-general to command the armies of the United States, and the president had nominated General Grant for the appointment. Before starting on his journey, Grant seized his pen, and in the very moment of his greatest elevation, filled with generosity towards those others, to whose exertions he modestly chose to ascribe his own deserved reward, hastily wrote these touching lines :—

“DEAR SHERMAN—The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately *in person*, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation.

“I start in the morning to comply with the order.

“Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

"There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success.

"How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I.

"I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

"The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.

"Your friend,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General."

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 10th of March, and immediately replied:—

"DEAR GENERAL:—I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th inst. I will send a copy to General McPherson at once.

"You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions.

"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

"I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits—neither of us

being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

"Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed since.

"I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype, Washington—as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be—but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Saviour.

"This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts—no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place, you would help me out, if alive.

"My only point of doubts was, in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but, I confess, your common sense seems to have supplied all these.

"Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come West: take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead-sure—and I tell you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let these influences work.

"Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.

"Your sincere friend."

On the 12th of March, 1864, the President relieved Major-General Halleck from duty as general-in-chief, and assigned

Lieutenant-General Grant to the command of the armies of the United States, with headquarters in the field, and also at Washington, where General Halleck was to remain as chief-of-staff. By the same order, Sherman was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and Major-General McPherson to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

Sherman received this order at Memphis, on the 14th, while on his way to Huntsville, to prepare for the great campaign in Georgia. In accordance with the request of General Grant, accompanying the order, he immediately proceeded to Nashville, where he arrived on the 17th, and accompanied the lieutenant-general as far on his way to Washington as Cincinnati. During the journey, they had a full and free conference as to the plan of operations in the approaching campaign, and a complete understanding of the work to be done by each. In a parlor of the Burnet House, at Cincinnati, bending over their maps, the two generals, who had so long been inseparable, planned together that colossal structure whereof the great campaigns of Richmond and Atlanta were but two of the parts, and, grasping one another firmly by the hand, separated, one to the east, the other to the west, each to strike at the same instant his half of the ponderous death-blow.



Amos A. Phelps
May 1861