



HARPER'S Pictorial History OF THE

By Alfred H. Guernsey
and Henry M. Alden.
**GREAT
REBELLION.**

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P R E F A C E.

THE writing of this History has extended over a period of five years. It began while the conflict of arms was at the hottest, and before it had passed its doubtful period; it is now concluded nearly three years after the surrender of the rebel armies, but before the final stage of Reconstruction can be fairly said to have been inaugurated. It has been a work of great magnitude, covering as it does the events of seven years—and those seven the most important in our national history.

The design of the Authors has been in no respect modified by the fact that this is an Illustrated History. We have written exactly as we should have done if the interest of our readers depended upon the unadorned recital of facts. No pains have been spared—no expense of time or of study—in order to make this the fullest and most complete history of the Civil War which at this time is possible. We have not compiled from other histories, but have depended entirely upon the original materials furnished by documents of every description, military and political, no small proportion of which have never been published, but have been obtained from prominent actors on both sides of the contest. If we had hastened to submit our work to the public, much of this material, both published and unpublished, would have been lost to us, and our work would to that extent have lacked completeness and maturity. By waiting we have also been enabled to bring the history down to the beginning of the present year, thus including the Reconstruction acts of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses. In the whole scheme of the work no less prominence has been given to political than to military events.

The materials from which we have drawn consist of all the official reports, both National and Confederate, which have been published, and a large number of others which we have obtained in manuscript; the official returns of the several armies on both sides; the innumerable letters of war correspondents; conversations with prominent military officers, National and Confederate; miscellaneous documents, maps, memoranda, letters, and orders, furnished by such officers; the *Congressional Globe*; and numerous biographical sketches, more

or less extended, of military and political characters. Wherever it has seemed sufficient, we have simply referred to these authorities by citation; and in numerous instances we have either quoted them in full or given a summary of their testimony.

The Introductory Chapters of the work were written early in the war by Mr. Richard Grant White. The remainder, commencing with the section headed "The War for the Union," is by us whose names appear on the title-page. Each of us has written independently of the other, except that we have had access to the same materials, and have consulted together at every stage of the work. As a rule, not however without exceptions, the chapters relating to military operations in the East, and the earlier ones upon political history, are by Alfred H. Guernsey. Those relating to military operations in the West, including the whole of Sherman's Campaigns, together with the later political chapters, are by Henry M. Alden.

While fully confident of the justice of the National cause in the Civil War, we have willingly conceded to those who opposed that cause the same sincerity of motive which we claim for ourselves, and the same conviction of justice in their appeal to arms. We have written of the living as if they were dead, and have endeavored to anticipate the impartial verdict of the future. If we have failed in this regard, it has been an error of judgment rather than of feeling. In the political chapters we have especially striven to avoid special pleading in behalf of any party, seeking to take the attitude of the spectator and judge rather than that of the advocate.

Such has been the scheme of our work, such the materials upon which it has been based, and such the spirit with which it has been conducted. The main outlines of the struggle which we have here portrayed we are confident will stand the test applied by time and by the judgment of posterity.

A. H. G.
H. M. A.

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HENRY W. HALLECK.

CHAPTER XXII.


POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.¹

Pope placed in command of the Army of Virginia.—Fremont relieved.—Positions of Pope's Forces.—The Plan of Operations.—Pope's Address.—His General Orders.—Similar Confederate Orders.—Pope concentrates his Force.—Jackson ordered to Gordonsville.—Re-enforced by Hill.—Battle of Cedar Mountain.—Banks attacks and is repulsed.—The Losses.—Pope re-enforced.—Jackson retreats to Gordonsville.—Lee joins Jackson, and Pope withdraws beyond the Rappahannock.—Estimate of the Confederate Force.—The Design of Lee.—Manœuvring on the Rappahannock.—Speedy re-enforcements promised to Pope.—Stuart's Raid on Catlett's Station.—Capture of Pope's Dispatch-book, and its Consequences.—Lee's new Plan of Operations.—Jackson marches for Thoroughfare Gap.—Longstreet follows him.—Pope begins to fall back.—Jackson captures Stores at Manassas Junction.—Fight at Bristoe Station.—Fitz John Porter ordered to move.—Taylor's Brigade routed.—Jackson's Peril.—He falls back to Bull Run.—First Battle at Groveton, August 28.—Pope confident of destroying Jackson.—Jackson stands at Bay.—Pope's Plan.—Why it failed.—Affairs at Washington.—Halleck and McClellan.—Second Battle of Groveton, August 29.—Sigel's ineffectual Attack upon the Right.—Fighting upon the Centre and Left.—Longstreet reaches Thoroughfare Gap.—Skirmish at the Gap.—Longstreet's Advance unites with Jackson.—McDowell and Porter.—Pope orders Porter to

attack.—The Order not obeyed.—Hooker's and Reno's Attack upon the Left.—Hatch's Assault along the Turnpike.—Close of the Battle.—Pope claims a Victory.—Pope's new Order to Porter.—Third Battle at Groveton, August 30: Strength of the two Armies.—Pope's Forebodings.—Is convinced that the Enemy is retreating, and orders a Pursuit.—The Confederate Position.—The Union Line.—Porter attacks Jackson's Right.—Reno and Heintzelman attack the Centre.—Jackson demands Re-enforcements.—Longstreet's Movements.—Warren's Stand.—Retreat of the Union Forces.—Losses in the Battles of Groveton.—The Forces after the Battle.—Terror at Washington.—McClellan and his Friends.—The Battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill.—Death of Kearney and Stevens.—The Retreat to Washington.—Pope relieved from the Command.—Estimate of Pope's Campaign.—The Difficulties in his Way.—His early Measures judicious.—His Error on the 29th.—The Time of Longstreet's arrival on the Field.—The greater Error of the 30th.—Estimate of Lee's Campaign.—Its different Phases.

ON the 26th of June, the day on which the closing operations before Richmond were commenced, General Pope was placed in command of the "Army of Virginia," made up of the corps of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell. Fremont took umbrage at being thus placed under an officer whom he outranked, and asked to be relieved from his command. The request was readily complied with, and he disappears from the history of the war, Sigel being placed in command of his corps. Pope found his army widely scattered. Of McDowell's corps of 18,500 men, one half, under King

¹ In addition to the authorities heretofore mentioned, we use mainly in this chapter *Pope's Report*, citing from the official copy, published by order of Congress; and the Report of the Fitz John Porter Court-martial, cited as "*Court-martial*."



JOHN POPE.

was at Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, the other half, under Ricketts, at Manassas Junction, thirty miles to the north; Banks, with 8000, and Fremont, with 11,500, were at Middletown, fifty miles farther to the northwest, with the Blue Mountains between them and Manassas. Infantry and artillery numbered 34,000, and there were about 5000 cavalry. A considerable part of the force was in bad condition.

The Federal government was still nervously apprehensive for the safety of Washington, though there was not a single Confederate soldier within ten days' march; every man had been withdrawn from the Shenandoah and Rappahannock to the Chickahominy. Pope was ordered, as McDowell had been, to cover Washington from attack from the direction of Richmond, assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and then, by menacing the Confederate lines of communication with the South by way of Gordonsville, to endeavor to draw off some of the force then opposed to McClellan before Richmond. The whole plan of the campaign was based upon the supposition that Jackson was still threatening the Valley, and thence Washington, Maryland, and even, Pennsylvania. Pope's first object was to concentrate his scattered command upon the line of the Rappahannock, whence he could, by rapid marching, interpose between any body of the enemy moving up the Valley and their main force at Richmond. The retreat of the Army of the Potomac to the James changed the whole aspect of affairs. Pope soon found that his plan for operations was wholly at variance with that of McClellan; and at his suggestion Halleck was summoned¹ from the West, and, as general-in-chief, placed in command of both.

Pope, on taking the field, issued an address to his army² censuring, by implication, the course of McClellan, and breathing a spirit of confidence which belied the forebodings which he felt.³ "I have come," he said, "from the

West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business has been to seek the adversary and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them; of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponent, and leave our own to take care of themselves."

This address was followed by a series of General Orders prescribing the mode in which the campaign was to be conducted. The troops were, as far as practicable, to subsist upon the country in which their operations were carried on; vouchers were to be given for all supplies taken, payable at the close of the war, upon proof that the holders had been loyal citizens.¹ The cavalry should take no trains for baggage or supplies, only two days' rations, to be carried on their persons; villages and neighborhoods through which they passed were to be laid under contribution for the subsistence of the men and horses.² People living along railroad and telegraph lines were to be held responsible for all damage done to them, and for guerrilla attacks. If roads or telegraphs were injured by guerrillas, the inhabitants living within five miles were to be turned out to repair them. If a soldier was fired upon from a house, it was to be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent as prisoners to head-quarters. If such an outrage occurred at a distance from any settlement, the people within five miles should be held accountable, and made to pay an indemnity. Any person detected in such outrages, either during the act or afterward, was to be shot, without awaiting civil process.³ All disloyal male citizens near, within, or in the rear of the army lines were to be arrested; those who took the oath of allegiance, and gave security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain at home; those who refused were to be sent South, beyond the extreme pickets of the army, and if thereafter found behind, within, or near the lines, would be considered as spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any one violated the oath of allegiance, he should be shot, and his property confiscated. No communication should be held, except through the military authority, with any person residing within the lines of the enemy; and any person concerned in carrying letters or messages in any other way would be considered and treated as a spy.⁴

Stringent as these orders were, their severest provisions had been more than anticipated by the action of the Confederate government in Tennessee. Eight months before,⁵ Judah Benjamin, then Secretary of War, issued official instructions "as to the prisoners taken among the traitors of East Tennessee." All, said the order, who can be "identified in having been engaged in bridge-burning, are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burnt bridges." All who had not been so engaged were to be sent to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and to be kept in confinement as prisoners of war. "In no case," continues the order, "is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the government to be released on any oath or pledge of allegiance. The time for such measures is past. They are to be held as prisoners of war, and kept in jail until the close of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms, are alone to be treated with leniency." The Confederate government, however, denounced the orders of Pope as gross violation of the rules of war, and by a General Order⁶ it was declared that General Pope, and the commissioned officers serving under him, were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, and if any of them were captured they were to be kept in close confinement; and if any persons should be executed in pursuance of his General Orders, an equal number of these prisoners, selected by lot, should be hung.

Pope's first movement was to concentrate his scattered forces, so as to bring them within something like supporting distance of each other. Sigel, who now commanded Fremont's corps, and Banks, were withdrawn from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and posted near Sperryville, east of the Blue Mountains; Ricketts, with his division of McDowell's corps, was brought down from Manassas to Waterloo Bridge, twenty miles to the east; King's division of McDowell's corps was still left at Fredericksburg. The Army of Virginia was thus posted along a line of forty miles. The region having been abandoned by the Confederates, a rapid march of two days, either from his right or left, would have enabled Pope to seize Gordonsville, which commanded the main railroad communication between Richmond and the South. Banks, who had in the mean while pushed southward a score of miles to Culpepper, was ordered, on the 14th of July, to send Hatch, who commanded the cavalry, to seize Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads which centre there from both directions. Hatch failed to execute this order, and having again failed a few days after, he was superseded in the command of the cavalry by Buford.⁷

Tidings of the renewed activity of the Federal forces on the Rappahannock soon reached Richmond, and although the Confederate capital was still threatened by McClellan's great army on the James, so important was the possession of Gordonsville, the key of communication with the South, that Lee ventured to weaken his force at Richmond in order to counteract the menacing movements of Pope. On the 13th of July, Jackson, with his own division and that of Ewell, was ordered to proceed to Gordonsville, with the

¹ July 11.² I "took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination to³ July 14.

carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and all the skill of which I was master."—Pope's Report, 6.

¹ Order No. 5.² Order No. 6.³ Order No. 7.⁴ Order No. 11.⁵ Nov. 25, 1861.⁶ No. 54, August 1, 1862.⁷ Pope's Report.

promise of re-enforcements in case there should be a chance to strike an effective blow without withdrawing troops too long from the defense of Richmond. Jackson found Pope too strong to warrant him in making any offensive movements, and for a fortnight contented himself with holding Gordonsville. But there being no indication that McClellan meditated moving upon Richmond, Lee, on the 27th of July, sent A. P. Hill to join Jackson.¹ The Confederate force at Richmond was thus reduced by 35,000 men, fully a third of its number.

On the 29th of July Pope left Washington to join his army in the field. On the 7th of August he advanced their position somewhat, concentrating his infantry within a space of ten miles along the road from Sperryville to Culpepper, the cavalry being thrown ten miles forward toward Gordonsville. On the same day, Jackson, having been informed that only a part of the enemy was at Culpepper, marched his command in that direction, hoping to strike a portion of Pope's army before it could be re-enforced. On the morning of the 9th, Banks was pushed six miles forward to a strong position near Cedar Mountain, and Ricketts was posted three miles in the rear. Sigel had been ordered to march to Culpepper, so as to be there in the morning; but, owing to misconception of orders, he did not arrive until late in the afternoon.

In the afternoon of the 9th, Ewell, whose division was in the advance, came in sight of Banks's position, near the northwestern flank of Cedar Mountain, a conical hill which rises sharply a few hundred feet from a plain intersected by creeks and low ridges. On the crest of one of these a body of Union cavalry was seen, the infantry and artillery being hidden by the opposite slope. Two brigades of Ewell's division, moving to the right, ascended Cedar Mountain, and planted their batteries two hundred feet up the side, so as to command the valley below. The remainder of Ewell's division, with a part of that of Jackson, keeping to the left, passed beyond the base of the mountain, and took up a position on a wooded ridge opposite the Union line. Hill's division had not yet come up. Lawton's brigade, the strongest of Jackson's division, was left behind to guard the trains, and took no part in the action. Between the wooded ridges occupied by the two armies lay an open plain a few hundred yards wide; here was a corn-field, and beyond this a wheat-field, upon which the yellow shocks of grain just reaped were still standing. At four o'clock a fierce fire of artillery had fairly opened. Some loss was sustained by the Federals from the batteries on the mountain side; more by the Confederates in the plain below. Winder, who now led the brigade which still bore the name of "Jackson's Own," was killed, and the command of it devolved upon Taliaferro. The cannonade was kept up for an hour, when Banks, believing that the enemy were in no great force,² threw his whole division in two columns across the grain-field. One column charged straight across the field upon the Confederate right. Early, who was posted there, being sorely pressed, called for re-enforcements. Hill had now come up, and one of his brigades was sent to Early's support. The main assault was upon the Confederate left. So sudden was the onset, that the extremity of the Confederate line was turned, and, before they were aware of it, they were charged directly in the rear, and forced back upon their centre, which also gave way. All seemed lost. The artillery, hurried to the rear, disappeared behind the crest of the ridge, while the greater part of the infantry broke away in confusion fast verging into rout. Jackson hurried in person to the front, and at length stopped the flight and re-formed his broken line. Two more brigades of Hill's division had now come up, and were pushed into action. The Confederates on the field now outnumbered the Federals by nearly two to one.³ The Union advance was checked, and then forced back across the open field beyond the ridge from which they had come. In the mean while, Pope, who was with Ricketts's division, only three miles in the rear, became convinced, notwithstanding the assurances which he had just received from Banks, that the enemy was really in force, and that a serious action was going on. He hurried forward with Ricketts, and just at dusk met the retreating forces of Banks. A new line was formed, toward which Jackson advanced cautiously in the darkness, opening upon it a sharp artillery fire, which was returned so vigorously that a Confederate battery was disabled and withdrawn. Jackson then fell back, and passed the night on the battle-field.

In this accidental engagement, which might be denominated simply an "affair" were it not for the magnitude of the loss on both sides, the Confederates lost, in killed and wounded, about 1300; the Union loss was estimated at about 1400 killed and wounded, and 400 prisoners. Besides these there were a large number of stragglers, who never returned to their commands.⁴

¹ Lee's Rep., i., 15; ii., 3.

² Banks's dispatches to Pope: "August 9, 2 25. The enemy shows his cavalry, which is strong, ostentatiously. No infantry seen, and not much artillery. Woods on the left, said to be full of troops. A visit to the front does not impress that the enemy intends immediate attack. He seems, however, to be taking positions."—"4 50. About four o'clock, shots were exchanged by the skirmishers. Artillery fire on both sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advancing. Now deployed in front as skirmishers. I have ordered a regiment on the right, Williams's, to meet them; and one on the left, Augur's, to advance on the left and in front."—"5 P. M. They are now approaching each other."—Pope's Report, 218.

³ The Union force consisted only of Banks's corps, numbering at the outset only 8000. There were present, as is shown by the report of losses (Lee's Rep., ii., 49), forty-two regiments of Confederate infantry, 21,000 men in all; but of these only about one half were seriously engaged in the actual fight. Two thirds of the loss, indeed, fell upon ten of the regiments of Jackson and Ewell.

⁴ "No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks. I can, therefore, only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to about 1800 men, besides which, fully 1000 men straggled back to Culpepper Court-house and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. . . . No material of war nor baggage-trains were lost on either side."—Pope's Report, 11. Jackson says: "We captured 400 prisoners, 5302 small-arms, one 12-pounder Napoleon and its caisson, with two other caissons and a limber, and three colors. The official reports of the casualties in my command show a loss of 223 killed, 1060 wounded, 31 missing—total loss, 1314. This was probably about one half that sustained by the enemy."—Lee's Rep., ii., 7. There is reason to suppose that Pope's estimate of his loss was too low; for he puts down Banks's force before the battle at 8000, and afterward he counts it at 5000, a diminution of 3000. If half of the 1000 stragglers returned to their com-

mand, there remain 2500 for killed, wounded, and prisoners, or 2100 killed and wounded, which we think to be about the true number. If all of the stragglers returned, there would still be a loss of 400 prisoners, and 1600 killed and wounded.

¹ Pope's Report, 11.

² Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 7.

³ The Confederate "Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia," while minute upon almost every other topic, are almost wholly silent as to the force engaged in the operations of August and September. We are forced to rely upon other sources for an approximative estimate of these forces. Four independent lines of investigation, taken in connection with a few hints scattered through the Reports, give results so nearly alike, that we consider our estimate as substantially correct.

I. It was shown (*ante*, pp. 361, 379) that the effective force at the commencement of the "Seven Days" was 100,000, and that the losses in battle were about 20,000; to which should be added probably 10,000 by sickness during the ensuing six weeks. The conscription law had been fairly in operation since the close of June, and had, as the writer was informed by General J. E. Johnston, during the five weeks after the battle of Fair Oaks, added about 40,000 to the army at Richmond. The operation of this law being very uniform, 40,000 were probably added during the six weeks preceding the middle of August. The recruits, instead of being sent on from the camps of instruction in regiments and brigades, were sent in squads to join the old regiments. This would make the entire force at the middle of August a little more than it was at the close of June—that is, 110,000. Every division and brigade, with the exception of that of Holmes, some 10,000 strong, was finally sent from Richmond and Petersburg in the following order: Jackson, July 13; A. P. Hill, July 27; Longstreet, August 13; D. H. Hill, August 21, joining Lee on the 23d of September, three days after the battle of Groveton. This makes the entire force at the outset 100,000 of all arms.

II. The reports of casualties, which will be cited in the appropriate places, give the loss by regiments in the whole series of battles; and as every regiment was apparently brought into action at one time or another, these lists contain the entire number of regiments. We find 177 different regiments of infantry from the different states, as follows: Virginia, 39; Georgia, 37; North Carolina, 26; South Carolina, 17; Alabama, 16; Mississippi, 12; Louisiana, 9; Texas, 3; Tennessee, 3; Florida, 2; Arkansas, 1. From indicia scattered here and there, we put the aggregate strength of the regiments at 500, which gives 88,500 infantry; the artillery and cavalry we put down at 5000 each, making a total of 98,500 of all arms.

III. There were, in all, 40 brigades; each of these comprised from three to six regiments. In many cases the numbers which were carried into the separate actions are noted in the reports. Comparing these, and taking into account the losses previously reported, we find the brigades to have averaged about 2250, making about 90,000 infantry, and 10,000 artillery and cavalry.

These data thus indicate, without the probability of any material error, that the entire force of the Confederate army, previous to any losses on the march or in action, was about 100,000 of all arms. The regiments brought into each action, and the losses in every battle being given throughout, we shall be able to arrive at a very close approximation of the actual force at each important period of the campaign.

IV. After the foregoing estimate had been made, I obtained an abstract of the official returns of the various Confederate armies during almost the whole period of the war. These returns came into the hands of the government at the surrender of the army of Lee. An abstract of these was furnished by the War Department to Mr. William Swinton, author of the "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." For this, and many other documents as yet inaccessible to the general student, I am indebted to Mr. Swinton. These returns corroborate the accuracy with which my previous estimates had been framed. I here give the returns of the Confederate "Army of Northern Virginia" from Feb. 28, 1862, to Feb. 28, 1865. I shall have frequent occasion, in subsequent chapters, to refer to this table. The explanatory notes appended to it are my own. In referring to the strength of this army at different periods, I shall consider only those reported as "present for duty." It will be seen that the returns are wanting for some of the most important periods.

RETURNS OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA FROM FEB. 28, 1862, TO FEB. 28, 1865.

Date.	Present and Absent.	Aggregate Present.	Present for Duty.	Date.	Present and Absent.	Aggregate Present.	Present for Duty.
1862. Feb. 28	84,225 .. 27,329 ..	56,396 ..	47,617	1863. Nov. 20	96,476 .. 40,488 ..	56,088 ..	48,269
" July 20	137,030 .. 42,344 ..	94,686 ..	69,559	" Dec. 30	91,253 .. 36,338 ..	54,915 ..	43,558
" Sept. 30	139,143 .. 76,430 ..	62,713 ..	52,609	1864. Jan. 31	79,692 .. 34,463 ..	45,229 ..	38,849
" Oct. 20	153,778 .. 74,403 ..	79,395 ..	67,805	" Feb. 20	68,435 .. 28,875 ..	39,560 ..	33,811
" Nov. 20	153,790 .. 67,207 ..	86,583 ..	73,554	" Mar. 10	73,202 .. 33,051 ..	40,151 ..	39,407
" Dec. 31	152,853 .. 51,308 ..	91,004 ..	79,072	" April 10	97,576 .. 36,358 ..	61,218 ..	52,626
1863. Jan. 31	144,605 .. 61,308 ..	93,297 ..	72,226	" June 30	92,655 .. 30,114 ..	62,541 ..	51,863
" Feb. 28	114,175 .. 39,740 ..	74,435 ..	58,559	" July 10	135,805 .. 66,961 ..	68,844 ..	57,097
" Mar. 31	109,839 .. 36,460 ..	73,379 ..	60,298	" May 31	146,838 .. 87,854 ..	58,984 ..	44,247
" May 31	133,689 .. 44,991 ..	88,754 ..	68,352	" Oct. 31	177,103 .. 94,468 ..	82,635 ..	62,875
" July 31	117,602 .. 63,991 ..	53,611 ..	41,135	" Nov. 30	181,826 .. 93,966 ..	87,860 ..	69,290
" Aug. 31	133,264 .. 61,300 ..	71,964 ..	56,327	" Dec. 20	155,772 .. 76,454 ..	79,318 ..	66,533
" Sept. 30	95,164 .. 39,943 ..	55,221 ..	44,367	1865. Jan. 31	141,627 .. 71,054 ..	69,673 ..	53,445
" Oct. 31	97,211 .. 39,960 ..	57,251 ..	45,614	" Feb. 28	160,411 .. 87,062 ..	73,349 ..	53,094

^a It has been shown (*ante*, p. 360) that at the close of May this army numbered 67,000, and (*ante*, p. 361) that at the end of June it had fully 100,000 men present for duty.

^b Three weeks after the close of the "Seven Days," its force present for duty, notwithstanding its losses, was nearly 70,000 on the 20th of July. The returns for the next six weeks are wanting; but it is certain that large additions were received, bringing its marching force in August fully up to 100,000.


^c On the 30th of September, a fortnight after the battle of Antietam, there were but 72,000 "present," including the sick and wounded. By this time all those who had fallen out in the march had rejoined their commands, so that the campaign from Cedar Run to Antietam cost 38,000, disabled and deserters. During the next two months the army was largely augmented by conscription.

^d The diminution at this time was owing to a part of Longstreet's corps having been sent to North Carolina, where he remained until May.

^e At this time Longstreet had been sent with re-enforcements to Bragg in Tennessee.

^f From this time the effects of desertion and sickness became strikingly apparent. The number of the "absent" exceeds, sometimes very considerably, that of the "present;" while of the "present" only about two thirds were fit for "duty." The effective strength of the army was only about one third of its nominal force.

^g The returns for the remainder of the period before the surrender are wanting.



MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

lan, the siege of Richmond was to be pressed. If it went to the Rappahannock, McClellan would be withdrawn from the James. Mosby, soon to be known as a vigorous partisan leader, had been captured; being set free by exchange, he passed Fortress Monroe as Burnside was embarking. He learned from a sure source that the destination was the Rappahannock, and conveyed to Lee the long-wished-for information.¹ Reports, which, however, were premature, also affirmed that a part of McClellan's army had gone to the aid of Pope. It was clear, therefore, that active operations against Richmond were no longer contemplated; and Lee believed that he might venture to leave the Confederate capital, and advance with almost his whole army upon Pope, and overwhelm him before re-enforcements could reach him. Some changes had been made in the organization of his army. Huger, whose incompetency had been demonstrated, was displaced; Magruder was sent to Texas. Their divisions, and that of Whiting, which had been only temporarily attached to Jackson's force during the Seven Days, were united with that of Longstreet, and placed under his command. This body of 50,000 men left Richmond by the 13th of August, and moved with such rapidity that by the 16th it had passed Gordonsville, and was advancing toward the Rappahannock, whither Jackson had proceeded the day before.² Thus, two days before McClellan's advance corps and trains had fairly started from their camp on the James, Richmond and Petersburg were left defended only by about 20,000, the division of D. H. Hill and Holmes, with perhaps a few raw conscripts who had not been assigned to their places in the grand army. So secretly had this movement been made, that on this very day reports reached McClellan that the enemy were advancing against him from the Chickahominy; and on the 17th he wrote that he should not feel entirely secure until he had his whole army beyond the Chickahominy,³ and a week later he thought it necessary to strengthen the defenses of Yorktown to resist an attack from the direction of Richmond. On that very day D. H. Hill left Petersburg with his division, the last to join in the movement toward Washington.⁴

Early on the morning of the 20th the pickets of Pope's right at Rappahannock Station were driven in, and before night the main body of the Confederate infantry, outnumbering him almost two to one, were in his front across the Rappahannock. During the two following days Lee made repeat-

ed attempts to cross at various points, and an almost continuous artillery fire was kept up along the whole line of eight miles, with little loss on either side.¹ Lee then began to move slowly up the river, in order to turn the Union right. Pope had been directed to keep himself in communication with Fredericksburg, whither the Army of the Potomac was being brought, and could not extend his right to check the enemy. He was assured, however, that if he could hold his line until the close of the 23d, he would receive re-enforcements sufficient to enable him to assume the offensive.² On the 22d he resolved to cross the river the next morning, and fling his whole force upon the flank and rear of Lee's long column, which was passing toward his right. The manœuvre, except that it involved no long march of the attacking column, would have been almost a repetition of that by which Lee assailed McClellan's retreating column at Frazier's Farm; but such was the disparity of force that it could hardly have been other than a disastrous failure. But a fierce rain-storm during the night raised the waters of the shallow river six or eight feet, swept away the bridges and overflowed the fords, so as to render the movement impracticable, and also prevented Lee from any serious attempt to cross above, which he had begun to do.³

An episode occurred during that stormy night of the 22d which, though trifling in itself, changed the whole course of the campaign. Pope's head-quarters were at Catlett's Station, ten miles in the rear of the centre of his line. Here all the army trains were parked, guarded by 1500 infantry and five companies of cavalry. Stuart, with 1500 cavalry, had crossed the river above Pope's extreme right, and, gaining the rear of his line, pressed, without being discovered, down to Catlett's Station. Here, in the midst of the darkest night he ever knew, Stuart found himself in the very midst of the Union camp. By chance he encountered a negro whom he had known before, who offered to guide him to the spot occupied by Pope's staff. A few companies stole unperceived up to the tents "occupied by the convivial staff of Pope," charged upon them, captured one or two of the inmates, and seized some plunder. But of far more importance than all was Pope's dispatch-book, which revealed just the situation of his army, his imminent need of re-enforcements, and his expectation of the time when they would reach him.⁴ This bold dash cost one man killed and one wounded. When that unnamed negro, accidentally encountered in the darkness, guided the Sixth Virginia cavalry to Pope's tent, he was potentially fighting the battles of Groveton and Antietam.

The disclosures made by this dispatch-book convinced Lee that, if he could at once throw his force directly upon the Union rear, cutting its communications with Washington, Pope's whole army could be destroyed or captured. To do this his force must be divided, a part marching rapidly around the enemy's right to his rear, the remainder occupying his attention in front until the departing column was well advanced, when it would follow by the same route.⁵ The manœuvre was a delicate one, depending upon every movement being executed at the precise time. A sudden storm, or any other accident interfering for a single day, would thwart the whole plan. It was also hazardous, for the Union army might fall with equal or superior force upon either of the separated divisions. Still, the chance of great success was sufficient to warrant the attempt, and not a moment was lost in carrying it out.

The first part, upon the successful execution of which every thing depended, was confided to Jackson, whose capacity for conducting a rapid march had been abundantly tested. On the morning of the 25th he left his position, passed up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossing the river beyond Pope's extreme right, and then pressed rapidly up the narrow valley between Blue and Bull Run Mountains. The column pressed on by strange country roads and by "nigh cuts" across open fields, and at midnight, after a march of twenty miles, reached Salem, a little town just opposite the Thoroughfare Gap, through which he hoped to pass the Bull Run Mountains, and emerge directly upon Pope's rear. If that pass should be defended the whole movement would be a failure. Stuart, with all the cavalry, accompanied the column on its right, scouring the region between it and the Union force. It was hoped that the movement would be unperceived and unsuspected by the enemy. "Don't shout, boys, the Yankees will hear us," said Jackson, as the long column passed by a point where he stood, proudly watching their rapid march. "Who could fail," he said, "to win victory with these men?"⁶

Pope, however, was not taken by surprise. Jackson's march had hardly been begun when he was informed that "a large detachment of the enemy, numbering 36 regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a large cavalry force, was marching rapidly up the North Branch, and was then pressing on toward White Plains and Salem, and from these points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, or even north of that place."⁷ He was, however, compelled

¹ The Confederate loss, August 20-23, was 152 killed and wounded.—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 50.

² Halleck to Pope, August 21: "I have telegraphed to General Burnside to know at what hour he can re-enforce Reno. I am waiting his answer. Every effort must be made to hold the Rappahannock. Large forces will be in to-morrow."—Later, same day: "I have just sent [query received] General Burnside's reply. General Cox's forces are coming on from Parkersburg, and will be here to-morrow or next day. Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil till we can re-enforce you. Forty-eight hours more, and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it."—*Pope's Report*, 221, 222.

General Haupt, Superintendent of Transportation at Alexandria, to Pope, received August 24: "Thirty thousand troops or more demand transport. We can manage 12,000 per day. The new troops might march, the veterans go in cars, horses driven; baggage, tents, etc., wait until they can be forwarded. Supplies take precedence."—Later, same day: "We expect to clean out all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day."—*Ibid.*, 227.

³ Stuart, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 137. ⁴ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 21. ⁵ *Cooke's Stonewall Jackson*, 275.

⁶ *Pope's Report*, 15. Colonel J. S. Clark, who at great risk watched Jackson's march, saw

¹ *Cooke's Stonewall Jackson*.

² *McC. Rep.*, 314, 317.

³ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 18; ii., 81, 90.

⁴ *McC. Rep.*, 320; *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 111.

by his orders to hold his force in such a position as to enable him to keep up his communication with Fredericksburg. Assurances of speedy re-enforcements were so precise and definite that he felt warranted in holding his position. He was assured that 30,000 would reach him by the 25th; but on the evening of that day only 8000 had come up.¹

On the 26th, Longstreet, who had kept up a show of force in front of Pope, yet all the while creeping away to his right, commenced his march to unite with Jackson, who, having left Salem at daybreak, was pressing through Thoroughfare Gap. Pope then abandoned the line of the Rappahannock, and undertook to throw his whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction. On the morning of the 27th he had 54,000 infantry, made up of his own Army of Virginia, and the re-enforcements which had reached him from Burnside's corps and the Army of the Potomac. He had also nominally 4000 cavalry, but their horses were so broken down that hardly 500 were fit for service.²

Jackson, in the mean while, had passed Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th; pressed past Gainesville, which Pope supposed to be strongly occupied, but where there was not a single Union soldier, and by sunset was at Bristoe Station, on the railroad which formed Pope's chief means for supplies. At Manassas Junction, seven miles distant, was a large dépôt of supplies almost without guard.³ A strong body of cavalry under Stuart, and about 500 infantry under Trimble, were dispatched to seize these stores. They pressed on through the darkness, though the infantry had made a march of more than twenty miles that day, and before dawn had effected their purpose, capturing the only considerable dépôt of stores between Pope's army and Washington.⁴ These stores were destroyed by the Confederates, and so were of little advantage to Jackson beyond giving his hungry troops rations for a single day, but their loss proved a serious disadvantage to Pope.

On the morning of the 27th the greater part of Jackson's command moved to Manassas, leaving Ewell at Bristoe, upon which place Hooker was marching. A short action took place in the afternoon, in which Ewell was worsted, but he fell back in good order to Manassas.⁵ Fitz John Porter, who, with 4500 men, was at Warrenton Junction, nine miles distant, was ordered by Pope to move during the night to Bristoe, to the support of Hooker, whose ammunition was entirely exhausted. He was to be there at daybreak, but did not reach the place until six hours later.⁶ Meanwhile a considerable body of Union troops came down toward Manassas along the railroad. They found the Junction too strongly held to be recovered, and after a gallant fight, in which General Taylor was killed, they retreated with much loss.⁷

Pope's force was now concentrating in the neighborhood of Manassas. Had this concentration been effected one day earlier, Jackson would have marched into the jaws of destruction. As it was, he was in imminent peril. He had no alternative but to retreat, but whither it was hard to say. McDowell, marching to his right from Warrenton, was at Gainesville, with a force equal to his own, cutting him off to the west by the route by which he had advanced. To retreat northward toward Aldie would have removed him every step farther from the main army of Lee, which was yet beyond the Bull Run Mountains. He adopted the only course which could have saved him, and even in this the chances were fearfully against him. This was to fall back toward the point from which Longstreet was advancing, and at the same time deceive his opponent as to the direction of his retreat. His own division, now commanded by Taliaferro, moved from Manassas directly north, while Ewell and Hill, with the cavalry, marched northeastward, as if pushing straight for Washington. At Centreville they turned sharply west, and during the 28th rejoined Taliaferro a little west and north of the battle-field of Bull Run.⁸ The ruse succeeded. Pope withdrew McDowell from Gainesville, marched him directly toward Centreville, and ordered Heintzelman in the same direction. Jackson had now secured a strong position a little north and west of the battle-field of Bull Run. McDowell's line of march led him close by the right of Jackson, and exposed him to a flank attack. This was made by Jackson just before sunset, and a sharp action, mostly of artillery, ensued, which was terminated by the darkness, neither side gaining any decided advantage,⁹ and both suffering heavy loss. Ewell and Taliaferro were severely wounded.¹⁰

Pope, supposing that Jackson was in full retreat to Thoroughfare Gap, was confident that there was no escape for him. At half past nine he wrote to Kearney, "McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy, and is now

in his front. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured." McDowell must hold his ground at all hazards, prevent the retreat of Jackson, and by daylight the next morning the whole force would be up from Centreville and Manassas Junction, and between them the enemy must be crushed. Jackson had now, after his losses, exclusive of cavalry, not quite 30,000 men. Pope had, or rather supposed that he had, 50,000, who could be brought into action in the morning. Of these, 25,000, under McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, were supposed to be directly west of Jackson, between him and the Gap; 25,000 more, with Kearney, Hooker, and Reno, near Centreville, on the east. His only apprehension was that Jackson might retreat northward toward Leesburg, and to prevent this, Kearney was to keep close to him during the night of the 28th.¹

This apparently well-conceived plan was based upon a misconception as to the purpose and position of the enemy. Jackson had no purpose of retreating, but had taken a position which he meant to hold until he should be joined by Longstreet, who was a full day's march nearer him than Pope supposed. The execution of his plan was prevented by a movement previously made by McDowell, who had sent Ricketts toward Thoroughfare Gap, and had before withdrawn King's division to Manassas Junction, near which place Porter now was. Pope's force, therefore, instead of being in the rear and on the front of Jackson, was on his right flank and front—Sigel's corps near Groveton, close on the flank; McDowell and Porter near Manassas; Reno and Heintzelman in front, toward Centreville. McDowell and Porter were ordered, on the morning of the 29th, toward Gainesville, and thus gain a position somewhat in Jackson's rear, while Sigel was to fall upon his flank, and Heintzelman and Reno, marching from Centreville, to attack him in front. These movements would bring the whole force together; and when communication was established, the whole command was to halt, and, above all things, to occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run that night; for Pope presumed that it would be necessary to do this on account of supplies. "The indications," he said, "are, that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace which will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day."²

Pope's expectation upon the morning of the 29th was, with his whole force, two to one, to fall upon Jackson's front, right flank, and rear; and he hoped, with good reason, "to gain so decisive a victory over the army under Jackson, before he could have been joined by any of the forces under Longstreet, that the army of Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to be no longer in condition to prosecute operations of an aggressive character."³ This accomplished, he would have fallen back across Bull Run, and have awaited supplies and re-enforcements, which would in a day or two have given him a force superior to that of the enemy. This plan failed utterly through the determined resistance opposed by Jackson, and from the fact that Longstreet was nearer at hand than was supposed. At the very moment when this order was written, Longstreet was pressing through the narrow gorge of Thoroughfare Gap; and, instead of coming to Jackson's aid "to-morrow night or next day," he was able to give him essential support that afternoon, and by the next morning, the 30th, to bring his whole force upon the field.

In the mean while all was confusion, doubt, and ignorance at the Federal capital. McClellan left Fortress Monroe on the 23d for Acquia Creek, on the Rappahannock, whither a part of his army had preceded him, and the rest was to follow. Next day he telegraphed to Halleck for orders, and especially for information as to where Pope was, and what he was doing. "I do not know," replied the general-in-chief, "where Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most anxious to ascertain." Two days later Halleck telegraphed, "There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. Don't draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present; we shall probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there." On the 27th still there was no sure information as to what was going on. Past midnight, McClellan had heard that heavy firing had been heard at Centreville; he had sent to ascertain the truth, and, meanwhile, asked anxiously whether the works in front of Washington were garrisoned and ready for defense. At 1 35 there is news that "Taylor's brigade, sent this morning to Bull Run Bridge, had been cut to pieces or captured;" and McClellan thinks the best policy will be to make the works at Washington "perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry." At 2 30: "I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. I am not responsible for the past, and can not be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available force according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark." At 6: "A dispatch from Pope, dated at 10 A.M., says, 'All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right, at Gainesville.' I have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2500 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's 1st Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held for the defense of Washington. If you wish me to order any part of this force to march to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate."⁴ At 4 10, on the 28th: "Franklin is with me here at Alexan-

only a part of his force. Instead of 36 regiments of infantry, Jackson had about 66, all of which were on the march. The entire cavalry force of the Confederate army was at this time with Jackson, for Longstreet (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 81) says that on the 27th he had no cavalry.

¹ *Pope's Report*, 15. Also, considerably enlarged, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 348. Also Note 2, ante, p. 384.

² *Pope's Report*, 17.

³ At half past ten on the evening of that day, McDowell, then at Warrenton, wrote to Pope, "Centreville and Manassas are fortified, the former sufficiently to offer a stout resistance, and the latter enough to aid materially raw troops."—*Pope's Report*, 200.

⁴ Among the stores captured were 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1000 barrels of beef, 2000 of pork, 2000 of flour; two trains loaded with stores and clothing, large quantities of forage, 8 guns, 42 wagons and ambulances, 200 tents; 300 prisoners, 200 negroes, and 175 horses also fell into their hands.—*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 155. A sharp dispute arose between Stuart and Trimble as to the credit of this operation, each denying the claims of the other.—*Ibid.*, 143, 150-159. Jackson (*Ibid.*, 93) clearly gives it to Trimble.

⁵ *Pope's Testimony on Porter's Trial*. The failure to execute this order formed one of the charges against Porter, who was subsequently tried by court-martial and cashiered.

⁶ *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 93.

⁷ Pope indeed says (*Report*, 18) that, if Jackson had massed his whole force and attacked the Union centre at Bristoe Station, the most serious consequences would have ensued; but the result fully justifies Jackson's course.

⁸ Pope says, "Each party maintained its ground." Jackson says, "The Federals did not attempt to advance, but maintained their ground with obstinate determination. Both lines stood exposed to the discharge of musketry and artillery until about nine o'clock, when the enemy slowly fell back, yielding the field to our troops."


⁹ The actions of this and the two following days are known as indifferently as the "Second Bull Run Battle," the "Battle of Manassas Plains," the "Second Manassas Battle," and the "Battle of Groveton." They were all one battle, fought on the same ground. We think Groveton the most appropriate, that being the name of a small hamlet near the centre of the battle-field.

¹ *Pope's Report*, 19.

² *Pope's General Order*, No. 5, August 29, to McDowell and Porter.—*Report*, 241.

³ *Pope's Report*, 22.

⁴ The dispatches are dated 1 35, 2 30, 6 P.M., August 27; but the context indicates that they



MAP OF OPERATIONS, AUGUST 28, 29, 30.

dria. I will know in a few minutes the condition of the artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. It is the key to Washington, which can not be seriously menaced as long as it is held." Halleck writes: "Place Sumner's corps, as it arrives, near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing now to be feared is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night time." McClellan, on the 29th: "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 P.M. He has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think he is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night." And in the afternoon, the battle then being fought, though no one at Washington knew it: "The last news I received from Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: (1st.) To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. (2d.) To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly sure. No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it."

Official reports from Washington notified McClellan that large bodies of the enemy were moving through Vienna, in the direction of the Chain Bridge; so McClellan halted Franklin at Annandale, only a few miles toward Pope.² Yet there was not a Confederate soldier within thirty miles, or between him and the forces at Washington. Jackson was sternly holding his ground beyond Bull Run, on almost the very spot where a year, a week, and a day before he had won the title of "Stonewall;" and Longstreet, having marched since early dawn, and for three successive days before, was within hearing of the noise of the battle which Jackson was so firmly waging.

Early on the morning of the 29th Sigel opened the attack on the Confederate right.³ Jackson's left, under Hill, stretched northward toward Sudley Ford, on the Bull Run; then came Ewell's division, under Lawton, in the centre; then Jackson's own division, now commanded by Starke, on the right, resting near the little hamlet of Groveton. His force lay mainly behind an abandoned railroad, whose deep cuttings formed a strong intrenchment. The ground was thickly wooded. His artillery was mainly massed in on low ridges in the rear of his right. Jackson's front fell back about half a mile until they reached the abandoned railroad, where a fierce combat ensued.⁴ Milroy and Schurz, of Sigel's corps, charged fiercely upon the enemy, sheltered by this embankment, but were driven back; the charge was repeated, and again repulsed. The Confederates then advanced, but were checked by a hot artillery fire, and fell back to their position.⁵ Jackson was fighting a defensive battle, in order to hold his position until re-enforced by Longstreet, who was rapidly coming up. Pope came upon the field about noon, and, in reply to Sigel's request for aid, told him that he must hold his ground, but that he should not be again pushed into action, for McDowell and Porter were coming up from Manassas by the Gainesville

road, and would soon fall upon the enemy's flank and probably upon his rear.¹ Heintzelman's corps, comprising the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, had meanwhile come upon the field and taken position on the right, and Reno's corps between Sigel and Heintzelman. For four hours a series of sharp skirmishes ensued along the centre and left of the Confederate line.²

Longstreet's command, Lee accompanying, had been advancing in the track of Jackson. It reached White Plains, at the western entrance of the Thoroughfare Gap, on the evening of the 27th, where the night was passed, and at dawn of the 28th pressed forward to that narrow defile, which a thousand men could have held against five times their number. Presuming it to be held, Longstreet sent a part of his force by a rough mountain path to Hopewell Gap, three miles northward, to turn the Union rear. But Thoroughfare Gap, the key to every thing, was not held. After some skirmishing, the Confederates poured through and gained its eastern mouth. Ricketts, commanding a division of McDowell's corps, had been sent from Gainesville in that direction "to assist Colonel Wyndham, who, at 10 15 A.M., reported the enemy passing through Thoroughfare Gap." He pushed forward rapidly, but was too late. At three in the afternoon, before reaching the Gap, he met Wyndham's skirmishers retiring before the enemy, who were already in possession. After vainly attempting to check them, finding himself outflanked on both sides, he retreated to Gainesville, and thence to Manassas, and the way was open for Longstreet to come to the aid of Jackson, who stood at bay on his chosen ground.³

Early on the morning of the 29th Longstreet's columns were united, and the advance to join Jackson was resumed. Before they reached Gainesville, the noise of the battle, five miles distant, was heard. The wearied troops pressed on with renewed vigor. His advance passed through Gainesville about nine o'clock,⁴ and in an hour began to come upon the field, and took positions on the rear and to the right of Jackson. The Confederate right now extended across the Warrenton Turnpike to the Manassas Railroad. The joint order to Porter and McDowell directing them to move toward Gainesville, found these commands near Bethlehem Church, two miles west of Manassas, and four or five miles from the field of battle. King's division had been detached from McDowell, and placed under Porter for a special purpose. McDowell, being senior officer, assumed command, and gave Porter an order for his movements,⁵ and pushed his corps, including King's division, toward the battle-field, which he reached at about four o'clock. Pope, who was wholly unaware that Longstreet had united with Jackson,⁶ now sent an order to Porter to come into action. "Your line of march," he wrote, "brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his

¹ Pope's Report, 21.

² After the attack in the morning, "the enemy moved around more to our left to another point of attack. This was vigorously repulsed by the batteries. About two o'clock P.M. the Federal infantry, in large force, advanced to the attack of our left."—Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 95. "From twelve until four o'clock very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various parts of our line, and were brought on at every indication the enemy made of a disposition to retreat."—Pope's Report, 21.

³ Longstreet, in Lee's Rep., ii., 81; McDowell, in Pope's Report, 44; Ricketts, *Ibid.*, 169.

⁴ General John Buford at this time counted 17 regiments of infantry, one battery of artillery, and about 500 cavalry. He estimates the regiments at 800 each; this is probably too high.—Court-martial, 188. He, however, saw only a part of Longstreet's force.

⁵ There is an irreconcilable discrepancy as to the nature of this order. McDowell testifies that it was to this effect: "You put your force in here [pointing in the direction where a cloud of dust indicated that a body of the enemy were approaching], and I will take mine up at the Sudley Spring road, on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the enemy. . . . The question with me was how soonest, within the limits fixed by the order of General Pope, this force of ours could be applied against the enemy," the limitation being that "the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or in the morning."—Court-martial, 85. Porter asserts that the order was that he should remain where he was. No other persons were within hearing when this order was given, or of the conversation which preceded and followed it.

⁶ "I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that at that time [4 30 P.M.] any considerable portion of Longstreet's corps had reached the vicinity of the battle-field."—Pope's Testimony, Court-martial, 35.

were sent during the night of the 27th, and should properly have been dated at these hours A.M. of the 28th.


¹ McC. Rep., 321-330.

² *Ibid.*, 332.

³ Pope says the attack began about daylight. Sigel says: "From half past six to half past ten our whole infantry and nearly all our batteries were engaged in a most vehement artillery and infantry contest." Jackson says: "In the morning, about ten o'clock, the Federal artillery opened with spirit and animation upon our right, which was soon replied to by our batteries."

⁴ Pope says: "Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed that he was compelled to make a stand, and make the best defense possible." This is clearly an error, for Sigel says, "Milroy and Schurz advanced one mile, and Schenck two miles from their original positions," and these were from three quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from a belt of woods occupied by the Confederate skirmishing-line. This simply fell back a few hundred yards to the railroad, Jackson's real line.

⁵ Reports of Milroy and Schurz, in Pope's Report, 90, 109.



THOROUGHFARE GAP.

rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing." This order was dispatched at half past four, and received by Porter just two hours later. He attempted to get his leading division, Morell's, into position; but, thinking the enemy in front in too great force, and judging the country impassable for artillery, did not advance, and retained his former position during the remainder of the day, knowing nothing of the battle which was going on four miles away. The failure to execute this order forms the second and gravest charge against Porter.

Sharp fighting, something more than mere "skirmishing," had been going on all the afternoon, especially upon the Confederate left, somewhat weakly held by A. P. Hill, with considerable intervals between some of his regiments. By three o'clock the fighting here had assumed the proportions of a battle. Grover, with his brigade of Hooker's division, rushed in upon the enemy a little to the right of his extreme left. Of this charge Jackson says:¹ "The Federal infantry, in large force, advanced to the attack of our left, occupied by the division of General Hill. It pressed forward, in defiance of our fatal and destructive fire, with great determination, a portion of it crossing a deep cut in the railroad track, and penetrating, in heavy force, an interval of nearly 175 yards, which separated the right of Gregg's from the left of Thomas's brigade. For a short time Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, was isolated from the main body of the command. But the 14th South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, with the 45th Georgia, attacked the exultant enemy with vigor, and drove them back across the railroad track with great slaughter. The opposing forces at one time delivered their volleys into each other at the distance of ten paces." Grover says:² "After rising the hill under which my command lay, an open field was entered, and from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest continued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force, supported by artillery. At three P.M. I received an order to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embankment, enter the woods beyond, and hold it. We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict, with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks; others struck down with the butts of pieces,³ and onward pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second line, which in its turn broke. The enemy's third line now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a portion of the left. With the gallant 16th Massachusetts in our centre, I tried to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre, and the weight of the enemy's lines, caused the necessity of falling back first to the embankment, and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors." In this fierce conflict, lasting only twenty minutes, Grover, out of less than 2000 men, lost 484.

¹ In *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 95.

² John Esten Cooke says: "Without ammunition, the men of Jackson seized whatever they could lay their hands on to use against the enemy. The piles of stones in the vicinity of the railroad cut were used; and it is well established that many of the enemy were killed by having their skulls broken with fragments of rock."—*Stonewall Jackson*, 293.

³ In *Pope's Report*, 76.

Kearney, on the extreme Union right, afterward advanced,¹ and swept "with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The enemy rolled upon his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. Still, our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our farther progress was impeded."²

A. P. Hill³ thus describes the fight toward evening: "The evident intention of the enemy was to turn our left, and overwhelm Jackson's corps before Longstreet came up; and to accomplish this, the most persistent and furious onsets were made by column after column of infantry, accompanied by numerous batteries of artillery. Soon my reserves were all in, and up to six o'clock my division, assisted by the Louisiana brigade of General Hayes, with a heroic courage and obstinacy almost beyond parallel, had met and repulsed six distinct and separate assaults, a portion of the time a majority of the men being without a cartridge. The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried masses, overwhelming superiority of numbers, and bold bearing made the chance of victory tremble in the balance. Casting about for help, fortunately it was here reported to me that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Early were near by, and, sending for them, they promptly moved to my front at the most opportune moment, and this last charge met the same fate as the preceding. Having received an order from General Jackson to endeavor to avoid a general engagement, my commanders of brigades contented themselves with repulsing the enemy and following them up but a few hundred yards." Both sides, as usual, claim to have fought against superior numbers; but a comparison of the divisions engaged, as shown in the respective reports, shows that the Confederates had at the close a considerable preponderance. That is, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Lawton outnumbered Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, to whom they were opposed. The opportune arrival of Longstreet upon the right enabled Jackson to concentrate nearly his whole strength to resist this attack upon his left.

At half past five, McDowell having come up, Pope, supposing that Porter was advancing, in compliance with the order sent an hour before, but only received an hour later, ordered an attack upon Jackson's right, which, ignorant of Longstreet's arrival, he supposed to be the extreme right of the whole Confederate force on the field.⁴ This attack was made along the Warrenton Turnpike by King's division, then commanded by Hatch, of McDowell's corps, who, "trusting to find the enemy in retreat, as he was told, and hoping to turn their retreat into a flight, took the men forward with an impetuosity akin to rashness."⁵ Instead of finding a retreating enemy, he was confronted, after marching three quarters of a mile, by a strong force. A fierce struggle, lasting three quarters of an hour, took place, mainly between Doubleday's and Patrick's brigades on the Union side, and those

¹ Heintzelman, in *Pope's Report*, 55, says not till several orders had been sent to him to do so, and after Hooker had been driven back.

² Kearney, in *Pope's Report*, 79.

³ In *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 125.

⁴ Pope (*Report*, 17) strangely says: "About half past five I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to assault the left of the enemy," and then proceeds to describe Grover's assault on the railroad embankment; and adds: "The whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back toward its centre, and our forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands." And again (*Report*, 21): "While this attack [by McDowell] was going on, the forces under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of the Warrenton Turnpike, so that at about eight o'clock in the evening the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army." Whereas the truth is that Grover's attack began at three, and was soon repulsed, as was also the subsequent one by Kearney and Reno.

⁵ McDowell, in *Pope's Report*, 46.



FRANZ SIGEL.

of Hood and Evans on the Confederate. The result, as told by Hatch, was: "Night had now come on. Our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The retreat was executed in good order, the attempt to follow being defeated by a few well-directed volleys from Patrick's brigade."¹ Longstreet says: "Hood, supported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driving the enemy back until nine o'clock at night. The enemy's entire force was found to be massed directly in my front, and in so strong a position that it was not deemed advisable to move on against his immediate front, so the troops were quietly withdrawn at one o'clock the following morning. After withdrawing from the field, my troops were placed in the line first occupied, and in the same order."²

The battle, as a result of the day, was wholly undecisive. The Confederates had not been driven a rod from any position which they held, and the Union army, on its extreme weak left, which was altogether unprepared, had been driven a little toward the centre. But Jackson had reached his object. He had held his ground until Longstreet's whole army had come up and taken position by his side and in his rear. Not so much as Pope. He believed that Jackson had suffered a defeat, which only the absence of Porter had prevented from being decisive.³ Early next morning he sent to Washington news of his success. "We fought," he wrote, "a terrific battle last day with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with our army from daylight until after dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted to push matters, but I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as Fitz John Porter's corps comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than 8000 men killed and wounded, and from the appearance of the field, the enemy have lost at least two to our one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every attack was made by ourselves. Our troops behaved splendidly. The battle was fought on the identical field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of our men. The news just reaches us from the front that the enemy is retreating toward the mountains. I go forward to meet them. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent." McDowell wrote a little more cautiously: "I have gone through a second battle of Bull Run, on the identical field of last year, and unhurt. The victory is decidedly ours."⁴

At half past eight on the evening of the 29th, Pope sent a peremptory order to Porter to march at once to the field of battle, where he was to appear at daylight.⁵ Two of his brigades, that of Griffin, and Piatt's, temporarily attached to his corps, by some misconception of orders, marched

to Centreville, and took no part in the fighting of the day. The rest of his corps, 7000 strong, joined Pope near Groveton early in the morning. Pope's whole force, with the exception of these two brigades, 5000 strong, and Banks's corps of the same number, which was at Bristoe in charge of the railroad and wagon trains, was at last concentrated. Its effective strength was now reduced to 40,000. Opposed to them were the combined forces of Longstreet and Jackson, now under Lee, who was on the field and assumed command, numbering about 60,000.¹ Both armies were exhausted by their previous marching and fighting, and neither manifested a disposition for a while to assume the offensive. Pope was, indeed, greatly discouraged by a letter which he received at daybreak from Franklin, informing him that rations and forage would be sent from Alexandria if he would send a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. He had no cavalry to send, and if he had, they could not go and return in time to furnish his men with the supplies of which they were in sore need. "It was not till I received this letter," he says, "that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged."² The natural course, under the circumstances, would seem to have been the one which he had contemplated the day before: to have fallen back to Centreville, or even beyond, and meet his supplies and the re-enforcements, which could not have been long delayed, from Alexandria. Meanwhile he became convinced that the enemy was actually retreating. Lee was drawing in Jackson's exposed left, and the movement of Longstreet's strong right was hidden from view by intervening hills and woods. A paroled prisoner came in and reported that the whole Confederate army was in rapid retreat. This soldier had come into Porter's lines, and was sent by him to Pope with an assurance that he did not believe a word of the story. Pope replied that he believed the soldier, and ordered Porter to advance.

At noon Pope gave a general order to pursue the enemy thus presumed to be retreating, and special orders to different commanders.³ Lee had no occasion or intention of retreating, nor did he propose to attack, but chose to await the assault of the enemy. His position was the same as on the previous day, except that Jackson's extreme left was drawn in a little. His line stretched northward for a mile, in a somewhat irregular crescent form, the convex side facing the east, and following the course of thickly wooded heights; its centre was also protected by a deep cutting for an unfinished railroad, which formed an admirable earth-work. Longstreet's line ran southeastward behind the crest of another wooded ridge, which concealed him wholly from the view of the enemy, to whom his presence and position was entirely unknown. His reserves lay considerably beyond the rear of Jackson, so that at any moment, without disturbing his front, he could sustain Jackson. His force being larger and his line shorter than that of Jackson, his brigades were much more closely massed. The whole line resembled an irregular L,⁴ Jackson forming the perpendicular, Longstreet the horizontal line. Between Jackson's right and Longstreet was a considerable interval, this was, however, swept by artillery massed behind the crest of a ridge in the rear, only the muzzles of the guns being visible. Pope, still believing that Jackson's right was the right of the entire Confederate force, instead of being in fact its centre, directed his main attack, or, as he fancied, his "pursuit," upon this point. His line of battle conformed closely to that of Lee. On the extreme right was Heintzelman, then Reno, then Sigel, forming the perpendicular, confronting Jackson; the other wing consisted of McDowell's command, which comprised his own corps, that of Porter, and the Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds—Porter being in the advance, Reynolds to his right. During the action some changes took place. Of McDowell's corps, King's division, now, as on the previous day, under Hatch, were sent forward with Porter, and Ricketts was added to Heintzelman, while Reynolds was in effect left to act for himself.⁵

After some hours of sharp cannonading, Sykes's division of Porter's corps was pushed forward to support an advance to be made by Butterfield. Thus far they had seen none of the Confederate infantry or cavalry, and of his artillery only the muzzles of the cannon. Butterfield's advance must have been ordered upon the supposition that Jackson was in full retreat. It was gallantly made, and gallantly supported, but it failed utterly. Jackson, sheltered by the railway embankment, was as secure as earth-works could make him, and poured in a furious fire, which tore in pieces the assailants as they emerged from the woods, their own fire being almost harmless against a sheltered foe.⁶ Reno and Heintzelman at the same time assailed Jackson farther to the right, aided by Reynolds, who had been moved thither from the rear, where they had been posted to support Porter's "pursuit."⁷ Jackson found his centre and left sorely pressed. "The Federal infantry," he says, "about four o'clock moved from under the cover of the wood, and ad-

¹ These estimates include only infantry, the cavalry being of little avail on either side.

The Union force is stated by Pope (*Report*, 23) as follows: "McDowell, 12,000; Sigel, 7000; Heintzelman, 7000; Reno, 7000; Porter, 7000—40,000 in all.

We arrive at an approximation to the Confederate force from the following data: Longstreet's whole force was on the field, as well as that of Jackson. These comprised 35 brigades, and at the outset, according to our previous estimate, numbered 78,750. In the various engagements from Cedar Mountain to the battle of the 29th, they had lost about 8000. The march had been long and exhausting, and probably quite 5000 had fallen out of the ranks from fatigue or sickness, thus leaving 65,000 available. The entire force seems not to have been actually brought into action, for in the detailed list of casualties losses are mentioned in only 115 regiments, which probably at the time averaged 400 each—46,000 in all, leaving 19,000 not directly in action. Pope brought nearly his whole force into action, probably about 35,000.

² *Report*, 23. ³ EXTRACTS FROM ORDERS: "The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously the whole day. Major General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit." McDowell to Porter: "Major General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds's. . . . Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him."—*Pope's Report*, 47.

⁴ Longstreet and Sykes describe the line as an irregular V reversed (<), but an L represents it more closely. ⁵ McDowell, in *Pope's Report*, 48.

⁶ Sykes, in *Pope's Report*, 147. ⁷ *Pope's Report*, 24; Heintzelman, *Ibid.*, 56; Reynolds, *Ibid.*, 67; Hatch, *Ibid.*, 178.

¹ *Pope's Report*, 179.

² *Pope's Report*, 22.

³ *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 82.

⁴ Newspapers, August 31.

⁵ Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in person. You are to understand that you are to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning."

vanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending the attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place, and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding general for re-enforcements."¹ Lee informed Longstreet of Jackson's peril; but, before any succor could be sent, Longstreet found that he could better aid Jackson by another movement. "From an eminence near by," he says, "one portion of the enemy's masses attacking General Jackson were immediately within my view, and within easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I did not expect to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position and immediately opened. As it was evident that the attack upon General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of the army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge."²

Let us now look at the field on the Union left, as seen from its positions. Butterfield's brigade had marched up the hill upon the as yet invisible enemy. "As he advanced there was a great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the wood swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails."³ Warren—then colonel, soon to be major general—commanding a weak brigade of two regiments, numbering together 1000 men, seized a commanding position which had been vacated by the withdrawal of Reynolds, and held it until he was fairly enveloped by the advancing enemy, and retreated only when the rest of Porter's corps had been driven back. Out of 480 men of the 5th New York, he lost, in killed, 79; wounded, 170; missing, 48. The 10th New York, out of 510 men, lost 23 killed, 65 wounded, 48 missing—412 out of 1000 in this one action.⁴ Porter's corps was thus compelled to bear the whole onset of Longstreet's advance. Outnumbered fully three to one, outflanked on the left and unsheltered on the right, where Reno and Heintzelman were falling back from the enflading fire of Longstreet's batteries and the fierce onset of Jackson's advance, they retreated, first to the plateau of the Henry House—the scene of the final struggle at Bull Run a year before—and then, the enemy still outflanking, across Bull Run to Centreville. Warren's desperate stand had not, however, been unavailing. To all seeming, it saved the defeat from becoming a rout.⁵ The retreat was made in good order. Porter's corps, though defeated, was not routed, and Sykes's regulars covered the retreat of a portion of the army. They had performed the same service on the same ground a year before. Out of scarcely 7000 men, Porter's corps lost, in the few hours during which this action lasted,

2164 men, of whom 323 are put down as killed, 1323 wounded, and 518 missing.¹

The main stress of the battle had fallen upon the centre of both armies, from thence extending to the Confederate left and the Union right. Hooker, on the Union right, assailed Hill, and gained some advantage.² But when the main attack had failed, and the anticipated pursuit had become a retreat, the whole Union force was ordered to fall back toward Centreville. The order was given at eight o'clock. The army retreated in order. It had suffered a defeat; but there was no disgraceful panic like that which had marked the close of the battle fought a year before on almost the same ground.³

In this three days' battle the Confederate loss was about 8400: 1400 killed, 7000 wounded. The Union loss was much larger, probably about 11,000.⁴ This, however, by no means measures the diminution which the army had undergone. Many had been made prisoners; Lee says "more than 7000, in addition to about 2000 wounded left in our hands." The straggling had been enormous. "Half of the great diminution of our

¹ General Pope says (*Report*, 24): "The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. . . . As soon as they could be rallied, I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most conspicuous service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan." Buchanan, however (*Ibid.*, 152), says: "About 5 P.M. the brigade was withdrawn in admirable order." Chapman, who commanded another brigade of Sykes's division, says (*Ibid.*, 172): "About 3 30 P.M., by General Porter's order, the brigade retired in admirable order to the point designated. . . . The movement was executed with surprising order, and elicited my warmest admiration." These, as well as Warren's brigade, belonged to Sykes's division. Of Morell's division of this corps we have no special reports; but Sykes incidentally mentions the gallantry with which Butterfield's brigade of this division made the attack upon Jackson. The losses in Morell's division of two brigades amounted to 1247, exceeding by a third those of Sykes, which certainly does not indicate any want of vigor in its attack. Among the specifications in the charges against Porter was, that on this day he "did so feebly fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices and make the resistance demanded by the importance of his position," etc. This specification was, however, withdrawn by the judge advocate, without offering any proof to substantiate it.—*Court-martial*, 9.

² "Hooker's division now advanced into the woods near our right, and drove the enemy back some distance."—Heintzelman, in *Pope's Report*, 56. "The onset was so fierce, and in such force, that at first some headway was made; but their advance was again checked, and eventually repulsed with great loss."—A. P. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 126.

³ The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good order, no pursuit whatever being attempted by the enemy.—*Pope's Report*, 24. "The obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords over Bull Run, rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position at Centreville."—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 25.

⁴ The Confederate loss can be fixed very closely upon official evidence. In *Lee's Rep.*, i., 50, is a detailed "List of Casualties at Manassas Plains in August, 1862," made out by regiments, giving the loss in each. The whole number there given is 1950 killed, 6154 wounded. This list is apparently not complete, the reports of Longstreet and Jackson adding considerably to the number.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Longstreet (<i>Ibid.</i> , ii., 89): "Total loss in the corps under my command between the 23d and 30th of August, embracing actions at Rappahannock, Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, and Manassas. . . ."	665	4016	4679
Jackson (<i>Ibid.</i> , ii., 95): "Losses in my command in its operations from the Rappahannock to the Potomac. . . ."	805	3547	4352
	1468	7563	9031
Deduct from the above losses in minor engagements before the 27th			
(<i>Ibid.</i> , i., 50).	27	94	
And losses (estimated) at Chantilly, Sept. 1.	100	400	500
Total in these actions.	1341	7069	8410

This includes the losses at Bristoe on the 27th, which are also included in the Union losses.

The Union losses can be given to a considerable extent only by estimate. Porter's and Reynolds's loss is given in full, Heintzelman's with the exception of one brigade. Sigel puts his whole loss at 1983, but does not discriminate between killed, wounded, and missing. We put the last at 500, and apportion the others in the usual proportion. Of the losses of McDowell and Reno we find no lists.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Reynolds.	533	1323	518
Heintzelman (say).	67	397	189
Sigel (say).	200	1300	400
Sigel (say).	300	1200	400
Total in these divisions.	900	4220	1507

The losses in McDowell's and Reno's corps were probably about equal to the above, and as the field remained in the hands of the enemy, many of those reported as missing were doubtless killed or wounded; these may be estimated at 600. Putting all these imperfect data together, we estimate the Union loss as in the text.



MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GROVETON.



PHILIP KEARNEY.



ISAAC I. STEVENS.

forces," says Pope, "was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with all gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their commands, and were never in any action. I had posted several regiments in the rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the campaign."¹

At Centreville, on the morning of September 1, Pope had remaining of McDowell's corps, 10,000; Sigel, 7000; Heintzelman, 6000; Reno, 6000; Porter, 9000, including the two brigades which had strayed thither on the morning of the 30th. Banks, with 5000, had rejoined the army, and Sumner, with 11,000, and Franklin, with 8000, had come up from Alexandria, raising the whole army to 62,000, exclusive of cavalry, which was so used up as to be unavailable.² Lee, after the battle, had, besides cavalry, about 60,000 present; but D. H. Hill, with his division, which had left Hanover Junction on the 26th, was close at hand, and on the 2d of September came up with his division of 10,000. The advantage of the situation was then really in favor of the Union army. The forces present were nearly equal; but Pope had strong intrenchments, and might certainly expect considerable reinforcements at once.³ His troops were, indeed, greatly exhausted by the fighting, and marching, and privations of the previous week; but Lee's could not have been in better plight. They had fought as much, marched as far, and fared quite as hard.⁴

But it was determined at Washington that Centreville should be abandoned, and the whole army once more retreat and take shelter within the defenses of Washington. The alarm for the safety of the capital rose again to its height. In their terror, the President and Halleck turned to McClellan. Pope had written to Halleck, charging "many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula" with unsoldierly and dangerous conduct. "The constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not fight. You can have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes in commander-in-chief and others. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away." He urged that Halleck "should draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it."⁵ The President urged McClellan to telegraph to his friends in the old Army of the Potomac, adjuring them not to fail in their duty. He complied by writing to Porter: "I ask of you, for my sake and that of the country, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever

have to me." In writing thus, McClellan merely complied with the request of the President. "Neither then, nor at any other time," he says, "did I think for one moment that Porter had been, or would be, in any manner delict in the performance of his duty." Porter replied, "You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed and wounded attest our devoted duty." Halleck wrote to McClellan, whom a hurried order had virtually stripped of all command, "You will retain the command of every thing in this vicinity not temporarily to be Pope's army in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience."¹

On the 31st, the day after the battle, a heavy storm set in; but Jackson was pushed forward toward Fairfax to turn the Union right, and Pope sent McDowell, Heintzelman, and Reno in that direction, intending to attack on the morning of the 2d of September. But the heads of the two forces came in contact just before dark on the 1st, at Ox Hill, near Chantilly. A fearful thunder-storm was raging, in the midst of which the engagement began. A portion of the Confederates were thrown into some confusion; then reinforced, they drove back Stevens's division of Reno's corps. Stevens was killed in the front of his troops. Kearney rushed in with his wonted dashing bravery, and, riding forward alone in advance of his men to reconnoitre the ground, fell in with a Confederate soldier, from whom he inquired the position of a regiment. Discovering his mistake, he turned to ride away, when the soldier fired, and Kearney fell from his saddle mortally wounded. Darkness closed the action, each army retaining a portion of the field, and both claiming a victory. But before morning the whole Union army was in retreat for Alexandria. Lee, with Longstreet's corps, came up during the day, and was joined on the battle-field by D. H. Hill, with his division fresh except for its rapid march.

With the battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill, as the Confederates name it, closed Pope's campaign in Virginia. He requested at its close, as he had done at its beginning, to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to his former post in the West. His request was granted, and on the 7th of September he departed from Washington. The Army of Virginia ceased to exist as such, and the whole force, resuming its old name of the Army of the Potomac, was again placed under the immediate command of McClellan.

It would be unjust to judge of the campaign of Pope by its unfortunate result, or by the censures to which it has been subjected, or even by the account of it as told by its commander. If we turn from what was said, and review what was actually done, in the light thrown upon it by the Confederate Reports, we shall find much to praise, and, until the last two decisive days, little to censure. The task imposed upon him was a difficult one. He found the army which he was to command disorganized and scattered. Some of the corps commanders were hostile to others.² His appointment was distasteful to many, and he had not acquired a reputation which would compel all to acquiesce in its wisdom, however much it might stand in the way of their advancement. Then his first address to his army alienated the feelings of the whole Army of the Potomac, a portion of whom were to serve under him. This feeling, though less strong than he supposed, stood

¹ Pope's Report, 26.² Halleck to Pope: "August 31, 11 A.M. You have done nobly. All reserves are being sent forward. Couch's division goes to-day. Part of it went to Sangster's Station last night with Franklin and Sumner, who must be with you. Can't you renew the attack?"—Pope's Report, 246.³ "Many of the men were barefooted, and limped along weary unto death. They were faint from want of food, and broken down by absence of rest. The phenomenon was here presented of an army living for many days upon green corn and unripe apples only, and during this time making exhausting marches, engaging in incessant combats, and repulsing every assault. The flower of the Southern youth, raised in affluence and luxury, were toiling on over the dusty highways, or lying exhausted by the roadside, or fighting when so feeble that they could scarcely handle their muskets."—Cooke's Stonewall Jackson, 277.⁴ Ibid., 25.⁵ Pope's Report, 250.¹ McC. Rep., 340, 344.² We do not care to dwell upon this point. Abundant proofs of it may be found by any one who chooses to read the Reports of the commanders of corps and divisions.

in the way of that open and hearty co-operation which is essential to the highest efficiency of an army. While there was, we think, no purposed neglect in supporting him in act, still the fact that his plans and movements were openly censured by officers high in rank could not fail to demoralize those of lower grade, and through them the soldiers. Hence the fearful amount of straggling and skulking with which he had to contend from the outset. That he was opposed to a general who in this campaign, and ever after, manifested military capacity of a high order, and whose plans were carried out with unswerving fidelity, was a contingency always to be taken into account. That he was from the first called to meet greatly superior forces was owing to no fault on his part; it should be charged to those who failed to send to him the re-enforcements so absolutely essential and so positively promised. His first steps toward concentrating his forces were none the less commendable because so perfectly obvious. For the battle of Cedar Run he is nowise responsible. Had it proved a disastrous defeat instead of a bloody but indecisive passage of arms, no blame could have attached to him. Fettered by his instructions, and buoyed up by unfulfilled promises of aid, he could not afterward have done other than attempt to hold the line of the Rappahannock. The discovery of his weakness made by Stuart's dash upon Catlett's Station was an accident which might have happened to any one, and the like of which happened to Lee three weeks later. The destruction of the stores at Manassas could not have occurred had the assurances been true, as he had a right to believe, of the force by which that place was held. The marchings and countermarchings from Manassas to Gainesville, then back toward Centreville, and again toward Gainesville, were warranted, and in a measure compelled, by what he had at the moment good reason to believe to be the position and movements of the enemy.

The battle of the 29th was delivered, and all the orders given on the supposition that Jackson, with about 25,000 men, was the only enemy to be encountered, and that Longstreet was at a distance. In the morning he thought that "the indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day." He must have been of the same opinion at half past four in the afternoon, when the order was written informing Porter that "your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank," and directing him to "push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank." But before the order was received, and even before it was written, a considerable part of Longstreet's corps had come upon the field, and taken position upon Jackson's right, so that the line of march prescribed to Porter would have brought him far to the left of what was then the enemy's right flank, and directly in front of at least the advance of the enemy's "whole force." It is certainly strange that at this hour Pope should have been uninformed that Longstreet was on the field, instead of being thirty or forty hours' march away; for between nine and ten o'clock Buford reported to McDowell that before that time he had seen a large body of the enemy, estimated by him at more than 13,000 men, passing Gainesville and apparently marching directly to the battle-field.¹ Pope, indeed, on the morning of the 30th, when he supposed that he had won a victory and that the enemy were in retreat, declared that he had met and driven from the field "the combined force of the enemy," which can only be interpreted to mean the united commands of Jackson and Longstreet. Still, the battle of the day was indecisive, and if Pope had carried out his plan of the morning, and fallen back beyond Bull Run, the substantial fruits of victory would have been his.

¹ Buford, in *Court-martial*, 188. Whatever was then known or might have been known, nothing is now more certain than that a considerable part of Longstreet's force joined Jackson by noon, and bore a considerable part in the action of the 29th, and that before night his whole corps, with the exception of Anderson's division, had arrived, and this came up on the following morning. Lee says (*Report*, i., 23-25), "On the morning of the 29th the whole command resumed their march, the sound of cannon announcing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in the rear of the enemy's left." After some manoeuvring, which is described, "Longstreet took position on the right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike, and at right angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brigades under Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under Kemper, D. R. Jones's division formed on the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad." D. R. Jones (*Ibid.*, ii., 217) fixes the time of his arrival at "about noon." Longstreet says (*Ibid.*, 81) "that the noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville [which must have been about eight, for Buford saw his strong advance beyond that place by nine], and the head of my column soon after reached a position in rear of the enemy's flank, and within easy cannon shot." Hood, whose division was in the advance, says (*Ibid.*, 209), "Early in the day we came up with the main body of the enemy on the plains of Manassas, engaging General Jackson's forces."

The attack of the 30th was a grave military error, and wholly without excuse, if we regard General Pope's subsequent explanations as setting forth the knowledge which he then had of his condition and that of the enemy. Shortly after daylight he "began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which he was charged." He was aware, by "twelve or one o'clock in the day, that we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and that those forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals;" and he "therefore advanced to the attack," in order to "lay upon the enemy such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any farther advance toward the capital."¹ Yet at twelve o'clock he ordered the forces under McDowell to "be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day."² That is, an inferior force was to pursue one already superior, which was every moment largely re-enforced, in the very direction from which those re-enforcements were advancing. Surely the thing then to be done was to fall back beyond Bull Run. If his force was sufficient to warrant him in attacking with any hope of escaping a complete defeat, it was more than sufficient to have enabled him to hold the line of Bull Run against the same enemy; and so long as this line was held, the enemy would be effectually prevented from making any farther direct advance toward the capital.

This campaign was conducted throughout by Lee and Jackson with rare ability. It grew in the end into something very different and far greater than was at first intended. Jackson was sent toward the Rappahannock merely to prevent the seizure of Gordonsville and the railroad. Lee's first object was to remove McClellan from his position on the James, and it seemed to him that "the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any attack from that quarter would be to re-enforce Jackson, and advance upon Pope."³ Halleck, at the same time, was equally desirous of relieving Richmond by withdrawing the Army of the Potomac, and McClellan, sorely against his wish, was carrying out this determination. As soon, therefore, as Lee was assured that Richmond was no longer threatened from the James, he pushed his main force toward the Rappahannock, hoping to overwhelm Pope before he could be joined by McClellan. To do this, he must cross the Rappahannock in front, or by the right or left of Pope, who confronted him on the opposite bank. While thus manoeuvring, the seizure of Pope's dispatch-book informed him of the precise strength and position of the Union forces, and convinced him that it was possible by a rapid march to gain its rear, cut it off from retreat, supplies, and re-enforcements, and fall upon it with such a preponderance of force as to render its destruction almost inevitable. Rapidity of execution was essential to the success of this plan, and a slight failure in any point of detail might be fatal. We have seen how the plan was executed. Lee's operations from the 24th to the 30th of August must take a high place in the history of the war. To find its equal in boldness of conception, we must go forward nine months to the time when Grant passed the batteries at Vicksburg. To find its superior, we must go forward two years and three months to the time when Sherman began his great March to the Sea.

¹ *Report*, 23, 24.

² *Ibid.*, 47.

³ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 19.



MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BULL RUN.



THE CONFEDERATES CROSSING THE POTOMAC.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.—ANTIETAM.

Result of the Campaign in Virginia.—The Invasion of the North.—Maryland! my Maryland!—Jackson's Scheme.—Lee's Design.—His Force.—Crossing the Potomac.—The Confederate Force.—Lee's Address to the People of Maryland.—His Reception.—The Command given to McClellan.—Reorganization of the Federal Army.—Movements of the Army.—Lee divides his Force.—Harper's Ferry.—The March upon the Ferry.—Lee's Order comes into the Hands of McClellan.—The Investment of Harper's Ferry.—Its Capture.—McClellan and Halleck.—McClellan advances.—Battle at Turner's Gap.—Battle at Crampton's Gap.—Lee's Position.—He falls back across the Antietam.—The Battle-field of Antietam.—Approach of the Union Force.—Confederate Troops come up from Harper's Ferry.—Movements of September 16.—McClellan's Plan of Battle for the next Day.—Hooker attacks the Confederate Left.—Is wounded.—His Corps repulsed.—Sumner attacks the Left and Centre.—Sedgwick repulsed on the Left.—The Fight in the Centre.—State of the Action at Noon.—Arrival of Franklin's Corps.—Its Part in the Engagement.—The Confederates worsted.—Their critical Position on the Left.—Over-caution of Sumner and McClellan.—Burnside's dilatory Movements.—He crosses the Antietam and drives back the Enemy.—A. P. Hill comes up from Harper's Ferry.—Burnside repulsed.—Close of the Battle.—Forces in and out of Action.—Estimate of Losses.—Results of the Battle.—The President's Proclamation freeing the Slaves.—After the Battle.—Lee recrosses the Potomac.—Affair at Shepherdstown.—McClellan and the Administration.—Stuart's Raid.—The President's Orders to Advance.—His Letter to McClellan.—McClellan's Plans.—He crosses the Potomac.—Advances toward Warrenton.—Lee moves to Culpeper.—Position of the Armies.—McClellan removed from Command, and Burnside appointed.

IN the brief campaign, lasting only twenty days from the time when the contending forces first encountered at Cedar Run, and only a week after the decisive movement for taking Pope's army in the rear was commenced, Lee had accomplished more than he had ventured to hope. Not only had the siege of Richmond been raised, but Virginia was virtually freed from the presence of the Federal armies; the main part of the force which had threatened North Carolina was withdrawn, and the whole plan of the Peninsular campaign thwarted; and, what was of still greater importance, the abundant harvests of the Valley of the Shenandoah would be reaped by Confederate sickles, and serve for the maintenance of Confederate armies. A bolder thought now came into the mind of the Confederate leader. There were yet some weeks, the most favorable in all the year for active military operations. During these, at least, the war might be carried on in the enemy's country. And so the noise of the battle of Groveton had scarcely ceased, when it was resolved to invade the State of Maryland.

Political considerations had much to do with this determination. It had come to be an article of faith that Maryland, from geographical position and community of institutions, belonged to the Confederacy. Richmond was thronged with refugees from Maryland who declared that the state was held within the Union by mere force, and that she wanted only an opportunity to break the hated bond. The song, "Maryland! my Maryland!" was thrummed on every piano, and sung by every voice. It was held to be the utterance of the people.¹ It needed only the presence of a powerful army to arouse the whole state, and bring her at once into the Confederacy. This accomplished, all the slave states—for Kentucky and Missouri were already claimed by the Confederacy and were represented in its Congress—would be detached from the Union. After the secession of Maryland, Washington could be no longer held as the Federal capital.

Jackson had long wished to lead or follow in an invasion of the North. Immediately after the battle of Bull Run he proposed to march directly into Western Virginia with 10,000 men, there recruit his army to 25,000, and then the Army of the Potomac, crossing at Leesburg, should unite with his own force; both should advance upon Harrisburg, and thence upon Philadelphia in the spring of 1862. With the heart of the North thus pierced by the Southern troops, the strategic points captured, and Washington evacuated, he believed that the Federal government would succumb and agree upon terms of peace.² How far Lee shared in these sanguine anticipations is doubtful. His Report, prepared seven months later, seems to imply that he proposed merely to occupy Maryland, and threaten Pennsylvania. He says: "To prolong a state of affairs every way desirable, and not to let the season for active operations pass without endeavoring to inflict farther injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be to transfer the army into Maryland. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course toward the people of that state gave it reason to apprehend. At the same time, it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty." "It was proposed to move the army into Western Virginia, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies."³

On the 2d of September Lee was joined at Chantilly by the division of D. H. Hill, consisting of five brigades. This gave him a force of about 70,000 men of all arms with which to undertake the invasion of the North; for by battle, disease, and straggling he had lost 30,000. The united army pushed rapidly on to the Potomac, Jackson in the advance. He crossed the river at a ford midway between Harper's Ferry and Washington, thirty miles from each, almost at the point where eight months before the Union

forces had passed over into Virginia to meet the disaster of Ball's Bluff. There was nothing to oppose the passage. As the head of the column reached the middle of the river, Jackson, raised from his usual calm demeanor by what seemed the beginning of his cherished plan of an invasion of the North, paused, raised his hat, while bands and voices struck up the words and music of "My Maryland."⁴ The entire Confederate force followed hard after, and on the 7th was concentrated near Frederick City, next after Baltimore the largest town in Maryland. All told they numbered barely 60,000, for without a battle thousands had fallen exhausted by the way, unable to keep up with the swift march.⁵

Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland. It was right, he said, that they should know, as far as concerned them, the purpose which had brought the Confederate army into the state. "The people of the Confederate States had long watched the wrongs and outrages which had been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the states of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties," and, "believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government," the people of the South wished to aid them in "throwing off this foreign yoke." There would be no constraint or intimidation; "this army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will."

But if Lee had anticipated a general rising in Maryland, or even any considerable accession to his army, he was doomed to disappointment. Bradley Johnson, a Marylander who held a command in the Confederate army, was placed in charge of the provost-guard at Frederick. He put forth an address to the people calling upon them to join the delivering forces. "We have arms for you," he said; "I am authorized to muster in for the war companies and regiments. Let each man provide himself with a stout pair of shoes, a good blanket, and a tin cup. Jackson's men have no baggage." This prospect was not alluring to those to whom war had presented itself as a gay holiday show. When the theoretical secessionists of Maryland saw their liberators, officers as well as men, barefoot, ragged, and filthy,⁶ they looked upon them with hardly concealed aversion. Yet that ragged and begrimed army was as brave a body of soldiers as the world ever saw. The enthusiasm of the Maryland secessionists exhausted itself in a few women secretly sewing clothing for the army, and in presenting to Jackson a magnificent horse, which threw him the first time he mounted it.⁴

The command of the Union army passed quietly and almost as a matter of course into the hands of McClellan even before Pope had asked to be relieved.⁵ The President and General Halleck went to McClellan's house on the morning of the 2d. Lincoln said that things were going on badly in front; the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington, and the roads were filled with stragglers. McClellan should go out and meet the army, take command of it as it approached the works, and put the troops in the best position for defense. Until this was said Halleck had no knowledge of the President's purpose.⁶ Lincoln had resolved, in his quiet way, that he must exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the army until he could find some man into whose hands this power could be intrusted. How often he tried to find such a man, and how fully he trusted him when found, this history will show. A formal order was forthwith issued: "Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital."

McClellan set vigorously to work to reorganize the shattered army. Some changes were made in the distribution of corps and commanders. Banks was placed in charge of the fortifications around Washington, the command of his corps in the field being given to Mansfield, a veteran officer who had never held any prominent command, but had shown at Norfolk high qualifications. Hooker was placed in command of the corps of McDowell, who disappeared from active duty. Burnside, Sumner, Franklin, and Porter retained the command of their corps. Thus, with the exception of Burnside, who was his personal friend, all the corps commanders had served under McClellan on the Peninsula. The core of the army consisted of the force brought from before Richmond. So admirably had this been organized by McClellan that, in spite of the shock which it had experienced in its retreat from the Chickahominy, its withdrawal from the James, and the disasters which a part of it had suffered under Pope, it took at once the form of a regular army, and formed a nucleus around which were rallied the troops gathered from every quarter. In a week, besides 72,000 men around Washington, and 13,000, mostly new recruits, left un-

¹ Stonewall Jackson, 308.

² The extent to which the army was reduced by fatigue and exhaustion is abundantly testified to by all Confederate accounts. Lee says (*Rep.*, i., 35): "The arduous services in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes, had greatly reduced our ranks. These causes had compelled thousands of brave men to absent themselves, and many more had done so through unworthy motives." Cooke says (*Stonewall Jackson*, 341): "All the roads of Northern Virginia were lined with soldiers, comprehensively denominated 'stragglers;' but the great majority of these men had fallen out from the advancing column from physical impossibility to keep up with it; thousands were not with General Lee because they had no shoes, and their bleeding feet would carry them no farther, or the heavy march without rations had broken them down. This great crowd toiled on painfully on the wake of the army, dragging themselves five or six miles a day; and when they came to the Potomac, near Leesburg, it was only to find that General Lee had swept on, that General McClellan's column was between him and them, and that they could not rejoin their commands. The citizens of that whole region, who fed these unfortunate persons, will bear testimony that numbers sufficient to constitute an army in themselves passed the Blue Ridge to rendezvous, by General Lee's orders, at Winchester. These 20,000 or 30,000 men were not in the battle."

³ "Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided as on this march."—D. R. Jones, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 221.

⁴ Stonewall Jackson, 309, 312; *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 111.

⁵ The government had, indeed, wished to remove him from the command, and had twice urged it upon Burnside. He declined to accept it, and declared that if matters could be so arranged as to remove the objections to him, McClellan could do more with the army than any other man.—*Com. Rep.*, 650.

⁶ *McC. Rep.*, 345; Halleck, in *Com. Rep.*, 451.

¹ Here are two stanzas of this song:

"The despot's heel is on thy shore,
Maryland! my Maryland!
His touch is on thy temple door,
Maryland! my Maryland!
Avenge the patriotic gore
That flecked the streets of Baltimore,
And be the Battle-queen of yore,
Maryland! my Maryland!"

² Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 86-88.

"I hear the distant thunder hum,
Maryland! my Maryland!
The Old Line's bugle, fife, and drum,
Maryland! my Maryland!
She is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb,
Huzzah! she spurs the Northern scum,
She breathes, she burns, she'll come, she'll come,
Maryland! my Maryland!"

³ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 27, 28.



MAP OF OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND.

accountably and against McClellan's wish at Harper's Ferry, there was a movable force of nearly 100,000 men to operate against Lee in Maryland. McClellan took the field at the head of this force.

McClellan took the field in Maryland in person on the 7th, when the march toward Lee was fairly begun. The army moved in three columns. The right wing, under Burnside, comprised his own corps and that of Hooker. The centre, under Sumner, comprised his own corps and that of Mansfield. Franklin, in command of his corps and Couch's division, had the left. Porter's corps, not fully organized, followed after. The movement was slow, for Lee's plan had not yet developed itself. In the six days, from the 7th to the 13th, the advance was barely thirty miles. McClellan was also deceived as to the strength of the enemy, estimating it at 120,000 men—twice the real number.

Lee's object in crossing the Potomac at a point so near Washington, instead of at Harper's Ferry or above, and thence advancing into the heart of Maryland, was to assume a position which should threaten both Washington and Baltimore. This he supposed would draw the enemy after him; and he proposed to give battle to the Union army as far as possible from its base of supplies. For the accomplishment of this purpose, he believed that the possession of Harper's Ferry was indispensable, in order to enable him to keep open his communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah. He assumed that the march into Maryland would have caused the Union troops at Harper's Ferry to be withdrawn, as they should have been, and as McClellan wished. This not being done, Lee undertook to dislodge, and, if possible, capture the forces there. To effect this, he divided his army, sending the whole of Jackson's command and half of Longstreet's toward Harper's Ferry, retaining with himself D. H. Hill's division, half of Longstreet's corps, and the greater part of the cavalry.¹ McClellan's advance had been so slow that Lee trusted that

Harper's Ferry could be reduced and his army reunited before he would be called upon to meet the enemy.¹ In forming his plan of operations, Lee must have under-estimated the Federal force as greatly as McClellan over-estimated that of the Confederates. He could not have supposed that the enemy whom he had outnumbered and defeated at Groveton, and whom he had seen in full retreat to the fortifications at Washington, should within ten days have swelled to a force outnumbering his own almost three to one.² He must have supposed that his own effective force and that of the enemy were about equal.

Harper's Ferry is at the junction of the Potomac and the Shenandoah. The Potomac, coming from the north, meets the Shenandoah, ranging from the west, at the foot of a spur of the Blue Ridge, here known as Elk Mountain. The united streams have torn a narrow passage through the mountain, rending it from summit to base, leaving on either side steep cliffs a thousand feet high. The eastern cliff is Maryland Heights; the western, on the Virginia side, Loudon Heights. In the angle at the junction of the rivers is an elevated plateau, falling steeply toward the Potomac, and sloping gently toward the Shenandoah, and stretching backward at the level of the surrounding country. The ridge of this plateau is Bolivar Heights, at the foot of which nestles the village of Harper's Ferry. Some one had once

street's "command" properly comprised 21 brigades; but at this time 10 of these were detached for the Harper's Ferry operation, and did not act during the remainder of this campaign under Longstreet. In the remainder of this chapter "Longstreet's corps" will indicate only the 11 brigades which remained with him. The others will be designated by the name of the respective division commanders, McLaws, Anderson, and Walker. D. H. Hill's division consisted of 5 brigades. Thus 24 brigades were detached to Harper's Ferry, and 16 remained with Lee. The effective strength of a brigade at this time, previous to losses in battle, was 1500; some, however, were much stronger, some much weaker.

¹ Lee's Rep., i., 28.
² On the 20th of September, after the loss of 15,000 at South Mountain and Antietam, no considerable re-enforcements having been received in the interval, the Army of the Potomac numbered "present for duty" 164,359, of whom 71,210 were stationed within the defenses at Washington, leaving in the field directly under McClellan 93,169. The nominal force—present for duty, sick, and absent—was 293,798.—*Com. Rep.*, 492.

¹ Jackson's "command," including A. P. Hill's division, comprised 14 brigades. Long-

VIEW FROM MARYLAND HEIGHTS



called this place "the Thermopylæ of America." It might have been so in the times when war was waged with bow and sword, with spear and sling, but with the appliances of modern warfare the place has no defensive value. It is completely overlooked by both Loudon and Maryland Heights at such a distance and height that a plunging fire of artillery or musketry can be poured into it from either without the possibility of reply. It is a mere military trap, unless the commanding heights are also held in force; and then it is worthless, as no enemy need go near it in order to cross the Potomac from either direction to invade Maryland or Virginia. Johnston had perceived this fifteen months before, and abandoned the place without resistance, and against positive orders, the moment it was menaced. Lee strangely considered its possession essential to his proposed operations, and, in order to seize it, divided his army. Had he done otherwise, the course of the campaign must have been wholly different. He would have fought the decisive battle far in the interior with the whole, instead of with a part of his force. Had he been defeated, his army must have been annihilated, for the victorious enemy would have been between him and Virginia, cutting off all possibility of succor or retreat. Had he been victorious, he might probably have anticipated Sherman's march to the sea, for beyond the Alleghanies there was no army to oppose him; and from Philadelphia he might have dictated terms of peace.

Harper's Ferry was held by a force of about 13,000, including an outpost at Martinsburg. They were raw troops, commanded by Colonel Miles. About 1500 men were posted on Maryland Heights, the remainder were intrenched on Bolivar Heights. Lee's plan was to surround this force, and thus capture it. His orders were issued on the 9th, and their execution commenced the next morning. Walker, whose two brigades had been sent to the mouth of the Monocacy to destroy the canal aqueduct, was to cross the Potomac, ascend its right bank, and seize Loudon Heights. McLaws, with eight brigades, was to march from Frederick, pass the South Mountain at Crampton's Gap, cross the narrow valley to the foot of Maryland Heights, which he was to ascend and occupy, disposing his forces in such a way as to hold the roads winding around its base, thus cutting off all retreat in that direction. Jackson, with fourteen brigades, was to cross the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, advance to the Potomac, cross it high above Harper's Ferry, sweep down its right bank, capturing or driving back the force at Martinsburg, and then march directly upon Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army was to march toward Hagerstown, where, or at Boonesboro', it was to be rejoined by that portion which, it was assumed, would have succeeded in its designs upon Harper's Ferry.¹

The directions of this order were executed with great precision. Walker took possession of Loudon Heights on the 13th, without encountering the slightest opposition. McLaws reached the foot of Maryland Heights on the 12th. He sent two brigades to scale the ascent and gain the summit. They encountered some resistance from the troops posted there, but this was overcome, the Federals abandoning their works, pitching the guns down the cliff, and making their way across the river to Harper's Ferry. Maryland Heights was in the possession of the infantry of McLaws on the evening of the 13th. The next morning was employed in cutting a road to the top of the Heights practicable for artillery, along which four guns were laboriously dragged, and from these fire was opened upon the town.

Jackson, in the mean while, was pressing upon his longer march with that speed which had gained for his command the name of the "foot cavalry." Leaving Frederick on the 10th, he reached the Potomac next day at Williamsport, 25 miles above Harper's Ferry, and on the 12th entered Martinsburg. The Federal troops abandoned this place at his approach, and fell back to Harper's Ferry. Jackson followed hard after, and on the following morning came in sight of the Union force, drawn up on Bolivar Heights. In three days he had marched 80 miles. The remainder of that day and the whole of the 14th were spent by Jackson in ascertaining, by courier and signal, the positions of Walker and McLaws upon Loudon and Maryland Heights. He found that they had gained the positions appointed for them, and commanded the only roads by which the Federals could retreat down the Potomac or up the Shenandoah, but that the enemy on Bolivar Heights were beyond the effective range of his light guns. Separated as they were from him by rivers, they could afford no direct assistance in capturing the Federal force as it then stood. Jackson undertook to


¹ *Lee's Rep.*, i, 28. For the full text of this order, see *McC. Rep.*, 353. D. H. Hill had left his copy of the order in his room at Frederick, where it was found and given to McClellan three days after. It placed him in full possession of the plans of his enemy; too late, indeed, to enable him to thwart them entirely, but in time to enable him to strike an unexpected blow.



SIGNAL STATION, SUMMIT OF MARYLAND HEIGHTS.

dislodge the enemy from Bolivar Heights, and drive them down into the slaughter-pen of Harper's Ferry. The force with which he was to do this exceeded only slightly that opposed to him. Miles had 12,000 or 13,000. Jackson's "command" numbered at the outset about 32,000. It had fought at Cedar Run, Bristoe, the three battles near Groveton, and at Chantilly, losing in all 6000 men, killed and wounded. Not less than 10,000 had fallen out from sickness or exhaustion on the long march from the Rapidan to the Potomac. He could not have brought more than 15,000 to Harper's Ferry. For the rest, the affair reads almost like a farce, with a few tragic lines interpolated.

By the morning of the 15th Jackson had fairly surrounded Miles; batteries from one side opened upon the other on the Bolivar plateau; the guns from Loudon and Maryland Heights played at the heads of those below, and were duly answered; none doing harm, except that one Confederate shot struck a Federal caisson. Miles called a council of war, and said he had resolved to surrender; one or two of his officers wished to "cut their way out;" the cavalry, 1500 strong, rode up the Potomac, with or without orders, and got off, encountering no opposition, and destroying in their way 75 wagons of the Confederate train. If the infantry had gone the same way there was nothing to hinder; but they were raw troops, commanded by worse than raw officers. Miles raised the white flag in token of surrender. Before it was perceived, he was mortally wounded by a chance shot. White, his superior in rank, who, on coming in from Martinsburg, had waived the command in Miles's favor, went to Jackson to arrange terms of surrender. There was then nothing else to be done, for the troops had degenerated into a crowd of frightened men. He found the Confederate general fast asleep on the ground. Hill, whom White had first encountered, aroused Jackson. "General," said he, "this is General White,



MOVEMENTS FROM SEPTEMBER 10 TO 17.

A, A. Jackson's March from Frederick to Sharpsburg.
B, B. Longstreet's " " " " " "
C, C. McLaws and Anderson's " " " "
D, D. Walker's March from the Monocacy to Sharpsburg.
E, E. Confederate Position at Antietam.
F, F. Franklin's March from Pleasant Valley to the Antietam.
G, G. Lee's March from Boonesboro' to Antietam.
H, H. Hill's March from Hagerstown to Antietam.

of the United States army." Jackson made a gesture of recognition, and again closed his eyes. "He has come to arrange terms of surrender," continued Hill. Jackson made no reply; he was fast asleep. Again, half awakened, he said, drowsily, "The surrender must be unconditional; every indulgence can be granted afterward," then fell fast asleep once more, leaving Hill to decide upon the terms.¹ The terms granted were certainly liberal. All were to be paroled, retaining their personal effects, and officers their side-arms; transportation to be furnished to carry away the property. Upon these terms more than 11,000 men were surrendered. The Confederates gained 73 guns, with but little ammunition, 13,000 small-arms, and a considerable amount of stores. The capture cost the Confederates perhaps two score of lives, and the Federals about as many.²

Although the affair at Harper's Ferry proved of ultimate disadvantage to the Confederates, it was disgraceful alike to the military authorities at Washington, who left the force in a place where it was of no use, and to the officers who attempted no adequate defense. Miles died a few hours after the surrender, but his conduct was sharply censured by the Military Commission. Ford, who shamefully abandoned Maryland Heights, was dismissed from the service on the ground of "such lack of military capacity as to disqualify him from a command in the service." White was commended as having "acted with decided capability and courage."³

Slow as had been McClellan's advance, it yet carried him farther from Washington than was thought prudent by Halleck. With more than 70,000 men in garrison, the authorities at Washington were nervously apprehensive for the safety of the capital. When tidings were brought that a Confederate force had recrossed the Potomac, it was assumed that the whole army had crossed or was about to cross and assail Washington, either in front, or in the rear by recrossing into Maryland below McClellan. Even as late as the 16th, when the two armies were face to face on the Antietam, Halleck still believed that the bulk of the Confederate force was in Virginia.⁴

¹ Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 325.

² McLaws speaks of a "sharp and spirited engagement" on Maryland Heights, but does not give his losses.—*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 163. Walker lost on Loudon Heights one killed and three wounded.—*Ibid.*, 204. A. P. Hill lost three killed and 66 wounded. There appear to have been no losses in the remainder of Jackson's command.

³ General Orders, 1862, No. 183.

⁴ *The President to McClellan*, Sept. 12: "Governor Curtin telegraphs me, 'I have advices that

The Confederates left Frederick on the 10th, and the place was occupied by the Federals on the 12th, after a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry left behind as a rear-guard. On the evening of the next day, accident, which had three weeks before favored Lee by disclosing to him the situation of Pope, placed in McClellan's hands the order from Lee disclosing his designs, and the position and movements of every division of the Confederate army. Thus informed, McClellan's course was plain. He had 100,000 men within a few hours' march from Frederick. Lee had divided his army into two parts, neither of which, by McClellan's own exaggerated estimate, consisting of more than 60,000, and, in fact, of only half as many. By a rapid march, the whole Union army could be thrown right between these two portions. He proposed to "cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail."¹ His arrangements were for once made with due promptness. That night orders were sent to every general. Franklin was to cross the South Mountain by Crampton's Gap, cut off McLaws, and relieve Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army, Hooker and Reno in the advance, followed by Sumner with his own corps and that of Mansfield, with the division of Porter which had come up, was to march upon the heels of Lee toward Boonesboro', crossing the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, six miles above Crampton's, and fall upon that half of the Confederate army which had not been sent toward Harper's Ferry.

Lee had meanwhile moved leisurely past the South Mountain. On the 11th Longstreet had reached Hagerstown, D. H. Hill stopping at Boonesboro'. On the afternoon of the 13th the Confederate commander was startled by intelligence that the Federals, whom he had supposed to be quietly resting at Frederick, were pressing swiftly toward Turner's Gap. If they succeeded in passing the mountains they would be fairly between the portions of his divided army. Hill was hurried back to the Gap at once to keep the enemy in check until Longstreet could be recalled from Hagerstown. Lee felt the full peril of his position. He had with him barely 28,000 men, and these stretched along a distance of 25 miles. To provide for the worst, he sent his trains across the Potomac, escorted by only two regiments.²

Hill reached the summit of the Gap early in the morning of the 14th, just before the head of the Federal force came up. His division had left Hanover Junction, a few miles from Richmond, on the 26th of July, and joined Lee at Chantilly, fully 150 miles distant, on the 3d of September, and were then, without a day's rest, pushed forward to the Potomac and into Maryland. They had not been engaged in a single action. But "the straggling had been enormous, in consequence of heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers," so that he could bring less than 5000 men into action³ out of more than twice that number with which he had set out.


The South Mountain rises to a height of about 1000 feet, the depression at Turner's Gap being about 400 feet. But the Gap is so narrow that a few hundred men with artillery could hold the summit against an army. But

Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac." Halleck to McClellan, Sept. 13: "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over." Sept. 14: "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear." Sept. 16: "I think you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington."—*McClellan*, 350.

General Halleck indeed testified (*Com. Rep.*, 453): "In respect to General McClellan's going too fast or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent to him. I telegraphed to him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington." But, as McClellan's left actually hugged the Potomac, and his centre and right, moving by parallel roads, were more nearly within supporting distance than if they had followed in the rear, it is hard to see how, if he moved at all, he could have gone at a less distance from the river.

² This significant fact is mentioned only by D. H. Hill, and that merely incidentally, in his report of the battle of Antietam. "Our wagons had been sent off across the river on Sunday, the 14th, and for three days the men had been sustaining life on green corn and such cattle as they could kill in the fields. In charging through an apple orchard at the Yankees, with the immediate prospect of death before them, I noticed men eagerly devouring apples."—*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 118.

³ D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 114.



BOONESBORO' AND TURNER'S GAP, FROM THE WEST.



JESSE L. RENO.

a road, rough though passable, runs along the summits of each of the ridges which bound the Gap on either side; by these the main attack of the Federals was made, the object being to turn, either by the right or the left, or by both, the Confederate force holding the summit of the Gap. Reno's division took the road to the left, and, after sharp fighting, succeeded at noon in gaining the summit, or rather one of the summits, for the crest of the mountain is cloven by a deep ravine, and beyond this the enemy held a strong position. There was now a lull in the contest lasting for a couple of hours, while Hooker, who had reached the base of the mountain after Reno, was working his way up the road on the right of the pass. A solitary peak, which overlooked the country for miles, was the key to the whole position. Whoever held that held the pass. Both sides seemed to apprehend this at once, and each endeavored to gain it. Hooker's men were climbing the steep slope, too steep for artillery to be dragged up. Hill, from the valley below, trained his guns upon the peak, but with little effect. He sent three brigades of infantry up to hold the peak. The lines met, and engaged in a fierce but desultory combat, each availing itself of every natural defense.

Until late in the afternoon the battle on the Confederate side had been fought wholly by Hill. But about four o'clock Longstreet had come up with eight brigades, worn and exhausted by the long march from Hagerstown. Some of these were hotly engaged, but they came two hours too late to change the fortunes of the day. When night closed in the Federals had won every position and held the Gap, through which their whole force could pour on the following morning. Nothing was left for Lee but to retreat, leaving his dead and wounded behind. The action was fought with determined bravery on both sides. In all, the Federals had brought in about 30,000 men, the Confederates 17,000.¹ The Federal loss in this action was 312 killed, 1234 wounded. That of the Confederates was greater. Hill lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, nearly 2000; for at Antietam, three days later, he could bring into action only 3000.² Some of Longstreet's brigades also lost heavily. The Federals secured 1500 prisoners, most of them from the wounded. The entire loss of the Confederates, in killed and wounded, was probably something more than 2000. Reno was killed near the close of the battle. The Confederates lost Garland. Both were brave officers and accomplished gentlemen.³

Simultaneously with the battle at Turner's Gap, an action had been going on at Crampton's Gap, a few miles distant. Franklin, with his corps, lacking Couch's division, which had not come up, advanced toward this gap. The foot of the pass was slightly held, and the force pressed on up the slope. Tidings of the approach of Franklin reached McLaws, who had just established himself on Maryland Heights. He sent Cobb back with three brigades, directing him to hold the pass if it cost the last man. Cobb took post near the top of the mountain, behind a stone wall; Slocum's division

charged this in front, while Smith moved round to assail it in flank and rear. The Confederates broke and fled down the slope in confusion, and in the evening Franklin debouched into Pleasant Valley, three miles from Maryland Heights on the opposite side, and only six from Harper's Ferry, whence the sound of firing indicated that the place was still held. The Federals lost 115 killed and 416 wounded; the Confederates more, for they left behind 600 prisoners, mostly wounded.

On the morning of the 15th McLaws drew back his whole force, leaving only two regiments upon the heights, and formed it across the lower end of the Valley, Franklin forming his across the upper end. Both lay watching each other all the morning, each supposing the other to be superior, and neither daring to attack. The numbers were, in reality, nearly equal, the Confederates having a small preponderance.¹

The passes of the South Mountain having been forced, the position of Lee was perilous. He had with him less than 25,000 men of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. So long as Harper's Ferry held out, the forces sent to capture it were cut off from reuniting with him. The position here was singular. If Jackson and McLaws held the garrison of the Ferry in a vice, that garrison and Franklin held McLaws and Walker in as close a grip. McLaws could not join Lee by marching up Pleasant Valley, for Franklin barred the way; he could not cross the Elk Mountain, for that was impassable for an army; until Harper's Ferry was taken, he could not cross the Potomac, and, by going up its south bank and recrossing, rejoin Lee. "There was," he says, "no outlet in any direction for any thing but the troops, and that very doubtful; in no contingency could I have saved the troops and artillery."² Walker, on Loudon Heights, was equally isolated, for between him and Lee was interposed both the Shenandoah and the Potomac. But when Turner's Gap was forced, Harper's Ferry was still uncaptured; but tidings had just come that the place must soon fall, when the troops beleaguering, and themselves beleaguered, would be set at liberty. If a battle could be postponed two days, Lee would be able to bring into action as many of these separated forces as would be able to endure the long march to join him. To shorten this march, he retreated during the night of the 14th toward the Potomac, and, placing the Antietam Creek between himself and McClellan, took up a strong defensive position near the village of Sharpsburg.

The Potomac makes a bend shaped somewhat like the two-horned antique bow, about six miles from tip to tip. The Antietam is like the loosened string of this bow. This stream in itself is no formidable military obstacle. It is passable for infantry at almost every point. Three stone bridges and several fords, within a distance of three or four miles, afford abundant passage for artillery, provided the approaches to them are not fully commanded by an enemy. The region beyond, that is, on the western side, is somewhat broken. There are low swells, with narrow intervening valleys, and patches of woodland and cultivated fields, cut up by roads, fences, and stone walls. The limestone rock every where crops up above the surface, affording tolerable shelter for troops. The position is such that, in case of need, a general with 20,000 men might fairly venture to hold it against 30,000; one with 30,000 might fairly venture to assail an enemy posted there with 20,000.

Lee reached this position on the morning of the 15th, the cavalry forming his rear-guard, somewhat closely pressed by the Union horse. The head of the foremost pursuing infantry column reached the east bank of the Antietam in the afternoon. McClellan had hoped to bring on an action that day. His orders were, that if the enemy were overtaken on the march, they should be attacked at once; if found in force and position, the advanced corps should halt and await his arrival. Coming to the front late in the afternoon, McClellan found the enemy drawn up beyond the Antietam, making an ostentatious display of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the opposite crests. The Union corps, coming after in different columns, had become somewhat entangled, and McClellan decided, in view of what he saw and could then have known, that it was too late to attack that day. If he had been aware how weak was the force in his front, he might, perhaps, have determined otherwise.

Lee had scarcely crossed the Antietam before he learned that Harper's Ferry had been surrendered, and that all obstacles, except those of time and space, to the reunion of his army were removed. Orders were at once sent for the whole force near the Ferry to hasten to Sharpsburg. Jackson was the first to move.

At 3 in the afternoon his men were ordered to cook two days' rations, and be ready to march. The march was begun an hour past midnight. On the morning of the 16th the corps were within two miles of Sharpsburg. They had made a night-march of fifteen miles in less than six hours, fording the Potomac by the way. The addition which he brought to Lee was small in numbers. The two divisions, Jackson's, or the "Stonewall," and Ewell's, had set out from Richmond 20,000 strong. Within six weeks they had fought at Cedar Run, Bristoe, and during all the three days at Groveton. They had marched from the Rappahannock to Manassas, from Manassas to the Potomac, from the Potomac to Frederick, from Frederick to Harper's Ferry, from Harper's Ferry back to Sharpsburg, losing

¹ McClellan says: "We went into action with about 30,000 men." He supposed that he had encountered "D. H. Hill's corps, 15,500, and a part, if not the whole of Longstreet's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's" (*Rep.*, 372). But he had actually met eight brigades of Longstreet's, about 12,000, and D. H. Hill's, 5000. Such was, however, the strength of the position, that if the Confederates had been able in the morning to have brought 10,000 or 15,000 men to its defense, and so held the crests on the two sides of the Gap with artillery, they could not have been dislodged by five times their number—See Longstreet and D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 84, 114.

² *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 114.

³ D. H. Hill thus brutally mentions the death of these two generals: "This brilliant service cost us the life of that pure, gallant, and accomplished Christian soldier, General Garland, who had no superior and few equals in the service. The Yankees, on their side, lost General Reno, a renegade Virginian, who was killed by a happy shot from the 23d North Carolina."

¹ Franklin's corps (Couch not having arrived) numbered not quite 13,000. McLaws's command was made up of troops which had suffered least in the previous actions, having been mostly in reserve, and only partially engaged at Groveton. His eight brigades would probably average at this time 1800 each. Deducting the losses of the day before, and the two regiments left on the Heights, there would be between 13,000 and 14,000. He himself says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 167): "The force in Harper's Ferry was nearly, if not quite equal to my own, and that above was far superior." He had just before estimated the "force above," that is, Franklin's, at "from 15,000 to 25,000 and upward." The force at Harper's Ferry he knew, at the time of making the report, to have been more than 11,000, for that number had surrendered, and the whole cavalry force had escaped. Our estimate of McLaws's strength is also confirmed by the numbers which he was able to bring upon the field at Antietam two days later.

² See McLaws, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 167.

at each step of the long way. Of those 20,000 men, Jackson brought back to Lee on the Antietam only himself and 5000 others.¹ In the afternoon Walker came up. His two brigades had not as yet been engaged in any action. They had formed part of the rear-guard at Groveton. The two brigades numbered a little more than 3000 men when they rejoined Lee that evening. McLaws remained at Pleasant Valley until the morning of the 16th. He then crossed the Potomac by the railroad bridge, passed through Harper's Ferry, not giving his men time for rest and refreshment, and at dark encamped for a few hours on the south bank of the Potomac, close by the ford. At midnight the march was resumed, and by dawn of the 17th the command was halted close by Sharpsburg. Of the eight brigades comprised in this command, three had suffered severely at Crampton's Gap; the others had done hard duty on Maryland Heights, and in watching the outlets from Harper's Ferry. The march to Sharpsburg had been trying. Men dropped from the ranks in utter exhaustion. McLaws brought with him only 7000 men, barely half his force; of these about 3000 belonged to his own division, about 4000 to that of Anderson;² so that, on the morning of the 17th, Lee had, exclusive of cavalry, about 36,000 men, infantry and artillery.³

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 16th, McClellan began to move. Hooker was sent across the Antietam at a point above the extreme left of the Confederates. The passage was made without opposition. He then moved down the west bank, and came in contact with the Confederate left. Some sharp skirmishing ensued, the only result being that Hooker established himself in a position from which he could strike on the next morning; and Lee could infer from what quarter the first blow would come, and make his dispositions accordingly. Mansfield's corps followed Hooker across the Antietam during the night, and encamped a mile in the rear. McClellan's plan, if Hooker understood it rightly, was the true one. He had undertaken the offensive. The action at Turner's Gap had shown that he was in superior force. With half his strength he had forced the passage through the South Mountain, and his opponent had fallen back in full retreat. He had come up with Lee standing at bay at the farthest point to which retreat was possible. Every thing pointed to the one conclusion, that the whole Union force should be thrown at the earliest moment upon the Confederates. That this was to be done on the morning of the 17th was the decision, as understood by Hooker, to whom the initiative was assigned.⁴

Hooker opened the attack at dawn on the morning of the 17th. The onset fell upon a portion of Jackson's command, which, few in numbers, was strongly posted in a wood upon the Confederate left. This was soon swept back, with the loss of half its numbers, out of the wood, across an open field, and into another wood, where the outcropping rock gave shelter from the fierce fire poured in upon it. Lawton, who now commanded Ewell's division, called upon Hood for all the assistance which he could give. Hood threw his two strong brigades into action, and was soon followed by three brigades from Hill's division. Hooker still pressed on, meanwhile sending back for Mansfield's corps to come up to his support. This came upon the field at about 8 o'clock. While deploying his column, the veteran commander, who had joined his corps only the day before, was killed, and the command reverted to Williams. Hooker still pushed on upon the extreme left of the Confederates, and by 9 o'clock had gained an elevation which commanded the position of the enemy. He thought the battle won. The enemy, as far as he could see, were falling back in disorder, while his own troops, full of spirits, rent the sky with cheers. Just then, while looking for a point at which to post his batteries in order to sweep the retreating foe, he fell severely wounded. Having directed a telegram to his friends, announcing that he had won a great victory, and sending a message to Sumner, who was already close at hand, to hasten upon the field, he was borne half-conscious to the rear.⁵

But when Sumner came up the whole aspect of the battle had changed. Hill and Hood had sprung to the relief of Jackson. Their united force was far inferior in numbers to that of Hooker and Mansfield, but they were indordinately strong in artillery. Hill, with but 3000 infantry, had more than 80 guns at his command.⁶ These, in front and upon the left, with the mounted artillery upon the right, under Stuart, were brought to bear upon Hooker's advancing corps. This was checked, then wavered, and when the enemy, with hardly half their numbers, charged from the sheltering woods, Hooker's corps broke and fled in utter rout, not to appear again upon the field. Their rout, moreover, threw into confusion a part of Mansfield's corps. The losses in Hooker's corps had been severe, but absolutely they had not been greater, and, relatively to the numbers engaged, had been less than they had inflicted. The killed and wounded had been about one sixth of the whole number, a ratio hardly one half of that of the forces which afterward bore the brunt of the fight on either side.⁷

¹ I accept this statement of the force brought by Jackson on the authority of the generals who commanded the divisions at Antietam: J. R. Jones, who commanded Jackson's division, says, "The old Stonewall division entered the action weary and worn, and reduced to the numbers of a small brigade . . . not numbering over 1600 men at the beginning of the fight."—*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 222. Early, who commanded Ewell's division, gives its losses at Antietam as 1352 "out of less than 3500, with which it went into that action."—*Ibid.*, ii., 196.

² *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 116, 172.

³ From this point we take no account of the cavalry force on either side, as it was not engaged in the action of the day.

⁴ "When I had left with my corps to make this attack, I had been assured that, simultaneous with my attack, there should be an attack upon the rebel army in the centre and on the left the next morning. I sent word to General McClellan when I proposed to attack, in order that he might direct the other attacks to be made at the same time. At dawn I made the attack."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 581.

⁵ Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 581. ⁶ *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 115. ⁷ The completeness of the rout of Hooker's corps, after his wounding, is shown by evidence too conclusive to be questioned. Sumner says (*Com. Rep.*, 368): "On going upon the field, I found that General Hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all, as I was advancing with my command upon the field. There were some troops lying down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield's command. General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his




JOSEPH K. MANSFIELD.

Sumner's large corps, more than 18,000 strong, was now thrown into action. It advanced in three columns. Sedgwick's division, on the extreme right, took the position from which Hooker had been driven so speedily that the Confederates were not aware of their signal success, but fell back to their former position before what they supposed to be merely re-enforcements brought up to support a force that had been driven back. Next on the left came the divisions of French's and Richardson's corps, pressing down toward the Confederate centre. Lee perceived that here was to be the main stress of the fight. To meet it, he ordered up every disposable man from his right. First came Walker's division, 3000 strong; then McLaws with 3000, and Anderson with 4000. So pressing seemed the emergency that Lee ventured still farther to weaken his right, detaching regiment after regiment, until D. R. Jones, who had been posted there with six brigades, had barely 2400 men with which to confront Burnside's corps of 14,000.¹ This withdrawal from the right was, however, screened from the view of the enemy by the wooded ridge along which the Confederate line was formed.

At ten it seemed that victory was secure for the Union forces. Sedgwick had gained a position a little beyond that from which Hooker had been driven an hour before, and Jackson's corps was streaming to the rear. Hood, having lost a third of his men and exhausted his ammunition, was withdrawn. Hill was sorely pressed by French and Richardson. Three of his five brigades were broken and retreating; the other two clung desperately to a sunken road which formed a natural rifle-pit. The Confederate left, worn by the fight in which it had been engaged for five hours, and pressed at every point by a superior force, was on the point of giving way. But the strong re-enforcements brought up not only restored the balance, but gave them a slight preponderance. All losses being deducted, Lee had here on his left about 24,000 men. Sumner had his own corps and half of that of Mansfield, now numbering together 22,000. The re-enforcements came up almost at the same moment. Jackson, strengthened by McLaws, advanced upon Sedgwick, who had gone considerably to the right, leaving a wide gap between himself and French. Into this gap Walker flung his division, assailing Sedgwick on the flank and threatening his rear. The combined attack was more than he could endure. The division was forced from the strip of woods which it held, and which Hooker had vainly attempted to win, across the open field, over which he had been driven for a full half mile, until they rallied behind a long line of post and rail fence. Here they re-formed, and poured in so fierce a fire that the Confederates were checked, and fell back again into the wood. Both sides now occupied here on the extreme right the positions which they had held in the morning, and the fighting in this quarter was closed. In this fierce encounter McLaws lost 1019 men and Walker 1103 out of the 6000 which they brought into the field. Jackson's loss during this final assault was nearly 1000. Sedgwick's loss was 1136, and Green's division of Mansfield's corps lost 650. Thus the Confederate loss in this final assault on the Union right was nearly double that of their opponents.²

corps also had been thrown into confusion. General Hooker's corps had been dispersed; there is no question about that. I sent one of my own staff officers to find where they were; and General Ricketts, the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise 300 men of the corps." General Meade, upon whom the command of General Hooker's men devolved, reported (*McC. Rep.*, 394): "There were but 6729 men present on the 18th; whereas, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 men present for duty, showing that previous to and during the battle 6364 men were separated from their command."

² The details of this action are given by McLaws and Walker in *Lee's Rep.*, 169, 205. Neither Lee nor Jackson make any separate mention of the defeat of Hooker in the morning. They



FRANCIS C. BARLOW.

French and Richardson were gaining slowly but steadily upon Hill. Colquitt's brigade had suffered severely, and fell back to the sunken road, where a vain attempt was made to rally them; they broke, and disappeared from the fight. Garland's brigade was pressing on, when an officer raised a shout, "They are flanking us!" "This cry," says Hill, "spread like an electric shock along the ranks, bringing up vivid recollections of the flank fire at South Mountain. In a moment they broke and fell to the rear." A part of it was rallied in the sunken road. Ripley's brigade had also fallen back to this road, and behind the crest of a hill which bordered it. Hill's numerous artillery had been withdrawn from his front. It had done good service in the conflict of the morning; but McClellan had posted his heavy guns near the Antietam in such a position as to command the position. "Our artillery," says Hill, "could not cope with the superior weight, caliber, range, and number of the Yankee guns. They were smashed up or withdrawn before they could be effectually turned against the massive columns of attack."¹

Howard, who now commanded the division of Sedgwick, who, having been twice wounded, was borne from the field, was still engaged with Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, when French on the right, followed by Richardson on the left, pushed vigorously upon Hill, driving him back toward the right and rear, into and beyond the sunken road, which formed a right angle with his previous line. Kimball, of French's division, and Meagher, of Richardson's, gained the border of this natural rifle-pit at almost the same moment. Here ensued the fiercest fighting of the day. R. H. Anderson had now brought his division of 4000 men to the support of Hill, who had been farther strengthened by a number of regiments drawn from D. R. Jones, who held the extreme Confederate right, opposite Burnside, who had hardly made an attempt to cross the Antietam and take his assigned part in the action. The fight here was almost wholly with musketry, scarcely a battery being brought into action on either side. Meagher's Irish brigade suffered fearfully. Its commander was disabled by a fall from his horse. The brigade, having nearly exhausted its ammunition, was withdrawn to replenish, its place being taken by Caldwell's brigade. Both brigades moved, one to the front, the other to the rear, as steadily as though on drill. Barlow, then colonel, since major general, now dashed upon the flank of the sunken road, capturing the 300 men who still clung to it.

Anderson was wounded shortly after coming upon the field, and the command of his brigade devolved upon Pryor.² The ground upon which Richardson and French had been fighting was broken and irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills covered with corn, inclosed by stone walls, behind which the enemy could manoeuvre and throw his strength, without being perceived, upon every part of the lines. More than half a score desperate attempts were made; all were repelled, and the conclusion of each found the Union troops in possession of some additional ground and

important position. Two of these repulses were given by Barlow, who, with his two regiments, the 61st and 64th New York, had won the sunken road. He fairly won his generalship upon this bloody field. Eighteen months before he had enlisted as a private. In one of the last of these, Richardson, whose services on this day were second to those of no other man, was mortally wounded, and the command of his division fell upon Hancock.

This action on the centre was fairly begun an hour before noon. By two hours after noon the Confederates here were worsted, and their force was so thoroughly shattered that it needed but a single heavy blow to shiver it to atoms, and, notwithstanding the reverse which Sedgwick had met, which was really only slight, to win a complete victory. McClellan had then at the very point where the blow should have been struck a force three-fold greater than was required to make it effectual. About noon, Franklin, with two divisions of his corps, 12,000 strong, had come up from Pleasant Valley.¹ The march had been an easy one, and these troops were perfectly fresh. McClellan had intended to keep this corps in reserve on the east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might require. But when it came up the action was so critical that he properly abandoned this purpose, and sent the corps across the stream. The leading division, that of Smith, touched the edge of the fight somewhat sharply. It came upon the field between Sedgwick and French just at the moment when Sedgwick had been forced back. The third brigade met a force of the enemy coming out of the woods so often contested, drove them back, and attempted to enter the woods. Meeting a severe fire, it fell back, somewhat disordered, behind the crest of a hill, where it reformed, the Confederates at the same time falling back into the shelter of the woods. Smith's second brigade was sent a little to the left to support French, and encountered a sharp fire from Hill's artillery.² Slocum's division of Franklin's corps followed directly after that of Smith, and the whole corps was ready for action. Franklin had given orders to advance. Had this been done, nothing in war can be more certain than that the absolute rout and capture of the Confederate army would have followed. This corps, 12,000 strong, perfectly fresh and eager for action, lay right in front of a great gap which had been left between the Confederate centre and left. On the left, Jackson, with McLaws and Walker, had left barely 8000 men; Hill, in the centre, with the remnants of his own division, of Anderson's, of the six brigades of Longstreet, including Hood's two, which returned to the field, had remaining not more than 13,000, and these were so utterly shattered and broken that, in the utmost emergency, not half that number could have been rallied for a fight. Confronting him were the divisions of Richardson, French, and Green, of Mansfield's corps, worn, exhausted, and reduced in numbers, it is true, but cheered with success, and still with quite 13,000 effective men.

Hill's condition, as told by himself and his brigade commanders, was indeed pitiable. Of his own five brigades four had been utterly routed. He had gone into action at South Mountain with 5000, and lost 2000; of the 3000 with which he entered the battle of Antietam, he could, the day after its close, muster less than 1700. In three days he had lost almost two thirds of his men. Thirty-four field-officers had gone into these two battles; when they were over, only nine were left; regiments, or the fragments of them, were commanded by lieutenants. His artillery, eighty guns and more, had been "smashed up," or withdrawn to avoid certain destruction. The Thersites of the Confederate army (saving only the point of cowardice; for, in spite of his foul pen and tongue, he was a skillful leader and desperate fighter), one can not wonder that Hill heaps invectives upon friend and foe. Reno is a "renegade Virginian," killed by "a happy shot;" the force opposed to him are always styled "Yankees," in which word he embodies the utmost of his detestation, save in one case, where, for deeper emphasis, they are denominated "the restorers of the Union." The Confederates failed of victory, he says, because McLaws and Anderson came up two hours too late; because the artillery was badly handled—"an artillery duel between the Washington artillery and the Yankee batteries was the most melancholy farce of the war;" and because "thousands of thievish poltroons had kept away from sheer cowardice; the straggler is generally a thief, and always a coward, lost to all sense of shame; he can only be kept in ranks by a strict and sanguinary discipline." Yet there is something almost sublime in the attitude of Hill at the close of the fight on his front. Two brigades had streamed to the rear in confusion, leaving a great gap, through which the enemy poured resistlessly. Rallying 150 men, Hill, musket in hand like a private, led them on.³ He himself shall describe the closing moments of his part of the engagement: "There were no troops

¹ Franklin says (*Com. Rep.*, 626): "The advance of my command arrived on the battle-field of Antietam about 10 o'clock." McClellan says (*Report*, 385): "Between 12 and 1 P. M. General Franklin's corps arrived on the field of battle." From a comparison of all the indicia of time, I conclude that Franklin gives the hour correctly, and that he was actually engaged before noon.

² This movement of Smith's division of Franklin's corps was of considerable importance. The Confederate reports respecting it are very full, and greatly exaggerated. Thus Hill says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 115): "Franklin's corps advanced in three parallel lines, with all the precision of a parade-day, upon my two brigades. They met with a galling fire, however, recoiled, and fell back, and finally lay down behind the crest of a hill, and kept up an irregular fire. I got a battery in position, which partly enfiladed the Yankee line, and aided materially to check its advance." Walker (*Ibid.*, ii., 206) describes at length the encounter between Smith's third brigade and two regiments of his division, which were ordered by Longstreet "to charge the enemy, who was threatening his front as if to pass through the opening between the point of timber. This order was promptly obeyed in the face of such a fire as troops have seldom encountered without running away, and with a steadiness and unflinching gallantry seldom equaled. Battery after battery, regiment after regiment, opened their fire upon them, hurling a torrent of missiles through their ranks; but nothing could arrest their progress, and three times the enemy broke and fled before their impetuous charge. Finally they reached the fatal picket fence. To climb over it in the face of such a force, and under such a fire, would have been sheer madness to attempt, and, their ammunition being now almost exhausted, Colonel Cooke very properly gave the order to fall back, which was done in the most perfect order; after which the troops took up their former position, which they held until night."

³ *Lee's Report*, ii., 346.

were not at all aware that it was an utter rout. So closely had the advance of Sedgwick followed the retreat of Hooker that it was supposed to be a rally of the same troops with strong reinforcements. See also McClellan's Report, and Sumner, in *Com. Rep.*, 368.

¹ D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 115.

² Lee's Report embodies no reports, either divisional or regimental, from Anderson's division, and its movements are barely alluded to by Hill. It was sharply engaged, losing more than 1000 men; but its efforts seem to have been desultory and ineffective.



BURYING THE DEAD.



SCENES ON THE FIELD AFTER THE BATTLE.

AT THE FENCE.

near to hold the centre except a few hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the old road which we had occupied in the morning, and occupied a corn-field and orchard in advance of it. They had now got within a few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and our rear. Affairs looked very critical. I found a battery concealed in a corn-field, and ordered it to move out and open upon the Yankee columns. It moved out most gallantly, though exposed to a terrible direct and reverse fire from the long-range Yankee artillery across the Antietam. A caisson exploded, but the battery was unlimbered, and, with grape and canister, drove the Yankees back. I was now satisfied that a single regiment of fresh men could drive the whole of them in our front across the Antietam. I got up about two hundred men, who said they were willing to advance to the attack if I would lead them. We met, however, with a warm reception, and the little command was broken and dispersed. About two hundred more were gathered, and I sent them to the right to attack the Yankees in flank. They drove them back a short distance, but were in turn repulsed. These two attacks, however, had a most happy effect. The Yankees were completely deceived by their boldness, and induced to believe that there was a large force in our centre. They made no farther attempt to pierce our centre, except on a small scale."¹

McClellan thus relates the closing operations on this part of the field: "Hancock, seeing a body of the enemy advancing to the left of his position, obtained a battery from Franklin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. The enemy seemed at one time to be about making an attack upon this part of the line, and advanced a long column of infantry toward this division" (this must have been Hill's last 200), "but on nearing the position, General Pleasanton opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, closing the operations on this part of the field." Not dreaming that the enemy who had encountered them so stubbornly, and who still showed so bold a front, was so utterly broken that a single fresh regiment would have put them to utter rout, Hancock and French desisted from the attack, and rested in the positions they had won.

Jackson's plight, had Sumner known it, was no less critical than that of Hill. Of the 5000 men whom he had brought from Harper's Ferry, 2000 had been killed or wounded in the morning's fight with Hooker. Re-enforced, he had pressed Sedgwick back for half a mile, and then fallen back himself, having not more than 7000 effective men. Sumner, in front of him, had left wellnigh 5000 of Sedgwick's division; of Hooker's routed corps at least 6000 remained with their command, and might have been rallied; of Mansfield's first division, which had withdrawn in the morning, there must have been 3000. In all, Sumner had at his hand on the extreme right twice the force of Jackson at the time when Franklin, fairly on the field, was ready and anxious to attack. Had he then thrown his fresh 12,000 between Hill and Jackson, and upon the flank of both, striking either to the right or left, one or the other of these commands must have been annihilated, even without an effort on the part of the troops with which they had already been engaged.

That this was not done was no fault of Franklin. He had made every preparation, and given orders for an assault upon the woods which had been so hotly contested all day, when Sumner came up, and, in spite of Franklin's urgency, forbade the movement. Neither is it to be charged to McClellan except in so far that he approved of Sumner's action.² Sumner, indeed, showed on this day a want of vigor and resource utterly at variance with the whole tenor of his military career. For six hours he seems not to have made the slightest attempt to rally the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, which had retreated hardly a mile in his rear. Among these were some of the best soldiers in the army.

McClellan's plan on the evening of the 16th, as understood by Hooker,³ was to make a simultaneous attack upon the Confederate right, centre, and left. By the morning of the 17th he had changed his scheme, and determined "to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme left; and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all their forces then disposable.⁴ Now Franklin's corps was fully four hours distant, and did not commence its march until an hour, and did not reach the ground until six hours after

¹ D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 116, 117.—This closing attack "on a small scale" is quite differently described by others. McClellan says: "The 7th Maine, of Franklin's corps, without any other aid, made a gallant attack against the enemy's line, and drove in the skirmishers, who were annoying our artillery and troops on the right." Hill says that "Pryor had gathered quite a respectable force behind a hill, when a Maine regiment" (he gives the number erroneously as the 21st) "came down to this hill, wholly unconscious that there were any Confederate troops near it. A shout and a volley informed them of their dangerous neighborhood. The Yankee apprehension is acute; the idea was soon taken in, and was followed by the most rapid running I ever saw."

² Franklin's testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 626; "The division of General Slocum arrived on the field. I formed two brigades of it in line of battle in front of the Dunker Church, with the intention of making an attack at once upon the enemy in that wood. I was waiting for the third brigade to be a reserve for the other two, when I was informed that General Sumner had detained the brigade at his headquarters for the protection of his right. I sent for it, and it finally arrived, and General Sumner with it. The general advised me not to make the attack, for if it failed, the right would be entirely destroyed, as there were no troops there that could be depended upon. I informed him that I thought it a very necessary thing to do, and told him that I would prefer to make the attack, unless he assumed the responsibility of forbidding it. He assumed the responsibility, and ordered me not to make it. One of General McClellan's aids was there at the time. He informed General McClellan what had been done, and the general himself came up and stated that things had gone so well [ill?] on all the other parts of the field that he was afraid to risk the day by an attack there on the right at that time. Therefore no attack was made by that division that day." McClellan's account (*Report*, 387) is to the same effect: "General Franklin ordered two brigades of General Slocum's division, General Newton's and Colonel Torbert's, to form in column to attack the woods that had been so hotly contested by Generals Sumner and Hooker; General Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form the reserve. At this time General Sumner, having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the safety of the whole army."

³ *Ante*, p. 399.

⁴ *McC. Rep.*, 377.

¹ These views, and those on page 403, are reproduced from Photographs by M. B. Brady, taken a day or two after the action. They are introduced as presenting the real aspect of a great battle-field. My acknowledgments are due to Mr. Brady for access to, and free use of his immense collection of scenes and portraits.



THE STONE BRIDGE OVER THE ANTIETAM.

the opening of the attack which they were to support. The attack on the Confederate right was not opened until at least three hours after it should have been made. It is not easy to say how far the blame for this delay rests upon McClellan, and how far upon Burnside. McClellan affirms that the order to advance upon the bridge was sent at 8 o'clock, which was the proper time, unless the attack was to be simultaneous with that of Hooker; that the order was twice repeated, at considerable intervals, the second time most peremptorily. Burnside testifies that the order was not received until about ten o'clock.¹

The part assigned to Burnside was of the highest importance. His initial attempts to execute it were feebly made, and were repulsed one after another. At length two regiments dashed at the bridge, which had all along been commanded by Toombs with two small regiments, numbering together less than 500 men, hidden behind fences and in a narrow belt of woods. These had been withdrawn a little before, as well as the force which commanded the adjacent fords, so that the actual passage of the stream was made without opposition.² Burnside's whole corps, nearly 14,000 strong, was soon across the stream. Here an unaccountable delay

of two more hours took place, and it was only after McClellan had given repeated orders that Burnside advanced.¹ To appreciate the vital importance of these delays to the salvation of Lee's army, we must turn to the movements of the Confederates upon their extreme right.


Lee's right wing consisted of six of Longstreet's weakest brigades, under D. R. Jones. These had been reduced one half by various details of brigades and regiments, so that during the morning Jones had not quite 2500 men.² When Walker, McLaws, and Anderson came up from Harper's Ferry, they were at first posted on the right and in the rear of the centre; but when the heavy attack had fairly developed itself on the left, they were all withdrawn thither. This withdrawal took place at about ten. It could never have been made had Burnside's attack been begun at nine; and without it Jackson and Hill must have been crushed by Sumner, and driven in hopeless rout upon their right. Now, at almost four, two full hours after the action on the right and centre had ceased, Burnside fairly began his attack. It was at first successful. The heights which command Sharpsburg were won; the Confederates were driven back through the town. Had this been done two hours before, a position would have been secured from which the whole Confederate line would have been swept by an enfilading fire of artillery. But now A. P. Hill had come up from Harper's Ferry, having marched seventeen miles that day. He brought with him five brigades, or rather such portions of them as could endure the march. One

¹ McClellan (*Report*, 390) says: "At eight o'clock an order was sent to General Burnside to carry the bridge. After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I dispatched an aid to ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in possession of the enemy. Whereupon I directed Colonel Sackett, the Inspector General, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge with the bayonet; and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly." Burnside testifies (*Com. Rep.*, 640): "On the morning of the 17th I was ordered to place the command in position to enable us to attack the enemy at the bridge as soon as I was notified to commence the attack. About ten o'clock I received an order from General McClellan to make the attack on the bridge."

² This withdrawal of the troops before the final attempt at crossing is expressly affirmed by D. R. Jones and Toombs (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 219, 324). Burnside's Report, however, seems to imply, without positively affirming it, that there was a conflict here.

¹ *McC. Rep.*, 390; Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 641.

² This number is expressly given by both Lee and Jones. The words of the latter, indeed, seem to imply that this was the entire strength of his six brigades. He says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 219): "My command had been farther reduced on the right, leaving me for the defense of the right with only Toombs's two regiments, and Kemper's, Drayton's, and Walker's brigades. When it is known that on that morning my entire command, of six brigades, comprised only 2430 men, the enormous disparity of force with which I contended may be seen." Now, although these brigades had suffered heavily at Groveton, where two of them lost nearly 1500 men, and considerably at South Mountain, it is hardly credible that their average strength should have been reduced to 600 each—not one third of their original strength. The whole six brigades took part in the fight with Burnside.



SITE OF A BATTERY.

brigade was reduced to 350 men;¹ all told there were not 4000, and of these only three brigades, including the weak one, numbering all together not more than 2000 men, were brought into the fight. It was over before the others could engage. With these and Toombs's brigade, then not 1000 strong, Burnside's whole corps was driven back, just as darkness was coming on, to the Antietam, which he recrossed the next morning. A. P. Hill hardly exaggerates when he says: "The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number over 2000 men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's corps of 15,000 men."² Hill lost 346 killed and wounded; Jones lost about 700. Burnside's loss in killed and wounded was 2173.

Porter's corps had not been brought into action at all. It was posted in the centre, between the right and left wings, to guard the trains, for the safety of which McClellan was apprehensive. Portions of it were at times detached as supports to batteries. It lost only 130. Franklin's corps can hardly be considered as engaged, although in its brief encounter it lost 438; so that 25,000 men, wellnigh a third of McClellan's force, and as many as Lee had in action at any one moment, were practically unemployed. Lee had in all, and at all times, exclusive of cavalry, something more than 40,000, of whom all but about 2000 were engaged. McClellan had 83,000, of whom 58,000 were engaged; but they were sent in by "driblets," corps after corps, at intervals of hours. What the result was has been shown; what it would have been had the assault been made in full force can hardly be a matter of doubt.³ Had the battle of Antietam been fought on the 16th, Lee

¹ Lee's Rep., ii., 263.
² A. P. Hill, in Lee's Rep., ii., 129.—It is indeed asserted by Burnside (*Com. Rep.*, 641): "The enemy had brought away from opposite the extreme right of our army portions of their forces, and concentrated them against us." There was, indeed, time sufficient for such an operation in the interval between the cessation of the action on the right and the beginning of this on the left, had the Confederates been in a condition to make it; but I do not find in any of their reports, which fully detail the movements of every brigade, with the exception of those of Anderson's division, the least intimation of any such movement, and this division was apparently in no condition for offense.
³ "I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into action in driblets, as they



SCENE OF A CHARGE.

could have mustered barely 27,000 men, while McClellan had—Franklin's corps not being present—fully 70,000. The Union loss was 11,426 killed and wounded; that of the Confederates about 10,000. The disparity arises mainly from the great excess of Burnside's loss on the left. On the right and centre each side lost about equally. The entire Union loss in the series of actions in Maryland, not including missing, was 14,200; that of the Confederates about 12,500.¹

were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left, Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps; and all escape for the enemy, I think, would have been impossible. Why that was not done I do not know."—Sumner, in *Com. Rep.*, 368.

¹ The Union force at Antietam is given in detail in McClellan's Report. In summing up the Confederate force we have to estimate that under Longstreet. We put down the average strength of his brigades at 1500—some were less, some greater. He had eleven brigades, and had probably lost 500 at Turner's Gap; this would give him 16,000 at Antietam. The strength present in the other commands is stated with sufficient accuracy in the various reports, as previously cited. From these data, omitting cavalry on both sides, we construct the following table:

FORCES PRESENT AT ANTIETAM.			
UNION.		CONFEDERATE.	
Hooker's corps	14,856	Longstreet's division	16,000
Sumner's "	18,813	Jackson's "	5,000
Porter's "	12,930	Walker's "	3,000
Franklin's "	12,300	McLaws' "	3,000
Burnside's "	13,819	Anderson's "	4,000
Mansfield's "	10,126	D. H. Hill's "	3,000
		A. P. Hill's "	4,000
		Reserve artillery	2,000
Total force	82,844	Total force	40,000
Not engaged: Porter and Franklin	25,230	Not engaged: Part of A. P. Hill	2,000
Total engaged	57,614	Total engaged	38,000

Probably, to make the comparison entirely just, some deduction should be made from McClellan's numbers, as the Confederate commanders report usually the numbers with which "they went into the action," while the Union report gives the number "present and fit for duty;" there will always be some discrepancy between these two modes of enumeration. Lee says (*Report*, i., 35): "This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side;" which we think a true statement. D. H. Hill, indeed, asserts (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 119): "The battle was fought with less than 30,000." Cooke (*Stonewall Jackson*, 340-342): "In General Lee's published official Report the exact numbers are given—33,000." I find in Lee's Report no such statement, but do find the one just cited. Again Cooke says: "Nor was the bulk of Jackson's corps present until four P.M., toward the end of the action. General Lee fought until late in the day with Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Ewell, and two other divisions, a force of about 25,000 men. The re-enforcements of McLaws, Anderson, and Hill increased this number to 33,000, with which force General Lee met the 87,164



BEHIND A BREASTWORK.



SHELTER FOR WOUNDED.

The action of Antietam was in all respects a drawn battle. The Confederates had inflicted a greater absolute loss than they had suffered; but they had suffered, in proportion to their strength, far more than they had inflicted. At the close of the fight the positions of the armies were nearly the same as at its commencement. On the extreme right and left, the Federals, after forcing back the Confederate lines, had been repelled in turn beyond the original Confederate lines; but the Confederates then fell back, so that neither side held the field of battle. In the centre the Confederate lines had been forced back a little, and here the Federals held some ground wrested from the enemy. During the night the Confederates changed ground a little, but in all essential respects their position was as advantageous as it had been in the morning. Nor did the battle decide the issue of the invasion of Maryland; that question had been decided three days before, when McClellan, forcing the passes of the South Mountain, interposed his army between Lee and his projected line of march into Pennsylvania. After the battle, Lee accomplished without hinderance just what he would have done had no action taken place. He gave up the invasion of the North, recrossed the Potomac, and awaited in Virginia the movements of his tardy opponent. But the moral effect of the battle was great. It aroused the confidence of the nation, who saw in it a sure presage of the speedy overthrow of the insurrection; and, what was more, it emboldened the President to issue his warning proclamation for the abolition of slavery. That proclamation had been written months before, though only his trusted advisers knew of it. If put forth at any time during the disastrous summer, it would have been a mockery. It would have sounded to the world like a despairing shriek for help. And so the proclamation, written and rewritten, touched and retouched, lay in his desk. How could he, without mockery, promise to "recognize and maintain" the freedom of all slaves in the insurgent states, when the victorious armies of those confederated states threatened the capital of the Union? And so, when urged to issue such a proclamation, he replied in one of the half-jesting phrases in which he was wont to couch his most serious thoughts, that it would be like "the pope's bull against the comet." But now it seemed that such a promise could be maintained. So five days after the battle of Antietam the proclamation was put forth, and the result of the contest was staked upon an issue from which a few months before the nation would have shrunk, and for which even now it was scarcely prepared. The principle upon which Mr. Lincoln acted then, before, and thereafter, was at the same time clearly expressed by himself: "My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I believe that what I am doing hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe that doing more will help the cause."¹ The inexorable march of events had now brought things to such a state that the conflict between Slavery and the Union was irrepressible. One or the other must go down. In a few months more all men saw that, whether the Union was saved or lost, Slavery was inevitably destroyed.

The battle was over, except on the extreme right, while the sun was yet high in the heavens, and McClellan had to consider whether it should be renewed the next day. Burnside, in spite of his severe repulse, was in favor

men reported by General McClellan as 'in action' on the Federal side." But McLaws and Anderson, instead of being absent until "late in the day," were hotly engaged before noon, the division of McLaws losing a larger proportion of its numbers than any other except that of D. H. Hill.

In giving their losses, the Confederate reports do not usually discriminate between the different engagements. The report by regiments (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 107, 108) makes their entire loss 1567 killed, 8274 wounded, 10,291 in all; but this is clearly defective, as is shown by the separate reports of division commanders. Those of Longstreet, including his entire "command," are given in *Lee's Report*, p. 89; Jackson, excluding A. P. Hill's at Antietam and Shepherdstown, *Ibid.*, 105; A. P. Hill at Antietam, *Ibid.*, 131; D. H. Hill, *Ibid.*, 119. The Union loss in each engagement is given separately. The following table presents a summation:

LOSSES IN THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN, SEPT. 14-17.

UNION.					CONFEDERATES.				
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Hooker.....	348	2,016	255	2,619	Longstreet.....	964	5,234	1,310	7,508
Sumner.....	860	3,801	548	5,209	Jackson.....	321	1,809	57	2,187
Porter.....	21	107	2	130	A. P. Hill.....	63	288	—	346
Franklin.....	70	335	33	438	D. H. Hill.....	464	1,852	925	3,241
Burnside.....	432	1,741	120	2,293	Reported losses	1812	9178	2292	13,282
Mansfield.....	274	1,384	85	1,743	Correcting the apportionment of killed, wounded, and missing, and adding prisoners as below, we give the following as a close approximation:				
Cavalry.....	5	32	—	37					
At Antietam.....	2010	9,416	1043	12,469					
Turner's Gap.....	312	1,234	22	1,568					
Crampton's Gap.....	115	416	2	533					
Total.....	2437	11,066	1067	14,970	Total.....	2062	10,428	4792	17,282

A large proportion of those entered as "missing" in the Confederate Reports were undoubtedly killed or wounded. D. H. Hill says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 118): "Doubtless a large number of the 'missing' fell into the hands of the Yankees when wounded;" and Rodes (*Ibid.*, 347): "The 'missing' are either prisoners or killed." At South Mountain they were forced to abandon their killed and severely wounded, and could only enter as such upon the lists those whose fate was known. Nearly all the killed and many of the wounded were also left behind at Antietam. It is safe to estimate that of the 2292 reported as missing, 1500 were killed or wounded; apportioning these in the usual ratio adds 250 to the killed and 1250 to the wounded, as reported, diminishing the missing by the same numbers.

McClellan puts the Confederate loss much higher. He says (*Report*, 396): "About 2700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction of Major Davis, Assistant Inspector General, counted and buried upon the battle-field of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy. This is conclusive evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we." Accepting this, and adding the dead at South Mountain, the Confederate killed must have numbered fully 3500, which would make their total loss more than 20,000, besides prisoners, of whom there were 6000, about two thirds of whom appear to have been stragglers. We do not undertake to reconcile these conflicting accounts as to the killed, and consequently of the wounded, but adopt the Confederate statement, with the exception above noted. To the "missing," however, we add 4000 unwounded prisoners.

The method of the Confederate generals in stating the number of the "missing" is wholly inexplicable. From the 23d of August to the 17th of September they put down in all only 2373, while it is certain that they lost nearly three times that number in prisoners during the three last days of this period, and all of their reports speak of thousands of stragglers.

¹ *Ante*, p. 203. For the proclamation, see *ante*, p. 208.

of renewing it in the morning if he could have 5000 fresh men. Franklin was of the same opinion; he was sure that he could take the hotly-contested wood, which would uncover the enemy's left. Sumner thought otherwise.¹ McClellan decided to postpone the attack. He reasoned that, "Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded, the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another organized force able to arrest its march."² Believing, as he and most of his generals did, that the enemy was equal or superior in numbers, he could not well have come to any other decision. But in truth his fresh troops were almost equal in number to Lee's entire remaining force, while those who were worst off were in better plight than the best of the enemy. During the morning Humphreys's and Couch's divisions, 14,000 strong, came up; Lee also received some accessions from those who had fallen out in the march from Harper's Ferry, and stood at bay all day awaiting an attack. McClellan ordered that this should be made on the morning of the 19th. But in the darkness of the night the Confederate forces slipped quietly away, and when McClellan looked for them in the morning they were safely across the Potomac, and as evening fell they encamped five miles from the river. Next morning a strong reconnoissance from Porter's corps was sent over at Shepherdstown to ascertain the position of the enemy. A. P. Hill, who brought up the Confederate rear, turned upon them and drove them back, with considerable loss.³

Gathering up the remnants of his army, and bringing on those who had been left behind at Harper's Ferry, and those who had fallen out on the march thence to the Antietam, numbering in all less than 40,000 effective men, Lee fell back to Martinsburg, and thence to Winchester, where he had ordered all his stragglers to rendezvous. On the 30th of September he had but 53,000 men present for duty. On that day, exclusive of 73,000 left behind for the defense of Washington, McClellan had with him 100,000 effective men.⁴

Six weeks of beautiful autumnal weather were passed in almost total inaction. McClellan, believing that his army was in no condition to provoke another battle, posted it along the eastern side of the Potomac, half near Harper's Ferry, and the remainder watching the fords above and below, for he still apprehended that Lee would attempt to recross the river. Meanwhile the old bickerings between the commander of the army in the field and the military authorities at Washington were renewed with increased pertinacity. McClellan wanted supplies, clothing, horses, and, above all, re-enforcements. The Washington authorities would not spare a man from the 73,000 lying idle in the defenses of the capital, and the clothing and horses forwarded were far less than McClellan demanded. On the 6th of October the President issued a peremptory order that the army should at once "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South." If the army crossed between the enemy and Washington, so as to cover the capital, it should receive 30,000 re-enforcements, otherwise not more than 15,000. McClellan paid no immediate attention to this order, but reiterated his demands and complaints. He assumed that he, being with the army in the field, was more competent to determine whether it was in a condition to move than was the general-in-chief in his office at Washington.⁵ On the 10th, Stuart, with 1800 cavalry, crossed the Potomac above the Union positions, made a clear circuit around the Union army, and recrossed below, without having lost a man. On the 13th the President wrote to McClellan earnestly urging him to action, and indicating the true theory upon which operations should be conducted.

"You remember," he said, "my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? You say that you can not subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order.⁶ But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do. He now waggons from Culpepper Court-house, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I should certainly be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of the autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time, which can not and must not be ignored. It is one of the standard maxims of war to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without exposing your own. You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond in twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should move toward Rich-

¹ *Com. Rep.*, 642, 627, 369.

² *McC. Rep.*, 394.

³ Hill (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 130) gives a most exaggerated account of this engagement: "A daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they lost 3000 men killed and drowned from one brigade alone. My own loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded."

⁴ See *ante*, p. 383, for Lee's force. The strength of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th of September was, according to the official report, signed by McClellan, 173,745 present for duty, of whom 73,601 were around Washington.—*Com. Rep.*, 507.

⁵ *McC. Rep.*, 426.

⁶ This had been destroyed by the Confederates.

mond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. If he made a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. In coming to us he tenders to us an advantage which we must not waive. We should not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond."¹

On the 21st McClellan was convinced that his army was nearly in a condition to move. The cavalry was indeed, he thought, in numbers much inferior to that of the enemy, but in efficiency was far superior. He now asked whether the President wished him "to march on the enemy at once, or to await the arrival of new horses." The reply was that no change was intended in the order of the 6th. The President did not expect impossibilities, but the season should not be wasted in inaction. McClellan's purpose had been to cross the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, and move directly upon the Confederate forces, expecting that they would either give battle near Winchester or retreat toward Richmond. He believed that if he crossed below, Lee would recross into Maryland. But now the season had come when the river might be expected to rise at any hour, rendering the apprehended Confederate movement too hazardous to be ventured. McClellan therefore decided to cross on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, thus threatening Lee's communications. He thought it possible, though not probable, that he might throw his force through some pass in the mountains, and gain the Confederate rear in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Failing this, he still hoped to strike the flank of their long retreating column, separate their army, and beat it in detail, or, at all events, force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus leave his own army free to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to move by his old way of the Peninsula.²

The crossing of the Potomac began on the 26th of October, and continued until the 2d of November, when the whole army was over. Leaving 15,000 men at and near Harper's Ferry, the army marched more than 100,000 strong, besides 20,000 detached from the force at Washington³ to co-operate with his movement. The weather was favorable, the roads good, and the great army moved rapidly. Keeping along the eastern foot of the Blue Ridge, Warrenton being the point of direction for the main body, its line of march for the greater part of the way being the same, but in a reverse direction, as that by which Lee had advanced upon Pope hardly three months before.

The Confederate army, during its two months' repose after Antietam, had been recruited to about 70,000.¹ As soon as Lee was aware of the threatening movement of McClellan, he hastened to counteract it by moving southward in the same direction. Jackson, with his own corps and Stuart's cavalry, was halted to observe, and, if occasion was given, assail the Union force upon its march, while the remainder of the army pressed up the Valley of the Shenandoah. For days the two hostile columns were moving parallel to each other, only a few miles apart, but with the Blue Mountains between them. Rapid as was the march of the Union army, that of the Confederates was still faster. Lee, in advance of his opponent, turned a spur of the Blue Ridge, passed from the Valley of the Shenandoah into that of the Rappahannock, and took position at Culpepper by the time that McClellan had massed his army near Warrenton, a half score of miles to the north. But in effecting this operation he had played into his opponent's hands, and given him an opportunity to strike more favorable than he had dared to anticipate. McClellan had hoped to separate the Confederate army. Lee had himself separated it. Jackson's corps was left fully three days' rapid march behind that of Longstreet. If an attack had then been made, it could hardly have failed to result otherwise than in a serious disaster to the Confederates. McClellan resolved upon an assault. For once he seemed satisfied that he had the preponderance of force.²

But this intent of vigorous action came too late. The breach between McClellan and the military authorities at Washington had become too wide to be closed. His removal from the command had been resolved upon, and had been delayed only from the difficulty of deciding upon his successor. The choice finally lay between Burnside and Hooker.³ Why Sumner, who outranked each, and had seen more service than both, was passed over, it is hard to say. But the choice now fell upon Burnside. Upon the stormy evening of the 7th of November, when McClellan had given directions for the movements of the next two days, a messenger from Washington reached the head-quarters of the army. He bore an order, couched in briefest military phrase, bearing date two days before, removing McClellan from the command of the army, and directing Burnside to assume it; and another equally curt, from Halleck to McClellan, the writing of which one may imagine to have been a pleasant task.⁴


¹ Present for duty, October 20, 67,805; November 20, 73,554.—*Ante*, p. 383.

² "The army was massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether, during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. . . . The reports from the advance indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately or forcing him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville to effect his junction with the rest of his army. . . . Had I remained in command I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy; and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I can not doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army."—*McC. Rep.*, 438, 439.

³ "General Hooker came very near receiving, instead of me, the command of the Army of the Potomac."—Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 725.

⁴ *General Orders*, No. 182.—"By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take command of the army. By order of the Secretary of War."

Halleck to McClellan.—"GENERAL,—On the receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting on your arrival at that place, by telegraph, for farther orders."—*Com. Rep.*, 565.



CAVALRY RECONNOISSANCE IN VIRGINIA.



AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.

CHAPTER XXIV.

BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN.—FREDERICKSBURG.

Burnside in Command.—His Plan for the Campaign.—Its Merits and Demerits.—New Organization of the Army of the Potomac.—The Movement from Warrenton to Fredericksburg.—Delay in crossing the Rappahannock.—The pontoons.—Fredericksburg threatened with bombardment.—The Confederate Army reaches Fredericksburg.—The Position on the Rappahannock.—Burnside's Preparations for Crossing.—The Delay opposite Fredericksburg.—Lee's Plan of Operations.—Crossing the River, and Preparations for Attack.—Burnside's final Plan for two Assaults.—Franklin's Attack upon the Left.—Meade's Advance repulsed.—Gibbon advances, and is repulsed.—The Confederate Pursuit checked by Birney.—The Moments of the Action.—The Confederate Position on the Right at Marye's Hill.—Its Strength.—Assailed by Sumner.—French and Hancock repelled.—Hooker ordered to attack.—Humphreys assaults, and is driven back.—Close of the Battle.—The Numbers engaged.—Burnside proposes to renew the Battle the next Day.—Is dissuaded by his Generals.—He recrosses the Rappahannock.—Effects of the Battle of Fredericksburg.—Condition of the Union Army.—Burnside designs a new Movement.—The proposed Cavalry Expedition.—The President forbids the Movement.—The Reasons for the Prohibition.—Franklin and Smith criticise Burnside's Plan, and propose another.—Cochrane and Newton's Interview with the President.—Burnside and Halleck.—Burnside's third Plan.—The Mud Campaign.—Burnside's Order No. 8, dismissing Hooker and others.—The President refuses to sanction the Order.—Burnside resigns, and Hooker is placed in Command.—Sumner and Franklin relieved.—Death of Sumner.—Hooker takes Command.

THE command of the Army of the Potomac was thrust into the unwilling hands of Burnside. He had twice declined it, and would have done so now had it been left to his choice;¹ but the order was peremptory, and he had no alternative but to obey. Yet, as if foreseeing the issue, he repeated to the messenger who brought the order and to members of his own staff what he had before said to the President and the Secretary of War, that he did not consider himself competent to take the command of so large an army, and, moreover, that from the place which his command had held during the campaign, he knew less than any other general of the posi-

¹ *Com. Rep.*, 645.

tion, numbers, and character of the several corps.¹ Still, with the knowledge then possessed by the military authorities, the choice was the wisest that could have been made. No other general had held an important separate command. His expedition to North Carolina had been successful. He had become entangled in none of the jealousies which impeded, or were thought to impede, the efficiency of the army. His personal and military character was unrepined and irreproachable. Burnside's modesty, contrasted with Hooker's vehement self-assertion, decided the question of the generalship. He was taken at the high estimate which the administration placed upon him, rather than at the low one which he placed upon himself.

Burnside was required not only to take command of the army, but to state what he proposed to do with it.² He had been from the first opposed to the movement made by McClellan upon Warrenton. He argued that if the army was to go to Richmond by land, the only way was that by Fredericksburg. McClellan was half convinced of the truth of this, and on the day before he was superseded gave orders which looked toward the abandonment of his present line of operations.³ Two days after he had been placed in command, Burnside presented his plan.


Its essential features were that McClellan's design of attacking Lee should be given up, the movement toward Gordonsville abandoned, and then there should be "a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point." In favor of his plan he urged that if the Union army should move upon Culpepper and Gordonsville, and even fight a successful battle, the enemy would still have many lines of retreat, and would be able to reach Richmond with enough of force to render necessary another battle there. Should the enemy fall back without giving battle, the pursuit would be simply following up a retreating army well supplied with provisions in dépôts in its rear, while the pursuing army would have to rely for supplies upon a single long line of communication, liable to be cut at any point. But in moving by the way which he proposed, the army would cover Washington until it reached Fredericksburg, where it would be on the shortest road to Richmond, the taking of which, he thought, "should be the great object of the campaign, as the fall of that place would tend more to cripple the rebel cause than almost any other military event, except the absolute breaking up of their army." The presence of a large army on the Fredericksburg line would render it impossible for the enemy to make any successful movement upon Washington. An invasion of Pennsylvania was not to be expected at that season of the year; and, even should a lodgment be made there by any force that could be spared, its destruction would be

certain soon after winter set in. "Could the army before Richmond be beaten, and their capital taken," he added, "the loss of half a dozen of our towns and cities in the interior of Pennsylvania could well be afforded."⁴

This plan was undoubtedly a judicious one upon the assumption that the capture of Richmond was the main aim of the campaign. For an advance thither by way of Gordonsville, the main base of supplies must be Alexandria, involving transportation by land of fully 150 miles by the route which must be followed. For an advance by way of Fredericksburg, Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, would be the base to which supplies could be sent by water, leaving but 75 miles of land transportation, by a line much less exposed. The advantage of the Peninsular route are still greater. The base of supplies would be at West Point, only 30 miles from Richmond. The main objection to this, that the army here would not be in a position to cover Washington, would be obviated by concentrating there a force sufficient for its defense, which the great numerical preponderance of the Union troops rendered easy. In fact, there was at this moment in and around Washington, independent of Burnside's army in the field, a force very nearly equal to the whole Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.⁵

¹ *Com. Rep.*, 650.² *Ibid.*, 650.³ *Ibid.*, 649.⁴ For the entire text of this plan, see *Com. Rep.*, 643; and for Burnside's own explanation of it, *Ibid.*, 650.⁵ The advantages of the Peninsular route, or rather a modification of it, taking the James River instead of the York as the base, were set forth six weeks later by Franklin and Smith, in a letter to the President, first made public in Swinton's *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 263-265. Mr. Swinton indeed affirms (*Ibid.*, 233), upon the authority of "the corps commander then most intimate in his confidence," that "Burnside had not matured any definite plan of action, for the reason that he hoped to be able to postpone operations till the spring. He did not favor operating against Richmond by the overland route, but had his mind turned toward a repetition of McClellan's movement to the Peninsula; and in determining to march to Fredericksburg, he cherished the hope of being able to winter there upon an easy base of supplies, and in the spring embarking his army for the James River." Not only is there no trace of any such purpose to be found in Burnside's written plan, but every recommendation implies the design of moving by the overland route.

The fatal error in Burnside's plan was that it wholly misconceived the main object to be aimed at. The capture of Richmond would indeed have been in itself a great material and moral loss to the Confederacy, but it would have been of far less moment than the destruction, or even the signal defeat of the army. That army was the head and front of the offending, and at this the blow should have been aimed. The President, with a keener insight into the case than any other man had yet attained, had written, "We must beat the enemy somewhere, or fail finally. If we can not beat him where he now is, we never can, he being again within the intrenchments of Richmond." This was as true now as it was a month before. It so happened that the Confederate commander had placed his army in such a position as to invite an attack. A little more than half of it was massed at Culpepper, a little less than half was lying three days' march away in the Valley of the Shenandoah. The Union army was massed only a few hours' march from the enemy, outnumbering him more than two to one. An attack in force could hardly have resulted otherwise than in a decisive victory. Burnside proposed deliberately to throw away the advantage thus thrust into his hands, and march directly away from his inferior foe, in quest of an object which, even if attained, was of wholly secondary consequence. The President, however, though with some reluctance, acceded to Burnside's plan, but with the significant intimation, "I think it will succeed if you move rapidly, otherwise not."¹ While preparing for this movement, Burnside organized his force into three "Grand Divisions"—Sumner being placed in command of the "Right," Hooker of the "Centre," and Franklin of the "Left."²




ROUTES TO RICHMOND.
This sketch illustrates the advantages, in point of distance, of the three proposed routes to Richmond. The first, abandoned by Burnside, assumes the basis of supply to be Alexandria. The second, proposed by him, assumes it to be at Acquia Creek. The third, that adopted by McClellan, places it at West Point.

sent toward Fredericksburg, while Jackson was ordered from the Valley to rejoin the main army.³ Lee, having divined Burnside's movement, met it in just the manner in which one would suppose he would have done, but, as it would seem, just in the way his opponent did not anticipate. There were five conceivable things to be done: To repass down the Valley of the Shenandoah and again invade Maryland, and threaten Pennsylvania; to make a demonstration upon Washington, with the intent of recalling the march to Fredericksburg; to fall back at once toward Richmond; to remain where he was, and await the issue of events; or to throw himself directly across the new line of advance proposed by Burnside. The first two movements Burnside had ruled out as impracticable or ruinous. For the third there was no immediate necessity; it could be done, if need were, afterward as well as then. Burnside seems to have supposed that Lee would choose the fourth. As it happened, he chose the fifth course, which accident enabled him to carry out under auspices far more favorable than he could have dared to anticipate.

Sumner, with the advance of the Union army, reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on the 17th. The design was that he should cross the Rappahannock at once, and seize the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg before Lee could re-enforce the small force stationed there. The river at that point could not be forded by an army in mass, and the railroad and turnpike bridges which had spanned it were destroyed. Burnside had, as he supposed, made arrangements by which pontoons sufficient to span the stream would have been sent to him from Washington so as to meet him on his arrival. But none came for a week, during which time nothing could be done to carry out the plan of operations.⁴ Sumner, indeed, who

Burnside began his movement from Warrenton to Fredericksburg on the 15th of November. He had proposed to make it by concentrating his force at Warrenton, as though he intended to attack Culpeper or Gordonsville. But Lee was not deceived. On the 17th he learned that Sumner had marched from Catlett's Station toward Falmouth, and that Federal gun-boats had entered Acquia Creek. This, he thought, "looked as if Fredericksburg was to be re-occupied," and he dispatched two divisions of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, to augment the small force which had held the town. Next day a bold dash by Stuart's cavalry upon Warrenton disclosed that the Federal army were gone, whereupon Longstreet's whole command was




son immediately concerned endeavored to shift from himself the burden of the responsibility. Burnside says (*Com. Rep.*, 651, 655): "My plan had been discussed by General Halleck and General Meigs at my headquarters at Warrenton on the night of the 11th or 12th, and, after discussing it fully there, they sat down and sent telegrams to Washington, which, as I supposed, fully covered the case, and would secure the starting of the pontoons at once. I supposed, of course, that those portions of the plan which required to be attended to at Washington would have been carried out there. I understood that General Halleck was to give the necessary orders, and then the officers who should receive those orders were the ones responsible for the pontoons coming here. I could have carried out that part of the plan through officers of my own; but, having just taken the command of an army with which I was unacquainted, it was evident that it was as much as I could attend to, with the assistance of all my officers, to change its position from Warrenton to Fredericksburg."—Halleck says (*Ibid.*, 673): "On my visit to General Burnside at Warrenton on the 12th of November, in speaking about the boats and things which he required from Washington, I told him that they were all subject to his orders. To prevent the ne-

¹ *Com. Rep.*, 645.

² Sumner's Grand Division consisted of the 2d Corps, under Couch, lately Sumner's, and the 9th Corps, under Wilcox, formerly Burnside's. Hooker's Grand Division comprised the 3d Corps, under Stoneman, from the garrison of Washington, and the 5th Corps, formerly Fitz John Porter's, under Butterfield. Franklin's Grand Division consisted of the 1st Corps, formerly Hooker's, under Reynolds, and the 6th Corps, formerly Franklin's, under W. F. Smith. The 12th Corps, so briefly commanded by Mansfield, was left at Harper's Ferry, under Slocum. The 11th Corps, under Sigel, detached from the defenses of Washington, was near Manassas Junction, guarding the railway line. This corps did not strictly form a part of Burnside's movable army. Among the commanders of "divisions," as distinguished from the "Grand Divisions," were Birney, Doubleday, French, Gibbon, Hancock, Howard, Humphreys, Meade, Newton, Sykes.

³ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 37.

⁴ This delay, upon which so much hinged, was made the subject of strict scrutiny. Each per-



ACQUIA CREEK. BURNSIDE'S BASE OF SUPPLY.

had been fired upon by a battery from across the river, and had silenced it so easily as to show that the enemy were there in only trifling force, was disposed to send a detachment by a ford which was practicable for the purpose, and gave an order to that effect. But he had received explicit orders not to cross and occupy Fredericksburg; and, "upon reflection, he concluded that he was rather too old a soldier to disobey a direct order; besides, he had had a little too much experience on the Peninsula of the consequence of getting astride a river to risk it here." So, having revoked the order, he sent a note to Burnside, asking whether he should take Fredericksburg the next morning, provided he could find, what he had already found, a practicable ford. Burnside replied in the negative; he did not think it advisable to occupy Fredericksburg until his communications were established; and Sumner coincided in this decision.¹ Hooker, who brought up the rear of the army, requested permission, on the 20th, to send a division across the Rappahannock, which should march down the south side and seize the heights behind Fredericksburg. Burnside next day refused permission. He thought that although Hooker might "beat any force of the enemy he would meet on his way, yet it would be a very hazardous movement to throw a column like that beyond the reach of its proper support;" and, moreover, a rain-storm which had set in during the night rendered the movement impossible.² Sumner, on the 21st, sent over a message to the corporate authorities of Fredericksburg demanding the surrender of the town, under pain of bombardment in case of refusal. The civic authorities were told by the military commander that "while the town would not be occupied for military purposes, its occupation by the enemy would be resisted." Directions were given for the removal of the people, and almost the entire population left their homes.³ No bombardment then took place; but a fortnight later, when the movement across the river was made, Fredericksburg, which was then used by the Confederates for "military purposes," and almost the entire population having been removed in consequence of the threat, was bombarded. This was fiercely denounced as a violation of the laws of war, but without the slightest ground. The town had been formally summoned to surrender; the unarmed population had abandoned it after abundant notice; and it was used for the direct "military purpose" of "resisting the occupation by the enemy."

A fortnight passed, during which time the Union army lay upon the north bank of the Rappahannock, waiting for means to cross the stream, and for the accumulation of supplies at the Acquia Creek, and the means of transporting them from the Potomac to the Rappahannock. The Confederate army was meanwhile concentrating on the southern side to resist any advance. About this time that army was formally organized into two corps, under the immediate command of Longstreet and Jackson, who had each been raised to the rank of lieutenant general. Longstreet's corps consisted of the troops formerly belonging to his command. To Jackson was assigned, besides those which he had heretofore commanded, the division of D. H. Hill. The two corps were now of nearly equal force, that of Longstreet being perhaps slightly in excess.⁴

cessity of the commanding officer here reporting the order for the boats there, the order was drawn up on his table and signed by me directly to General Woodbury. I saw General Woodbury on my return, and he told me that he had received the order. I told him that in all these matters he was under General Burnside's direction; I had nothing farther to give him except to communicate that order to him. I gave no other order or direction in relation to the matter."—There seems to have been an unaccountable misapprehension as to the purport of the order which was addressed to General Woodbury, of the Engineer Brigade. It read: "Call upon the chief quartermaster to transport all your pontoons to Acquia Creek" (*Ibid.*, 663). Woodbury did not understand that this order demanded instant execution. "Had the emergency been made known to me in any manner," he says, "I could have disregarded the forms of service, seized teams, teamsters, and wagon-masters for instant service wherever I could find them. Then, with good roads and good weather, they might possibly have been in time. But I had no warrant for such a course, which, after all, could only have been carried out by the authority of the general-in-chief" (*Ibid.*, 665).—Quarter-master General Meigs said that the blame did not rest upon his department, "which was no more responsible for the march of a pontoon train than for the march of a battery of artillery or of a regiment of infantry. Its business was to provide material for the transportation of an army. If General Woodbury had orders from General Burnside, he was responsible for carrying them out" (*Ibid.*, 680).

¹ Sumner, in *Com. Rep.*, 657.

² *Com. Rep.*, 654, 666.

³ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 33.

⁴ Longstreet's corps, the First, consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Pickett, Ransom, Wood,

It was almost the middle of December. Four weeks had passed since Burnside's plan had been sanctioned by the President; but the essential thing upon which he had based the probability of success—that the movement should be rapidly made—had failed. The faultiness of the whole scheme was now apparent. Burnside had shrunk from assailing the half of Lee's force which lay directly in his front, in a position hastily taken and of no great natural strength. He was now confronted by the Confederate army, drawn up in a position almost unassailable by nature, strengthened by the labor of three unobstructed weeks, which could be assailed only by crossing a formidable stream; and even if that were passed, the enemy assailed and driven from his position, the pursuit would still encounter at every step of the way just the same obstructions which would have been met on the line which had been abandoned. If military considerations were alone in question, no farther movement would have been made, and the army would have gone into winter quarters. But public feeling demanded a movement, and Burnside, sanctioned by his generals, resolved to take the offensive. The only question was where the intervening river should be crossed.¹

The Rappahannock, with a general course from south to north, makes a sharp bend westward a mile above Fredericksburg, running between two lines of heights. Those on the north, known as Stafford Heights, slope steeply down to the river bank, with an elevation sufficient to command the valley across the river. On the south side, the hills just in the rear of Fredericksburg rise sharply something less than a mile from the river; then they trend away, in a semicircular form, until they sink down into the valley of the Massaponax, six miles below Fredericksburg, leaving an irregular broken valley, two miles broad at its widest point. This range of heights was mostly covered with dense woods, oaks with branches now leafless, skirted with sombre pines, rising southward by a succession of wooded ridges, each dominating the one below until lost in a wild wooded region soon to become famous under the name of the "Wilderness." Upon the crests and slopes of these wooded heights Longstreet's corps had been disposed, covering a front of about five miles. There was little need of artificial aid to the natural strength of the position; but artillery and rifle pits were dug and abatis constructed.² D. H. Hill's division was posted near Port Royal, twenty miles below, to prevent the Union gun-boats from ascending the river, and some skirmishing here took place.³ The remainder of Jackson's corps was

and McLaws, comprising 21 brigades. Jackson's corps, the Second, consisted of the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Ewell, and Taliaferro, comprising 19 brigades. The cavalry and horse artillery, under Stuart, acted somewhat independently with either corps; at the battle of Fredericksburg, mainly with Jackson.

¹ Sumner: "I was in favor of crossing the Rappahannock, because I knew that neither our government nor our people would be satisfied to have our army retire from this position or go into winter quarters until we knew the force that was on the other side of the river, and the only way of ascertaining that was by feeling them" (*Com. Rep.*, 658).

Franklin: "General Burnside called a council, in which it was the unanimous opinion, I think, of all the generals present, that if this river could be crossed, it ought to be crossed, no matter what might happen afterward. The point of crossing was not then definitely determined upon; but I thought at the time that we were to cross several miles farther down. Afterward General Burnside called us together again, and informed us that he had determined to cross at the two points at which we finally did cross. I had no objection to that, but thought they were as good as the point farther down" (*Ibid.*, 661).

Hooker: "After the pontoons arrived, it became a matter of importance to determine where and in what way we should cross the Rappahannock. The officers commanding the Grand Divisions were called together to discuss and determine that matter. General Burnside proposed that a portion of the command should cross at Fredericksburg, and a portion should cross about twelve miles below. I objected by my vote in the council to crossing two columns so far apart, and stated my preference that the whole army should cross at what is called the United States or Richards's Ford, about twelve miles above; but I was overruled" (*Ibid.*, 666).

² "Pits were made for the protection of the batteries; and, in addition to the natural strength of the position, ditches, stone fences, and road-cuts were found along different portions of the line, and parts were farther strengthened by rifle-trenches and abatis."—Longstreet, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 427.

³ Hill always managed to say something quite out of harmony with the usual decorum of the Confederate official reports. Here, with abridgments, is his account of what took place at his extremity of the line: "Four Yankee gun-boats were then lying opposite the town of Port Royal. Rifle-pits were constructed to prevent the pirates from ascending. Hardaway opened upon the gun-boats. Finding the fire too hot for them, they fled back. Hardaway continued to pelt them, and, to stop his fire, the ruffians commenced shelling the town. A dog was killed and a negro wounded. The pirates fled down the river; but a worse fate awaited them than a distant cannonade—a section of artillery immediately on the bank gave them a parting salute. From Yankee sources we learned that the pirates lost six killed and twenty wounded. Whether they over-esti-

AN ARMY TRAIN.





BUILDING THE BRIDGE AT FREDERICKSBURG.

posted so as to be in a position to support either Hill or Longstreet. Two shots in immediate succession were to be the signal giving notice for the whole of the Confederate force to concentrate upon any point that should be menaced in force.

Burnside had resolved to cross at a point known by the euphonic designation of Skinker's Neck, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg. The movements which were made for this purpose caused the enemy to concentrate much of his strength in that direction. The thought then occurred to him to detain this force there by ostentatious demonstrations, and to make the crossing at Fredericksburg. "I decided," he says, "to cross at Fredericksburg, because, in the first place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us to cross here, but down below; and, in the next place, I felt satisfied that this was the place to fight the most decisive battle, because, if we could divide their forces by piercing their lines at one or two points, separating their left from their right, then a vigorous attack with the whole army would succeed in breaking their army in pieces."¹ No conclusion could, as matters stood, be more sound, provided that the premises upon which it was based were sure. If it was certain that Lee's left would be behind Fredericksburg, and his right a dozen miles or more away, then an adequate force flung into this great gap would divide the Confederate army, and a vigorous assault upon its left might be expected to crush it when cut off from aid from the right. To carry out this plan, it was necessary that the river should be crossed and battle be waged and won in a single day. Failing this, the rest must depend upon contingencies which no man could foresee.

The 11th of December was fixed upon as the day for crossing the river. During the previous night nearly one hundred and fifty heavy guns were placed in position upon the crest of Stafford Heights, commanding a great part of the opposite valley. The intention was to throw three bridges across at Fredericksburg, and as many more at a point two or three miles below. Sumner's Grand Division was to cross by the upper bridges, Franklin's by the lower, while Hooker's was to be held in reserve, ready, if the assault was successful, to spring upon the enemy in his retreat.² It was supposed that the bridges could be built in two or three hours.³ Before dawn the pontoons were brought down to the river bank, and the work of laying the bridges was begun in the darkness. Two single shots broke the stillness which reigned through the Confederate lines. These were the signal for Longstreet's corps to concentrate upon the threatened point. Fredericksburg was held by only two regiments of sharpshooters, who were sheltered in houses and rifle-pits, and behind walls on the river bank. In addition to the darkness of night, a dense fog filled the valley. The engineers had hardly begun to lay the bridges when they were assailed by rifle-shots at short range from the opposite shore, and driven off with severe loss. Again and again they returned, and again and again were driven off. The two or three hours had stretched to six, and the narrow stream was only half spanned, and not another length could be laid under the fierce fire. Burnside now ordered that fire should be opened upon the town from his artillery which crowned the opposite crests. Nearly one hundred and fifty heavy guns at once opened fire into the pall of mist which still shrouded the scene. After two hours a column of rising smoke indicated that a part of the town was in flames, and another attempt was made to complete the bridges. This was repelled as the former ones had been, showing that almost ten thousand shot had failed to dislodge the sharpshooters from their coverts. When the fog lifted at noon, it was found that the elevation at which the guns were placed was so great that few of them could be sufficiently depressed to bear upon the river front of the town. The day was fast wearing away, and nothing had been accomplished. The officers reported that the bridges could not be built. Burnside said that it must be done, and some means must be found to dislodge the sharpshooters. It was now decided that a detachment should cross in open pontoon boats and carry the town. Two regiments from Massachusetts and one from Michigan volunteered for the perilous work. They rushed down the bank and pushed the boats into the stream; a few strong strokes with the oars, and they were under shelter of the opposite bluffs, up which they dashed, and in a quarter of an hour carried the town.⁴ In half an hour more the bridges were finished, and, as evening was falling, Couch's division was over and the first step in the enterprise fairly taken.⁵ Franklin had indeed met with scarcely a show of opposition. His artillery covered the opposite shore, and his bridges were ready before noon; but Burnside had resolved that the attack should be made in two separate columns, and Franklin was not suffered to cross until the other bridges were completed.

It was no part of Lee's plan seriously to oppose the passage of the river by the Federal force, or even to assail it when over. He wisely chose to await its assault upon his strong position,⁶ to which his opponent would

mated or under-estimated their losses I do not know; they sometimes lie on one side and sometimes on another. In a few days the pirates returned with some more of their thievish consorts. Guns were brought down to the river under cover of a dense fog, and when it lifted were opened upon them. We have learned from the same respectable Yankee source that three of the pirates were struck, one three times, and that a captain was killed, and four or five other thieves knocked on the head."—D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 458.


² Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 667.


³ Burnside's Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 652.

⁴ Burnside, *Ibid.*, 655.

⁵ McLaws says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 445) that the artillery fire was so severe that his "men could not use their rifles, and the different places occupied by them becoming untenable, the troops were withdrawn from the river bank at half past four, when the enemy crossed in boats, and, completing their bridges, passed over in force and advanced into the town." ⁶ Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 656.

⁶ Lee indeed believed that it was impossible to prevent the crossing. He says (*Rep.*, i., 39): "The plan of Fredericksburg is so completely commanded by the Stafford Heights, that no effectual opposition could be made to the construction of bridges or the passage of the river without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of the numerous batteries of the enemy. At the same time, the narrowness of the Rappahannock, its winding course and deep bed, presented opportunities for laying down bridges at points secure from the fire of our artillery. Our position was therefore selected with a view to resist his movements after crossing, and the river was guarded only by a force sufficient to impede his movements until the army could be concentrated."—Franklin, however, was confident that not only might his passage have been prevented, but that his division, when over, could have been crushed. He says (*Testimony*, in *Com. Rep.*, 661): "I always





FRANKLIN'S GRAND DIVISION CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

have been pledged by crossing the river. He seems, indeed, to have been uncertain whether the movement in his front was a serious one, or merely a feint to cover an attempt upon one of his flanks; for it was not until from twenty-four to forty hours after the firing of the signal-guns that Jackson's corps was brought up from its positions nearly a score of miles down the river.¹ Could the bridges have been completed, as was expected, early on the morning of the 11th, and the attack made that day, Burnside would have encountered only half of the Confederate force, and the result of the action could hardly have failed to have been different.

The whole of the 12th was most unaccountably spent in crossing the river and deciding upon the order of the attack on the next day. It was found that the extreme Confederate right was protected by a canal, all the bridges crossing which had been destroyed; there was, besides, a sluiceway and mill-pond, so that this point was unassailable; and an attack upon the right could only be made against the steep front of Marye's Hill, rising in the rear of the town and presenting a front of a mile, then sloping off sharply to a ravine traversed by a small stream; thence the heights sweep away from the river, leaving a broken plain, its edges deeply indented by wooded spurs. This plain, about two miles broad, is traversed by the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, which winds around the base of the heights, occasionally cutting through the extremities of the projecting spurs. Midway between the railway and the river runs the old Richmond or Port Royal Road, often embanked and fringed with trees, affording shelter behind which the Union force could be deployed. When the final arrangements had been made on both sides, the Confederate forces, 80,000 strong, were posted along the ridge of the range of hills, their advance line in places pushed forward to the wooded base, Jackson's corps holding the right and Longstreet's the left. The Union army, 100,000 strong, was posted along the Richmond Road, from Fredericksburg down; Couch's corps, of Sumner's division, in the town; then Wilcox's corps, forming the connection with Franklin's Grand Division on the left.

The character of the ground unmistakably indicated that the main attack should be made by Franklin; for not only was the Confederate position here manifestly weaker, but the plain in front of it was spacious enough to give room to deploy his whole force; while to the right, in front of Sumner, the plain was so narrow that only a fragment of his force could at any one moment be brought into action. If he assailed the strong position before him, it must be by successive blows, not by a single attack with his whole force. Franklin understood, on the afternoon of the 12th, that Burnside intended that he should make the attack with his Grand Division, to which had been added a part of Hooker's. Hooker understood that there was to be a twofold assault, at distinct points, the main one by Sumner, on the right.² Burnside clearly proposed a twofold attack in force, that on the left to be the first.³ But when, on the morning of the 13th, Franklin received his order, it was so worded as to lead him and his generals to suppose that it meant he should make merely an armed reconnoissance of the enemy's lines with but one of his eight divisions, to be supported by another, keeping the remainder in position for a different movement.⁴ Franklin was also informed that a column, consisting of a division or more, detached from Sumner's corps, was to move against the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Thus, as the plan was framed, not more than four divisions, one quarter of the force which had crossed or was ready to cross the river, were to assail the position held by the Confederates. We can only account for this plan by supposing that Burnside thought that the enemy in his front was really in inconsiderable force, its bulk being still a score of miles away, and that not only had he crossed the Rappahannock at a point where he was not expected, but that during the eight-and-forty hours which had passed since the attempt was begun the enemy had not concentrated his strength in his front. Thus only can we explain the part assigned to Hooker, to spring upon the enemy on his retreat, and the order to Franklin to be in readiness to march down the Richmond Road, that being the direction which the retreating Confederates would naturally take. If such was his belief, he must have been confirmed in it by the trifling opposition offered to his passage of the river. There was, indeed, nothing to show the neighborhood of a great hostile army. Hardly a reply had been made to his heavy bombardment; not

doubted our power to cross, and I do not believe we could have crossed had the enemy chosen to prevent it; and I know, from what I have seen since and what I before suspected, that they could have prevented our crossing at those two points if they had chosen. However, the crossing was successfully made, under cover of a fog, and, as far as my wing was concerned, we got into position safely, with the loss of a very few men. Still, we were in such a position that, if the enemy had at any moment opened upon us with the guns they had bearing upon us, I think in the course of an hour our men would have been so scattered that it would have been impossible to rally them. For some unaccountable reason they did not open their batteries."

¹ "It having been definitely ascertained that the enemy had crossed the Rappahannock in large force, I was ordered to move my division at dawn on the 12th" (A. P. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 461).—"Just before sundown on the 12th I received an order to march that night to Fredericksburg, as the Yankees were expected to attack General Lee that day. A portion of my command was twenty-two miles from that city, and the most of them from eighteen to twenty" (D. H. Hill, *Ibid.*, 458).—"A. P. Hill moved his division at dawn on the morning of the 12th. At the same time, Taliaferro, then in command of Jackson's division, moved from his encampment. Early on the morning of the 13th, Ewell's division, under Early, and D. H. Hill, with his division, arrived, after a severe night's march, from their respective encampments, the troops of D. H. Hill being from fifteen to eighteen miles distant from the points to which they were ordered" (Jackson, *Ibid.*, 434).

² "General Burnside said [in the council] that his favorite plan of attack was on the telegraph road."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 667.

³ "The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour through a bad country. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front, and drive them out of their works."—Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 653.

⁴ Franklin, in *Com. Rep.*, 708. The order is given in full in *Com. Rep.*, 707. The essential portions are these: "The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond Road; and you will send out at once a division at least to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. . . . You will keep your whole command ready to move at once, as soon as the fog lifts."

an enemy showed himself during that day or the next besides the few regiments which had been driven from Fredericksburg, and the scanty line of sharpshooters, hardly more than a picket-guard, scattered along the river bank. He had indeed been informed by a German prisoner, who represented that he had been impressed into the Confederate service, of the strength of the enemy, of their positions and batteries, and that they regarded it as an impossibility that the heights could be carried; but Burnside clearly placed no faith in his story.¹

The morning of Saturday, December 13, broke with a dense fog resting in the valley, shutting the two armies from all sight of each other. So dense was it that the Confederates could hear the word of command given to the invisible lines before them.² The night had been bitterly cold. Some of the Confederate pickets were frozen at their posts.³ About ten o'clock the fog lifted, and showed Franklin's command in motion. He had placed a liberal construction upon the order to assault with at least one division, and threw forward Reynolds's entire corps, Meade's division in advance in the centre, supported by Gibbon's on the right, and Doubleday's on the left, somewhat in the rear. The Confederate horse artillery, under Stuart, was so posted across the Richmond Road as to enfilade the Union line, and Doubleday was deflected still farther to the left to dislodge them. After an hour's sharp cannonading Stuart's guns were withdrawn, and Meade opened a fierce artillery fire upon the woods in his front. The Confederate batteries making no response, Meade pushed forward right against what proved to be the centre of Jackson's position.⁴

Jackson's front line was composed of three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, posted in the woods at Hamilton's Crossing, the point which Franklin had been ordered to assail with a single division; the other three brigades formed the second line along the military road, while the divisions of D. H. Hill, Ewell, and Taliaferro were in reserve beyond the crest of the heights. A wide gap had been left between two of Hill's front brigades, just behind a strip of boggy wood which was supposed to be inaccessible.⁵ By one of those accidents which sometimes change the result of a battle, Meade advanced right upon this opening, and his division thrust itself a wedge through the unguarded opening, in the face of a fierce artillery fire now opened upon his column from the hitherto silent batteries. This wedge, by sheer force of impact, forced itself between and past the Confederate brigades of Lane and Archer, sweeping back the flanks of each, and gaining the second line along the military road. A part of Gregg's brigade was thrown into confusion, but the remainder of the line stood firm, and checked the rush of Meade's column. This had pushed in so rapidly that it was separated from Gibbon's division, which was to be its immediate support, and was enveloped, for it had pierced, not shattered, the first Confederate line, whose separated portions assailed each of its flanks, while its front was headed by the second line. It was now a mere question of force. Meade's three brigades were opposed to Hill's six, and they fell back in confusion over the ground which they had gained. Meanwhile Gibbon's supporting division, after a brief delay, which to Meade seemed long,⁶ came up on his right, and for a moment stemmed the Confederate advance. But in the mean while a messenger from Hill had dashed up to Early, who was in the rear, bringing tidings that "an awful gap" had been left in the front line, through which the enemy were pouring, endangering not only the infantry of that line, but all the batteries. Early sent Lawton's brigade into the fight; they rushed in with the wild "cheer peculiar to the Confederate soldier, and which is never to be mistaken for the studied hurrahs of the Yankees,"⁷ closely followed by the remainder of the division. At the same time Hood, whose division of Longstreet's corps was next to Jackson, and who had received orders to co-operate with him, sent a brigade to the scene of action. This united force swept back Gibbon's division, as well as the shattered remains of Meade's.⁸

The consequences of the wording of Burnside's order, and Franklin's understanding of it, were now apparent. Franklin held his Grand Division in a position for a "rapid advance down the Richmond Road," and so, with the exception of Meade and Gibbon, it was stretched along the road, the nearest part being a full mile from the scene of conflict, and most of it much farther, for Doubleday's division, which was to have directly supported the attack, had gone so far to the left as to be beyond reach. But, fortunately, Stoneman's corps of Hooker's Grand Division had begun to cross the river opposite the place of the fight. Birney's division of that corps, which led, had been ordered to follow Meade when he advanced; but the order was countermanded, and he was directed to retire his men from a hot artillery fire which was opening upon them. He had begun to do this when he was told to push forward to aid Meade, whose division was flying back in all direc-

tions. The fugitives rushed straight through Birney's lines, closely pursued by the enemy, who dashed within fifty yards of Birney's guns. Four batteries of these opened such a furious fire of canister that the Confederates were checked; they then recoiled, falling back to their original first line on the railroad.¹ The battle on the left was now over. It had lasted about two hours, counting from the time when Meade advanced down to the moment when the Confederates recoiled from the pursuit.² Burnside, indeed, sent an order to Franklin directing him to attack in front, but before this was received Franklin deemed it too late to make any change in his dispositions.³ Jackson also planned an assault under cover of darkness upon the Federal position. He proposed to attack with his artillery in advance, followed by the infantry; but his first guns had hardly moved forward a hundred yards when the Federal artillery reopened its fire, and so completely swept his front as to satisfy him that the attempt must be abandoned.⁴

In this action upon the left the Federals lost, in killed and wounded, about 3700, of which nearly 2600 fell upon the two divisions of Meade and Gibbon, and 900 upon that of Birney. The Confederates lost about 3200, of which half fell upon the division of A. P. Hill, and a fourth upon that of Ewell. In their advance the Federals captured 500 prisoners, and lost about as many in the retreat.⁵

During this action on the left, a still more fiercely contested fight was raging three miles away on the right, at the foot of Marye's Hill, directly behind Fredericksburg. The Confederate position here was of great strength.⁶ "Marye's Hill, covered with their batteries, falls off abruptly toward Fredericksburg, to a stone wall which forms a terrace on the side of the hill, and the outer margin of the Telegraph Road, which winds along the foot of the hill. The road is about twenty-five feet wide, and is faced by a stone wall, about four feet high, on the city side. The road having been cut out of the side of the hill in many places, this last wall is not visible above the surface of the ground. The ground falls off rapidly to almost a level surface, which extends about a hundred and fifty yards; then, with another abrupt fall of a few feet, to another plain, which extends some two hundred yards, and then falls off abruptly into a wide ravine, which extends along the whole front of the city." This road, invisible from the direction whence the attack was to come, was precisely like the ditch of a fortress, affording perfect protection to the men posted in it. Parts of two brigades, numbering in all not 2000 men, were stationed here, and yet so small was the space that they stood four deep.⁷ The line of this sunken road was continued on each side by a stone wall raised above the ground, and by rifle-pits and trenches. The crest of the hill was covered with artillery, but so narrow was the space that there was here only room for eleven guns of the Washington Artillery; these were mostly 12-pounders. Other guns, about fifty in all, of heavier calibre, were posted so as to enfilade the approaches, while the bulk of the artillery was held in reserve beyond the crest of the hills, the ammunition trains being several miles in the rear.⁸ Lee, indeed, seems to have assumed that the enemy would succeed in gaining the crest of the hills, and that the battle would be fought on the plateau beyond, where his whole system of defensive works had been constructed; while Burnside supposed that these crests once gained the victory would be won.

The attack upon Marye's Hill was committed to Sumner; but, as Wilcox's corps of his Grand Division had been stretched down the river to keep up the connection with Franklin, the burden of the assault was laid upon Couch's corps. French's division was to begin the attack, followed by that of Hancock, "two of the most gallant officers in the army, and two divisions that had never turned their backs to the enemy."⁹ When the fog lifted at noon, these divisions were seen formed in two columns of attack, marching straight toward the base of the heights, along two roads which here run parallel, that on the right being the "Orange Plank Road," leading westward to the "Wilderness," four months hence to become historical in connection with

¹ Birney, in *Com. Rep.*, 705; Reynolds, *Ibid.*, 698; Jackson, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 436; A. P. Hill, *Ibid.*, 464; Early, *Ibid.*, 471.

² The moments of the fight are best given in the dispatches of General Hardie, of Burnside's staff, who was placed at Franklin's head-quarters to report upon the operations. We give the main points of his consecutive dispatches, as contained in *Com. Rep.*, 712-714: "December 13, 7 40 A.M. Meade's division is to make the movement from our left; but it is just reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left.—9 A.M. Meade just moved out; Doubleday supports him. Meade's skirmishers engaged with enemy's skirmishers.—9 40. Two batteries playing upon Reynolds. They must be silenced before he can advance.—11 A.M. Meade advanced half a mile, and holds on.—12 M. Birney's division now getting into position. That done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance.—12 5 P.M. Meade's line is advancing in the direction you prescribed this morning.—1 P.M. Enemy opened a battery enfilading Meade; Reynolds has opened all his batteries upon it. Reynolds hotly engaged.—1 15 P.M. Heavy engagement of infantry; Meade is assaulting the hill.—1 25 P.M. Meade is in the woods; seems to be able to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in if necessary; the infantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy; things look well enough; men in fine spirits.—1 40 P.M. Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's position in the woods, we have 300 prisoners; tough work; men fight well; Gibbon has advanced to Meade's right; Meade has suffered severely; Doubleday, to Meade's left, not engaged.—2 15 P.M. Gibbon and Meade driven back from the woods; Newton gone forward; Jackson's corps of the enemy attacks on the left; Gibbon slightly wounded; Bayard mortally wounded by a shell. Things do not look so well on Reynolds's front; still we will have new troops in soon.—2 25 P.M. Franklin will do his best; new troops gone in.—3 P.M. Reynolds seems to be holding his own; things look better somewhat.—3 40 P.M. Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another attack can not be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be collected, and if it be done in time another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods on our left, threatening the safety of that portion of our line. Just as soon as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a front attack; but it may be too late this afternoon; indeed, we are engaged in front any how. Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the morale generally of the troops is good.—4 30 P.M. The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left; but the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to the left or front."

³ *Com. Rep.*, 710.

⁴ Jackson, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 438.

⁵ For detail of the losses in this action, and in that on the right, see *supra*, p. 416.

⁶ This description is copied from Kershaw's Report (in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 487). Of all the Reports on either side, this of Kershaw, who commanded here, is the only one which gives any adequate idea of the strength of the Confederate position. The existence of the sunken road, which, as it happened, was the key to the whole action here, seems never to have been known to any of the Union generals, even when they furnished their reports.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 488.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 522, 533, 547.

⁹ Sumner, in *Com. Rep.*, 658.

¹ Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 667.

² *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 428.

³ *Ibid.*, ii., 487.


⁴ Reynolds, in *Com. Rep.*, 698; A. P. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 462.

⁵ *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 466.

⁶ "General Gibbon's division on my right, which I understood was to have advanced simultaneously with my own, did not advance till I was driven back. It advanced until it came within short range of the enemy, when it halted. The officers could not get the men forward to a charge, and the division was held at bay there some twenty or thirty minutes, during which time my division had gone forward. That delay enabled the enemy to concentrate their force and attack me on my front and both flanks. I had penetrated the enemy's lines so far that I had no support on either flank, and was therefore forced to fall back. As I came out, Gibbon's forces advanced, and got as far probably as the railroad, which was the enemy's outer line" (Meade, in *Com. Rep.*, 691).—Gibbon says: "I saw General Meade's troops moving forward into action, and I at once sent orders to my leading brigade to advance and engage the enemy. Shortly afterward I ordered up another brigade to the support of the first. The fire was very heavy from the enemy's infantry, and I ordered up the third brigade, and directed them to take the position with the bayonet, having previously given that order to the leading brigade. But the general commanding that brigade told me that the noise and confusion was so great that it was impossible to get the men to charge, or to get them to hear any order to charge. The third brigade went in, took the position with the bayonet, and captured a considerable number of prisoners. I had just received the report of the success of the third brigade, when shortly after I saw a regiment of infantry come out on the left of my line, between myself and General Meade. No troops came up in support of my division to enable me to hold the position which I had gained" (*Ibid.*, 715).

⁷ Early, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 470.

⁸ *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 428, 457.



THE ASSAULT UPON MARYE'S HILL.

the battle of Chancellorsville; the other, the "Telegraph Road," bending southwardly, and leading to Richmond, in which, hidden from view, lay the few regiments forming the advance line of the Confederate force, commanded by Cobb;¹ but he having been killed early in the day, the command was given to Kershaw, whose brigade was thrust forward into and near the sunken road.

No sooner had the Federal columns moved in dense masses out of the deep ravine, through which some suppose that the Rappahannock once flowed, and emerged upon the narrow plain at the foot of Marye's Hill, than they came within range of the Confederate artillery posted upon the crests. Every gun opened upon them with terrible effect, "making great gaps that could be seen at the distance of a mile."² The light guns of the Confederates, at this close range, were better than though they had been heavier, for they could be worked more rapidly. French's division, in the advance, pressed on in the face of the artillery fire, closing up the great gaps plowed through their ranks, and had crossed half of the narrow space toward the foot of the hill, when they were met by a sheet of fire full in their faces from an invisible foe. It came from the Confederate infantry hidden in the road "cut out of the side of the hill," not a man of whom was visible above the smooth slope. The heads of the advancing columns melted away before this solid wall of fire, delivered from ranks four deep,³ like a snow-bank before a jet of steam.

French's division recoiled before this fierce fire, and streamed back over the narrow plain across which they had advanced, leaving almost half their number behind. Hancock's came close after; this, with French's remaining men, pushed straight on, disregarding the hot artillery fire from the heights; but no sooner did they come within musket-range of the sunken road than a solid sheet of lead poured upon them. The front which was to be carried was so narrow that scarcely more than a brigade could be brought upon it at once. Brigade dashed in after brigade, each taking the place of one which had been swept back so rapidly that it seemed, from the Union lines in the plain, but a single assault, lasting three hours; but, as seen from the Confederate positions on the hill, it seemed a succession of waves dashed against the rocky wall at its base. But it was not a question of numbers. Had twice as many men been brought up the result would have been the same, only the loss would have been twice as great. Nor was it a question of bravery; for never, not even when, seven months later, the Confederates in their turn dashed and were shattered against the steeps at Gettysburg, was an assault made with more desperate and unavailing valor.⁴ The main stress of the assault had been borne by divisions of French and Hancock. They had pressed across the narrow plain, about 10,000 strong, and lost fully 4000 in killed and wounded.


Burnside had watched the action from the heights across the Rappahannock. Two full hours had passed, and nothing seemed gained. Assault after assault had been made by divisions which had "never turned their backs to the enemy." The regiments which he had expected to see crowning the crest had been repelled from the base. "That crest must be crossed to-night," he exclaimed, and directed Hooker to cross and attack upon the Telegraph Road—the very position against which French and Hancock had been "butting all day long." Of Hooker's six divisions, two, and these, he says, "were my favorite divisions, for the one was that which I had educated myself, and the other was that which Kearney had commanded, and of these I knew more than of any others in my command," had been sent to the left to support Franklin. Another division had been sent across to the upper end of Fredericksburg to support Howard, and still another lower down to support Sturgis, both of whom had been pushed forward to aid French and Howard. Hooker had then but two divisions left with which to act; they were that of Humphreys, composed of new men, and Sykes's regulars, who had fought at Bull Run and Cold Harbor, at Malvern and Groveton. Hooker rode forward across the river to consult with the generals who had been engaged in the attack. He saw Couch and Wilcox, French and Hancock. With a single exception, they were all of opinion that no attack could be successfully made there. Hooker examined the position himself, and sent to Burnside an aid with a message dissuading from a new assault. The messenger returned with orders that an attempt must be made. Hooker then rode back, and in person repeated his urgency

¹ T. R. R. Cobb, not to be confounded with Howell Cobb, once Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury, but now also a general in the Confederate army.

² Lee's Rep., ii., 429.

³ "I found, on my arrival, that Cobb's brigade occupied our entire front, and our troops could only get into position by doubling on them. This was accordingly done, and the formation along most of the line was consequently four deep. As an evidence of the coolness of the command, I may mention here that, notwithstanding that their fire was the most rapid and continuous that I have ever witnessed, not a man was injured by the fire of his comrades."—Kershaw, in Lee's Rep., ii., 488.

⁴ The Confederate reports testify abundantly to the desperate bravery with which this assault was carried on. Lee says (Rep., i., 42): "Our batteries poured a rapid and destructive fire into the dense lines of the enemy as they advanced to the attack, frequently breaking their ranks, and forcing them to retreat to the shelter of the houses. Six times did the enemy, notwithstanding the havoc caused by our batteries, press on with great determination to within one hundred yards of the foot of the hill; but here, encountering the deadly fire of our infantry, his columns were broken, and fled in confusion to the town."—Ransom, whose division bore half the brunt of the fight, says (*Ibid.*, 451): "Another line was formed by the enemy, he all the while keeping up a brisk fire with sharpshooters. This line advanced with the utmost determination, and some few of them got within fifty yards of our line; but the whole were forced to retire in wild confusion before the telling fire of our small-arms at such short range. For some minutes there was a cessation; but we were not long kept in expectancy. The enemy now seemed determined to reach our position, and formed apparently a triple line, and, almost massed, moved to the charge heroically, and met the withering fire of our artillery and small-arms with wonderful stanchness. On they came to within less than one hundred and fifty paces of our line; but nothing could live before the sheet of lead that was hurled at them from this distance. They momentarily recovered, broke, and rushed headlong from the field. A few, however, more resolute than the rest, lingered under cover of some fences and houses, and annoyed us with a scattering but well-directed fire. Nothing daunted by the fearful punishment he had received, the enemy brought out fresh and increased numbers of troops. Our men held their fire until it would be fatally effective; meanwhile the artillery was spreading fearful havoc among the enemy's ranks. Still he advanced, and received the destructive fire of our line; even more resolute than before, he seemed determined madly to press on; but his efforts could avail nothing."



FRANKLIN'S DIVISION RECROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

against an attack. But Burnside was inflexible, and insisted that it should be made.¹

The short December day was verging to a close before Hooker was prepared to attack. He thought that the assault had not been sufficiently concentrated, and proposed to breach "a hole sufficiently large for a forlorn hope to enter." He brought forward batteries, and poured in a fire from every gun at his command. It made no more impression than if it had been poured upon "the side of a mountain of rock;" indeed, the sunken wall, which formed the real Confederate defense, could not be touched by any fire from the plain. Just at sunset Hooker ordered Humphreys's division to form in column of assault. Knapsacks, overcoats, and haversacks were thrown aside, and the men were directed "to make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time there to load and fire." At the word, they rushed forward with loud hurrahs, charging straight for the stone wall. As it happened, the Confederate artillery, which had been posted on the crest of Marye's Hill, had exhausted its ammunition, and was passing to the rear, while other guns were coming forward to supply their places.² Humphreys's men thus escaped the terrible artillery fire which had staggered French and Hancock, and the head of the column gained a few yards—possibly rods—beyond the point attained by those who had gone before, and had then been hurled back by the musketry fire from the sunken road.³ Here they met, as those who had gone before had met, the solid sheet of lead, winged with flame, poured in their faces, and turned, as they had done, from that fierce fire. Of the 4000 men whom Humphreys led up to that hidden defense, almost a half were stricken down in a quarter of an hour, for so brief had been the time between their rush and their repulse. Had Humphreys succeeded in his assault, Hooker had proposed to support him by Sykes; but the assault had signally failed; and, says Hooker, grimly, "finding that I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack, and directed that the men should hold, for the advance line between Fredericksburg and the enemy, a ditch that runs along about midway between the enemy's lines and the city, and which would afford a shelter for the men."⁴

The Confederate army lay on their arms that night, fully expecting that the battle would be renewed the next day. The attack had been made by so small a portion of the Union force, and had been repulsed, especially on the right, by so small a part of the Confederate force, that Lee could not believe it to be the final attempt, and he resolved to await its renewal in his strong position, rather than run the risk of attacking in turn.⁵ Burnside had crossed the river with 100,000 men. About 55,000 of these were with Franklin on the left; of these, about 17,000 had been fairly put into action. Against these Jackson had brought in about 20,000, being half of his own corps, and a brigade of Hood's division of Longstreet's corps. Hooker and Sumner, on the Union left, had 45,000; of these, 15,000 had been thrown

against the stone wall. Actually opposed to them were not more than 5000 of Longstreet's corps, though the whole, 40,000 strong, exclusive of Hood, could have been brought in had it been necessary; so that, in this twofold action, less than one third on either side were actually engaged.¹

Burnside passed the night in consultation with his officers and men. Notwithstanding their dissuasion, he resolved to renew the assault next morning. Sumner, with the corps which Burnside himself had originally commanded, and which had not been seriously engaged, was to assail the heights by a direct attack, conducted just as that had been which had been so disastrously repulsed. He thought that these regiments, "coming quickly after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent." And so the order was given. With Sumner, to receive an order was to set about its execution, and before the morning lifted the columns of attack were formed. Then, when all was ready for the desperate attempt, the veteran soldier felt at liberty to remonstrate. "General," he said, "I hope you will desist from this attack. I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army." Burnside could not but hesitate when such advice was given by one "who was always in favor of an advance when it was possible." He kept the column formed, but suspended the order for advance until he could consult with his generals. One and all—commanders of corps and divisions on the right—were against the attempt. He sent for Franklin from the left, and his opinion was the same. So, after hours of thought, Burnside resolved that he would not venture the attack, which he himself at the time believed would have been successful, though he soon became convinced to the contrary. Night had almost come when he informed his officers that he had determined to recross the river with the bulk of the army, but to leave enough to hold Fredericksburg itself, and to protect the bridges, which were to remain, in case he should want to cross again. But upon the representations of Hooker and Butterfield—two men into whose composition entered no feeble fibre—he was convinced that even Fredericksburg could not be held; that every thing must be withdrawn across the river, and the whole enterprise abandoned as a failure.² Sumner alone, of all the council, was still in favor of holding on to Fredericksburg. He thought this might have been done by a single division, provided the batteries across the river were rightly posted, and so the upshot of the affair would have presented a better appearance:

¹ There is some discrepancy of statement as to the numbers of Union force which crossed the river, the forces constituting each wing, and the numbers actually engaged. Burnside, however, testifies (in *Com. Rep.*, 656): "We had about 100,000 men on the other side of the river. Every single man of them was under artillery fire, and about half of them were at different times formed into column of attack. Every man was put in column of attack that could be got in." But a careful perusal of all the testimony shows that of the divisions formed into "columns of attack," fully a third were not fairly thrown into action.—Franklin estimated (*Com. Rep.*, 709): "The force under my command was somewhat over 40,000 men. I do not think it was over 50,000, counting Stoneman's two divisions; but I can not tell without looking at the figures. There were six divisions engaged in supporting the attack—Meade's, Doubleday's, Gibbon's, Birney's, Sickles's, and Newton's; I think the number was about 40,000." But, as has been shown, only three of these six were seriously engaged—Meade's and Gibbon's, of Reynolds's corps, which together lost fully 2500 out of the 2800 in Franklin's Grand Division, leaving only 300 for the three divisions of Doubleday, Sickles, and Newton, and of these 200 were from Doubleday's. Birney's division of Hooker's command was also engaged, losing nearly 1000 (*Ibid.*, 706). Three days before the battle Meade's and Gibbon's divisions, according to the returns of the day, numbered not quite 12,000 "present for duty," of which Meade had 6800; but he says he brought into action only 4500. Birney's numbered 7000 (*Ibid.*, 691, 702, 706); so that the estimate of 17,000 brought into action by Franklin on the left is fully equal to the truth. On the right we have seen that the three divisions of French, Hancock, and Humphreys were the only ones brought directly into the fight: the utmost strength of these divisions was 5000 each.

In placing the Confederates at 80,000 I am guided mainly by the official returns (*Ante*, p. 406), which give the numbers "present for duty" on the 20th of November, a fortnight before the battle, at 73,554; and on the 31st of December, a fortnight after the battle, at 79,092. At each date there were about 12,000 reported as "present," besides those "present for duty;" while the nominal strength, "present and absent," exceeded 150,000, being greater at the first date than the last. Of the "absent" I suppose that none could in the interval have been brought back; of those "present," but not reported as "for duty," probably a few thousand might have been available in an emergency. The Confederate Reports give the movements and losses of every brigade and regiment, so that, assuming their whole force to have been 80,000 effective men, I am able to give, without the possibility of material error, the numbers actually engaged on any part of the field.

² Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 653.

¹ Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, 667; Burnside, *Ibid.*, 723. Both generals agree precisely as to facts. Burnside, however, considered this delay on the part of Hooker as "loss of time, and a preparation on the part of an officer for a failure, inasmuch as it was his duty to attack when ordered."

² *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 532.

³ Hooker says (*Com. Rep.*, 668): "The head of General Humphreys's column advanced to within perhaps fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which was the advanced position which the rebels held, and then they were thrown back as quickly as they had advanced. Probably the whole of the advance and the retiring did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, as was reported to me, 1760 of their number out of about 4000."—McLaws, describing the field as it appeared after the close of the action, says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 447): "The body of one man, supposed to be an officer, was found within about thirty yards of the stone wall, and other single bodies were scattered at increased distances, until the main mass of the dead lay thickly strewn over the ground at something over one hundred yards off, extending to the ravine, commencing at the point where our men would allow the enemy's column to approach before opening fire, and beyond which no organized body of men was able to pass."

⁴ *Com. Rep.*, 668. This ditch is what is called in the Confederate Reports a "ravine."

⁵ "The attack on the 13th had been so easily repulsed, and by so small a part of our army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit his efforts to one attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations and the extent of his forces, seemed to be comparatively insignificant. Believing, therefore, that he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of our position, and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries beyond the river by advancing against him. But we were necessarily ignorant of the extent to which he had suffered."—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 43.

it would have been merely "a change of tactics—a drawing back a little in order to try it again."¹

During Sunday, the 14th, and the greater part of Monday, the 15th, the two great armies lay in their positions, each expecting when the morning fog lifted to be attacked by the other. There was some firing at different points along the extended lines, but nothing which approached to an engagement. On the afternoon of the 15th a formal truce for the purpose of removing the wounded was agreed upon between Jackson and Franklin on their part of the field—the Union left and the Confederate right.² Opposite Fredericksburg, on the Union right, while there was no formal truce, there was little actual hostility. Each force was waiting to see what the other would do. Burnside, after some hours of deliberation, ordered, on the afternoon of the 15th, that his whole force should recross the Rappahannock. A cold rain-storm had in the mean while set in during the night, under cover of which the passage was effected without its being suspected by the enemy. Next morning, the 16th, when the fog lifted from the valley, the whole Union force was seen across the Rappahannock; the pontoons were swung back, and the river once more separated the two armies. Burnside left nothing behind save a part of the dead in front of the stone wall, some ammunition, and 9000 muskets which had fallen from the hands of his slain and wounded.³

The Confederates lost about 4600 men, of whom 600 were killed and 4000 wounded. The Union loss was nearly twice and a half as great: about 1500 killed and 9000 wounded. The Confederates lost also 650 prisoners, the Federals 900,⁴ besides 1200 stragglers who never rejoined their commands. In the action on the left the losses were not greatly disproportionate, that of the Federals being somewhat in excess. But on the right, in front of the stone wall, the disproportion was enormous. Of the 1800 losses in Longstreet's corps, 250 occurred in holding Fredericksburg on the 11th, and as many more in Hood's division which supported Jackson, leaving but 1300 who fell in the defense of Marye's Hill.⁵ The Union loss here was fully 6500, of which probably 5000 fell before the fire of the 2000 infantry who held the stone wall. These lost not more than 500, and most of these fell while getting into position; when once behind that defense they were perfectly sheltered, except when a man exposed himself accidentally to a chance shot from a skirmisher. Two thirds of the Confederate loss at Marye's Hill was sustained by regiments posted on the surrounding slopes, and partially exposed to distant artillery fire. In the final charge, when Humphreys's division dashed with unloaded muskets toward the sunken road, and were flung back in a quarter of an hour with a loss of 1700 men, it is doubtful whether the Confederates suffered the loss of a single man killed or wounded.⁶

Severe as were the casualties of the battle, they formed a small part of the injury inflicted upon the Union army. Its morale was seriously impaired. It was clear to every man, the commanding general only excepted, that the whole plan of the campaign was thwarted. Whatever might have been the chances of its success had it been promptly executed, they were all destroyed by the fatal delay of a month. Officers in their tents, and soldiers by their bivouac fires, discussed the campaign, and declared that it was not possible even to cross the Rappahannock, much less to march to Richmond. The feeling of discouragement was universal from the private up to the commander of a grand division. Burnside alone appeared ignorant of the real condition of his army. "I do not," he said, "consider the troops demoralized, or the condition of the army impaired, except so far as it has been by the loss of so many men."⁷ But his officers knew otherwise. Sumner, a week after the battle, thought the army far more demoralized than

was warranted by its losses. "There is a great deal too much croaking; there is not sufficient confidence," he said; but he still thought that "within a few days, with sufficient exertion, the army will again be in excellent order."¹ But this revival of confidence never came. The tone of the army was indicated by resignations among officers and desertions among privates, which increased to an alarming extent.

Burnside meanwhile determined upon another attempt, which was in effect a repetition of the one which he had first proposed, of crossing the river some miles below Fredericksburg, and thus turning the Confederate right, wholly avoiding the strong position from which he had been so disastrously hurled. Meanwhile a cavalry force of 2500 was to cross the Rappahannock by the upper fords, and gain the rear of Lee's army; they were then to separate, a part returning by different routes, while a picked body of 1000 men, with four pieces of artillery, were to press on, passing to the south of Richmond, and joining General Peck at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in waiting to bring them back to Aquia Creek. The object of this cavalry expedition was twofold: To attract the attention of the enemy from his main movement, and to "blow up the locks on the James River Canal, the iron bridge over the Nottoway, on the Richmond and Weldon Railroad," thereby seriously interrupting the Confederate communications and sources of supply.

On the 26th of December, all the preparations for this movement were made. The place of crossing had been selected, the positions for artillery to protect the passage chosen, and orders given that three days' rations should be cooked for the whole army, while ten or twelve days' supply of food, forage, and ammunition should be provided, and the whole army be in readiness to move at twelve hours' notice. On the 30th the movement had been fairly commenced, when Burnside received a telegram from the President informing him that he had good reason to order that there should be no general movement until he had been informed of it. Burnside suspended the movement, and hastened to Washington to ascertain the reason for this order.²

A week before, Franklin and Smith had addressed a letter to the President, declaring that in their opinion the plan of the campaign already commenced could not be successful. It was, they said, sixty-one miles to Richmond, and for the whole distance it would be necessary to keep the communications open, and these communications were liable to be broken at many points. If the railroad was rebuilt as the army advanced, the enemy would destroy it at important points. If wagon transportation was depended upon, the trains must be so large that much of the strength of the army would be required to guard them, and the troops would be so separated by the trains blocking the road that the van and the rear could not be within supporting distance. The enemy would, moreover, be able to post himself defiantly in strong positions, whence probably the whole strength of the army would not be able to drive him; and even if he were driven away, the result would not be decisive. His losses in these strong positions would be slight, while ours would be enormous. To insure a successful campaign, it was in their judgment essential that all the troops in the East should be massed; that they should approach as near as possible to Richmond without an engagement; and that the line of communication should be absolutely free from danger of interruption. These requisites could only be secured by a campaign on the James River, and they accordingly drew up the outlines of such a campaign.³

While the President was deliberating upon this letter, Generals Newton and Cochrane went up to Washington, and laid before him what they considered the condition of the army. They told him that it was the general opinion of officers and men that it would be a dangerous and ruinous folly to attempt to cross the Rappahannock; that they knew they could not succeed, and would therefore be deprived of a great portion of their vigor.⁴ The President thereupon gave the order prohibiting any movement of which he was not previously informed. Burnside urged that the movement should be made. The President refused his assent until he had consulted with his military advisers. The general returned to his camp, whence he wrote asking for distinct authority from Halleck to cross the river. He knew, he wrote, that there was hardly an officer holding any important command who would favor the movement, but he was confident that it should be made, and he would take the responsibility of making it upon himself; but he felt that the general-in-chief should at least sanction it. Halleck replied in general terms, laying down sundry general rules which ought to govern the management of an army, and saying that while he had always favored a forward movement, he could not take the responsibility of giving any directions as to how or when it should be made. The prohibitory order appears to have been withdrawn, for Burnside resolved to make another move upon his own responsibility, and without making any reply to this letter of Halleck.⁵

This movement was to be commenced by passing the Rappahannock

¹ Sumner, *Ibid.*, 659.

² Lee's *Rep.*, ii., 438.

³ Lee's *Rep.*, i., 43.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i., 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii., 433.

⁶ The Official Reports of Losses (Union, in *Com. Rep.*, 681; Confederate, in Lee's *Rep.*, ii., 433, 439) are as follows:

UNION.					CONFEDERATE.				
Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
Sumner's Grand Div.	480	4150	855	5494	Longstreet's Corps	251	1516	127	1894
Hoyker's " "	327	2469	748	3544	Jackson's " "	344	2545	526	3415
Franklin's " "	333	2430	1531	4679		595	4061	653	5409
Engineers' " "	7	43	100	150					
	1152	9101	3234	13771					

This Union Report, furnished by the Medical Inspector General soon after the battle, requires some considerable emendations. Of those set down as "missing," about 1200 returned to their commands (*Halleck's Report of Operations*), reducing the missing to 2078. The Confederates claim about 900 prisoners (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 43), leaving nearly 1200 missing to be accounted for. I have no doubt that a third of these were slain outright on the field, in addition to those reported as killed. I attribute all these to the assault on the stone wall on the right, for on the left the dead and wounded were buried or removed by truce between Franklin and Jackson. It is only by making such an addition that I can explain the great disproportion between the killed and wounded on the right, as reported. The usual ratio in a close engagement is one killed to five or six wounded; here it is put down as a little more than one to ten, while all the circumstances of the fight indicate that the killed must have borne an unusual proportion to the wounded. Moreover, the Medical Inspector says, "The return of killed may be too small." I have therefore adopted these emendations into the text, increasing the killed by 450, and diminishing the missing by 1650.

As the Confederates remained in undisturbed possession of the entire field of battle, they were able to account for every man of their army. I adopt their Official Report as accurate. In *Lee's Report*, i., 33, there is a statement of the Confederate losses, making them 458 killed and 3743 wounded; and there seems to have been published a statement purporting to be Lee's Official Report, making his entire loss only 1800 killed and wounded. I find this reproduced in several histories, notably in Pollard's *Lost Cause*, p. 346, where it appears thus: "General Lee, in his official dispatch, writes, 'Our loss during the entire operations since the movements of the enemy began amounts to about 1800 killed and wounded.'" This was published fully two years after the real official report of Lee was printed by order of the Confederate Congress. I can account for this statement only by supposing that as Lee was with Longstreet's corps during the whole action, he only referred to the casualties in that corps, not including that in Jackson's corps, which were almost twice as many.

The estimate of losses at various movements, and on the different parts of the field, has been formed from a careful analysis of the reports on both sides. The absolute loss in each army was, however, much less than the reports indicate, the proportion of those wounded so slightly as not to be disabled having been unusually large on both sides. Several of the Confederate reports note this fact. The Union Medical Inspector General says (*Com. Rep.*, 681) that, of the 9101 reported as wounded, there were only 1630 whose cases required to be treated in hospitals; these, added to the 1152 reported as killed—which he thought probably too small—amounting in all to 2782, would, he was confident, "cover the whole amount of disabling casualties occurring at the battle of Fredericksburg."

⁷ Testimony in *Com. Rep.*, 656.

¹ Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 716-718.

² Sumner, *Ibid.*, 660.

³ This letter is given entire in Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, 263-265. The arguments in its favor were, that "on the James River our troops can be concentrated more rapidly than they can be at any other point; that they can be brought to points within twenty miles of Richmond without the risk of an engagement; that the communication by the James River can be kept, by the assistance of the navy, without the slightest danger of interruption." The principal features of the proposed plan were these: Concentrate 250,000 men; land 150,000 on the north, and 100,000 on the south side of the James, as near as possible to Richmond. Let both bodies advance in the lightest marching order, pontoons being ready to make a connection at any time. It was not probable that the enemy would have sufficient force to withstand the shock of two such bodies. If he declined to fight on the river, the army on the south bank should seize the railroads running from Richmond southward, while the remainder should either attack or invest the Confederate capital.

⁴ Newton's Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 730-740; Cochrane's, *Ibid.*, 740-746. They must also have implied, if they did not express the opinion which Newton had formed (*Ibid.*, 731), "that the dissatisfaction of the troops arose from a want of confidence in General Burnside's military capacity."

⁵ Burnside, in *Com. Rep.*, 718, 719.

at fords six miles above Fredericksburg, masked by a feint at crossing some miles below the town, the feint to be made in such force that it might be converted into the real attempt, if circumstances should warrant, for there were conflicting accounts of the positions of the enemy. This required that roads should be cut through forests in both directions, and corduroyed so as to be passable for artillery and trains; sites for batteries chosen and prepared, and other arrangements made. At last a trusty spy brought information which decided Burnside to make the real attempt above Fredericksburg.

It was now the 20th of January. After the friendly storm, under whose cover the Union army had safely recrossed the Rappahannock, there had ensued five weeks of serene weather. The roads were as good as the bad Virginia roads can be. Burnside gave the final order to move in a hopeful spirit. "The commanding general," he said, "announces to the Army of the Potomac that they are about to meet the enemy once more. The late brilliant actions in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas have weakened the enemy on the Rappahannock, and the auspicious moment seems to have arrived to strike a great and mortal blow to the rebellion, and to gain that decisive victory which is due to the country." The movement had been commenced the day before. The infantry of the grand divisions of Franklin and Hooker having marched up the river by parallel roads, screened from the observation of the enemy by the intervening heights, and encamped near the fords where the crossing was to be effected, while Couch's corps moved down the river to make the proposed feint, and Sigel's reserve corps, which had in the mean while been brought up, held the communications between the two wings. But the pleasant weather, upon the continuance of which every thing depended, had come to a close. Late in the afternoon a cold, fierce storm set in. The sleet, driven by a furious gale, penetrated the clothing, and cut the faces of the men as they staggered on in their weary march. In two hours every mud-hole became a little lake, and the clayey roads, unhardened by frost, were transformed into quagmires wherein the wagons sank beyond the axles, and the mules to their bellies. It seemed as though the bottom had dropped out. The storm raged all that night and the next day. There was but one man in the army who did not perceive that the movement must be a failure. That one man was Burnside. He still hoped against hope, and resolved to struggle against fate. So all day on the 21st the army staggered on in its march through the mud. Not a gun or a wagon could be moved except by doubling or trebling the teams, and often a hundred men and more pulling at a stout rope were required to drag a pontoon-wagon through the mire. By terrible exertions some were got forward, while the roads were strewn with a chaos of confusion—shipwrecked wagons, horses and mules dead and dying, pontoons and guns immovable in the mud. Still, a formidable force of all arms was got together upon the river bank at the points where the crossing was to be essayed. But before the artillery and pontoons could be put in position, the Confederates had divined every thing, and had posted their forces so as to render the possibility of even crossing the river a matter of doubt; while, had the passage been effected, any farther advance was impossible. So thought the general officers of the army; and the opinions of some of them were expressed in such a form, that Burnside perceived that either he or they must vacate their posts. He sought direction from Halleck, but vainly. Then he recalled the troops to their former positions, and the three days' mud campaign came to an end.¹

Burnside had for weeks been aware that his entire plan of operations was denounced by some of his leading generals. While he would not charge them with any willful disobedience of orders, he thought that they manifested a want of alacrity which seriously affected the result of the operations. He now resolved to get rid of persons whom he regarded as of no use, and to make some strong examples to the army.² He drew up a general order dismissing from the service Hooker, the commander of a grand division, Brooks, Newton, and Cochrane, commanding army divisions, and relieving from duty Franklin, commander of a grand division, together with Smith, Sturgis, and Ferrero, commanding army divisions. Colonel Taylor, the acting adjutant general of Sumner's grand division.³ This sweeping order was drawn up with the knowledge of but two men besides the

general, and was ordered to be issued. But one of these confidants, "a cool, sensible man, and a firm friend" of Burnside, intimated that while the order was just and should be issued, it transcended in some points the authority of the general. He could not dismiss an officer or hang a deserter without the express approval of the President; and, moreover, by publishing the order, he would force the President to take sides in the military dispute. If he sanctioned the order, his administration would incur the hostility of many influential men, friends of the dismissed officers; if he refused to sanction it after it was issued, he would appear to be the enemy of the commanding general. Still Burnside was firmly convinced he could not retain the command unless he issued the order, with the assurance that it should be sustained. He accordingly went to Washington with the order in one hand and his resignation in the other. He told the President, "If you will say to me, 'You may take the responsibility of issuing the order, and I will sustain it,' I will take that responsibility: this is the only way in which I can retain the command of the Army of the Potomac; otherwise here is my resignation; accept it, and here is the end of the matter as far as I am concerned." The President hesitated. He must consult his advisers. "If you consult any body," replied Burnside, "you will not sanction the order." And so it proved. After deliberating for a day, the President decided to relieve Burnside from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and place Hooker in command, making also some important changes in other respects, principal among which were that Sumner and Franklin should be relieved from their commands. Burnside was satisfied with this decision. "If Hooker can gain a victory," he said to the President, "neither you nor he will be a happier man than I shall be."

Burnside then supposed that his resignation would be accepted; but the President judged otherwise. "We need you," he said, "and can not accept your resignation." The truth was, that while Burnside's own opinion had proved true, that he was not fitted for the command of so large an army, he had yet shown so much capacity for a less onerous command, and had, above all, manifested such an entire absence of all selfish purposes, that the nation could not spare him. He still wished to resign; his private affairs required his attention; and, moreover, he said, if all general officers whom it was found necessary to relieve should resign, it would be better for the President, as it would relieve him from the applications of their friends. "True," replied the President; "but there is no reason for you to resign; you can have as much time as you please for your private business, but we can not accept your resignation." Several commands were proposed to him. He could have the department of South Carolina, or the departments of South and North Carolina would be combined and given to him. He declined both, because he thought these departments were then in good hands. He would remain in the army if his services were absolutely required; but, if he staid, he wished to be employed. Then came up the question as to the form in which his retirement from the command of the Army of the Potomac should be announced. An order had been drawn up at the War Department stating simply that Burnside had been relieved at his own request. To this he objected; he did not wish to appear as having voluntarily given up his command without good reason. This order did not express the real facts of the case, and he still wished to resign. The general-in-chief and the Secretary of War urged that by so doing he would injure himself and the cause. For himself, Burnside "did not care a snap," but he did not wish to injure the cause; the Department might issue just what order it chose; he would take thirty days' leave of absence, and would then come back and go wherever ordered, even if it were to command his old army corps under Hooker. So, when the official order appeared,¹ it announced that Burnside, "at his own request," had been relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Hooker assigned to the command; that Sumner, "at his own request," had been relieved from duty in this army, and that Franklin was also relieved, but without the significant addition of "at his own request."²

Sumner was soon after assigned to the command of the Department of Missouri; but while on his way to the West he died at Syracuse, in New York, on the 21st of March, leaving his name honorably identified with many of the severest struggles of the war. He entered the army in 1819, and had been in active service for forty-four years. He was twice brevetted for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Mexican battles; then he was placed in command of the Department of New Mexico, where he directed important military operations against the turbulent tribes of savages. The opening of the civil war found him a colonel of cavalry, but with an appointment of brigadier general to command upon the Pacific coast. From this, at his own request, he was recalled to take part in the operations of the Army of the Potomac, where his services were rewarded by promotion to the rank of major general of volunteers, and, later, of major general by brevet in the regular army.

Burnside, his thirty days' leave of absence having expired, was assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio, his own old army corps, the 9th, going with him. Subsequently, as we shall have occasion to see, he was recalled to the Army of the Potomac, acting an important part in the closing campaign of the war.

The formal transfer of the command of the Army of the Potomac from Burnside to Hooker was made on the 26th of January. Burnside, in his farewell order, said that the short time in which he had been in command "had not been fruitful in victory," but the army had shown qualities which, under more favorable circumstances, would have accomplished great results."

¹ "Before we could get the pontoons and artillery in position, the plan had been discovered by the enemy, which rendered the crossing very precarious, and the movement of artillery on the opposite bank, even if they had been got over, would have been rendered almost impossible from the state of the roads and the whole face of the country, in consequence of the storm. But a very serious objection to attempting the crossing after this occurred was the almost universal feeling among the general officers that the crossing could not be made there. Some of them gave vent to these opinions in a very public manner, even in the presence of my own staff officers, who informed me of the fact. I telegraphed to General Halleck that I would be very glad to meet him at Aquia Creek; or, if he wished it, I would run up for an hour to Washington. He sent me word that I must be my own judge about coming up. I at once telegraphed back, 'I shall not come up.' I then determined to order the commands back to their original encampments. After doing that, I went to my adjutant general's office, and issued an order which I termed General Order No. 8. That order dismissed some officers from service, subject to the approval of the President, and relieved others from duty with the Army of the Potomac."—Burnside's Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 719.

² Testimony in *Com. Rep.*, 723.

³ GENERAL ORDER NO. 8, Jan. 23, 1863 (Extracts): "General Joseph E. Hooker having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticisms of the actions of his superior officers, and of the authorities, and having, by the general tone of his conversation, endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and having, by omissions and otherwise, made reports and statements which were calculated to create incorrect impressions, and of habitually speaking in disparaging terms of other officers, is hereby dismissed the service of the United States as a man unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present." General W. T. H. Brooks was dismissed "for complaining of the policy of the government, and for using language tending to demoralize his command." Generals John Newton and John Cochrane were also dismissed "for going to the President of the United States with criticisms upon the plans of their commanding officer." These dismissals were made subject to the approval of the President. Then followed a list of officers who were "relieved from duty," it "being evident that they can be of no farther service in this army." The names on this list were Generals Franklin, commanding a grand division; Smith, commanding an army corps; Sturgis, Ferrero, and Cochrane, commanding army divisions; and Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, adjutant general of Sumner's Corps. Cochrane's name appears in both lists, as relieved absolutely by Burnside's authority, and dismissed subject to the approval of the President.

¹ Jan. 28, 1863.

² For the details of the transactions relating to the closing period of Burnside's command, see *Com. Rep.*, 57-60, and *Ibid.*, 716-722.





IN THE MUD.

