

A NIGHT ENCAMPMENT.

were rescued by the Kearsarge. Of the crew of the Alabama seven were killed in the fight; nineteen, most of whom were wounded, went down with the vessel. On board the Kearsarge there were three wounded, one mortally.

The life of the Alabama had been two years lacking nine weeks, counting from Sunday, August 24, 1862, when she first hoisted the Confederate flag, down to Sunday, June 19, 1864, when she was sunk, leaving not a wrack behind. No one ship that ever floated ever inflicted such injury upon an enemy. In all, she had captured sixty-five vessels, burning all except the few required to save the lives of her prisoners. She had destroyed vessels and cargoes valued at ten millions of dollars, and, what was of more injury to the enemy, had well-nigh driven the American commercial flag from the ocean. She was to all intents a British vessel, built at a British dock, manned by a British crew, and sailing almost always under the British flag. Her keel was never wet in Confederate waters, and no man from her deck ever caught a glimpse of the shores claimed by the Confederates; and she rarely hoisted the Confederate flag, except when, having decoyed a prize by the show of false colors, she raised her own in the act of making a prize. Her long impunity from capture is not a matter for wonder. The whole wide ocean was her hiding-place. A hundred vessels might be in search of her, and it would be a matter of chance if one would encounter her. If heard from to-day at any point, to-morrow she would be hundreds of miles away, in what direction no man not on board of her could know. "Her stay in any neutral harbor was necessarily as short as the perching of a hawk on a bough. Like the hawk's in upper air, the Alabama's safety, as well as her business, was on the high seas."[1] At the very last, it was a mere matter of accident that the Kearsarge was at hand when the Alabama appeared at Cherbourg. No one supposed that she was then on this side of the globe. The last that had been heard of her she was in the Indian Ocean. Even at Cherbourg she might have declined to enter into combat with the Kearsarge. Safe while she remained in the neutral harbor, she might have waited her time, as she had done at Martinique, when watched by the San Jacinto, and again, fitted for sea, have crept out into the wide ocean. But Semmes wished to signalize himself by something more than the capture of defenseless merchantmen, and knowing that the ships were "equally matched,"[1] he challenged the Kearsarge to the contest. It was supposed that Semmes would soon be again at sea in command of a still more powerful vessel than the one which he had lost. This was iron-clad, and was almost completed by the builders of the Alabama; but the British government had now perceived the danger into which they were rushing by their interpretation of the neutrality laws, and took possession of the ship. Semmes, after a while, made his way to the Confederacy, and received the nominal rank of brigadier general in the army, and as such was, a year after, included in the surrender of Johnson's army.

[1] *Semmes*, ii., 280.

The brilliant success which attended the early operations of Burnside at the commencement of the year has been already recorded.[2] The successive captures of Roanoke Island, Newbern, Elizabeth City, Fort Macon, and Beaufort, gave the Union forces command of the greater part of the coast of North Carolina, and of the Sound by which it is bordered. Wilmington, and the intricate approaches which lead to it, remained to the Confederates, and afforded facilities for running the blockade. It was supposed that these successes would be followed up by a march into the heart of the state, which would seize the lines of railroad connecting the far South with Richmond. But Burnside's force of 15,000 was insufficient for such an enterprise, and the exigencies of the campaign in Virginia left the Federal government no troops by which he could be re-enforced. The most that Burnside could do was to hold the points on and near the coasts which he had seized. When McClellan retreated from the Chickahominy to the James, Burnside was ordered to bring to Fortress Monroe all the troops which he could collect,[3] leaving Foster with just enough to garrison Newbern, Beaufort, and a few other points. The Confederates also brought all their available force from North Carolina to Virginia; so that, during the summer and early autumn, there was little fighting in North Carolina.

When Lee's invasion of Maryland had failed, and the Union and Confederate armies lay confronting each other on the Rappahannock, considerable re-enforcements were dispatched to Foster in North Carolina, so that he was able to assume the offensive. Early in November he pushed an expedition inland toward Tarboro, where he had learned that there were a few regiments of the enemy; but, finding that they had been largely re-enforced, he retreated. In December he planned a still more important enterprise, the main object being to reach Goldsboro, and destroy the railroads centering at that point. The Confederates meanwhile had strengthened their force in the Department of North Carolina. In November they had but 9000 men, of whom 6000 were reported as present for duty. By December these numbers were fully doubled, and Gustavus W. Smith was placed in command. After the wounding of Johnston at Fair Oaks, Smith had been placed in command of the army before Richmond. He had held it hardly for a day when he was struck down by an attack of paralysis, and Lee was appointed in his place. Foster left Newbern with his entire movable force,[4] about 10,000 strong, and encountered no serious opposition until he reached Kingston, half way between Newbern and Goldsboro. Here a sharp fight occurred,[5] the Confederates retreating. Foster pressed on toward Goldsboro,

[1] *Ibid.*, ii., 278. [2] *Ante*, pp. 242–249. [3] July 4, 1862. [4] Dec. 11. [5] Dec. 14.



BATTLE OF KINGSTON, DECEMBER 14.



ACTION AT WHITEHALL, DECEMBER 16.

hoping to strike the railroad. On the 16th he reached Whitehall, where a brisk skirmish ensued; the Confederates were driven back, and two gunboats which were there building were destroyed. Foster then pushed on toward Goldsboro, following the course of the Neuse, and sending detachments in various directions to destroy the railroad bridges. On the 17th another skirmish took place at a point near Goldsboro. In the mean while the Confederates had gradually concentrated a superior force at Goldsboro, and Foster found it unwise to attempt to reach this place, the point at which he had aimed. He therefore commenced a rapid retreat to Newbern, where his force arrived on the 24th, having been absent ten days, during which time it had marched nearly two hundred miles. Foster lost 90 killed and 478 wounded; the Confederates lost 71 killed, 268 wounded, besides 476 prisoners, most of whom were captured at Kingston, and immediately paroled. The expedition really accomplished nothing. The slight injury done to the railroad was soon repaired, and the communication between Richmond and the far South was hardly interrupted. With this attempt closed the active operations for 1862 in North Carolina. But in February of the ensuing year the Federal force was considerably strengthened, and Lee, perceiving that military operations on the Rappahannock would be suspended until spring, ventured to detach Longstreet, with a considerable part of his corps, from the army in Virginia, and send him to North Carolina. In March the Confederate force in this department nominally numbered 73,000 men, of whom 53,000 were reported as "present," and 45,000 "present for duty."

During the year various movements looking toward a siege of Charleston were attempted. The most important of these was an attempt on the 16th of June to take possession of James Island. The Federals were repulsed, with a loss of 700. But the siege of Charleston forms an episode so complete in itself as to require a separate chapter.



ROUTE FROM NEWBERN TO GOLDSBORO.



SKIRMISH NEAR GOLDSBORO, DECEMBER 17.

COURSE OF THE MISSISSIPPI FROM CAIRO TO THE GULF.



JOHN RODGERS.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE WAR ON THE MISSISSIPPI.

The River.—Gun-boat and Mortar Fleet.—Farragut's Squadron.—A Succession of Victories.—Vicksburg becomes a Military Post.—Masked Batteries along the River Shore.—Shelling of Grand Gulf.—General Williams arrives before Vicksburg.—Farragut runs the Blockade.—Junction of the Fleets.—Bombardment of Vicksburg.—Escape of the Ram Arkansas.—Battle of Baton Rouge, and Destruction of the Arkansas.—Resumption of Operations against Vicksburg.—General Grant's Plan of the Winter Campaign.—An embarrassing Surrender.—Sherman's Defeat at Chickasaw Bayou.—McClernand in Command.—Capture of Arkansas Post.—General Grant's Army at Young's Point.—A Series of Naval Exploits.—The "pocket-full of Plans."—General Williams's Canal.—The Lake Providence Route.—The Yazoo Pass Expedition.—The "Deer-Creek Raid."—On to New Carthage.—The Transports run the Blockade.—Grierson's Raid.

"THE possession of the Mississippi," said General Sherman, in his speech at St. Louis just after the close of the war, "is the possession of America."[1] That this great river is not to the American what the Nile was to the Egyptian is owing to the greatness of America herself, who proudly refuses to be dependent upon even so important an ally; though, next to the two great oceans which skirt her continent, the river is the most important fact of her physical existence, and now (that is, in *anno Domini* 1866) has been proved to be the bond, sealed in blood, of her indissoluble union. Naturally, both in appearance and in fact, the river unites the North with the South, and, though seeming to divide between the Atlantic and the Pacific slopes, she in reality unites these also. The Algonquin Indians aptly named her *Missi Sepe*, "the Great River;" for, if the Missouri is to be considered—as it would have been but for a natural blunder on the part of the early American geographers—the parent, and not merely the tributary stream, the Mississippi is the longest river in the world. Even if we accept the more contracted limits which the geographers have given her, and date her origin from Itasca Lake, she drains a basin of more than a million of square miles—a basin which by possibility provides for a population of nearly four hundred millions, or almost one half of the present population of the entire globe. Even Aaron Burr, in his most splendid calculations respecting the destiny of this mighty garden—this granary of the world, under-estimated its gigantic possibilities. In the basin of the Mississippi the America of the future includes within its limits, as an *imperium in imperio*, a region, the population of which will outnumber the almost innumerable multitudes which have gathered about the Nile and the Ganges. For the present, however, the Englishman may well compare with the Mississippi his Thames, and the German his Rhine. Two centuries and a half go but a little way in the development of the resources of a nation, and far less than that period can be said to have been occupied in the real history of the Mississippi Valley.

The Mississippi is the most tortuous of rivers, and this circumstance, by the impediment which it offers to the current, doubtless favors navigation. Frequently the distance which has to be traversed is twelve, and sometimes even thirty times greater than it would be in a direct line. This circumstance also renders the river more capable of defensive fortification. Taken with its tributaries, the river affords nearly 17,000 miles of water which is navigable by steam. Its largest tributaries are the Missouri, Ohio, White, Arkansas, and Red Rivers. The Missouri is 3000 miles in length; it is a rapid and turbid stream, and asserts its lordship over the Mississippi by imparting to the latter a good measure of these characteristics. It enters the Mississippi a few miles above St. Louis. The Ohio, the largest eastern tributary of the Mississippi, enters the latter stream at Cairo, having previously received the waters of the Alleghany, the Kentucky, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. From Pittsburg, where the Alleghany and Monongahela unite, to the mouth of the Ohio, is 948 miles; the river, with its tributaries, has 5000 miles of navigable waters. Within the limits of Arkansas, and not far apart, are the mouths of the White and Arkansas Rivers. The latter, much the more important tributary, is about 2000 miles long, and drains a basin of 178,000 square miles. The Red River enters the Mississippi from the west, about 200 miles above New Orleans. The greater part of its course is through fertile prairies of a reddish soil, which gives its color to the waters, and a name to the river. But for "The Raft" which obstructs its course, this river would be navigable for 400 miles from its mouth.

All of the western tributaries of the Mississippi drain the slopes of the Rocky Mountains, while its great eastern tributary, the Ohio, with *its* tributaries, drains the western slopes of the Appalachian range. Every one of these tributary and sub-tributary streams is swollen in the spring from the melting snows of the mountains. From the first of March, therefore, until the last of May—or for about ninety days—there is not simply a flood on the Mississippi, but literally an accumulation of floods. On the Missouri there is an average rise of fifteen feet, and this, added to the swollen Mississippi, makes a flood twenty-five feet in height. A second flood is heaped above this from the Ohio, below whose mouth the rise of the Mississippi is fifty feet. Above Natchez the flood begins to decline. At Baton Rouge it seldom exceeds thirty feet, and at New Orleans seldom twelve. At every flood the river overflows its banks for a distance of five hundred miles from its mouth, chiefly on the western side, inundating the country for the space of from ten to thirty miles. To guard against this, *levees* have been constructed, which confine the river within its original limits. Sometimes these levees are broken down by the violence of the current, and the consequent destruction of property is immense. To the yearly overflow of the Mississippi are to be attributed the large number of bayous in its vicinity. These vary in their extent, some of them scarcely exceeding a small river in size, while others spread out into lagoons and lakes.[1]

[1] When, at the beginning of this century, Monroe and Pinckney were negotiating with Napoleon I.—then First Consul of France—in regard to the purchase of Louisiana, Napoleon, anxious to transfer the province to the United States, lest it should fall into British possession, remarked that whatever nation held the Valley of the Mississippi would eventually be the most powerful on earth.

[1] "It is estimated that about 16,000,000 acres of the most fertile and productive lands of the states of Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, are subject to overflow. To protect these lands from the annual devastation by the waters has been the object of incessant toil and immense outlays of capital by the inhabitants of the Valley of the Mississippi.

"So early as 1840, Congress made an appropriation for the construction of a chart of the "Hydrographical Basin of the Mississippi," which was executed by J. N. Nicollet, in the employ of the United States Topographical Bureau.

"In 1850, a corps of engineers was organized under Captain, now General A. A. Humphreys, which made a thorough survey of the Delta with special reference to the discovery of some system of works by which the country could be protected from overflow. These observations were made during and subsequent to the great flood of 1851.

"The constant increase of the volume of the flood revealed by each successive rise is ascribed by Captain Humphreys, in his Report, to the superior drainage produced by the cultivation of the country on the upper tributaries of the Mississippi, whereby the waters are thrown more rapidly into the main channel; the leveeing of the river and its tributaries in the states above Louisiana, so as to prevent the escape of the waters into the swamps and lowlands, whence it would be gradually drained to the river; the construction of cut-offs; the shortening of the channel, and more rapidly conveying the water to points below; and the lengthening of the Delta, thus extending the level mouth of the river, so that the current being retarded, the water is held back in the channel above.

"The remedies suggested are: Higher and stronger levees; prevention, by act of Congress, of the construction of additional cut-offs; formation of new outlets to the Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain; opening of the closed bayous; enlargement of the Atchafalaya and Bayon Plaquemine, and the creation of artificial reservoirs in the swamps, to relieve the channel of the river in extreme cases.

"The early settlers, who selected the more elevated and fertile lands on the banks of the river, found little difficulty in protecting themselves from the floods. The whole country was then open to the waters, and a slight embankment, several inches high, would turn off the water, which was drained to the lowlands farther from the river. Other settlers, however, followed the pioneers; new plantations were established; and, by independent individual action, the slight embankments became linked together for many miles along both sides of the river. The waters, by reason of this confinement, rose higher every succeeding year, the embankments were enlarged, strengthened, and extended, until a line of levees, from fifteen to thirty feet wide at the base, and varying in height from five to twenty feet, stretched, with little interruption, from the lands on the coast, below New Orleans, along the channel of the river, to the boundaries of Tennessee and Missouri.

"The system, owing to its origin, was purely a selfish one. Each settler provided for his individual protection. If by a cut-off he could drain the water from his own place and throw it on the lands below, or by closing a bayou he could reclaim additional acres, the thing was done without reference to the effect it might have on the country lower down the stream. Much damage was thus done by shortening the channel of the river and by closing some of its natural outlets to the sea.

"The legislation of the states along the Mississippi has been little better than the individual action. The enactments depended more upon the comparative strength of the parties to be benefited and injured than upon any well-established plan for the control of the waters. Under authority of law, the channel of the river was shortened by the construction of cuts across the narrow necks formed by the great bends so frequent in the course of the stream. Bayous, which led from the main channel of the river to the gulf, forming independent outlets or mouths, were closed, and the water forced into one channel, which was unable to carry it to the sea.

"Before the war, therefore, the Father of Waters had become unmanageable in the hands of those who sought to control his floods. During the war, when labor that had been forced to the task day and night, and which at times was able to grapple successfully with the elements, was withdrawn, the waters swept away the levees at Morganzia, West Baton Rouge, at Chinn's and at Robertson's plantation, and at other points both above and below the mouth of the Red River, and inundated the country west of the Mississippi from Morganzia to Berwick's Bay.

"An attempt was made during last winter to rebuild these broken embankments. Under the combined efforts of the state authorities of Louisiana and the War Department at Washington, a large number of laborers were employed, and the work had been so far repaired that it was believed to be sufficiently strong to resist the pressure of the flood. Many planters and men from the North, believing that these levees would be rebuilt, engaged in the cultivation of the fertile lands in the parishes of Point Coupee, West Baton Rouge, Iberville, Lafourche, Terrebonne, and parts of others that were overflowed last year. Recent reports from Louisiana bring the sad intelligence that all these newly-constructed levees have been swept away, and that the water is rapidly filling up the swamps and spreading over the whole country, driving the homeless inhabitants before it.

"It is a grave question for the consideration of the country whether Congress should not undertake the protection of the whole Delta of the Mississippi against overflow. The present sys-

CREVASSE ON THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI.

The commercial development of the Mississippi Valley, although very rapid, has scarcely advanced beyond its first stage. It has been thus far a purely agricultural growth. The fertility of the valley is infinite, and along the banks of the river and its affluents large plantations have suddenly sprung up, and enjoyed an almost incredible prosperity. Oftentimes a single cotton or sugar crop has brought its planter a fortune. Necessity has given rise to towns, sparsely populated, and whose sole importance consists in their convenience as dépôts for the shipment of cotton or sugar. The necessity of securing the sites of these towns against the violence of perennial floods led to their situation upon the bluffs which rise here and there along the river banks. In the development of these towns—for they could scarcely be called cities—manufactures and the arts could have but little scope. In some cases, indeed, an easy communication by railroad with the Atlantic sea-board gave them some of the characteristics of our Eastern cities. The principal towns situated upon the banks of the Mississippi are St. Louis, Cairo, Columbus, Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Baton Rouge, and, near the mouth of the river, New Orleans, which alone can be said to compare in commercial importance with the great cities of the East.

All of these were in our civil war points of great military importance. Their very situation, in nearly all cases, was such as to give them many facilities for defense against a naval attack. The city of New Orleans was, however, not in itself favorably located in this respect; it was not built upon bluffs like Memphis and Vicksburg, and had to be defended against inundation by artificial levees. But the approach to the city from the Gulf was well guarded by Forts Jackson and St. Philip. With the exception of these two forts, there were no military defenses worth considering on the Mississippi at the beginning of the war, and if the nation had possessed any considerable naval strength, the entire river from Cairo to New Orleans might have been secured at the outset. But, while a navy was being provided, there were constructed at favorable points fortifications which for some time secured the greater portion of the river to the Confederacy. The two points which were the last to surrender to the national arms were Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The campaigns—naval and military—which had for their object the reduction of these two strong-holds form the main subject of this and the succeeding chapter. But, before entering directly upon these campaigns, we shall briefly review the previous naval history of the war on the Mississippi.

The importance of a navy on our Western rivers was early appreciated. A month after the capture of Fort Sumter, Commander John Rodgers was summoned to Washington, and to him was assigned the duty of creating the Western navy. In the first stages of the undertaking, the War Department, under Secretary Cameron, assumed the expense and supervision; and it was not until the autumn of 1861 that the matter was transferred to the charge of the Navy Department, where it properly belonged.

Rodgers, an officer fitly chosen to organize the armed flotilla of the West, was son of the distinguished Commodore John Rodgers, one of the fathers of the American Navy. A native of Maryland, he had entered the naval service of the United States in 1828, at an early age. He had seen much service as midshipman and lieutenant; had been for two years engaged in boat service on the coast of Florida, in the war with the Seminoles and in the Coast Survey Expedition; in 1852 had been appointed second in command of the North Pacific and Behring Straits Exploring Expedition, and, succeeding to the chief command of that expedition on account of the severe illness of Captain Ringgold, had taken his vessel, the Vincennes, farther into the Arctic region than a ship-of-war had ever before penetrated; and when the rebellion broke out he had reported for active service, and had been sent to Norfolk to attempt the rescue of the vessels there, but, arriving too late to accomplish this, had been assigned to the difficult and dangerous duty of blowing up the dry-dock. It was from Norfolk that Rodgers was, on May 16, 1861, summoned to Washington to receive orders respecting his mission to the West. Entering immediately upon this mission, he went to work heartily. He purchased steamers, which, under his supervision, were fitted, armed, and armored as gun-boats. But it was a slow and difficult undertaking, demanding much skill, and more than ordinary perseverance. The question of the comparative power of even iron-clad gun-boats as against forts was still one about which a great deal might be said on both sides. Even as we look back now and consider what the war has taught us in regard to the solution of this vexed problem, we hesitate to pronounce definitely, satisfying ourselves with the somewhat vague conclusion that the result depends as much upon one member of the equation as the other. In the instances of successful reduction of forts by gun-boats, the case might have been reversed if the enemy had constructed better fortifications. Certain it is that Foote was severely repulsed at Donelson, though he had been so victorious at Henry; and that nearly all the captures of forts during the war were the immediate consequence of assaults with an overwhelming military force, the ships accomplishing little beyond the silencing of the enemy's guns.

Commander Rodgers never took any of his vessels into action. He became the victim of covetous contractors, and, at the suggestion of General Fremont, who afterward regretted the circumstance, was relieved by A. H. Foote, September 6, 1861. The new naval commander, on his arrival in the West, found three wooden vessels in commission, besides which there were, in process of construction, nine iron-clad gun-boats and thirty-eight mortar-boats. There was not a single navy yard or dépôt on any of the rivers. Much embarrassment was occasioned by the paucity of funds and the want of ordnance. Even after the boats were completed it was found difficult to man them. These obstacles were surmounted by Flag-officer[1] Foote, "whose perseverance and courage," says Secretary Welles, "were scarcely surpassed by the heroic qualities displayed in subsequent well-fought actions on the decks of the gun-boats he had under so many discouragements prepared."

In the month of February Foote was able to bring against Fort Henry seven gun-boats—the Essex, St. Louis, Carondelet, Cincinnati, Tyler, Lexington, and Conestoga, of which the last three were wooden. In that fight the Cincinnati and Essex were disabled, and could not be brought against Fort Donelson a week later. In the naval action at Donelson the Tyler also was absent on the Tennessee, but the two iron-clads were replaced by the Louisville and Pittsburg. Foote declared that if the battle could have been postponed one week, he could also have brought eight of his mortar-boats into action. Besides the nine gun-boats involved in the attacks on Henry and Donelson, three others—the Benton, Mound City, and Cairo—were ready for action in a few days. At Island No. 10, in March, sixteen mortar-boats were engaged. From a letter written about this time by General Strong to Foote, it appears that the Confederates then had "thirteen gun-boats independent of the five below New Madrid, and the Manassas, or ram, at Memphis." These vessels were, however, far inferior to Foote's gun-boats, as was shown shortly afterward; yet they excited considerable apprehension, for Farragut's fleet had not then entered the river from below. From this time additions to the gun-boat fleet of the Western navy were slowly made. By the close of 1862, the Tuscumbia, the Baron De Kalb, and the Osage had been added, and there were in process of construction the Neosho, Indianola, Choctaw, and Chillicothe. The Ozark was completed in 1863. Including these, the gun-boat fleet consisted of twenty vessels, with an armament of about 170 guns, and a tonnage of nearly 10,000 tons. Nine or ten more gun-boats were added before the close of the war.[2] Of the gun-boats added to the Western fleet during the year after the fight at Donelson, the Tuscumbia was among the largest.[3] The Mound City was blown up in July, 1862, on the White River, and subsequently the Cairo met a similar fate on the Yazoo.

Next to the vessels known as gun-boats, Ellet's steam-ram fleet held the most important place in the Mississippi squadron. Charles Ellet bore the same relation to steam rams as Ericsson to the monitors. He was a native of Pennsylvania. As a civil engineer he had gained a reputation which was well earned. His treatise on "The Laws of Trade in Reference to Works of Internal Improvement," published in Philadelphia in 1837, was an exhaustive work on the subject, and attracted considerable attention. A few years afterward he was chosen by the War Department to survey the Lower Mississippi. It was an important object of his life to carry out a scheme which he had conceived for improving the navigation of the Western rivers.[4] He was so impressed with this project that, in honor of it, he named his son Charles *Rivers* Ellet. It is not more remarkable that De Soto found

tem, or rather want of system, seems to be a failure; and, unless some such combination of works as is suggested by General Humphreys be adopted, planting on the fertile river lands must ever be a precarious undertaking, with the weight of the chances largely against success. The distinguished engineer who conducted the survey referred to estimated the total cost of works to protect the country from the Ohio to the Gulf at $26,000,000. The country thus reclaimed and protected would easily bear a tax of an amount sufficient to pay the interest on this sum, to keep the works in repair, and, finally, to liquidate the debt. This, like all other physical problems, must be capable of determination. The water brought down the Mississippi is not infinite; its quantity, its velocity, its pressure, are measurable; the height and strength of levees, and the capacity of outlet required to confine and discharge the annual floods brought down, are therefore determinable measurements. To solve the problem, it is only necessary that a competent superintendent, clothed with ample authority over every portion of the territory to be protected, be charged with the task, so that the whole work may be carried on and completed in accordance with some well-established system."—*N. Y. Tribune*, May 26th, 1866.

[1] This title remained in existence until the operation of an act of Congress of July 16, 1862. By this act the officers of the navy were distributed into nine grades, taking rank according to the date of commission in each grade, as follows:

GRADES IN THE NAVY.	CORRESPONDING GRADES IN THE ARMY.
1. Rear Admirals.	1. Major Generals.
2. Commodores.	2. Brigadier Generals.
3. Captains.	3. Colonels.
4. Commanders.	4. Lieutenant Colonels.
5. Lieutenant Commanders.	5. Majors.
6. Lieutenants.	6. Captains.
7. Masters.	7. First Lieutenants.
8. Ensigns.	8. Second Lieutenants.
9. Midshipmen.	

In regard to the change thus introduced, Secretary Welles, in his Report for 1862, says: "The act of July 16, 1862, 'to Establish and Equalize the Grade of Line Officers of the United States Navy,' does justice in conferring ranks and grades that had until that time been withheld from as meritorious and gallant a class of officers as ever devoted their days and periled their lives for their country. Though the justice to which they were entitled has been long delayed, it was gracefully and generously rendered by the present Congress, and has been and is appreciated by the brave men who are its recipients, and by all attached to the service, as a just recognition of the worth and ability of the officers of the American Navy. . . . The commanders of our squadrons now hold rank with those of other naval powers on the ocean, on distant service, and wherever they carry our flag, or appear as the representatives of their country."—Page 40.

Flag-officers Goldsborough, Dupont, Farragut, and Foote were nominated to the Senate for the grade of rear-admiral on the day subsequent to the approval of the act. Other officers—among whom were captains Stewart, Read, Gregory, Stringham, and Paulding—were the same day nominated for rear-admirals on the retired list.

Subsequently, in 1864, the rank of vice-admiral was created by Congress, to correspond with the revived grade of lieutenant general in the army. The bill creating this rank, originating in the Senate, passed the House December 20, and was approved on the 21st by the President, who the same day nominated Farragut to the new office. After the close of the war Congress created the rank of general in the army, and the corresponding rank of admiral in the navy, to which ranks U. S. Grant and David G. Farragut were respectively assigned.

[2] There were building in May, 1864, the following iron-clad vessels for the Mississippi squadron: The Catawba, 2 guns, 970 tons; the Chickasaw, 2 guns, 970 tons; the Etlah, 2 guns, 614 tons; the Kickapoo, 4 guns, 970 tons; the Klamath, 2 guns, 614 tons; the Koka, 2 guns, 614 tons; the Milwaukee, 4 guns, 970 tons; and the Oneota, 2 guns, 1034 tons.

[3] The Tuscumbia had an armament of five guns—three eleven-inch Dahlgrens forward, and two 100-lb. rifled guns in battery aft. Her sides were plated with three-inch, and her deck with one-inch wrought iron; the plates over the batteries, or gun-rooms, were six inches thick forward, and four aft. Her timbers were very strong, her build stanch, and her outfit complete. A bulwark of iron, loop-holed for musketry, was placed around her guards. She had also an apparatus for throwing a stream of water 200 feet.

[4] "Mr. Ellet found that the use of dikes, or levees, along the banks caused the water to rise higher between them, because the river was previously wont to fill the swamps adjacent. Either fresh outlets must be formed for the tremendous accumulation of water somewhere above the present Delta, or the levees must be raised indefinitely, at an enormous cost, and with a continual danger of breaking away. His remedy proposed for the navigation of the Ohio seemed to be the most natural, the most secure, and the cheapest, as well as the most beneficial to apply to the Mississippi. He advocated the building of dams on the Ohio or other tributaries, to improve their navigation and secure the lower valley from inundation, and urged Congress to adopt the work for the general benefit of the country."—*Harper's Magazine*, vol. xxxii., p. 297.

his grave in the waters of the Mississippi, which he discovered, than that both the Ellets, father and son, perished in the attempt to secure, by their warlike invention of rams, that very navigation which the father had sought to improve by peaceful measures for so many years.[1]

After the seizure of the Norfolk Navy Yard, and when uneasiness had been aroused by the report that the Confederates were converting frigates and steamers into iron-clad rams, Ellet appreciated the threatened danger, and in a printed memorial to Congress, dated Georgetown, February 6, 1862, a month before the appearance of the Merrimac, he gave the government a warning as to the consequences which might ensue upon the appearance of these Confederate rams.[2] The government listened to this final appeal, though it was not until the appearance of the Merrimac, and the events which followed had fully vindicated Ellet's judgment, that the latter was summoned to the aid of Secretary Stanton. Foote was at this time very anxious on account of Confederate rams on the Mississippi, and he knew he had no vessels which could meet these rams on equal terms. Here was an opportunity to test Ellet's favorite project. He was sent West by Secretary Stanton with authority to purchase and convert into rams such vessels as he should deem suited to his purposes. With a colonel's commission, he set out on the 26th of March. At Pittsburg he purchased five powerful tow-boats, the Lioness, Samson, Mingo, Fulton, and Homer. The hulls were strengthened, the bows filled with solid timber, the boilers protected by a double tier of oak twenty-four inches thick, and the pilot-house plated against musketry. At Cincinnati he purchased four side-wheel steamers of great power, as being more readily handled in the strong current of the Mississippi—the Queen of the West, Monarch, Switzerland, and Lancaster. But for Colonel Ellet's extraordinary personal influence he would never have been able to obtain men for his rams, although he had permission to recruit from the army. The project was deemed not only a visionary, but a perilous one. His brother, Alfred W. Ellet, then a captain in the Fifty-ninth Illinois, brought his own company, with another from the Sixty-third Illinois, and met the boats at Cairo. For firemen Ellet was mainly indebted to negroes.

CHARLES ELLET.

We turn now from the Mississippi squadron, which before the end of 1862 numbered about 80 vessels—gun-boats, rams, mortar-boats, and side-wheel steamers—to Farragut's fleet, which, after the fall of New Orleans, occupied the Lower Mississippi. This fleet consisted of two parts: vessels of the West Gulf squadron, and Admiral D. D. Porter's mortar flotilla.[3] At the close of 1861 the entire Gulf squadron numbered 21 vessels, with 282 guns and 1000 men. This squadron was divided into an Eastern and Western, February 21, 1862. The former was under the command of Flag-officer McKean, who was relieved June 4, 1862, by acting Rear-admiral Lardner, who was shortly succeeded by Commodore Theodorus Bailey. The limits of this eastern squadron comprised the southern and western portions of the Florida coast, commencing at Cape Canaveral and extending to Pensacola. Westward from and including Pensacola, the West Gulf squadron extended to the Rio Grande. This latter was a very important command, for two reasons: first, on account of the operations against New Orleans, which had been contemplated ever since the early autumn of 1861; and, secondly, on account of the importance of the blockade in this quarter, within the limits of which were included the ocean outlets of the Mississippi Valley. David G. Farragut, then captain, afterward admiral, vice-admiral, and finally Admiral of the United States Navy, was wisely chosen to command this de-

CHARLES RIVERS ELLET.

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[1] In order that the reader may fully comprehend Mr. Ellet's connection with steam rams previous to the war, we transcribe a few paragraphs from the article in *Harper's Magazine*, already referred to:

"It was in the winter of 1854–5, at Lausanne, in Switzerland, that home of wandering savans, during the siege of Sebastopol, when the Russians spoke of sinking their splendid fleet, that Mr. Ellet first revolved in his mind the plan of protecting and strengthening war vessels, so that they might be used as rams; that thus, instead of sinking their fleet, the Russians might sink that of the allies, and raise the blockade of the harbor. In December, probably, he wrote to the Russian government, giving a detailed statement of his plan, which was thankfully received, but, in consequence of the death of the emperor soon after, was overlooked and never acted upon. In the following April (26th) he addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, through Mr. John Y. Mason, our minister at Paris, with the same propositions. These, with a reply and rejoinder from our Navy Department, were afterward published (Richmond, 1855) in pamphlet form, and circulated widely both in the South and in Europe. We were at that time slightly menaced with war with England on the Right of Search question.

"In his prefatory note, dated Richmond, December 1, 1855, Mr. Ellet says:

"'People are accustomed to regard the art of naval warfare as the art of manœuvring cannon, and throwing shot and shell. I wish them to reflect upon the power of a moving steam-boat driven against the enemy who has no means of resistance but his batteries, and to decide which is the more certain warfare. I wish, therefore, to compare the number of fighting steamers which may be sent to any port in the United States from the shores of Europe with the number of river steamers, coasting steamers, steam-tugs, and even ferry-boats, which might be found ready to meet them here.'

"This remarkable pamphlet, upon which must be based his claims to the paternity of the steam ram, is so forcible and explicit, that it should be given entire did space allow. Like all he ever wrote, it is clear, earnest, well reasoned, and nervous in style. He says:

"'My plan is simply to convert the steamer into a battering-ram, and to enable her to fight, not with her guns, but with her momentum. In short, I propose to strengthen the steamer throughout in the most substantial manner, so that she may run head on into the enemy, or burst in his ribs, or drive a hole into his hull below the water-line. A hole only two feet square, four feet under water, will sink an ordinary frigate in sixteen minutes.'

"He then minutely details the altering or building of ships for his purpose. And then he adds:

"'I have read accounts of five or six accidental collisions at sea in the last six months—sometimes by steamers running into sailing vessels, and sometimes by sailing vessels running into steamers—and in every case the vessel struck in the waist was sunk, and the vessel which ran into her was able to keep on her course. For harbor defense, however much we may continue to build and arm forts and batteries, I think we should not neglect also to build *floating batteries—rams*—great steamers, as near shot and shell proof as they can be made, with a strength of hull, speed, and power that will enable them to crush in the side of a man-of-war by simple collision.

"'To my understanding, the efficacy of the plan which I recommend is self-evident. *And I hold myself ready to carry it out in all its details whenever the day arrives that the United States is about to become engaged in a naval contest.*'

"To this letter the following remarkable answer was returned:

"'Navy Department, Washington, D. C., March 21, 1855.

"'Sir,—The receipt of your letter of the 25th ult. is acknowledged, and the Department tenders you its thanks for the views expressed therein. The suggestion to convert steamers into battering-rams, and, by the momentum, make them a means of sinking an enemy's ships, was proposed as long ago as 1832, and has been renewed many times since by various officers of the navy. No practical test has been undertaken; but with the necessary speed, strength, and weight, a large steamer on the plan proposed by you would introduce an entire change in naval warfare.

"'Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'Charles W. Welch, Acting Secretary of the Navy.'

"In reply to this, Mr. Ellet, on the 16th of August, sent another letter to the Navy Department, through Mr. Buchanan, then our minister in London, in which letter he still more strenuously urges the adoption of his plan. The Secretary of the Navy, J. C. Dobbin, in a very courteous reply, dismissed the subject, stating that the Department had no power, but by special vote of Congress, 'to undertake the construction of proper vessels and machinery for experimenting.'

"In the letter which elicited this last reply Mr. Ellet discusses the objections which are likely to be raised against his plan, such as that his own vessel might be sunk or hopelessly damaged in engine or vital parts by the collision or by hostile shot. With our late remarkable experience we can see that these objections fall to the ground. But from the data before him he reasoned correctly that the danger from collision would be immensely against the vessel struck; and in the danger from shot, he entered into a nice calculation of the probabilities of a vessel being struck in a vital part, between the points of extreme range and that of close contact, by which he showed that the chances were reduced to an inappreciable fraction.

"When we consider how the allied fleet bombarded the fortress of Sweaborg, defended by about 800 guns, for the space of forty-five hours, without suffering the loss of a single man by the enemy's shot, 'in consequence of the continual movement of the ships,' as the Russian general alleged, and as we also recall some very remarkable engagements of our own in the late war, we may appreciate the prevision of our advocate. The bombardment of Port Royal and the experience of blockade-runners confirm the result of his calculations.

"Among the cases of accidental collisions cited are several remarkable ones, all tending to the support of his theory. The well-known sinking of the Arctic by the Vesta, with great loss of life; the Wellington, of 131 guns, damaged by a sailing ship; the Imperatrice, steamer, sunk almost immediately by the schooner Commerce; the Victoria, ship, sunk in two minutes by a small Sardinian steamer; the brigantine Henry, run into by a diminutive steamer and lost immediately.

"In 1842, the Hudson River steamer Empire, coming into New York with a new pilot on a misty morning, ran fairly into a new wharf with the full power of the engine, forcing the bow of the boat through the timber facing of logs eighteen inches square, then through a solid stone filling eight and a half feet thick, and then through earth and rubbish seventeen feet farther, making a chasm of twelve feet wide at the logs, twenty-seven feet long, and seventeen feet deep. The only injury sustained by the boat was the breaking of one of her oblique braces and a slight leak at the stem.

"Now, if such is the effect of a frail river steamer upon an object of this sort, what must be expected of a vessel built and armed for the very purpose of a ram? There is another example, memorable for the tragical, mysterious manner in which it occurred. It may be recollected that, a few years ago, an American vessel, with an English captain, was hired, it is supposed, to run down a Russian ship of war in the Baltic. He strengthened his bows with solid timber, and followed the war vessel out of St. Petersburg, and in the gray of dawn next morning, when near the Categat, while his crew were asleep or below decks, he took the helm himself and ran into the Russian ship with the power of sails merely, and instantaneously sunk her with her crew of three hundred souls.

"'The practical conclusion,' says Mr. Ellet, 'to be drawn from these facts is apparent. If vessels built for ordinary commercial purposes, and propelled either by steam or sail, invariably sink the vessel they strike with their bow when running with any considerable velocity, while themselves receiving but little injury from the collision, it follows, of necessity and *à fortiori*, that a steamer expressly designed for such conflict, well fortified at the bow, strongly built throughout, divided longitudinally and centrally by a solid partition reaching from kelson to deck and from stem to stern, and transversely by other partitions, separating the hull into six or eight water-tight compartments, and horizontally by one or more partitions or floors, of which one shall be below the water-line when light—I say it follows of necessity that such a vessel, skillfully framed and properly fastened, may be driven at high speed against any ship of ordinary construction in the certainty that the ship struck will go down and the battering ship float.'

"All this, which is familiar knowledge to us in 1865, was foreseen and reasoned out in 1855. At that time Mr. Ellet was living in Richmond. His views, as set forth by his pamphlet, addresses to Congress, and by conversation and newspaper communications, were all well known. Here, indeed, is the germ of the idea wrought out but partially by the rebels after their seizure of the navy yard at Norfolk. To the suggestion that the enemy could strengthen his ships, and meet them ram with ram, it is only necessary to add that this is a fundamental condition of all civilized warfare, and will occur under every species of construction, armament, or defense."

[2] We make the following extract from this memorial:

"Steam Rams.—It is not generally known that the rebels now have five steam rams nearly ready for use. Of these, two are on the Lower Mississippi, two are at Mobile, and one is at Norfolk. The last of the five is doubtless the most formidable, being the steam frigate Merrimac, which has been so strengthened that, in the opinion of the rebels, it may be used as a ram. But we have not yet a single vessel at sea, nor, so far as I know, in course of construction, able to cope with a well-built ram. If the Merrimac is permitted to escape from the Elizabeth River, she will be almost certain to commit great depredation on our armed or unarmed vessels in Hampton Roads, and may even be expected to pass out under the guns of Fortress Monroe and prey upon our commerce in Chesapeake Bay. Indeed, if the alterations have been skillfully made, and she succeed in getting to sea, she will not only be a terrible scourge to our commerce, but may prove also to be a most dangerous visitor to our blockading squadron off the harbors of our Southern coasts.

"I have attempted to call the attention of the Navy Department and of the country so often to this subject during the last seven years that I almost hesitate to allude to it again, and would not do so here but that I think the danger from these tremendous engines is very imminent, but not at all appreciated."

[3] Farragut's fleet was constituted thus:

Steam-sloops.		*Steam-sloop.*		*Mortar Fleet.*	
Hartford	24 guns.	Sciota	4 guns.	H. Beals.	
Richmond	26 "	*Sailing-sloop.*		J. Griffith.	
Pensacola	24 "	Portsmouth	17 "	Racer.	
Brooklyn	24 "	*Mortar Fleet.*		S. Bruen.	
Mississippi	12 "	Norfolk Packet.		H. Jones.	
Colorado	28 "	Arletta.		Dan. Smith.	
Gun-boats.		Sophronia.		*Vessels accompanying Mortars.*	
Iroquois	9 "	Para.		Harriet Lane	4 guns.
Oneida	9 "	C. P. Williams.		Miami	7 "
Varuna	12 "	O. H. Lee.		Westfield	6 "
Cayuga	6 "	W. Bacon.		Clifton	6 "
Winona	4 "	T. A. Ward.		Uncas	5 "
Katahdin	4 "	A. Dugel.		Owasco	5 "
Itaska	4 "	M. Vassar.		Octorara	10 "
Kineo	4 "	C. Mungham.		Sea Foam	5 "
Wissahickon	4 "	M. J. Carlton.		A. Houghton	2 "
Pinola	4 "	S. C. Jones.		*Coast Survey Vessel.*	
Kennebec	4 "	Orvetta.		Sachem	5 "

The Octorara did not arrive until after the capture of New Orleans. Each of the mortar-boats mounted a bomb and two guns. Some of the vessels accompanying the mortars were only armed tugs.



ADMIRAL PORTER'S MORTAR FLEET.

partment. After July 11 Pensacola became the great naval dépôt for the West Gulf squadron.

Farragut sailed from Hampton Roads to take the command on February 2, 1862, and, arriving at Ship Island on the 20th, began to organize his fleet. Two months were consumed in these preparations, the greatest difficulty being encountered in landing the vessels of heavy draught. After every effort had been made, the Colorado and the Wabash could not be got over the bar. The entire fleet sent against New Orleans, including the vessels withdrawn from the blockade, consisted of 48 vessels, with about 300 guns and 20 bombs. Porter's mortar flotilla had been organized at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in the winter of 1861–2, and performed a very important part in the opening of the Mississippi. In Farragut's entire fleet there was not a single iron-clad vessel.

The most brilliant naval period of the war — if the brilliancy of naval operations depend upon their success in actual engagement with the enemy's ships and forts — is comprised within the brief space of four months, beginning February 6, and ending June 6, 1862. Yet this was far from being the period of our greatest naval strength. Very much stronger expeditions were fitted out afterward, but they failed of success, except in one or two instances.[1]

Let us review the brief, but eventful and satisfactory record of these four months. The capture of Fort Henry, February 6, was the first of a series of victories on the Western rivers that aroused the nation from a situation, if not of doubt, at least of a negative sort of confidence, to one of positive hope and courage. The capture of Donelson ten days later, though it could scarcely be called a naval victory, still derived a large measure of its importance from its bearings upon the progress of naval operations. It gave us command of the Cumberland, as the victory at Fort Henry had given us command of the Tennessee. It was followed, within the space of a fortnight, by the evacuation of Columbus and Nashville. The Confederates held New Madrid until March 14, when their communications had been cut off by General Pope. In the capture of Island No. 10, April 7, the army under Pope, and the naval squadron under Foote, had an equal share. Here there was no battle, but there were captured nearly 7000 prisoners and a large amount of war material, including 100 siege-guns. The crossing of Pope's force to the rear of the enemy, on the west side of the Mississippi, by the aid of the gun-boats, had secured the victory without the loss of a single man.

Before the close of April, Farragut, with his fleet, had steamed past Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and, arriving before New Orleans, held the city under his guns. Lovell's fleet had been disposed of in a short but sharp conflict during the passage by the forts. This was purely a naval victory. New Orleans was conquered by Farragut, and the forts surrendered to Admiral Porter, commanding the mortar fleet. Butler's army, numbering about 14,000 men, became an army of occupation. The capture of New Orleans

[1] It would be unfair to infer that because our navy was not always successful in these gigantic expeditions, that it ceased, after the period we have indicated, to be an important element in the war. Our blockading squadrons were from the first indispensable to success. If the monitors accomplished little in actual service, they were none the less a security against foreign intervention. The extent of our iron-clad fleet made it useless for the Confederates to organize a fleet of any sort. Though the Confederates could construct forts which baffled our fleets, yet the latter, co-operating with the army, were of the greatest service, of which service one of the most memorable instances was the capture of Fort Fisher. And the instances are not a few in which our armies were saved from disaster by the presence of gun-boats. Two or three of the inferior gun-boats of the Mississippi squadron, in several important Western battles, were of greater value than an entire military division could have been. At Belmont, the Tyler and Lexington saved Grant's army from defeat. At Pittsburg Landing, the same gun-boats, if they did not save the first day's battle, at least, by the moral effect of their presence, rendered the defeat far less disastrous than it might otherwise have been. On February 4, 1863, the Lexington, assisted by the A. S. Robb and other boats, repulsed 4500 Confederates at Dover, Tennessee. At Helena, five months later, the Tyler enabled an inferior national force to hold the position against an attack which, under other circumstances, might possibly have succeeded. In the same month (July), at Bluffington Island, Indiana, John Morgan's force was terribly cut up by the Alleghany, Naumkeag, and three other boats. Although the navy, acting alone, was unable to capture Vicksburg, it not only rendered some of the most brilliant feats of General Grant's campaign against that post possible, but also, after the victory, secured the permanent possession of the river far more effectively than a reserve force of one hundred thousand men could have done. It was due to our great naval strength alone that, after the termination of the Vicksburg campaign, the Confederates were compelled to adopt the line of defense running eastward and southward from Chattanooga, keeping aloof from the great Western rivers.



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE BASIN OF THE MISSISSIPPI.



CHARLES H. DAVIS.

was, thus far, the most substantial triumph of the war. It was to the South a greater disaster, comparatively, than the loss of New York City would have been to the North.

In the mean time, Foote was engaged in an expedition against Fort Pillow, which he had undertaken directly after the surrender of Island No. 10. But Pope's army abandoned him April 17th, to join the army moving upon Corinth, and left him helpless. Early in May, this gallant naval officer, still suffering from his wound, was, at his own request, relieved, and the command of the Mississippi squadron was assigned to Captain C. H. Davis. A little more than a year after his resignation of this command Admiral Foote died, while making preparations to depart for Charleston, to relieve Admiral Dupont. The day after Davis assumed the command—May 10—the Confederate fleet at Memphis came up the river and engaged the squadron, but withdrew, defeated, after an hour's fight, having, however, succeeded in badly crippling the Cincinnati and the Mound City. The evacuation of Corinth gave us Fort Pillow without a battle, June 4, and the next day the city of Memphis was surrendered.

But before the surrender of Memphis there was a spirited conflict with Montgomery's fleet. Davis left Fort Pillow, June 5, with a fleet of nine boats—five gun-boats, two tugs, and two of Colonel Ellet's rams, the Queen of the West and the Monarch. Montgomery, with his eight boats, had threatened to "send Lincoln's gun-boats to the bottom," and the inhabitants of Memphis gathered upon the hill-side to witness this expected catastrophe. The fight which followed has already been described in a previous chapter. It was here that Ellet redeemed all the promises which he had made for his rams. The two rams alone could have sunk the entire fleet.[1] Colonel Ellet in person commanded the Queen of the West, which was his flag-ship. His brother, Alfred Ellet, commanded the Monarch. During the progress of the fight, Colonel Ellet, stepping out upon the forward part of the deck to observe the effect of a blow which he had given the Lovell, and which was sinking the latter, received a bullet in his knee. The wound proved to be a dangerous one, and amputation became necessary; but the colonel resisted stoutly, declaring that "the life should go first." Two weeks after the battle he was conveyed to Cairo on one of his rams—the Switzerland—and died on reaching the wharf on the morning of June 21. He left his brother Alfred in command of the ram fleet.

After the capture of Memphis, four of the gun-boats, with an Indiana regiment under Colonel Fitch, were dispatched to the White River to open communication with General Curtis, who had advanced to Batesville. Some batteries were carried at St. Charles, but the main object of the expedition was not accomplished, and General Curtis, in order to find a base of operations, was obliged to transfer his army from Batesville to Helena, on the Mississippi.

Meanwhile Farragut's fleet had been advancing up the river. The Iroquois, under Commander Palmer, arrived off Baton Rouge May 7. The authorities, ordered to surrender, indulged in the same mock-heroic nonsense which the mayor and council of New Orleans had been indulging in the week before. They were determined that the city of Baton Rouge should not "be surrendered voluntarily to any power on earth." There was no military force, the mayor added, in the city, and its possession by the Federals "must be without the consent and against the wish of the peaceable inhabitants." He declined to hoist the national flag because it was "offensive to the sensibilities of the people." Palmer, "determined to submit to no such nonsense," took possession of the arsenal, barracks, and other public property of the United States. No resistance was offered. In a note to Mayor Bryan, on the 9th, Palmer informed him that he had taken possession of the arsenal, and hoisted over it the United States flag, and added: "War is a sad calamity, and often inflicts severer wounds than those upon the sensibilities. I therefore trust I may be spared from resorting to any of its dire extremities; but I warn you, Mr. Mayor, that this flag must remain unmolested, though I have no force on shore to protect it. The rash act of some individual may cause your city to pay a bitter penalty." Farragut, having come up on May 10, continued the mayor in office, and encouraged the employment which the latter had already made of the foreign corps as a police guard for the maintenance of good order. Baton Rouge was the first place of importance above New Orleans, from which it was distant about 140 miles. It was situated on a plateau 40 or 50 feet above high water, on the east bank of the river; was the capital of Louisiana, and had a population, in 1860, of 5498.

Fifteen miles above Baton Rouge is Natchez, in Mississippi. This place Palmer, with the Iroquois and other gun-boats, reached on the 12th. He addressed a note to the mayor, which the citizens at the landing refused to receive. Palmer then seized a ferry-boat which was loading with coal, put aboard of it a force of seamen, a few marines, and two howitzers, and sent the expedition across the river, with orders to see that the mayor received the note. But there was no occasion to land this force, as two members of the Common Council were already in waiting with the mayor's apology. Mayor Hunter submitted to the necessities of the situation, if not with remarkable grace, at least without any heroic bluster. But Natchez was of

[1] "While the engagement," writes Captain Davis, "was going on in this manner, two vessels of the ram-fleet, under command of Colonel Ellet, steamed rapidly by us, and ran boldly into the enemy's line. Several conflicts had taken place between the rams before the flotilla (of gun-boats), led by the Benton, moving at a slower rate, could arrive at the closest quarters. In the mean time, however, the firing from the gun-boats was continuous, and exceedingly well directed. The General Beauregard and the Little Rebel were struck in the boilers and blown up.

"The ram, Queen of the West, which Colonel Ellet commanded in person, encountered with full power the rebel steamer General Lovell, and sunk her, but in so doing sustained pretty serious damage. Up to this time the rebel fleet had maintained its position, and used its guns with great spirit. These disasters compelled the remaining vessels to resort to their superiority in speed as the only means of safety. A running fight took place, which lasted nearly an hour, and carried us ten miles below the city. The attack made by the two rams under Colonel Ellet, which took place before the flotilla closed in with the enemy, was bold and successful."



NATCHEZ UPON THE HILL.



NATCHEZ UNDER THE HILL.

little military importance, and had never been occupied by any military force; it was therefore abandoned.

Thus far no resistance had been encountered by the fleet since the capture of New Orleans. It was therefore somewhat of a surprise, doubtless, to S. P. Lee, commanding the advanced naval division of Farragut's squadron, when, on May 18, in reply to his demand for the surrender of Vicksburg, he received the defiant response, "Mississippians don't know, and refuse to learn, how to surrender to an enemy. If Commodore Farragut or General Butler can teach them, let them come and try!" Such, indeed, was the answer returned to the demand by James L. Antry, military governor and colonel commanding the post. M. L. Smith, a brigadier general in command of the military defenses of Vicksburg, replied, on his own account, that he had been ordered to hold the defenses, and that it was his intention to do so as long as it was in his power. L. Lindsay, mayor of the city, added his refusal to that of the military authorities. "As far as the municipal authorities are concerned," he said, "we have erected no defenses, and none are within the corporative limits of the city." Phillips, on the 21st, gave Mayor Lindsay notice to remove the women and children of Vicksburg beyond the reach of his guns, as any attack upon the defenses must injure or destroy the town. This notice was given by Phillips for the purpose of placing it at his own option whether he should fire or not immediately upon the expiration of the truce. And thus the matter rested. Phillips, however, did not make an attack.

Above and below Vicksburg the river was now entirely in the possession of the national forces. A co-operating military force only half as large as that which secured the victories at New Madrid and Island No. 10 could at this time have compelled the surrender of Vicksburg, and opened the Mississippi from Cairo to New Orleans. But the whole available military force in the West was then being collected together against Beauregard's army at Corinth. Even Curtis's force in Arkansas had been so far reduced for this purpose that it was unable to assume the offensive. From General Butler's department no troops could be spared, since, after garrisoning Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Ship Island and Baton Rouge, there was left a force barely sufficient to defend New Orleans against such an attack as might be expected.

But for Vicksburg—an obstacle which was not overcome for nearly fourteen months—the river, we have said, was completely possessed. But armed vessels and transports, passing up and down, were frequently annoyed by attacks from guerrillas and concealed batteries. Porter, on his way up the river with the mortars, was thus attacked at Ellis's Bluffs on June 3.



ELLIS'S BLUFFS.

Whenever these attacks were made in the vicinity of towns, it was found necessary to retaliate by holding the inhabitants responsible; and if they were repeated, the villages or towns, as the case might be, were in some instances destroyed. Natchez, Grand Gulf, and Donaldsonville, in the course of the year, suffered severely from punishments inflicted upon them in this way. The most serious collision of this nature took place early in June, at Grand Gulf. The Confederates were just then beginning to fortify that place, and Commander Palmer, fearing that the passage down the river might be obstructed, sent down the Wissahickon and Itaska, under Commander De Camp, to reduce the newly-erected batteries. These vessels arrived off Grand Gulf on the morning of June 9, when they were attacked from the shore with rifled and other cannon. After an action of two hours, in which the gun-boats were quite roughly handled, one of them being hulled seventeen and the other twenty-five times, the batteries were silenced. On the vessels one man was killed and five wounded. Palmer then decided to bring down the rest of the squadron from below Vicksburg. His position was one of some difficulty. The batteries above him were manned by a force of 500 artillerists. Their position upon the hill seemed to protect them against serious injury, and the gun-boats had much to fear from their plunging fire. He did not dare to leave a few vessels only at Vicksburg. He expected that at any moment the iron-clad ram Arkansas might come down from the Yazoo. Fort Pillow, too, had just been evacuated; and, not aware of the destruction of the Confederate fleet at Memphis, he feared that the vessels of that fleet might, in conjunction with the Arkansas, attempt a raid against his little squadron. The fortifications of Vicksburg were daily being strengthened by the arrival of new guns and ammunition. His gun-boats were "all of them in a most crippled condition;" the sick-list had largely increased; the time of the men on the Colorado had expired; he was almost out of both coal and provisions, and had little oil left for his engines. "Unless supplies come up," he writes, June 10, "we can not stay here a week longer."

Palmer sent the Katahdin and Itaska down as far as to the mouth of Red River to discover if there were any more of those formidable obstacles in the shape of batteries in process of erection, and on the afternoon of the 10th dropped down and shelled the Grand Gulf batteries for an hour. This effected nothing, and he determined, in case of the repetition of an attack from the shore, to burn the town. The attack was repeated, and the town was burned.[1]

[1] Captain Craven, of the Brooklyn, passing up the river a week afterward, reports that he was molested nowhere on his route from Baton Rouge to Vicksburg. Speaking of Grand Gulf, he says: "The town there was in ruins, having been first riddled by shot and then destroyed by fire. On a small hill just to the right of the town was a small earthwork, which had been but recently thrown up, and was capable of receiving three or four field-pieces. This work, as well as the town, was entirely deserted."

Grand Gulf had been fired upon previously, on which occasion Lieutenant Commander E. T. Nichols, of the Winona, had notified the Mayor of Rodney, a few miles below, that a similar punishment would be visited upon that place in the event of the batteries in that vicinity firing upon the national vessels. This notification led to the following correspondence:

[No. 1.]

"Jackson, Mississippi, June 12, 1862.

"SIR,—I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter received by the Mayor of Rodney, notifying him, in substance, that if the vessels of the United States Navy are fired upon by our troops from or near the town, vengeance will be taken upon the women and children, or, as the writer is pleased to term it, 'punishment for the offense will be visited upon the town;' and this, too, that 'we are not here to war upon unarmed and peaceable citizens.'

"Where two nations are at war, it has been customary, among civilized people, 'to punish the offense' of an attack by the armed forces of one upon those of the other by a combat with the attacking party. If such attack be made from a town, the assaulting party is not entitled to, and, so far as our troops are concerned, does not claim, any immunity by reason of the presence of women and children. *What we do claim*, however, and insist upon, is, that when your vessels or transports are fired upon by our troops, they shall not hasten to the nearest collection of unarmed and peaceable women and children, and wreak their vengeance upon them, as was done lately at Grand Gulf by United States vessels in retaliation for an attack with which the town had nothing more to do than had the city of St. Louis.

"My batteries are located at such points upon the river as are deemed best suited for the desired purposes, and without reference to or connection with the people of the town. Should the site happen to fall within a village, you, of course, are at liberty to return the fire. Should it be



VIEW OF VICKSBURG FROM THE RIVER.

Vicksburg, which, as regards heroic and obstinate resistance to the national arms, held almost equal rank with Richmond and Charleston, lies in the State of Mississippi, on the east bank of the river, 400 miles above New Orleans, and about the same distance from Cairo. Its commercial importance is due to its location in the midst of the great cotton-growing country along the Yazoo. It is connected with Jackson, the state capital, by railroad; and from De Soto, on the opposite bank, a railroad, running to Monroe, drains the land commerce of Northern Louisiana. It is the most important, and, at the same time, the most defensible military position on the Mississippi. At the time of the capture of New Orleans, this fact was little appreciated on either side.[1] The population of Vicksburg, before the war, was, in round numbers, 5000. The town, situated on the shelving declivity of high hills, with its dwellings scattered in groups on the terraces, presents a very picturesque appearance.

On the 20th of June, a month after the first appearance of Farragut's fleet off Vicksburg, Brigadier General Thomas Williams left Baton Rouge with a large portion of the garrison which had been there posted, and in four days' time reached a position on the peninsula opposite Vicksburg. He had only four regiments and eight field-guns. The force defending Vicksburg at this time consisted of about 10,000 men.[2] General Williams immediately set about constructing a canal across the narrow neck of the peninsula, on the Louisiana side, which, if successful, would throw Vicksburg and its defenses six miles inland. Of this we shall have more to say hereafter in connection with the projects for getting a position to the rear of the city. Porter's mortar fleet of sixteen vessels had in the mean while moved up the river to Vicksburg. It was now proposed that a junction should be effected between Farragut's fleet and that under Davis's command, as preliminary to as formidable an attempt against the city as it was possible for this combined naval force to make.

In two or three instances already the national vessels had run the gauntlet of Confederate batteries on the Mississippi. The Carondelet on the 4th, and the Pittsburg on the 6th of April, had run past the enemy's fortifications on Island No. 10. In the latter part of the same month, Farragut, with nearly his entire fleet, passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip. He did not, therefore, reckon it an enterprise of very great magnitude or peril to run the Vicksburg blockade. It is not likely that he anticipated any very important results from this operation. He knew well enough that batteries could be passed with much greater ease than they could be taken. But he had been ordered by the Navy Department and the President to do something against Vicksburg, and was disposed to strike the heaviest blow possible with the force he had in hand; and on the night of the 27th of June he had every thing in readiness for the undertaking. The order was given for a movement the next morning. Porter, who had got his mortar fleet and his gun-boats in an advantageous position, and who had been for the past two days employed in ascertaining the range of the enemy's works, was to open fire upon the latter at four o'clock A.M. He was to perform a part similar to that which had been assigned him at New Orleans—that is, he was to stand still and engage the enemy's batteries, while Farragut should pass them with his fleet. This fleet of Farragut's consisted of the

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in the vicinity of one, however, the usages of civilized warfare do not justify its destruction, unless demanded by the necessities of attack or defense.

"I can not bring myself to believe that the barbarous and cowardly policy indicated in the inclosed letter will meet with the approval of any officer of rank or standing in the United States Navy. I have, therefore, thought proper to transmit it to you under a flag of truce, with the confident expectation that you will direct those under your command to confine their offensive operations as far as possible to our troops, and forbid the wanton destruction of defenseless towns, filled with unoffending non-combatants, unless required by imperious military necessity.

"The practice of slaying women and children as an act of retaliation has happily fallen into disuse in this country with the disappearance of the Indian tribes, and I trust it will not be revived by the officers of the United States Navy, but that the demolition and pillage of the unoffending little village of Grand Gulf may be permitted to stand alone and without parallel upon record.

M. LOVELL, Major General Commanding.

"Commanding Officer United States Navy, Mississippi River, near Baton Rouge."

[No. 2.]

"Baton Rouge, June 17, 1862.

"SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th instant, together with its inclosure, in which you are pleased to say that vengeance will be visited upon the women and children of Rodney if our vessels are fired upon from the town. Although I find no such language contained in the letter of Lieutenant Commanding Nichols, or even any from which such inference might be drawn, still I shall meet your general remark on your own terms. You say you locate your batteries 'at such points on the river as are deemed best suited,' etc., without reference to the people of the town, and claim no immunity for your troops. Now, therefore, the violation is with you. You choose your own time and place for an attack upon our defenseless people, and should therefore see that the innocent and defenseless of your own people are out of the way before you make the attack; for rest assured that the fire will be returned, and we will not hold ourselves answerable for the death of the innocent. If we have ever fired upon your 'women and children,' it was done here at Baton Rouge, when an attempt was made to kill one of our officers, landing in a small boat manned by four boys. They were, when in the act of landing, mostly wounded by the fire of some thirty or forty horsemen, who chivalrously galloped out of the town, leaving the women and children to bear the brunt of our vengeance. At Grand Gulf, also, our transports were fired upon in passing, which caused the place to be shelled, with what effect I know not; but I do know that the fate of a town is at all times in the hands of the military commandant, who may at pleasure draw the enemy's fire upon it, and the community is made to suffer for the act of its military.

"The only instance I have known where the language of your letter could possibly apply took place at New Orleans, on the day when we passed up in front of the city, while it was still in your possession, by your soldiers firing on the crowd. I trust, however, that the time is past when women and children will be subjected by their military men to the horrors of war; it is enough for them to be subjected to the incidental inconveniences, privations, and sufferings.

"If any such things have occurred as the slaying of women and children, or innocent people, I feel well assured that it was caused by the act of your military, and much against the will of our officers; for, as Lieutenant Commanding Nichols informs the mayor, we war not against defenseless persons, but against those in open rebellion against our country, and desire to limit our punishment to them, though it may not be always in our power to do so.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. G. FARRAGUT.

"Major General MANSFIELD LOVELL."

[1] So little notion was there of any farther struggle for the possession of Vicksburg, that we find, in an intercepted letter from Mr. Davis's niece, dated May 7, 1862, and addressed to her mother in Mississippi, the following passage: "Uncle Jeff. thinks you are safe at home, as there will be no resistance at Vicksburg, and the Yankees will hardly occupy it, and, even if they did, the army would gain nothing by marching into the country, and a few soldiers would be afraid to go so far into the interior."

[2] This was Captain Craven's estimate (*Rep. Sec. Navy, Accompanying Documents*, p. 309). This estimate tallies with that given by A. S. Abrams, one of the Vicksburg garrison. (See *Abrams's Siege of Vicksburg*, pp. 6 and 7.)

three steam-sloops Brooklyn, Hartford, and Richmond, and the gun-boats Iroquois, Oneida, Wissahickon, Sciota, Winona, Pinola, and Kennebec. The fleet was to form a double line of sailing, so that the gun-boats, advancing in the order named, should form a second line, and fire between the ships. The Hartford, as occasion offered, was to fire her bow guns on the forts at the upper end of the town, while the broadside batteries of all the ships were to be particularly directed to the guns in the forts below and on the heights. "When close enough," ordered Farragut, "give them grape." Upon reaching the bend of the river, which was just above Vicksburg, the Wissahickon, Sciota, Winona, and Pinola were in any case to continue their course, but the other gun-boats were to drop down the river again if the enemy's batteries were not thoroughly silenced.



PORTER'S MORTAR FLEET IN TRIM.

The signal to weigh anchor was given at 2 A.M. on the 28th. At four o'clock, as had been ordered, Porter opened fire from the mortars, and almost at the same moment the Confederates fired their first gun, which was returned by the leading vessels of the fleet as they came up. On Farragut's starboard quarter, Porter brought up the Octorara, Westfield, Clifton, Jackson, Harriet Lane, and Owasco, and united in the attack. By the united efforts of the fleet and the mortar flotilla the Confederate guns were soon silenced, sometimes not replying for several minutes, and then again with but a single gun. The Hartford, in its attack upon the summit batteries, succeeded better than had been expected. The passage up the river was slow, the flag-ship having but eight pounds of steam, and even stopping once in order that the vessels in its stern might close up. The Brooklyn, Kennebec, and Katahdin failed to follow the flag-ship past the batteries, and turned back. The commanders of these vessels gave various explanations of this failure, but they do not seem to have been satisfactory to the commander of the fleet. The vessels which succeeded in passing received some injury, not of a serious character, from the upper batteries, after the latter had been passed, and suffered a loss in men of fifteen killed and thirty wounded. On the vessels which failed to pass there were no casualties. General Williams, on the Louisiana side, had a battery in operation during the action, thus affording a slight support to the fleet.

The whole significance of this bold affair is summed up in a few words by Admiral Farragut, namely, "that the forts can be passed; and we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us." And that was all. We can do no more, he added, than silence the batteries for a time, as long as the enemy has a large force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding the place. He said that it was impossible to take Vicksburg without an army of from 12,000 to 15,000 men. Admiral Porter, in his official report of the action on the 28th, says: "It is to be regretted that a combined attack of army and navy had not been made, by which something more substantial might have been accomplished. Such an attack, I think, would have resulted in the capture of the city. Ships and mortar vessels can keep full possession of the river and places near the water's edge, but they can not crawl up hills 300 feet high, and it is that part of Vicksburg which must be taken by the army. If it was intended merely to pass the batteries at Vicksburg, and make a junction with the fleet of Flag-officer Davis, the navy did it most gallantly and fearlessly.[1] It was as handsome a thing as has been done during the war, for the batteries to be passed extended full three miles, with a three-knot current against ships that could not make eight knots under the most favorable circumstances."

By six o'clock the batteries were passed, and Farragut met Lieutenant Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet, of the ram fleet, who had made his way down the river bank during the night, and who now offered to forward communications to Flag-officer Davis, and to General Halleck, then at Memphis. After effecting a junction with Davis, Farragut applied to Halleck for a military force to co-operate in an immediate attack on Vicksburg. Halleck's reply on the 3d of July was an utter disappointment.

In the mean while Vicksburg was subjected to a bombardment from the mortar-boats above and below. When Farragut passed the batteries there were but few guns mounted.[1] During the progress of the bombardment which followed, General Earl Van Dorn[2] was sent to Vicksburg, and placed in command over Brigadier General M. L. Smith. Soon afterward the garrison was re-enforced by Breckinridge's brigade from Beauregard's army. Van Dorn's appointment to this post, for which he certainly had no peculiar fitness, was received by the Mississippians with enthusiastic pleasure. The hope of successful resistance at this point was every day growing brighter. It was with no little pride that the citizens of Vicksburg contrasted their own position, and the fate of their city thus far, with what they naturally regarded the too facile surrender of other posts on the river. In this pride the ladies of the heroic city had their full share. On the morning of June 28, when Farragut's fleet was on its way past the city, and shells were falling like hail in the streets, crowds of these enthusiastic ladies might have been seen on the Court-house, the "Sky Parlor," and other prominent places in the city, gazing upon "the magnificent scene."[3]

While Vicksburg was being bombarded by mortars, Farragut and Davis

[1] In regard to the conduct of his own men in the bombardment, Admiral Porter says: "They know no weariness, and they really seem to take a delight in mortar-firing, which is painful even to those accustomed to it. It requires more than ordinary zeal to stand the ordeal. Though I may have been at times exacting and fault-finding with them for not conforming to the rules of the service (which requires the education of a lifetime to learn), yet I can not withhold my applause when I see these men working with such earnest and untiring devotion to their duties while under fire."—*Rep. Sec. Navy*, 1862, *Acc. Doc.*, p. 410.

[1] Abrams says only seven.—*Siege Vicks.*, p. 6. This estimate is probably considerably below the mark.

[2] "This doughty Confederate cavalier, of Rosecrans's class at West Point, has greatly astonished his old associates. West Point men of his time remember him as a small, handsome, modest youth, literally at the foot of his class. In Mexico he was on the staff of General P. F. Smith, and was very popular, for to his other qualities he added dashing bravery. His conspicuous course in the rebel interests at the breaking out of the war deceived them into thinking him a general. A good soldier he certainly was—brave, dashing, a splendid horseman, but he lacked *head*, and was always taking his men into *culs de sacs*. He died by the hand of a man who believed he had seduced his wife."—Coppee's *Grant and his Campaigns*, p. 133.

[3] Abrams's *Siege Vicks.*, p. 7.



PASSAGE OF THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES BY FARRAGUT'S FLEET.

organized an expedition to ascend the Yazoo River. General Williams offered to send up a few sharp-shooters from his army to co-operate with the gun-boats Tyler, Carondelet, and the ram Queen of the West, which formed the naval part of the expedition. The object of the movement was to procure correct information concerning the obstructions and defenses of the river. It was known that eighty miles from the mouth there was a raft obstructing the passage with a battery near it below, and above, the new Confederate ram Arkansas, "a vessel represented to be well protected by iron, and very formidable in her battery." To find and capture this ram was the most important part of the expedition. The gun-boats, early on the morning of July 15, had scarcely passed the mouth of the Yazoo when they encountered the Arkansas coming down. This vessel, in her construction, resembled the Louisiana and Mississippi, destroyed at New Orleans. She was built at Memphis, and at the time of the capture of this place she succeeded in escaping up the Yazoo, while a consort of hers, built in the same manner, was destroyed. She was a sea-going steamer of 1200 tons. Her cut-water was a sharp, cast-iron, solid beak. She was thoroughly covered with T rail iron, with heavy bulwarks of thick timber, with cotton-pressed case-mating, impervious to shot. Her port-holes were small, with heavy iron shutters; all her machinery was below the water-line, and she had a battery of ten guns.[1] She was commanded by Isaac N. Brown, and had a picked crew. The gun-boats met the ram about six miles above the mouth of the Yazoo. They were commanded, the Carondelet by Captain H. Walke, the Tyler by Captain Gwin, and the ram Queen of the West by Colonel Alfred Ellet. When the ram was discovered, the gun-boats were proceeding at intervals of a mile apart, the Queen of the West ahead, the Tyler next, and the Carondelet behind. The result of a conflict with the Arkansas was, to say the least, uncertain, and all the national vessels reversed their course, and retreated down the river, keeping up a running fight with



MORTAR BOATS FIRING ON VICKSBURG AT NIGHT.

the Tyler was seen to proceed from the mouth of the Yazoo, with the Arkansas closely following. It was to Admiral Farragut a moment of surprise and of mortification. Had the event been anticipated, the fate of the Arkansas could have been decided in thirty minutes. As it was, the vessels of the fleet were lying with low fires, but none of them had steam, or could get it up in time for so instant an emergency, and the ram escaped without serious injury, though she received a broadside fire from all the national vessels. The Benton, it is true, got under way and pursued the ram for some distance, but at her snail's pace the pursuit seemed only less ludicrous than the situation which would have followed if she had been so unfortunate as to overtake and come into close quarters with her adversary.

Thus far the result of the ram's appearance had not been seriously disastrous. Indeed, though this was not known at the time to her opponents, she was incapable of inflicting a very severe blow. Her smoke-stack had been shivered in pieces early in the action, and for want of steam she could not be used as a ram with any effect. The Carondelet had run ashore, her wheel-ropes being shot away, and would probably have fallen a prey to the Arkansas if the latter had had leisure for improving her opportunity. The Tyler was partially injured. About thirty men on the Federal side were killed, wounded, or missing, and many of these casualties occurred among Williams's sharp-shooters, who were especially exposed. The loss on the Arkansas was ten killed and fifteen wounded.

Partly to support the few vessels of his fleet on the Lower Mississippi,



DAVIS'S FLEET ON ITS WAY TO JOIN FARRAGUT'S.

the ram for about an hour. The firing was distinctly heard by both the squadrons in the Mississippi, and it was supposed that the gun-boats were engaging batteries. But the true cause of the firing became apparent when

[1] *Naval Scenes on the Western Waters*, p. 59.



THE ARKANSAS RUNNING THROUGH THE UNION FLEET OFF VICKSBURG.

and partly to make another attempt against the Arkansas, Admiral Farragut determined, on the night of the 15th, to repass the Vicksburg batteries. He was supported by Davis's squadron and the mortar flotilla; but the ram, lodged under the guns of Vicksburg, was so well concealed by her situation that she escaped the destruction intended for her.

On the 22d another attack was made upon the ram, which now lay between two forts at the upper bend of the river. Farragut's fleet was four miles below, and it was understood that he would receive the ram if she should attempt to escape down the river. The attack was made by the Queen of the West, commanded by Colonel Ellet, and the Essex, under Commander W. D. Porter; but it proved a failure. The Queen of the West and the Essex passed down under cover of a fire opened upon the upper batteries by the Benton, Cincinnati, and Louisville. The Essex boldly attacked the ram, but the bow-line of the latter being let go, the current drifted her stern on, and the gun-boat, missing the Arkansas, ran ashore. There was less than a rod's distance between the two vessels, and in these close quarters the three nine-inch guns of the Essex told with serious effect upon the ram. The Queen of the West also ran at the ram, but was so severely damaged by the fire from the shore that she with difficulty escaped. "This attempt on the part of Colonel Ellet," says Farragut, "was a daring act, and one from which both Flag-officer Davis and myself tried to deter him." The Sumter, which had come down with the other vessels, on account of some misunderstanding did not join in the attack. The Essex remained aground for ten minutes, under a heavy fire, and then, getting afloat, ran down to Farragut's fleet through a storm of shot and shell, but without receiving a single blow after she left the upper forts. From the latter and from the ram she was penetrated with three projectiles, one of which went through her casemates, and, exploding inside, killed one man and wounded three of her crew. The Queen of the West steamed back, exposed to the fire from the shore and struggling against the current of the river, to Davis's squadron. She had on board two officers, four soldiers, and three negro firemen, not one of whom were injured.

Farragut had on the 20th received an order to descend the river to New Orleans. Owing to the fall in the river, this was becoming an imperative necessity. Waiting only a day or two after the engagement with the ram, and until General Williams had completed his arrangements for departure with his small force, he proceeded to obey this order. It was arranged that the Essex and Sumter, under Commander W. D. Porter, should take charge of the lower part of the river. Left in this situation, the fleet on the Mississippi, so far from being competent to make any offensive movement, was likely to have difficulty in holding its ground against the enemy, who now had, besides the Arkansas, two gun-boats on the Red River and two on the Yazoo. "I presume," says Farragut, writing from New Orleans, July 29, "Flag-officer Davis will destroy those in the Yazoo; and my gun-boats chased the Music and Webb up the Red River, but drew too much water to go far."

The situation before Vicksburg, therefore, at the beginning of August, was discouraging. There was no longer any co-operating army. Flag-officer Davis's fleet was reduced in power, both by the absence of a large number of gun-boats—undergoing repairs or engaged in special duty—and by sickness among the men.[1] The garrison of Vicksburg had been largely increased, nearly doubled, and a large number of additional guns had been mounted in the batteries. The canal, which had been finished for about ten days, had proved a failure. The bulkhead was knocked away on the 22d of July, but the Mississippi, which had so often been known to change its channel in a single night on the slightest occasion, refused by a singular caprice to take the course which General Williams had opened for it, and Vicksburg, instead of becoming an inland city, had joyful occasion for self-congratulation and for laughter at the foiled project of "the Yankees." But, although the canal failed to answer the purpose for which it had been constructed, it was of great service so long as Williams remained. It had been made a means of defense "by constructing a continued breastwork and rifle-pit on the lower border, and an angle on the upper border to enfilade the canal where it was crossed by the levee. This levee, distinguished as the *new* levee, formed in itself a convenient breastwork."[2] When Williams left, however, it was no longer safe for the ordnance, commissary, hospital, and mail boats to lie at the bank. It was also impossible to maintain communication with the vessels below Vicksburg across the neck, and the latter could no longer be used to co-operate in a bombardment from below. The Sumter and Essex must now depend upon Baton Rouge and New Orleans for their supplies. Davis found, moreover, that he would be compelled to exhaust a large measure of his force in maintaining his own connection with Cairo. He determined, therefore, to abandon his position before Vicksburg, and withdraw to the mouth of the Yazoo River. From this point there was a lull of five months in the operations against Vicksburg.

The Confederate line of defense in the West at this time ran from Vicks-



[1] Davis writes, July 23, just before Williams's departure, thus: "My force is also reduced by the absence of eight gun-boats, three of which are guarding important points on the river, and five of which are undergoing repairs. I have said that I am in want of 500 men to insure the efficiency of the flotilla. In this calculation I make allowance for the return to duty of many of the sick; but 600 men would not be too many to send to me. The most sickly part of the season is approaching, and the Department would be surprised to see how the most healthy men wilt and break down under the ceaseless and exhausting heat of this pernicious climate. Men who are apparently in health at the close of the day's work, sink away and die suddenly at night under the combined effects of heat and malarial poison. The enemy, however, suffers a great deal more than we do. He counts seventeen or twenty thousand men on his rolls, but can hardly muster five thousand in his ranks. To sickness are added, in his case, the want of hospital accommodations, the want of medicines, and the want of suitable food. I learn that General Williams is about to move down the river. Should it prove so, it will be very unfortunate in its results. This is one of the points at which the co-operation of the army is most essential."

[2] *Rep. Sec. Navy*, 1862, *Acc. Doc.*, p. 517.

burg southward parallel with the river, and from the same point deflected northward to the northern boundary of the State of Mississippi, and thence turned eastward, following the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad. Morgan and Forrest had just been raiding through Kentucky and Tennessee, preparatory to Bragg's invasion. General Grant, on the northern border of Mississippi, was confronted by large Confederate armies under Price, Lovell, and Van Dorn. As soon as General Williams left Vicksburg, Breckinridge withdrew his division in order to attack Baton Rouge, and, in co-operation with the ram Arkansas, to secure the Lower Mississippi. If the expedition could have been undertaken a few days sooner, it would have been a success so far as Baton Rouge was concerned. Breckinridge doubtless knew that a large proportion of Williams's troops were suffering from sickness. He could not have reckoned too strongly upon this element in his favor, for when Williams left Vicksburg he had scarcely well soldiers enough to take care of the sick ones.

Breckinridge's force received marching orders on the 26th of July. It was transported by railroad as far as Tangipahoa, in St. Helena Parish, Louisiana, which became the base of operations. Between forty and fifty miles from this place, at Camp Moore, on the Comite River, there was a body of Louisiana troops being fitted for active duty in the field. There were only one or two regiments here, with a battery, and a few cavalry, the whole under the command of General Ruggles. This became one of the two columns acting against Baton Rouge, and remained under Ruggles's immediate command, while the column from Vicksburg was assigned to General Charles Clarke. The latter consisted of two brigades, of four regiments, or parts of regiments, each. The troops of this column were all veterans. The design was to attack Baton Rouge from the rear, while the Arkansas, with the help of the Webb and Music from the Red River, engaged the Federal gun-boats. Several days were occupied in waiting until the ram should have recovered from the wounds inflicted upon her in her recent conflicts with the Mississippi squadron. At length Van Dorn telegraphed to Breckinridge that the ram was ready, and would be due at Baton Rouge on the morning of August 5th, which time, therefore, was fixed for the attack.

General Williams had not returned to Baton Rouge a moment too soon. He was well aware of the enemy's design, and industriously provided for the coming battle. On the river were the Essex, Cayuga, Sumter, Kineo, and Katahdin. On the land Williams had nearly 2500 men available for action. These were encamped in the rear of the city, and it was determined to meet the enemy just on the skirts of the town, and there dispute his nearer approach.

The march to Comite River from Tangipahoa, a distance of about fifty miles, was at this season very exhausting to the Confederates under Breckinridge. The heat was intense, and the men fell rapidly out of the ranks from sickness or fatigue. Almost every farm-house on the roadside was converted into a hospital. There was a brief halt at Camp Moore, and on the 4th, a little before midnight, the two columns were pushing on over a smooth sandy road that led through well-cultivated plantations to Baton Rouge. About dawn, when these columns were within three miles of the city, there occurred a strange misadventure. They were passing by a piece of woods when they were fired upon by a company of partisan rangers, who mistook them for Federal troops. Before the mistake was rectified several casualties had occurred, and the line had been thrown into confusion. General Helm, commanding one of the brigades, was disabled by the fall of his horse into a ditch, and was withdrawn from the field. It was here that Captain Alexander A. Todd, a brother-in-law of President Lincoln and an officer on General Helm's staff, met his end. He was instantly killed by a shot from the woods.[1] Order was soon restored, and the columns marched on, Clarke's to the right and Ruggles's to the left. They first appeared in the open fields bordering on the Greenwell Springs Road, toward the upper part of the city and southeast of the Arsenal. Here they attempted without success to draw out the national forces. Failing in this, they veered to the southward a little farther, and it was in the position thus taken that the battle of Baton Rouge was fought.

The streets of the city ran out to the verge of the Federal encampments. The battle-field was flat in surface, extending in the form of an arc about the city from the Arsenal grounds to those of the Capitol. Bayou Gross ran north and east of the Arsenal grounds. Within the latter were two guns, sweeping the field to the left of the Fourth Wisconsin and Ninth Connecticut, on the opposite or right bank of the bayou. In the rear of the centre of the Ninth were two guns, and on the other side of a knoll in the Government Cemetery two more. Farther to the right was the Fourteenth Maine, on the left of the Greenwell Springs Road and in rear of the Bayou Sara Road, which crosses at right angles the two main approaches to the city. In the road itself were four guns, afterward increased to six. On the right of the Greenwell Springs Road was the Twenty-first Indiana (which was under cover of a wood), with the Magnolia Cemetery in its front. To the right of Magnolia Cemetery the Sixth Michigan continued the line across a country road and another known as the Clay Cut Road, supporting two guns in the country road. The Seventh Vermont was stationed in the rear of the two latter regiments, on the right of the Catholic cemetery. The extreme right was held by the Thirtieth Massachusetts, a short distance in the rear of the Capitol, and supporting Nims's Battery. Considering that the attack was expected on the Greenwell Springs Road, this disposition of force was an admirable one, the only fault consisting in the unfortunate position of the encampments of the Fourteenth Maine and Twenty-first Indiana, which were in front of those regiments, and liable to capture in case of their retreat, an event which really did occur.[1]

The Confederates at daylight drove back the Federal pickets. General Breckinridge in person led the right wing, his young son, Cabell, acting as aid-de-camp. The full force of the first determined attack fell upon the Indiana, Maine, and Michigan regiments. The resistance was obstinate. The Federal flanks were called in to support the centre; but the enemy succeeded, after a sharp conflict, in driving in the regiments in the advanced front and capturing their encampments. The Seventh Vermont failed to give efficient support at the critical moment, and Colonel Roberts, its commander, was killed while vainly attempting to urge forward his men. "He was worthy," said General Butler, "of a better disciplined regiment and a better fate." The Indiana regiment lost all its field-officers before retreating. General Williams had just given the order for the line to fall back, when, seeing the condition of this regiment, he advanced to its front, and told the Indianians that, in the absence of their officers, he would lead them himself. Scarcely had the responding cheers died away when he fell, mortally wounded.[2] The batteries had done good execution. The soldiers, though many of them had never seen a battle before, disputed bravely every advance of the enemy. It had come at length to a hand-to-hand conflict, the result of which seemed to be in favor of the Confederates. As the national forces withdrew from the vicinity of Magnolia Cemetery, where had been the deadliest conflict, the gun-boats in the river opened on both of the enemy's flanks, their fire over the city being directed by a system of signals from the Capitol, instituted by Lieutenant Ransom.



DEATH OF GENERAL THOMAS WILLIAMS.

In the mean time Breckinridge was listening anxiously in the intervals of conflict for the guns of the Arkansas; but he heard them not. About six miles from the city the ram had stopped in her progress down the river, unable to proceed on account of her inefficient engine machinery. She had left Brown, her former commander, sick at Vicksburg, and was now commanded by Lieutenant Stevens. Her crew numbered 180 men, well chosen; she had ten heavy guns (six 8-inch and four 50-pounders), but could not be brought into action.

Disappointed at the non-appearance of this indispensable ally, and seeing

[1] A Confederate, alluding to this event, says: "Captain Todd was a young gentleman of fine accomplishments, great personal daring, exceeding amiability, and the warmest home affections. But the evening before he wrote to his mother, and just before the accident he was conversing with Lieutenant L. E. Payne, ordnance officer of the brigade, communicating the messages he wished conveyed home in case of his fall. . . . Brave boy! he met his end serenely, and his body was interred by gentle and loving hands."

[1] See *Weitzel's Report in Reb. Rec.*, vol. v., p. 301, *Doc.* Fletcher, an English historian of the war, says: "The position does not appear to have been well selected, as in front of the centre of the line, between the two roads, was a large cemetery, overgrown with high grass, and affording both cover for an advancing enemy, and, when occupied, a strong offensive position." This is probably true so far as the position was related to the shape which the attack finally took.

[2] The following General Order (No. 56) was issued by General Butler after the battle:

"The commanding general announces to the Army of the Gulf the sad event of the death of Brigadier General Thomas Williams, commanding Second Brigade, in camp at Baton Rouge.

"The victorious achievement—the repulse of the division of Major General Breckinridge by the troops led by General Williams, and the destruction of the mail-clad Arkansas by Captain Porter, of the Navy—is made sorrowful by the fall of our brave, gallant, and successful fellow-soldier.

"General Williams graduated at West Point in 1837; at once joined the Fourth Artillery in Florida, where he served with distinction; was thrice breveted for gallant and meritorious services in Mexico as a member of General Scott's staff. His life was that of a soldier devoted to his country's service. His country mourns in sympathy with his wife and children, now that country's care and precious charge.

"We, his comrades in arms, who had learned to love him, weep the true friend, the gallant gentleman, the brave soldier, the accomplished officer, and the devoted Christian. All this and more went out when Williams died. By a singular felicity, the manner of his death illustrated each of these generous qualities.

"The chivalric American gentleman, he gave up the vantage of the cover of the houses of the city, forming his lines in the open field, lest the women and children of his enemies should be hurt in the fight.

"A good general, he made his dispositions and prepared for battle at break of day, when he met his foe.

"A brave soldier, he received the death-shot leading his men.

"A patriot hero, he was fighting the battle, and died as went up the cheer of victory.

"A Christian, he sleeps in the hope of the blessed Redeemer.

"His virtues we can not exceed; his example we may emulate; and, mourning his death, we pray, 'May our last end be like his.'"



DESTRUCTION OF THE ARKANSAS.

the impossibility of attempting to fight the national infantry, artillery, and gun-boats at the same time, Breckinridge ordered the captured camps to be burned as a preliminary to withdrawal from the field. His forces found some shelter from the shells of the fleet in the woods which skirted the battle-field all around. It was not noon yet when the battle was over, and the field was left in possession of the national forces, under Colonel Cahill, who had succeeded to the command after the death of General Williams.

The enemy had suffered severe loss, especially in officers, among whom General Clarke was left in our hands mortally wounded. His dead, to the number of seventy, were left upon the field, so hasty had been his retreat. The battle-field gave striking evidence of the nature of the conflict. In front of the Indiana and Michigan regiments some of the enemy were found who had been killed with rails, which the Union soldiers, having lost their arms, had used as weapons. "In one spot," says an eye-witness, "behind a beautiful tomb, with effigies of infant children kneeling, twelve dead rebels were found in one heap."

The forces engaged in the battle, though variously estimated, were probably not very far from equal.[1] The loss on the national side was 90 killed and 250 wounded.

The morning after the battle, the Essex, accompanied by the Cayuga and Sumter, advanced up the river to where the Arkansas was lying, abandoned by her companions, the Webb and Music. There was no serious conflict. Commander W. D. Porter engaged the ram for a short time, when the latter was fired, deserted, and then blown up. Very soon the vessels of the national fleet saw floating past them the shattered fragments of their most formidable antagonist on the Mississippi. In informing the Naval Secretary of this event, Admiral Farragut said: "It is one of the happiest moments of my life that I am able to inform the Department of the destruction of the ram Arkansas, not because I held the iron-clad in such terror, but because the community did."

A few days after the battle (August 16) Baton Rouge was evacuated by the national troops, and the place was afterward held by the naval force.

Sherman had been confirmed major general of volunteers on the 1st of May, 1862. In urging this appointment, Halleck, writing from the West shortly after the battle of Shiloh, said: "It is the unanimous opinion here that Brigadier General W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 6th, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of the 7th." At the time when Halleck wrote thus, Grant was under a cloud; his military qualities were scarcely appreciated; he was thrust somewhat into the background, and subjected to much mortification, enjoying little of that confidence which he afterward won from the government. But in this unfortunate period of his career his rightful claims were supported heartily and in full by General Sherman.[2] Afterward when, at the very close of the war, the latter was for one single act bitterly and unjustly calumniated, he received from General Grant a full return of sympathy and support. Grant had always believed in Sherman, even when the latter had been called insane. He always gave him the most responsible position under his command. In recommending his promotion to the rank of brigadier general in the regular army in 1863, he says: "At the battle of Shiloh, on the first day, he held, with raw troops, the key-point of the landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say that I do not believe there was another division commander on the field who had the skill and experience to have done it. To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that battle."

When Halleck was called to Washington in July, 1862, to assume the duties of general-in-chief, the Department of the Mississippi was assigned to the hero of Fort Donelson.[1] There was at that time a lull in military operations, and Grant had leisure to give attention to the general administration of affairs in this department. One of the very first things which he did was to send Sherman, with his own and Hurlbut's divisions, to occupy Memphis as its military commander. Sherman assumed command of the district, superseding General Hovey, on the 21st of July, stationing his own division in Fort Pickering, Hurlbut's on the river below, and sending the other troops to Helena. He retained the mayor and other civil officers of the city in their offices, and confined the action of provost-marshal guards to persons in the military service, and to buildings and grounds used by the army. All citizens were required to yield obedience to the United States government or leave the district; if they staid, and gave aid to the enemy, they were to be treated as spies. He did not exact from all a formal oath of allegiance. He required no military passports for inland travel, but he restricted it to the five main roads leading from the city, and there was a minute inspection of all persons and property going in or out. The principal matter requiring stringent regulations was that of trade. The exportation of salt and of all war material was prohibited. All cotton bought beyond the lines and brought in had to be purchased on contracts for payment at the close of the war, because, if paid for in coin or in treasury notes, these were almost always sure to find their way into the coffers of the Confederate treasury.

As the army penetrated the southern districts along the Mississippi, the temptation to indulge in cotton speculation became a great obstruction to military discipline. But, notwithstanding this, it was found expedient to allow a partial trade in cotton, though every effort was made by General Grant to prevent this commerce from demoralizing his subordinate officers. It was manifestly the policy of the government to drain the South of its cotton. This important staple was an invaluable aid to the enemy; it was a part of his war material, since his foreign loans were based entirely upon a cotton basis. It seemed wise, therefore, to make it for the interest of Southern cotton-holders to retain the staple, instead of burning it or allowing it to pass into the hands of the Confederate government. This temptation was afforded by allowing a partial trade.[2]

[1] Whatever odds there may have been were certainly in favor of the Confederates. The wide discrepancy in the estimates given is somewhat singular. Pollard says Breckinridge had less than 3000 men, and Williams nearly 6000. Abbott, on the other hand, makes Williams's force less than 2500, and Breckinridge's 8000. The only authority for this latter estimate of the enemy's numbers is a soldier's letter published in the *Rebellion Record* (vol. v., p. 307, *Doc.*). This letter is throughout wholly unreliable. In a later statement Abbott estimates the enemy's force at 5000. Cahill makes Williams's force 2500, and that of the enemy ten regiments, or 5000 men. Weitzel estimates Breckinridge's force at 6000. Fletcher makes the numbers on both sides about 4000. It is possible that the enemy may have numbered between 3000 and 4000; Williams certainly had not 3000 men.

[2] A staff-officer of General Grant thus writes of this period: "La Fontaine truthfully says, '*Aucun chemin de fleurs ne conduit à la gloire.*' Detraction was busy with her poisonous tongue. Grant was more bitterly assailed now than at any previous time, as a 'butcher,' as 'incompetent,' and as being a 'drunkard.' Some one was disparaging Grant in Sherman's presence, when the latter broke out with, 'It won't do, sir, it won't do; Grant is a great general! He stood by me when I was crazy, and I stood by him when he was drunk, and now, sir, we stand by each other.'"

[1] It was on October 16, 1862, that General Grant was made commander of the Department of the Tennessee, this department being made to include Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Mississippi, and portions of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River.

[2] The connection of the cotton question with the Confederate conduct of the war is so important that some of its details may be interesting to the reader.

The first auction sale of confiscated cotton from Port Royal took place in New York on the 10th of June, 1862. At this sale seventy-nine bales were sold, at an average of sixty cents per pound. From this time on to the close of the war such sales were quite frequent. Before a single bale of cotton had been confiscated, however, the Confederates had contemplated the possibility of such conquests on the part of the United States government as would bring into its possession a portion of their accumulated stores. As early as February 26, 1862, a meeting of cotton and tobacco planters was held at Richmond to consider the expediency of the purchase by the Confederacy, or of a voluntary destruction of the entire tobacco and cotton crop. The *Richmond Examiner* describes the audience as "one of the largest, wealthiest, and most intellectual meetings" ever



COTTON HOARDS IN SOUTHERN SWAMPS.

Toward the close of October Sherman was summoned to meet Grant at Columbus for military consultation. The Department of the Mississippi had been broken up, and General Grant was at the head of the Department of the Tennessee. About this time Rosecrans assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. Corinth and Perryville had been fought, and both battles—that of Corinth especially—had resulted in important national victories. The objective point in the campaign now contemplated by General Grant was Vicksburg.

During the interval of some months in which Vicksburg had been left undisturbed, the enemy had strengthened its fortifications. Several additional batteries had been erected above the town, and a strong line of defenses had been thrown up from Chickasaw Bayou to Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo River. The bluff itself had been fortified, and opposed an insuperable obstacle to the ascent of the national fleet farther up the river. Port Hudson, in the mean time, had become a strong-hold second only to Vicksburg in importance, and between these two points the Mississippi (as also the Red River) was in full possession of the Confederates, who had thus an opportunity of availing themselves, to an almost unlimited extent, of the abundant supplies to be obtained from Louisiana and Texas. After Van Dorn's defeat at Corinth, he had been superseded by John C. Pemberton, a favorite of President Davis, who, that he might outrank Van Dorn and Lovell, had been made a lieutenant general. This officer has been very severely criticised by Southern writers on the ground of his general incompetency for the position assigned him, and, in particular, for his apathy during this important period, when the opportunities for provisioning Vicksburg and increasing its efficiency as a defensive point appear to have been neglected. He made his head-quarters, it is said, at this time rather at Jackson than at Vicksburg, only paying an occasional visit to Vicksburg. He thought, probably, and with good reason, that his presence was imperatively demanded to the rear and westward of Vicksburg, to guard against



MAP OF THE MISSISSIPPI CENTRAL RAILROAD.

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sembled in that city. The speeches made and the resolutions adopted were certainly characteristic. General T. J. Green, of North Carolina, having called the meeting to order, the Hon. C. K. Marshall arose to read the resolutions. "We have it in our power," he said, by way of preface, "to do what will have a serious influence not only within the city of Richmond, but may ameliorate the condition of the race of mankind at large."

The following is a copy of the resolutions:

"Whereas, the government of the United States have made an unprovoked, flagrant, and wicked war on the government and people of the Confederate States, and have conducted that war on principles hitherto unknown among civilized nations; and, whereas, we feel that our only safety against so ruthless and unrelenting a foe is to be found in the courage, patriotism, and self-sacrificing spirit of our people; and, whereas, no sacrifice, however enormous, is too great if it only brings us freedom from our oppressors; and, whereas, the tyrants and despots of the North have openly proclaimed their purpose to desolate our homes and appropriate our property to their own use, and have, in various instances, carried the infamous threat into practical execution by plundering our people of cotton, tobacco, rice, and other property; and, whereas, fire, when applied by heroic hands, is more formidable than the sword, therefore it is by this meeting

"*Resolved*, That as a means of national safety, dictated alike by military necessity and true patriotism, we deem it the imperative duty of this government to adopt measures for the purchase of the entire crops of cotton and tobacco now on hand, with the purpose of at once preventing the appropriation of them by the invaders of our soil and country, and making a fair and equitable compensation for the same to their owners, by such arrangements as shall enable the government to meet the debt incurred thereby without involving the public treasury in any serious liability on account of the said purchase. Certificate of government liability to be given for the entire property.

"*Resolved*, That, as the owners of these great staples, the government would hold in its hands the power of removing so great temptation from the path of the Federal army, now making its raids into our country, and robbing our citizens under the avowed pledges of supplying, by force, the markets of the world with these valuable articles of demand, which must necessarily be done, if those pledges are redeemed, by the total bankruptcy of our planting interests on the one hand, and the utter subjugation and enslavement of the people of the South on the other.

"*Resolved*, That, possessed of these products, it would become the solemn duty of the government to take immediate action through commissioners appointed for that purpose, or otherwise to take an account of such portions of said crops as are at exposed places, first furnishing the owners thereof with certificates of the amount and value of their crops as evidences of debt by the government therefor, and consign the property to the devouring flames.

"*Resolved*, That in case the owners of said staples decline to accept the terms offered by the government, a tax of —— cents per pound should be assessed and collected from such crops, and if finally lost or sacrificed, as a measure of public safety thereafter, such owners should not be allowed any compensation for the same.

"*Resolved*, That where other articles of produce or stock are exposed to the raids of the enemy, they should be removed if practicable, and if not practicable, an inventory of them should be taken, with an estimate of their value, by military authority, or a government agent, or, in the absence of either, by competent citizens, and certified to by them, and said property forthwith destroyed, and the parties thus deprived of their property should be indemnified by the government."

Mr. Marshall then made a speech on the resolutions. He alluded, in terms so extravagant as to appear ludicrous, to the expedients to which the Confederates had been driven by the blockade. "Men," he said, "have seized pikes and lances, for want of proper arms, to defend their wives, and daughters, and mothers." He thought the Richmond government did not fully appreciate the exigency of the times. If it had purchased the first cotton crop, the Southern navy might then have boasted of thirty such vessels as the Merrimac. The last crop was now actually rotting unbaled. They had been taught to believe that France and England wanted cotton so badly that they would come and get it. Why didn't they come? He had begun to doubt whether there were such countries as France and England. "The enemy found cotton at Ship Island; some, it is true, they found in flames, but not enough of it. At Florence they went up and took an inconsiderable quantity. No one seemed to think of setting fire to it. At Nashville they will perhaps get fifty thousand bales, and the owners, to save their property, will have to swear allegiance to that miserable tyrant, Abe Lincoln. And presently they will descend the Mississippi with perhaps fifty gun-boats, and compel the negroes to load them with cotton, and send it to Europe, and say, We have opened a cotton port—there is the evidence. I want us to do something manly—something grand. I want the Confederate government to buy all the cotton, and, if need be, destroy it. If one of those pillars which support this temple were cotton, and the other tobacco, and England, France, Russia, and the United States of America, *and ourselves* depended on them for existence, and it were necessary, I would, Samson-like, drag them down, *and let one universal ruin overwhelm civilization*. Suppose, as these resolutions propose, the government buys the cotton and tobacco crops, it is not to be expected that it will soon be able to pay for them. Hardships will be the consequence. Great numbers must suffer. A tax will have to be imposed. I will suppose that half of the cotton and tobacco crop has been burned. My cotton has been burned, and I have received seven cents a pound from the government, while my neighbor's, whose crop has not been burned, has been enhanced double in value. His small crop of cotton would be a fortune, yet who among us would hesitate to apply the torch to it sooner than it should fall into the hands of the enemy? But suppose the government were to buy the whole crop, and determine to burn it (as I want them to do), that the world may see that this little republic, as they may choose to consider us, can strike a blow that will send consternation through the world, while they are talking about conquering the republic and hanging the President. I want the government to come forward and say, Here is the money for four million bales of cotton, and give it to her commissioners, and say, Burn it. I want the government to go in search of the cotton, instead of leaving it to be captured by her [that is, the enemy's] iron-clad steamers. The government have two million of bales as a financial measure. There are some gentlemen present who raise as much as four thousand bales of cotton, and who say they will themselves burn it, indemnity or not, rather than the Yankees shall get possession of it. A lady of my acquaintance has said she will not only burn her crop, but her house itself, and take to the forest, rather than see the enemy possess it. We shall ruin our own interest by letting this crop lie here, and putting another crop upon it. Cotton, instead of being ten cents, will not command more than three cents. Suppose the blockade were opened now, we could not get it to market by August. The boats which used to transport our cotton are engaged in making war upon us, and some of them have got well peppered at Fort Donelson. They are to-day planting cotton in Texas, and next week they will begin to plant farther north. I needn't enlarge on this to planters. It is evident to them there will be two crops on the market before next January. Some will say we will force England to go to India for cotton. I will say to her, Go! England has spent three hundred and fifty million pounds, and gotten Louisiana planters to go to those distant countries, and has been obliged to give it up as a forlorn hope. But suppose England finds other cotton-fields, I'd like to know if we can't find other spinners for our crops, and be forever independent of her. To the west of us are two little countries, China and Japan. In China they desire to put all their lands in tea, but they fear to discontinue the raising of cotton. If they could get cotton elsewhere, they would put all the land in tea. Well, then, the best spinners and weavers in China can be hired for nine cents a day, and we can get them to spin and weave our cotton long before England can find other cotton-fields. China and Japan are not so distant from us as we were from England when Whitney put the first cotton-gin in operation in Savannah. I hope Congress will take up and pass these resolutions. I have great hope from this meeting. So much have these resolutions to recommend them to the people of the Southern Confederacy, that, were I addressing them to-night, I believe I could get an overwhelming vote for government buying the entire crops of cotton and tobacco, and consigning them to the flames."

Governor Moore, of Kentucky, then addressed the meeting, advocating the resolutions.

On motion of Edmund Ruffin, who fired the first gun of the war, and who blew his brains out after the defeat of the Confederacy, the resolutions were put to vote, and unanimously adopted. Henry S. Foote, the Tennessee senator in the Confederate Congress, was then called to the stand, and strongly approved of the resolutions.

About the same time, a bill was reported in the Confederate Senate to indemnify planters for property destroyed to prevent its capture. The bill, as passed, made no such provision, but made it the duty of all military commanders to destroy all cotton, tobacco, or other property that might be useful to the enemy, if the same could not be safely removed, whenever said property was, in their judgment, liable to capture. It was estimated that the amount of cotton and tobacco which would thus be destroyed would be about one twentieth of the entire crop. On the 3d of March a resolution was passed in the House advising planters to raise provisions and cattle in place of cotton and tobacco. This came before the Senate March 12, and Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, proposed a substitute, in the form of a bill to curtail the cotton crop for 1862, the amount being limited to three bales for each planter, and an additional bale per head for each hand employed in its culture, and inflicting a penalty of forty dollars for every bale raised above this quota. He thought the House measure would affect injuriously the patriotic planters, while it enriched the disloyal.

Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, thought the number of "patriotic planters" was very small. Wigfall, of Texas, was not so sure about the expediency of neglecting to raise cotton. Mr. Barnwell, of South Carolina, thought that on the cultivation of cotton, and the increase of supplies of that staple for the market, depended not only the sources of wealth, but the importance, consequence, and weight of the Confederacy with foreign nations. "We must," he said, "raise it, hold it, and fight for it." Besides, he thought the power assumed by Mr. Brown's substitute the grossest assumption of authority he had ever witnessed. Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, objected on the ground that the measure taxed the patriotism of the planters, and was an interference with state rights. Like Barnwell, he thought that reducing the supply would so advance the price that other sources of cotton would be sought. Mr. Brown urged that the main object of the United States in descending the river was to get cotton, and that there should be as little of it to be found as possible. The idea that cotton could be raised in India was "played out." He was in favor of burning all the cotton they had, and raising no more until the world was disposed to do them justice. Semmes, of Louisiana, said he had long since abandoned the idea that cotton was king. England would not interfere for it. "Rather than make war with the United States, she would convert her government into an eleemosynary for the maintenance of her hordes of starving operatives." He should vote for the resolution, to warn the people of a lengthy war, and that they must raise provisions. The resolution, being put to vote, was lost.

On the 6th of May, in answer to an inquiry made by a Southern firm whether cotton purchased on foreign account would be exempted from the order enjoining the destruction of all cotton about to fall into the enemy's hands, J. P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, replied that if purchases of that sort were made, it must be at the risk of the purchasers.

The Charleston *Courier* of May 14 published a circular which it claimed to be "the deliberate expression of the wealthiest and most influential class of the citizens of New Orleans." For manifest reasons no signatures were attached. After a chivalric prelude, the circular goes on to urge the destruction of every bale of cotton liable to capture on the Western rivers, and the refusal to ship or sell a bale until the independence of the Confederacy was recognized. "Let the conquest of the United States," it said, "be a barren one. If we are true to ourselves there will be no trade, and the countless millions of foreign products will be without a purchaser. How long will they remain idle spectators of such a scene," etc. For copying this circular, the New Orleans *Bee* was on the 16th suppressed by General Butler. The same day, for publishing an article of similar purport, the general took possession of the New Orleans *Delta*.

The planters, for the most part, justified Mr. Orr's doubt of their patriotism. They were very reluctant to burn their cotton, and in most cases where the destruction was accomplished it was by Confederate guerrillas. Such, for instance, was the case near Memphis, where, toward the last of June, a large body of Confederate cavalry visited a number of plantations on the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, burning great quantities of cotton, and arresting all persons found purchasing that staple. But, in spite of every effort made by the Confederate government, large quantities of cotton were seized by the United States at every step of the army's progress southward. A portion of the cotton found belonged to the Confederate government, and a portion to private citizens, who had in many instances secreted it against the very occasion of possible capture.

Mr. Pollard, the Southern historian, thinks it was a great mistake that the Confederate government did not, in 1861, purchase the entire cotton crop, and make it the basis of its credit. He estimates that there were at this time 3,500,000 bales of cotton in the South, which might have been secured at the rate of seven cents a pound. He enters into an indignant protest against the illicit trade in cotton indulged in by the planters: "The country had taken a solemn resolution to burn the cotton in advance of the enemy; but the conflagration of this staple soon became a rare event; instead of being committed to the flames it was spirited to Yankee markets. Nor were these operations always disguised. Some commercial houses in the Confederacy counted their gains by millions of dollars since the war, through the favor of the government in allowing them to export cotton at pleasure. . . . The cotton and sugar planters of the extreme South, who prior to the war were loudest for secession, were at the same time known to buy every article of their consumption in Yankee markets, and to cherish an ambition of shining in the society of Northern hotels. It is not surprising that many of these affected patriots have found congenial occupation in this war in planting in copartnership with the enemy, or in smuggling cotton into his lines. The North is said to have obtained in the progress of this war [Pollard is writing this in 1863], from the Southwest and Charleston, enough cotton at present prices to uphold its whole system of currency—a damning testimony to the avarice of the planter. Yet it is nothing more than a convincing proof, in general, that property, though very pretentious of patriotism, when identified with selfishness, is one of the most weak and cowardly things in revolutions, and the first to succumb under the horrors of war."—*Pollard's Second Year of the War*, p. 289.

the operations of General Grant, which were threatened in that quarter. It has been said that Pemberton was in favor of evacuating all points held by the Confederates on the water, and had even recommended the abandonment of Charleston and the destruction of its works.[1] He certainly did not act upon this theory in the Vicksburg campaign.

The first thing to be accomplished by General Grant was the expulsion of the enemy from the line of the Tallahatchie. Then, while Rosecrans occupied Bragg, Grant, with Sherman's help, proposed to take Vicksburg. The details of the campaign were admirably planned, and, so far as the principal movements were concerned, successfully carried out up to just the last point, when the whole scheme miscarried, not by reason of a great defeat, but by the disgraceful and unnecessary surrender of Holly Springs.

In the first stage of the campaign, as arranged by Grant and Sherman, three columns were to move—one, under Grant, from Jackson, in Tennessee; a second, under Sherman, from Memphis; and a third, consisting mainly of a cavalry force, under C. C. Washburne, from Helena—against Pemberton's army on the Tallahatchie, numbering 40,000 men.[2] The success of this first part of the campaign is thus concisely summed up by Sherman: "Grant moved direct on Pemberton, while I moved from Memphis, and a smaller force under General Washburne struck directly for Grenada; and the first thing Pemberton knew, the dépôt of his supplies was almost in the grasp of a small cavalry force, and he fell back in confusion, and gave us the Tallahatchie without a battle."[3]

From the vantage-ground thus gained Grant could almost see his way into Vicksburg. To him, then, Jackson seemed almost within his grasp, and thence it was but a step into the coveted strong-hold. The force sent from Helena, which had now been recalled (perhaps too soon), had swept a clear course for him to Grenada. Pemberton had fallen back to Canton, a few miles north of Jackson. On November 29th Grant reached Holly Springs; on December 3d his head-quarters were at Oxford, and his cavalry in the advance were driving Van Dorn out from Water Valley and Coffeeville. Not a score of miles from Coffeeville is Grenada; and if all holds well behind—at the dozen points in the rear where garrisons have been left to keep open communications—Jackson must fall before Christmas, and Vicksburg before New Year.

So sure was Grant of his goal, that, while at Oxford (December 8), he dispatched General Sherman, commanding the right wing of his army,[4] to undertake a co-operative expedition from Memphis against Vicksburg. Sherman was to take with him one division of his present command, and all the spare troops from Memphis and Helena. Scarcely a fortnight was allowed for the preparation of this important but ill-fated expedition. In the mean while Grant waited, or pushed on slowly, so as to give the appearance of a continuous movement. On the 14th of December he wrote to Sherman, saying that, for a week hence, his head-quarters would be at Coffeeville, and expressing particular anxiety to have the Helena cavalry back again with him—evidently not at ease about Van Dorn's movements in his rear. With one eye on Vicksburg, he was forced to cast the other suspiciously on Holly Springs, his principal dépôt of provisions and ammunition, garrisoned with little over a thousand men under Colonel R. C. Murphy. Van Dorn was leading his cavalry against this place, and Grant, knowing this, gave Murphy timely warning. The blow fell suddenly, on December 20, and found Murphy unprepared. The place was surrendered, and Grant, cut off from his base, was obliged to fall back to Grand Junction, and to give up a campaign which, but for this fatal surrender, promised a fortunate issue.

Sherman embarked from Memphis on the 20th of December,[5] the very day on which Holly Springs was surrendered. He had in his command Morgan's and the two Smiths' divisions—about 30,000 men. At Helena this army was re-enforced by over 12,000 men under General Frederick Steele, comprising the brigades of Hovey, Thayer, Blair, and Wyman.

From a letter written by Sherman to Porter (December 8), we gather a pretty definite idea of the objects which the expedition was intended to ac-



MAP ILLUSTRATING OPERATIONS ON THE YAZOO AND THE ARKANSAS.

complish. Sherman at this time, and, indeed, up to the time of his own defeat, confidently expected that Grant would succeed on the northeast of Vicksburg—a result which, so far as he was concerned, was chiefly valuable because it would keep Pemberton on the line of the Yalabusha, and thus insure his own success on the Yazoo. "We hope," he writes, "that they (the rebels) will halt and re-form behind the Yalabusha, with Grenada as their centre. If so, General Grant can press their front, while I am ordered to take all the spare troops from Memphis and Helena, and proceed with all dispatch to Vicksburg." He intended first to break the inland communications of Vicksburg, and then to make a combined attack upon the city by land and water, Porter co-operating with the fleet. He would "cut the road to Monroe, Louisiana, to Jackson, Mississippi, and then appear up the Yazoo, threatening the Mississippi Central Road where it crosses the Big Black," thus disconcerting the enemy and throwing him on to Meridian, leaving Vicksburg an easy capture.

The want of sufficient transportation for Sherman's large force was the cause of much embarrassment in fitting out the expedition, and of great confusion and inconvenience on its route to Friar's Point. The confusion was increased by the necessary haste of the embarkation. The transports, suddenly pressed into service, were crowded so closely as to afford scarcely more than standing-room, and, of course, there were no adequate accommodations for the comfort or cleanliness of the men. The discomforts of this situation were exaggerated by the embarkation of Steele's force at Helena. The negroes along the river were greatly impressed at sight of an expedition which they confidently believed had been sent down for the express purpose of their liberation. Many of them, indeed, came upon the boats, and were taken under the protection of the flag. The fleet arrived at Milliken's Bend on Christmas eve, and not a few of the enthusiastic soldiers expected to eat their Christmas dinner in Vicksburg.

The next day troops were landed, and destroyed the railroad leading from Vicksburg to Texas. The expedition was convoyed by Porter's gun-boats, on December 26th, to Johnston's Landing, twelve miles up the Yazoo River.[1] On the transport fleet Morgan's division led the advance, followed in order by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith.

Vicksburg itself is situated upon very high bluffs, which extend southward along the river to Warrenton, and northward till they touch the Yazoo, about fifteen miles from Haines's Bluff. Between these bluffs, upon which the Confederates were now strongly fortified, and the Yazoo is a low country, full of swamps, lagoons, sloughs, and bayous. The points of approach to the bluffs from the river are few and difficult—far more difficult than Sherman had anticipated. In this bed of mire and quicksand the national troops were landed, on the 27th, near Chickasaw Bayou, which runs from Vicksburg around the hills in the rear of the city and into the Yazoo, taking a sharp turn northward before it reaches the river.

Scarcely had Holly Springs fallen into Van Dorn's hands before Pemberton was warned of the attempt about to be made against the northern de-

[1] *Abrams*, p. 8.

[2] This is Bowman's estimate.—*Sherman and his Campaigns*, p. 77.

[3] Speech at St. Louis after the war.

[4] General Grant's army constituted the Thirteenth Army Corps, of which the right wing was under command of General Sherman. This right wing consisted of three divisions:

The First, commanded by A. J. Smith, and consisting of two new brigades, Burbridge's and Landrum's.

The Second, commanded by Morgan L. Smith, consisting of G. A. Smith's and David Stuart's brigades.

The Third, commanded by G. W. Morgan, comprising the new brigades of Osterhaus, Lindsay, and De Courcey.

The other brigades remained at Memphis.

[5] Before embarkation General Sherman issued the following characteristic order:

"I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal or private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as a part of the crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats and nurses to the sick alone will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife, must pass below Helena.

"II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quarter-master, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and invoice it to Captain A. R. Eddy, chief quarter-master at Memphis.

"III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quarter-master will furnish him with a receipt for the same, to be settled on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.

"IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quarter-master, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.

"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena in violation of these orders, any colonel of a regiment or captain of a battery will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deckhand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.

"VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, or comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies."

[1] "On entering the Yazoo, the first object that attracted the attention was the ruins of a large brick house and several other buildings, which were still smoking. On inquiry, I learned that this was the celebrated plantation of the rebel General Albert Sidney Johnston, who was killed at Shiloh. It was an extensive establishment, working over three hundred negroes. It contained a large steam sugar refinery, an extensive steam saw-mill, cotton-gins, machine-shop, and a long line of negro quarters.

"The dwelling was palatial in its proportions and architecture, and the grounds around it were magnificently laid out in alcoves, with arbors, trellises, groves of evergreens, and extensive flower-beds. All was now a mass of smouldering ruins. Our gun-boats had gone up there the day before, and a small battery planted near the mansion announced itself by plugging away at one of the iron-clads, and the marines went ashore after the gun-boats had silenced the battery, and burned and destroyed every thing on the place. If any thing were wanting to complete the desolate aspect of the place, it was to be found in the sombre-hued pendent moss, peculiar to Southern forests, and which gives the trees a funereal aspect, as if they were all draped in mourning, as on almost every Southern plantation there were many deadened trees standing about in the fields, from the limbs of all of which long festoons of moss hung, swaying with a melancholy motion in every breeze."—*Missouri Democrat.*

fenses of Vicksburg. In this respect he had an overwhelming advantage over Sherman (who knew nothing of the unfavorable turn which affairs had taken in the rear of Vicksburg), and Grant's withdrawal to Grand Junction left him free to pursue his advantage without hinderance. He faced about with his army; and by the time Sherman had landed on the south bank of the Yazoo, he had not only an equal force to confront the latter, but also an impregnable line of defense, covered by abatis, constructed from the thicket in front of his works. Thousands of slaves had for months been engaged upon these fortifications.

The emergency which Sherman was about to meet was one in which neither the bravery of his Western soldiers nor his own fertile ingenuity availed him any thing. It is true, the enemy had a line of works fifteen miles in extent to defend; and, supposing that he was attacking a force much inferior to his own in point of numbers, Sherman may well be justified in the confident hope that he might, at some point in this long line, make an impression, and that, by persistent pressure, he must succeed in driving the enemy out of his fortifications.



BATTLE OF CHICKASAW BAYOU.

Having debarked his troops, he pushed the enemy's pickets back toward the bluffs, and on the 28th intended to make a general assault. Chickasaw Bayou proved the chief obstacle to his plan of attack. Dividing the country in the enemy's front into nearly equal portions, it could be crossed only at two points, each completely covered by the enemy's fire. This necessitated either a division of the attacking force, or the restriction of the assault to the west side of the bayou; and, as the bayou turned westward along the base of the bluffs, it covered the enemy's entire left, and had in this section only four points at which a crossing could be effected, and even at these only in the face of rifle-pits on the table-land behind, of rifle-trenches on the hill-sides farther back, and of heavy batteries posted on the summits of the hills. Along the base of these hills, and back of the bayou, ran the road from Vicksburg to Yazoo City, serving the enemy as a covered way along which he could at leisure move his artillery and infantry, concentrating them upon any of the points which might be selected for crossing the Federal troops.

Steele advanced on the east side of the bayou, but, encountering a swamp over which there was no passage except by a long corduroy causeway, and that, too, at the risk of losing one half of his division, wisely concluded to give up the attempt. Morgan, on the other side of the bayou, advanced up to the enemy's centre as far as to the bank of the bayou in front of the bluffs, where his progress was arrested, though he held his ground during the ensuing night. Morgan L. Smith advanced simultaneously farther to the right. While reconnoitring the ground he was disabled by a bullet lodged in his hip, and Brigadier General David Stuart succeeded to the active command. Where this division reached the bayou there was a crossing by means of a narrow sand-slip, but the attempt was deemed too perilous. On the extreme right General A. J. Smith advanced, and Burbridge's brigade—arriving on the field about noon, having just returned from a raid on the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad—was pushed forward by Smith to the bayou, with orders to cross on rafts under cover of a heavy cannonade. Landrum's brigade occupied a high position on the main road, within three fourths of a mile of the enemy's works, and with Vicksburg in plain view on his right.

On the morning of the 29th Steele had been recalled, and held the left, supporting Morgan. The entire army lay opposite the Confederate centre and left, with the inevitable bayou on its own left and front. Nothing had been heard from Grant, but his near presence was conjectured from a signal rocket which had been seen ascending in the east the first night after landing.

Sherman determined to assault the hills in Morgan's front, while A. J. Smith should cross at the sand-spit to the right. The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the table-land across the bayou, the heads of the supporting columns being brought well up to the enemy's works. The audacity of the troops up to this point was never surpassed. Blair's brigade, originally holding a position between Morgan and M. L. Smith, in advancing, had crossed the track of Morgan's division till it reached the extreme front on the left, in Steele's van. Here it crossed the bayou at a point where both banks were covered by tangled abatis, and the quicksand bed of the bayou was covered by water three feet deep. Through this bed Blair led his brigade across, leaving his horse floundering in the quicksands behind, and carried two lines of rifle-pits beyond, under a fire which struck down one third of his command. But, despite such instances of valor, beyond the crossing of a few regiments, and the slight foothold gained on the southern bank of the bayou, no impression was made; and so scathing was the fire from the enemy's rifle-pits, and the cross-fire from his batteries, that the advanced columns faltered and fell back, leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners.

Still Sherman urged A. J. Smith, on the right, to push his attack across the sand-bar. The latter had already crossed the Sixth Missouri, who lay on the other side, under the bank of the bayou, with the enemy's sharp-shooters directly over their heads. They were about to make a road by undermining the bank, when the utter failure of Morgan's assault on the left led to an order for their withdrawal, which was accomplished, as the advance


POSITION OF THE SIXTH MISSOURI AFTER CROSSING THE [illegible]



ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLEET AT THE MOUTH OF THE YAZOO.

had been, with heavy loss. All this time Burbridge had been skirmishing across the bayou, and Landrum pushing ahead through the abatis toward Vicksburg.

The night of the 29th was spent by the troops in the position of the night before, lying, exposed to a heavy rain, upon the miry ground, with no shelter but their blankets, and with no consolation from victory for their past loss or present hardship.

Sherman now gave up all hope of success from his present position. His only resource left was an attempt to turn the enemy's line by carrying his extreme right, the batteries upon Drumgould's Bluff, some miles farther up the Yazoo. While his army was encamped in the swamp on the night of the 29th, Sherman visited Admiral Porter on board his flag-boat, where was concerted the following plan of operations: Porter was to move up the Yazoo and bombard the batteries, while about 10,000 picked troops should make a determined assault, the rest of the army making a strong demonstration on the enemy's left. If successful in carrying out this plan, the national forces would have complete possession of the Yazoo River, and would hold the key of Vicksburg.

Steele's division, and one of Morgan L. Smith's, were accordingly embarked on the night of the 31st. But a dense fog made it impossible for Porter to advance his gun-boats, and the expedition was deferred to another night. But the next night the clear moonlight, which would last till morning, proved as unfavorable as the fog of the night before, since there would be no cover of darkness for landing the troops, and the attempt to secure a lodgment on the ridge between Yazoo and Black Rivers was abandoned.

Porter had previously (on the 24th and 27th) assailed the position at Haines's Bluff without success. In the second attempt the gun-boat Benton had been disabled, and Captain Gwin, her gallant commander, received a wound of which he died January 3, 1863.

The entire expedition was now a pronounced failure. The loss suffered by the national forces was 191 killed, 982 wounded, and 756 missing. The Confederate loss was very slight. It was also evident to General Sherman that the army under Grant, due a week ago, must have failed to co-operate with him. On the morning of January 2d the expedition was re-embarked for Milliken's Bend, and before nightfall the last of the transports had passed out of the Yazoo. At the mouth of the river Sherman met General McClernand, who had come down on the steamer Tigress with orders to assume command of the expedition. To him General Sherman resigned his command.[1]

The War Department had, on December 18, 1862, issued a general order dividing the Army of the Tennessee into four separate army corps, to be

[1] On January 4 Sherman issued the following order:

"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by General G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own 'corps,' I desire to express to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, the capture of Vicksburg, but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement, in which others were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.

"We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defenses of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify, and, having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff not attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by letter to Major General McClernand, commanding the Army of the Mississippi, on board the steamer Tigress, at our rendezvous at Gaines's Landing, and at Montgomery Point.

"By order of Major General W. T. SHERMAN.

"J. H. HAMMOND, A. A. G."

The connection of General McClernand with this expedition against Vicksburg is chiefly worthy of note as being so characteristic of the entire want of system—and, we might add, of judgment—in the general direction of the national armies at this time, and, indeed, until Grant became lieutenant general. It appears that, independently of any consultation with Grant, of whose winter campaign Vicksburg was the objective point, McClernand had in the autumn of 1862 been intrusted by the War Department with the organization of an expedition down the Mississippi. This, we understand, was done at McClernand's own instance. There was a long correspondence between him and the Department, the latter adopting his suggestions and urging him to hasten his preparations. The President and the Secretary of War united in drafting a document ordering him to organize the troops remaining in Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois, and to forward them with all dispatch to Memphis and Cairo, that, as soon as a sufficient force, not required elsewhere, should be got together, an expedition against Vicksburg might be organized under his command. The troops, however, were "subject to the designation of the general-in-chief," and were to be employed "according to such exigencies as the service in his judgment might require." The order was a confidential one, but the President, in his indorsement, allowed McClernand to show it to governors or others at his discretion, and expressed his "deep interest" in the proposed expedition.

McClernand was all in earnest. On the 16th of December he writes:

"Having substantially accomplished the purpose of the order sending me to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, by forwarding upward of 40,000 troops, as was particularly explained in my letter of the 1st instant to the Secretary of War, and referred by him to you, I beg to be sent forward in accordance with the order of the Secretary of War on the 21st of October, giving me command of the Mississippi expedition."

Whether General Halleck looked with disfavor upon the arrangements made with McClernand by the President or Secretary of War, thinking it would be better to leave the disposition of the troops at Memphis to General Grant, does not appear. Certain it is, however, that when Grant, early in December, received the order to send an expedition down the river, no mention of McClernand was made. When Halleck received McClernand's letter of the 16th, the expedition was upon the point of starting under Sherman's command. Yet, two days after the receipt of this letter, the following telegram was transmitted to Grant from Halleck:

"The troops in your department, including those from General Curtis's command which join the down-river expedition, will be divided into four corps. It is the wish of the President that General McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command under your directions."

McClernand was detained by his correspondence with the War Department until December 25th, when he left Springfield (Illinois), with his staff, for Cairo—nearly a week after Sherman's expedition had started from Memphis. Grant had dispatched an order the same day that he received Halleck's telegram, giving McClernand the command, but the dispatch was interrupted at Jackson, Tennessee, and could proceed no farther.

Finally, McClernand received the dispatch and was ready to leave Memphis December 30th, reaching the mouth of the Yazoo, as we have seen, just in time to meet the retreating expedition, with which he had been so curiously connected.

In regard to Sherman's conduct of the expedition, General Grant, writing after the capture of



THE ATTACK ON THE FORT



THE APPEARANCE OF THE CASEMATES BEFORE THE ATTACK.



CASEMATE No 1 DESTROYED BY GUN-BOAT DE-KALB



CASEMATE No 2 DESTROYED BY U.S. GUNBOAT LOUISVILLE.

REAR VIEW OF CASEMATE No 2.

THE ATTACK ON ARKANSAS POST.

CONFEDERATE TRANSPORT BRINGING CATTLE TO VICKSBURG.

known as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and to be commanded respectively by McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson, while General Grant was to retain command of the whole. Upon assuming command of the expedition, now returned to Milliken's Bend, McClernand gave the command of his own corps to General Morgan, this command comprising the divisions of A. J. Smith and Morgan's own division, now commanded by General P. J. Osterhaus. Sherman's corps comprised also two divisions, Steele's and M. L. Smith's (now commanded by Stuart).

These two corps, with McClernand in chief command, embarked upon the same transports which had brought them from Memphis, and, under convoy of Admiral Porter's gun-boats, proceeded up the river to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, on the north bank of the Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth, and a little more than twice that distance below Little Rock. Here a settlement had been made by the French in 1685. The fort was situated on the first high ground to be found in ascending the Arkansas; it had a parapet eighteen feet across, with a ditch of twenty feet wide by eight deep, strong casemates, and a cordon of rifle-pits. Its commander was General T. J. Churchill, who had under him a garrison of about 5000 men. The fort was mounted with eight guns, and its capture was an affair of no great difficulty. But Churchill had orders from Lieutenant General Holmes, the Confederate commander in Arkansas, "to hold on till help arrived, or till all were dead."

The expedition entered White River, and, after ascending it for fifteen miles, through a cut-off, moved into Arkansas River January 9, and by noon of the next day the troops were all debarked three miles below the fort. The story of the capture is soon told. The gun-boats, even while the troops were landing, had shelled the sharp-shooters out of their rifle-pits along the levee, and, moving up to the fort, opened a bombardment. By land the army was pushed up around the fort, across bayous and swamps, and during the night of the 10th slept on their arms, in readiness for the assault of the next day. The gun-boats opened again a little after noon on the 11th, and in two or three hours the guns of the fort had been completely silenced. In the mean time several brigades had charged up to within musket-range of the enemy's works, where they found partial shelter in the ravines. In this advance General Hovey was wounded, and General Thayer had a horse shot under him. General A. J. Smith pressed back the Confederate right until, as he sent word to McClernand, he could "almost shake hands with the enemy." As soon as the guns of the fort were silenced, McClernand ordered a general assault, when a white flag appeared on the ramparts, just as the Eighty-third Ohio and Sixteenth Indiana, with General Burbridge at their head, were entering the intrenchments on the east side, while Sherman's and Steele's advanced regiments were on the point of entering on the north and west, and the fort was in McClernand's hands, with 5000 prisoners, 17 guns, and 3000 small-arms. Churchill professed, even after the capture, his intention to have held out till the last man was slain, and said he was only prevented from doing so by the unauthorized display of the white flag by some of his Texan soldiers. So much the better, it would seem, for the Texans! The Confederate loss in killed was 60, and in wounded from 75 to 80. McClernand reports his own loss 129 killed, 831 wounded, and 17 missing. A few days later, the fortifications at Arkansas Post, the command of which had been assigned to General Burbridge, were dismantled and blown up. The position was of no importance, and was therefore abandoned. Before the withdrawal from Arkansas, however, an expedition under General Gorman and Lieutenant Commanding Walker was sent up the White River, and Des Arc and Duval's Bluff were captured.

Grant, having attended to the reorganization of his forces into four army corps, proceeded to Memphis, and on the 18th of January he went down the river and met Sherman, McClernand, and Porter near the mouth of the White River, returning from their successful raid into Arkansas, and, accompanying them to Helena, he consulted them in regard to farther operations for the reduction of Vicksburg. Three days later, McClernand's force reached Young's Point, nine miles above Vicksburg, on the opposite bank of the river, facing the mouth of the Yazoo. For over two months—until the movement on New Carthage—Grant's army was engaged in several unsuccessful attempts at an approach to Vicksburg from above. Before entering upon a review of these experiments, let us for a moment turn our attention to the interesting exploits of some of our gun-boats during this interval.

On the 2d of February, Colonel Charles R. Ellet, with the Queen of the West, ran past the batteries, with orders to destroy the City of Vicksburg, a vessel which had, after Sherman's failure, been brought down by the enemy from the Yazoo to the front of Vicksburg. This movement had not escaped Porter's observation. It was also known to him that supplies were continually being obtained both at Vicksburg and Port Hudson by means of transports. To these transports, also, Colonel Ellet was expected to pay his regards. The Queen of the West was a wooden steamer, strengthened so as to carry an iron prow. Her armament consisted of an 80-pounder rifled Parrott gun on her main deck, one 20-pounder and three 12-pounder brass howitzers on her gun-deck. In order to protect her from the shot and shells of the batteries, she had had her steering apparatus removed and placed behind the bulwarks of her bows, and three hundred bales of cotton covered her machinery. The change in her steering apparatus proved a great inconvenience, and, after starting on her trip, it was found necessary to return it to its original position. This caused some delay, and she did not pass into full view of the batteries before sunrise, thus becoming a fair target for a hundred guns bearing upon her at once. Only three or four shots, however, struck her before she reached the City of Vicksburg, which was made fast to the river's bank at the centre of the bend. Colonel Ellet made for the steamer at once, and struck her, but the force of the blow was broken by wide guards, which overlapped the prow of the ram, and prevented the latter from reaching the hull of the Vicksburg. The current, which was very strong at this point, swung the Queen round side by side



THE QUEEN OF THE WEST AND THE VICKSBURG.

Vicksburg, says, "General Sherman's arrangement as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs last December was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side from the attack afterward, I saw the impossibility of making it successful."

The account of the expedition published just after its failure in the *Missouri Democrat* abounded in vituperative charges against General Sherman. It accused him of an ambition to anticipate Grant in order to gain for himself the entire glory of the capture of Vicksburg; it asserted, without any authority, that Sherman knew that McClernand was properly the commander of the expedition, and represents him as exulting in his shrewdness in "cutting that general out;" and it charges him, in effect, with the murder of 2000 soldiers for the satisfaction of his own ambition. It is, however, quite evident that the motive which led to this outburst of indignation was General Sherman's order in relation to newspaper correspondents.



LOSS OF THE QUEEN OF THE WEST.

with the enemy. At this moment Colonel Ellet fired his starboard bow gun, loaded with incendiary shells, into the Vicksburg, his own cotton bales being at the same time set on fire by shells from the batteries. It was impossible to attempt any thing farther at this point, and the Queen, without material injury, passed the lower batteries. Below Natchez she captured and burned three small steamers laden with provisions. During the night a flat-boat, with a cargo of coal, was cast loose from the fleet above, and floated down to the ram.

A week later (February 10) the Queen started upon another expedition down the river, accompanied by the De Soto as tender. The next evening she reached the mouth of Old River, into which Red River runs. On the 12th, leaving the De Soto to guard the mouth of Old River, the Queen entered the Atchafalaya, and made some captures of army wagons and provisions, and, on the way back to her anchorage of the previous night, was fired upon from the shore and her master mortally wounded. On the 12th the two steamers passed up into Red River, and, moving up to the mouth of the Black River, where they anchored for the night, they the next morning captured the Era, No. 5, a steamer of 100 tons, with fourteen Texan soldiers, $28,000 in Confederate money, and 4500 bushels of corn destined for Little Rock. The pilot of the Era was taken on board the Queen, and, either by accident or design, he grounded the steamer directly under the guns of Fort Taylor, located at a bend in the river twenty miles above the spot where the Era was captured, and where she now lay under guard. The guns of the fort opened with frightful accuracy upon the unfortunate Queen, nearly every shell striking her, and one shot pierced her smoke-pipe, filling the boat with steam. It was impossible for the Queen to reply to the shots that were crashing through her machinery. There was the greatest confusion on board; cotton-bales were tumbled into the river, and men, jumping overboard, clung to them, hoping to float down to the De Soto, a mile below; negroes, frightened to death, were plunging into the water, where, with no means of preservation within their reach, they were drowned. The De Soto endeavored to come to the rescue, but the attempt proved too perilous, and she withdrew out of range. As she floated down she picked up several of the crew. Colonel Ellet escaped in this manner. By 11 o'clock P.M. the De Soto reached the Era, and, proving unmanageable, was blown up. Upon the Era, with the Confederate ram Webb sixty miles behind him and in swift pursuit, Colonel Ellet worried his way out of Red River and up the Mississippi, past Ellis's Cliffs, where he met the Indianola, one of the finest of the national gun-boats. Just as the Era came alongside of her unlooked-for deliverer the fog lifted, and revealed her pursuer, the Webb, not far in the rear. The tables were then turned, and the Webb was pursued by the two boats, but, being a swift vessel, she escaped.

The Era was now furnished with supplies, and sent back to Admiral Porter. The Indianola[1] had set out from the mouth of the Yazoo on the night of February 13. She passed the batteries without steam, floating down with the current at the rate of about four miles an hour. Although her crew could hear the voices of the Confederate soldiers on the bank, yet she passed by unobserved until she drifted by a camp-fire on the levee, when she was discovered by a soldier, who discharged his musket at her. This was the signal for a general discharge of muskets and cannon. As the Indianola now put on steam to hasten her progress her position became known, and she was opened upon from every battery which she had now to pass; but she suffered no injury. She was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Brown. How she arrived in time to rescue the Era has been already shown.

The Queen of the West was being repaired by the enemy, and as it would be difficult to manœuvre so long a boat as the Indianola in the waters of the Red River, and no pilots could be obtained, Brown returned with his boat up the river. When he reached the mouth of the Big Black River, forty miles below Vicksburg, on the 24th, the Webb and the Queen of the West hove in sight behind him, accompanied by two cotton-clad steamers. Brown had expected another vessel to come down to assist him in meeting the emergency which now threatened, but he had been disappointed. It was now half past nine P.M., and the night was very dark. Clearing for action, Brown stood down the river to meet them. The Queen of the West led in the attack, striking through a coal-barge against the Indianola, but harmlessly; then came the Webb. "Both vessels came together, bows on," says Brown, "with a tremendous crash, which knocked nearly every one down on board both vessels, doing no damage to us, while the Webb's bow was cut in at least eight feet." Not minding the cotton-clads, which kept up an incessant fire with small-arms, Brown turned his attention to the rams, with whom he was now engaged at close quarters. From his forward guns

[1] "The Indianola was a new iron-clad gun-boat, one hundred and seventy-four feet long, fifty feet beam, ten feet from the top of her deck to the bottom of her keel, or eight feet four inches in the clear. Her sides (of wood) for five feet down were thirty-two inches thick, having beveled sticks laid outside the hull (proper), and all of oak. Outside of this was three-inch-thick plate iron. Her clamps and keelsons were as heavy as the largest ship's. Her deck was eight inches solid, with one-inch iron plate, all well bolted. Her casemate stood at an incline of twenty-six and a half degrees, and was covered with three-inch iron, as were also her ports. She had a heavy grating on top of the casemate that no shell could penetrate, and every scuttle and hatch was equally well covered. She was ironed all round, except some temporary rooms on deck, and, besides the amount of wood and iron already stated, had coal-bunkers seven feet thick alongside of her boilers, the entire machinery being in the hold. She had seven engines—two for working her side wheels, two for her propellers, two for her capstans, and one for supplying water and working the bilge and fire pumps. She had five large five-flued boilers, and made abundance of steam. Her forward casemate had two eleven-inch Dahlgren guns, and her after casemate two nine-inch. Her forward casemate was pierced for two guns in front, one on each side, and two aft, so that she could fire two guns forward, one on each side, and four at an angle sideways and astern. She had also hose for throwing scalding water from her boilers that would reach from stem to stern, and there was communication from the casemates to all parts of the vessel without the least exposure. The pilot-house was also thoroughly iron-clad, and instant communication could be had with the gunners and engineers, enabling the pilot to place the vessel in just such position as might be required for effective action."—*Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1863, p. 44.

he fired at his antagonists as opportunity offered. He received a third blow, which crushed the starboard coal-barge. Two more blows were struck without seriously damaging the Indianola. The sixth blow from the Webb crushed the starboard wheel and disabled the starboard rudder, starting a number of leaks back of the shaft. The Webb now struck a fair blow in the stern, starting the timbers of the Indianola, which let in the water in large volumes. Finally, the gun-boat, with two feet and a half of water over her floor, was run ashore. Unable longer to hold out against four vessels, mounting ten guns, and manned by over a thousand men, Brown surrendered, after a fight of an hour and a half. All his guns had been either thrown overboard or rendered useless.



THE INDIANOLA RUNNING THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES.

The enemy intended immediately to repair the Indianola, which was an important accession to his fleet. Her destruction afterward was probably the most ludicrous incident of the war. It happened in this way. Porter observed the Queen of the West on the morning of February 25th at Warrenton, seven miles below Vicksburg. He had not heard of the capture of the Indianola, and the appearance of this boat excited alarm. He had no expectation that the Queen would so soon be repaired, and began to fear (too late) for the safety of the Indianola. In a letter written by him on the 26th, he expresses his anxiety on her account. It appears that he stood in becoming awe of the Queen (whose loss he considered more to be deplored than the disaster at Galveston), but had little fear of the Webb, which really gave the death-blow to the Indianola. The latter vessel (the Indianola) Porter characterizes as weak, the only good thing about her being her battery. But a trivial instrument of war at this crisis was destined to effect more than the Queen of the West or the Indianola had been able to accomplish. Admiral Porter had observed that while the Queen and the Indianola were running past the batteries, five of the enemy's guns were burst and dismounted. He therefore tried to provoke the fire of the batteries by placing a mortar so that its fire bore upon that portion of the town where there was nothing but army supplies. For a time the mortar accomplished its object, when the enemy gave up firing.

"Finding," says the admiral, "that they could not be provoked to fire without an object, I thought of getting up an imitation monitor. Ericsson saved the country with an iron one, why could I not save it with a wooden one? An old coal-barge, picked up in the river, was the foundation to build on. It was built of old boards in twelve hours, with pork-barrels on top of each other for smoke-stacks, and two old canoes for quarter-boats; her furnaces were built of mud, and only intended to make black smoke and not steam."

Porter considered his "dummy" a very much better-looking affair, after all, than the Indianola. Well, he let slip this formidable dog of war one night (that of the 24th), hardly expecting of it such good service as it really accomplished before the enemy discovered how he had been fooled. When the dark monster, without a soul on board, was disclosed by the first dim morning light, the Confederates appear to have had no hesitation about firing. "Never," says Porter, "did the batteries of Vicksburg open with such a din; the earth fairly trembled, and the shot flew thick around the devoted monitor." Of course the "dummy" could not be sunk, for the shots went in one side and out at the other. The soldiers of Grant's army lined the banks, and "shouted and laughed like mad" to see the fun. In the very midst of this frolic the Queen of the West appeared off Warrenton, and a damper was thrown upon the jollity of the spectacle on which all eyes had been fixed, by apprehensions as to the fate of the Indianola.

In the panic occasioned by the appearance of the "dummy," the enemy had given warning to the Queen of the West, who, supposing that she was pursued by a monster gun-boat, and trembling for her life, turned and fled down the river. The sham monitor, though it deigned no reply to the Confederate guns, did pursue the Queen as rapidly as a five-knot current would allow. Dispatches had been already sent from Vicksburg ordering the Indianola to be blown up without delay, that she might be saved from the clutches of her novel antagonist. The Queen of the West took refuge in the Red River, but, having no support, was not long afterward blown up to avoid capture. The order to blow up the Indianola was obeyed, and the gun-boat was annihilated. This exploit of the "dummy,"[1] strange as it may

[1] In regard to the effects produced by Porter's "dummy," the Richmond *Examiner* of March 7, 1863, says:

"The telegraph brings us tidings of something which is tremblingly described as a 'turreted monster.' Gun-boats are deemed not more dangerous than dug-outs, but when the case is altered to an interview with a 'turreted monster,' then the brave defenders of the Father of Waters can do nothing better than make two-forty toward the mountains.

"The reported fate of the Indianola is even more disgraceful than farcical. Here was perhaps the finest iron-clad in the Western waters, captured after a heroic struggle, rapidly repaired, and destined to join the Queen of the West in a series of victories. Next we hear that she was of necessity blown up, in the true Merrimac-Mallory style, and why? Laugh and hold your sides, lest



ADMIRAL PORTER'S "DUMMY."



THE LANCASTER AND SWITZERLAND RUNNING THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES.

seem, broke up that naval supremacy of the river below Vicksburg which had been almost secured by the enemy. If a few more regular gun-boats had run the blockade with the same results as the Queen of the West and Indianola, the Confederates would have soon had a powerful and almost irresistible fleet. It was certainly ingenious in Admiral Porter to send the "dummy" down instead.

Precisely a week after the victory of the "dummy" the rams Lancaster and Switzerland attempted to pass the batteries, being wanted by Admiral Farragut in the Red River. By some delay, it was daylight when they came under fire. The Lancaster was sunk, and the Switzerland, though she succeeded in passing, was badly cut up. Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet[1] commanded the latter vessel; the Switzerland was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Ellet, brother of Alfred Ellet.

The aspect of military affairs at the close of 1862 was for the nation a discouraging one. The repulse at Fredericksburg in the East had its Western counterpart in Sherman's defeat on the Yazoo. Indeed, the whole year just closed had presented no grand results in favor of the national arms except the capture of New Orleans.

The Yazoo expedition had been an experiment, and a somewhat costly one; and, following upon its failure, for several weeks, so far as Vicksburg was concerned, every operation of Grant's army was an experiment, and proved a failure. The state of the river did not allow of those brilliant operations which in the end were successful. But Grant had a large army, consisting of McClernand's command, and of his own troops brought down from Memphis. It would almost seem that it was to keep this immense force out of idleness that he embarked upon the series of adventures which preceded the advance to New Carthage in April.

you die of a surfeit of derision, oh Yankeedom! Blown up because, forsooth, a flat-boat or mud-scow, with a small house taken from the back garden of a plantation put on top of it, is floated down the river before the frightened eyes of the Partisan Rangers. A turreted monster!

"'A most unfortunate and unnecessary affair,' says the dispatch. Rather so! 'The turreted monster proved to be a flat-boat, with sundry fixtures to create deception!' Think of that! 'She passed Vicksburg on Tuesday night, and the officers (what officers?), believing her to be a turreted monster, blew up the Indianola, but her guns fell into the enemy's hands.' That is passing odd. Her guns fell into 'the enemy's hands after she was blown up!' Incredible! Mallory and Tatnall did better than that with the Merrimac.

"'The Queen of the West,' continues the facetious dispatch, 'left in such a hurry as to forget part of her crew, who were left on shore.' Well done for the Queen of the West and her brave officers! 'Taken altogether,' concludes the inimitable dispatch, 'it was a good joke on the Partisan Rangers, who are notoriously more cunning than brave.' Truly an excellent joke — so excellent that every man connected with this affair (if any resemblance of the truth is contained in the dispatch) should be branded with the capital letters 'T. M.,' and enrolled in a detached company, to be known by the name of 'The Turreted Monster' henceforth and forever."

[1] A few weeks afterward, at the close of the summer, Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet applied for leave of absence on account of illness, and in August retired to the home of his uncle, Dr. Ellet, at Bunker Hill, Illinois. He had been troubled with a severe attack of neuralgia in the face, for which he was in the habit of taking some opiate. On the night of October 16th he died, either from an overdose of morphine or from prostration. He was little more than twenty years old, was a man of great literary culture and refinement, and had shouldered responsibilities such as few of much riper years were called upon to bear.



POSITION OF WILLIAMS'S CANAL.



THE LAKE PROVIDENCE ROUTE.



THE YAZOO PASS ROUTE.



THE STEELE'S BAYOU ROUTE.

NEGROES AT WORK ON THE CANAL.

First among these was General Williams's Canal, to which allusion has already been made. Grant came down to Young's Point in person on the 2d of February, and under his superintendence the work on the canal was re-opened and vigorously prosecuted. To secure the encampment from inundation, a levee was constructed on the eastern side. The river was rising rapidly, and it proved difficult to keep the gathering flood out of the canal and the camps. While the work was still going on, on the 8th of March the levee gave way suddenly just west of the canal, and the waters with great violence rushed in, carrying away the dikes which had been built and the implements of the workmen, and, entering the camps, drove the soldiers to the refuge of the levee. The entire peninsula south of the railroad was flooded.

Failing to find a route for his transports to a point below Vicksburg by means of the canal, Grant directed his attention more prominently toward another mode of effecting this object, by a route which his engineers had pronounced practicable. By cutting a channel into Lake Providence from the Mississippi, it was thought possible that transports might be conveyed through that lake, then through the Tensas, Black, and Red Rivers into the Mississippi below Natchez. Work had been begun on the channel shortly after the work on the canal had been reopened. This Lake Providence route would have brought the army down to a point far below Vicksburg, but it would have enabled Grant to co-operate with Banks at Port Hudson. The channel, about a mile in length, was completed March 16th. Before, however, any thing had been fairly done in making this plan available, the promise of success by means of a similar route on the east side of the river created a diversion. The flood, to which a path was opened by the Lake Providence Canal, inundated a large district of country in Louisiana, some portion of which was a fine cotton-growing region.

The plan of operations on the east of the Mississippi, by the Yazoo Pass route, had at first for its object only the destruction of the enemy's transports on the Yazoo, and the gun-boats which were being built on that stream. Eight miles below Helena (but on the opposite bank) a canal was cut into Moon Lake, from which, by Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater and Tallahatchie Rivers, there was a passage into the Yazoo. The navigation by this route proving better than was expected, Grant entertained a hope of gaining in this way a foothold on the high land above Haines's Bluff. Major General J. B. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, was directed to hold his men in readiness to move by this route, and he was re-enforced by one



BREAK IN THE MISSISSIPPI LEVEE, NEAR THE CANAL.

division from McClernand's and another from Sherman's corps. "But," says General Grant, "while my forces were opening one end of the pass, the enemy was diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeded in gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha." The passage into the Coldwater River was an affair of great difficulty. The flood which had been occasioned by the cutting of the canal, the swift current of the stream, and the gigantic branches of the cypress and sycamore overhanging the boats and obstructing their passage, rendered the progress of the expedition very slow, the rate of speed being about one mile in four hours. The boats were greatly damaged, but the expedition succeeded in reaching the junction at Greenwood, where Fort Pemberton opposed such a resistance that it was compelled finally to withdraw. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the gun-boats to reduce the fort, which they bombarded for two days. The land about the fort was loose, and at this time flooded with water, a circumstance which debarred the army from co-operation in the attack. The Confederate force was estimated at over



IN THE SWAMPS.



BAYOU NAVIGATION.



AMONG THE BAYOUS.

McCLERNAND'S CORPS MARCHING THROUGH THE BOGS.



FROM MILLIKEN'S BEND TO NEW CARTHAGE.

5000 men, under the command of General Tilghman, who a year before had been captured at Fort Henry, in Kentucky.

Another plan was then attempted by which Fort Greenwood might be avoided and left in the rear. This was to be effected by a passage up the Yazoo River to Cypress Bayou (opposite the position occupied by Sherman in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs the previous December), thence into Steele's Bayou, and through Little Black Fork into the Big Sunflower River, and turning at Rolling Fork southward into Deer Creek, which empties into the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff. The expedition, commanded by Admiral Porter, consisted of the gun-boats Pittsburg, Louisville, Mound City, Cincinnati, and Carondelet, with a number of small transports. Porter found a co-operating military force essential, and a column was sent under Sherman. "The expedition failed," says Grant, "probably more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to move forces to effectually checkmate farther progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."

Grant then reverted to his original plan of moving his transports to the south of Vicksburg. His engineers had prospected a route through the bayous which ran from near Milliken's Bend on the north and New Carthage on the south, through Roundabout Bayou into Tensas River. The route was opened, and one small steamer and a number of barges were taken through the channel. But about the middle of April, the river beginning to fall rapidly, the roads became passable between Milliken's Bend and New Carthage, and communication by water was out of the question.

In the course of the Deer Creek raid a Federal soldier is reported to have been captured and taken before a Confederate officer, when the following colloquy took place: "What in the devil is Grant in here for? what does he expect to do?" "To take Vicksburg," was the reply. "Well, hasn't the old fool tried this ditching and flanking five times already?" "Yes," replied the soldier, "but he has got thirty-seven more plans in his pocket."[1] It is quite impossible to conceive what these other thirty-seven plans could have been, for certainly, with the exception of that which was next put in operation, and which resulted in the capture of Vicksburg, it seems that every possible mode of approaching, turning, or avoiding the city had been tried.

Grant's idea, from his first arrival at Young's Point, was to get his army across the river at a point below Vicksburg, having effected which, he proposed to attack the city from the rear. He was now able to set about this work in earnest. It was with this view that he had sought to open a water communication between Milliken's Bend and New Carthage. At the same time, he had determined to occupy the latter place with his troops. New Carthage was the first point below Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water then existing. On the 29th of March, McClernand, with his corps, was ordered to advance and occupy this position, to be followed by Sherman's and McPherson's corps as soon as supplies and ammunition for them could be transported. The roads, though level, were intolerably bad, and as McClernand's advance reached Smith's Plantation, two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, and New Carthage had been insulated. The troops were therefore compelled to take a more circuitous route by marching twelve miles around the bayou to Perkins's Plantation. Supplies of provisions, ammunition, and ordnance for the troops had to be hauled over bad roads for a distance of thirty-five miles from Milliken's Bend. McClernand's advance was therefore one of extreme difficulty.

As the water fell it was found necessary to get the transports which were to convey the army across the Mississippi down the river by running the Vicksburg batteries. The gun-boats selected to convoy the transports were the Benton, Lafayette, Price, Louisville, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Tuscumbia, and Mound City—all iron-clad except the Price. Three transports were selected—the Forest Queen, Henry Clay, and Silver Wave—their machinery being protected by cotton bales. They were laden with supplies. On the night of April 16th the expedition set out. The iron-clads were to pass down in single file, and when abreast of the batteries were to engage the latter, covering the transports with the smoke of their cannonade. Fire was not opened upon the fleet until it was squarely in front of Vicksburg, and then the gun-boats responded, pouring their full broadside of twenty-five guns into the city. Into the cloud of smoke which now rolled heavily above the gun-boats the three transports entered. The Forest Queen, in the advance, received a shot in the hull and another through the steam-drum, which disabled her instantly. The Henry Clay, next in order, was stopped to prevent her running into the crippled vessel, and at the same moment received a shell which set fire to her cotton. Her demoralized crew launched the yawl and made for the shore, while the transport, in a blaze of flame, floated down the river, finally disappearing below Warrenton. The Forest Queen was towed down by a gun-boat, and the Silver Wave escaped uninjured.

Succeeding in getting these two transports down, Grant ordered six more to be sent in the same manner. Five of these, on the 22d, succeeded in passing the batteries with slight damage; the other was sunk just after passing the last battery.

Admiral Porter repaired the damaged transports, five of which were brought into running order, while the other two were in a fit condition to serve as barges. The limited number of transports in his possession led Grant to extend his line of movement to Hard Times, in Louisiana, seventy-five miles from Milliken's Bend. Here, before the end of April, the Thirteenth Corps (McClernand's) was in readiness for the campaign about to be undertaken across the river.

It was at this crisis that Colonel Grierson's raid was undertaken, under directions from General Grant. The entire Confederate force in the states bordering on the Mississippi was now being gathered together to meet the blows which Grant was preparing to strike. Thus the way was open for one of those bold cavalry incursions for which hitherto only the Confederates had distinguished themselves, but which, from this time, became a prominent feature in the national conduct of the war. Morgan, Forrest, and Van Dorn had set the example, which was to be followed now by Colonel Grierson in a bold movement from La Grange, in Tennessee, through the State of Mississippi to Baton Rouge, in Louisiana.

At the outbreak of the war, Colonel Grierson, a native of Illinois, entered the army as an aid to General Prentiss. Subsequently colonel of the Sixth Illinois, he soon rose to the command of a brigade in Grant's army. The force placed at his disposal for his celebrated raid consisted of a brigade 1700 strong, composed of the Sixth and Seventh Illinois and Second Iowa Cavalry.

La Grange, the starting-point of the expedition, is an inland town, about fifty miles east from Memphis, on the southern border of Tennessee. Grierson's command set out from this place on the morning of April 17th, the Sixth Illinois in the advance. At night the head of the column encamped within four miles of Ripley, the first town reached after crossing the Mississippi border. The route of the expedition through Mississippi, as will be seen from the following map, passed entirely around Pemberton's army, between the Ohio and Mobile and the New Orleans and Jackson Railroads, crossing the railroad leading east from Vicksburg a little south of Decatur, and the New Orleans Railroad just in the rear of Natchez. After three days of adventurous riding, and meeting only inconsiderable detachments of the enemy, which were easily scattered, the command on the night of the 19th reached Mr. Wetherall's plantation, eight miles south of Pontotoc, and



GRANT'S TRANSPORTS RUNNING THE BATTERIES.

[1] *Iowa Colonels and Regiments*, p. 223.

BENJAMIN H. GRIERSON



SCHEME OF GRIERSON'S RAID.



SAVING THE BRIDGE ACROSS PEARL RIVER.



DESTROYING RAILROADS.



GRIERSON'S COMMAND ENTERING BATON ROUGE.

sixty miles from its first night's encampment. Forty miles were made the next day; and on the 21st, Colonel Hatch, with the Iowa regiment, in an excursion, the object of which was the destruction of the Mobile Railroad at Columbus, was confronted by a superior force of the enemy. In the fight which ensued Colonel Hatch was seriously wounded, and his command dispersed. On the 27th the expedition reached Pearl River, where it was joined by a detachment of thirty-five men who about a week before had been sent from the main column to cut the telegraph running northward from Macon. This little party had succeeded in marching to Macon and safely returning to the main column, under the leadership of Captain Forbes. It had been in great peril, for the whole state was now alarmed. Unable to capture Macon, it was misled by false information to Enterprise, where, but for the boldness of Captain Forbes, it would have fallen into the hands of three thousand Confederate soldiers. The captain, understanding his danger, tried to bluff the enemy, and succeeded. He rode boldly up to the town with a flag of truce, and demanded the instant surrender of the place to Colonel Grierson. Colonel Goodwin, commanding the Confederate force, asked an hour to consider the proposition, to which request Forbes was only too willing to accede. That hour, with rapid riding, delivered his little company from its embarrassing situation.

In the mean time, the main column, which, after Hatch's defeat, only numbered 1000 men, had been rescued from imminent peril by a deliverance still more remarkable, because it was providential rather than strategic. During the 22d and the following night, the expedition made the most difficult march of the raid. Waiting in the morning for the return of a battalion which had been detailed to destroy a large shoe factory near Starkville, it had been delayed, and toward night found itself entangled in the swamps of the Okanoxubee River, a few miles south of Louisville. The water in many places on the roads was four or five feet deep, and the tired horses, after a march already accomplished of over fifty miles, and now confronted by a waste of water, without the light of day to guide their path, were many of them drowned. Fortunately not a man was lost, and the next morning (that of the 23d) found the entire column hurrying forward to reach the bridge across Pearl River. Confederate scouts had gone before them, and if the bridge should be destroyed there was no hope of escape. It was not till late in the afternoon that Colonel Prime, with the Seventh Illinois, neared the bridge. Upon a closer approach it was discovered that the enemy's scouts were already engaged in the destruction of the bridge, stripping up the planks and hurling them into the river. The scouts were driven from the bridge, which in a few minutes more would have been rendered useless. This was near Decatur, where, on the next day, Grierson destroyed two warehouses full of commissary stores, several carloads of ammunition, and burned the railroad bridges and trestle-work, besides capturing two trains of cars

THE ADVANCE ON PORT GIBSON.

It was Grierson's raid which first demonstrated that the Confederacy was but a shell, strong at the surface by reason of organized armies, but hollow within, and destitute of resources to sustain or of strength to recruit those armies.

The same day that Grierson entered Baton Rouge was fought and won the battle of Port Gibson, the first of a series of victorious battles in the rear of Vicksburg which in the course of two months had their crowning success in the capture of the "heroic city."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE WAR ON THE MISSISSIPPI.—(*Continued.*)

Opening of the new Campaign against Vicksburg.—Getting into Position.—Battle of Port Gibson and Evacuation of Grand Gulf.—Feint Attack at Haines's Bluff.—General Banks's Progress in Louisiana.—Port Hudson.—Farragut runs the Blockade.—Battle at Raymond.—Capture of Jackson.—Battle of Champion Hill.—McClernand's Fight on the Black River.—Investment of Vicksburg.—First Assault, May 19th.—Second Assault, May 22d.—The Siege.—The Capitulation.—Results of the Campaign.—Capture of Port Hudson.

and two locomotives. On the morning of the 27th they reached the Pearl River at a point sixty miles nearer its mouth. Here again they were fortunate in obtaining ferriage across the river. At Gallatin, on the night of the 27th, they captured a 32-pounder rifled Parrott gun and 1400 pounds of powder. At Bahala, on the 28th, four companies, detailed for that purpose, destroyed the railroad dépôt and transportation. The next day, at Brook Haven, on the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad, the Seventh Illinois dashed through the streets, burned the railroad dépôt, cars, and bridges, and paroled over 200 prisoners. After farther destruction of railroads and stores at Bogue Chito and Summit, Grierson's command on the 1st of May, near Osyka, returned to the main road to avail itself of a bridge, its only means of crossing an important stream. Here it fell into an ambuscade, and Lieutenant Colonel Blackburn was severely wounded. That night it crossed Amite River, evading the sleeping pickets of the enemy. Finally, at noon on May 2, the raiders galloped into the streets of Baton Rouge, as dusty, ragged, and wayworn a band of heroes as ever was seen.

In this raid, Grierson's command, by a succession of forced marches, often through drenching rain and almost impassable swamps, sometimes without rest for forty-eight hours, had in sixteen days traversed 800 miles of hostile territory, destroying railroad bridges, transportation, and commissary stores, paroling a large number of prisoners, and destroying 3000 stand of arms, at a cost of only twenty-seven men.

As a result of his observations, Grierson writes:

"The strength of the rebels has been over-estimated. They have neither the arms nor the resources we have given them credit for. Passing through their country, I found thousands of good Union men, who were ready and anxious to return to their allegiance the moment they could do so with safety to themselves and families. They will rally around the old flag by scores whenever our army advances. I could have brought away a thousand with me, who were anxious to come—men whom I found fugitives from their homes, hid in the swamps and forests, where they were hunted like wild beasts by conscripting officers with blood-hounds."

Five hundred negroes followed the raiders into Baton Rouge on the captured horses.

AT length the campaign was opened which was to result in the capture of Vicksburg. The transports had been brought down, and three corps of troops were in motion. McClernand, who had the advance, had been waiting—"impatiently waiting," according to his report, for an opportunity, had with considerable difficulty crossed the peninsula from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. "Old roads," says he, "were repaired, new ones made, boats constructed for the transportation of men and supplies, twenty miles of levee sleeplessly guarded day and night, and every possible precaution used to prevent the rising flood from breaking through and ingulfing us." He had also to contend with Harrison's cavalry, which finally retreated to Perkins's Plantation, six miles below New Carthage. Upon McClernand's approach, New Carthage was hastily abandoned by the enemy, who, taking refuge at James's Plantation, a mile and a half below, was dislodged also from that position. The arrival of the transports at this point accelerated the movement of the corps, which advanced from New Carthage to Perkins's Plantation, General Hovey constructing on this route nearly 2000 feet of bridging out of extemporized material, thus in the short space of three days completing the military road from the river above to a point on the river forty miles below Vicksburg.

On the 22d of April Porter notified McClernand that on the following morning he would attack Grand Gulf, requesting the latter to send an infantry force to occupy the place so soon as he should succeed in silencing the enemy's guns. Osterhaus's division was detached for this purpose; but, after farther consideration, the attack was postponed. The line being now extended southward on account of the limited number of transports, McClernand advanced to Hard Times, fifteen miles below Perkins's Plantation, and seventy miles from Milliken's Bend. This position was three miles above Grand Gulf. It being desirable to get below this strong-hold, the cavalry, followed by McClernand's, and afterward by McPherson's corps, crossed Coffee Point to D'Schron's Plantation, and on to a point opposite Bruinsburg. While the cavalry were reconnoitring this route, an attack was made (April 29th) on Grand Gulf by the gun-boats, a military force 15,000 strong having embarked on transports for the purpose of effecting a landing in case the attack succeeded. Seven gun-boats participated in the attack—the Louisville,



ATTACK ON GRAND GULF.

Carondelet, Mound City, Pittsburg, Tuscumbia, Benton, and Lafayette. The three last mentioned attacked the upper and more formidable batteries. The batteries below were soon silenced, and the entire force of the bombardment was directed against the upper one, which had been hotly engaged by the Benton and Tuscumbia. Both these vessels were now suffering severely. Many on board were numbered among the killed and wounded; and, just as the Pittsburg came up to their support, a large shell passed through the Benton's pilot-house, wounding her pilot and disabling her wheel, so that she was forced to drift down and repair her injuries. In a very short time the Pittsburg had lost eight killed and sixteen wounded. The Tuscumbia, too, was being badly cut up. General Grant was watching the conflict from a tug-boat, and to him the prospect of success in this direct attack did not appear promising. The gun-boats had now fought at a disadvantage for nearly six hours in the strong currents and eddies of the stream, and were being very much crippled, while the guns of the enemy's batteries were apparently uninjured.

It was therefore determined to cross over to Bruinsburg—the landing for Port Gibson—and to turn the position at Grand Gulf. McClernand's corps was disembarked at Bruinsburg before noon on the 30th, and, after a distribution to the troops of three days' rations, which took up three or four hours, the army began its advance toward Port Gibson. McPherson's corps followed as rapidly as possible.

The march began at three o'clock P.M. Carr's division moved in the van, followed in order by Osterhaus's, Hovey's, and A. J. Smith's. There was no halting except for the preliminary packing of haversacks, and, in the case of Benton's brigade, even this had been dispensed with. This brigade, the first of Carr's division, had moved forward as soon as it was landed, and had left a detail behind to bring its supplies; not a light labor, when it is remembered that the brave fellows carried these provisions upon their backs under a broiling sun for a distance of four miles. Benton's command having gained the hills, four miles back from the river, and waited there for its rations, the whole corps was soon in motion. It marched on until midnight, when, about eight miles out from Bruinsburg, there was a smart encounter with the enemy. A fight of two or three hours ensued, in which the artillery took chief part, resulting in the withdrawal of the enemy. Farther advance was impossible, and the soldiers laid down and slept upon their arms until daylight. They had been awakened the morning before at three o'clock by the bombardment of Grand Gulf—covering the movement of the transports down the river—and for twenty-four hours had not had a moment's sleep. At dawn the march was resumed, and continued for four miles, when the enemy was encountered in his chosen position on Centre Creek, three miles west of Port Gibson.

Grant's movement had proved a complete surprise to Pemberton, who, until the last fortnight, had supposed Tullahoma, in Tennessee, to be the object of the impending campaign rather than Vicksburg. As late as April 13th, three days before the first passage of Grant's transports below Vicksburg, Pemberton telegraphed to Joe Johnston, then at Tullahoma, "I am satisfied Rosecrans will be re-enforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?" But on the 17th the descent of the transports had apparently convinced him of his mistake, as he then telegraphed to Johnston the "return" of Grant, and the "resumption" of operations against Vicksburg. From this time he was scarcely allowed either the chance of a doubt as to Grant's real intentions, or time for preparation. And what time he had slipped leisurely away without any show of positive energy on his part. He must have known, when he saw the transports going down, that an attempt would be made by Grant to cross the river *somewhere* below Vicksburg, and that probably it would be made at Grand Gulf. Thus, on the 29th of April, he telegraphed to Johnston, "The enemy is at Hard Times in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack Grand Gulf, with a view to Vicksburg."

The only preparation which he had made against this contemplated attack was to send a few thousand troops, under command of General Bowen, to Grand Gulf. The attempt to occupy Grand Gulf was made, as we have seen, on the 29th; it was going on, indeed, while Pemberton was telegraphing the above dispatch to Johnston. But suddenly the attack was given up, and Bowen, leaving a small force at Grand Gulf, found it necessary, with an incompetent army, to move southward from the mouth of the Big Black, putting that river between himself and Vicksburg. Re-enforcements were on the way; but Grant was moving with precipitate rapidity, and nothing could now prevent his immediately landing two corps. On the morning of the 1st of May, Bowen found himself, with only two brigades, in a position which should have been taken ere this by the greater portion of Pemberton's army. His situation made victory for him impossible, for Grant almost inevitable. One thing, and but one, was in his favor; this was the character of the country in which he must venture battle—"a country," said Grant, "the most broken and difficult to operate in I ever saw." It is, of course, useless to speculate as to what might have happened had Pemberton appreciated the importance of the strongest possible resistance at this point; but it is none the less a damaging fact that he did *not* appreciate it. But it was too late now for Pemberton to speculate about the matter; the Vicksburg campaign was already virtually decided. Bowen, resist however bravely he might, must retreat; and Grant must advance, carrying with him the key of Vicksburg.

Bowen's resistance was as gallant and as obstinate as the circumstances of his situation allowed. His army, if it might be called an army, was posted on Centre Creek, where, out of the road leading from Bruinsburg, two others branched in opposite directions, but each conducting to Port Gibson. Upon the one rested his right, and his left upon the other. He had between five and six thousand men. Opposed to him were more than twice his own numbers, supported by a full corps, which was moving rapidly upon the field. But in such a position a small force easily opposes a very much larger one. The roads run along narrow ridges, with deep and almost impenetrable ravines on either side. Only a comparatively small army can be brought into action at one time in such a field, and it is only by long-continued fighting that the superiority in numbers is made to tell.

It was McClernand's corps which, on the national side, fought the battle of Port Gibson. Carr's division held the front, the first brigade on the right, and the second on the left. Hovey's division occupied the ridges on Carr's right. Osterhaus's confronted the enemy's left, and secured McClernand's rear. When A. J. Smith's division came up, it moved into the position first occupied by Hovey, while the latter advanced to the support of Benton's brigade (Carr's right), which had been fighting against odds for nearly two hours. Opposite the Eighteenth Indiana regiment, which was Benton's right, touching the road from Bruinsburg at Magnolia Church, was a Confederate battery, situated on an elevated position, and which was a source of great annoyance. A spirited charge was made by detachments from both Carr's and Hovey's divisions, resulting in the capture of this battery and 400 prisoners—an achievement which should be credited to both divisions. From this time the enemy was steadily though slowly driven back. Several attempts on his part, directed against McClernand's centre, had already

GENERAL LOGAN CROSSING THE BAYOU PIERRE.

failed; against Osterhaus's position on the left he still maintained his ground, until finally J. E. Smith's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came to the assistance of Osterhaus, when, by a flank movement, Bowen was driven from the field; yet, from the nature of the ground and the approach of darkness, he was able to retire in good order. The next morning Port Gibson was occupied by McPherson's corps, after bridging the Bayou Pierre, the enemy having burned the bridge in his retreat. The national loss in the battle had been 130 killed and 718 wounded; that of the enemy was in proportion probably much heavier.

On the 3d of May, as a consequence of his defeat at Port Gibson, the enemy evacuated Grand Gulf just as Admiral Porter was about to subject that position to another bombardment. As soon as the place was abandoned, Grant determined to make it his base of supplies. His forces had now advanced fifteen miles out, to Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black. Before any farther progress could be ventured, it was necessary to complete the arrangements occasioned by the change of base from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf, and to wait for Sherman's corps.

This corps had been left behind until the last, as a blind to Pemberton, to prevent his sending heavy re-enforcements southward from Vicksburg to Bowen's army. Sherman, on April 28th, received an order from Grant to make a feint the next day against the Confederate batteries on the Yazoo simultaneously with the attack on Grand Gulf. The field in which this demonstration was to be made was the scene of his repulse four months before, and the associations revived were doubtless not of a pleasant character to General Sherman, who was now called upon—by a threatening advance, to be followed by a hasty retreat—to incur the popular suspicion of a second defeat. But Sherman could afford to look past disaster in the face, and to defy the popular impression which his present task must occasion, but which succeeding events would shortly dispel. So far as his own army was concerned, there would also exist, for a brief period, this unfavorable impression; but it could not last long enough to cause demoralization, or to impair the confidence of his soldiers in his military leadership. He embarked General Blair's division on ten steam-boats, and at 10 A.M. on April 29th entered the waters of the Yazoo, where he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, the iron-clads Choctaw and De Kalb, the gun-boat Tyler, and several smaller wooden boats, ready for co-operation. During that night this military and naval force lay off the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, and early next morning got within range of the Confederate batteries. A vigorous bombardment of the latter was kept up for four hours, and, toward evening, Blair's division was disembarked in full view of the enemy, as if intending an assault. The ruse succeeded; for, although there was no road across the submerged field which lay between the river and the bluff, it seemed to the enemy, from his previous experience of Sherman's movements, more than probable that a real attack would be ventured. After the landing of the troops, the gun-boats and the batteries resumed their cannonade. The 1st of May, while the battle of Port Gibson was being fought, was occupied on the Yazoo in movements similar to those of the day before. In the midst of these movements, orders came from Grant hurrying Sherman's corps forward down the river to Grand Gulf. The force in front of the Yazoo batteries vanished as rapidly as it had appeared. Sherman, dispatching orders to Steele and Tuttle to march to Grand Gulf by way of Richmond, silently fell down to Young's Point on the night of May 1st.

At noon on May 6th Sherman's corps reached Hard Times. In the course of the next two days it had crossed the Mississippi and marched to Hankinson's Ferry, where it relieved Crocker's division, and enabled it to join McPherson's corps in the advance movement which had been ordered by Grant the day previous.

Grant's purpose had originally been to collect all his forces at Grand Gulf, accumulate a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores before moving, and, during the time thus occupied, detach one of his corps to co-operate with General Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson, after which, by a junction of the two armies, he would have an additional force of about 12,000 men to bring against Vicksburg. But, after the advantage he had gained at the outset in defeating Bowen, he wisely deemed it not worth his while to wait for Banks, who was now west of the Mississippi, and could not be at Port Hudson before May 10th, and determined, from the foothold already acquired, to push rapidly northward to the rear of Vicksburg. He knew that Johnston would, as quickly as possible, re-enforce Pemberton, and that if he waited for the capture of Port Hudson, while the delay might bring him a few thousand more men, it would bring Pemberton a much larger force. He therefore, on the 7th, had ordered a general movement of his army against the railroad conducting from Vicksburg westward to Jackson.

Before following the course of this campaign through the battles immediately preceding the investment of Vicksburg, let us glance at General Banks's progress in Louisiana up to the commencement of operations against Port Hudson.



BANKS LANDING AT BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA.

General Banks arrived at New Orleans December 14th, 1862, when he assumed the command of the Department of the Gulf, relieving General Butler. He brought with him a military force of about 10,000 men, and the fleet with which he sailed consisted of twenty-six steam and twenty-five sailing vessels. The entire Army of the Gulf, thus re-enforced, numbered 30,000 men, and was designated the Nineteenth Army Corps. General Banks's object was threefold—to regulate the civil government of Louisiana; to direct the military movements against the rebellion in that state and in Texas; and to co-operate in the opening of the Mississippi by the reduction of Port Hudson. This latter post, lying within his department,



BURNING OF THE MISSISSIPPI.



MAP OF PORT HUDSON.

was on the east bank of the Mississippi, at the terminus of the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad, twenty-five miles above Baton Rouge.

The first notice taken of Port Hudson as a military post was in the latter part of August, 1862, when W. D. Porter, of the Essex, went up the river to reconnoitre the batteries reported to be in process of erection at this point. At that time no guns could be discovered, but earthworks were being constructed. About a week after this reconnoissance, the Anglo-American, in passing Port Hudson, was opened upon from three batteries, and received seventy-three shots.

In March, 1863, General Banks had concentrated at Baton Rouge, which he had reoccupied immediately after his arrival at New Orleans, an army of 25,000 men, and on the 13th made a strong demonstration against Port Hudson. All that was intended to be effected by this was a diversion in favor of Admiral Farragut, who, with a naval force (consisting of the Hartford, Mississippi, Richmond, and Monongahela, and the gun-boats Albatross, Genesee, Kineo, Essex, and Sachem, and six schooners), was about to run the Port Hudson batteries, which had been multiplied and strengthened during the last six months. Had Banks, instead of merely making a demonstration, invested Port Hudson, it might, according to Halleck's report, have been easily reduced; but as the garrison consisted at this time of about 18,000 men, this result would not probably have been reached.

Farragut had to pass a line of batteries commencing below the town and extending along the bluff about three and a half miles. Early on the 14th his fleet reached Prophet's Island, five miles below Port Hudson. In the afternoon the mortars and two of the gun-boats opened on the batteries, and at 9 30 P.M. the signal to advance was given. The Hartford, with the admiral on board, took the lead, with the gun-boat Albatross lashed to her side. The Richmond and the gun-boat Genesee followed; the Monongahela, with the Kineo, came next, and the Mississippi brought up the rear, the mortars still bombarding the batteries. The admiral's ship passed without difficulty, but the smoke from their fire obscured the river from the vessels following. The Richmond, receiving a shot through her steam-drum, dropped out of fire, with three of her crew killed and seven wounded. The captain of the Monongahela also dropped down the river and anchored. The gun-boat Kineo, her propeller fouled by a hawser, and with a shot through her rudder-post, followed their example. So accurate was the fire from the batteries that the destruction of the whole fleet was imminent. The Mississippi grounded, and, after destroying her engines, spiking her guns, and setting her on fire, Captain Smith, with the officers and crew, abandoned her, escaping to the shore opposite Port Hudson. The vessel soon drifted down the river, and finally exploded. Such is the story of the fleet. General Banks had a slight encounter with the enemy, and returned to Baton Rouge. Farragut's object in passing up the river was to cut off Vicksburg from supplies brought from the Red River.

General Banks now turned his attention to the borders of the Bayou Teche. From Algiers, opposite New Orleans, starts the New Orleans and Opelousas Railroad, terminating at Brashear City, eighty miles distant, where Grand Lake forms a junction with the Atchafalaya. Opposite Brashear City is Berwick, near the entrance of the Bayou Teche into the Atchafalaya. Starting from a point near Opelousas, the Teche runs southeastwardly about two hundred miles. The principal towns on its banks are Franklin, Martinsville, and Opelousas. It was up this river that, only a few weeks previous, General Weitzel had attempted to advance, but, meeting so stubborn a resistance from the Confederate General Mouton, aided by the gun-boat Cotton, had been compelled to fall back. Apprehending a second advance, however, the enemy had burned the gun-boat. The obstructions put in Weitzel's way had also been swept away by the current of the bayou. But, a few miles above Pattersonville, on the river, Fort Bisland had been constructed, and was held by several thousand Confederates.

This region was the richest in the state, and Banks devoted himself to its reclamation from the enemy. Having concentrated his forces at Brashear City, Weitzel's brigade was crossed over to Berwick on the 10th of April, followed shortly by General Emory's division. As Banks advanced up the bayou, General Dick Taylor, commanding the Confederates, retired upon Fort Bisland. On the 12th, Grover's division, embarked on transports, and accompanied by the national gun-boats Clifton, Estrella, Arizona, and Calhoun, entered Grand Lake, the object of the expedition being to get in Taylor's rear, and either to cut off his retreat if he evacuated his works, or, if he remained, to attack him, co-operating with the forces in front. On the 13th this division landed about three miles west of Franklin. The enemy, on its approach, blew up the Queen of the West, which he had only recently captured. A fight occurred at Irish Bend, where Grover landed, and the enemy retreated, destroying, as he fell back, his gun-boat Diana, and some transports at Franklin. Banks meanwhile pushing him in front, Taylor was obliged to abandon his fortified position. He was vigorously pursued; at New Iberia, on his retreat, he destroyed five transports loaded with commissary stores and ammunition, and a gun-boat not yet finished. This place was reached by Banks's army on the 17th, and a cannon foundery was taken, and two regiments sent to destroy a celebrated salt mine in the town. Already 1500 prisoners had been captured, besides a large number of horses, mules, and beeves.



VIEW ON THE TECHE.

Taylor retreated on Opelousas after a brief stand against Grover at Bayou Vermilion. His destruction of bridges as he fell back occasioned some delay in Banks's advance, but the latter reached Opelousas on April 20th, Taylor continuing his retreat toward Alexandria, on the Red River. The gun-boats at the same time oc-



MAP OF THE BAYOU TECHE CAMPAIGN.



OCCUPATION OF ALEXANDRIA.



BANKS'S ARMY LEAVING SIMMSPORT.

JOHN A. LOGAN.

cupied Butte-à-la-Rose, opening the Atchafalaya to Red River, and thus establishing communication with Admiral Farragut, who held the mouth of that river. During the first week in May, while Grant was preparing for an advance from Grand Gulf, Taylor evacuated Fort De Russey and Alexandria, falling back to Shreveport, near the border of Texas, with orders from General Moore to withdraw into the latter state if pressed by General Banks. On the 6th of May Admiral Porter appeared before Alexandria with a fleet of gun-boats, and took possession of the town without opposition. Thus, after the capture of 2000 prisoners, two transports, and twenty guns, and compelling the destruction by the enemy of eight transports and three gun-boats, General Banks had conquered all of Louisiana west of New Orleans and south of the Red River, and had possession of the latter stream from its mouth to Shreveport.

He now put his army in motion against Port Hudson, sending as many as possible by water, and marching the remainder to Simmsport, where they were ferried across the Atchafalaya, and moved down the west bank of the Mississippi to a point opposite Bayou Sara, where they crossed on the night of May 23d, and the next day Port Hudson was besieged on the north, while General C. C. Augur, with 3500 men from Baton Rouge, invested it on the south. These two investing armies joined hands on the 25th, after a repulse of the enemy by Augur, and a steady advance of the right wing, under Generals Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight, resulting in the enemy's retiring within his outer line of intrenchments.

General Frank Gardner commanded the garrison at Port Hudson, which had now been very much reduced to meet the more pressing exigencies of the Vicksburg campaign. Leaving this position thus invested by an army of 12,000 men, we return to the battles around Vicksburg.

The movement ordered by General Grant on May 7th, and which had been scarcely begun before the arrival of Sherman's corps, consisted of an advance by two parallel roads up the southeast bank of the Big Black River, McPherson hugging the river closely, McClernand moving on the higher or ridge road, and Sherman following, with his corps divided on the two roads. The movements of these two corps after the battle of Port Gibson had indicated an immediate advance across Black River at Hankinson's or Hall's Ferries toward Warrenton. But their real objective was the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad, which Grant wished to reach somewhere between Bolton and Edwards's Station. He knew what he had to apprehend from Joe Johnston's army, and that vigorous efforts would be made by the Confederate authorities of Mississippi to arouse the militia against him (Governor Pettus, indeed, had, on May 5th, called upon every man in the state to take up arms) to harass his movements. His eyes were turned now not directly upon Vicksburg—they looked eastward to Jackson. This was a point which he must secure at once; the railroads centring there must be destroyed, as also the military stores there accumulated. This was the special duty assigned to McPherson, while McClernand and Sherman were to strike the railroad farther to the west.

General Grant moved with Sherman. On the evening of May 11th he telegraphed to General Halleck that his forces were across Fourteen-mile Creek, that he should communicate no longer with Grand Gulf, and therefore might not be heard from for several weeks. This telegram, in the general's own mind, meant "Success is certain, but no time is to be lost; I must look to the country for my soldiers' rations, and fight my way round Vicksburg to a new base of supplies on the Yazoo!"

The next day, McPherson, having nearly reached Raymond, a few miles west of Jackson and south of the railroad, met two brigades of the enemy, under Generals Gregg and Walker. A battle followed between General Logan's division, which was in the advance, and the Confederates, who held a strong position on a creek within three miles of Raymond, with two batteries posted on an eminence commanding the road on which McPherson was moving, and with his infantry lying on the hills to the right of this road, and in the timber and ravines in front. Although the fight was severe enough to inflict upon Logan a loss of 69 killed and 341 wounded, it was of short duration. After an unsuccessful attempt to execute a flank movement on Logan's left, and a furious charge for the purpose of capturing De Golyer's battery, which was repulsed with severe loss to the assailants, the enemy was driven from the field, and Logan entered Raymond. The Confederate loss in this battle was severe both in killed and wounded, and on account of desertion. The killed amounted to 103, the wounded and captured to 720. The forces engaged were nearly equal. Johnston reports Gregg's and Walker's force as 6000. Logan's division was inferior in numbers, but Crocker's arrived in time to accelerate the enemy's retreat.

At this stage of Grant's progress his army extended from Raymond westward toward Edwards's Station. As the enemy defeated by McPherson retreated toward Jackson, where re-enforcements were continually arriving, and where Johnston was hourly expected to take command in person, both Sherman and McClernand were ordered to move toward Raymond preparatory to an attack on Jackson. McPherson, on the 13th, advanced to Clinton, the first important position directly west from Jackson, where he destroyed the railroad and telegraph. Sherman approached Jackson from the southwest by the Mississippi Springs Road, while McClernand moved to Raymond, and on the 14th occupied with one division Clinton, with a second Mississippi Springs, a third remaining at Raymond.

McPherson and Sherman were the same day moving against Jackson. When, at about 10 A.M., the former was within three miles of Jackson, he was met by the bulk of the enemy's forces under General W. H. T. Walker, whose command, consisting of South Carolina and Georgia troops, had arrived the previous evening. At the same time, and about the same distance south of Jackson, Sherman encountered the enemy in a position apparently of great strength. After some delay, caused by a heavy shower, McPherson disposed his forces for an attack. Crocker's division was in the advance. The battle here was almost an exact repetition of that which took place two days before at Raymond, though shorter and less severe. A brief artillery duel was followed by an impetuous charge of Crocker's division across the ravine in front, up the hill held by the Confederates—a charge which swept the enemy up to and out of their breastworks. The national troops pursued until they came within range of the guns defending Jackson, when McMurray's and Dillon's batteries were brought up and shelled the flying Confederates.

The resistance offered to Sherman was feeble, the enemy soon retreating into his interior defenses. The town was then immediately abandoned by the Confederates, and at 4 P.M. the flag of the Fifty-ninth Indiana was waving over the Capitol, McPherson's and Sherman's commands entering the place almost simultaneously. McPherson's loss in this battle was 37 killed, and 228 wounded and missing. The Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to 845.

General Joe Johnston had reached Jackson on the night of May 13th.



CROCKER'S CHARGE AT JACKSON.

JOHN C. PEMBERTON.

He conducted the battle of the 14th, superintended the evacuation of Jackson, and then withdrew his army northward. This general—probably the most able officer in the Confederate service—after his wound at the battle of Seven Pines, in Virginia, in May, 1862, was incapable of military service until November following, when he was assigned to the command of the West.[1] He left Richmond with his staff November 29, and on December 4 reached Chattanooga. The next day he went to Murfreesborough, but was still, on account of his wound, prevented from any other than a general supervision of Bragg's army. At this time President Davis was on a tour of inspection in the West. He visited Murfreesborough with Johnston. The next notice we have of Johnston he was with Davis (December 26, 1862) at Jackson, before the Mississippi Legislature. On this occasion the Confederate President addressed a long and eloquent speech to the Legislature. The fact that Davis belonged to Mississippi imparted an unusual interest to this address, which was also very characteristic of the man. He had left his constituency two years before to assume his present position. He alluded in eloquent terms to his political connection with the state, and to his interest in her welfare; he glanced backward to the time when he had last addressed them, and admitted that, while he then had thought war inevitable as the result of secession, the conflict had assumed proportions more gigantic than he had anticipated; this was due to a want of moderation, sagacity, and morality in the Northern people; he wondered now how it had ever been possible for the people of the South "to live for so long a time in association with such miscreants," and loved so rotten a government. They of Mississippi knew as yet but little of the horrors of the war; but *he*, from his post at Richmond, had witnessed them in the captivity of old men, and the insults offered by "dirty Federal invaders" to delicate women, in the wanton destruction of property, and every imaginable outrage. There was a difference between the two peoples. "Our enemies," he said, "are a traditionless, homeless race;" they had, from the time of Cromwell, been disturbers of the world's peace, first in England, then in Holland, and again in England on their return; unable to let Papacy alone in the Old World, they could not let Quakers and witches alone in the New. Hence, knowing the savagery of the Yankees, it had been his chosen policy to carry on the war on the fields of the enemy—a policy which had been thwarted by the superior power of the North; and this disparity of power it was which had necessitated the rigors of conscription in the South. He appealed to the Mississippians to send every available man to the front, and alluded in complimentary terms to the bravery of the Mississippian soldiers—to the old men among them, and the gentle boys of sixteen, of whom he had heard on Virginia battle-fields. He warned them that every effort would be made by the enemy to capture Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and told them about the brilliant commanders whom he had chosen to defend these positions; then again he invoked them, by the glorious dead of Mexico, and by the still more glorious dead of the battle-fields of the Confederacy, by the desolate widows and orphans left behind, and by their maimed and wounded heroes, to rush forward and place themselves at the disposal of the state. Against the capture of New Orleans he offset the repulse formerly sustained by the enemy's fleet before Vicksburg, and his recent repulse at Fredericksburg; he referred to the smiles of the Emperor Napoleon; prophesied the conversion of the Northwest to the Confederate cause; pointed to the bright hopes of the trans-Mississippi campaign; and, as the climax of hope, mentioned the interesting fact that the gallant State of Kentucky was "still the object of the ardent wishes of General Bragg," and that he had even heard that officer, in an address to his troops, speak longingly of Kentucky and the banks of the Ohio! Such was the address of President Davis. General Johnston was then called upon for a speech. "The scar-worn hero," says a report of the proceedings, "looked a little nervous, while the house rang with loud and prolonged applause. He rose and said: 'Fellow-citizens, my only regret is that I have done so little to merit such a greeting. I promise you, however, that hereafter I shall be watchful, energetic, and indefatigable in your defense.'"

As soon as Davis reached Richmond he was pressed to remove General Bragg and give Johnston command of the Army of Middle Tennessee. Davis referred the matter to Johnston, who (February 12, 1863) expressed his approbation of General Bragg, and his belief that the interests of the service required that the latter should not be removed. A month later, while at Mobile, on his way to Mississippi, Johnston received an order to assume command of the Army of Middle Tennessee, and to direct General Bragg to report to the War Department. When Johnston reached Tullahoma he informed the Secretary of War (March 19th) that the change could not be made, on account of the critical condition of Bragg's family. On the 10th of April he repeated this to President Davis, and added that he himself had been sick, and was not now able to serve in the field. On the 9th of May he was ordered to proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there. Up to this time Johnston had been physically unable to undertake any responsibility for the conduct of the war in Mississippi.

And he assumed the command too late for his assistance to be of any value. Grant's army was already within a short distance of Jackson, while Pemberton, completely deceived by the Federal demonstrations toward Warrenton, was holding the main body of his army on the west bank of the Big Black, in the vicinity of Edwards's Station, where he continued to hold it until after the capture of Jackson, making no attempt to find out the real movements of Grant, or to harass his exposed flank and rear.

This was the situation when Johnston reached Jackson, where his little army of about 6000 men was of course unable to save the place from capture. In retreating he took the Canton Road, by which alone he could preserve communication with Pemberton. Upon Grant's first landing, Johnston had urged Pemberton to attack him without delay, and with all his army. "Success," he said, "will give back what was abandoned to win it." He telegraphed on May 1st to Richmond that Pemberton was calling for re-enforcements, which could not be sent from Bragg's army without giving up Tennessee. "Could not one or two brigades be sent from the East?" A week later Johnston again begged for re-enforcements.

On the night of his arrival at Jackson, Johnston for the first time knew what had been the result of the battle at Port Gibson, and the progress of Grant's army. He urged Pemberton to immediately attack the Federal division at Clinton, and promised co-operation. But his own hands were tied the next day by Grant's advance on Jackson. After abandoning the town, he marched his army six miles the same day, and encamped for the night. He from this encampment sent a dispatch to Pemberton, informing the latter of his situation, and that re-enforcements—under General Gist from the East, and General Maxey from Port Hudson—had been ordered to assemble at some point forty or fifty miles from Jackson. The re-enforcements, he said, would, when gathered together, number from 12,000 to 13,000. As soon as these had joined the two commands under himself and Pemberton, the whole army ought to concentrate and fight a decisive battle.

This dispatch Pemberton says he did not receive until the evening of May 16th. In the mean time this general had ventured a battle on his own account. He had disobeyed Johnston's order to move toward Clinton, compliance with which would have secured the junction of the two commands on the 15th, and proceeded forthwith, against the advice of his subordinate generals, to make a movement which would render union impossible.[1] This

[1] The following is the order issued from the Adjutant and Inspector General's office at Richmond, November 24th, 1862:

"General J. E. Johnston, Confederate States Army, is hereby assigned to the following geographical command, to wit: Commencing with the Blue Ridge of mountains, running through the western part of North Carolina, and following the line of said mountains through the northern part of Georgia to the railroad south of Chattanooga; thence by that road to West Point, and down the west or right bank of the Chattahoochee River to the boundary of Alabama and Florida, following that boundary west to the Choctawhatchee River, and down that river to Choctawhatchee Bay—including the waters of that bay—to the Gulf of Mexico. All that portion of the country west of said line to the Mississippi River is included in the above command. General Johnston will, for the purpose of correspondence and reports, establish his head-quarters at Chattanooga, or such other place as in his judgment may best secure facilities for ready communication with the troops within the limits of his command, and will repair in person to any part of said command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or desirable.

"By command of the Secretary of War. JOHN WITHERS, A. A. G.

"His Excellency the President, Richmond, Va."

[1] Pemberton, upon the receipt, on the morning of the 14th, of Johnston's order, or rather suggestion, to attack Sherman at Clinton, replied that he would at once move from Edwards's Station in compliance with the order, though he considered the movement a hazardous one. Pemberton thought he ought to remain behind the Big Black, and near Vicksburg. He called a council of war, and the majority decided in favor of the movement indicated by Johnston. The others—including Generals Loring and Stevenson—preferred a movement for the purpose of cutting off Grant from his supplies by the Mississippi. Little did Loring and Stevenson know about Grant's supplies, or the facility with which the latter could feed his army, even if there were no such river as the Mississippi. Pemberton was in favor of neither movement, fearing that either would "remove him from his base," but determined finally (*i. e.*, on the afternoon of the 14th) to direct all his disposable force—about 18,000 men (probably a low estimate)—toward Raymond or Dillon's, in Grant's rear. This plan of the campaign completely ignored the existence of Johnston or his army. Johnston's plan was to attack Grant, and to attack him in such a manner as to secure, first, the co-operation of the two commands, and afterward their concentration. Johnston ignored Vicksburg; it seemed plain enough to him that if Grant could not be beaten in the field, it was not only useless to attempt the defense of Vicksburg against a siege, but involved, moreover, in the end, the capture of the besieged army. Pemberton, on the other hand, was willing to risk every thing for Vicksburg, and would risk nothing which might involve its abandonment. On

McPHERSON AND HIS CHIEF ENGINEERS.

movement led to the battle of Champion's Hill, or Baker's Creek. Johnston, in the mean while, was falling back on Canton, with his hands completely tied so far as any possible co-operation with Pemberton was concerned.

The capture of Jackson was followed by the destruction of the railway station, arsenals, workshops, etc., in the town. It would have been well if the work of destruction had here stopped; but some soldiers of Sherman's corps got possession of some bad rum, and burned private houses, the Roman Catholic church, the hotel, and the penitentiary.

In the mean time Pemberton was crossing the Big Black. Having remained idle while Johnston was at hand and fighting, as soon as the latter had retreated he advanced and offered battle. Grant became informed of these movements of the enemy, which were sufficiently convenient to his own purpose. He was now ready to face about toward Vicksburg with his three corps.

Early on the morning of the 16th, Sherman, who had been occupying Jackson, was ordered to join as rapidly as possible the main body of Grant's army, then in the vicinity of Bolton. Blair's division of Sherman's corps was hurried on to Edwards's Station. This division supported the left of McClernand's corps, which moved at the same time.

Three roads to the north of Raymond, leading out from the Raymond and Bolton Road, conducted to Edwards's Station, uniting two miles east of that place. The longer of these roads was a mile and a half north of Raymond, another was two miles farther north, and a third ran out from the Raymond and Bolton Road one mile south of Bolton, and was separated from the second or middle road by a distance of four miles. Upon these roads McClernand advanced on the morning of the 16th. Grant had ordered the advance on the night of the 15th to be made that morning, and McClernand, when he received the order, was ready to move. Hovey's division was at the entrance of the northern road; A. J. Smith's at that of the southern, with Blair in support; and Osterhaus's at that of the middle, supported by General Carr. Grant had already ordered on McPherson's corps, which was ready to support Hovey's division. As these columns advanced, the several divisions supporting each other, their position was one equally fitted for defense and attack.

The enemy, under General Pemberton, had taken a strong position along a ridge of hills east of Edwards's Station, and on the right bank of Baker's Creek, his front covered by cavalry skirmishers and artillery. Early on the morning of the 16th (6 30 A.M.) Pemberton received a dispatch from General Johnston instructing him to move northward in order to effect a junction of the two commands. It was Pemberton's intention to obey this or-



MAP ILLUSTRATING GRANT'S VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

his own plan he acted without consistency. It was plainly absurd for him to refuse a battle with Johnston's co-operation, and forthwith to bring on one in which only his own command could participate.

der. His trains were ordered back to the Big Black, and the army would have followed had it not been already too late. He wrote to Johnston that he was coming in obedience to orders; but the most important part of his communication was the postscript, which told of heavy skirmishing already begun at the front. The skirmishing went on, and grew into a general engagement. The battle of Champion's Hill had to be fought, and General Pemberton could not help himself.

Five miles out from Edwards's Station the enemy's skirmishers were first met on A. J. Smith's front. Half a mile brought the division within range of the enemy's artillery, and the advance at this point was delayed till the opposing guns were silenced. Osterhaus, in the centre, heard the firing on his left, and soon after came himself into collision with the enemy on the skirt of a thick wood, "covering," to use McClernand's phrase, "a seeming chaos of abrupt hills and yawning ravines." Soon he came upon the enemy in full force. Two hours and a half after the first skirmishing on the left, McClernand learned from Hovey that the latter "had found the enemy strongly posted in front," and that McPherson was close on his rear. McClernand had been ordered to find the enemy, but to risk an engagement only upon the assurance of certain victory. Grant was on the right, with Hovey and McPherson. He had left Clinton for the front at an early hour. When he reached the junction of the Vicksburg Railroad with the Raymond and Bolton Road, he found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps rebuilding a bridge which Osterhaus's cavalry had destroyed the night before. Passing on to the front, after seeing McPherson's two divisions well under way, Grant found Hovey's division ready at any moment to bring on a battle.

The top of the ridge on which the enemy rested was covered with dense forest and undergrowth. On the south side of the Vicksburg Road, which here makes a sharp turn to the left, was a precipitous height resembling in character the adjacent ridge. The country to the right of the road sloped gently through a short reach of timber, then opening into cultivated fields and into a valley of considerable extent. On the road, and into the wooded ravine on the left, lay Hovey's division disposed for attack. McPherson operated on the right of the road, threatening the enemy's rear.

McClernand, as we have seen, had been delayed, skirmishing and driving away the artillery in his front, while Grant, on the right, was waiting to hear from him. McClernand appears to have been extremely solicitous about McPherson's supporting Hovey. Grant, having already settled this matter to his own satisfaction, signified to McClernand a little after noon that he wished him to push forward with all rapidity, and that he would himself attend to Hovey and McPherson.

The Federal left had been made secure by McClernand's judicious disposition of his own and Blair's divisions. When the order came urging forward the left and centre, the right, under Hovey, had been contending for nearly two hours against superior numbers. Hovey's division bore the brunt of the whole conflict. Directly in his front was the Confederate General Stevenson's division, posted in a strong position on Champion Hill, from which the battle is named. One brigade, and then a second, of Crocker's division, was sent to re-enforce Hovey, who, after a difficult approach to the enemy's position under a galling fire, was contending against great odds, and had been borne back by the overwhelming forces of the enemy. Logan had in the mean time gained an important position on Pemberton's left flank, and Grant, appreciating the opportunity thus afforded him, again ordered Hovey's division forward, re-enforced as above stated, and this attack, with that upon the flank, finally drove the enemy from the field. Logan's movement had so far succeeded that the Confederate General Loring's division was cut off from Pemberton, and was compelled to retreat by a long detour southward, evading the Federal left, losing all its guns, and narrowly escaping capture.

Hovey's division lost in this battle 211 killed, 872 wounded, and 119 missing—a total of 1202, about one third of its entire strength. Osterhaus lost 14 killed, 76 wounded, and 20 missing. In A. J. Smith's division the loss was 24 wounded and 4 missing. This record clearly indicates that Hovey, with McPherson's assistance, had really fought and decided the battle before McClernand's other divisions had come into any very serious collision with the enemy. He had been repulsed, leaving behind eleven guns captured from the enemy; but his men, undaunted, and under cover of a heavy artillery fire, again advanced, and carried the closely-contested field.

McPherson's corps fought with equal gallantry — Stevenson's brigade, of Logan's division, making a brilliant charge on the enemy's flank, capturing seven guns and several hundred prisoners, and, gaining the Vicksburg Road, cutting off Loring.

Carr's and Osterhaus's divisions, now being well advanced on the left, were ordered to pursue the retreating enemy to the Big Black. The pursuit was continued till after dark, resulting in the capture of a large amount of munitions and stores.

Sherman's corps had no part in the battle, not coming upon the field at all. McPherson fought only two of his divisions, Ransom's brigade not having yet arrived from Milliken's Bend. The entire Federal loss in the battle was 426 killed, 1842 wounded, and 189 missing—total, 2457. The Confederate loss was not probably less in killed and wounded, besides that of some 2000 prisoners, from fifteen to twenty guns, and thousands of small-arms. Among the killed was General Lloyd Tilghman, of Fort Henry renown, now commanding one of Loring's brigades, who was shot while attempting to check the Federal pursuit.[1]

The pursuit was continued on the 17th, McClernand's corps in the advance. Sherman, having reached Bolton, was turned northward toward Bridgeport, where Blair soon joined him.

The only stand made by Pemberton's retreating and demoralized army was on the banks of the Big Black River. Here it was found by McClernand on the 17th, strongly posted on both sides of the river. At this point, on the west bank—the main position of the enemy—bluffs extend to the water's edge. On the east bank there is an open bottom a mile wide, surrounded by a stagnant bayou two or three feet in depth and from ten to twenty in width, extending in the form of a segment from the river above to the river below; behind this bayou the enemy had thrown up rifle-pits. McClernand made the most elaborate disposition of his command for an attack. Carr's division held the right, and Lawler's brigade the extreme right. After Carr's division had been delayed by the enemy's artillery for two or three hours, Lawler discovered a way of approach by which the position could be successfully assaulted. A charge was made at this point by Lawler. His brigade, coming into close quarters with the enemy, received a volley in flank, bringing down 150 men; but the charge was sustained. No shot was fired by the gallant assailants until they had crossed the bayou. They then poured in their volley, and, without reloading, swept on with fixed bayonets, and the position was abandoned by the Confederates, leaving in their works eighteen guns, 1500 prisoners, and large quantities of small-arms and commissary stores. McClernand's loss was 29 killed and 242 wounded. Those of the enemy who were not captured escaped across the river by a bridge which had been constructed of three steam-boats. This temporary bridge and the railroad bridge were burned by the fugitives, and it was impossible for the Federals to cross the river in the face of the enemy, whose sharp-shooters lined the opposite bluffs.

That night Pemberton's disordered army straggled into the streets of Vicksburg, bringing panic with its approach.[2]

[1] As to the numbers engaged on the Confederate side in the battle of Champion's Hill, we have taken Pemberton's estimate (18,000 men). This is, no doubt, below the mark. Grant estimates the enemy's numbers at 25,000. Abrams, to whom we have formerly referred, and who was well acquainted with the defense of Vicksburg, gives Pemberton a command of from 23,000 to 26,000 men, positioned as follows:

"Major General Stevenson's division, composed of the brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Lee, Barton, and Cummings, and Colonel, now Brigadier General Reynolds, in front; General Loring's division, composed of the brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Tilghman, Featherstone, and others, in the centre; and Bowen's division, composed of two brigades under Brigadier General Green and Colonel Cockrell. There was also one brigade commanded by Brigadier General Baldwin, detached from Major General M. L. Smith's division, Waul's legion of Texans, and Wirt Adams's cavalry regiment, the whole making an effective force of between 23,000 and 26,000 fighting men."

[2] Abrams thus describes the entrance of the Confederate army into Vicksburg:

"At about 10 o'clock on Sunday night the main body of the Confederate forces commenced entering Vicksburg, and then ensued a scene that almost beggars description. Many planters living near the city, with their families, abandoned their homes and entered our lines with the Confederate forces. We were among the troops when they entered, and never in our life beheld any thing to equal the scene. As if by magic, the stillness of the Sabbath night was broken in upon by an uproar, in which the blasphemous oath of the soldier and the cry of the child mingled, and formed a sight which the pen can not depict. It was a scene which, once beheld, can not be forgotten. There were many gentle women and tender children torn from their homes by the advance of a ruthless foe, and compelled to fly to our lines for protection; and mixed up with them, in one vast crowd, were the gallant men who had left Vicksburg three short weeks before,

COLTON BRIDGE BUILT BY McPHERSON ACROSS THE BIG BLACK

Johnston, as soon as he learned the result of the fighting on Baker's Creek, dispatched to Pemberton: "If Haines's Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and can not be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast." But before the dispatch was received Pemberton had already shut himself up in Vicksburg, and Grant had locked him in.

Was Haines's Bluff untenable? Sherman had found it impregnable on the river side last December. But where was the Confederate army to defend this post now — this post now so absolutely necessary to General Grant?

While McClernand was crossing the Big Black on the morning of the 18th by floating bridges a short distance above the scene of the preceding day's battle, Sherman crossed the same river at Bridgeport. From that point he approached Vicksburg until within about three miles of the town, when he turned to the right and took possession of Walnut Hills and the adjacent banks of the Yazoo without resistance.

McPherson struck into and followed Sherman's course up to the point where the latter had turned eastward. McClernand advanced on the Jackson and Vicksburg Road, and thence, at St. Alban's, turned to the left into the Baldwin's Ferry Road, so as to cover the approaches to Vicksburg from the southeast.

That night Vicksburg was fairly invested. It was the night of May 18th, 1863. Precisely one year had elapsed since the first attempt had been made against Vicksburg, and since, in return to S. P. Lee's demand of surrender, the authorities of the town had replied that Mississippians did "not know, and refused to learn, how to surrender to an enemy."

Admiral Porter, in the mean time, having returned to the Yazoo, on May 16th was able to open communication with Grant's army and send it provisions; he also attacked Haines's Bluff, the evacuation of which had already begun. On the approach of the gun-boats the garrison made a precipitate retreat, leaving forts, guns, munitions, tents—every thing.[1]

The way was now open to Yazoo City and the whole valley of the Yazoo. Lieutenant Walker, with five gun-boats, was sent up the river by Admiral Porter, and, upon reaching Yazoo City (May 20th), found the Confederate navy yard there in flames and the city defenseless. There were also found two rams—the Red Republic, 310 feet long by 75 wide, and the Mobile, ready for plating—and some other vessels. In the hospital were 1500 Confederate sick and wounded.

Pemberton's army, as we have seen, began to enter Vicksburg on the night of the 17th. The eastward or land defenses of the town were not yet wholly completed, but no time was lost in repairing their defects. While Haines's Bluff was being evacuated, the Confederate troops were entering their defenses, distributed as follows: On the left was Major General M. L. Smith's division, composed of brigades under Shoup, Baldwin, Vaughan, and Buford; in the centre, Major General J. H. Forney's division, consisting of Moore's and Herbert's brigades; and on the left, Major General C. L. Stevenson's division, consisting of brigades under Barton, Cummings, Lee, and Reynolds. Bowen's division, consisting of two brigades under Green and Cockrell, was held in reserve. This army, now the garrison of Vicksburg, numbered about 25,000 effective men. Including the non-combatants, there was an accumulation of provisions sufficient to last nearly two months. The fortifications consisted of strong bastioned forts on the right, centre, and left, favorably located on high points, and without these ran an exterior line of intrenchments. The works had been admirably well planned by M. L. Smith, but the execution had been imperfect. They were neither high enough nor thick enough; the position of the guns was too much exposed, and the guns themselves, being *en barbette*, were easily dismounted. During the interval which elapsed, however, between the occupation of these intrenchments on Sunday night, and the first attempt made against them on Tuesday afternoon (the 19th), the axe and spade were diligently used, and a strong front was presented to the assailants.

McClernand's command—the left corps of the besieging army—advanced on the 19th to Two-mile Creek (so called on account of its distance from Vicksburg), after driving in the enemy's skirmishers. Overlooking this creek, a long hill ran north and south in general conformity with the Vicksburg defenses, which were in plain view on a similar range a mile westward. The intervening space between the two ranges consisted of a series of deep hollows, separated by long, narrow ridges, both the hollows and the ridges running from the enemy's works toward McClernand's position until they terminated in the valley of the creek, being covered near their termination with a thicket of trees and underbrush. McClernand had scarcely occupied the hills across Two-mile Creek, and posted his artillery, when he received an order from General Grant instructing all the corps commanders to gain as close a position to the enemy as possible, preliminary to a general assault, which was to be made at 2 o'clock P.M. A. J. Smith's division, on the right of the Vicksburg Road, and Osterhaus on the left, with Carr in reserve, by 2 o'clock had approached to within 500 yards of the enemy. General Os-



VICKSBURG FROM THE HILLS IN ITS REAR.

in all the pride and confidence of a just cause, and returning to it a demoralized mob and a defeated army, all caused through one man's incompetency."

[1] Admiral Porter, in his dispatch to the Secretary of War, May 20th, says:

"The works at Haines's Bluff were very formidable. There are fourteen of the heaviest kind of mounted 8- and 10-inch and 7½-inch rifled guns, with ammunition enough to last a long siege. As the gun-carriages might again fall into the hands of the enemy, I had them burned, blew up the magazine, and destroyed the works generally. I also burned up the encampments, which were permanently and remarkably well constructed, looking as though the rebels intended to stay some time. Their works and encampments covered many acres of ground; and the fortifications and rifle-pits proper of Haines's Bluff extend about a mile and a quarter. Such a network of forts I never saw."

terhaus, who had been wounded in the fight on the Big Black, was now able to resume the command of his division.

To the right of A. J. Smith, McPherson's corps, holding the centre, advanced in like manner. The right was held by Sherman, who had on the 18th pushed forward Tuttle's division, supported by Blair's, on the northernmost approach to Vicksburg, while Steele's division, taking a blind road still farther to the right, moved toward the Mississippi. On the morning of the 19th Sherman had his right resting on the Mississippi, in plain view of Porter's fleet at the mouth of the Yazoo and at Young's Point, while his front, in sight of Vicksburg, was separated from the enemy by only 400 yards of very difficult ground, cut up by almost impracticable ravines. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry had taken possession of Haines's Bluff, and communication had been opened with Admiral Porter.

This was the situation when Grant ordered the general assault on the 19th. Sherman alone was in a position to make a determined attack; and Grant, counting on the demoralization of the enemy, hoped, by a vigorous onset against the Confederate left, to win an immediate victory. At the hour designated Blair's division moved forward, with Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades on the right of the road, and T. K. Smith's on the left, artillery being disposed in the rear to cover the point where the road entered the Confederate intrenchments. Tuttle's division held the road, Buckland's brigade, however, being deployed to Blair's rear. The assault was not successful, though it was a most gallant affair. The line advanced across the intervening chasms, filled with standing and fallen timber, up to the trenches, and the Thirteenth Regulars (Giles Smith's left), reaching the works first, succeeded in planting its colors upon the outer slope; but this was effected at a cost of 77 out of 250 men, the commander of the regiment, Captain Washington, being mortally wounded, and five other officers more or less severely. Almost simultaneously, two other regiments (the Eighty-third Indiana and the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois) reached the same position, but, though able to hold their ground by making it fatally hazardous for any head to appear above the parapet, they could not enter the works. Other regiments on either side obtained similar positions, but night came on finding them still outside of the works, which they could only threaten but not take. Under cover of the darkness Sherman withdrew his advanced columns to a safer position.

The next two days were occupied by the Federals in perfecting their system of supplies (twenty days of marching and fighting had now been passed with but about five days' rations drawn from the commissary), opening military roads, and posting artillery in positions more commanding. The enemy, inspirited by his own success in resisting Sherman's assault, was employed meanwhile in a similar task.

On the 22d Grant determined to venture a second assault, this time engaging his whole line. He gives, in his report, four reasons for this second attempt: 1st. He hoped the assault, from the position already gained, would be successful. 2d. His present force was inadequate to maintain a complete investment of Vicksburg and at the same time attend to Johnston's army, now at Canton, and daily increasing in numbers by re-enforcements from the East. His own effective army now numbered scarcely more than 30,000 men, being but little superior in this respect to that immediately in his front. 3d. Success would close the campaign, and not only save the government from sending him large re-enforcements, but also free his own army for farther operations. 4th. Even if the attempt should prove unsuccessful, the troops, impatient now to take Vicksburg, would not work so willingly in the trenches before as after such an assault. Accordingly, the assault was made. If it had succeeded, it would have been a victory almost unparalleled in the annals of war; for success involved the forcing of a strong line of intrenchments eight and a half miles in length, by operations carried on over the most difficult ground; it involved the capture of a strong-hold defended by a garrison of 25,000 men—one third of which was fresh, and not yet dispirited by defeat—by an army of about 30,000 men, already exhausted by twenty days of rapid marching and severe fighting. It was not an impossible achievement, but its only chance of accomplishment must rest upon the utter demoralization of the enemy. This demoralization might have been counted upon in the case of an impetuous attack immediately following upon the entrance into Vicksburg of Pemberton's defeated army; but, just as truly, it could *not* be counted upon after the repulse of Sherman on the 19th. But as Grant had tried every conceivable approach to Vicksburg before attempting the only one which really promised success, so now, with the alternative before him of an almost hopeless assault or of a siege which *must* result in his favor, he refused to depend upon certain but delayed victory until he had first risked a somewhat serious loss upon the precarious chance of instant triumph; he refused to believe any thing hopeless until Fortune had added her denial to that furnished by military casuistry.

The assault was ordered on the 21st to take place at 10 o'clock A.M. on the 22d; and so fastidiously was a simultaneous attack insisted upon, that Grant had the watch of each of his corps commanders timed exactly to his own. We will follow the fortunes of the battle—the last which was fought for the possession of Vicksburg—beginning with Sherman's attack on the right.

At the appointed hour, even at the appointed moment, Sherman's assailing column, consisting of Blair's division (G. A. Smith's and T. K. Smith's brigades), led by Hugh Ewing's brigade,[1] advanced along a road selected the night before. This road followed the crown of an interior ridge, being thus partially sheltered, and finally entered the parapet of the enemy's works

[1] Blair commanded the second division of Sherman's corps, formerly Sherman's fifth division. Hugh Ewing's brigade had belonged to Rosecrans's army, but joined Sherman's command after the battle of Murfreesborough.

HUGH EWING.

at a shoulder of the bastion. Tuttle supported Blair, and Steele, from his position half a mile to the right, attacked simultaneously the enemy in his front. As Blair advanced, not a head could be seen above the enemy's works except now and then that of some sharp-shooter, who quickly discharged his piece and then disappeared. To keep these down a line of picked skirmishers was placed. The advancing column was led by a volunteer storming-party of 150 men, carrying boards and poles to bridge the ditch. Meanwhile five batteries concentrated their fire on the bastion commanding the approach; but no enemy appeared, although the assailing column, as it came upon the crown of the ridge, was fully exposed. Unassailed the storming-party had reached the salient of the bastion, and passed toward the sally-port, followed closely by Ewing's brigade, when from behind the parapet rose the enemy in double rank, and poured on the head of the column a terrific fire, staggering and sweeping it back to cover. The rear pressed on, but vainly attempted to brave this reserved storm of bullets. Still undaunted, Ewing's advance shifted to the left, crossed the ditch, climbed up the outer face of the bastion, and planted its colors near the top, burrowing in the earth from the fire upon its flank. Giles Smith's brigade meanwhile formed line in a ravine, and threatened the parapet 300 yards to the left of the bastion, while Kilby Smith, from the slope of a spur, assisted by Ewing's brigade, kept up a constant fire on any object appearing above the parapet.

It had been impossible for the two rear brigades to pass the point in the road where Ewing had been driven back; but Giles Smith had connected with Ransom's brigade—the right of McPherson's command—and held a position which Blair reported (at 2 P.M.) as favorable for an assault. Sherman, therefore, kept up the attack on his front. But Smith and Ransom, charging up to the parapet, were met, as Ewing had been, with a reserved fire, before which they recoiled to the cover of the hill-side. Steele all this while was fighting with equal desperation on the extreme right, and with as little profit.

All along the line the battle had been raging for more than three hours. McPherson's whole corps was engaged. On the left, McClernand had from dawn until 10 o'clock kept up a bombardment from thirty-nine guns (including four 30-, six 20-, and six 10-pounder Parrott's), breaching the enemy's works at several points, and temporarily silencing his guns. Carr's division had relieved A. J. Smith's, in advance on the right of the corps, and, at the time designated for the combined attack, Lawler's brigade of the former division, and Landrum's of the latter, charged the enemy's line, and in fifteen minutes had carried the ditch, slope, and bastion of a fort in their front, which was entered by Sergeant Griffith with eleven men of the Twenty-second Iowa regiment. All of these fell inside the fort except the sergeant, who captured and brought off thirteen Confederates. The colors of two Illinois regiments (the Forty-eighth and Seventy-seventh) were planted on the bastion, and those of the Thirteenth Ohio on the counterscarp of the ditch. Within the next quarter of an hour the ditch and slope of another earthwork were carried by Benton's and Burbridge's brigades (of Carr's and Smith's divisions), and their colors were planted on its bastion. Captain

THE APPROACHES TO VICKSBURG.

THE INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG—SHERMAN'S EXTREME RIGHT ON THE MISSISSIPPI.

carried forward one of his guns by hand to the ditch, and, double-shotting it, fired into an embrasure of the work, disabling a gun in it about to be discharged, and cutting down its gunners. The works thus partially occupied by these two divisions were separated from each other by a curtain. Hovey and Osterhaus, on the left, advanced on a more extended line of attack, but, encountering an enfilading fire, were repulsed.

Thus far, the battle on the left had not in any essential feature differed from that on the right and centre. Each corps had succeeded in planting colors on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions. Thus much had been effected, and nothing more seemed possible. The works partially carried were of no value unless the works at their left and right were also carried. Grant, who had taken a commanding position in McPherson's front, saw all this, and was almost ready to withdraw his forces, when he received a dispatch from McClernand which excited his astonishment. The dispatch informed him that McClernand had gained two of the enemy's forts, and asked for re-enforcements. It found Grant in Sherman's front. Now Grant had held a better position during the attack for observation of what was going on in McClernand's corps than McClernand himself. He had not seen any possession of forts, nor any necessity for re-enforcements. In reply to a dispatch previously received from the same source, asking for aid, he had ordered the latter to re-enforce from his left. He knew that, from the nature of the ground, "each corps had many more men than could be used in the assault. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie." Moreover, McArthur's division was on its way from Warrenton, and this he ordered McClernand to bring up to his aid. He showed McClernand's dispatch to General Sherman, who ordered a renewal of the attack on his front. While going back to the centre Grant received from McClernand a third dispatch, stating that the latter had gained the enemy's intrenchments *at several points*, but was brought to a stand. Grant doubted the accuracy of this information, but he could not disregard these reiterated statements, which *might*, after all, be true, and, that no possible opportunity of success should be allowed to escape through any fault of his, he ordered Quinby's division to report to McClernand, leaving McPherson with only four brigades to hold the centre. The dispatches were shown to McPherson, to satisfy him of the necessity of making a diversion in his front. At half past three a fourth dispatch was received from McClernand, still expressing a hope of forcing the enemy's line, stating that he had taken several prisoners, and that his men were still in the forts. The prisoners alluded to were probably the baker's dozen brought in by Sergeant Griffith; and the "men still in the forts" were doubtless there, but in the same condition with the eleven unfortunate braves whom Griffith had left behind. But Quinby's division did McClernand no good, and McArthur's did not get up till the next day. The only result of McClernand's illusory dispatches was a mortality list longer by half than it would have been if the troops had been withdrawn at three instead of at eight o'clock P.M. Sherman had ordered Tuttle to detail for the assault one of his brigades. Mower's was selected for this duty, but, upon advancing against the bastion, encountered a more severe fire, if possible, than that which had repulsed Ewing in the forenoon. Steele, too, renewed his attack midway between the bastion and the river. He advanced over ground exposed to a flank fire, and deeply cut by gullies and washes up to the parapet, which was found too strongly defended to be carried, and, after holding the hill-side, to which he had retreated for cover until night, he withdrew his division.

Thus ended the assault of the 22d of May, which, though it made no impression upon the Vicksburg defenses, attested the valor of the national troops. For ten hours they had fought against fortune, but had not won the battle. Repeatedly they had charged the three strong bastioned forts on the right, centre, and rear of the enemy's line, only to be swept back each time with decimated ranks. Partial successes, indeed, they had had, standing upon the very edge of victory, with their colors flaunting in the faces of the foe; but these had only excited false hopes and led to greater carnage; death had been the sole reward of their enthusiasm. McClernand's loss alone amounted to 1487 killed, wounded, and missing, making three fourths of the entire loss of this corps during the whole campaign. Nearly one half (677) of the casualties occurred in Carr's division. A. J. Smith's loss was nearly as great, amounting to 499. Sherman's corps lost about 600 men. The casualties in the three corps counted up to almost 3000, of which, therefore, nearly one third must have been in McPherson's command, which confronted the most formidable redoubt in the whole line —that commanding the main approach (by the Jackson Road) to Vicksburg.

The Confederates—mostly drawn from the Cotton States—also fought with determined bravery. Opposed to Sherman were Baldwin's and Shoup's brigades (W. L. Smith's division); Herbert's brigade (J. H. Forney's division) met the persistent attack which was made on both sides of the Jackson Road, the Third, Twenty-first, and Twenty-third Louisiana regiments especially distinguishing themselves; while farther to the right, Moore and Lee (the latter of Stevenson's division) held their ground against McClernand. Bowen's two brigades re-enforced the other commands as occasion required. The Confederate loss was upward of 1000 men. If Pemberton had not prevented sharp-shooting and artillery duels from the time of the investment—which he was probably compelled to do in order to save ammunition—the national troops would have found much greater difficulty in approaching so near the Confederate line; as it was, however, the Federal sharp-shooters had got so close that it was dangerous for the enemy's gunners to rise from cover to load their pieces; and, besides this, many of the enemy's guns were dismounted. The charges, therefore, made by the Federals in this battle met with little or no resistance from artillery.

Admiral Porter co-operated in the assault. On the evening of the 21st he was notified of the proposed attack by General Grant, and ordered to shell the water batteries before and during the first stage of the engagement. All that night he kept up a bombardment on the works and the town from six mortars which he had stationed in the river, and sent up three gun-boats to shell at the same time the water batteries. In the morning another gun-boat was added, and the four vessels crossed the river and opened on the hill batteries, which they finally silenced. The water batteries were then engaged for two hours at a distance of 440 yards. Such was the noise and smoke on the river front that Admiral Porter neither saw nor heard any thing of the battle in the rear. At 11 o'clock A.M. the spectacle presented to an occupant of Vicksburg must have been one of terrible sublimity. An unceasing storm of fire enveloped the city on all sides. The gun-boats engaged the batteries; the mortars and the Parrott guns, mounted on rafts in the river, and guns posted on the opposite peninsula, shelled the town; and Grant's army was concentrating every available gun against the forts in the rear, while his columns were forming into line for the assault. Still, though environed by this circle of fire, stores in Vicksburg were opened as usual, the streets were promenaded by women and children, and only a very few persons were injured.[1]

On the 27th of May the gun-boat Cincinnati was sunk in the attempt to silence one of the land batteries. She was abreast of the mortars, and rounding to, when a well-directed shot from a fine piece of ordnance called "Whistling Dick" entered her magazine, and she began to sink rapidly; and other shots in quick succession crashed through her iron plating. The gun-boat managed to reach the right bank of the river, and her crew was landed before she sank. She was afterward (August, 1863) raised and towed to Cairo.

After the failure of his second assault, Grant was compelled to resort to a regular siege of Vicksburg. His army was largely re-enforced.[2] McArthur was already on hand; Lauman's division and four regiments had already been ordered from Memphis; these were soon joined by Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the Sixteenth (Hurlbut's) Army Corps, which were assigned to Major General C. C. Washburne. Herron's division, from the Department of Missouri, arrived June 11th, and was put on the extreme left, Lauman's connecting it with McClernand; and, three days later, two divi-

[1] Says a citizen who occupied Vicksburg during the siege, "Such cannonading has, perhaps, scarcely ever been equaled; and the city was entirely untenable, though women and children were in the streets. It was not safe from behind or before, and every part of the city was alike within range of the Federal guns. The gun-boats withdrew after a short engagement, but the mortars kept up the shelling, and the armies continued fighting all day. . . . . It would require the pen of a poet to depict the awful sublimity of this day's work—the incessant booming of cannon and the banging of small arms, intermingled with the howling of shells and the whistling of Minié-balls, made the day most truly hideous."

[2] Grant's army, thus re-enforced, consisted of the following sixteen divisions:

1. F. Steele's,	Sherman's Corps.	9. J. A. Logan's,	McPherson's Corps.
2. F. Blair's,		10. M. M. Crocker's,	
3. J. McArthur's,		11. J. G. Lauman's,	Washburne's Command.
4. J. M. Tuttle's,		12. W. S. Smith's,	
5. P. T. Osterhaus's,	McClernand's Corps.	13. N. Kimball's,	
6. A. J. Smith's		14. F. J. Herron's,	
7. A. P. Hovey's,		15. J. Welsh's,	Parke's Corps.
8. E. A. Carr's,		16. R. B. Potter's,	

There were also belonging to Washburne's command four regiments from Memphis. The whole army numbered nearly 70,000 men.

C. C. WASHBURNE.

WILLIAM H. EMORY.

sions of the Ninth Army Corps (now belonging to Burnside's Department of the Ohio), under command of J. G. Parke, reached the field, and with Washburne's command were sent to Haines's Bluff.

On the 28th of June General McClernand's connection with Grant's army ceased, Major General Ord superseding him in command of the Thirteenth Corps. His military career had for himself been an unfortunate one. As to his bravery or his fidelity, no doubt had ever been entertained. A great favorite in the southern portion of Illinois, he was yet unpopular among his peers and superiors in the army. He had been very successful in political life, and had always identified himself with the Democratic party. At twenty years of age he took an honorable position at the bar; he established (1835) the first Democratic press in Shawneetown, Illinois, his native town; in 1836 he was elected to the State Legislature from Gallatin, his native county; in 1838 the office of lieutenant governor was tendered him, which he declined, not being of the constitutional age (thirty years); he was again in the Legislature in 1840, and during the session accepted a challenge to personal combat from Judge J. W. Smith, who had been offended by some strictures made by McClernand on the conduct of the Supreme Court, but, the judge not appearing, the duel was not fought; he was again elected in 1842, and the next year was sent as representative to Congress, being re-elected in 1844, 1846, and 1848; in 1850 he prepared and offered the first draft of the famous compromise measures of that year; the next year he retired to Jacksonville, Illinois, removing thence to Springfield in 1856, and in 1859 was elected representative in Congress from the capital district; twice he had been a presidential elector (for Van Buren and Pierce); in April, 1861, at the instance of Governor Yates, he accompanied a volunteer force to Cairo and occupied that place, and in July he resigned his seat in Congress. Such are the naked outlines of his political career. But when he entered the service of his country against the rebellion he was not without military experience, having at an early age served as a private in the Black-Hawk War until its close. It was rather to his disadvantage that he was urged forward in the first stages of the civil war by his political friends. If he could have done in his military as he had in his political life—taken his position where circumstance assigned him, and let his aspirations follow the appreciation of his military merits by his superior officers—he would then have found his true place, whether high or low. He fought well at Fort Donelson, and again at Shiloh; afterward he commanded the army corps of the reserve in Halleck's campaign against Corinth. We next hear of him in connection with the expedition against Vicksburg at the close of 1862. At that time Grant had command of the Army of the Mississippi. But Grant's time had not yet come. If the capacities for generalship which he afterward revealed had been then known, he would, at any rate, have been allowed to command his army without interference from Washington. Unhappily, this interference could not then be avoided. Grant assigned Sherman to command the Vicksburg expedition; the War Department relieved Sherman, and put McClernand in command. If any attribute was peculiarly characteristic of Grant, it was his knowledge of men. He had faith in Sherman, he had not in McClernand; but McClernand was forced upon him, and he was obliged to use him. McClernand, in command of a single corps, very soon assumed to be a *quasi* commander-in-chief. Military courtesy as well as military discipline requires absolute subordination; but McClernand's aspirations were disagreeably prominent; he was officious in advice and suggestions as to how the campaign ought to be conducted. The assault of May 22d, and the false hopes entertained on account of his dispatches to Grant, soon brought on a crisis. In addition to this, McClernand's congratulatory order to his command, on May 31st, amounted to an insinuation against his superior officer, and he was promptly relieved. Afterward we find McClernand engaged in the advocacy of McClellan for President in opposition to Lincoln. He resigned his place in the army in November, 1865.

Four days after the second assault on Vicksburg, General Banks had invested Port Hudson. Port Hudson is located on a bend in the Mississippi River, about twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge, and one hundred and forty-seven from New Orleans. Batteries had been erected along the river on high bluffs, extending from Thompson's Creek above the town southward for three and a half miles. The land defenses began from Thompson's Creek, and ran in a semicircular form for ten miles till they connected with the lower battery. The line of investment from right to left was held by Weitzel's brigade, and Grover's, Paine's, Augur's, and T. W. Sherman's divisions. The Confederate works had been skillfully planned, consisting, like those around Vicksburg, of strong redoubts commanding all the approaches to the town, and supporting each other, with rifle-pits between and in front; the garrison, however, had been reduced to about 6000 men. An attempt was made on May 27th to carry the works by assault. A heavy bombardment preceded the attack, which was begun by Weitzel, Grover, and Paine on the right at 10 A.M. The left, under Augur and Sherman, did not attack with any vigor until four hours later, and thus all the value of a simultaneous assault was lost. The river batteries in the mean time were engaged by Farragut's fleet—the Hartford and Albatross above, and the Richmond, Monongahela, Genesee, and Essex below. The naval attack was not entirely unsuccessful; the gun-boats compelled the enemy to abandon his southernmost battery, dismounted many of his heavy guns, and even reached the landward defenses with a fire in reverse.

But on the land side the assault was a complete failure. Not because of any want of gallantry in the troops; no men ever fought better. The enemy's rifle-pits were protected by impassable abatis swept by heavy guns. The battle on the right lasted till 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Weitzel, Grover, and Paine—neither of whose commands amounted to more than a brigade—with two regiments of colored troops, crossed Sandy Creek in the morning, and succeeded in driving the enemy through the woods to his fortifications. Augur and Sherman in the afternoon achieved a similar success on the left, moving up to the fortifications until they held the sides of the parapet opposite the enemy, but, toward night, being exposed to a flank fire, they withdrew. The position gained on the right was maintained. The negro troops were posted on the extreme right, a position well calculated to test their steadiness and bravery. They made during the day three charges

THE ASSAULT ON PORT HUDSON, MAY 27, 1863.



PORT HUDSON FROM THE OPPOSITE BANK.

on the enemy's batteries, and, although losing heavily, they held their position with the other troops without flinching until nightfall. This was the first instance in which negro troops fought during the war. In this action General T. W. Sherman was severely wounded. The entire National loss was 1842, of whom 293 were killed. The Confederate loss was inconsiderable.

The troops now went to digging, mining, and sharp-shooting. They were mostly nine-months' men, whose time had nearly expired. In a hostile region, with a large body of Confederate cavalry in their rear, and all Louisiana left open to Dick Taylor by Banks's concentration against Port Hudson, their situation was not an enviable one, and would have been perilous if, at this time, the attention of the enemy had not been so wholly given to the more important post of Vicksburg.

After several days' bombardment a second assault was made on Port Hudson. The chief point of attack was the northeasterly corner of the enemy's line of intrenchments. The result of the assault was a nearer approach to the works, and on the left, while Grover and Weitzel made the more palpable attack on the right, General Dwight succeeded in carrying and holding an eminence which commanded a vital point in the defenses known as "the Citadel." But what had been thus gained had cost 700 more men, and no subsequent assaults were made. Among the wounded was General Paine.

On the west side of the Mississippi, Dick Taylor had had the field in Louisiana almost entirely to himself. Early in June he reoccupied Alexandria and Opelousas. Upon his advance down the Atchafalaya, apparently threatening New Orleans, the advanced federal posts were withdrawn to Brashear. To this latter point Lieutenant Colonel Stickney had been sent by General Emory from New Orleans, to take command. From mismanagement, and lack of preparation and discipline, the enemy succeeded in taking Thibodeaux, Terre Bonne, and Bayou Bœuf, capturing their garrisons, while another column, under Mouton and Green, threatened Brashear from Berwick. Brashear was surrounded and captured with 1000 prisoners, Fort Buchanan, 10 heavy guns, and thousands of liberated negroes were reduced to slavery. Ryder, who had a few weeks before needlessly burned Berwick, managed to escape with the only national gun-boat left in the bayou. The road was now open for Taylor to advance to Algiers, the western suburb of New Orleans, Lafourche having been evacuated by Stickney. But the enemy fortunately had too weak a force to attempt the recapture of New Orleans; therefore he moved northward and threatened Donaldsonville; but, even after his storming-party had entered the fort, he was repulsed by the aid of the gun-boats, with a loss of 200 killed and 124 prisoners.

In the mean time Grant's army held its ground before Vicksburg. Five days after the investment the garrison had been reduced to 14½ ounces of food per day to each man, and it is reported that Pemberton had expressed his determination never to surrender the town till the last dog had been eaten and the last man slain. The only hope of relief from the alternative of starvation or surrender was in Joe Johnston; but if Pemberton entertained any hope from this source he leaned upon a broken reed. Grant's re-enforcements enabled him to give Sherman a detached command, consisting of the forces at Haines's Bluff, a division from each of the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth corps, and Lanman's division, for the especial purpose of looking after Johnston. The character of the country was also in his favor, enabling him by intrenchment to secure himself against an attack in his rear, while the Big Black formed a strong defensive line on the south, and his means of communication were beyond the enemy's reach. Johnston was also embarrassed by the frequency of straggling and desertion in his army. The evil was so great and of such extent as to cause Governor Brown, of Georgia, through which state the delinquents found their way to the East, to issue a proclamation, ordering their arrest by associations of citizens as well as by state troops.





ENTRANCE OF GALLERY LEADING TO THE MINE.

MINERS AT WORK UNDER THE FORT.

The irregularities of the ground between the two lines afforded opportunities for the construction of winding covered ways leading up to the outworks of the enemy. This circumstance facilitated the construction of mines. The excavations were well guarded from the observation of even the Federal troops. The first mine was sprung on June 25th, under a fort opposite the centre, in McPherson's front, and to the left of the Jackson Road, where Logan, early in the siege, had occupied and erected a fort upon a hill near the enemy, and overlooking his works. The explosion threw down a part of the face of the fort which had been undermined. An attempt was made to get possession, but without success. The Confederate General Herbert had built a second fort in the rear, so that the explosion of the first was of no great importance. A grandson of Henry Clay was killed in the struggle with the Federal troops on this occasion. In the same way other forts were undermined, the enemy countermining at a great disadvantage, and often the miners and counterminers approached so nearly that they could hear each other's picks. If it had been necessary, Grant's army would, no doubt, have dug itself into Vicksburg.

The garrison, exhausted from an insufficient supply of food, was wearied moreover by uninterrupted confinement in the rifle-pits, where many, escaping the accurate shots of Grant's sharp-shooters, fell victims to disease. The national troops, on the other hand, sheltered by the kindly covering of woods from the burning heat of the summer sun, well supplied with food —for they had the resources of the entire West at their backs and within their command—and finding innumerable springs of the best water in the deep ravines, improved daily in health; thousands of men became available who were numbered among the non-effectives just after the assault of May 22d.

Next to the hardships endured by the brave defenders of Vicksburg were those suffered daily by the non-combatants. Starvation confronted these latter in its worst forms. All the beef in the city was exhausted before the end of June, and mule-meat was resorted to as a last expedient.[1] The poor were without money, and, but for the charity of those possessed of better means, must have starved, with flour at $1000 per barrel, meal $140 per bushel, molasses $10 per gallon, and beef at $2 50 per pound. The city looked like a pile of half-ruined buildings, so searching were the Federal shells. For safety, the inhabitants went to caves dug into the sides of the hills, and here too the missiles of death reached them, not sparing even innocent children. The spirits both of the citizens and the troops were kept up, in a measure, by the rumors continually reaching them that Johnston was about to raise the siege. Couriers frequently found their

[1] Abrams says that he "partook of mule-meat for three or four days, and found the flesh tender and nutritious, and, *under the peculiar circumstances*, a most desirable description of food."

EXPLOSION OF FORT ON McPHERSON'S FRONT.



THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG—BATTERY HICKENLOOPER.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

way through the swamps and thickets of the Yazoo to Grant's rear, and on their return gave out these vague hints, exciting the most extravagant expectations. Many believed that Johnston had gathered together an army of 50,000 men for the relief of Vicksburg. By the same route used by these couriers, Pemberton supplied himself with percussion caps during the siege.

Johnston himself, with an army of about 24,000 men, gathered together from all possible sources under the pressure of necessity, and poorly equipped, had no hope of raising the siege by an attack on the rear of Grant's army. He could obtain no assistance from Bragg, who was firmly held by Rosecrans, and the diminution of whose force would have compelled the abandonment of Tennessee, without securing the possession of Vicksburg. But it seemed not impossible that some help might come from the west side of the Mississippi if Kirby Smith and Taylor could re-establish their communications with the Vicksburg garrison. Even such help could only have protracted the campaign. But, whatever it promised, it was not to be had. An unsuccessful attempt was made, in April, by the Confederate General Marmaduke, to capture Cape Girardeau, above Cairo, which, if it had succeeded, would have somewhat seriously embarrassed General Grant's operations. General Kirby Smith's attempt to open communications with Vicksburg proved equally abortive. An attack was made early in June upon the Federal camp at Milliken's Bend. The first stage of the attack promised a favorable result to the Confederates, who succeeded in driving the small detachment of national troops from their outer line of intrenchments to the river's bank, but with the aid of a gun-boat the tide of battle was turned, and the Iowa regiments, assisted by negro troops, rallied and repulsed the assailants. After another fight at Richmond, nine miles from Milliken's Bend, in which it was defeated, Kirby Smith's army retired into the interior. His 8000 men, says Johnston, had been mismanaged, and had fallen back to Delhi. From the West no farther attempt was made for the relief of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

A correspondence was kept up between Pemberton and Jackson during the siege. Again and again the latter professed his inability to raise the siege, or to do any thing more than co-operate with Pemberton in an attempt to extricate the garrison. To urgent appeals from the War Department at Richmond, Johnston repeatedly replied that he could effect nothing with so inadequate a command. "If I attack," he said, "there is the Big Black in my rear, cutting off my retreat." Finally, on June 21st, Pemberton wrote to Johnston recommending him to make a demonstration on the Federal right, and promised to himself move out his garrison, if possible, by the Warrenton Road and across Hankinson's Ferry. Upon mature consideration this plan was deemed impracticable. On the 22d of June, the day after he had made this bold proposition, Pemberton suggested that Johnston should make to Grant propositions to pass his army out, with all its arms and equipages. He could hold out, he said, fifteen days longer. In reply to this, Johnston complimented Pemberton upon his determined spirit, and held out hopes of aid from Kirby Smith. He hoped that "something might yet be done to save Vicksburg" without resorting to any mode of merely extricating the garrison, but he declined to confess his own weakness by making the proposed terms to General Grant. Such terms, if necessary, must come from Pemberton, though they might be considered as made under his authority. Johnston, in the mean time, having obtained his field transportation and supplies, marched toward the Big Black, June 29th, hoping better results from an attack on the south than on the north of the railroad. On the night of July 3d he sent a messenger to notify Pemberton that he was ready to make a diversion to enable the garrison to cut its way out, but before the arrival of this messenger Vicksburg had been surrendered.

It may seem wonderful that Vicksburg should have been surrendered on the Fourth of July, a "Yankee anniversary," as the enemy was now pleased to call it. Pollard, the Southern historian, takes especial umbrage at this circumstance. Surrendered it must have been, doubtless; but why, of all days of the year, on *that* day? The explanation must rest with General Pemberton. He knew that Grant was preparing for an overwhelming attack. This attack, he thought, would certainly be made on the 4th. The chances in such an event were wholly in Grant's favor. Of the garrison not more than 15,000 men could probably be made available for the defense of a line eight miles long, and against a brave, well-fed, and confident enemy numbering over 60,000 men. It was bad enough to surrender on the 4th of July, but it was still worse to be ingloriously beaten on that day. Moreover, it was quite natural that Pemberton should be confident of securing better terms for his army by indulging the enemy a little in this particular.

At any rate, on the morning of July 3d an unusual quiet rested upon the defenses of Vicksburg, which was soon explained by the appearance of a flag of truce upon the works in front of A. J. Smith. This flag ushered into our lines two Confederate officers, Colonel Montgomery and General Bowen, with a sealed communication from Pemberton to Grant. The letter proposed the arrangement of terms of capitulation by the appointment of commissioners, three on each side. Of course Pemberton said that he was "fully able to maintain his position for an indefinite period." General Grant replied, refusing to submit to the terms of a commission, and demanding an unconditional surrender. He, however, consented to meet Pemberton at 3 o'clock P.M., and to arrange the terms of surrender by a personal interview.

The two generals met at the appointed hour under a gigantic oak in McPherson's front. Many and various have been the accounts published of this important interview. By some Pemberton is represented as having chatted in an indifferent manner, making arrangements for the surrender of a large army and of the Mississippi River while chewing straws with marvelous *sang froid;* others report that he was stormy, irascible, and even im-

INTERVIEW BETWEEN GRANT AND PEMBERTON.

pertinent. As to General Grant's behavior there can be no doubt; of course he smoked, and equally, of course, he was cool and imperturbable. Whether Pemberton chatted or scolded is of little consequence. It is said that the latter refused to surrender unconditionally, declaring that he would rather fight it out, and that Grant replied, "Then, sir, you can continue the defense. My army has never been in a better condition for the prosecution of the siege." However this may have been, the interview ended with the understanding that Pemberton would confer with his subordinate officers, and return an answer the following morning. The oak-tree has long since disappeared through the ravages of relic-hunters. Upon the spot where it stood a monument was erected. This also was soon so much defaced that in 1866 it was displaced by a sixty-four-pounder cannon placed in an erect position, with the muzzle pointing upward.[1]

Grant, after consultation with his generals, anticipated any communication which Pemberton might make by writing him a letter on the evening of the 3d. He proposed the following scheme: Pemberton's army should be allowed to march out of the city as soon as paroled, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, while staff, field, and cavalry officers might retain one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. The necessary amount of rations could be taken from the stores in Pemberton's possession, with utensils for cooking; also thirty wagons for transportation. The sick and wounded would be subject to similar conditions as soon as they should be able to travel. If the terms were accepted, he would march in one division and take possession at 8 A.M. on the 4th.

Early the next morning Pemberton's reply was received, accepting the proposed terms in the main, but submitting that, in justice both to the honor and spirit of his army, manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, it ought to be allowed to march out with colors and arms, stacking them in front of the lines, after which Grant should take possession; that the officers should be allowed their side-arms and personal property, and that the rights and property of citizens should be respected.

Some of these requests were acceded by General Grant; others were refused. He had no objection to paying Pemberton's troops the compliment

[1] The original monument was a pyramid twenty feet high, surmounted with a fifteen-inch globe. On one of its faces was an American eagle sustaining on its wings the Goddess of Liberty. On another face was the following inscription: "To the memory of the surrender of Vicksburg by Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton to Major General U. S. Grant, on the 3d of July, 1863."





of allowing them to march to the front and stack their arms, provided they then marched back again, remaining as prisoners until they were paroled. The parole was insisted upon in its strictest form, to be signed in each case by the paroled soldiers individually. He refused to be bound by any stipulations as to the treatment of citizens, confining himself simply to the assurance that he did not propose to cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss. With these modifications the parley must close. If the terms were not accepted by 9 A.M. they would be regarded as refused, and hostilities would recommence. Acceptance would be indicated on Pemberton's part by the display of white flags along his lines.

These terms were promptly accepted by Pemberton. Three hours were occupied by the Confederate army in marching out and stacking their arms. In the afternoon the national troops marched in and took possession. This was the third recurrence of the national anniversary since the beginning of the war. The first saw Congress convoked to assist the executive in meeting, for the first time in our history, an aggressive enemy within our own borders. The second witnessed McClellan's return to Harrison's Landing after a most disastrous campaign. But on the third was celebrated the surrender of Vicksburg and the victory of Gettysburg, the two events which, taken together, mark the turning-point of the war against the Southern Confederacy.

By 3 o'clock P.M. the national fleet of rams, gun-boats, and transports lined the levee. Grant, with McPherson, Logan, and their several staffs, entered Vicksburg. After an active campaign of eighty days—counting from the first passage of the transports below Vicksburg—he had won the most important and stupendous victory of the war. His loss had been 8575,[1] of which 4236 fell before Vicksburg. Not more than half of the wounded had been permanently disabled. The enemy's loss before the surrender amounted to at least 10,000 killed and wounded, not counting stragglers. In addition to these, 27,000 men were captured with Vicksburg, including fifteen general officers, one hundred and twenty-eight pieces of artillery, and about eighty siege-guns, besides arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000, together with a large amount of public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steam-boats, cotton, etc. Much property had also been destroyed to prevent its capture.

Grant had acted at his own discretion in paroling so large a number of troops. It saved the government the expense of removing them North, which at this time would have been very difficult with the limited transportation on hand, and also of their subsistence, and it left the army free to operate against Johnston.

The enthusiasm of the national forces upon their entrance into Vicksburg surpasses description. To Pemberton's army, in addition to the distressing hardships of the siege, was added the humiliation of defeat. One of the most interesting features connected with the capture of Vicksburg was the exultation of the negroes. Crowds of them congregated upon the side-walks,

THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG, JULY 4, 1863.

[1] Grant sums up his loss in the series of battles about and before Vicksburg as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Port Gibson	130	718	5
Fourteen-mile Creek	4	24	—
Raymond	69	341	32
Jackson	40	240	6
Champion's Hill	426	1842	189
Big Black Bridge	29	242	2
Before Vicksburg	245	3688	303
Total	943	7095	537
Sum total			8575



FEDERAL TROOPS BEFORE JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI.

welcoming Grant's army with broad grins of satisfaction. On the next day, which was Sunday, they dressed themselves in the most extravagant style, and promenaded the streets with a more palpable expression of triumphant joy than the conquerors themselves.

When Johnston was apprised of the surrender of Vicksburg he withdrew from the Big Black to Jackson. Immediately after the capture, Grant sent the remainder of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps to re-enforce the five divisions already assigned to Sherman for operations against Johnston. Sherman had constructed a line of defense in Grant's rear from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black. This line had kept Johnston from his proposed attack north of the railroad, and the surrender of Vicksburg had made a diversion on the Big Black as unnecessary as it was impracticable.

Johnston's four divisions covering Jackson on the morning of July 9th were commanded by Major Generals Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge, while a division of cavalry, under General Jackson, guarded the fords of Pearl River above and below the town. Sherman in the mean time had been marching his command over the intervening fifty miles in the heat and dust, and through a country almost destitute of water—so destitute, indeed, that Johnston considered a siege of Jackson impossible. His advance appeared before the enemy's intrenchments on the 9th, and on the 12th had invested the town, both flanks resting on Pearl River. While skirmishing was going on in front, the cavalry were operating on the north and south of Jackson, destroying railroads and other property.

Johnston's position was entirely untenable. Batteries posted upon the surrounding hills were within easy range, commanding the town. Sherman's army fell but little short of 50,000 men, and he had a hundred guns planted upon the hills. In this situation he only waited for his ammunition train, which arrived on the 16th. This delay gave Johnston time for retreat; to remain was certain disaster.

In a too close approach to the works on the 12th, Lauman's division suffered a severe loss—about 500 men, of whom two hundred were captured, with the colors of the Twenty-eighth, Forty-first, and Fifty-third Illinois. This unfortunate loss was the result of a misapprehension of orders. Lauman's division was under Ord's command, and held the extreme right, confronting Breckinridge. Ord, thinking the position of the division too much retired, ordered it forward, so as to connect with Hovey's. This advance was not designed to bring on an engagement, nor would it have done so but for a careless misapprehension on Lauman's part. Pugh's brigade, after crossing the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad at a point about two miles south of Jackson, and driving back the enemy's skirmishers, found itself, with less than 1000 men, confronted by a strong line of works held by two brigades of the enemy, with two full batteries, and protected by abatis in front. The intervening space was open, affording no cover to a charging column. Pugh reported this situation to Lauman; but the latter repeated the order to move forward. It was certain death to every other man in the brigade, but the order was obeyed. No other result was possible but that which followed, namely, the useless murder of half the column. Well may Lauman have wept when he looked upon the remnant of his old brigade. He was afterward relieved of his command by General Ord.[1]

Jackson was evacuated on the night of July 16th, Johnston retreating across Pearl River, burning the bridges behind him, and through Brandon toward Meridian, about 100 miles east of Jackson. The town, thus again left in possession of the national troops, was once more devoted to destruction. Sherman pursued the enemy as far as Brandon, and then returned with his army across the Big Black. The Confederate loss at Jackson, by Johnston's report, was 71 killed, 504 wounded, and about 25 missing. Desertions were frequent from his army both during the siege and in the retreat.

The navy had necessarily a less conspicuous share than the army in the capture of Vicksburg, but its co-operation had been absolutely essential to Grant's success. The gun-boats had been constantly engaged in shelling the town from below. For forty-two days the mortar-boats had also been at work without intermission, throwing shells into all parts of the city, and even reaching the works in the rear of Vicksburg, three miles distant, with a fire in reverse; thirteen guns had been transferred from the fleet to the army; the river had been patrolled from Cairo to Vicksburg, to clear out the guerrillas who had on several occasions built batteries on the shore, and attempted to sink or capture the transports conveying stores, re-enforcements, and ammunition to the besieging army; and the gun-boats, with General Ellet's marine brigade, had frustrated the schemes of Kirby Smith by their co-operation with the small force on the right bank of the Mississippi at Milliken's Bend.[2]

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[1] Sherman, speaking of this affair, attributes the disaster to "misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of General Ord's minute instructions on the part of General Lauman."

[2] Immediately after the surrender Sherman penned the following impromptu, but characteristic letter to Admiral Porter:

"I can appreciate the intense satisfaction you must feel at lying before the monster that has defied us with such deep and malignant hate, and seeing your once disunited fleet again a unit; and, better still, the chain that made an inclosed sea of a link in the great river broken forever. In so magnificent a result I stop not to count who did it. It is done, and the day of the nation's birth is consecrated and baptized anew in a victory won by the united navy and army of our country. God grant that the harmony and mutual respect that exists between our respective commanders, and shared by all the true men of the joint service, may continue forever, and serve to elevate our national character, threatened with shipwreck. Thus I muse as I sit in my solitary camp out in the woods, far from the point for which we have justly striven so long and so well; and though personal curiosity would tempt me to go and see the frowning batteries and sunken pits that have defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many of our early comrades in the enterprise, I feel that other tasks lie before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting anchor, and despite the heat, and the dust, and the drought, I must again into the bowels of the land, to make the conquest of the land fulfill all the conditions it should in the progress of this war. Whether success attend my efforts or not, I know that Admiral Porter will ever accord to me the exhibition of a pure and unselfish zeal in the service of our country.

The 4th of July, 1863, also witnessed a conflict of some importance at Helena, Arkansas, on the right bank of the river, above Vicksburg. This place, since its occupation in the summer of 1862 by the advance of General Curtis's army, had rested undisturbed in the possession of the national forces, and had been of great use as a dépôt of recruits and supplies for operations farther south. It threatened also the most important points in those portions of the state occupied by the enemy.

Toward the close of the siege of Vicksburg, Lieutenant General Holmes, the Confederate commander in Arkansas, at the suggestion of Secretary Mallory, and with Kirby Smith's permission, prepared an expedition to attack Helena. He left Little Rock on the 25th of June, and made Clarendon, sixty miles east of the capital, on White River, the rendezvous for his forces. Fagan, Sterling Price, and Marmaduke were to command columns in the attacking army. It was Holmes's design to surprise the Federal force; but Price, owing to high water, was four days behindhand, and in the mean time General B. M. Prentiss, commanding at Helena, became acquainted with the enemy's intentions. The garrison numbered about 4000 men, and was intrenched behind strong earth-works, well mounted with artillery, and with their main approaches covered by abatis. Prentiss had also an important ally, upon whose presence the enemy had not calculated, in the gun-boat Tyler, commanded by J. M. Pritchett.

The town lies upon the river flat, but near it are high commanding ridges, with ravines opening toward the river. Upon a low ridge nearer the town Fort Curtis was located, while upon the higher ridges commanding it outworks had been constructed by Brigadier General F. Salomon, to whose charge also had been assigned their defense. These outworks consisted of four strong batteries, designated from right to left by the first four letters of the alphabet in their succession. The flanks, which, being between the ridges and the river, were open, were protected by rifle-pits and batteries.

Holmes reports his total force to have been 7646, or about twice the strength of the garrison. The Missourians were under Price, Parsons, and Marmaduke, while the brigades of Fagan, McRae, and Walker consisted of troops gathered together from Arkansas. The Confederate command was not lacking in bravery, and the attack was admirably conducted, but the assailing force was too weak by half for any chance of success against a determined garrison in so strong a position. The Confederate Governor of Arkansas, Harris Flanagan, with his adjutant general, Colonel Gordon Rear, were on the field, acting as volunteer aids to General Holmes.

On the morning of July 4th Holmes's army was within a mile of the outworks. Price led the brigades of Parsons and McRae (3095 men) against Battery C on Grave-yard Hill, and succeeded, after great loss, in carrying the single regiment lost its colonel, lieutenant colonel, and over 100 men. The remainder withdrew to the rifle-pits already captured, where, exposed to the fire from the fort, they held their ground until 11 o'clock, when a general retreat was ordered.

Marmaduke, with 1750 men, had been ordered to take the fort on Righton Hill (Battery A) on the north, but he failed even to make a vigorous assault, not being supported by Walker's brigade.

Holmes reports his loss in this battle as 173 killed, 687 wounded, and 776 missing. Thus, by his own admission, he lost over one fifth of his command. Prentiss says he buried nearly 300 of the enemy's killed, and took 1100 prisoners. His own loss was less than 250, all told. The gun-boat Tyler had a large share in the havoc which was made among the charging columns of the enemy.

The capture of Port Hudson and its garrison followed as the immediate and necessary consequence of the surrender of Vicksburg. In any case, Gardner could not have held out much longer. His ammunition for small-arms was almost gone, only twenty rounds remaining to each man, and the garrison was on the verge of starvation. Its mill had been fired by a shell, 2000 bushels of corn being burned with it. No meat was left, and the mules were being killed to satisfy the demand; even rats, it is reported, were eaten by the famishing soldiers. Only fifteen serviceable guns remained on the land defenses, the others having been, one after the other, disabled by the accurate fire of the Federal guns. Banks's sappers and miners had dug their way up to the works, and General Dwight had a mine ready on the left, charged with thirty barrels of powder, in such a position that its explosion would have destroyed "the Citadel," already referred to as a vital point in the enemy's defenses. The hospitals were full of the sick, and the men in the trenches were so exhausted and enfeebled that they were unfit for action. The capture of Vicksburg, however, precipitated the capitulation of Port Hudson. Grant had embarked an expedition, under General Herron, to reenforce Banks, but scarcely were the men on board when the tidings was brought of the capture of Port Hudson, and Herron's expedition was ordered up the Yazoo.

It was on the 6th of July that the news of the victory at Vicksburg reached Port Hudson. Gardner could hardly by any possibility have misinterpreted the tremendous salute of the gun-boats, re-echoed from the land batteries, or the news shouted across his lines. He forthwith convened a council of war, and a surrender was determined upon. On the 7th he communicated with General Banks, asking the latter to give him official assurance of the news. If Vicksburg had really been surrendered, he asked for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the consideration of terms for the capitulation of Port Hudson. Banks replied by sending Grant's own dispatch, but refusing a cessation of hostilities. Conferees were appointed on each side, and on July 8th terms of surrender were concluded upon, and the next morning formal possession was taken of the town.



SALUTING THE FLAG AT PORT HUDSON.

Banks does not report his loss before Port Hudson, but it probably fell not far short of 3000. The enemy admitted a loss of only 610 men during the forty-five days' campaign, but this, Banks is confident, must have been too low an estimate, as he found 500 wounded in the hospitals. The number of prisoners taken was 6408, of whom 455 were officers. The captures of the whole campaign, including the trans-Mississippi operations, Banks estimates at 10,584 men, 73 guns, 6000 small-arms, three gun-boats, eight other steam-boats, besides cotton and cattle of immense value.

The capture of Port Hudson scared Dick Taylor out of the country east of the Atchafalaya, compelling him to evacuate Brashear City just one month after its capture. Both Grant and Banks now urged an immediate combined movement against Mobile, but were overruled at Washington. It seems some Texan refugees were anxious that operations should be recommenced on the line of the Red River, and Banks was advised accordingly. The history of the campaign thus opened we reserve for a subsequent chapter.

Herron, in the mean time, having transferred his troops to vessels of lighter draft, moved up the Yazoo, his transports preceded by the iron-clad De Kalb and two tin-clad gun-boats under Captain Walker. The expedition had for its object the destruction of a large number of Confederate steam-boats which had run up the Yazoo to find refuge from Porter's fleet. When nearly opposite Yazoo City the De Kalb was sunk by a torpedo. The Confederate garrison abandoned the city upon the approach of the expedition. Only one of the steam-boats was captured, the others making their escape up the river. The fugitive vessels were, however, pursued by Herron's cavalry, and all of them, to the number of twenty-two, were burned or sunk. Three hundred prisoners were captured, six heavy guns, 250 small-arms, 800 horses, and 2000 bales of cotton.

work, capturing some of its guns, which were either spiked or devoid of friction-primers, and therefore useless to the captors. Price had great difficulty in bringing his own artillery over the broken country and up the hill. Meanwhile his infantry was falling under a fire from all the other works. Instead of retreating, hundreds of his command pushed forward in disorder and without support, and encountering a cross fire, until, unable to retreat, as many as had escaped death surrendered. Price reports a loss in this action of over one third of his command.

Fagan's small command of four regiments had attacked at the same time, attempting the still more difficult task of carrying Battery D on the left. The charge at this point was exceedingly gallant, but met with only partial success. The brave Arkansans rushed up the precipitous ravines, and drove the Federal sharp-shooters out of their rifle-pits; but every assault upon the fort itself only added to the useless slaughter of the assailants. A

Breese, and the many elegant and accomplished gentlemen it has been my good fortune to meet on armed or unarmed decks of the Mississippi squadron."



OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI—ARRIVAL OF THE "IMPERIAL" AT NEW ORLEANS.

Thus ended the campaign for the possession of the Mississippi River, which now, to use the happy expression of President Lincoln, "ran unvexed to the sea." On the 16th of July the steam-boat Imperial arrived at New Orleans from St. Louis, the first steamer which had made the trip for more than two years.

The foremost man in this campaign was General Grant, the taker of guns and armies. His name was on every tongue. The shout of joy which arose from a whole people on account of his victory was mingled with a pæan of praise to the victor. He was at once appointed to the vacant major generalship in the regular army, to date from July 4th, 1863. In the midst of these acclamations to his honor, President Lincoln addressed him a letter[1] acknowledging the inestimable service he had rendered his country, and adding a personal acknowledgment of his own error of judgment as to the propriety of re-enforcing Banks after the battle of Port Gibson instead of moving directly against Vicksburg. In this Vicksburg campaign General Grant showed his capacity for the command of a large army, and for the conduct of movements the most extensive; a remarkable boldness of conception, almost unlimited resources, and a steady persistence of purpose not to be moved by any obstacle, and not to be conquered by a succession of partial defeats. As to total defeat with such a commander, *that* was clearly impossible.

[1] "Executive Mansion, Washington, July 13th, 1863.

"TO MAJOR GENERAL GRANT:

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for *the almost inestimable service you have done the country.* I wish to say a word farther. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass Expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment *that you were right and I was wrong.*

"Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN."

JOSEPH HOOKER.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

HOOKER IN COMMAND.—CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Hooker assumes Command.—Bad Condition of the Army.—Hooker's Measures of Reform.—Hooker's Plan of Operations.—Changes in the Commands.—Strength of the two Armies.—Hooker's Orders to Stoneman.—Cavalry Expedition postponed.—Hooker moves upon Chancellorsville.—The Rappahannock and Rapidan crossed.—Chancellorsville and the Wilderness.—Sedgwick crosses near Fredericksburg.—Hooker's Anticipations of Success.—Lee's Movements.—Hooker's Delay at Chancellorsville.—He advances toward Fredericksburg, then retreats.—Position of the Forces.—Lee and Jackson in Council.—A Flank Attack resolved upon.—Jackson marches.—Sickles attacks the Confederate Rear.—Jackson's March.—Lee's Operations.—Jackson routs the Federal Right.—Pleasonton checks the Confederate Advance.—Lee's Operations in Front.—The Advance of Birney.—Jackson Wounded.—Death of Jackson.—His Career.—Wishes the War to be without Quarter.—Hooker assumes a new Position.—The Union Line of Battle.—Birney's Night Attack.—*The Battle of Sunday, May* 2: Forces Present.—Stuart occupies Hazle Grove.—Assails Sickles.—Is forced back.—Sickles asks for Support.—Hooker Disabled.—Sickles falls back.—French attacks Stuart, and is repulsed.—Lee assails the Union Centre.—Unites with Stuart.—Occupies Chancellorsville.—The Federals Retreat.—Their new Position.—Sedgwick ordered up from Fredericksburg.—His dilatory Movement.—Storms the Heights and Advances.—Perilous Situation of Lee.—He sends Troops to meet Sedgwick.—The Fight at Salem Heights.—*The Battle of Monday, May* 3: Lee re-enforces McLaws.—Early retakes Fredericksburg Heights.—Howe repulses Early and McLaws.—Hooker's Orders to Sedgwick.—Sedgwick recrosses the Rappahannock.—The Council of War.—Hooker recrosses the Rappahannock.—Movements of Averill and Stoneman.—Losses at Chancellorsville.—Criticism upon Operations.—Hooker's Errors.—Lee's Errors.

FROM this survey of operations in the West we turn again to Virginia, where, at the opening of the year, the two great armies of the Union and the Confederacy lay confronting each other upon the banks of the Rappahannock.[1]

Hooker was invested with the command of the Army of the Potomac on the 26th of January. Just three days before, his predecessor had drawn up an order dismissing him from the service, and on the very day before it was doubtful whether that order should be put in force. But the transfer of command was executed with all due military courtesy. "Give," said Burnside, in his parting address to the army, "to the brave and skillful general

[1] The following are the leading authorities for Chancellorsville: Testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, contained in volume i. of the second series (cited as *Com. Rep.*, ii.).—Lee's Report of Chancellorsville (cited as *Lee's Rep.*): it embraces his own report and those of nearly all of his principal commanders.—Hotchkiss and Allan, engineers in the late Confederate army, have put forth a monograph upon Chancellorsville. It is specially valuable for its elaborate maps, which clearly represent the topography of the region, and show every movement upon both sides.—Dabney's Life of Stonewall Jackson embraces some valuable information respecting the operations of that commander. The author had access to many materials which are now probably destroyed.

who has so long been identified with your organization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and co-operation, and you will deserve success." Hooker, in assuming command, said that "he only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he conveys to our late commander, Major General Burnside, the most cordial good wishes for his future."

Hooker took command with a confidence in himself which contrasted strongly with the self-distrust which had been expressed by Burnside. The position had come to him unsought, but, as he believed, not undeserved. "No being lives," he averred, "who can say that I ever expressed a desire for the position. It was conferred on me for my sword, and not for any act or word of mine indicative of a desire for it."[1] He had, indeed, grave misgivings, not as to his own capacity, but as to the state of the force placed under his command.[2] Foremost among these causes of misgiving was the hostility of Halleck, who for six months had sat, and for thrice as long was to sit, under the title of general-in-chief, as an incubus upon the Union armies. Hooker knew, or at least believed, that Halleck had been hostile to him from the first, and the sole request that he made of the President was that he would stand between him and his superior in command.[3] The condition of the army was a still more grave matter for apprehension. Burnside had received it from McClellan strong in numbers, discipline, and spirit. In three months he transmitted it to Hooker reduced in numbers and impaired in efficiency. Much of this was owing to causes over which Burnside had no control. Lincoln's policy, as finally indicated by his emancipation proclamation, was looked upon with disfavor by a very considerable part of the army. Many of the officers in high command, especially those who had belonged to the regular army, were far from hostile to slavery. McClellan, just escaped from the Chickahominy swamps, had found time six months before to present his views of the principles upon which the war should be waged. "The rebellion," he said, "has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any state in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of states, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain the requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies."[4] McClellan gave voice to the prevailing feeling among the leading officers of the army. No inconsiderable part of the private soldiers had been drawn from a class which looked with bitter aversion upon the negro. This was especially the case with the regiments raised in the large cities of the North. To them the very name of Abolitionist was a word of reproach. But now the proclamation issued on New Year's day of 1863 had solemnly pledged the nation to the abolition of slavery as an essential feature of the future conduct of the war.

For a time it seemed that McClellan's prophecy that a declaration of radical views upon the subject of slavery would be verified by the rapid disintegration of the Army of the Potomac. Officers high in rank openly declared that they would never have embarked in the war had they anticipated this action of the government.[5] When rest came to the army after the disaster of Fredericksburg and the failure of the mud campaign, the disaffected began to show themselves and to make their influence felt. The army fell into a course of rapid depletion. Express trains, and even the mails, were burdened with civilian clothing, sent to soldiers by their friends to facilitate their escape from camp. When Hooker took command desertions numbered 200 a day. In a week the army lost as many men as were killed in any pitched battle. What with deserters and absentees, 85,000 men, almost 4000 of whom were commissioned officers, wellnigh half the nominal strength of the army, were away from the field, scattered all over the country.[6] The great body of the disaffected, whether in or out of the army, believed that the government would soon be forced to restore McClellan to the command, and practically to abandon its declared policy of emancipation. By these men the appointment of Hooker was looked upon with no favor. They could not fail to remember the unsparing terms in which he had attributed the disaster of the Peninsular campaign to the utter want of capacity of their favorite commander.[7] They looked eagerly forward to the time when he should be placed at the head of the army, and thence, as political affairs seemed to be shaping themselves, raised to the Presidency of the United States. The feeling in the army and that in the country acted and reacted upon each other, and for a time it seemed that the policy of the government would be condemned alike by citizens and soldiers.

In spite of these untoward circumstances and the grave misgivings which he felt, Hooker grasped the command with a firm hand. It was midwinter, and operations in the field must be postponed until early spring should render the roads passable. In that interval much could be done. Hooker set himself strenuously at work to improve the condition of the army. At the very outset he broke up the grand divisions, and restored its former organization into corps, each being placed under the command of a general in whom he had confidence. Then the great evil of desertions was to be encountered. The loose system of furloughs was thoroughly revised. Hitherto the corps commanders had granted leaves of absence at discretion. By the new regulations no leave of absence could be granted except from head-quarters to officers of high rank. In no regiment could more than one field officer or two line officers be absent at the same time. Not more than two privates out of a hundred in any regiment could be absent on furlough at the same time, and no man could receive a furlough unless he had a good record for attention to his duties. The leaves of absence being of short date, fifteen days being the utmost limit, even these strict rules enabled all deserving men who wished it to visit their homes. Disloyal officers were carefully weeded out. Express trains were examined, and all citizens' clothing found therein was burned. The police and commissariat of the army received special attention. Comfortable winter huts were built; vegetables and fresh bread were ordered to be issued twice a week. The good result of these measures was soon apparent. Desertions ceased; absentees returned to their commands; the ratio of sickness sank from more than ten per cent. to less than five. The cavalry, which had heretofore been scattered among the grand divisions, was organized into a separate corps, and soon grew into a powerful arm, wanting only a fitting man to wield it; but Hooker was not, as commander of this army, to find such a leader. He did the best he could by giving the cavalry corps to Stoneman, with Averill next in command. Sheridan was yet to be brought from a subordinate position in the West. The outpost duty had been grossly neglected; the Confederates knew what was passing within the Union lines almost as accurately as did its own commanders. Hooker changed all this. The picket lines were rendered impenetrable. One division lay encamped on Falmouth Heights, opposite Fredericksburg, in plain view of the enemy. The camps of the other divisions, a score or more in number, covering a circuit of a hundred miles, lay beyond the wooded crests of Stafford. What passed beyond this screen was hidden from the keenest view which the Confederate commander could gain, saving when some ostentatious demonstration, or a sharp, sudden dash of pickets was made, with the object, as Hooker explained, "to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men, by successes however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries." Knowing, moreover, that idleness was the bane of all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed, and whenever the weather permitted they were engaged in field exercises.

As winter wore away and spring opened, the commander felt assured that he had at length "a living army well worthy of the republic," or, as he was wont to express it in larger phrase, "the finest army upon the planet." All through those winter weeks he had pondered the problem how and where he should strike.[1] His instructions were of the most general character. Halleck wrote: "In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to punish any force of the enemy sent against them."[2] Hooker had, however, caught the true idea of the work to be done. It was not so much to capture Richmond as to destroy the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia which lay in his front. Lincoln had months before vainly sought to impress this idea upon McClellan.[3] Grant seized upon it months later. In seeking to solve the problem of attack, Hooker soon came to the decision that it was impossible to cross the Rappahannock and assail the enemy directly in front. The misadventure of Burnside had demonstrated this point; and, moreover, since that luckless attempt, the Confederate position had been greatly strengthened. The mere passage of the river in front of the Confederate lines presented, indeed, no very serious difficulty, for Lee adhered to his former plan, rather inviting than threatening such an operation.[4] But his long lines of intrenchment, stretching for a distance of twenty miles along the sides and crests of the heights, were in plain view. Interspersed with the infantry parapets were epaulements for artillery which would sweep the hill-sides and bottom-lands over which an

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[1] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 112.

[2] "I entered upon my duties with many misgivings and forebodings. When it was announced to me that I had been placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, I doubted, and so expressed myself, if it could be saved to the country."—*Ibid.*, 112.

[3] "I was informed by a member of the cabinet that [when it was first proposed to remove McClellan] the President and five members of it were in favor of placing me at the head of the Army of the Potomac, and one or two members of the cabinet and General Halleck were opposed to it." (Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 175.)—"I had been reliably informed that I was again opposed by him on the removal of Major General Burnside." (*Ibid.*, 112.)—"In my interview with the President, among other subjects relating to the new position I had been called to fill, I stated that I hoped to succeed, provided he would stand between me and the commanding general of the army. This was the only request I made of the President in assuming command."—*Ibid.*, 111.

[4] McClellan to the President, July 7, 1862, *McC. Rep.*, 280–282.

[5] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 112.

[6] *Ibid.*, 112.

[7] "I do not hesitate to say that the failure of the Peninsular campaign is to be attributed to the want of generalship on the part of our commander."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, i., 575.

[1] "The subject of the campaign was one to which General Hooker gave much thought and attention. But, while getting the views of every body else, he did not give his own, but kept his intentions in regard to the proposed campaign entirely secret from every one, fearing that what he intended to do might come to the knowledge of the enemy. When he assumed command of the army there was not a record or document of any kind at headquarters of the army that gave any information at all in regard to the enemy. There was no means, no organization, and no apparent effort to obtain such information. We were almost as ignorant of the enemy in our immediate front as if they had been in China. An efficient organization for that purpose was instituted, by which we were soon enabled to get correct and proper information of the enemy, their strength and movements." (Butterfield, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 74.)—"Knowing that the passage of the river would be resisted, and perhaps defeated, if brought to the knowledge of the enemy, I had taken every precaution to keep it a profound secret. I had not even communicated it to my corps commanders, or the officers of my staff." (Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 118.)—A close examination of Hooker's dispatches and orders, compared with what is now known, shows that he was almost as well aware of the strength and positions of the Confederate force as of his own.

[2] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 115, 285.

[3] "I would press the enemy closely; fight him if a favorable opportunity should present. If he make a stand at Winchester, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we can never when we bear the wastage of coming to him. We should not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond. I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached." (Lincoln to McClellan, October 13, 1862, abridged, *Com. Rep.*, i., 525.)—"General Hooker finally determined upon a plan of campaign, the intent and purpose of which was to destroy the army of General Lee where it then was; not merely to fight a battle and gain possession of the battle-ground, and have the enemy fall back to Richmond, but to destroy him there; for General Hooker believed that we could better afford to fight the enemy nearer Washington than Richmond."—Butterfield, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 75.

[4] "As in the battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy than incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his crossing."—*Lee's Rep.*, 6.

Blacksmiths Department, Head-Quarters.



Stables and Negro Servants' Tent.

General Hooker's Tent.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

assailing force must march. Abatis of fallen timber guarded every point between the impassable swamps at the foot of the hills, while in the rear these outer lines were covered by rifle-pits, and every little rise of ground bristled with intrenchments like a miniature fortress. To attack these works in front seemed hopeless. "Previous exposure in attempting it under Burnside, when the enemy's preparations were far less complete, had made this a conviction in the mind of every private in the ranks."[1]

The enemy could then be assailed only by turning his position either below or above. Against the former operation was the fact that the river increases so rapidly in width that it would require a thousand feet of bridging, and the pontoon trains and artillery must march twenty miles over a broken and wooded country, by roads still axle-deep with clayey mud. This march could not be concealed from the enemy on the opposite bank, who could easily extend his intrenchments down the river faster than the assailants could construct practicable roads. This movement was, then, clearly impracticable.[2]

It only remained to turn the Confederate right far above Fredericksburg, and this was possible only upon condition that the movement should be a surprise. Three miles above Fredericksburg, in a straight line, but twice as far following the bend of the river, is Banks's Ford; seven miles farther is the United States Ford,[3] neither of them to be waded except in the dry season; now the water was so high that the passage could be made only by bridges. These points were defended by works so strong and strongly held as to preclude all possibility of carrying them. A little above the United States Ford the Rappahannock receives the Rapidan, an affluent almost equal to itself. Here was the extremity of the Confederate lines, although small detachments were posted up the Rapidan for some miles. If the Rappahannock should be crossed above the position, the Rapidan was still to be passed. Lee never imagined that his opponent would attempt to turn his flank by marching such a distance, over roads almost impassable, into a region where his army must subsist upon what it could carry with it, crossing, also, two rivers which a single shower would so swell as to cut him off from his ammunition and provision trains. Yet this was the bold operation which Hooker resolved to undertake.

The army of Hooker was divided into seven corps. Many changes had been made in the principal commands. The Ninth Corps, which Burnside had brought back from North Carolina, and which had fought under him at South Mountain and Antietam, was detached from the Army of the Potomac, and, under the immediate command of W. F. Smith,[4] sent with its old leader to the West. Its place was supplied by the Twelfth, under Slocum, which had been posted at Harper's Ferry. The Eleventh, under Sigel, which had guarded the approaches to Washington, was brought down to the main army. Sigel had applied for leave of absence, and, at the urgent request of Hooker, the command of this corps was given to Howard. Butterfield was made chief of staff, and the Fifth Corps was assigned to Meade. Stoneman was placed at the head of the cavalry, and the Third Corps was given to Sickles. Sedgwick replaced Smith in the command of the Sixth Corps. Reynolds retained the First Corps, and Couch the Second. The army which Hooker had in hand numbered in effective men, "present for duty," 120,000 infantry and artillery, besides 13,000 cavalry.[5] The cavalry, excepting a single brigade of perhaps 1000, under Pleasanton, as we shall have to show, were sent away on an expedition in which they accomplished nothing, and so must be placed out of the account in estimating the effective force with which the opposing generals encountered each other in that series of actions which we call the battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederate force was far inferior.[6] Three months before it had numbered 80,000; but, confident in the strength of his position, and somewhat embarrassed by the scarcity of forage, Lee had sent Longstreet with half of his corps southward toward North Carolina, where offensive operations were threatened. There remained on the Rappahannock the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, and Jackson's entire corps, consisting of the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Trimble (formerly that of Jackson), and Early. But D. H. Hill had been put in command of the Department of North Carolina, and his division was now under Rodes; Trimble was at home on sick-leave, and his division was commanded by Colston. Besides these, there was Stuart's cavalry, reduced to two brigades, and a strong reserve artillery. The entire effective strength of all arms was something more than 60,000 men. Anderson's and McLaws's divisions guarded the line from the United States Ford downward beyond Fredericksburg, a distance of ten miles; Early held the intrenchments at the foot of the hills opposite Franklin's Crossing; the remainder of Jackson's corps lay near Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg. Both armies had built for themselves comfortable winter huts in the wooded region on either side of the Rappahannock, which formed for the time a barrier which neither could overpass.

Hooker, having matured his plan of campaign, wished to commence its execution as early as possible. The term of enlistment of 40,000 men, a third of his army, would soon expire, and he knew that there was little use of putting troops into action just before the close of their time of service. Before the middle of April, though the roads were still too heavy for artillery and wagon trains, he thought that mounted men might move. On the 12th he ordered Stoneman to take the whole cavalry force, with the exception of a single brigade, 12,000 sabres strong, turn the hostile position on the left, throw himself between the enemy and Richmond, isolate him from his supplies, and check his retreat. Every where and all told, Stoneman could not encounter a force half equal to his own. In sharp phrases, which rang like battle orders, Hooker gave his directions to Stoneman: "Harass the enemy day and night, on the march and in the camp unceasingly. If you can not cut off from his column large slices, do not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be Fight! and let all your orders be Fight! Keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him. Take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army; bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war." The primary object of this cavalry expedition, to which every thing was to be subservient, was to cut the enemy's communication with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route.[1] The movement was premature. The cavalry rode two days up the Rappahannock, and threw a division across, but a sudden storm swelled the capricious stream, and this division, in order to avoid being isolated, was forced to recross by swimming. The storm continued, the river became wholly impassable, and the cavalry were ordered to remain where they were.

A fortnight of genial spring weather now intervened. It seemed that the rainy season was over, the swollen river was confined within its banks, the roads grew firmer. Hooker in the mean while had matured his grand enterprise. "I concluded," he says, "to change my plan, and strike for the whole rebel army instead of forcing it back upon its line of retreat, which was as much as I could hope to accomplish in executing my first design." This plan was the one which has been already indicated. It was to ascend the Rappahannock beyond the hostile lines, throw a strong force across, which should sweep down the opposite bank, "knock away the enemy's force holding the United States and Banks's Fords by attacking them in their rear, and, as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce the marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left were to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his dépôt of supplies, to prevent his dispatching an overwhelming force to his left."[2] How near this plan came of success, and how utterly it failed, is now to be shown.

On the 26th of April Hooker issued the orders which gave the first inti-

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[1] Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 52. [2] *Ibid.*, 53.

[3] More properly, the United States Mine Ford; sometimes called the Bark Mill Ford.

[4] As it happened, however, Smith did not accompany the corps to the West. He remained at the East, and the command of the corps was given to Parke.

[5] There is no absolutely official report, to which I have been able to gain access, showing the exact strength of Hooker's army, but scattered through the testimony given in the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War are data which enable me to fix it without possibility of any material error. Hooker (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 120) gives the strength "for duty" of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps at 44,661—say 45,000. The Eleventh was the weakest in the army, numbering (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 121) 11,000. There remain 34,000 for the Fifth and Twelfth. These were apparently of about equal strength, 17,000 each. The Sixth was the strongest corps; Sedgwick, its commander (*Ibid.*, 95), places it at 22,000; Hooker (*Ibid.*, 128) says it numbered 26,233; but he adds, "not the whole of which, by a few thousands, it is reasonable to suppose, appeared in line of battle." This difference between 22,000 and 26,000 is about the normal discrepancy between those borne upon the muster-rolls as "present" and those actually at any moment "present for duty." Sedgwick, who had for a time the First and the Third, as well as his own corps, the Sixth, gives (*Ibid.*, 95) the numbers of the two former at 35,000. Sickles (*Ibid.*, 7) says that the strength of his corps, the Third, was 18,000, which would leave 17,000 for the First, that of Reynolds. There then remains only the Second Corps, that of Couch; of the strength of this I find no special mention. I assume it to have been 17,000, that being the average number of each of the other corps.

[6] Confederate writers usually place the numbers of Lee's army at 45,000. But the official returns (see *ante*, p. 381) show that on the 31st of March there were present in the Army of Northern Virginia 73,379 men, of whom 60,298 were present for duty. The force was certainly not diminished during the next month, for Longstreet was detached a month before. Lee says (*Rep.*, 5), "General Longstreet, with two corps, was detached for service south of the James River in February." I am inclined to suspect a clerical error here, and that for "two divisions" we should read "three;" for Longstreet's Corps consisted of five divisions, those of Anderson, McLaws, Hood, Ransom, and Pickett. Only the first two are in any way mentioned in the Reports of the Battle of Chancellorsville, and in the list of regiments I find none belonging to the last three divisions. Moreover, Dabney says (*Stonewall Jackson*, 664): "The three divisions of Hood, Pickett, and Ransom were absent in Southeastern Virginia, making a demonstration against Suffolk, whither they had been directed by the scarcity of forage and food in Spottsylvania." Dabney, who seems to have had access to authentic reports as to Jackson's force, says: "His four divisions now contained about 28,000 muskets, and an aggregate of more than 30,000 men and officers. They were supported by 28 field batteries, containing 115 guns; besides these batteries, the army was still accompanied by a reserve corps of artillery. Stuart's division of cavalry was also acting upon the left." Adding the artillery and cavalry to the 28,000 muskets and more than 2000 officers, will bring the strength of Jackson up to fully 35,000. This writer, indeed, adds: "Lee had, in all, an aggregate of about 45,000 men." But, even apart from the actual returns which have been cited, this is clearly an under estimate, for Longstreet's Corps was always much stronger than that of Jackson, and the divisions of Anderson and McLaws were much the largest in that corps, and had suffered less in the previous actions than the others. They probably numbered, including artillery and cavalry acting with them, fully 25,000 men; so that the most reliable indirect evidence attainable corroborates the accuracy of the official returns, which give Lee a little more than 60,000 men.

The foregoing was written before the appearance of Hotchkiss and Allan's work, previously noted. They give the force of each division as follows: Jackson's Corps—A. P. Hill, 11,100; D. H. Hill, 9000; Trimble, 6000; Early, 7400; in all, 33,500. Anderson and McLaws, 17,000; Artillery, 170 pieces, 5000 men; Cavalry, present, 2700—a total of 58,200. But it is expressly stated that these are the numbers of "muskets," that is, privates and non-commissioned officers. They add (page 24): "We have not the exact data on which to give the effective strength, but an addition of 4000 to the total above would be a liberal estimate." This addition to the "effective" must mean the officers, who are included in the Union returns. This statement differs only slightly from my estimate as to the total force, but makes that of Jackson larger, and those of Anderson and McLaws smaller. Anderson's division contained three more regiments than that of McLaws, and was probably the stronger by 1000. I adopt their statement, distributing the 3800 "additional," as nearly as may be, among the different organizations.

From these data is framed the following table:

FORCES AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

UNION.		CONFEDERATE.		
REYNOLDS (1st Corps). *Divisions:*		JACKSON'S CORPS.	A. P. Hill	11,800
Doubleday, Robinson, Wadsworth	17,000		Rodes	9,600
COUCH (2d Corps). *Divisions:*			Colston	6,400
French, Gibbon, Hancock	17,000		Early	7,800
SICKLES (3d Corps). *Divisions:*		LONGSTREET'S CORPS.	Anderson	9,500
Berry, Birney, Whipple	18,000		McLaws	8,500
MEADE (5th Corps). *Divisions:*			Artillery	5,400
Griffin, Humphrey, Sykes	17,000		Cavalry	3,000
SEDGWICK (6th Corps). *Divisions:*			*Total Force*	62,000
Brooks, Howe, Newton	22,000			
HOWARD (11th Corps). *Divisions:*				
Devens, Schurz, Steinwehr	11,000			
SLOCUM (12th Corps). *Divisions:*				
Geary, Williams	17,000			
PLEASONTON (Cavalry)	1,000			
Total Force	120,000			

[1] Hooker's Instructions, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 113 [2] Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 116.



PICKET GUARD.

mation of his plan. The corps of Meade, Slocum, and Howard were to form the main turning column. They were to march at sunrise next day, ascend the Rappahannock to Kelly's Ford, twenty-seven miles above Fredericksburg, cross the river, and move for the Rapidan, cross, and sweep down its southern bank. They were to move as lightly as possible, the men to carry eight days' rations on their persons; each corps to have but a single battery and six ambulances, the small ammunition to be carried on mule-back. Most of the artillery, and several regiments whose term was about to close, being left behind, this column marched 36,000 strong. Couch, with two of his divisions—that of Gibbon being left opposite Fredericksburg—was to follow after as far as the United States Ford, there halt in readiness to cross the moment that the hostile force guarding it should be swept away. Sedgwick, with his own corps and those of Sickles and Reynolds, were to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and make a vigorous demonstration to distract the attention of the enemy.

The main turning column pressed rapidly up the Rappahannock, and before night of Tuesday, the 28th, reached Kelly's Ford. The stream was unfordable, but a pontoon bridge was quickly thrown over, and early on the morning of the 29th the crossing was effected. The force, separated into two columns, pressed rapidly on to the Rapidan. Slocum and Howard crossed at Germania Ford; Meade at Ely's Ford, ten miles below. The Rapidan was hardly fordable, the water reaching to the armpits of the men; but they waded through, bearing their knapsacks on their bayonets. So wholly unanticipated was this advance, that a small party of the Confederates were surprised at Germania Ford in the act of building a bridge; these were all captured. Meade swept eastward down the right bank of the Rapidan, directly toward Fredericksburg, until he came in view of the United States Ford over the Rappahannock. Two Confederate brigades which had been guarding this point fell back. As soon as Couch caught sight through the mist of the head of Meade's column, pontoon bridges were laid, his divisions passed over, and all the four corps headed straight for Chancellorsville, their appointed place of rendezvous, where they were concentrated late in the afternoon of the 30th.

Chancellorsville was a solitary brick house, with a few insignificant outbuildings, standing in a clearing on the eastern verge of a wild, wooded region known as the Wilderness. Looking eastward toward Fredericksburg,



CAVALRY CROSSING AT ELY'S FORD.



CROSSING AT UNITED STATES FORD.

eleven miles distant, are two roads; to the right the Orange plank road, to the left the turnpike. These diverge for a space, and then, converging, unite half way between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. Both are excellent roads; the one planked, the other macadamized. Westward from Chancellorsville they run together for a couple of miles, and then separate, the turnpike running to Culpepper, the plank road to Orange Court-house. This road is the essential feature of the military position. From the north comes in another road, which after a mile divides, sending branches to the different fords of the Rapidan and the Rappahannock. The cleared fields around Chancellorsville have a circuit of a mile; the belt of woods surrounding them eastward toward Fredericksburg, and southward toward Spottsylvania, is a mile or two in breadth. Beyond this, in both directions, lies an open cultivated country.

The Wilderness, henceforth to be historic, stretches westward from Chancellorsville. The region for a space of a dozen miles is seamed with veins of iron ore. These have been wrought for five generations. Here indeed were erected the first regular iron furnaces in North America. The forests had been cut down to furnish fuel for these furnaces. The soil being generally too poor to repay culture, the region was left to Nature, which soon covered it with a dense mass of dwarf pines, scrubby oaks, chinquapins, and the like. Every stump left by the woodman's axe sent up a cluster of sprouts in place of the parent trunk. Whortleberries and brambles of every kind, availing themselves of the temporary flood of sunshine, twined and matted themselves into thickets through which the solitary huntsman could make his way only by dragging his rifle after him. The surface was an elevated plateau, swelling every where into low hills and ridges, with swampy intervales between, along which sluggish brooks made their way toward the Rapidan on the north and the Mattapony on the south. Here and there is a little farm-house, or tavern, or church, with a small clearing around it, surrounded by the forests, like an island in the midst of waters. Four miles west of Chancellorsville, the Brock Road, leaving the turnpike, runs southeastward. Besides these, other roads, mostly mere wood-paths, penetrate the thickets. In this Wilderness, and upon its eastern and western verge, Lee, with the Confederate army of Northern Virginia, was within a year and a day thrice to encounter and foil the Union Army of the Potomac under the successive commands of Hooker, Meade, and Grant.

Hooker's turning movement, apparently the critical point of his whole plan, had been successfully performed. His wary opponent was taken by surprise. He knew nothing of it until it was practically accomplished. On the 28th, Sedgwick, with his own corps and those of Sickles and Reynolds, moved down the river, screened from the view of the enemy by the intervening heights. All that rainy night they lay upon their arms, with no camp-fires to betray their position. Before dawn, while the flanking column was crossing the river thirty miles above, the pontoons were borne silently to the river bank and swung across. When day broke, Jackson saw a great force of the enemy across the stream, holding the very ground from which they had dashed upon his lines four months and a half before. He sent the news to the commanding general. "I heard firing," said Lee to the messenger, "and was beginning to think it was time that some of you lazy young fellows were coming to tell me what it was all about. Say to General Jackson that he knows just as well what to do with the enemy as I do."[1] Noon came before Lee received tidings that Hooker had crossed the Rappahannock and was then pressing toward the Rapidan, the columns converging upon Chancellorsville. He sent a message to Anderson, who held the lines, sharply censuring him for his negligence.[2] During the night of the 29th Anderson's brigade retired from the ford to Chancellorsville, but, learning of the great force that was advancing against them, fell back the next morning six miles farther toward Fredericksburg, where they intrenched themselves. Saving some skirmishing between Pleasonton's cavalry and the retiring Confederates,[3] so slight that no Federal commander reports it, Hooker's columns reached Chancellorsville without opposition. To all human seeming, Hooker was justified in the congratulatory orders which he issued that evening. "It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his intrenchments and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."[4] To those around him he spoke in the same strain. "The rebel army," he said, "is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond, and I shall be after them."[5] Sedgwick was ordered, should the enemy in his front show any symptoms of falling back, to pursue him with the utmost vigor along the road leading to Richmond; "pursue until you destroy or capture."[6] It was a foregone conclusion with Hooker that Lee must retreat the moment his flank was fairly turned. He hoped to force him to fall back toward Gordonsville rather than by the direct route to Richmond, for which place he would then strike, having fifty miles less to march. In anticipation of these results, he had a

[1] *Dabney*, 661.

[2] "During the forenoon of the 29th Stuart reported that the enemy had crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the preceding evening. Later in the day he announced that a heavy column was moving from Kelly's toward Germania Ford on the Rapidan, and another toward Ely's Ford on that river. The routes that they were pursuing, after crossing the Rapidan, converge near Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear of our position at Fredericksburg." (*Lee's Rep.*, 6.)—"I captured a courier from General Lee, with a dispatch in Lee's own handwriting. It was dated at 12 o'clock that day, and I captured it at one o'clock, only one hour from Lee's hand. It was addressed to General Anderson, and read: 'I have just received reliable intelligence that the enemy have crossed the river in force. Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my head-quarters at once.' "—Pleasonton, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 27.

[3] "The enemy's cavalry skirmished with Anderson's rear-guard as he left Chancellorsville, but, being vigorously repulsed by Mahone's brigade, offered no farther opposition to his march."—*Lee's Rep.*, 6.

[4] Hooker's General Order, No. 47, April 30. [5] *Swinton*, 275. [6] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 103.



THE ADVANCE OF SEDGWICK'S CORPS CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

6 H

million and a half of rations placed on board lighters, with gun-boats ready to tow them down the Potomac and up the Pamunkey, so that his advance would not be impeded by want of supplies.[1]

Hooker had done much, but he left undone the one thing which was needed to place his complete success beyond all reasonable doubt. On that Thursday night he halted his force in the Wilderness around Chancellorsville, where it was cooped up as effectually as though it had been on an island, instead of pushing forward another hour's march, which would have brought it into open country beyond. To oppose this march Lee had then at hand only the single division of Anderson. McLaws and Early were yet on the heights at Fredericksburg, the nearest troops fully ten miles away. The bulk of Jackson's corps were twice as far off. It was not until the night of the 30th was far spent that Lee was fully assured that the operations upon his front were a feint, and that the main danger was to come from his flank and rear. He was not minded to retreat without a struggle. The Union army was divided; if one half could be defeated, the whole would be neutralized, and if worst came to worst, he could retreat after a battle as well as before. Leaving Early's division and Barksdale's brigade —less than 10,000 men in all—to hold the line near Fredericksburg, Lee began at midnight of the 30th to concentrate the remainder of his force in front of Hooker. McLaws was hurried up from the extreme left, and Jackson, with the divisions of A. P. Hill, Rodes, and Colston, from the right. By eight o'clock on Friday morning, the first of May, the head of Jackson's column began to come up to Anderson, and three hours later all had arrived and formed line of battle at the very place upon which Hooker was now directing his advance.[2]

For now, as the morning was wearing away, Hooker began to prepare to move out of the skirts of the Wilderness into the open space beyond. He had ordered Sickles's corps to join him, and it had come up, raising his force to more than 60,000, a number greater by a quarter than Lee could bring against him after providing for the maintenance of the lines at Fredericksburg. There were three roads centring at Chancellorsville and running eastward. Upon each of these a column was to be pushed out. Meade's corps was to lead: the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys on the left, by the river road; Sykes, to be supported by Hancock, of Couch's corps, in the centre, along the turnpike; Slocum's corps on the right, by the plank road, while French's division of Meade's corps was to strike still farther south. Two o'clock in the afternoon was assigned for the completion of these movements. After that time the headquarters were to be at Tabernacle Church, close by the junction of the plank road and the turnpike, half way toward Fredericksburg.[3]

Hooker was destined never, during the war, to see the spot which he had assigned for his headquarters. The left column moved five miles down the river road, and came in sight of Banks's Ford without meeting an enemy. The right column marched unopposed half as far, when it was arrested by tidings from the central column. This column, Sykes leading, Hancock behind, had pressed down the plank road, and soon came upon the enemy's advance. Sykes drove them back for a space, and at noon gained the point assigned to him. After some sharp fighting he was forced back for a little, and took up a position which he desired to hold. But orders came that he, with all others, should fall back to the positions from which they had set out. Warren, who bore the order, had vainly urged that it should not be sent; Couch protested against it; Hancock thought they should advance instead of retreating.[4]

Thus, in opposition to the opinions of every general who had felt the enemy, Hooker withdrew his advancing columns, and instead of keeping up the offensive which he had assumed, threw himself upon the defensive. With

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[1] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 145.

[2] "The enemy in our front, near Fredericksburg, continued inactive, and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. It was therefore determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of the army to give battle to the approaching column. Early's division of Jackson's corps, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's division, with part of the reserve artillery under General Pendleton, were intrusted with the defense of our position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight on the 30th General McLaws marched with the rest of his command toward Fredericksburg. General Jackson followed at dawn next morning with the remaining divisions of his corps. He reached the position occupied by General Anderson at eight A.M., and immediately began preparations to advance."—*Lee's Rep.*, 7.

[3] Hooker's Order, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 124.

[4] "On gaining the ridge about one and a quarter mile from Chancellorsville, we found the enemy advancing and driving back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia infantry, which formed the enemy's advance. General Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss till he had gained the position assigned to him. This he attained at about 12 o'clock. No sound yet reached us indicating that any other of our columns had encountered the advance of the enemy. General Sykes bravely resolved to hold the position assigned him, which his command had so gallantly won from the enemy, and I set out with all possible speed to report the condition to the commanding general. From information received since the advance began, the general decided to countermand it, and receive the enemy on the line occupied the night before."—Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 56.

"I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. I thought with our position and numbers to beat the enemy's right wing. This could be done by advancing in force upon the two main roads toward Fredericksburg, each being in good supporting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on the enemy's right flank by the river road." (Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 56.)—"The ground upon which I had posted Hancock in support of Sykes was about one and a half mile from Chancellorsville, and commanded it. Upon receiving orders from General Hooker to come in, I sent to him urging that on account of the great advantages of the position it should be held at all hazards. The reply was to return at once. General Warren also went in person and urged the necessity of holding on." (Couch, *Report of Chancellorsville.*)—"I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advanced positions, and still kept pushing on and attempt to make a junction with General Sedgwick."—Hancock, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 66.

"At 11 o'clock the troops moved forward upon the plank and turnpike roads—Anderson, with the brigades of Wright and Posey, leading on the former; McLaws, with his three brigades, preceded by Mahone's, on the latter. Wilcox and Perry, of Anderson's division, co-operated with McLaws; Jackson's troops followed Anderson on the plank road. The enemy was soon encountered on both roads, and heavy skirmishing with infantry and artillery ensued, our troops pressing steadily forward. A strong attack upon McLaws was repulsed with spirit by Semmes's brigade; and Wright, by direction of Anderson, diverging to the left of the plank road, marched by way of the unfinished railroad from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville, and turned the enemy's right. His whole line thereupon retreated rapidly, vigorously pursued by our troops until they arrived within about one mile of Chancellorsville."—*Lee's Rep.*, 6.



LAYING THE PONTOONS FOR SEDGWICK'S CORPS.

a force largely superior, instead of attacking, he prepared to receive the attack of the enemy. His reasons, as stated by himself, were based wholly upon the character of the region. "The ground in our vicinity," he says, "was broken, and covered with dense forests, much of which was impenetrable to infantry. The ravines to the north of the road were deep, and their general direction was at right angles to the Rappahannock, affording the enemy a formidable position behind each of them. Here was the enemy's entire army, with the exception of about 8000 men which had been left to hold the line from below Hamilton's crossing to the heights above Fredericksburg, a distance of between five and six miles. The right and central corps had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be advancing in line of battle. Nearly all of the Twelfth Corps had emerged from the forest at that moment, but as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of General Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail. Accordingly instructions were given for the troops in to hold themselves in readiness to receive the enemy."[1] But Warren, who had scanned the ground with the eye of an engineer, thought the physical conditions favorable to the Union force. "If," he says, "the attack found the enemy in extended lines across our front, or in motion toward our right flank, it would have secured the defeat of his right wing, and consequently the retreat of the whole. The advantages of the initiative in a wooded country like this, obscuring all movements, are incalculable, and so far we had improved them."[2]

The defensive position which Hooker now assumed formed a line of nearly five miles from east to west, running mainly parallel and a little south of the united plank road and turnpike. The left, a short distance east of Chancellorsville, was bent back a little northward; the right presented a similar

[1] Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 125.

[2] Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 56.—Hancock indeed states that Hooker too late countermanded the order for withdrawal: "General Warren, who brought the order, suggested to General Couch that he should not fall back, although the order was to that effect. But General Couch did not feel at liberty to follow that suggestion, having received peremptory orders to fall back. It appears, however, that General Warren rode off to General Hooker and explained to him the extreme



MAP OF THE REGION NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE.[1]

curve. The general shape was nearly that of the letter C, the main front facing southward, the upper and lower curves looking west and east. The corps and divisions were somewhat broken up. The general placing in front was, Meade on the extreme left, toward Fredericksburg; Slocum in the centre; Howard on the right. The corps of Couch and Sickles were mainly in reserve, though a division of each was thrust forward into the front line, which was strengthened by abatis and breast-works. The right was weakly posted, but it was, in military phrase, flung out into the air; but as the enemy were wholly on the left, hardly reaching to the centre, it was thought that an attack was not to be looked for in that direction, and Howard gave assurance that he could hold his position against any force that could be brought against it.[2]

At nightfall Lee and Jackson, who had been engaged on different parts of the field, met upon the brow of a little hill covered by a clump of pines which had escaped the woodman's axe, whose annual shedding of leaves formed a soft carpet upon the ground. They retired apart to consult upon the situation. This was critical. They must either win a battle or retreat. Hooker having assumed the defensive, they must attack. The Confederate skirmishers which had been pushed into the belt of wood had succeeded in ascertaining that the Union lines were unassailable in front of Chancellorsville.[3] But Stuart, whose cavalry had been reconnoitring westward and northward, reported that in these directions the Federal camps were open, and that almost all of his cavalry force was absent. Jackson proposed that while a part of the Confederate force should demonstrate upon Hooker's front, the remainder should march clear around his line, and assail it upon its right flank and rear. The measure was hazardous in the extreme. The Federals, now in position, outnumbered the whole Confederate force, and this was to be divided. But it was certain that Hooker must soon learn how small was the force remaining near Fredericksburg, and would then bring up Sedgwick from the Rappahannock, increasing the disparity nearly two to one. And even if the flank attack should miscarry, the Confederate army, then separated into three portions, would still have lines of retreat as favorable as they now had. Jackson's three divisions would have the plank road westward, or the road southward through the open country; McLaws and Anderson had the latter route; Early could fall back toward the others, and the three bodies could reunite and make a stand upon new ground, or, if need were, press on to Richmond; so that, barring the risk, which must be run, of a total defeat, their position would be no worse than it now was.[1]

This plan was settled, and the two Confederate commanders lay down to rest without shelter upon the bare ground. Jackson had neither blanket nor overcoat. He declined an overcoat offered him by one of his staff. Thinking him asleep, the officer took off the cape, spread it over Jackson, and fell into slumber. Jackson rose and spread the cape over its owner, and laid down again uncovered. Before dawn he was seen sitting crouched over a scanty fire, almost hugging it, and shivering with cold, yet busy studying a rough map of the region, inquiring of his chaplain, who knew something of the country, if there were no roads by which the Federal flank might be turned. The chaplain only knew that a little beyond was a blind forest-path, which, by various windings and turnings, struck the plank road four miles west of Chancellorsville. The line was traced on the map. "That is too near," said Jackson; "it goes within the lines of the enemy's pickets. I wish to get well to his rear without being observed." An inhabitant of the region was now brought up, who said that the furnace road, upon which they were, ran southward for a few miles, and then was intersected by the Brock road from the northwest, which struck the plank road, so that by making a circuit of fifteen miles a point would be reached several miles above Hooker's extremest outposts. This was just what Jackson desired, and at sunrise he began the march with his three divisions.[2]

SATURDAY, MAY 2.

A mile of dense forest intervened between the road and Hooker's front, completely hiding the march from observation. But at one point the road crossed a bare hill just opposite Sickles's position. For two hours the long column, with its trains and ambulances, filed over the hill in plain view.[3] It was clearly a movement in force, but with what purpose was a matter of doubt. It might be for offense upon the right, and so Hooker directed Howard to be fully prepared, to keep heavy reserves in hand to meet it, and especially to throw out pickets in his front.[4] How utterly and criminally this order was disregarded remains to be shown. But the road on which the column was observed ran here due south, straight away from the Union lines; this indicated that the movement was a retreat. Sickles sent

[1] This map shows, in a general way, the topography of the region in which Hooker proposed to operate. Though not perfectly accurate, it is the best then accessible. Of the actual character of the Wilderness he was almost wholly ignorant, and had no means of becoming acquainted with it. The essential features of the map are the relative positions of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the fords by which the Rappahannock and Rapidan were to be passed, and the roads leading away from Fredericksburg by which it was supposed that the Confederate army must retreat. The roads are: (1.) The railroad to Richmond, and the Telegraph Road, running southwardly nearly parallel with it; (2.) The plank road and turnpike. These are represented on the map as one road from Fredericksburg to the point marked as the "Wilderness," where they diverge. The road from "Todd's Tavern" to the "Wilderness" shows nearly the line of Jackson's flank movement. With these exceptions, the roads laid down are mere rude country roads, hardly passable for an army with artillery and trains. In moving from near Falmouth, Meade, Slocum, and Howard crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, north of Germania Ford, on the Rapidan; Couch, and subsequently Sickles and Reynolds, at United States Ford. Lee's chief dépôt was at Guinea's Station, on the railroad, near which Jackson's corps had its winter quarters; but they had been moved half way up to Fredericksburg, near which place McLaws and Anderson were posted. The distance between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville is 11 miles, which will indicate the scale upon which the map is drawn.

[2] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 56.

[3] "The enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breast-works of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached in front, and commanded the adjacent woods. Darkness was approaching before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained; and as the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles with the plank road, extending on the right to the mine road, and to the left in the direction of Catharine Furnace."—*Lee's Rep.*, 8.

[1] *Dabney*, 672. [2] *Ibid.*, 675. [3] Birney, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 34.
[4] Hooker's Order, 9.30 A.M., in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 126.



SEDGWICK'S BRIDGES LAID.

a rifled battery to a point where it could play upon this column, but the distance, a mile and a half, was too great to permit the fire to produce any serious effect. Birney's division, afterward followed by others, and Pleasonton's cavalry, were sent forward through the woods to reconnoitre. Birney passed down the blind road which Jackson had refused to take, fell upon a regiment of McLaws's division which had been placed there as a guard, and captured it. This movement of Birney's so seriously threatened Jackson's trains in the rear that two brigades were hastened back to protect them. As it happened, however, Birney did not follow after Jackson's column, and these two brigades, after seeing the trains well away, followed after, but were unable to get up in time to take part in the action of this day.[1]

Long before midday, Jackson's column—infantry and artillery, with Stuart's cavalry patroling the region between him and the enemy, in all 30,000 strong—were clear out of sight of friend and foe. The troops felt that they were upon one of those great flank marches which had more than once led them to victory, and they pressed forward with more than their wonted speed, every step for hours increasing the distance between them and Lee. Their march had been southwestwardly until they reached the Brock road; then it turned at a sharp angle to the northwest. At three o'clock they struck the plank road at the old Wilderness tavern. By this march of fifteen miles Jackson had passed clear around Hooker's position, and was in a straight line hardly six miles from the point from which he had started ten hours before. Here, like an oasis in the forest desert, was a broad clearing, which gave him ample space in which to form his corps in battle array. Barely two miles away, down the road, lay Howard's corps, forming Hooker's right. The Confederate pickets, creeping through the thickets, reported its position. Jackson from the summit of a little hill surveyed it, and made his dispositions for an assault.

His column was formed into three lines—Rodes in front, then Colston, and, last, A. P. Hill, stretching across the plank road for some distance on each side, completely overlapping the head of the Federal line, thus commanding it on front, flank, and rear.

Lee, with parts of the divisions of Anderson and McLaws,[2] not 20,000 men in all, had reserved to himself the less brilliant but not less critical task of keeping in check a force three times as strong. For a whole day the two corps would be isolated, neither being able to aid or even communicate with the other. If Hooker changed the position of his right, Jackson's meditated blow would miss its mark. If, divining the character of the movement, he should assail Anderson and McLaws either in front from Chancellorsville, or on the flank and rear by bringing Sedgwick up from Fredericksburg, their destruction was inevitable. Between Sedgwick's 30,000[3] and him lay only Early's 10,000, guarding a line of six miles. Lee confined himself during the morning to demonstrations all along Hooker's front. Early in the morning he got a few guns into a position which commanded the field in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove all the wagons back into position. Then, at intervals, his infantry crept into the woods, delivered a yell and a volley, and disappeared, to reappear at a different point.[4] Sickles's advance was so threatening that Lee was obliged to resist it in force.[5] Sickles, with Birney's division, maintained his ground successfully, and sent back for re-enforcements; his other divisions were promised him, together with a brigade from Slocum, and one from Howard. Sickles was just about to open his attack with all this force, fully equal to the whole of Anderson's and McLaws's, when some officer came dashing up, breathless, with a report that Stuart's cavalry were moving in his rear, and might cut him off; that Jackson's infantry were very near; that the Union troops were retreating. Sickles disbelieved this story. Surely such a thing could not have happened without a serious engagement, and had there been a battle he would have heard the noise. But almost instantly an aid came up with tidings from Howard. The right flank had been turned; Howard's corps had given way, and Jackson was right on Sickles's rear. Hooker also sent word that he could not give the promised re-enforcements; he had to use them to check the enemy, who had broken through the Eleventh Corps. Sickles must withdraw his whole force, and save as many of them as he could.[6]

Jackson had struck his blow. A little after five o'clock he had formed his lines, and began to press through the dense thickets which skirted the plank road, down which, only three miles away, lay a part of Howard's corps, forming the extreme right of Hooker's army. No assault here had been dreamed of. Intrenchments had been thrown up, but they were left unguarded. The men had stacked their arms, and were scattered about cooking their suppers; ambulances, ammunition-wagons, pack-mules, and cattle were huddled together.[7] Not a picket was thrown out into the woods in front, nor even up the road, where for more than two hours Jackson had been deploying his divisions, hardly three miles away. The Union right was like a militia regiment at the close of a holiday muster rather than an army in presence of an enemy.[8]

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[1] Thomas and Archer, in *Lee's Rep.*, 54–58.

[2] These divisions consisted of nine brigades; but Barksdale's, of McLaws's, had been left at Marye's Heights, and Wilcox's, of Anderson's, had been sent back to Banks's Ford.

[3] Reynolds's corps was withdrawn from Sedgwick that morning, and ordered to Chancellorsville, where it arrived during the night. Sedgwick had then his own corps and Gibbon's division of Couch's.

[4] Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 45; Pleasonton, *Ibid.*, 27; Hooker, *Ibid.*, 127.

[5] "At midday the enemy appeared in some force at the furnace. Posey's brigade was sent to dislodge him, and was soon engaged in a warm skirmish with him. The increasing numbers of the enemy made it necessary to move Wright's brigade over to the support of Posey's."—Anderson, in *Lee's Rep.*, 25.

[6] Sickles, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 6.

[7] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 45, 127.

[8] Devens, whose division occupied the extreme right, testifies (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 173): "About two or three o'clock in the afternoon, two soldiers, who had been sent out to observe the enemy's lines as spies from one of the other commands, came in and reported that the enemy were massing heavily on our right," and that he sent them to Howard with the tidings. But [illegible] pickets

With a yell and a volley the Confederates dashed out of the woods into the open space occupied by this unsuspecting division. The regiments upon whom the onset first fell scattered without firing a shot, and rushed in wild confusion upon those behind them; these in turn gave way before the wild rush of their own comrades. Some of the regiments made a stand to stem the torrent; but it was vain, and the whole corps was soon streaming down the road, and through the woods toward Chancellorsville. Rodes, who commanded the front line of the Confederates, thus describes the conflict: "At once the line of battle rushed forward with a yell, and Doles at the moment debouched from the woods, and encountered a force of the enemy and a battery of two guns intrenched. Detaching two regiments to flank the position, he charged without halting, sweeping every thing before him; and pressing on to Talley's, gallantly carried the works there, and captured five guns by a similar flank movement of his command. So complete was the success of the whole manœuvre, and such was the surprise of the enemy, that scarcely any organized resistance was met with after the first volley was fired. They fled in the wildest confusion, leaving the field strewn with arms, accoutrements, clothing, caissons, and field-pieces in every direction. The larger portion of his force, as well as intrenchments, were drawn up at right angles to our line; and being thus taken in the flank and rear, they did not wait for the attack. On the next side, which had an extended line of works facing in our direction, an effort was made to check the flying columns. For a few moments they held this position; but once more my gallant troops dashed at them with a wild shout, and, firing a hasty volley, they continued their hasty flight to Chancellorsville. It was at this moment that Trimble's division, which had followed closely in my rear, headed by Colston, went over the works with my men, and from this time the two divisions were mingled in inextricable confusion. Pushing forward as rapidly as possible, the troops soon entered a second piece of woods, thickly filled with undergrowth. The right, becoming entangled in an abatis near the enemy's first line of fortifications, caused the line to halt, and such was the confusion and darkness that it was not deemed advisable to make a farther advance. I at once sent word to Lieutenant General Jackson, urging him to push forward the fresh troops of the reserve line, in order that mine might be reformed. Riding forward on the plank road, I satisfied myself that the enemy had no line of battle between our troops and the heights of Chancellorsville, and on my return informed the chief of artillery of the fact, and he opened his batteries on that point. The enemy instantly responded by a most terrific fire, which silenced our guns, but did little execution on the infantry. When the fire ceased General Hill's troops were brought up, and, as soon as a portion were deployed in my front, I commenced withdrawing my troops by order of the lieutenant general."[1]

Rodes was right. Between him and Chancellorsville, hardly half a mile away, there was no line of battle, and nothing from which to form one. Jackson was almost justified in declaring that with half an hour more of daylight he could have carried that place.[2] The check to the Confederate rush came from an unexpected quarter. When the tidings came to Sickles of the flight of Howard, Pleasonton, with two regiments of cavalry, was riding leisurely back to the rear, for in the dense forest there was nothing for cavalry to do. He found the open space which he had left a few hours before filled with fugitives, ambulances, and guns. He had with him a battery of horse artillery. The moment was critical. The enemy must be checked then and there, and to do it there was but this battery and those few horsemen. Turning to Major Keenan, he said, "You must charge into those woods with your regiment, and hold the rebels in check until I can get some of these guns into position; you must do it at any cost." "I will do it," responded Keenan, with a smile, though both knew that the order was equivalent to a death-warrant. The charge was made; a quarter of the regiment fell, their leader at their head. But ten priceless minutes were gained. Pleasonton brought up his battery at a gallop, double-shotted the guns with canister, and pointed them at the ground line of the parapet, telling the gunners to aim low. Then getting a score of guns into position out of the confused mass around, he had all double-shotted, pointed at the woods in front, and bade the gunners to await his order to fire. Hardly was this done when the whole forest, whose verge was a quarter of a mile distant, seemed alive with men. Just as he was about to give the order to fire, a Federal flag appeared on the front. He sent an aid to learn whether these men were friends or foes. "Come on," they shouted; "we are friends!" The order to fire was suspended for a moment. During that moment the woods blazed with musketry, and the enemy, leaping over the parapet, dashed straight up toward the guns. Then came the order to fire, and the low-pointed guns swept the whole line away like chaff. They returned again and again to the charge. At one time they came within fifty yards of the guns. Had they known it they might have captured them, for the artillery were utterly without infantry support. Pleasonton had left but two squadrons of raw cavalry. These he disposed in a single line, with drawn sabres, in the rear of his batteries, with orders to charge should the enemy come up to the guns.[3]

Lee had all day kept up demonstrations against Hooker's front. Anderson and McLaws had been ordered, as soon as the sound of Jackson's guns was heard, to press strongly upon the Union left, to prevent re-enforcements from being sent to the right, but not to make any attack in force, and inclining all the while to their left, so as to connect with Jackson's right, as he closed in upon the centre.[4] A fierce artillery fire from several commanding positions was kept up, accompanied by ostentatious infantry demonstrations upon the line held by Slocum and Couch. Meade had been posted upon the extreme Union left, quite out of the reach of the battle, so

[1] *Lee's Rep.*, 111. [2] Dabney. [3] Pleasonton, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 28. [4] *Lee's Rep.*, 9.

ALFRED PLEASONTON.

that Hooker had at hand only Berry's division of Sickles's corps, and a single brigade of Couch's, which had been held in reserve at Chancellorsville. Berry's division was the one which Hooker had commanded, and it had never failed him. He pushed this forward at double-quick to meet the enemy. It was vain to attempt to check the wild rout of the Eleventh Corps. Hooker ordered the few cavalry with him to charge the flying mass, sabre in hand. Some of the fugitives were shot down by his staff, but no human power could arrest their flight,[1] though they had already outstripped their pursuers. Berry's division, with fixed bayonets, pressed through the flying mass, hoping to regain the high ground which they had abandoned. They were too late; it was in possession of the enemy. The most that he could do was to take a stand upon a ridge, known as Fairview, upon the hither side of the forest which bounded the clearing at Chancellorsville, and thence to pour a fire of artillery and musketry up the road and into the woods.

Night was closing in. The full moon shone brightly, throwing into deep shade the forests, just bursting into leaf. The divisions of Rodes and Colston, which had chased Howard's corps two miles through the dense thickets, had fallen into inextricable confusion. Seeing no enemy before them, they had halted, and there was a lull in the contest. Jackson, who had been urging on the pursuit, ordered A. P. Hill's division to come to the front and take the place of Rodes and Colston, and, accompanied only by his staff, passed down the road to examine the position. Some of his companions remonstrated against his exposing himself. "There is no danger," he replied; "the enemy is routed. Go back and tell Hill to press on." A few minutes after a musketry fire from Berry's pickets pattered among the trees. Jackson turned back toward his own lines. Some of Hill's troops were coming down from the opposite direction. Seeing this little group of horsemen, they mistook them for Union cavalry, and fired upon them. Half of Jackson's escort fell dead or wounded. He himself received three balls at the same instant. One passed through his right hand, a second through his left, while a third struck the left arm near the shoulder, severing the main artery and shattering the bone. His frightened horse darted back into the woods toward the Union lines. Jackson was bruised and almost dismounted by striking his face against the overhanging bough of a tree. His left arm was useless, but, mastering the horse with his wounded right hand, he turned back to the road, and fell almost lifeless into the arms of an aid, one of the two who had kept up with him. One of these remained, while the other rode off in search of a surgeon. Just then Hill, with his staff, came to the spot. With his own hand Hill bandaged the broken arm of his commander, and then rode off toward where the battle was about to reopen.

A little group was soon gathered around, and the wounded general was placed upon a rude litter and borne back toward the rear. They had gone but a few rods when Berry's guns poured a fierce fire up the road. One of the litter-bearers was killed, the others fled, leaving Jackson with but two companions. These flung themselves flat upon the ground to escape the canister which hurtled over them. The fire slackening for a moment, Jackson rose, and, supported on each side by an aid, staggered into the

[1] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 126.

THE STAMPEDE OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.—BERRY'S CORPS CHECKING THE PURSUIT.



NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY 1.

wood which bordered the road. He came upon Pender's brigade lying flat to avoid the shot pouring into the gloom. "I fear," said Pender, recognizing his wounded commander, "that we can not maintain our position here." "You must hold your ground," replied Jackson, for a moment blazing into his old battle-fire. This was the last order ever given by Jackson on the field. He was soon replaced in the litter and borne back through the tangled brushwood. One of the bearers stumbled and fell. Jackson was thrown to the ground, striking heavily upon his broken arm, and bruising his side. An ambulance was soon found, in which he was borne to the rear, where the broken arm was amputated. The operation promised well. Two days later he was borne to the hospital a score of miles away. But pneumonia set in, occasioned probably by the exposure of that Friday night before his great flank march, when he had slept unsheltered upon the bare ground, aggravated perhaps by the bruise which he had received when thrown from the litter. He died on Sunday, the 10th of May. When the supreme hour approached, his mind wandered. Visions of the battle-field and of Paradise mingled together. "Order Hill to prepare for battle—pass the infantry to the front rapidly—tell—" Then a change passed over his delirium; and murmuring gently, "Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees," he fell into the sleep which knows no earthly wakening.

The military career of Thomas Jonathan Jackson as a Confederate commander lasted just two years. On the 2d of May, 1861, he was placed in command at Harper's Ferry; on the 2d of May, 1863, he received his mortal wound in the Wilderness of Virginia. His great fame was won within the last year of his life, for in May, 1862, took place his operations in the Valley of the Shenandoah, wherein, by foiling Fremont and Shields, he showed that he possessed qualities higher than those of a stubborn fighter and a daring partisan. Born of a respectable family, fallen into decay, accident gave him an appointment as cadet at West Point. Passing in due course from the Military Academy into the army, he served with credit in the war with Mexico. Soon after he left the army, and became Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy and Artillery Tactics in the Virginia Military Academy at Lexington. Meanwhile a great change had occurred in his moral nature—that alteration which theologians denominate "a change of heart." He embraced that form of Christianity which finds its exponents in Calvin and Edwards. Major Jackson, Professor in the Military Academy, was also Deacon Jackson of the Presbyterian Church. His ten-years' career as professor was far from brilliant. He was rather a laughing-stock to the gay youths who thronged the Academy. That he was master of the management of guns was admitted; that he understood the science which he was set to teach was possible; but he had little faculty for imparting his knowledge. There were eccentricities in his mode of life, arising, materialists would say, rather from a disordered stomach than from a disturbed brain, but still sufficiently marked to furnish occasion for men to consider him as "half-cracked." The few who knew him well, however, saw that these eccentricities were but superficial; that underlying them was a firmness and persistence of character which would enable him to run a great career if an opening to such should ever occur. Few even of these few knew the boundless ambition, and the unquestioning, almost fatalistic self-confidence which lay hidden below all the outward manifestations of his character.

When the great rebellion broke out, any one would have been justified in assuming that Jackson would have taken sides with the Union. He had been educated by the Union; he had fought with honor under the flag of the Union; all his interests, and, as might be supposed, all his feelings, were with the Union rather than with the Confederacy. His personal concern in slavery was of the slightest. The region in which he was born and where he resided was farming rather than planting. Most of the owners of slaves wrought in the fields as laboriously as their servants. Unless, as was not often the case, they reared slaves for the Southern market, they would have been richer without than with the ownership of these laborers. Society in the Valley was constructed like that of Massachusetts rather than like that of South Carolina. But somewhere and somehow Jackson, during his quiet ten years as Professor, had become imbued with the extremest Southern ideas; not merely the "State-right" doctrine that the primary allegiance of the citizen was due to his state—that to the nation being secondary and dependent—but with the extremest views of the extremest men of the extreme South. As early as 1856 he was a Disunionist.[1] He spent a part of the summer of 1860 in New England, and on his return said that he had "seen enough to justify the division that had just occurred in the Democratic party, which resulted in the defeat of Douglas and the election of Lincoln—a division which, he predicted, would render a dissolution of the Union inevitable.[2]

When the war broke out, it would have been hard to find a man so fully prepared for extremes as Jackson. The deacon who had gone round asking for subscriptions of a few dimes from negroes in aid of the Bible Society—who had, with infinite misgivings, consented, upon the representations of his pastor, to "lead in prayer" at "evening meetings"—calmly declared that no quarter should be given. It was, he said, "the true policy of the South to take no prisoners in this war."[3] He threw himself

[1] *Dabney*, 143. [2] *Ibid.*, 145.

[3] I venture this statement solely upon the assertion of Dabney, whose words I quote. This writer professes to give the substance of what was, months after, said by Jackson in justification of the ground which he had assumed. The war, he said, as reported by Dabney, "was different from all civilized wars, and therefore should not be brought under their rules. Its intention was a wholesale murder and piracy. It was the John Brown raid resumed and extended; and as Virginia had righteously put to death every one of those cut-throats upon the gallows, why were their comrades in the same crime to claim now a more honorable treatment? Such a war was an offense against humanity so monstrous that it outlawed those who shared its guilt beyond the



NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY 1.

into the conflict with all the fervor of a firm but narrow mind, in which there was not room for doubt. In the long list of enthusiasts who have devoted themselves to a cause, there is not one whose faith was more undoubting than that of Jackson. From the moment that he took the field his hypochondria vanished. Heretofore he had timed his hours and measured his food; thenceforth the hardest lot of a soldier's life was endured without a thought. He left his home almost without warning, and never returned to it alive. He was never for a day absent from the field. The mooning professor was at once inspired with the genius of command.

In all the annals of war there can be found no general who held more absolute sway over his troops. Some have regarded him as the hand to execute what others conceived; but this certainly falls far below his military merit. Two great movements, each of which postponed for a year the issue of the war, were conceived as well as executed by him. The flank march whereby Pope was routed in the summer of 1862, and this of the spring of 1863, whereby alone, as it happened, Lee was saved from destruction at Chancellorsville, were Jackson's, both in conception and execution. The Confederates might better have lost a battle than this one man.

Hooker was greatly discouraged by the rout of Howard's corps. His first impulse was to withdraw from Chancellorsville and the road leading thence from the Wilderness; but he changed his plan during the night, and resolved to await the Confederate attack, meanwhile causing Couch to draw up an entirely new line, to which he might fall back in case of need,[1] and ordering Sedgwick up to his aid from Fredericksburg. The line of battle was necessarily somewhat contracted. What had before been the extreme Union right had been won, and was still held by the enemy. On the line now assumed, the right, instead of stretching westward parallel with the plank road, was bent sharply northward, directly across it. The position on the centre and left remained unchanged. Howard's corps, now partly reorganized, was sent to the extreme left, where no assault was anticipated. Reynolds's corps, which had come up during the night, was halted some two miles away from the actual right; Meade's was partly in reserve, and partly guarding the road leading to the river. These two corps took no part in the action which ensued.

The real line of battle for Sunday, the 3d of May, formed three sides of an irregular square. The left, facing eastward toward Fredericksburg, was held by Hancock's division of Couch's corps; the centre, facing southward, by Slocum's corps; the right, facing westward, by Sickles's corps, with French's division of Couch's corps. Sickles's extreme left, on a small plateau known as Hazle Grove, projecting southward beyond the general line, was somewhat isolated and open to assault; but it commanded the centre of the Union position. If the enemy won that, he could hold it with artillery, and pour an enfilading fire along Slocum's line. Hazle Grove was the key to every thing, and should have been held at every hazard;[1] but Hooker, knowing only of its exposure, and unaware of its vital importance, ordered Sickles to abandon it, and fall back to the line on the heights at Fairview. The movement began at daybreak, but before it was completed the battle of Sunday—the main action at Chancellorsville—was opened.

Jackson had fallen before he had accomplished half his plan. He had intended, after having driven in Hooker's right, to move still farther northward, and intrench himself at the point where the roads unite which lead from Chancellorsville to the river. He believed that he could seize and hold that point, which was vital, inasmuch as it commanded Hooker's line for supplies. "My men," he said, "sometimes fail to drive the enemy from their positions, but the enemy are never able to drive my men from theirs."[2] But the execution of this design was impossible, even had Jackson been there to attempt it, for Reynolds's corps had come up and occupied this very point.

Leaving Jackson wounded upon the battle-field, Hill had on Saturday evening pressed through the woods to the right, where Pleasonton had got his guns into position, and renewed the assault. This was repulsed, and

pale of forbearance." The war, he averred, would soon assume an internecine character; the North would arm the slaves against their masters; the Confederate States could not, and should not, submit to this, and should retaliate, rather, however, "against the instigators than the ignorant tools. But," he continued, "by the time this stern necessity had manifested itself, the Federal government might have many of our soldiers and much of our territory in their clutches, so that retaliation would be encumbered with additional difficulties. It would be better, therefore, to begin upon a plan of warfare which would place none of our citizens in their power alive;" and if, he concluded, "quarter was neither given nor asked," the Confederate soldiers "would be only the more determined, vigilant, and unconquerable;" while the Union soldiers "would be intimidated, and enlistments would be prevented" (*Dabney*, 192–194). It must be added, however, that when the murderous principle upon which Jackson wished the war to be carried on failed to meet the approval of the Confederate government, there was no general in their service who more strictly observed the amenities of warfare. When he lay wounded almost within the Union lines, he objected to being removed in case it would do him any injury. "If the enemy comes," he said, "I am not afraid of them. I have always been kind to their wounded, and I am sure they will be kind to me."—*Hotchkiss*, 124.

[1] "About midnight, or after, I was awakened by General Couch, who told me that we were ordered to withdraw, I supposed to some new position, and that the Second Corps was to form the rear-guard; but at daylight, just as the movement was about to commence, as I understood, General Couch informed me that we were going to remain there and fight a battle."—Hancock, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 67.

[1] "I immediately"—that is, on Saturday night—"set to work, knowing the importance of this position, to fix it up for the fight of the next morning. I managed to get forty pieces in position, and I cleared out behind us the débris of the Eleventh Corps, that had gone off—the caissons, guns, ambulances, etc., all piled up in great confusion in a marsh that was there. I built three bridges across the marsh, and, with the support of Sickles's corps, we could have defeated the whole of the rebel army there that morning. At 3 o'clock I received an order to fall back in rear of the position at the Chancellorsville House. Before I left, General Sickles informed me that he also had orders to leave with his corps. I mentioned to him the importance of this position, and he agreed with me that we ought to make an effort to hold it. I feel perfectly satisfied that, had General Hooker been able to see the position that I occupied there, he would never have abandoned it; and I looked upon it as a great misfortune that he did not see that point. The rebels, having this position, could enfilade our whole line to the Chancellorsville House with their batteries at this point."—Pleasonton, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 29.

[2] *Dabney*, 700; *Hotchkiss*, 125.



CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY 1.

Hill was wounded. Rodes was next in rank, but Hill sent for Stuart, who was five miles away, and desired him to take command of the whole corps. When he came, Rodes yielded, not with the best grace.[1] Stuart found every thing in confusion. This was increased by a midnight attack made by Birney, who forced the Confederates back for a space through the woods, and recovered some of the guns which had been abandoned by Howard's corps in its precipitate flight. In the darkness some of the Confederate brigades fired upon each other.[2]

All that night Stuart was busy in reorganizing the shattered corps which had so unexpectedly come under his command. He was separated from Lee by six miles of dense forest. Morning was approaching before he could inform his commanding general of his position, and receive instructions. The messenger said that Jackson had urged that "the enemy should be pressed in the morning." Lee's response was, "Those people shall be pressed."

The odds on that Sunday morning were greatly in favor of Hooker. At and about Chancellorsville he still had fully 78,000 effective men. Lee proposed to press this force in its intrenchments with 30,000 less.[3] Moreover Sedgwick, with his own strong corps, and Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, quite 27,000 men in all, were near Fredericksburg, not fifteen miles away. They were confronted by Early with not more than 11,000. It was clearly possible that Sedgwick would force his way to Hooker, and, assuming that Early should escape destruction and join Lee, the Federal preponderance would be greatly increased. Taking no account of probable losses on either side, Hooker would have 95,000 men, Lee 59,000. Apart from numbers, Hooker's position was far the better. His 78,000 lay together, Lee's 48,000 were separated, and it depended upon the chances of battle whether they could be united. Hooker, moreover, was intrenched upon ground mainly of his own choosing; Lee, assuming the offensive, must assail these intrenched lines. The region was indeed a difficult one, but the physical obstacles were as great for the one side as for the other, and the one venturing the offensive must undertake to overcome them. Considering that each commander was well informed of the force of his opponent, one can not but wonder that Lee should have ventured an attack, and that Hooker should have awaited it.

SUNDAY, MAY 3.

The action was opened at dawn by Stuart, earlier than he had intended. He had ordered his right to be swung around through the woods, from the position to which his men had fallen back during the night. This brought two of his brigades right in front of Hazle Grove, from which Sickles had withdrawn every thing except Graham's brigade, which formed his rear-guard. Stuart's direction was mistaken for an order to attack. A sharp conflict ensued, with loss on both sides; but Graham got safely off to Fairview, and Stuart took possession of Hazle Grove. A glance showed him the value of the position which had been abandoned to him. In a few minutes he occupied it with thirty guns. His whole force was then ordered to advance upon the Union lines, which, as the fog lifted, were seen crowning the Fairview ridge, a third of a mile in front. Between lay the valley of a little creek covered with a tangled forest growth, through which the attacking columns must force their way, in the face of a fierce fire of artillery and musketry. Again and again they charged down the valley, through the woods, and up the slope, and as often were thrown back in confusion, only to advance again with fresh force and unabated resolution.

Sickles, upon whom all this onset fell, first sent word to Hooker that he could hold his position so long as his ammunition lasted, and then, a little later, that he needed prompt support. This last urgent demand came in an evil time. For two hours and more the Confederate guns at Hazle Grove had been playing upon Chancellorsville. The house was riddled by shot. A ball struck a pillar of the veranda against which Hooker was leaning. He fell senseless. Those around thought him dead or dying. There was no one at hand with authority to send the re-enforcements so urgently asked by Sickles, though the two corps of Reynolds and Meade were wholly disengaged. Half of either of these sent to Sickles would have been enough to

[1] "Captain Adams, of General A. P. Hill's staff, reached me post-haste, and informed me of the sad calamities which had for the time deprived the troops of the leadership of both Jackson and Hill, and of the urgent demand for me to come and take command as quickly as possible" (Stuart, in *Lee's Rep.*, 17).—Rodes says (*Ibid.*, 112): "I yielded the command to General Stuart, not because I thought him entitled to it, belonging as he did to a different arm of the service, nor because I was unwilling to assume the responsibility of carrying on the attack, as I had already made the necessary arrangements, and they remained unchanged, but because, from the manner in which I had been informed that he had been sent for, I inferred that General Jackson or General Hill had instructed Major Pendleton to place him in command; and for the still stronger reason that I feared that the information that the command had devolved upon me, unknown except to my own immediate troops, would, in their shaken condition, be likely to increase the demoralization of the corps."

[2] "The attack was made precisely at midnight by Ward's brigade, with the remaining part of Birney's division in support. It was admirably conducted under General Birney, and was in all points successful. It was made entirely with the bayonet. We drove Jackson back to our original line, and reoccupied General Howard's rifle-pits, and recovered several pieces of artillery and some caissons which had been abandoned during the day. Jackson's force was thrown into great confusion, and his own artillery opened upon his own men" (Sickles, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 7).—"At about midnight on Saturday, General Sickles ordered me to attack Jackson's corps with my division, driving them from the plank road and the small earthworks. At one o'clock I reported that we held the road and works, and had recaptured the artillery and caissons taken from us during the stampede of the Eleventh Corps" (Birney, *Ibid.*, 35).—"There was much confusion on the right, owing to the fact that some troops mistook friends for the enemy, and fired upon them."—Stuart, in *Lee's Rep.*, 18.

[3] Hooker had with him the corps of Reynolds, Meade, Sickles, Howard, and two divisions of Couch, numbering at the outset 81,000. Howard's corps had lost 2500, the greater part prisoners; all other losses up to this time could not have exceeded 500, leaving an effective force of 78,000. Lee's entire force, exclusive of cavalry, was 60,000. Of these, Early's division, and two brigades from Anderson and McLaws, about 11,000, were left near Fredericksburg. The entire losses on Friday and Saturday could not have exceeded 1000, leaving with Lee, near Chancellorsville, about 48,000. We take no account of the cavalry, because the character of the region prevented them from being brought into active service, on either side, in this operation.

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have secured the victory.[1] That attack repulsed, the remainder of Hooker's unengaged force, sweeping around, would have enveloped Stuart's broken corps, and crushed it to powder. Reynolds was indeed minded to bring his corps into the fight. This seems to have been the plan of Hooker, as understood by some of his officers.[2] But if such was the purpose of Hooker, its execution was prevented by the blow which disabled him. For two eventful hours the Union army was without a commander. Hooker lay insensible for a time, then, partly recovering, mounted his horse; but pain overmastered him, and he lay upon the ground as if in a doze, the Confederate shells bursting all around him. Now and then he was partially aroused when some important dispatch required a prompt answer.[3]

Sickles's ammunition was almost exhausted. Again he sent to headquarters asking for aid, but there was no one there even to reply to his urgent demand. He withdrew his now useless artillery, and fell back with his infantry to a second line, which he resolved to hold by the bayonet. He was not followed, and, looking to his front, it seemed that the enemy was routed. They had the aspect of a disorganized crowd rather than an army. Just then French, with his division, had advanced upon the Confederate left, and driven it back.[4] Stuart concentrated all his force upon this point, and succeeded in repelling the attack, the only offensive movement made by the Union forces at Chancellorsville on that day. Had it been supported by a half, or even a quarter of Reynolds's corps, which lay idle only a few furlongs off, Stuart could not have escaped destruction.

While Stuart was thus with varying fortune pressing the attack upon the Union right, Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, assailed the centre held by Slocum, under an enfilading fire from the batteries posted at Hazel Grove. The left, held by Hancock's division of Couch's corps, was threatened, rather than attacked,[5] for Lee was all the time edging to his left in order to make a junction with Stuart. This was effected at ten o'clock, at the very moment when the battle hung in even scales. Both sides had lost terribly. Stuart's three divisions, numbering in the morning about 27,000, had lost fully 6000 in killed and wounded, and 1500 prisoners. Sickles and French had lost well-nigh 5000 out of 22,000. The united Confederate force, 40,000 strong after all its losses, pressed on converging toward Chancellorsville. In their way lay Sickles, French, and Slocum, with some 10,000 less. Barely two miles away on either hand were Reynolds, Meade, and Howard, with fully 42,000, not a regiment of whom were moved to the scene of conflict at the supreme moment. The stress of the Confederate assault now again fell upon Sickles. His ammunition exhausted, he could only hold his line with the bayonet. Five times the enemy dashed upon him; five times they were thrust back. Then the whole front melted away, Sickles's corps first yielding the position.[1] Then, in obedience to orders from Couch, who had in some sort assumed temporary command, the army retreated to the line which had been traced out the night before.

As a defensive position to be held against a superior force, a better could hardly have been desired. It formed a sharp curve, the apex three quarters of a mile back of Chancellorsville, the sides stretching back right and left to the Rappahannock and Rapidan, covering the fords. Each flank was covered by a little stream bordered by dense woods. An enemy could assail it only by its narrow front, and this was covered by the skirt of the forest, pierced with only a few rough roads. It was a position which any general might venture to hold against double his force. Hooker had here fully 70,000 men, half of whom had not been seriously engaged. Lee had left barely 40,000; yet, in the face of these odds, he was on the point of renewing the fight, when he was arrested by ominous tidings. While the fierce fight had been going on around Chancellorsville, Sedgwick had marched from below Fredericksburg, stormed the heights, and was advancing to unite with Hooker.[2] Sedgwick had now his own corps, 22,000 strong. These were across the river, two or three miles below Fredericksburg. Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, 5000 strong, which had been left behind at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, was also under Sedgwick's command; thus, all told, he had 27,000. Confronting him along the heights was Early, who had been left from Jackson's corps, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's, and Wilcox's of Anderson's, in all 11,000 strong. Just after four o'clock on Saturday afternoon Hooker sent an order to Sedgwick directing him to march upon Fredericksburg, capture it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. "We know," he added, though he did not himself believe it,[3] "that the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them." This order did not reach Sedgwick until dusk. Almost simultaneously came another, dated three hours later, directing the route which should be taken in pursuit. At this time Jackson had struck his blow and shattered Howard's corps. At an hour before midnight another order came to Sedgwick. Hooker, not aware that he had already crossed the river, and supposing him still to be on the north bank, directed him to "cross the Rappahannock on the receipt of this order, take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with the major general commanding, and attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road. You will leave all your trains behind except the pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in vicinity of the general at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the force commanded by General Lee, and between you and the major general commanding he expects to use him up. Be sure not to fail." This peremptory and special order was dispatched after Jackson's assault had been checked.[4] Sedgwick put his corps in motion at once. The moon shone almost as brightly as day upon the hills, but thick fogs were gathering in the valley. The Confederates were on the alert, and their skirmishers presented some annoyance. Still Sedgwick's march was unaccountably slow. It took the head of his column until daybreak—a space of fully six hours, to reach Fredericksburg, a distance of three miles.

Two or three attempts were made to carry the heights on the Confederate right, which were held by Early with the main strength of his division. These attempts were repulsed with little difficulty. Gibbon, who had now crossed the river, made a demonstration against their left, but a deep canal, the bridges over which had been removed, prevented any advance. It had the effect, however, of detaining there a Confederate brigade which was moving from that direction toward Marye's Hill in the centre. This hill was

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[1] "If Hooker had been well enough to have answered my request for re-enforcements, it would have turned the whole tide of battle. I have no doubt it would have been won in thirty minutes; at least it would have been won in an hour. It would have been won just as soon as you could have got ten thousand men from the right or the left to have repulsed that attack."—Sickles, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 10.

[2] "We expected that Jackson's forces would assault us in the morning at Chancellorsville, and the intention was that General Sickles, with all his force, was to meet him at once; and the First Corps, Reynolds's, was also to attack him and envelop him; and, if necessary, more forces were to be drawn from the left of our line, leaving only forces enough to hold Lee's forces in check" (Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 46).—"I can not tell why the First Corps was not brought into action. I thought that the simple advance of two corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its result. General Reynolds once or twice contemplated making this advance upon his own responsibility. Colonel Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable."—Doubleday, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 17.

[3] Pleasonton, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 31.

[4] Sickles (in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 8) thus describes the aspect at this moment: "The enemy seemed to be satisfied with having forced me to withdraw my infantry from their front line to this second position, and the battle paused for half an hour or more. The loss inflicted upon the enemy, especially by my artillery, was most severe. Their formation for the attack was entirely broken up, and from my head-quarters they presented to the eye the appearance of a mass—a crowd without definite formation."—Stuart (in *Lee's Rep.*, 16) thus describes the situation: "In the mean time the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and all the re-enforcements I could obtain were sent there. Colquitt's brigade of Trimble's division, ordered first to the right, was directed to the left to support Pender. Johnson's brigade, of the second line, was also engaged there, and the three lines were more or less merged into one line of battle, and reported hard pressed. Urgent requests were sent for re-enforcements, and notices that the troops were out of ammunition. I ordered that the ground must be held at all hazards, if necessary with the bayonet."—Several of the Confederate brigade commanders report how hardly they were pressed by the advance of French. Thus Pender (in *Lee's Rep.*, 52) says: "My men were about out of ammunition, broken down, and badly cut up."—Ramseur (*Ibid.*, 74) tells how he was obliged to run over the Confederate troops in his front, and how his line was "subjected to a horrible enfilade fire, by which it suffered severely." Out of 1509 men he lost 788.

[5] The left, that is of the line as actually engaged, for the corps of Meade and Howard, forming the absolute left, were not engaged at all. Hancock says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 68): "Although the enemy massed their infantry in the woods very near me, and attempted to advance, and always held a threatening attitude, I judge they had exhausted their troops so much that they dared not attack me. There was no forcible attack on me."

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[1] "No supports coming up, and the enemy meanwhile having had time to restore order in his own lines and bring up fresh reserves, I was again attacked, and, having no means of resistance except the bayonet, after repelling five successive attacks I again fell back to General Hooker's headquarters, which were then within easy range of the enemy's cannon, and were rapidly becoming a pile of ruins, almost every shot telling upon the building" (Sickles, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 9).—Hancock, who, from his position on the left, could see something of what was going on upon the right, says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 67): "The first lines finally melted away, and the whole front appeared to pass out. First, the Third Corps (Sickles's) went out; then the Twelfth Corps (Slocum's), after fighting a long time, and there was nothing left on that part of the line except my own division. I was directed to hold that position until a change of line of battle could be made, and was to hold it until I was notified that all the other troops had gotten off."—The Confederate reports uniformly give 10 o'clock as the time when Chancellorsville was carried; the Federal reports place the time an hour later.

[2] "The troops, having become somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of the contest, were immediately reformed preparatory to renewing the attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer the Rappahannock, which he had previously fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our preparations were just completed, when farther operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg."—*Lee's Rep.*, 10.

[3] "It was based on a report sent in from General Sickles that the enemy was flying at the time he was sent out to follow up Jackson's corps. I was of the impression that the general was mistaken, but nevertheless felt that no harm could follow from its transmission to General Sedgwick."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 147.

[4] Sedgwick (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 95) says that this dispatch was dated at ten minutes past 10. He probably gave the hour from memory. Hooker (*Ibid.*, 129) gives its date at 9 o'clock. There is no doubt, however, as to the time when it was received, although Howe (*Ibid.*, 23) says it was "received just after dark, say 8 o'clock; but he evidently confounds it with a previous order. As to the character of the night, I have endeavored to reconcile statements which upon their face appear wholly inconsistent. Hooker and Butterfield say expressly and in almost the same words (*Ibid.*, 76, 129): "It was a bright moonlight night, and clear, sufficiently light for staff officers to write dispatches by moonlight." Howe says (*Ibid.*, 22): "It was bright starlight, so that I could see what was in the advance." Sedgwick, on the other hand, says (*Ibid.*, 100): "In consequence of the enemy and the darkness, it took us until daylight to make a little over three miles. It was a very foggy night."

held by only two brigades—that of Barksdale occupying the stone wall at its base, from which it had so disastrously repulsed Burnside a few weeks before. The morning was wearing away, and nothing had been effected. At length Sedgwick, urged by Warren, resolved to assail Marye's Hill in front. At 11 o'clock, just as the fight at Chancellorsville was closing, he formed two strong columns, which dashed at the wall. The enemy reserved their fire until the nearest column, led by Colonel Johns, was within a few score yards; they then poured in a solid sheet of musketry. The column faltered and fell back. In a couple of minutes it rallied, and pressed fifty yards nearer. Again it met the sheet of fire, and again broke. It seemed that the tragedy of December was to be re-enacted. But Johns, though wounded, rallied his men for a third charge. This time they did not stop; they rushed over and around the wall, and in fifteen minutes from their first advance carried it, killing or capturing its defenders. Johns was again wounded and borne from the field. Colonel Spear, who led the other column, was killed. Other regiments now swarmed up the height from both sides. The Confederates made a fierce fight, but it was vain. Early fell back southward along the telegraph road. Sedgwick's corps thus stood directly between Early and Lee, with only two brigades in his front. This little force retreated sullenly along the plank road, closely followed by Sedgwick.

Such were the tidings which reached Lee at Chancellorsville. His situation was full of peril. Sedgwick might overwhelm Early, and then the Confederate lines of communication would be cut, or he might press straight on to Chancellorsville, and fall upon Lee's rear. This corps must be defeated at every cost, or all was lost. Four brigades of McLaws and Anderson, which had suffered least in the fight of the morning, were sent back to check the Federal advance. They came up with the retreating regiments at Salem Church, midway between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. Here a brief stand had been made upon a low wooded ridge. This was carried by the divisions of Brooke and Newton, for Howe had been posted in the rear to keep Early in check, and Gibbon had been left behind to occupy Fredericksburg. The Confederate re-enforcements now pressed Brooke and Newton back through the wood with heavy loss, and were in turn checked by the artillery. Night coming on, both armies slept upon the field. All this afternoon, Hooker, with 70,000 men, lay supinely behind his intrenchments, in front of which were barely 30,000 of the enemy. He made no attempt to aid Sedgwick, who had at length, though tardily, accomplished two thirds of his march.

MONDAY, MAY 4.

No army ever found itself in a more dangerous position than that of Lee on Monday morning, the 4th of May. All counted, it now numbered less than 50,000 men. Stuart, with nearly all of Anderson, confronted Hooker at Chancellorsville. Six miles to the east was McLaws, with less than 10,000, holding Sedgwick in check. Three miles farther to the south was Early, with 8000. Sedgwick had lost heavily, but he still had quite as many as McLaws and Early together. It was hardly within the range of possibility that Hooker would not discover the situation, and either assail Stuart in front with twofold numbers, or, leaving enough to hold him fast, fall upon the rear of McLaws, who would thus be crushed between two fires. Lee's only hope lay in dislodging Sedgwick. To do this he must still farther weaken his force at Chancellorsville. Anderson's remaining three brigades were moved down, leaving only Stuart, with 20,000 men, in front of Hooker. These took position toward Sedgwick's left, threatening to cut him off from the river, while Early marched along the ridge and retook Marye's Hill, thus throwing himself in Sedgwick's rear and cutting him off from Fredericksburg, which was thereupon abandoned by Gibbon, who recrossed the river.[1] Sedgwick's position was now a defensive one, for Hooker directed him not to renew the attack upon Salem Heights. By noon Lee had about 27,000 men opposed to Sedgwick, who had about 18,000, having lost 3000 on the previous day. There was some skirmishing all through the day, but no serious attack was made until 6 o'clock, when, Anderson having united with Early, these two divisions fell upon Howe, who, with 6000 men, was on the Union left. Howe met the assault with great stubbornness, and then fell slowly back toward Banks's Ford, to a strong position which he had previously chosen. The enemy dashed furiously upon this, but were met by a galling fire and driven back, broken and apparently routed. Howe was confident that they would not venture another attack, as, indeed, they did not. Two hours after dark he was surprised to learn that Sedgwick was about to fall back to the ford. He refused to abandon his position without a positive order. The order came, and was obeyed.[2] The division marched to the ford without the slightest molestation, having occupied its strong position two hours after having repulsed the attack.

Hooker all this day lay wholly inactive with his great force of 70,000 men, within two hours' march. Between him and Sedgwick, by the road along which Meade had marched out on Thursday, there was at no time more than three brigades. Hooker's orders to Sedgwick indicate the uncertainty under which he labored all that day, even when he had resumed the command after his injury. Long before daybreak he directed Sedgwick not to resume his assault upon Salem Heights unless he himself attacked, for he hoped that the enemy would assail him; but he was too far away to give any directions; only, if Sedgwick thought best to cross the river, he could go either to Banks's Ford or Fredericksburg. At 11 o'clock in the morning he directed Sedgwick not to cross unless compelled to do so, but, if possible, to hold the position at the ford. Half an hour later, Hooker sent word that he proposed to advance upon the enemy the next day, and in that case Sedgwick's position would be as favorable as could be desired. Sedgwick had all day been doubtful whether he could maintain himself on the south side of the river; but after the repulse of the attack made upon him, he wrote that he could hold his position. But, just ten minutes before Hooker received this, he sent an order to Sedgwick to cross. He immediately countermanded the order, but, before this was received, which was just before daylight, nearly the whole corps were over, and the enemy had taken a position which commanded the bridge, and it was too late to return.[1] Sedgwick lost in all nearly 5000 in killed, wounded, and missing, the greater portion of them on Sunday, and captured nearly 1400 prisoners. The Confederates lost about 4000.[2]

But, during the night, Hooker had resolved to abandon his own position. He summoned his corps commanders to a consultation. Slocum was not present. Howard wished an advance. Sickles and Couch were in favor of withdrawing. Reynolds went to sleep, saying his opinion would be the same as that of Meade. Meade at first opposed the crossing of the river mainly on the ground that the movement could not be effected in the presence of an enemy flushed by success; he, however, ceased to press his objections upon Hooker's confident assurance that the army could be withdrawn without loss. Hooker had no doubt that he could hold his position, and perhaps force the enemy to retire; but he urged that, as he would fall back toward Richmond, he would become constantly stronger, while we were growing weaker; he could be better assailed near Washington than at Richmond. So the order to cross the river was issued, and a new line of intrenchments was thrown up close by the United States Ford to cover the passage. When Sedgwick announced that he could hold his ground, Hooker appears to have proposed to recross back again at Banks's Ford, unite with Sedgwick, and give battle. But this purpose was frustrated by Sedgwick's movement.[3]

Lee, leaving Early on the heights at Fredericksburg to prevent Sedgwick from recrossing, reunited his remaining force, now reduced to 40,000, before the position from which Hooker was preparing to retire. In the afternoon of Tuesday a fierce storm sprung up. The river rose rapidly, submerging the approaches to the bridges. One of these was taken down and used to piece out the others, over which the army retreated without being perceived by the enemy. The storm passed away during the night, and Lee had made preparations to attack the Federal works at daylight; but, upon advancing his skirmishers, he found that the great Union army was beyond the river.[4]

The cavalry movement, upon which Hooker had relied for destroying the enemy by cutting his communications, proved equally fruitless. Stoneman divided his corps. Averill, in command of one column, ascended the Rapidan some twenty miles. At Rapidan Station, on the Orange Railroad, he came up, on Friday, with W. F. Lee, with 900. He reported the next day that he had been engaged with the cavalry of the enemy, and destroying communications. His loss in this "engagement" was one man killed and two wounded. On Sunday he retraced his steps, whereupon Hooker displaced him from command, and appointed Pleasonton in his place. But meanwhile the battles had been fought and lost. Stoneman, with the main cavalry column, pushed on farther southward. Arriving at a point thirty miles northwest of Richmond, he divided his force into six bodies. "We dropped," he says, "like a shell in that region of country, intending to burst it in every direction, expecting each fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much terror as would result from sending the whole shell. The result of this plan satisfied my most sanguine anticipations." One regiment struck the James River Canal, and attempted ineffectually to destroy the aqueduct which spans the Rivanna River. They then returned to the main body. Four others were sent in various directions to break up the railroad from Richmond to Fredericksburg, which was the primary object of the whole movement. Davis, with one regiment, reached to within seven

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[1] Sedgwick appears to have supposed that Early's force were re-enforcements from Richmond. He says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 106): "I was informed, at an early hour, that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of Richmond, had occupied the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting off my communication with Fredericksburg."

[2] "The movement was commenced very late, and Hays's and Hoke's brigades were thrown into some confusion by coming in contact; and it becoming difficult to distinguish our troops from those of the enemy, on account of the growing darkness, they had therefore to fall back to reform" (Early, in Lee's *Rep.*, 35).—"The attack was delivered with a violence that I had never before encountered. We resisted the first attack better than I expected, and at a favorable time the left of my line was thrown back partially behind some woods. As I expected, the enemy seemed to be under the impression, from this movement, that we were giving way. They advanced until they reached a point that we should have desired above all others they should have advanced upon, and where a reserve force, which I had placed under cover, had an opportunity to get a flank fire upon them with full effect. When the fire from our new position struck them, it was but a short time before they were entirely broken, and fell back in a rout. After this repulse, the position of the Sixth Corps, in my judgment, was less liable to a serious attack than it had been at any time since it crossed the Rappahannock, and I saw no necessity for recrossing the river" (Howe, in *Com. Rep.*, 21).—"Some time after we had returned to our old camps, I met General Hooker, and spoke to him of the movements we had made and the position we held. I stated to him that after the fight of the 4th of May I could have gone with my division to the heights of Fredericksburg, and held them. He expressed his surprise that those heights could have been held on the night of the 4th, and said, 'If I had known that you could have gone on those heights and held them, I would have re-enforced you with the whole army.' I told him that if I had not received orders to go back to Banks's Ford, I could have marched uninterruptedly to Fredericksburg Heights after 9 o'clock that night; for, after the fight we had had, the rebels abandoned the Heights, and there was nothing to be seen of them. There was a bright moon that night, and we could see an object of the size of a man or a horse at a great distance" (*Ibid.*, 25).—"The attack on Brooks was easily repulsed, chiefly by the skirmish line and the battery of the First Massachusetts. That on Howe was of a more determined character. It was gallantly resisted by our infantry by a counter-charge, while the artillery of the division played with fearful effect upon their advance. At length our line was forced back upon the left, and Howe directed his right to retire to a less advanced position. The division reformed promptly, the batteries keeping up a most effective fire. The advance of the enemy was checked, his troops were scattered and driven back with fearful loss, and the new position was easily maintained until nightfall. Several hundred prisoners, including one general officer and many others of rank, and three battle-flags, were captured from the enemy in this engagement."—Sedgwick, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 107.

[1] Sedgwick, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 97; Hooker, *Ibid.*, 133.

[2] Early, who encountered only Sedgwick, reports his entire loss at 1474; McLaws, 1889, the greater portion being in the action with Sedgwick; Anderson, 1445, probably half here.

[3] Butterfield, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 77; Hooker, *Ibid.*, 135.

[4] *Lee's Rep.*, 13.

miles of Richmond, tore up a few rails, and destroyed some stores; captured a train filled with wounded, who were paroled; then, finding himself likely to be cut off, he headed southeastwardly for Williamsburg, but, discovering Confederate cavalry in his way, turned northward, crossed the Mattapony, and, following down its bank, reached the Union outposts at Gloucester Point, opposite Yorktown. Kilpatrick, with another regiment, on Monday struck the railroad still nearer Richmond, destroyed the dépôts at Hungary Station, then rode to within two miles of the city, passing through the outer line of defenses. With his small force it was useless to attempt any thing farther; so he turned eastward, passing the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, which he destroyed, and crossed the Mattapony without having encountered any opposition. Here he fell in with Davis, and both proceeded to Gloucester Point. Stoneman himself remained near the point where his divisions had separated, with only 700 men, which he kept as a nucleus around which the different parties could rally in case of need, having sent out three regiments to destroy the bridges in his vicinity. These reunited on Tuesday, and Stoneman set out on a rapid retreat to the Rapidan and Rappahannock, crossing the latter river at Kelly's Ford on Thursday, the 8th. The alarm caused by the "explosion of the bomb" was great, but the injury inflicted was small. In three days the railroad to Fredericksburg was in running order. Had it been known that almost the whole transportation of the road was collected at Guinea's Station, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, where also were the main dépôts of supply, and that these were left wholly unguarded, a rapid dash made by half of the cavalry upon this point at any time during this eventful week would have changed the whole course of the campaign.[1]

The Federal loss in these operations at Chancellorsville was something more than 17,000, of whom 5000 were unwounded prisoners. They also lost 13 guns, some 20,000 muskets, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and accoutrements. The Confederate loss was about 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 8700 wounded, and about 3000 prisoners.[2]

Hooker issued an order congratulating his army on its achievements. "If," said he, "it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented. . . . . We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received . . . . . have placed *hors de combat* 18,000 of his chosen troops, destroyed his stores and dépôts filled with vast amounts of stores, deranged his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation." But no dépôts were destroyed or communications deranged except by the cavalry; the stores destroyed were not sufficient to interfere with Lee's scanty accumulations, and the interruptions to communications were so slight that they were restored in two or three days. Far more truthful was Lee's statement to his army: "Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock."

Hooker declared that when he returned from Chancellorsville he "felt that he had fought no battle," for the reason that he could not get his men into position to do so, though he had more men than he could use;[3] that he failed in his enterprise from causes "of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources." A careful examination of all that was done, or left undone, evinces that every one of these circumstances was of a character which lay fairly within the limits of probability; and that there was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of the Union army. The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached, and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly conceived and admirably executed. The initial error, by which alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville. Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been resumed early in the following morning, the army would have got clear of the Wilderness without meeting any great opposing force, and then it would have been in a position where its great superiority of numbers would have told.[1] The rout of Howard's corps was possible only from the grossest neglect of all military precautions. Jackson, after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open ground not two miles from the Union lines. A single picket, sent for a mile up a broad road, would have discovered the whole movement in ample time for Hooker to have strengthened his position, or to have withdrawn from it without loss. The blame of this surprise can not, however, fairly be laid upon Hooker. He had a right to presume that whoever was in command there would have so picketed his lines as to prevent the possibility of being surprised in broad daylight. But even as it was, the disaster to the Eleventh Corps should have had no serious effect upon the general result. That was fully remedied when the pursuit was checked. On Sunday morning Hooker was in a better position than he had been on the evening before. He had lost 3000 men and had been strengthened by 17,000, and now had 78,000 to oppose to 47,000. The Confederate army was divided, and could reunite only by winning a battle or by a day's march. The only thing which could have lost the battle of that day was the abandonment of the position at Hazle Grove, for from this alone was it possible to enfilade Slocum's line. But surely it is within the limits of military forethought that a general who has occupied a position for two days and three nights should have discovered the very key to that position, when it lay within a mile of his own headquarters. The disabling of Hooker could not, indeed, have been foreseen; but such an accident might happen to any commander upon any field, and there should have been somewhere some man with authority to have, within the space of three hours, brought into action some of the more than 30,000 men within sound, and almost sight, of the battle then raging. Sedgwick's assault upon the heights of Fredericksburg was certainly dilatory. He could not, indeed, have safely executed to the letter his orders, which involved a night assault upon the heights; but they could have been more easily stormed at 5 o'clock than at 11, and this would have brought him upon Lee's rear by 9, when the action was going sorely against the Confederates. How the hours from Sunday noon till Monday night were wasted, has been shown. Hooker, indeed, reiterates that he could not assail the Confederate lines through the dense forests. But Lee broke through those very woods on Sunday, and was minded to attempt it again on Wednesday, when he found that the enemy had disappeared. The golden opportunity was lost never to be recovered, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia gained a new lease of life.

If final success were a certain test of the merits of a military plan, we must accord the highest success to that of Lee. But it succeeded only through a series of accidents, any one of which failing would have involved ruin; and a general, save in the direst emergency, has no right to reckon upon the favors of fortune. His first movement, that of marching with the bulk of his army to confront Hooker at Chancellorsville, was wise, for he had good reason to suppose that then and there the force of the enemy was inferior to his own. He had no means of knowing that Sickles's corps had come thither; and, at the worst, he could fall back if he found himself overmatched, and return to his former position, or retreat upon his communications, and make a stand at any favorable point. But when, on the next morning, he divided his army, sending three fifths of it a day's march away, he staked upon an unlikely chance every reasonable possibility of safety. He had no right to assume that the Union right would be surprised, or that Hooker would fail to fall with overwhelming force upon one part or the other of his divided army. So, on Sunday morning, he had no right to anticipate that an attack made by an inferior force upon lines strongly intrenched could succeed, or that his opponent would meet him with only half of his force. How hardly, and by what accidents only, the battle of Sunday morning was won, has already been shown. He tempted fortune still more desperately when, on that afternoon and the next morning, he still farther divided his force. How could he suppose that Stuart's 20,000 would for a long day hold in check Hooker's 70,000, while a great battle was being fought close by between forces so equally matched that a tenth of this idle force added to the enemy would assuredly turn the scale? To retreat promptly and rapidly upon and along the railroad was the only course which any man knowing what both commanders knew, and, still more, what we now know, would have pronounced safe for Lee, when he was startled by the tidings that Sedgwick had stormed the heights and was advancing upon his rear. Lee, reversing the words of Hooker, might have said, "We succeeded only through circumstances of a character not to be foreseen or brought about by human sagacity or resources."

[1] "General Lee had but two regiments of cavalry, under W. H. F. Lee, to oppose to the large force under Stoneman. The whole country in the rear of the Confederate army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was collected at Guinea's Station, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one fourth of Stoneman's force. Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more than a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his communications for any length of time would have imperiled his army or forced him to retreat." —*Hotchkiss*, 101–9. See also Hooker and Stoneman, in *Com. Rep.*, 137–40.

[2] The official report of Union losses is given by Hooker in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 143; the Confederate in *Lee's Rep.*, 131–133. In the Union report, the respective numbers of killed, wounded, and missing are not given; but Lee (*Rep.*, 15) states that he took "about 5000 prisoners, exclusive of wounded." This statement has been adopted, and an attempt has been made to apportion the missing among the several corps, but the estimate is almost wholly conjectural. The Confederate report, while giving separately the killed and wounded in every regiment, makes no mention of the missing. But in their separate reports (in *Lee's Rep.*, 27, 33, 36, 117), Anderson, McLaws, Early, and Rodes give the missing in their respective divisions. Hill and Colston do not report their missing; but, as they were in the hottest of the fight on Saturday and Sunday, it is presumed that their loss in missing was at least equal to the average of the others. From these data the following table has been constructed:

Losses at Chancellorsville.

UNION.				CONFEDERATE.			
	Killed and Wounded.	Missing.	Total.		Killed and Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
First Corps (Reynolds)..	192	100	292	Early's Division.....	851	500	1,351
Second Corps (Couch)...	1,525	500	2,025	A. P. Hill's Division....	2,583	500?	3,083
Third Corps (Sickles)...	3,439	600	4,039	Colston's Division	1,868	450?	2,310
Fifth Corps (Meade)	399	300	699	Rodes's Division.....	2,178	713	2,891
Sixth Corps (Sedgwick) .	3,601	1000	4,601	Anderson's Division	1,180	210	1,390
Eleventh Corps (Howard)	508	2000	2,508	McLaws's Division	1,379	380	1,760
Twelfth Corps (Slocum).	2,383	500	2,883	Artillery and Cavalry...	227		
Cavalry, etc.....	150		150	Total.....	10,277	2753	13,030
Total.....	12,197	5000	17,197				

There is reason to suppose that the losses on each side were some hundreds greater than officially given. Thus Sedgwick reports his loss to have been 4925 (*Com. Rep.*, 107), and Sickles says (*Ibid.*, 10) that on Sunday he "lost 260 officers and about 4500 men in a couple of hours." Such of the Confederate generals as gave their losses state them considerably above those put down in the general report. In four divisions, the excess is about 400 in killed and wounded. Then, as to the missing, Sedgwick states that he made about 1400 prisoners, while in the division opposed to him the Confederate reports acknowledge only 1090, and some of these must have been captured before they encountered Sedgwick. Still we must consider the final official reports on both sides as the highest authority attainable in this case.

[3] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 142.

[1] "A mile or more in advance of the position I then had would have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior force, the enemy would probably have been beaten."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 142.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.—GETTYSBURG.

Hooker's Plans.—The President's Views.—Pleasonton's Cavalry Reconnoissance.—Lee's Plans.—Reasons for invading the North.—Elections at the North.—State of public Feeling.—Opinion of the British Minister.—Strength of the Confederate Army.—Route of Milroy.—The Advance into Pennsylvania.—Cavalry Encounters.—Hooker's Policy.—Halleck and Hooker.—Hooker resigns.—Meade appointed to the Command.—His Antecedents.—Lee's Movements.—The President calls for Militia.—The Armies concentrate toward Gettysburg.—Meade selects a Position on Pipe Creek.—Pleasonton marks Gettysburg as the Battle-field.—*Battle of July* 1: Topography of Gettysburg.—Reynolds and Hill approach.—Reynolds killed.—Howard takes Command.—Meade sends Hancock to the Field.—The Federals driven back.—Hancock decides to accept Battle.—The Position chosen.—Lee's Dilemma.—*Battle of July* 2: Meade's Line of Battle.—Sickles goes too far in advance.—Hood's Attack upon Round Top.—The Attack repulsed by Vincent.—Sickles and Hood wounded.—Birney attacked and driven back.—Crawford checks the Confederate Attack.—Humphreys assailed and falls back.—The Union Line re-formed.—The Confederates fall back.—Confederate Advantage on the Right.—The Situation at Night.—*Battle of July* 3: Lee's Plan of Attack.—Ewell forced back on the Right.—The Cannonade on the Centre.—Pickett and Pettigrew advance.—Lieutenant Haskell.—The Confederate Rout.—Cavalry Attack.—Close of the Fight.—Order for Pursuit given and countermanded.—The third of July at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.—Meade holds a Council of War.—Lee retreats to the Potomac.—Meade slowly advances.—Lee recrosses the Potomac.—Losses at Gettysburg.—Criticism on the Battle.

FROM Chancellorsville and the Wilderness both armies returned to their old positions on opposite banks of the Rappahannock.[1] Hooker meditated repeating, with some modifications, the attempt in which Burnside had failed.[2] He proposed to pass the river at Franklin's Crossing, and assail the enemy's intrenchments in front; for he could not anticipate that with their inferior force they would come out of their strong works, and meet him on

[1] For this campaign and the ensuing ones in Virginia, the full reports of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia are wanting. If they were ever made, I have not been able to gain access to them. I presume that they were among the lost archives of the Confederacy. General Lee, a few days after the battles of Gettysburg, made a Preliminary Report, which will be found in the *Rebellion Record*, vol. vii. Some months later he made a somewhat more detailed report. This, I believe, has never been printed. For a MS. copy of it I am indebted to Mr. William Swinton. It, however, adds little to the information contained in the earlier Report. I find no reports from corps, division, and brigade commanders. The testimony given before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War is the best authority upon the Union side. This (cited as *Com. Rep.*, ii.) will be found in the first volume of the second series of this Report. Not a few of the newspaper accounts of this battle, Northern and Southern, are very accurate. From these sources the following account has been mainly drawn.

[2] "As soon as I heard that General Sedgwick had recrossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position where it was, and believing that it would be much more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed to recross the river."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 134.

the open plain. This was an enterprise which he had before pronounced to be wholly impracticable. It is vain to inquire what had happened within the week to make the project more feasible. His army had been much reduced by the departure of the nine-months' and two-years' men. On the 13th of May he informed the President that his "marching force of infantry was cut down to 80,000 men;" he added, "I hope to commence my movement to-morrow; but this must not be spoken of to any one." Lincoln replied that he did not think any thing was to be gained by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock; still, if Hooker believed that he could renew the attack successfully, he would not restrain him.[1] Whatever the proposed movement was, it was not attempted.

The result at Chancellorsville had inspired the Confederates with the most unbounded confidence. There was a universal clamor that the invincible army of Virginia should assume the offensive, carry the war beyond the bounds of the Confederacy, and conquer a peace upon Federal soil. To do this, it was necessary that the entire force, except what was engaged upon the Mississippi, should be concentrated in Northern Virginia. Before the close of May it became evident to Hooker that some great operation was in contemplation. Longstreet's three divisions, which had been engaged south of Richmond, were brought up one by one toward the Rappahannock. During the month of April he had been besieging Peck at Suffolk. But on the 2d of May, the ominous tidings that Hooker had advanced upon Lee caused Longstreet to abandon the siege, and put his force upon the march northward. The issue at Chancellorsville caused the movement to be suspended, and the force moved slowly by separate divisions. During the first week of June the whole army was concentrated near Culpepper, with the exception of A. P. Hill's division, which was left at Fredericksburg to mask the contemplated movement. Hooker, discovering that something was in progress, sent over on the 5th of June a part of Sedgwick's corps for the purpose of observation. Hill made such a display of his troops as to convince Hooker that the force in his front was not seriously diminished. Prisoners reported that the movements were merely a change of camps. Hooker indeed suspected that the van of the Confederate column would be heading toward the Potomac, while its rear was still left at Fredericksburg. He asked permission in that case to cross the river and fall upon their rear: this was refused, Halleck deeming that it would be perilous to permit the main force of Lee to move upon the Potomac, while the Union army was attacking a part of it in an intrenched position. The President concurred in this view, couching his opinion in his own quaint language.[2] But if it was Hooker's purpose to cross at Banks's Ford or the United States Ford, instead of marching right upon the front of the Confederate intrenchments, one can hardly see how he could have failed to inflict serious damage upon their rear, which would be thus severed from the main body at Culpepper, sixty miles away. Hooker in the mean time had learned that the Confederate cavalry at least was concentrated at Culpepper, and, in order to break up their camps, sent Pleasonton with two brigades of cavalry and 3000 infantry in that direction. This force ascended the north bank of the Rappahannock on the 9th of June, and marched in two columns toward Culpepper. The columns soon found themselves in presence of the enemy in large force, both of cavalry and infantry. A succession of sharp skirmishes ensued, lasting from early morning until late in the afternoon. The loss was about equal, four or five hundred on each side; but Pleasonton, finding himself confronted by superior numbers of both arms, retreated. Lee claims to have taken 400 prisoners; Pleasonton claims to have taken 200. This movement, and subsequent reconnoissances, which showed that the enemy were moving into and down the Valley of the Shenandoah, clearly indicated that they were bent either upon interposing between Hooker's army and Washington, or crossing the Potomac and invading the North.

Lee's design was first to detach Hooker from his strong position at Fredericksburg, then to free the Valley of the Shenandoah from the Union force which had occupied it during the winter and spring, "and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac." He also hoped that there would be an "opportunity to strike a blow at the army commanded by Hooker;" or, in any case, that "this army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and perhaps would draw with it troops from other quarters; and so their plans of the campaign would be disarranged, and a part of the season for active operations would be consumed in forming new combinations."[3]

Apart from these purely military reasons, there were grave political motives for an invasion of the North. A numerous party, and one active even beyond its numerical strength, had bitterly opposed the war. The Emancipation Proclamation had concentrated and intensified this opposition. During the hundred days which intervened between the announcement of Lincoln's purpose to put forth this proclamation and its actual issue, elections had been held in ten of the states of the Union. In these states Mr. Lincoln had, in 1860, a majority of more than 200,000; now the opposition majority was 35,000. In 1860 these states had sent 78 Republican and 37 Democratic representatives to Congress; now they elected 51 Administration and 67 Opposition members. This change was specially notable in the large states. New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, which had sent 65 Republicans and 34 Democrats, now returned 40 Administration and 59 Opposition members. In Ohio Clement C. Vallandigham had been arrested on account of a speech in bitter denunciation of the war; had been tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to imprisonment in a fortress until the close of the war. This sentence was commuted by the President to banishment into the Confederacy. A great Democratic meeting was held at Albany, in which the leaders of the party in the State of New York inveighed bitterly against this proceeding; and at home Vallandigham was nominated by acclamation as the Democratic candidate for Governor of Ohio. At the time no one doubted that he would be elected. No one could dream that a state which had just sent to Congress 14 Opposition and but 5 Administration representatives would in a few months give a majority of a hundred thousand for the administration; nor could any one presume that a very large portion of the members of Congress elected as opposition would range themselves on the side of the administration in upholding the war. The draft, moreover, which was soon to go into effect, was vehemently denounced, declared to be unconstitutional, and threats were openly made that its enforcement would be violently resisted. There was fair occasion for the South to be persuaded that any great success gained over the Union army would elicit such a feeling throughout the North that the government would be compelled to desist from the prosecution of the war. "It was hoped," says Lee, "that, in addition to military advantages, other results might be attained by the success of our army." Nor was this opinion that the people of the North were becoming weary of the war confined to those whose interests and feelings were so strongly enlisted. The British minister at Washington had six months before shared in this opinion, and so informed his government.[1] Since then an almost uninterrupted series of successes had been gained by the Confederates. They had defeated Burnside at Fredericksburg, and foiled Hooker at Chancellorsville; Vicksburg and Charleston still held out against all the Federal assaults; none of the operations on the Lower Mississippi and the Gulf had succeeded; the capture of Galveston had given all Texas into the hands of the Confederates; the Alabama and the Florida had swept American commerce from the high seas. Saving the few miles occupied by the main armies, the Union forces actually held no part of the Confederate territory of which they had taken possession. During the first six months of the year 1863 it seemed as though the tide of success had fully set in favor of the Confederacy, and it appeared that nothing but a successful invasion of the North was wanting to secure its final triumph, recognized by all the great powers of Europe.

The invasion once determined upon, the entire disposable strength of the Confederacy was placed at the disposal of Lee. Southern Virginia and North Carolina were almost stripped of troops, to augment the Army of Northern Virginia. By the middle of June, when the movement toward the North was fairly commenced, Lee found himself in command of a force of fully 100,000 men of all arms.[2] This was divided into three corps, commanded by Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Ewell, the cavalry being under Stuart. The advance of this great army was made with a deliberation in strong contrast with the hurried invasion of Maryland the year before.

Hooker, having learned of the advancing movement on the 12th of June, withdrew his army from opposite Fredericksburg, and moved northward so

[1] *Com. Rep.*, ii., 105.

[2] "In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight in intrenchments, and have you at disadvantage; and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled up on the river, like an ox jumped half way over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."—*Com. Rep.*, ii., 155.

[3] *Lee's Rep.*

[1] "The success of the Democratic—or, as it now styles itself, the Conservative party—has been so great as to manifest a change in public feeling among the most rapid and the most complete that has ever been witnessed even in this country. . . . The Conservative leaders seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as the will of the people; that he would seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the South, and renounce the idea of subjecting or exterminating them." (*Dispatch of Lord Lyons*, November 17, 1862.)—The minister indeed goes on to say that at that moment "the Conservative party were calling loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war;" but he adds, "I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether." He goes on to affirm that while they "would, if possible, obtain an armistice without the aid of foreign governments, they would be disposed to accept an offer of mediation, if it appeared to be the only means of putting a stop to hostilities."

[2] Pollard (*Lost Cause*, 402) gives the numbers as 75,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. But as the Confederate government never published official returns of the strength of its armies, this statement must be conjectural. I think it fully 10,000 too low. The captured returns (*Ante*, p. 383) are wanting for Lee's army for the month of June, which would have given its strength when this movement commenced. At the close of May the numbers of this army were 88,754 "present," of whom 68,352 were "present for duty." But it is clear that during the ensuing weeks it was considerably augmented. The statement in the text is based upon the following data:

I. It has been shown that after the close of the actions at Chancellorsville, Lee had with him, exclusive of 9000 wounded, 47,000 infantry and artillery, and 3000 cavalry. It may be assumed that of the wounded 5000 would in the ensuing six weeks be able to return to duty. This would give him, apart from re-enforcements, 55,000 men. The re-enforcements consisted mainly of Longstreet's three corps, which had been sent south of Richmond, and rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia late in May and early in June. The captured returns show that in March there were under Longstreet "present for duty," in the Department of North Carolina and South Virginia, 45,103, and in the Department of Richmond, under Elzey, 5789. In June there were in these departments, that of North Carolina now being under D. H. Hill, 25,997, a diminution of almost 25,000. These were all sent to Lee, and, added to his 55,000, would give him 80,000 infantry, apart from new levies raised in the interim. The number of these new levies was certainly very considerable, for we find that the cavalry, which at the close of April numbered less than 3000, had by the middle of June swelled, according to Pollard, to 15,000. It is certain, also, that under the stringent conscription laws very considerable accessions were made to the infantry. For example, we find it specially noted that Pettigrew's entire division, which acted so important a part at Gettysburg, were "raw troops from North Carolina, who had never been under fire," and consequently formed no part of the former Army of Northern Virginia, which had fought on the Peninsula, at Groveton, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. If we allow only 10,000 for the absolute increase of infantry during May and early June, these, added to Lee's 80,000 and the 10,000 new cavalry, would give a sum of 100,000, the number set down.

II. Longstreet (Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, 310) says that when the army was concentrated at Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, it numbered 67,000 "bayonets," that is, privates; adding to these the officers, there would be a total of fully 75,000 infantry and artillery, besides about 5000 cavalry, the remaining 10,000 having been sent elsewhere. This would make the whole force which crossed the Potomac 90,000. As there was a long line, from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, to guard, a considerable number must have been left behind for that purpose. Estimating these at only 10,000, we have fully 100,000 as the original number.

III. As the army passed through Hagerstown it was carefully counted. Of the results of this count we have two reports. Hooker says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 173): "With regard to the enemy's force I had reliable information. Two Union men counted them as they passed through Hagerstown. In round numbers Lee had 91,000 infantry and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with that column were about 6000 cavalry; a portion of the enemy's cavalry crossed the Potomac below Edwards's Ferry; this column numbered about 5000 men." Butterfield, now his chief of staff, as he had been of Hooker's, reported this to Meade (*Ibid.*, 420), who seems to have adopted it as the basis of his estimate (*Ibid.*, 337) of the force opposed to him, although on the day after he took command he had telegraphed to Washington (*Ibid.*, 479) that "Mr. Logan, Register of Wills, and Mr. Preston, 80,000; they counted the artillery, made it 275 guns; 2000 comprise the mounted artillery and cavalry." These two counts, apparently independent of each other, confirm our estimate that the Confederate force which entered Pennsylvania numbered


PENNSYLVANIA
MARYLAND
VIRGINIA
DELAWARE
NEW JERSEY
WASHINGTON
GETTYSBURG
HARRISBURG
YORK
LANCASTER
CARLISLE
CHAMBERSBURG
HAGERSTOWN
FREDERICK CITY
BALTIMORE
PHILADELPHIA
WILMINGTON
READING
WEST CHESTER
ANNAPOLIS
CHESAPEAKE BAY
DELAWARE BAY
POTOMAC R.
SUSQUEHANNA R.
BLUE RIDGE
SOUTH MTN
CATOCTIN MTN
ELLICOTTS MILLS
SCALE OF MILES

BURNING THE BRIDGE OVER THE SUSQUEHANNA, COLUMBIA, PENN.

as to cover Washington. A. P. Hill forthwith left Fredericksburg, and joined the main army at Culpepper. Lee then pushed forward his divisions one by one, and by different routes, all centring upon Winchester, the key of the lower valley of the Shenandoah. Milroy, with 7000 men, had been long lying at Winchester. On the 12th of June he began to get tidings that the enemy were pressing down upon him, in what force he could not learn; but on the next day his doubts were solved by authentic tidings that the Confederates were advancing in overwhelming force. Then was the time to retreat; but this was delayed until the 15th, when, before dawn, he destroyed what he could of his stores, spiked his guns, and started for Harper's Ferry; the Confederates having in the mean while sent a strong force, which gained his rear, while he was also attacked in front. Milroy's whole force was dispersed, and 2300 of them were captured.[1] The others made their way, utterly broken, to and across the Potomac; some of them never halted in their wild flight until they had reached Chambersburg, far into Pennsylvania. Ewell's corps, which had gone on in advance, followed on and entered Maryland, the cavalry pushing as far as Chambersburg.

Lee had supposed that this partial movement would cause Hooker to leave Virginia and cross the Potomac to defend the threatened North, rendering an attack upon Washington feasible. But Hooker was not entrapped by this manœuvre, and kept his army near the old battle-field of Manassas, effectually covering Washington. Lee now began to move the corps of Hill and Longstreet down the Valley of the Shenandoah, along the west side of the Blue Ridge, Hooker being on the east side. The cavalry of each army, sent out as feelers, came into frequent collision, sometimes in considerable force, the advantage, on the whole, being with the Federals.[2] Lee hoped by all these movements to draw Hooker farther from Washington, which had now become his base, and even to induce him to pass the Blue Ridge and venture an attack. The opportunity seemed, indeed, a favorable one. For some days the Confederate army was stretched from Culpepper a hundred miles to the Potomac. To strike that long line somewhere seemed feasible. So thought the President. "If," he wrote to Hooker, "the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere; could you not break him?"[3] But Hooker determined not to make the attempt. In his view, the wisest course was to move his army on a concentric but inner circle to that followed by the main body of the enemy, and thus be enabled to thwart his general design, whatever that should prove to be. Any slight advantages which he might hope to gain over portions of the hostile force would be more than counterbalanced by the necessity which would be involved of marching his army away from the point where it was most needed. Although the rear of the Confederate army was so far away from its front, it was moving to unite, and there was no probability that a Union force could strike it strongly any where without encountering a superior force. For the time the true policy was that adopted by Hooker, and thereafter for a time by Meade, to be governed in his operations by those of the main body of the hostile army.[1]

Lee having failed in finding an opportunity to strike a blow at the Union army in Virginia, or inducing Hooker to assail him upon unfavorable terms, now resolved to transform the raiding operations in Pennsylvania into a serious invasion by his whole army. Longstreet's and Hill's corps pushed rapidly to the Potomac. On the 24th and 25th, the river, now so low as to be easily fordable, was passed at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, almost within sight of the battle-field of Antietam, and the columns, uniting at Hagerstown, pressed forward toward Chambersburg. Hooker's course was now clear. On the 26th his army crossed the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, the point where Lee had crossed into Maryland nine months before, and headed toward Frederick City. Lee had advanced so far from the Potomac as to leave his base of communications and supply greatly exposed. Hooker's plan was in the first place to assail these rather than to precipitate a battle; for every day would weaken the invaders, while it would give him new strength. He now, more urgently than ever, urged that every soldier within reach should be added to his available army.

It so happened that there were 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry, under French, who had not long before been put in command there. The place, as we have before seen, was utterly worthless for either side. For all military purposes, these men might as well have been a thousand miles away as at Harper's Ferry. The strength of the two opposed armies was so nearly equal that 10,000 men might make the difference between victory and defeat. The force at Harper's Ferry had been in a manner placed under the command of Hooker; but, in reply to an inquiry whether there was any reason why the place should not be abandoned, and the troops there brought into use, Halleck rejoined that much expense and labor had been incurred in fortifying the works there and thereabout, and he could not approve of their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity. Hooker thereupon sent back to Halleck two dispatches at the same time. One, which was to be shown to the President and the Secretary of War, briefly reiterated his views as to the retention of Harper's Ferry; the other contained his resignation of the command of the Army of the Potomac,[2] evidently intended to be acted upon in case the former should be unavailing. Halleck replied forthwith that Hooker had been appointed to the command by the President, to whom the application for being relieved must be referred. Brief time was taken for consideration, for on that same day, already far advanced into the afternoon, Hooker's resignation had been accepted, and the command of the Army of the Potomac formally assigned to General Meade.

Viewed simply as an isolated act, this sudden resignation of Hooker at a moment when the two armies were inevitably approaching a decisive con-

[1] "In a short time the whole infantry force, amounting to more than 2300 men, with eleven stand of colors, surrendered, the cavalry alone escaping. These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley, the capture of 4000 prisoners with a corresponding number of small-arms, 28 pieces of superior artillery, about 300 wagons, and as many horses. Our entire loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing."—*Lee's Rep., MS.*

[2] "On the 17th the enemy's cavalry encountered two brigades of ours under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and General Stuart was in turn compelled to retire."—*Lee's Rep.* "On the 21st the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. In these engagements the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing."—*Ibid., MS.*

[3] Lincoln to Hooker, June 14th (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 260). Two days later (*Ibid.*, 160) Lincoln recurs to the same topic: "Your idea may be right, probably is; still, it pains me to abandon the fair chance presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line, stretched now from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania."

[1] When A. P. Hill's corps "took up its line of march, following those of Ewell and Longstreet, I was clearly of the opinion that it was my duty to be governed in my operations by those of the whole rebel army, and not a part of it, and accordingly I directed my marches with that view."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 161.

[2] These dispatches both bear date June 27, 1 P.M. They were received almost at the same moment, 2.55 and 3 P.M. (See *Com. Rep.*, ii., 174, 292.)—No. 1. "I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I found 10,000 men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They can not defend a ford of the river; and, as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his Excellency the President."—No. 2. "My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position that I occupy."

flict would seem uncalled for and unjustifiable. The immediate occasion was not of sufficient consequence to warrant a step which involved such grave consequences. But the question now mooted as to the troops at Harper's Ferry was but the culminating point of a long course of discord. Hooker knew that Halleck had opposed and twice defeated his appointment to the command of the Army of the Potomac. He perceived, or thought he perceived, a fixed determination to thwart him in every way.[1] This ill feeling had by this time grown to such a height, and assumed a form so personal, that it was clearly out of the question for the two men to act together in the positions which they occupied. Halleck took early occasion to vent his spite. There was an order prohibiting officers from visiting Washington without permission. Hooker, four days after his supercedure, went to the capital. He had hardly left his carriage ten minutes when he was put under arrest by order of the general-in-chief. How many opportunities were lost, and how many lives sacrificed by the personal ill feeling and professional jealousy which had sprung up among officers high in rank in the army, it would be vain to inquire.

The country and the army were astounded on the 28th of June by the announcement that the command of the Army of the Potomac had been relinquished by Hooker and was conferred upon Meade. Despite the misadventure at Chancellorsville, Hooker still retained the confidence of the soldiers who served under him. There was a kind of self-assured confidence in the man which begat confidence in others. Of Meade, who was so suddenly called upon to replace him, less had been heard than of almost any other corps commander in the army. Just a year before he had commanded a brigade at Cold Harbor. Four days later his brigade made its mark at Frazier's Farm. Glimpses were caught of him at South Mountain and Antietam. At Fredericksburg he won a partial success, but this was lost sight of in the disasters which accompanied and followed. At Chancellorsville, his corps, through no fault of his, hardly touched the fight. He had little of that imposing personal presence to which McClellan owed all, and Hooker much of power. His aspect was that of a scholar rather than of a captain. Those who knew him best could only say that wherever tried he had never been found wanting, but that he had never been subjected to a great trial. If the question had been simply whether Meade should replace Hooker, it would have been difficult to find a man to favor the change. But things had suddenly come to such a condition that a great change must be made at a critical moment. Either Halleck must be displaced as general-in-chief, or Hooker must vacate the command of the Army of the Potomac. The smaller the change at the urgent crisis involved the less of apparent peril, and so Hooker's request to be released from command was promptly granted. What special reasons fixed the choice upon Meade as his successor can only be conjectured. There were no open cliques of generals in his favor, and consequently no ostensible ones against him. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret.[2]

No man in or out of the army could have been more surprised than was Meade when the tidings came that he was appointed to the command. He took upon himself his new duties in a quiet way, which strongly contrasted with the self-distrust of Burnside and the self-assertion of Hooker. The movements planned by his predecessor were carried out by the same staff. Only that the orders were issued over a new name, the army would scarcely have known that it had a new commander. The only important changes made were that Hancock was placed in command of the Second Corps, vacated by Couch's appointment to the Department of the Susquehanna, and Sykes took the Fifth, formerly led by Meade. Reynolds retained the First Corps, Sickles the Third, Sedgwick the Sixth, Howard the Eleventh, and Slocum the Twelfth.

Lee, having crossed the Potomac, pushed rapidly forward into Pennsylvania with his whole force. Cutting loose from its supplies, his army was to live upon the country. But Lee ordered that supplies should be extorted in an orderly manner, upon formal requisitions duly made, payment being tendered in Confederate notes; if these were declined, certificates were to be given showing the amount and value of the property thus taken. If the local authorities neglected to meet these requisitions, the required supplies were to be seized. These requisitions were frequently onerous. Thus the town of York, with but 7000 inhabitants, was called upon, among other things, for 165 barrels of flour, 3500 pounds of sugar, 32,000 pounds of beef, 2000 pairs of boots or shoes, and $100,000 in cash. Probably the whole borough did not contain this amount of stores and money. At all events, only a quarter of the money could be raised.

This formidable invasion aroused the most intense apprehension. Directly after the rout of Milroy at Winchester, the President issued a proclamation calling for 100,000 militia from the nearest states. Of these, Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000, Ohio 30,000, Maryland 10,000, West Virginia 10,000. These were called out for six months, unless sooner discharged. Besides these, the Governor of New York was asked to order out 20,000. Within a few days New York sent nearly 16,000, of whom 14,000 were from the Empire City. Their absence gave opportunity for the fearful riots which ensued in the city of New York about the middle of July. In Pennsylvania, which was immediately threatened, the President's call was slightly responded to. In that state the militia system was so imperfect that there was not a brigade or regimental organization in existence. The governor called for 60,000 volunteers, who would be "mustered into the service of the state for ninety days, but would be required to serve only so much of the period of the muster as the safety of the people and the honor of the state should require." About 25,000 in all responded to these calls from Pennsylvania, but so tardily that not a man of them ever came in sight of the enemy. The Pennsylvania militia did not fire a gun to relieve their state from invasion. Some of the New York regiments came up in time to touch the van of the enemy as they halted in their advance. In New Jersey a few thousand men were raised, and a few companies actually went as far as Harrisburg. About 2000 were furnished by Delaware to guard the railroads in Maryland. The other states which were called upon did absolutely nothing. Before, indeed, any of the militia could be brought up, the battle of Gettysburg had been fought, and the crisis was past; for events had been so shaping themselves as to render a great battle inevitable. The time and place of this was determined more by accident and the physical character of the region than by any purpose on the part of either commander.

The South Mountain, a continuation of the Blue Ridge of Virginia, runs northward through a corner of Maryland far into Pennsylvania. Lee had crossed the Potomac on the west of this ridge, Hooker on the east. The line of march of the two armies was nearly parallel, the mountains between them, and each commander for a few days knew little of the movements of the other. Meade in the mean time followed out the plans conceived by Hooker. Lee, having some days the start, was considerably northward of Meade; Ewell, in the advance, was as far as Carlisle, and preparing to move toward Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, while Longstreet and Hill halted at Chambersburg. Meade had gone about half as far from the Potomac, and was in such a position that, by a rapid march to the west through the unobstructed passes of the South Mountain, which his left column had almost reached, he could throw himself right in the rear of Lee, and effectually cut him off from his supplies, wholly isolating him in a hostile country. Tidings of this movement reached Lee on the night of the 28th of June. He saw at once that the great invasion could be carried no farther, at least until he had destroyed the army which thus hung menacingly upon his flank and rear. The whole Confederate army was thereupon ordered to concentrate toward the enemy. The point of concentration was Gettysburg, beyond South Mountain. Thither Longstreet and Hill were to march eastward from Chambersburg, and Ewell southward from Carlisle.[1] Now Meade's left column, consisting of the corps of Reynolds and Howard — Sickles's corps, though not so far in advance, forming part thereof, with Buford's cavalry, had advanced farther northward than the remainder of the army, and on the 30th were close by Gettysburg. On that morning Meade learned that the enemy were moving against him. He thereupon resolved to concentrate his forces, which were now spread over many miles of country. The natural mode was to withdraw his advance, and bring up his centre and rear. His leading purposes were to compel the enemy to withdraw from the Susquehanna, and then to give or receive battle at the first favorable opportunity. The position which he selected as most likely to be the scene of conflict was on Pipe Creek, a little stream fifteen miles southeast from Gettysburg.[2]

When Lee appointed Gettysburg as the place of rendezvous for his army, he knew nothing of its supreme strategical importance. Meade, also, knew

[1] "Almost every request I made of General Halleck was refused. It was often remarked that it was of no use for me to make a request, as that of itself would be sufficient cause for General Halleck to refuse it. . . . . I may add as my conviction that if the general-in-chief had been in the rebel interest, it would have been impossible for him, restrained as he was by the President and the Secretary of War, to have added to the embarrassment he caused me from the moment I took command of the Army of the Potomac to the time I surrendered it."—Hooker, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 175.

[2] "I have said that there were no "open" cliques in favor of Meade as opposed to Hooker. That there was some secret opposition to Hooker's retention of the command soon after Chancellorsville is clear. On the 14th of May the President writes to Hooker (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 150): "I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true."—General Couch was the ranking officer of the corps commanders. But early in June he was detached from the Army of the Potomac and placed in command of the "Department of the Susquehanna," that is, of Pennsylvania. This change seems to have been quite acceptable to Hooker: "I can give a command to General Couch," telegraphed the Secretary of War to Hooker on the 9th of June; "I can spare General Couch," returned Hooker at once (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 252). Just after the battle of Gettysburg, Halleck notified Couch that Meade had the command of all the troops in the Department of the Susquehanna, and that his orders must be obeyed. To which Couch rejoined: "General Meade's wishes, instructions, and recommendations have been carried out so far as practicable. As I prominently mentioned that officer for his present position, it may be inferred that I would show no lukewarmness in carrying out his orders" (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 501).—Now, as there seems to have been no time between the resignation of Hooker and the appointment of Meade in which Couch, then in Pennsylvania, could have been consulted, it must be presumed that this "prominent mention" by Couch was made at an earlier day.

[1] "Preparations were made for the advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th [so printed, but it should clearly be the night of the 28th; that is, the night before the 29th] information was received that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle."—*Lee's Rep.*

[2] "I determined to move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on both sides of that line as far as I could consistently with the safety and rapid concentration of that army, and to continue my movement until I either encountered the enemy or had reason to believe that he was about to advance upon me; my object being, at all hazards, to force him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna, and meet me in battle at some point. It was my firm determination to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such considerations as must govern every general officer. On the night of the 30th I had become satisfied that the enemy was apprised of my movements; that he had relinquished his hold on the Susquehanna; that he was concentrating his forces, and that I might expect to come in contact with him in a very short time—when and where I could not at that moment tell. I instructed my engineers to select some general ground, having reference to the existing position of the army, by which, in case the enemy should advance upon me across the South Mountain, I might be able, by rapid movement of concentration, to occupy this position, and be prepared to give him battle upon my own terms. The general line of Pipe Creek was selected, and a preliminary order issued notifying the corps commanders that such line might possibly be adopted, and directing them how they might move their corps, and what their positions should be along this line. This order was issued on the night of the 30th of June, possibly on the morning of the 1st of July; certainly before any positive information had reached me that the enemy had crossed the mountain and were in conflict with any part of my force." (Meade, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 330.)—This statement is given in full, as it sets at rest the assertion often made that Meade proposed to retreat before the enemy, and that he was forced to fight at Gettysburg by an unauthorized attack made by Reynolds. His purpose of assuming the line of Pipe Creek was contingent upon circumstances which might or might not arise. It was, as will be seen, accident, so far as any previous purpose on the part of either commander was concerned, that made Gettysburg the scene of the conflict—the speedy occurrence of which, somewhere hard by, had become inevitable, unless, indeed, Lee should consent to retreat without having fairly attempted anything —and this he was by no means inclined to do.



GETTYSBURG.

quite as little thereof. "It was a place," as he told the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, "which I had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now." Yet it would seem that a glance at a map should have revealed its importance. This little town occupies, as it were, the hub of a wheel, from which roads, or spokes, radiate in every direction: northwestward toward Chambersburg; northeastward toward Harrisburg and Philadelphia; southwestward toward the Potomac; southeastward toward Baltimore. Whosoever held Gettysburg, held, if he knew it, the key to a campaign. It so chanced that one soldier had happened to study the topographical features of this region, and he had made up his mind that Gettysburg was the one spot whereat, if so it could be, to have a fight. And it so happened, also, that this man was the only one, who, as things stood, could have so ordered events that the fight should have happened just then and there. That man was Alfred Pleasonton, now commanding the cavalry corps; the man to whom primarily it was owing that the fierce rush of Jackson had been stayed at Chancellorsville. In the distribution of his troopers, he had sent the strongest division, that of Buford, to cover the left flank of the army, that is, Reynolds's column, which was nearest the enemy. His order to Buford was to hold Gettysburg to the last extremity, until the army could be concentrated there.[1] Buford reached Gettysburg early on the morning of the last day of June, in advance of the infantry of Reynolds's column, whereof the First Corps, properly his own, but now under the immediate command of Doubleday, and the Eleventh, Howard's, encamped that night four miles from Gettysburg.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1.

On the morning of the 1st of July Buford pushed his troopers northwestward. At the same time the advance of the Confederate army was approaching from that direction. Lee had moved his force slowly from Chambersburg and Carlisle, not imagining that any considerable Union force was in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, for, as it chanced, Stuart, with his vigilant cavalry, was far away. He had been left behind in Virginia to harass the Union rear, and was then to cross into Maryland. This crossing was made far to the south of the point where Hooker went over, so that Stuart found the whole Union army between him and Lee, and he could reach Carlisle, the place appointed for rendezvous, only by making a wide circuit. When he came there on the 1st of July, he found the place evacuated, and the army on the way to Gettysburg, whither he hastened, but not in time to take any part in the action of the first two days. Reynolds set his command in motion toward Gettysburg. He had evidently discerned the supreme necessity of preventing the enemy from seizing this point.[2] No one who looked upon the ground could fail to perceive this.

The quiet town of Gettysburg nestles in a little hollow ten miles east of the South Mountain range. The surrounding country is rough and broken, granite ridges cropping up all around. This granite had been, in the formative period of the earth's history, flung up through the soft shale, which, worn away by water-currents, left exposed the bare ridges of the harder stone. The general course of these ridges is north and south; they are not continuous for any great extent, and are not unfrequently cast into irregular forms. Looking westward from the town at a distance of half a mile, one sees a long, wooded height, its centre crowned by the buildings of a Theological Seminary, whence it receives the name of Seminary Ridge. Looking southward, at the distance of a mile, is the rounded extremity of another ridge, broken into several separate hills. Ascending the nearest of these, the ridge is seen falling away for a space, then, at the distance of three miles, rising again into a broken spur, closing in a rocky, wooded peak. This whole range bears the name of Cemetery Ridge, for upon it was the burying-ground where rest generations of the dwellers of the quiet town. But now, hard by is a great City of the Dead, made populous in three short days. This ridge, running first northward, then, with a sharp curve, eastward, then, again, bending to the south, is, in shape, not unlike a fish-hook. Each of the rugged hills which rise from the clearly-marked line of the crest bears its own name. That at the extremity of the stem of the hook is Round Top, with Little Round Top its prolongation. Cemetery Hill is at the bend; Culp's Hill forms the barb. These two ridges are now historic, for on Cemetery Ridge the Union Army took its position, the Confederate force being drawn up on Seminary Ridge. The valley between them, half a mile wide at its narrowest point, near the town, then gradually spreading southward to twice that breadth, consists of cultivated fields, interspersed with patches of woodland. In these fields and woodlands, and up the rough slopes of Cemetery Ridge, was waged for two days the mightiest conflict of the war.

On Wednesday morning, July 1, Hill, who, leading the Confederate advance, had encamped the previous night half a dozen miles west of Gettysburg, learned, to his surprise, that the town was occupied by the Union cavalry. What force of infantry lay behind he could not know. He put his divisions in motion, and sent back to urge forward Longstreet's corps, which was yet fifteen miles in the rear. Buford had meanwhile gone out two

[1] Pleasonton, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 359.

[2] Otherwise we can not explain his conduct in acting in direct contradiction to the order which he had just received to fall back in the opposite direction to Pipe Creek. It was clearly one of those cases in which a subordinate commander was justified in disregarding a positive order, which he knew must have been given in ignorance of the real position of affairs. Sickles, later in the day, did precisely the same thing. He was some fourteen miles behind Reynolds, and had also been ordered to fall back; but, learning that an action was going on at Gettysburg, he marched directly thither. "I assumed," he says, "that this new fact [the action then going on] was not known to General Meade when the order to retreat was issued. The emergency did not admit of the delay that would have been required to communicate with General Meade, who was ten miles distant. I moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility. As soon as I had determined to do that, I sent to General Meade informing him of what I had done, and expressed my anxiety to have his sanction of it. I received a communication from him informing me that he approved of

JOHN BUFORD.

miles in that direction, crossing Seminary Ridge. At nine o'clock Hill's leading division, that of Heth, came upon Buford, who, knowing that Reynolds was on the march, resolved to contest the Confederate advance. Unlimbering the guns of his horse artillery, and deploying his troopers, he held the enemy briefly in check, but was soon forced back to the crest of the ridge. The sound of his guns quickened the march of Reynolds, whose leading division, under Wadsworth, 4000 strong, was now within a mile of Gettysburg. These were soon formed, under fire, in line of battle. The action had scarcely opened when Reynolds fell dead, shot through the head by a rifle-ball. There were but few men who could not have been better spared. There were not wanting those who had begun to look upon him as the most promising general in the Union army. Doubleday, who had come up, now took command; but he brought no re-enforcements to Wadsworth, for the other divisions of Reynolds's corps, and the whole of Howard's, were yet two hours' march behind. For two hours this one division maintained the fight, and then began slowly to give way. The enemy pressed on, a part of Archer's brigade so eagerly that they were isolated. Meredith swung round his "Iron Brigade," and captured 800 men, including their commander. Cutler's brigade of this division was now sorely pressed, and fell back; but two regiments of the Confederates, advancing along a deep cutting for an unfinished railway, were swept upon by a flank movement, and, shut up in this gorge, were forced to surrender. Thus far the contest had been waged between a single division on each side. The balance of success was against the Confederates. The two remaining divisions of Reynolds's corps now came up, closely followed by Howard's corps. Howard assumed command of the field.



THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, GETTYSBURG.

But still heavier re-enforcements were coming up to the aid of Heth. First came Pender's division of Hill's corps, northwestward from toward Chambersburg; then from the north, Ewell from toward Carlisle, pressing down upon the Union right. They struck Robinson's division of Reynolds's corps. Their first blow was unsuccessful, and three North Carolina regiments were captured. Howard, leaving Steinwehr's division of his corps in reserve on the Cemetery Ridge behind Gettysburg, pushed Schurz and Barlow forward to meet the advance of Ewell. The roads by which the Federal troops had advanced diverge from Gettysburg like the spokes of a wheel, so that at each step the line grew thinner and thinner; while the Confederates, coming to the centre along these same spokes, were concentrating at every moment. As the afternoon wore away, Ewell's whole corps, and two thirds of that of Hill, fully 50,000 strong, were steadily pressing down upon the two corps of Reynolds and Howard, numbering at the outset not more than 21,000 men, including the division of 4000 left in reserve, which was not brought forward.[1] Howard now sent back to Sickles, a dozen miles away to the south, urging him to come up to his relief. Sickles

[1] "I do not believe that our force actually engaged, belonging to the two corps, amounted to over 14,000 men. There was a reserve of 3000 or 4000 of the Eleventh Corps, which did not join actively in the fight. It fired some shots from Cemetery Hill, but the most of them fell short into our own front line." (Doubleday, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 309.)—Doubleday adds: "According to the reports rendered to me, we [i. e., apparently Reynolds's corps] entered the fight with 8500 men, and came out with 2450." I suspect that there is here some error in the printing of these figures; for Wadsworth states that in his division "about 4000 men went into action," and that of these, on the next morning, he had but about 1600 men to answer to their names. It is hardly to be supposed that the two remaining divisions of this corps were so greatly inferior in numbers to any of the others. I think it safer, on many grounds, to estimate the six divisions of these two corps at 3500 each.



PLAN OF THE SOLDIERS' CEMETERY AT GETTYSBURG.

THE WHEAT-FIELD WHERE REYNOLDS FELL.

put his corps in motion, but a forced march only enabled him to reach Gettysburg after the action was over.

At an hour past noon, Meade, who, with his column of the centre, was at Taneytown, fourteen miles southeast of Gettysburg, learned that a fight was going on, and that Reynolds had fallen. He perceived "that the matter was being precipitated very heavily upon him." Of Gettysburg himself he knew nothing, and the first thing to be done was to ascertain whether it was a place whereat to give or receive battle. Calling to Hancock, the corps commander in whom he most confided, he ordered him to hurry to the field and take command there. Hancock was outranked by Howard, who was there, and by Sickles, who might be there; but it was no time to regard the niceties of military etiquette. Hancock sprang into an ambulance, that he might study the maps on his way, and in two hours was on the field, in time to see a lost battle, which, indeed, bore the aspect of a rout;[1] for Rodes's division of Ewell's corps had thrust itself right into a wide gap between the right of the First and the left of the Eleventh Union Corps, folding completely around the right of the First, pressing it back toward the Seminary. Here, behind a slight rail intrenchment, a stand was made long enough to permit the trains and ambulances to get off. Doubleday threw his personal guard of twoscore men into the Seminary building, whose quiet walls had never before witnessed any thing more stirring than debates upon points of theological controversy. But by this time the whole region was filled with the advancing lines of the enemy, double, sometimes triple. When the remnants of this gallant corps finally abandoned their position, they fell back to Gettysburg, right between two lines of the enemy. The Eleventh Corps at the same time was driven back to the same point, and the two retreating columns became entangled in the streets. The First Corps, being a little in advance, got well through. The Eleventh was struck heavily by Ewell's advance, and three fourths of the survivors of its two divisions engaged were made prisoners.[2] This battle cost the two Union corps not less than 10,000 men, of whom half were killed or wounded. Well-nigh half of the killed and wounded fell upon Wadsworth's division of 4000, which had for six hours withstood the enemy. The loss of the Confederates was very heavy. Wadsworth thought that his division inflicted more injury than it received.[3]

When Hancock rode up to Gettysburg, he bore with him the responsibility of all that was to follow; for he was charged not only to take the command of whatever force he should find there, but to decide whether that force should fall back, or whether the whole army should be brought forward and concentrated there. In a brief interval, what remained of the First and Eleventh Corps were assembled on the rocky ridge fronting Gettysburg, and presented so imposing an appearance as to cause Lee to hesitate to assail them. Looking back in the light of what is now known, the decision of the Confederate commander was most erroneous; but for one knowing only what he could then have known, it was the only safe one. Of his three corps only two had come up—Longstreet's, the strongest of all, was still behind. What part of the Union force lay upon and behind that rugged ridge he could not know. So the attack was suspended, and the Confederate army paused, waiting to see what the next day should bring forth. Hancock sent back to Meade such a report as to determine him to fight at Gettysburg, and during the night all the army was set in motion for that point. Sickles had already arrived two hours before night set in. Hancock's corps, and Slocum's, with that of Meade, now commanded by Sykes, came up in the morning. Sedgwick's did not reach the ground till afternoon, after a fatiguing march of thirty-five miles.

When the Federal army was finally posted, Slocum was on the extreme right, on Culp's Hill, the barb of the fish-hook; next was the remnant of Wadsworth's division, Howard's corps, on Cemetery Hill; then, along the stem of the hook, the corps of Hancock and Sickles, with Sykes's and Sedgwick's on the extreme left, behind the rocky rampart of the Round Tops. Reynolds's corps, to the command of which Newton had now been appointed, was in reserve behind the centre of the whole line, which was three miles in extent, measured along the ridge; but, owing to its curving form, no part of it was an hour's march from any other. As the line was intended by Meade, two thirds of the entire force could in half an hour have been concentrated upon any point; but by a misapprehension, arising from the nature of the ground, Sickles took a position considerably in advance, and upon this movement hinged the battle of the day. The bulk of the Confederate force was drawn up upon the opposite Seminary Ridge, Longstreet's corps on the right, then Hill's in the centre, that of Ewell on the extreme left, being at the foot of Culp's Hill. This line, forming an exterior curve, was fully five miles long, there being, however, an interval of a mile between Ewell's right and Hill's left. The forces were about equal, each numbering from 70,000 to 80,000 infantry and artillery.[1] The Federal po-

[1] "I arrived on the ground not later than half past three o'clock. I found that, practically, the fight was then over. The rear of our column, with the enemy in pursuit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg. General Howard was on Cemetery Hill, and there had evidently been an attempt on his part to stop and form some of his troops there."—Hancock, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 405.

[2] Lee claims to have taken here 5000 prisoners; these must have been mainly from the Eleventh, for Wadsworth says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 413): "Very few of my division were taken prisoners; but a great many prisoners were taken on the right from the Eleventh Corps, and from one division of the First Corps that went into position on the right."

[3] "I am sure that the slaughter on the side of the enemy was greater than on our own side on the first day. I know that we almost annihilated one or two brigades that came against us." (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 415.)—More than 2000 prisoners are claimed to have been taken from the Confederates.

[1] Meade (in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 337) says: "Including all arms of the service, my strength was



MEADE'S HEADQUARTERS, CEMETERY RIDGE.



LEE'S HEADQUARTERS, SEMINARY RIDGE.



sition was very strong, its chief disadvantage being that a great portion of it was so broken and rocky as to allow not more than a third of the artillery to be brought into position. But this was counterbalanced by the advantage which it gave for infantry.

It was evident that Lee could not, for any time, retain his present position. He was far from his base of supply, and the country around would not long subsist his great army, even could he forage at will, as he had done in the fertile valley of the Cumberland; and, moreover, his foraging parties would be likely to be cut off in the mountain passes.[1] He was then shut up to a choice of one of three things. He must attack the enemy in their strong position, or he must draw them from it by continuing his march, and threatening Washington and Baltimore, or he must retreat to Virginia. The third course would be a complete abandonment of the enterprise which had been so deliberately undertaken; the second was strongly urged by Hood, but it would only be prolonging the suspense, for an action must soon take place somewhere, and the enemy would, beyond all doubt, become stronger every day.[2] He decided upon the first. The controlling reason is doubtless to be found in the temper of his army. They had won a series of great victories; among these they even counted Antietam. At Fredericksburg, with but a fraction of their available force, they had beaten Burnside, though here they had position in their favor. At Chancellorsville, with two thirds of their present numbers, they had foiled and driven off Hooker, whose force was known to be much larger than that now led by Meade. There they had successfully attacked the enemy in his intrenchments; why should they not do so now with equal success? Besides, it would seem that Lee, not without reason, greatly under-estimated the numbers in his front. The force which he had driven back the day before was certainly small, and there was nothing to indicate the great army which had been concentrated during the night, and now lay hidden behind that rocky crest.[3] So Longstreet was ordered to assail the extreme Federal left, while Ewell was at the same time to make a "demonstration on the right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer."[1] The points of attack were fully five miles apart.

Meade had intended, and so ordered, that his line should occupy the ridge directly between Cemetery Hill and Round Top; and from the point where he was, the course of this ridge was plain enough; but this crest, at its centre, where Sickles was to take position, is low, and, sinking down into a valley in front, rises at a few hundred yards into another wooded ridge, running diagonally to the one in its rear. To Sickles this seemed the position contemplated in the order, so he marched out upon it. This movement left a wide gap between him and Hancock, who was to have connected with his right. But he was also to rest his left upon Round Top. Now, as the course of this ridge is such that its extremity is a mile in advance of this hill, Sickles could only fulfill this condition by bending his left back, so that his line described two sides of a triangle. Birney's division formed the left, facing southwestward; Humphreys's division the right, facing northwestward. The Confederate right overlapped the Union left, and, swinging round to attack, completely enveloped it. At four o'clock, Meade, coming to the front, saw the perilous position in which Sickles had placed his corps, and commenced an order to withdraw, but before the sentence was completed the Confederates opened the attack, and it was thought that it was too late for any change of position. Meade determined to support Sickles, even at the hazard of disarranging all his carefully-formed plans. Troops were hurried up from every part of the field: from Slocum on the extreme right, Hancock in the centre, Sykes on the left; Sedgwick, whose corps, wearied by their long march of twenty hours, had been halted in the rear. Hood, in the mean time, had swung round his overlapping right, and penetrated the interval which separated Birney's extreme left from Little Round Top. This steep, rocky ridge, strangely enough, was not occupied. It was the key to the whole position; for, if the enemy could gain it, they could hold it, and a few guns planted there would enfilade the whole line[2] as far as Cemetery Hill. It was to Gettysburg what Hazle Grove was to Chancellorsville. They commenced scaling its rugged sides, for a time meeting no opposition except from its steep ascent. But it so happened that Warren, who, with no troops, had gone out as engineer to survey the field, reached the summit just in time to take in the peril of the situation. Hurrying back, he encountered Barnes's division of Sykes's corps marching out to the aid of Sickles. From this, Vincent's brigade and a single regiment of Ayres's were directed to scale the ridge on the side opposite to that up which the Confederates were climbing. The crest was reached from each side almost at once, the Federals a moment in advance. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued among the gray granite boulders piled up in wild confusion. The Confederates were flung back from the face of the hill, but, working around through the ravine at its base, some of them penetrated between the two Round Tops. Vincent's ammunition was exhausted, but the enemy were driven back by a bayonet charge, and, as darkness began to close in, this vital point was safe. Regiments from the Eastern, the Western, and the Central States were among the little band who, on this barren cliff, rendered possible the victory which was finally to crown the heights of Gettysburg.[3]

about 95,000." This I understand to be the entire force at the commencement of operations; but the losses on the previous day reduced this number by 10,000; the cavalry numbered about 10,000, but these took no part in the action of this day. Longstreet (see *ante*, p. 502) states that when the three Confederate corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, "the morning reports showed 67,000 bayonets," equivalent to about 75,000 officers and men; they had lost on the previous day not far from 5000. The Confederate artillery formed a separate corps, probably 5000 strong. I am not certain whether these are to be included in the 67,000 "bayonets." If they are not, then Lee's infantry and artillery would number about 75,000. Some thousands on each side were left behind with the trains. Thus, of the Confederates, Pickett's division was in the rear, and was not brought upon the field until the next day.

[1] *Lee's Rep.*

[2] "The enemy are here," said Lee to Hood, "and if we do not whip him he will whip us." Longstreet was opposed to making an attack this day; he wished to wait until Pickett's division should come up. "He did not want to walk with one boot off."—These facts were narrated after the close of the war by General Hood to General Crawford, from whom I receive them.

[3] We infer that Lee under-estimated the force of Meade, not only from the fact that he nowhere speaks of the "superior numbers of the enemy," but also from the nature of the attacks which he made on this and the following day.

[1] *Lee's Rep.*

[2] "The enemy threw immense masses upon General Sickles's corps, which, advanced and isolated in this way, it was not in my power to support promptly. At the same time that they threw these immense masses upon General Sickles, a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top Mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last. Immediately upon the batteries opening I sent several staff officers to hurry up the column under General Sykes, of the Fifth Corps, then on its way, and which I had expected would have been there by that time. This column advanced, reached the ground in a short time, and fortunately General Sickles was enabled, by throwing a strong force upon Round Top Mountain, where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued, to drive the enemy from it, and secure our foothold upon that important position." (Meade, in *Com. Rep.*, 332.)—"I went to what is called Bald Top, and from that point I could see the enemy's line of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes's corps; but, before they arrived, the enemy's line of battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it."—Warren, *Ibid.*, 377.) See also Crawford, *Ibid.*, 470.

[3] The regiments which repelled the attack here were the 16th Michigan, the 44th and 140th New York, the 33d Pennsylvania, and the 20th Maine. Vincent was mortally wounded. Early next morning Meade telegraphed to Halleck: "I would respectfully request that Colonel Strong Vincent, 33d Pennsylvania Regiment, be made a brigadier general of volunteers for his gallant conduct on the field yesterday. He is mortally wounded, and it would gratify his friends as well as myself. It was my intention to have recommended him with others, should he live." The Secretary of War replied: "According to your request, Colonel Vincent has been appointed brigadier general for gallant conduct on the field."—*Com. Rep.*, ii., 492.



BREASTWORK IN THE WOODS.



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.



UNION POSITION NEAR THE CENTRE.



SUMMIT OF LITTLE ROUND TOP, JULY 2.



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY 2.

Longstreet, with the remainder of Hood's division, soon joined by that of McLaws, was pressing fiercely upon Birney's division.[1] Sickles was borne from the field with his right leg shattered. Hood was also wounded, losing an arm. Birney's line was so thin that when the enemy attacked any point he was forced to draw regiments thither from other places. Caldwell and Ayres, of Sykes's corps, were sent to his support. They held the ground stubbornly, but were forced back, and their retreat soon became almost a rout.[2] Crawford, with the Pennsylvania Reserves, was now coming up. He ordered a charge with his whole division, himself leading. The color-bearer of his leading regiment had been shot down; Crawford leaned from his horse, snatched the flag, and, waving it over his head, shouting "Forward, Reserves!" dashed down the slope, and met the enemy's skirmishers advancing through the open wheat-field. They recoiled, and then fled back to their line of battle, posted behind a stone wall. Here they made a brief stand, but were driven back, with heavy loss, to a ridge in their rear. Crawford, having advanced without supports, halted, and took position behind the stone wall, the enemy holding the ridge in front and the woods on his left. It was now dusk, and the action closed upon the extreme left.

For a time Humphreys, whose division had formed Sickles's extreme right, had hardly been molested, but in front of him lay Hill's whole corps, ready to be launched upon him at any moment. When Birney found that he could no longer hold his ground, he ordered Humphreys to change front, so as to join with him upon a new line, or rather upon that from which the corps had originally advanced. Just then the enemy, who had opened a sharp artillery fire, pressed down upon his front and both flanks. Humphreys fell back deliberately, although suffering fearfully. In a few minutes he lost 2000 out of his 5000 men. By the time he reached the crest of the Cemetery Ridge the enemy were close upon him. Birney's broken force streamed beyond the crest. But the line had now been formed, patched up, indeed, by brigades from almost every corps. Some of these, as well as Birney's, had been fearfully cut up. The Confederates surged up against this line, but were encountered with a fire so fierce that they halted, then recoiled. Hancock now ordered a counter-charge. Humphreys's men, who had never broken, turned and joined in the charge. The enemy had exhausted the impulse of their onset, and were driven back to the position where they had fallen upon Sickles.

Ewell's demonstration on the right was delayed until the fight on the left was drawing to a close. Most of Slocum's corps had been brought away from Culp's Hill, and the Confederates succeeded in effecting a lodgment within the exterior intrenchments of the extreme Union right. Elsewhere the assault was repelled.

The Federal losses on this day were fully 10,000 men, of which three fifths fell upon Sickles's corps, which lost fully half its numbers.[3] The Confederate loss could not have been less, and was probably somewhat greater. The action of this day had decided nothing as to the ultimate issue. Lee indeed held the advanced line from which Sickles had been driven, but it was a line which Meade had never intended to occupy, and from which he would gladly have receded without a fight. Ewell's foothold upon the left had no significance unless it could be extended. Cemetery Ridge, from Round Top to Culp's Hill, remained intact. Still these "partial successes" encouraged Lee to hope that a stronger assault the next day might prove successful.[4]

FRIDAY, JULY 3.

Lee's general plan of attack was the same as that on the preceding day. Ewell was to press his advantage on the extreme right, while the main assault was to be upon the centre. But at daybreak Meade assumed the offensive against Ewell, and after a sharp contest, which lasted all the morning, drove him from the foothold which he had won within the Federal intrenchments on the extreme right. Now this point was fully two miles from the Seminary, where Lee had taken his post, and wholly hidden from it by the intervening heights. By some strange accident he received no tidings of the mishap which had befallen Ewell, and which, in the result, neutralized that third of the Confederate army on their left, leaving Meade at liberty to use almost his whole force, if need were, at any point. Supposing that Ewell would be able to aid by a strong demonstration, if not by a direct attack, upon the Union right, Lee resolved to assail the left centre, which held the low ridge between Cemetery Hill and Round Top.

All the morning was spent in preparation. The Confederate line along Seminary Ridge afforded an admirable position for artillery. Here, directly in front of the Union centre, at the distance of a mile, were concentrated a hundred and twenty guns. A great part of the Union line was so rugged that artillery could not be brought upon it, so that, although Meade had three hundred guns, he could reply with only about eighty at the same time. At an hour past noon the Confederates opened with all their batteries. For two hours, from a space of less than two miles, there was an incessant cannonade from two hundred guns. Upon no battle-field in the world's history had such a bombardment been witnessed. The Confederate fire told fearfully upon the Federal guns; many were disabled, but their place, as well as that of those which had expended their ammunition, was supplied by others brought up from the rear. The infantry, sheltered behind the crests, suffered little. The contest was not to be decided by artillery. At length Hunt, the chief of artillery, ordered the fire to be slowly slackened, partly "to see what the enemy were going to do, and also to make sure that there should be a sufficient supply of ammunition to meet the attack,"[1] of which this cannonade was the sure prelude.

It was now three o'clock. Lee, supposing that the Federal batteries had been silenced and the infantry disordered, now slackened his fire, and at the instant his infantry columns emerged from the woods which crown Seminary Hill and advanced down its slope. Pickett's strong division of Longstreet's corps had early that morning come upon the field. They were veteran Virginians, and had not been engaged. To them, supported by Wilcox, was assigned the right of the attacking force; Heth's division, supported by two brigades, had the left.[2] Lee had proposed to advance his artillery to the support of his infantry, but found too late that it had expended its ammunition.[3] In all, the attacking columns numbered about 18,000 men. They marched down the slope and across the plain in compact order and swiftly, but not with the fierce rush and wild yells which were wont to mark the Confederate onset. Never upon any stricken field since when, at Wagram, Massena wedged his column between the Austrian lines, was a more imposing spectacle than that now presented to friend and foe, watching from opposite crests, as this great column pressed on. All the Federal batteries from Round Top to Cemetery Hill opened upon them. Great gaps were plowed in their lines only to be closed again. At first the column headed for the left of the Union centre. Here Doubleday was posted. His division, which had suffered fearfully on the first day, had been strengthened by Stannard's Vermont brigade, and now numbered 2500 men. They were in lines five deep, and well strengthened by hasty intrenchments of rails and stones. The Confederates turned a little to their left, where Hancock's corps lay only two lines deep. In making this movement, Pickett's right wing, bending to his left, exposed his centre to a flank fire from Stannard, which threw it into some confusion,[4] and was the first of the disasters crowded into the space of a few minutes. Still the column pressed on, galled by artillery in front, and obliquely from batteries on Round Top and Cemetery Hill. Hancock's infantry withheld their fire until the enemy were within three hundred yards, and then poured in volley after volley. Pettigrew's division, on the left, first meet this sheet of flame, melted away before it like a snow-bank, and in five minutes were streaming back in wild confusion, leaving, besides their dead, a third of their numbers prisoners. Wilcox, meanwhile, had not advanced, and, Pettigrew being routed, Pickett's division was left alone, but undaunted. Their fierce onset struck first upon Webb's brigade, which, posted behind a low stone wall, occupied Gibbon's front line.[5] They broke this, and charged right among the batteries, where a fierce hand-to-hand struggle took place. The officers on each side fought pistol to pistol, the men with clubbed muskets. Gibbon, as it chanced, was a little to the right, urging the regiments there to follow Pettigrew's routed troops, and was struck down. Webb's brigade fell back from the stone wall over which the assailants were surging, but only to the second line behind the crest. Gibbon had a little before sent Lieutenant Haskell to Meade with tidings that the enemy were upon him. He was returning, and had just reached the brow of the hill, when he met Webb's brigade falling back. Without waiting to find Gibbon, Haskell rode to the left, and ordered the whole division to the right to meet the advancing foe. At that critical moment the virtual command was exercised by this young lieutenant.[6] The troops "came up helter-skelter, every body for himself, their officers among them," the only thought being to throw themselves into the breach. All that mortal men could do to win victory was done by Pickett's veterans in the five or ten immortal minutes which followed the instant when their battle-flags flaunted above the stone wall. Of his three brigade commanders, Garnet lay dead and Armistead fatally wounded within the Union lines, and Kemper was borne off to die; of fifteen field officers but one was unhurt. But all was vain; they were checked in front, and a murderous fire was poured into their flank. To advance, stand, or retreat was impossible; they flung themselves upon the ground with hands uplifted in token of surrender. Of that gallant band not one in four escaped; the others were dead or prisoners.

The few shattered remains of Pickett's and Pettigrew's commands were flying wildly to the rear, pelted by the Federal artillery and by that of the Confederates, who opened fire from all their batteries.[7] Wilcox, who had

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[1] It must be borne in mind that a "division" in the Confederate army corresponded nearly to a "corps" in the Federal army.

[2] "I heard the cheers of the enemy, and looking in front across a low ground, I saw our men retreating in confusion; fugitives were flying across in every direction; some of them rushed through my lines. The plain in front was covered with the flying men. A wheat-field lay between two masses of wood directly in my front. The enemy in masses were coming across this field, driving every thing before them."—Crawford, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 470.

[3] On the 10th of June this corps numbered 11,898; on the 4th of July there were but 5766, a loss of 6132. It took no active part in the action of July 3.—*Com. Rep.*, ii., 428.

[4] "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held [that is, on Thursday] a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. After a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. These partial successes de-

[1] Hunt, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 451.

[2] Heth's division was now commanded by Pettigrew.

[3] "The enemy's fire slackening, Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's division in two lines, Pickett's division on the right; Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scale's brigades, under General Trimble. . . . Our batteries, having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. This fact was unknown to me when the assault took place."—*Lee's Rep., MS.*

[4] "The prisoners state that what ruined them was Stannard's brigade on their flank, as they found it impossible to contend with them in that position, and they drew off all in a huddle to get away from it."—Doubleday, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 310.

[5] Hancock in this action took charge of the whole line of battle, leaving Gibbon in command of the Second Corps.

[6] "There was one young man on my staff who has been in every battle with me, and who did more than any other one man to repulse that last assault at Gettysburg, and he did the part of a general there, yet he has been [April, 1864] only a first lieutenant until within a few weeks. I have now succeeded in getting the Governor of Wisconsin to appoint him to a colóneley, and I have no doubt he will before long come before the Senate for a star."—Gibbon, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 445.—He never came before the Senate for a star; among the killed at Cold Harbor not two months later we read the name of the gallant Colonel Franklin A. Haskell, 36th Wisconsin.

[7] "As soon as that attack was over, and the enemy saw that their men had given up, they opened their batteries at once, upon their own men and ours at the same time, and after that cannonade they formed another column of attack, which advanced, but more upon our left."—Hunt

not advanced, moved forward as if to renew the assault. But he was checked by a hot artillery fire, and never came within musket-shot of the Union line. To Stannard, who had struck the first sharp blow in this fight, it was reserved to strike the last. He launched two regiments upon the retreating force, and cut off some hundreds from its rear.

Meanwhile Ewell on the Confederate left, and Hood and McLaws upon the right, lay wholly inactive. Hood had been held in check by Kilpatrick's cavalry upon his rear, and by Crawford upon what was now his flank. The cavalry had indeed made a sharp attack upon Hood, which, though disastrous to them, had much to do with the fortune of the day. Farnsworth's brigade leaped a fence and charged up to the very muzzles of a Confederate battery, from which they were repulsed with heavy loss, their commander being among the killed.[1]

After the decisive repulse of the Confederate assault there were yet three hours of daylight. Meade rode to the left of his line and ordered Sykes to advance his corps. Crawford, who had held the position which he had won the night before, pushed a few regiments into the wood in his front. They struck Hood's foremost brigade, which broke and fled, running over another brigade which had thrown up strong intrenchments. These also fled without firing a shot, and Hood's whole division fell back a mile, leaving two or three hundred prisoners and 7000 stand of arms. Many of these had been flung away the previous day by Sickles's corps; these were piled up in heaps in order to be burnt.[2] But before the widely-scattered corps could be concentrated night was approaching, and the order for pursuit was countermanded.

Another scene in the great drama of the war was being enacted twelve hundred miles away. At the very moment when the Confederate column started upon its march to death two guns were fired from the confronting lines at Vicksburg. They were the signal that Grant and Pemberton were approaching to confer upon the terms of surrender for that strong-hold. During that hour in which two armies were struggling upon the heights of Gettysburg, those two men, seated apart in the shade of a great oak, were debating upon the conditions upon which the great Western prize should pass from the hands of those who had so long and stoutly held it into the hands of those who had so long and stoutly sought to win it. At the moment when the fragments of the Southern army streamed back in wild rout from the Northern cliffs, the great river of the West was permitted to run unvexed to the sea. The same shadow on the dial marked the time of the defeat at Gettysburg and the virtual surrender of Vicksburg.

When the Confederate army had, apparently, firmly established itself in Pennsylvania, it was thought that a favorable opportunity was presented to open negotiations with the Federal government. Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President, had offered to proceed to Washington as a military commissioner. On this 3d of July he set out, bearing a letter signed by Jefferson Davis as Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces, addressed to Abraham Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In case the President should refuse to receive a letter thus addressed, Mr. Stephens was to procure a duplicate of it, addressed to Lincoln as President of the United States, and signed by Davis as President of the Confederacy. Apparently there was no political purpose involved in this mission. Its ostensible object was to enter into stipulations by which the rigors of war might be mitigated; but it can not be doubted that it was undertaken just at this time in the confident persuasion that Lee had met with such success in the invasion of Pennsylvania as would dispose the Federal government to consent to negotiations of wider scope. But, while Stephens was awaiting permission to pass the Union lines, tidings came of the great victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and the government refused to receive the commissioner, declaring that "the customary agents and channels are adequate for all needed communications and conference between the United States forces and the insurgents."

When Lee saw the remnants of Pickett and Pettigrew rushing back from their fruitless assault, he perceived that all hope of successful offensive operations had vanished. "We can not expect always to win great victories," he said. He could only hope to avoid a total rout. He contracted his lines from the right and left toward the centre, expecting and perhaps hoping to be attacked in turn.

When morning broke it became a matter of grave doubt with Meade what course to pursue. That the enemy had suffered severely was certain, but how severely could not be known. His own losses were great, and were supposed to be greater than they were. The corps commanders made hurried estimates of their remaining force. These summed up only 51,514 infantry.[3] A council of war was held, to which Meade propounded four questions: Shall the army remain at Gettysburg? If we remain, shall we resume the offensive? Shall we move upon him by way of Emmettsburg? If the enemy is retreating, shall we pursue on his direct line of retreat? The decision was to remain.[1] During the day a heavy rain set in, and at nightfall Lee, finding that an attack would not be ventured upon his position, began his retreat to the Potomac. This having been discovered on the morning of the 5th, Sedgwick's corps, which had not been engaged, was dispatched to follow him up and ascertain his whereabouts. After a march of eight miles he found their rear-guard strongly posted in the mountain passes, where a small force could hold him in check for a long time, and thought it unadvisable to pursue upon that road. Meade thereupon decided, on the 6th, to follow Lee by a flank movement, by way of Frederick and Boonesboro, involving a march of eighty miles, to Williamsport, on the Potomac, whither Lee was clearly heading. Lee, having but forty miles to march, reached the river on the 7th. But the stream which he had crossed almost dry-shod a fortnight before had been swollen by the heavy rain, and was unfordable. A bridge which he had flung across had been destroyed by a sudden cavalry dash made by French from Harper's Ferry, and Lee had no alternative but to intrench himself, with his back to the river, and await an attack.

Meade marched slowly, feeling the way with his cavalry, but on the 12th his army came in front of the Confederate lines. He had been strengthened by French with 8000 men from Harper's Ferry; Couch had sent 5000 militia, under W. F. Smith, from Carlisle, and, moreover, considerable numbers were close at hand from Baltimore and elsewhere; but these were nine months' men, just brought from North Carolina and the Peninsula, who had only one or two days more to serve. Meade judged that these would add nothing to the real strength of his army for attack, and left them behind. Still his actual numbers exceeded those of the enemy by quite a half. Meade, although he supposed the enemy to be nearly of his own strength, was disposed to attack at once, but submitted the question to his seven corps commanders. Wadsworth and Howard were in favor of attack, the other five were opposed to it until after farther examination of the position. Meade yielded his opinion, and the next day was spent in reconnoissances. The result was that in the evening an order was issued for an advance of the whole army at daylight. But when morning broke the enemy had disappeared. Lee had succeeded in patching up a bridge, and the river had fallen so that it was barely fordable at a single point. Ewell crossed by the ford, Hill and Longstreet by the bridge. The Confederate army stood once more in Virginia, and the invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which so much had been staked, was at an end.

The Federal loss at Gettysburg was 23,190, of whom 2834 were killed, 13,733 wounded, and 6643 missing. The Confederate loss was about 36,000, of whom 13,733, wounded and unwounded, remained as prisoners. The entire loss to this army during the six weeks from the middle of June, when it set forth from Culpepper to invade the North, to the close of July, when it returned to the starting-point, was about 60,000.[2]

The Confederates were slow to admit the great disaster at Gettysburg. Three weeks after the battle Alexander H. Stephens, in a speech at Charlotte, N. C., declared that "General Lee's army had whipped the enemy on their own soil, and obtained vast supplies for our own men, and was now ready to again meet the enemy on a new field. Whatever might be the movements and objects of General Lee, he had entire confidence in his ability to accomplish what he undertook. He would come out all right in the end. The loss of Vicksburg was not an occurrence to cause discouragement or gloom. It was not as severe a blow as the loss of Fort Pillow, Island No. 10, or New Orleans. The Confederacy had survived the loss of these points, and would survive the loss of Port Hudson and other places. If we were to lose Mobile, Charleston, and Richmond, it would not affect the heart of the Confederacy. After two years' war the enemy had utterly failed, and if the war continued two years longer they would fail. So far they had not broken the shell of the Confederacy."[3]

Meade, having determined "to act on the defensive, and receive the attack of the enemy, if practicable," his dispositions for the battle were to be mainly determined by the movements of the enemy. He must place his force so as to meet the assault, at whatever point it should be made, only, of course, holding the strong points of his position. It is incomprehensible, therefore, why, during all the day of July 2, the Round Tops were left wholly unguarded; for this, as Meade clearly states, was "the key-point of my whole position. If the enemy had succeeded in occupying that, it would

[1] "I have always been of the opinion," says Pleasonton (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 360), "that the demonstration of cavalry on our left materially checked the attack of the enemy on the 3d of July, for General Hood was attempting to turn our flank when he met Farnsworth's and Merritt's brigades of cavalry; and the officers reported to me that at least two divisions of infantry and a number of batteries were held back, expecting an attack from us on that flank."—Gregg, also on the right, engaged Stuart's troopers, who had now, after a wide detour, come upon the field in that quarter. In modern warfare, the great results of a campaign, when brought to an issue upon a stricken field, are decided by the shock of infantry and artillery—the hands of an army; the services of cavalry—its eyes, being mainly preliminary. If, in narrating a great campaign, the historian could detail every striking episode, he would find in this campaign nearly a score of cavalry encounters, any one of which in the earlier stages of the war would have ranked as a battle.

[2] Crawford, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 471, and private statement.

[3] First Corps, 5000; Second, 5000; Third, 5676; Fifth, 10,000; Sixth, 12,500; Eleventh, 5500; Twelfth, 7838. These corps had marched from the Rappahanock 78,245 strong (Butterfield, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 428), and had been re-enforced by fully 6000. This would give a loss of fully 33,000, besides that of the cavalry, which had been considerable, Buford's division having been so severely cut up on the first day that it had been sent to Westminster, twenty miles to the rear, to protect the trains and to recruit. (Pleasonton, *Ibid.*, 359.)—This estimated loss was, however, half greater than it actually proved to be. "This," says Butterfield (*Ibid.*, 427), "is always the case after a battle. A great many commanders come in and say that half their force is gone; the colonel reports that half his regiment is gone; that is reported to the brigade commander, who reports that half his brigade is gone, and so on."

[1] Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren were for remaining for a day, and await the development of the enemy's plans; Slocum and Pleasonton were for a direct pursuit of the enemy, if he were retreating; Newton would move by way of Emmettsburg; Howard was doubtful.—See Butterfield, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 427; Birney, *Ibid.*, 368.

[2] The statement of the Union loss and of the number of Confederate prisoners is unquestionable, being given in Meade's official report. Of the Confederate losses no reports were published, and probably none were ever rendered, for Lee, in his report, says that he is not able to give them. Recourse must therefore be had to collateral evidence. The only point absolutely fixed is the report of numbers on July 31 (*ante*, p. 383), which shows that on July 31 there were "present for duty 41,000 men." If we accept Pollard's statement that this army set out 90,000 strong, the loss would be nearly 49,000. If our estimate of 100,000 as the original strength be accepted, the loss will be 60,000. This includes not only the losses at Gettysburg, but those incurred by casualty and wastage in the march from Culpepper to Gettysburg and back, which must have amounted to many thousands. Lee especially notes that the cavalry suffered severely from toil and privation. Farther, if we accept the estimate of the forces actually present at Gettysburg, based upon Longstreet's statement (*ante*, p. 502), at 80,000, the losses of all kinds from July 1 to 31 would be 39,000, including those incurred from wastage and skirmishes on the way back from the Potomac to the Rappahannock; allowing 3000 for these, there remain 36,000 for Gettysburg and the days immediately following. Of this 14,000 prisoners, we judge from various indicia that 8000 were unwounded—1500 captured on the field on the 1st of July, 5000 on the 2d, and 1500 in the pursuit. This leaves 28,000 for killed and wounded. Apportioning these in the same ratio as in the Union loss, there will be about 5000 killed and 23,000 wounded of the Confederate army.

[3] *Richmond Dispatch*, June 25.

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have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last;" and it was only "fortunately that General Sykes was enabled, by throwing a strong force upon Round Top Mountain, where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued, to drive the enemy from it, and secure our foothold upon that important position."[1] It was, indeed, a fortunate accident that a division of Sykes's corps, who were marching in quite a different direction, happened to be near enough to reach the summit of Round Top as the enemy were on the point of gaining it. "They arrived barely in time to save it, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it."[2] Again, if the advanced position taken by Sickles was as disadvantageous as it seemed to Meade, one may wonder why he was not withdrawn. The enemy were indeed advancing to the attack, but there was as yet some space between, and it would seem to have been easier to withdraw from an untenable position than to be driven from it.[3] It is not easy to comprehend why Sedgwick's corps, stronger by half than any other one in the army, took no active part in the action of either day,[4] or, at least, was not held in such a position that, when the enemy broke and fled at the close of the action, it could have been launched in pursuit,[5] for there was yet three hours of daylight.

But, granting that it was not advisable to pursue and assail the enemy in the position of unknown strength which he occupied on the evening of the 3d, there can be little hesitancy in condemning Meade's failure to follow when it had been ascertained that Lee was in full retreat toward the Potomac. To make a wide detour with the expectation of striking him on the flank was equivalent to declining a battle; for Lee had so far the start that he reached the river at the same time that Meade began his flank march of eighty miles. He would have crossed at once, had he been able; but the stream, swollen by rains, was not fordable, and his only bridge had been destroyed. The Confederate army was in bad plight, and looked eagerly for the falling of the waters.[6] When, upon the 12th, Meade came up with the enemy, he had every chance in his favor. He was in superior force; his army was in excellent condition and in high spirits; the enemy could not be other than wearied and disheartened. If the attack was unsuccessful, it could amount to no more than a check, for he could fall back to the South Mountain, where he would be unassailable; but if the assault was successful, the Confederates would be ruined, for they had at their back a swollen river, which they had no means of crossing. Meade was minded to fight; he had come for that purpose; but, unfortunately, he submitted the question to a council of war. He had been hardly a fortnight in command, and would not assume the responsibility of acting in opposition to the views of his corps commanders, so he yielded his opinion to theirs;[7] unwisely as it seems to us, wisely as he was himself afterward convinced.[8] When, after spending a day or two in reconnoitring, he ordered the attack to be made at daybreak on the 14th, he was too late. The enemy had crossed, and the swollen Potomac lay between. "The fruit was so ripe, so ready for plucking," said Lincoln, "that it was very hard to lose it." The President, indeed, expressed himself in terms of censure so sharp that Meade asked to be relieved from the command of the army.[9] The request was refused.

The operations of Lee at Gettysburg can be justified, or even explained, only upon the supposition that he was wholly deceived as to the strength of the enemy in his front. He had, indeed, very good reasons to suppose himself to be in greatly superior force. On Wednesday, when he had won a decided advantage, he had clearly two to one on the field. On Thursday morning he was, after his losses, stronger by more than half, and there was nothing in the operations of that day to evince that the Federals had been greatly strengthened. He had, indeed, gained important apparent advantages at two points. Ewell had effected a lodgment within the intrenchments on the Union right. On their left, the Federals had been driven back from what seemed to be a strong part of their chosen line; and though the attack had been finally repelled, still the ground contended for had been won, and was held. Owing to two accidents—the temporary withdrawal of Slocum's corps on the right, and the advance of Sickles on the left beyond the main lines—the Confederates had seen only a force inferior to their own, and it was reasonable to infer that this formed all which could have been brought into action by the enemy. On Friday, every thing, up to the moment of the final charge, confirmed this impression. Lee was ignorant that by noon Ewell had been driven out of the intrenchments which he had won the night before. The fierce cannonade, which was opened an hour after noon, was replied to by little more than half the number of guns, and of these the fire was slackened in such a way as to indicate that the Union batteries were effectually silenced. To suppose that Lee assailed the heights of Gettysburg knowing, or imagining that they were held by an army fully equal in numbers to his own, is to attribute to him a degree of rashness which is belied by his whole military career.

Lee's attack on the last day has been subjected to grave censure. If it was made with a knowledge of the numbers opposed to him, it was wholly indefensible. But it must be judged in the light of what he knew at the time. He was under no necessity of giving or even of receiving battle. The main object of the invasion had indeed failed. There was no chance that he could seize Baltimore or Philadelphia; none, indeed, that he could hold his position in Pennsylvania. But the way of return to Virginia was open to him. He was in a position where a battle which should be less than a victory so great as to involve the destruction of the army opposed to him would have been useless, while a defeat could hardly be other than ruinous. Having decided to attack, the assault should have been made with his whole force. After all his losses he had certainly 60,000 men; his plan of attack involved the use of hardly half of these, including Ewell's proposed demonstration. The main assault was committed to only 18,000.[1] What, asked Longstreet, would have been the result if the assault had been made by 30,000 men instead of 15,000? There can be no doubt that if this attack was to be made, it should have been made by twice the force. Yet, in the light of what we now know, it was well that this was not done. If twice as many men had been sent in they must have equally failed, and with twice the loss. The Confederates only just succeeded in touching the Union line of defense, and from this they were repelled in utter rout by less than a fifth of the force which could have been brought there in another twenty minutes. Only two divisions of Hancock's corps, with a single other brigade, were really engaged.[2] The other division of that corps, together with the corps of Howard, Reynolds, and Sickles, which had been badly cut up during the two previous days, were at hand; Slocum's corps had cleared itself from Ewell at Culp's Hill, on the right, and could have been brought into action on the left; moreover, there was Sedgwick's whole corps, which had not yet even touched the fight. Meade, while holding his right and left, could easily, if need were, have brought 50,000 men to the defense of his centre. What with his artillery, which swept the approach, it is safe to say that no 50,000 or 80,000 men, if they could have been hurled at once upon the Cemetery Ridge, could ever have carried it. "The conduct of the troops," says Lee, "was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserved success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their noble qualities, and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy, has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict." This task, "more than they were able to perform," was imposed upon his votaries by Lee. Upon him, therefore, must rest the blame for the failure to execute it.

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[1] Meade, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 332.

[2] Warren, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 377. See also Crawford, *Ibid.*, 469

[3] Sickles indeed affirms that the position which he took was a good one. He says (*Com. Rep.*, ii., 298): "I took up that line, because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take—as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force—would have rendered our position on the left untenable, and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us." But the enemy did actually take the position held for a time by Sickles at the cost of half his corps, and were only repelled from the very line which Meade had proposed to hold.

[4] "My corps did not take any important part in the battle of Gettysburg. It was frequently sent to different parts of the field to re-enforce and support other troops that were more vigorously engaged."—Sedgwick, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 460.

[5] "I think that our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe that we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the attack would be made. General Meade told me before the fight that, if the enemy attacked me, he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the enemy's flank. I therefore, when I was wounded, and lying down in my ambulance, and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the Fifth and Sixth Corps, I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterward, when I returned to the army, what he had done in the premises. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night, except that some of the Pennsylvania Reserves went out and met Hood's division, and actually overthrew it. There were only two divisions of the enemy on our extreme left, opposite Round Top, and there was a gap of one mile that their assault had left; and I believe that if our whole line had advanced with spirit, it is not unlikely that we should have taken all their artillery at that point. I think that we should have pushed the enemy there, for we do not often catch them in that position; and the rule is, and it is natural, that when you defeat and repulse an enemy, you should pursue him."—Hancock, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 408.

[6] "The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the recent rains as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence. The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but, as he was in condition to obtain large re-enforcements, and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned, was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered, and new boats built. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th."—*Lee's Rep.*

[7] The objections of the council were not to fighting, but to attacking them. "We all," says Pleasonton (*Com Rep.*, ii., 361), "wanted to fight There was one general, General French, I think, who remarked, after General Meade declared that he would not order an attack against the vote of the council, 'Why, it does not make any difference what our opinions are. If you give the order to attack, we will fight just as well under it as if our opinions were not against it.'"

[8] Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 336.

[9] Halleck to Meade, July 14: "I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore." Meade to Halleck: "Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President is in my judgment so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army." Halleck to Meade: "My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved."

[1] It is indeed said that McLaws and Hood, with some 15,000 more, were to have taken part, and that Lee was bitterly indignant at the "slow-footed McLaws" for not coming up. But there is in his report no indication that such was any part of his plan. The wording of it, indeed, seems to exclude any such purpose, and implies that the carrying of Cemetery Heights was intrusted to Pickett and Pettigrew.

[2] "The shock of the assault fell upon the second and third divisions of the Second Corps, and these were the troops, together with the artillery of our line, which fired from Round Top to Cemetery Hill at the enemy as they advanced, whenever they had the opportunity. Those were the troops that really met the assault. No doubt there were other troops that fired a little, but these were the troops that really withstood the shock of the assault and repulsed it. The attack of the enemy was met by about six small brigades of our troops, and was finally repulsed after a very terrific contest at very close quarters."—Hancock, in *Com. Rep.*, ii., 408.