



OCCUPATION OF CUMBERLAND GAP.

which De Courcy threatened from the north. Frazier, who occupied the Gap with four Confederate regiments, was well supplied, and confident of his ability to hold the position. But some of Shackelford's men succeeded on the 7th in creeping through the lines and burning the mill upon which the garrison depended for flour. Burnside arrived in person on the 9th, when Frazier surrendered 2000 men and 14 guns. The pursuit of a small Confederate force under Sam Jones into Virginia completed the long-sought conquest of East Tennessee. The campaign had been accomplished without a single battle.

By the Loyalists along his line of march and at Knoxville Burnside was hailed as a deliverer. His entrance into Knoxville was an ovation which might have flattered the greatest of conquerors. His wayworn troops shared the generous welcome. National flags, long concealed, came forth from the houses, and made the 3d of September seem like a 4th of July.<sup>1</sup> General Burnside captured at Knoxville a large quantity of ammunition, 2000 stand of small-arms, 11 guns, and 2500 prisoners.

#### CHAPTER XXXIV. THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. IV. THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Rosecrans crosses the Tennessee.—Movements of his three Corps.—Bragg retreats from Chattanooga.—Over-confidence of Rosecrans.—Why Burnside did not co-operate.—Bragg's Opportunity.—General Negley's Fight at Dug Gap discovers the Enemy.—Rosecrans alarmed.—Hurried Concentration and narrow Escape of his Army.—The Situation on the Evening of September 18.—Battle of the 19th.—General Thomas strikes the first Blow.—Baird's Repulse; Loss of the "Loomis" Battery.—Enemy driven, and Guns recaptured.—Confederate Attack in the Afternoon; Van Cleve driven; Hazen repulses the Enemy with Artillery.—Pat Cleburne's Night Attack.—Results of the Day's Fighting.—Council of War at the Widow Glenn's.—The

<sup>1</sup> Dr. W. H. Church, of Burnside's staff, thus describes the reception of the troops on the way to and in Knoxville:

"The East Tennessee troops, of whom General Burnside had a considerable number, were kept constantly in the advance, and were received with expressions of the profoundest gratitude by the people, who are described as the most heartily and generally loyal people in the United States. There were many thrilling scenes of the meeting of our East Tennessee soldiers with their families, from whom they had been so long separated.

"The East Tennesseans were so glad to see our soldiers that they cooked every thing they had and gave it to them freely, not asking pay, and apparently not thinking of it. Women stood by the road side with pails of water, and displayed Union flags. The wonder was where all the stars and stripes came from. Knoxville was radiant with flags. At a point on the road from Kingston to Knoxville sixty women and girls stood by the road side waving Union flags, and shouting 'Hurrah for the Union!' Old ladies rushed out of their houses and wanted to see General Burnside, and shake hands with him, and cried 'Welcome, welcome, General Burnside! welcome to East Tennessee!' A meeting of the Union citizens of Knoxville was held, and addressed by General Burnside and General Carter. It was attended by about five hundred men, and a large number of women and children. The demonstrations were not boisterous, but there was intense, quiet rejoicing. Men who had been hidden for months came in, full of gratitude for their deliverance."

Confederate General Longstreet's Arrival.—Battle of the 20th.—Rosecrans's Dispositions.—Bragg's Plan of Attack.—Polk's Delay.—Thomas is hard pressed, but holds his Position.—Longstreet's Attack.—Hindman breaks through the Right of the Federal Line.—How the Gap was made.—Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden swept from the Field.—Extent of the Disorder.—Garfield goes to Thomas.—Formation of a new Line on the Slope of Mission Ridge.—General Negley's Position.—Weakness of the new Line.—Longstreet's Assault delayed.—Granger arrives in time to meet it and to save the Day.—Withdrawal of the Army by Night to Ross-ville and thence to Chattanooga.—Estimate of Losses.—Review of the Campaign.

WE left Rosecrans's army at Winchester, south of Elk River, with its left and rear toward McMinnville well guarded, and its outposts advanced to Pelham and Stevenson. If its progress thus far had been difficult, it was yet mere play when compared with a farther advance across the Cumberland Mountains and the broad Tennessee to Chattanooga, whither Bragg had retreated. A direct attack upon the enemy, strongly intrenched in Chattanooga, was out of the question, even if Rosecrans's army had been a hundred thousand strong. The campaign against Bragg, therefore, necessarily involved an attack upon the railroad running southward from Chattanooga through Dalton to Atlanta. The railroad connecting Chattanooga with the East would very soon be rendered useless to the Confederates by Burnside's advance to Knoxville. The valley through which the Atlanta Road runs could be reached in two ways: westwardly, by turning the head of Sequatchie Valley, or by crossing the valley at Dunlap or Thurman's, and then moving across Walden's Ridge, crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga; or southwardly, by moving across the Cumberland range, crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga, and then the four ranges south of the river—Raccoon, Lookout, Mission, and Taylor's.<sup>1</sup> Rosecrans chose the latter, or southward route, leaving the natural valley from East Tennessee to Northern Georgia open to the co-operative movement which he expected would be undertaken by Burnside.


Upon whatsoever route Rosecrans might advance, there could be little dependence upon the country for forage, none at all for the subsistence of his soldiers. Supplies of food and ammunition sufficient for the campaign must be accumulated before moving, and must be carried with the army, thus increasing the difficulties of the march. The necessity of a long halt after Bragg's retreat was therefore inevitable; yet, strange as it may seem, General Halleck, at Washington, not appreciating Napoleon's maxim that "an army crawls upon its belly," wondered and chafed at this delay, and finally issued a peremptory order directing Rosecrans to advance, and report his progress daily to the War Department.<sup>2</sup> Very fortunately, Rosecrans was

<sup>1</sup> Or, striking farther southward, after crossing the Tennessee, there would be Sand, Lookout, and Pigeon Mountains, and Taylor's Ridge.

<sup>2</sup> The order was issued early in August. On the 4th Rosecrans writes:

"Your dispatch, ordering me to move forward without farther delay, reporting the movement of each corps until I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations, and getting such information





STEVENSON, ALABAMA.



nearly ready to move. He had completed the railroad from Murfreesborough to Stevenson, and thence to Bridgeport, by the 25th of July, and only waited for the opening of the road from Cowan to Tracy City. By straining to the utmost the capacities of the Stevenson Road, he had accumulated by the 8th of August a sufficient quantity of supplies to warrant his immediate advance. The enemy was in no condition to disturb his communications or to resist his advance to the Tennessee. So far, therefore, he was relieved of anxiety. While his own army covered the approaches to his rear and right, Burnside's was more than adequate to the protection of his left.

Sheridan's division had already occupied Stevenson and Bridgeport before Halleck's order was issued. The movement of the main army began on the morning of August 16th. Two of Crittenden's columns crossed the Cumberland Mountains—Palmer by Dunlap, and Wood by Thurman's—into the Sequatchie Valley, while a third, under Van Cleve, struck Pikeville at the head of the Valley. Crittenden's left, in this movement, was covered by Colonel Minty's cavalry. Thomas's and McCook's corps advanced southward to the Tennessee, occupying positions above and below Stevenson, preparatory to crossing the river. Three brigades of cavalry moved on the right, making a long detour by way of Fayetteville and Athens, to guard the river below as far as Whitesburg, about eighty miles from Stevenson.

Crittenden, upon reaching Sequatchie Valley, sent reconnoitring columns of infantry and cavalry across Walden's Ridge, Wagner's brigade and Wilder's cavalry advancing to a point opposite Chattanooga, and shelling the town on the 21st, silencing the Confederate artillery, and creating great consternation among the citizens. Another brigade (Hazen's) had also crossed the ridge farther north, at Poe's, and, with Wilder's cavalry, reconnoitred the country to Harrison's Landing, twelve miles above Chattanooga. The rest of Crittenden's command moved down the Sequatchie to the Tennessee, below Chattanooga.

On the 21st, the whole army, having crossed the Cumberland Mountains, lay upon the right bank of the Tennessee, extending over a line of 150 miles. Along this line the river flows in a southwest direction, forcing its passage through the Cumberland range, and entering Alabama at Bridgeport. The two brigades east of Walden's Ridge were prepared to enter Chattanooga in the event of its evacuation by Bragg; to force this evacuation, or to cut off the enemy from his southern communications, was the work of the main army. The preparations for crossing the river consumed ten days. During this time reconnoissances were made to discover the most available points for this purpose; the pontoons and trains were brought forward, and trestle-work and materials for improvised bridges were prepared with the utmost secrecy. The pontoons were sufficient for only two bridges, and twice that number were needed to secure rapidity of movement. The facility with which the enemy could, from the high spurs abutting on the river, overlook the whole length of the valley, prevented absolute secrecy; this, however, was of little consequence, as the intervening mountains made it impossible for Bragg to oppose any serious resistance to the movements on his left. The troops began to cross on the 29th of August, and by September 4th all were on the south side except a brigade of regulars of Baird's division, left to guard the railroad until it should be relieved by Gordon Granger's reserve corps. The crossing was conducted at four points—Shellmound, the mouth of Battle Creek, Bridgeport, and Caperton's Ferry, at the mouth of Big Crow Creek. The bridge at Bridgeport was the one mainly used for the crossing of trains. Thomas crossed one division at each of the points named; McCook crossed Woods's and Van Cleve's at Caperton's (the lowest crossing), and Sheridan's at Bridgeport; Crittenden (except Wagner's and Hazen's brigades) crossed at Shellmound, at the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Bridgeport. An accident to the bridge at Bridgeport delayed the crossing at that point for four days. The cavalry, under General Stanley, still keeping the left, crossed with McCook at Caperton's.

The plan of Rosecrans's campaign, after crossing the Tennessee, was very simple in its idea, though attended with many difficulties in its execution. Crittenden was to threaten Chattanooga by a direct advance; Thomas was to cross Raccoon Mountain, and seize Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, leading through Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove, twenty miles south of Chattanooga; McCook and Stanley, in the mean time, were to move twenty miles farther southward across the mountains to Valley Head, turning the southern extremity of Pigeon Mountain, and threatening an advance on Rome. Except in its topographical features, this plan was very similar to that adopted by Hooker in his Chancellorsville campaign. In either case the enemy was flanked by the crossing of a river and an advance upon his left and rear. Hooker thought Lee would retreat, falling back upon Richmond or Gordonsville. Rosecrans was equally confident that Bragg, abandoning Chattanooga, would fall back to Rome. Both were alike mistaken; each, finding that the enemy had indeed abandoned his position, but was ready to meet the advance squarely in front, refusing to acknowledge defeat until after the test of battle. But there were three important points of difference between the Chickamauga and Chancellorsville campaigns. Hooker was able to encounter the enemy with nearly double the force of the latter, while Rosecrans, at a greater distance from his base of supplies, accepted battle with the advantage of numerical superiority against him and in Bragg's

favor. Again, Rosecrans had a more difficult country in which to operate, though this was in some degree compensated by the circumstance that the very obstacles in his own way afforded security to his rear. Finally, the sequel of the two campaigns was far different; for, although both Hooker and Rosecrans each succeeded in inflicting greater injury upon the enemy than he suffered himself, yet the former sustained a complete defeat as regarded the object of his campaign, while Rosecrans, retiring from the battlefield of Chickamauga, secured Chattanooga, the professed object of his advance from Murfreesborough.

But in carrying out this comparison we are anticipating our narrative. By the time the last divisions of the army had crossed the Tennessee, Thomas's and McCook's corps were already far advanced. Negley's division had crossed Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley, and was encamped at Brown's Spring; at the foot of the mountain, on the west side, and ready to begin the ascent, was Reynolds's division; Brannan's had reached the summit; Jeff Davis's division, of McCook's corps, had crossed Lookout Mountain into Wills's Valley, seizing Winston's Gap; Johnson's was across Sand Mountain, while Sheridan had just reached the left bank of the Tennessee. On the 8th all the preliminary movements of the campaign had been successfully carried out. Their effect upon the enemy was immediate. Chattanooga was evidently no longer tenable. Bragg's effective force at this time was about 45,000 men.<sup>1</sup> He could not well afford to divide this force by sending a detachment of his army to fight the enemy, nor could he stay in Chattanooga. The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, was an instance, too recent to be forgotten, of the consequence of holding a position simply because of its strength, and in defiance of starvation. The nature of the country, and the presence on his right front of Burnside's army (at Knoxville on the 3d), made a counter attack upon the Federal rear, if not impossible, extremely hazardous. Reluctantly he abandoned Chattanooga, but not the campaign for its possession. The prize must be fought for, but with Rosecrans must be left the choice of the battle-field. If the Federal army emerged from the passes of Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove or Wills's Valley, he would meet it there; if it drew in its left in order to occupy Chattanooga in full force, and successfully evaded battle, he would still maintain the offensive, sitting down in front of the strong-hold he had so unwillingly abandoned, with his own supplies close at hand, while those of the enemy must be brought over the mountains from Murfreesborough, a hundred miles distant. His confidence in the final result was heightened by the expectation that his army, now very little inferior to that of the enemy, would soon be nearly doubled by re-enforcements from Mississippi and Virginia. Chattanooga was evacuated on the 7th and 8th. On the morning of the 9th Crittenden was apprised of this event by General Rosecrans, and ordered to push forward his entire command, with four days' rations, and make a vigorous pursuit. Bragg had waited at Chattanooga until Rosecrans had fully developed his movements southward. He then took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the road leading southward from Chattanooga, facing the eastern slope of Pigeon Mountain. In this position he was nearer to either of Rosecrans's three corps than they were to each other.<sup>2</sup>

And just here Rosecrans began to base the future of his campaign upon a false calculation. His impression that Bragg's army was retreating upon Rome, demoralized and conscious of defeat, amounted to a conviction, almost to an infatuation. There was some ground for the presumption. Bragg had been flanked out of Middle Tennessee. Why not out of East Tennessee and Northern Georgia? But here Rosecrans should have remembered that in the summer campaign, his strength, as compared with that of the enemy, had been much greater than it was now. Besides its additional strength from the accession of Buckner's command, Bragg's army was now within easier reach not only of abundant supplies, but also of extensive re-enforcements. Under the circumstances, the greatest peril lurked in that presumptuous confidence with which Rosecrans was now prepared to push forward his columns.<sup>3</sup> There was really nothing in the way of Burnside's co-operation with over 20,000 effective men. There was every argument in its favor, and no good one against it. The moment Knoxville had been secured, Burnside ought to have been ordered to Chattanooga. He could have made

<sup>1</sup> The official returns from the Army of Tennessee for August 31, 1863, give: *Present for duty*, 45,041; *aggregate present*, 59,027; *aggregate present and absent*, 83,273. Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Chickamauga, says that at this time (September 8) his effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was a little over 35,000 men. He includes "two small divisions" just arrived from Johnston's army. The estimate given in the text is no doubt correct, as the official returns of an army are always more likely to be accurate than the numbers given in the report of a battle. It includes the cavalry force and Buckner's command.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas was twenty-six miles from Crittenden, on his left, and the distance to McCook's corps, on the right, was nearly as great. Rosecrans makes the distance "from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads," fifty miles.

<sup>3</sup> The idea that Bragg's army would make no stand on Rosecrans's present front seems also to have prevailed with General Halleck. On the 6th he had telegraphed to the latter: "There is no reason now to suppose that any of his troops have been detached, except, perhaps, a small force at Charleston." On the 11th he gives the following instructions: "After holding the mountain passes on the west and Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move farther south into Georgia and Alabama." So far is Halleck at this time from being aware of Rosecrans's danger, that he urges the latter to find out whether Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee! If he had himself taken some pains to ascertain whether Lee was re-enforcing Bragg, a mistake on Rosecrans's part which proved next to fatal might have been avoided. As early as September 7th Rosecrans seems to have been aware of Bragg's having received re-enforcements from Johnston's army. On that day, in reply to a dispatch from Halleck (dated September 6th), inquiring about the position of Bragg and Buckner, and suggesting that, in the event of their union, it would be necessary for him to unite with Burnside, he writes:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received with surprise. You have been often and fully advised that the nature of the country makes it impossible for this army to prevent Johnston from combining with Bragg. When orders for an advance of the army were made, it must have been known that those two rebel forces could combine against it, and to some extent choose their place of fighting us. This has doubtless been done, and Buckner, Bragg, and Johnston are all near Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was independent of mine. Your apprehensions are just, and the legitimate consequences of your orders. The best that can now be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left, supporting it with his infantry, and, refusing his left, threaten the enemy without getting into his grasp, while we get him in our grip, and strangle him, or perish in the attempt."

as may enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops?"


And the following is General Halleck's reply (August 5):

"The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are permanent."

Rosecrans appears to have received all this in good feeling. He writes (August 7):

"Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issue of the order. This army shall move with all the dispatch compatible with the successful execution of the order. We are preparing every thing to bring up forage for our animals; the present rolling stock of the road will hardly suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily."





MAP ILLUSTRATING ROSECRANS'S MOVEMENTS, SEPT. 4-12.

the march in eight days,<sup>1</sup> connecting with Rosecrans's left within three days after Bragg's evacuation. The very fact of Buckner's precipitate withdrawal from a country abounding in strong positions for defense was sufficient evidence that the movement was something else than a mere retreat. But neither Halleck nor Rosecrans understood its real import. The former was too far from the field of operations; the latter was over-confident of the demoralization of the enemy. Before the 14th Rosecrans never asked or seemed to expect any thing from Burnside beyond a demonstration with cavalry. His chief anxiety was lest Burnside might be withdrawn to North Carolina. Even as late as the 12th he felt sufficient for the enemy in his front, but, in the case of Bragg's retreat to the Coosa River, he apprehended an advance from the line of that river into Tennessee, and thought a force from the Army of Tennessee ought to shut up that avenue.<sup>2</sup>

After the capture of Cumberland Gap<sup>3</sup> Burnside was ordered by General Halleck to concentrate on the Tennessee, connecting with Rosecrans. If this order had been issued when Burnside first reached Knoxville, and had been promptly executed, the two armies would have been by this time in co-operation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Judging from the time occupied by Sherman in his march with 25,000 men to the relief of Knoxville: November 28th—December 6th.

<sup>2</sup> The following letter was written by Rosecrans, September 12th, to General Halleck, from Chattanooga:

"I think it would be very unwise, in the present attitude of affairs, for General Burnside to make any move in the direction of North Carolina; it would leave my left flank entirely unprotected, and open the way into Kentucky. I trust I am sufficient for the enemy now in my front; but, should he fall back to the line of the Coosa, the roads from there are short and comparatively good to the Tennessee, where it is necessary for me to cross two ranges of mountains, over very barren, rough, and difficult roads, to reach the Tennessee, and then move from thirty to fifty miles to reach the flank of a column moving from Gunter's Landing or Whitesburg on Nashville. It is desirable to have that avenue shut up. Can not you send a force from the Army of Tennessee to do it?"

<sup>3</sup> September 9. "The main body of General Burnside's army was now ordered to concentrate on the Tennessee River, from Loudon west, so as to connect with General Rosecrans's army, which reached Chattanooga on the 9th. . . . As the country between Dalton and the Little Tennessee was still open to the enemy, General Burnside was cautioned to move down by the north bank of the river, so as to secure its fords, and cover his own and General Rosecrans's communications from rebel raids. With our forces concentrated near Chattanooga, the enemy would be compelled to either attack us in position or to retreat farther south into Georgia. If he should attempt a flank movement on Cleveland, his own communications would be cut off and his own army destroyed. But, although repeatedly urged to effect this junction with the Army of the Cumberland, General Burnside retained most of his command in the upper valley, which was still threatened, near the Virginia line, by a small force under Sam Jones."—Halleck's Report, 1863. This is the statement made by General Halleck, which reflects upon Burnside. But the *ipsissima verba* of the dispatch sent to Burnside on the 11th do not indicate that the order to co-operate with Rosecrans was very explicit, or was based upon any definite idea of the enemy's movements. The dispatch reads:

"I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with General Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or

Rosecrans does not fairly admit the fact, but it is nevertheless beyond question that, during the three days following the occupation of Chattanooga by Crittenden's corps, he had not the shadow of a doubt either as to the enemy's retreat to Rome, or as to his own secure and full possession of the object of his campaign. His only fear was that the enemy might turn his right and advance north of the Tennessee. For Rosecrans to deny that he was conducting his army under this mistaken impression is to convict himself of a folly of which the most stupid colonel in his army could not be capable. Of course he preferred the peaceable possession of Chattanooga, if that were possible. Therefore, if he had not felt secure of the place, he would have secured himself. There was nothing, absolutely nothing, in the way of his doing so. Three days, or at the most four, would have sufficed for the concentration of his entire army at Chattanooga, the fortifications of which would in the mean while have been strengthened by Crittenden. This movement demanded not one half the strategy which he had shown on numerous occasions, nor did it expose his army to any special peril. Between him and the enemy rose Lookout Mountain, "a perpendicular wall of limestone over which no wheel could pass." No change of position, open to Bragg's observation, was necessary. With the cavalry still demonstrating on the extreme right, beyond Winston's, and a portion of Thomas's corps still holding Stevens's Gap, the main army could stealthily, rapidly, and without danger, in twenty-four hours' time, have passed beyond the reach of any possible interruption from the enemy. The only thing necessary was expedition.<sup>1</sup>

some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes in the west. This being done, it will be determined whether the available force shall advance into Georgia and Alabama, or into the Valley of Virginia and North Carolina."

Two days after this dispatch was sent, it became apparent to General Halleck that troops were moving westward from Lee's army. He then instructed Burnside to move down his infantry "as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga." But the reason given for the movement (namely, to secure against an advance of Bragg's army into Tennessee and Kentucky) gave Burnside no hint of Rosecrans's immediate danger. And, in any case, the order came too late to secure the arrival of Burnside before Longstreet could join Bragg.

The communications received all this time by Burnside directly from Rosecrans indicated that the latter, so far from being in embarrassment, was getting on swimmingly in Georgia, sweeping every thing before him. On the 10th Crittenden writes from Chattanooga:

"I am directed by the general commanding the Department of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this place, having entered it yesterday, at 12 M., without resistance. The enemy has retreated in the direction of Rome, Georgia, the last of his force, cavalry, having left a few hours before my arrival. At daylight I made a rapid pursuit with my corps, and hope that he will be intercepted by the centre and right, the latter of which was at Rome. The general commanding department requests that you move down your cavalry and occupy the country recently covered by Colonel Minty, who will report particulars to you, and who has been ordered to cross the river."

<sup>1</sup> Rosecrans, of course, swears that this movement was impossible. He says, in his evidence before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War (*Rep. Com., Rosecrans's Campaigns*, p. 31): "It has been a popular impression, possibly encouraged, if not believed, in high





JAMES S. NEGLEY.

Rosecrans's movements, more clearly than any thing else, indicate his misapprehension as to the situation of the Confederate army. On the evening of the 9th McCook was informed that Bragg was retreating southward, and ordered "to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, Georgia, in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and attack him in flank."<sup>1</sup> Thomas was at the same time ordered to move on Lafayette.<sup>2</sup> Crittenden was sent to Ringgold in pursuit. By this disposition of his army Rosecrans exposed each of his three corps to a separate and overwhelming attack of Bragg's army, which, instead of retreating to Rome, fronted the western slope of Pigeon Mountain, and was ready, holding a central position, to strike Thomas when he should emerge from Dug Gap on the way to Lafayette, Crittenden on his right, or McCook on his left. Rosecrans and his corps commanders had been alike misled by the reports of citizens and deserters, sent by Bragg within the Federal lines for the direct purpose of conveying an impression of his rapid retreat to Rome.<sup>3</sup> This ruse had been successful. Bragg fully appreciated his opportunity. Even on the 9th—the very day of the occupation of Chattanooga by the national troops, and while Rosecrans was urging a "vigorous pursuit" of the enemy by Crittenden, an advance by McCook and Stanley upon his flank and rear, and of Thomas's columns through the

military quarters, that because a portion of our command, including myself, entered Chattanooga, we had possession of it, in the sense of being so established there that we could have retained it without a battle. This is an error into which no good military mind cognizant of the facts could for a moment fall. Bragg was compelled or induced to fall back from Chattanooga by the menacing attitude of Thomas's corps at Frick's and Cooper's Gaps, twenty-six miles south, and of McCook's, with the cavalry corps, at Valley Head, forty-two miles from Chattanooga. Crittenden's corps, a part of which was employed in making the demonstration above Chattanooga, and the remainder in watching and covering the pass over the extremity of Lookout, passed into Chattanooga when Bragg fell back, and repaired at once to that point to ascertain the movement of the enemy; and all that was done was done promptly, and to that end only. And the instant these movements were discovered, and the enemy was found to have retired slowly toward Lafayette, not a moment was lost in making the necessary disposition, first, to secure our troops against being cut up in detail, and, secondly, to effect a most expeditious concentration at an eligible point between the enemy and Chattanooga, the goal of our efforts."

Now this is cool. Apart from the fact that Rosecrans does not here adduce the slightest argument to show *why* he could not on the 9th have commenced the concentration of his army at Chattanooga, or why such a movement must be discarded by any "good military mind cognizant of the facts" as impracticable, his entire statement gives a false impression of the theory upon which he conducted the campaign immediately after Bragg's abandonment of Chattanooga. He had only just ordered Crittenden to enter Chattanooga and vigorously pursue the retreating enemy, when he telegraphed to General Halleck (from Trenton, September 9th, 8 30 P.M.): "Chattanooga is ours without a struggle, and East Tennessee is free. Our move on the enemy's flank and rear progresses, while the tail of his retreating column will not escape unmolested. Our troops from this side entered Chattanooga about noon. Those north of the river there are crossing." This dispatch, the instructions given to Burnside, through Crittenden, that he was in full possession of Chattanooga, and the tenor of all his dispatches to Halleck at this time, indicate, as clearly as words any way can, that Rosecrans believed that the campaign for Chattanooga was virtually ended, and that he did not concentrate at Chattanooga for the simple reason that he deemed it unnecessary, and hoped, through his advanced position, to prevent "the tail of Bragg's retreating column" from escaping unmolested. As to being "cognizant of the facts," it is certain that Rosecrans not only did not understand Bragg's movements, but misapprehended them, and acted upon his misapprehension. As we have said in the text, it is only under cover of his mistake that he can evade the imputation of folly. But no arguments, not even from Rosecrans himself, can make us believe that he was foolish enough to expose three corps of his army—each separated from the other by mountain barriers, and by a distance greater than that intervening between either of them and the enemy—to the danger of being cut up in detail. If we were not so compelled by all the circumstances of the case, we should still prefer to believe that it was a mistake, rather than deliberate recklessness, that led him to keep his army for even a single day in such a position. It is true that, after he found out his mistake, he succeeded in extricating his army from destruction, but, as we shall see, this was due to the dilatory movements of the enemy. And his manner of extricating it compelled him to accept the wager of a doubtful battle; whereas, if he had been less confident of the enemy's discomfiture, he might previously have evaded a battle, and, with his army strongly posted in Chattanooga, awaited re-enforcements.

<sup>2</sup> Rosecrans does not publish this order, nor even allude to it in his report. But there is conclusive proof this order was given in the fact that, at 8 P.M. on the 9th, General Negley (commanding the advance of Thomas's corps) received instructions to move the next day to Lafayette. Negley writes to Thomas at this date, "Your order, directing me to march to Lafayette to-morrow, has been received. I will start at 8 A.M."

<sup>3</sup> "Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his centre, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail."—*Bragg's Report.*

gaps of Pigeon Mountain upon Lafayette—Bragg was preparing to strike Thomas in McLemore's Cove, and by moving around his left, between him and Crittenden, to secure an easy victory over both, reserving for McCook's corps the final blow. Five hours after Rosecrans had telegraphed to Washington that Chattanooga was his "without a struggle," Bragg issued written orders to Hindman and Hill to move against Thomas.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate force thus ordered to move on Stevens's Gap outnumbered General Negley's division, holding that position, more than two to one.<sup>2</sup> Celerity was absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of Bragg's scheme. Either he should not disclose his position, waiting for the enemy to put himself more completely in his power before springing his trap, or, if he unmasked his force, he should strike a sudden and decisive blow. In this he was foiled by the dilatory execution or the refractoriness of his subordinate generals. Hill reported the order to move on Negley to be impracticable, "as General Cleburne was sick, and both the gaps, Dug and Catlett's, had been blocked by felling timber, which would require twenty-four hours for its removal."<sup>3</sup> Early on the morning of the 10th Bragg ordered General Buckner to execute with his corps the order issued to General Hill. Hindman had advanced promptly, and was at Morgan's (three or four miles from Davis's Cross-roads, but east of Pigeon Mountain), ready to move forward into the cove upon the arrival of a supporting column. Buckner joined him in the afternoon. To secure promptness of action, Bragg transferred his headquarters from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette. Polk was ordered to send Cheatham's division to cover Hindman's rear, and Cleburne, at Dug Gap, was instructed to attack in front. During the night of the 10th the obstructions were removed from the gap, and Walker's reserve corps was directed to join Cleburne in the front attack. Thus more than 25,000 men, besides cavalry, were, on the morning of the 11th, ready to spring upon Negley's division.

Negley in the mean time had advanced from Stevens's Gap to Bailey's Cross-roads, and thence, on the 10th, to Davis's, one mile west of Dug Gap. Until he had reached this latter position he was in utter ignorance of the fact that only the obstructions in the passes of Pigeon Mountain separated him from an overwhelming force of the enemy on his front and left; but then, just in time to save his division, his eyes began to be opened through information received from the citizens and his scouts.<sup>4</sup> He immediately urged Baird to support him, and made dispositions to meet the enemy. Baird was up by 8 A.M. on the morning of the 11th, with two brigades, and was posted in reserve at Davis's Cross-roads. Bragg's attack was fortunately delayed. At daylight on the 11th he went to Cleburne's position, and found him awaiting the opening of Hindman's guns, which were not heard until the middle of the afternoon, and Cleburne, on advancing, found that Negley had fallen back to Bailey's Cross-roads.<sup>5</sup> General Negley had found

<sup>1</sup> The following are the orders, dated at Lee and Gordon's Mill, 11 45 P.M., September 9th:

"Major General HINDMAN, Commanding Division:

"GENERAL.—You will move with your division immediately to Davis's Cross-roads, on the road from Lafayette to Stevens's Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and take command of the forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column, according to rank. If in command, you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4000 or 5000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain, at Stevens's Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap, number not known."

"Lieutenant General HILL, Commanding Corps:

"GENERAL.—I inclose orders given to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division, to unite with General Hindman at Davis's Cross-roads to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night, and he has thirteen miles to make. The commander of the column thus united will move upon the enemy, encamped at the foot of Stevens's Gap, said to be 4000 or 5000. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis's Cross-roads."

<sup>2</sup> Negley's division numbered 5000 men. Baird's division, however, of nearly 6000 men, was moving up to his support. Brannan and Reynolds were still at Trenton, on the other side of Lookout. The two divisions ordered to move on Negley were Hindman's and Pat Cleburne's, numbering together over 11,000, with a large cavalry force, and with Bragg's whole army within easy supporting distance.

<sup>3</sup> At 8 P.M. on the 9th he writes to Thomas, "All the information I have received this evening from my scouts and others induces the belief that there is no considerable rebel force this side of Dalton." Twenty-six hours later, having discovered his danger, he writes the following dispatch to General Baird:

"Widow Davis's, September 10th, 1863—10 P.M.

"Brigadier General BAIRD:

"SIR.—There are indications of a superior force of the enemy in position near Dug Gap. Another column, estimated as a division, with twelve pieces of artillery, near Morgan's Mills, three miles to my left, in the direction of Catlett's Gap. Also a cavalry force, under Forrest, at Culp's Mills, near the road from Pond Spring to Cooper's Gap—there with the intention (as citizens and deserters report) of attacking our rear in the morning."

"My scouts all report the appearance of an offensive movement in this direction, and they confirm the reports I received this morning of a considerable force of the enemy being in the vicinity of Lafayette and Dug Gap."

"My position is somewhat advanced, and exposed to a flank approach by two roads leading from Catlett's Gap; but it is a favorable one to fight the enemy providing your division is within supporting distance, which I understood from General Thomas would be the case, and that your division would move up to Chickamauga Creek to-night. Please inform me if this will be the case."

"Have the kindness to send this information to General Thomas to-night."

"I have the honor to remain, yours very truly,

JAS. S. NEGLEY, Major General."

<sup>4</sup> "A careful examination of the ground we occupied, which was a long, low ridge, covered with a heavy growth of small timber, descending abruptly on the north end to the Chickamauga, while the east, south, and west sides were skirted by corn-fields and commanded by high ridges, demonstrating the fact that it would be impossible to hold this or any other position south of Bailey's Cross-roads, and fight a battle, without involving the certain destruction of our trains, which, from the contour of these ridges and uneven nature of the ground, we would be obliged to park in close proximity to our position."

"The preservation of the trains, perhaps the safety of the entire command, demanded that I should retire to Bailey's Cross-roads, two miles northwest of our position, while we could get our trains under cover and fight the enemy to better advantage. I therefore directed that the trains should commence moving back slowly and in good order, and also directed General Baird to hold Widow Davis's Cross-roads until I could withdraw a portion of the second division, and take position on the north side of Chickamauga Creek, to cover the withdrawal of his two brigades and prevent the enemy from flanking us on our left."

"At 1 P.M. a heavy column of cavalry was seen moving steadily on our left flank, with the evident intention of gaining my rear. I immediately had four pieces of artillery placed in position on the ridge at John Davis's house, which commanded the valley on my left; also sent General Beatty, with one regiment and a section of artillery, to seize and hold Bailey's Cross-roads, which was reported to be in possession of the enemy's advance."

"At 2 P.M. the trains were all in motion, falling back to Bailey's Cross-roads. General Beatty and Colonel Scribner, of General Baird's division, were directed to proceed to that point without





CHATTANOOGA FROM THE NORTH BANK OF THE TENNESSEE.



his position untenable, and, after some severe fighting, retired without losing any of his artillery or transportation. His caution in observing, by means of scouts, the operations of the enemy, and his skillful disposition of his forces on the 11th, had saved his division from otherwise certain destruction. He reached Stevens's Gap with his trains at 10 o'clock P.M., and forthwith dispatched to Thomas an account of the day's operations, suggesting that the troops (Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions) moving *via* Cooper's Gap take the most direct route to Stevens's Gap, reaching that point at the earliest possible moment. He anticipated an immediate attack from the enemy; but Bragg had withdrawn his forces from the cove.

The army was still in danger. Rosecrans was as yet ignorant of the enemy's position. The weight of evidence (received through Bragg's ingenious ruse of sending deserters and citizens within the Federal lines with false information) had indicated that Bragg was moving on Rome. Information received on the 10th made it certain that the enemy had retreated by the Lafayette Road, but gave no hint of his present position. The next morning Crittenden was ordered to Ringgold, from which point he was to send a reconnoissance to Lee and Gordon's Mill. If the enemy was found in the vicinity of Lafayette, Crittenden was to support Thomas, otherwise he was to advance toward Rome.<sup>1</sup> In making the movement to Lee and Gordon's Mill, Crittenden drove "squad of the enemy" before him, indicating that the main body of the Confederate army was not far distant. At 3 P.M. on the 11th, Rosecrans warned Crittenden that a heavy force of the enemy was in Chattanooga Valley, and urged him to move his whole force promptly to the Rossville and Lafayette Road. This Crittenden began to do on the following morning (the 12th), moving his whole command that day to Lee and Gordon's Mill. The same day Brannan's division, of Thomas's corps, reached Negley's left, *via* Cooper's Gap, Reynolds's following close behind. In the mean while, McCook, having reached Alpine on the 10th, found "that the enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga."<sup>2</sup> He had been ordered (the day before) to move rapidly on Alpine and Summerville to intercept Bragg's line of retreat, and to attack him in flank. Finding that, after all, he was not on the enemy's flank, he communicated with Thomas, and was surprised to learn that the latter "had not reached Lafayette, as ordered." The movement to Summerville, therefore, was not made. Thomas informed McCook on the 10th that he could not reach Lafayette before the 13th. McCook, beginning to be alarmed on account of the isolated situation of his corps, on the 12th wisely returned his trains to the summit of Lookout Mountain, remaining with his command near Alpine to await the result of a cavalry reconnoissance sent out by General Stanley to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy.

Bragg, having failed in his designs against Thomas, retired from McLemore's Cove, and sent Polk and Walker's corps in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill. It might not be too late for a movement northward against Crittenden. Learning from General Pegram, the Confederate cavalry commander in that direction, that this corps of the Federal army was divided, one division being at Ringgold, Bragg ordered Polk to attack this division on the morning of the 13th. His plan now was to crush Crittenden's divisions in detail, and then to turn again upon Thomas's corps in the Cove.<sup>3</sup> Here again he was disappointed. Polk, with double the numbers of the enemy which lay between him and Chattanooga, dispatched to Bragg (11 P.M. on the 12th) that he had taken a strong position for defense, and requesting heavy re-enforcements. He was again ordered not to delay his attack, his force already being numerically superior to the enemy, and was promised Buckner's corps the next morning. On proceeding to the front, early on the 13th, Bragg found that his orders had not been obeyed, and that Crittenden's forces were united, and on the west side of the Chickamauga.<sup>4</sup>

delay, and protect the train from the attack of a large force of cavalry approaching with the view.

"At 3 o'clock the skirmishers of General Baird's division were ordered back across the creek, where they were placed in position to hold the enemy in check until I could get my artillery in position on the ridge this side. Two companies of the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry, concealed behind a stone fence, poured into the ranks of the enemy a destructive volley, killing, as I have since learned, thirty on the spot. This partially checked the enemy, who was advancing in three heavy lines. Meantime I had ten pieces of artillery planted on the ridge to the rear of Davis's house, which commanded that position, until another new line could be formed on a ridge to the rear.

"The enemy now occupied the south side of the creek with a heavy force, and opened two batteries of artillery at a distance of 400 yards. Two of his brigades were parallel to our position on the right. Buckner's corps was deployed, and moving up steadily on our left, within short range. Colonel Stanley's and a portion of General Starkweather's brigades sustained here a well-directed and terrific fire, which our troops returned with spirit and marked effect. The firing increased, and indicated an immediate general engagement along our entire front, and would have terminated in an assault from the enemy in a few moments, which would have been disastrous to us, considering the overwhelming force of the enemy and our very unfavorable position.

"By direction, General Baird deployed General Starkweather's brigade to our right, which checked the enemy's advance in that direction, and enabled Colonel Stanley to withdraw his brigade, which being done, we retired slowly and in good order to Bailey's Cross-roads, where a strong position of defense was assumed, and the troops were bivouacked for the night, with trains parked at Stevens's Gap. During the night the enemy withdrew to Dug Gap."—General Negley's Report.

<sup>1</sup> Crittenden's Report.

<sup>2</sup> McCook's Report.

<sup>3</sup> His orders to Polk were explicit, and were thrice repeated, as follows:

"Lafayette, Georgia, 6 P.M., September 12th.

"Lieutenant General Polk:

"GENERAL,—I inclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the Cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.

"To attack at daylight on the 13th."

"Lafayette, Georgia, 6 P.M., September 12th, 1863.

"Lieutenant General Polk, Commanding Corps:

"GENERAL,—I inclose you a dispatch marked 'A,' and I now give you the orders of the commanding general, viz., to attack at daylight to-morrow the infantry column reported in said dispatch at three quarters of a mile beyond Peavine Church, on the road to Greysville from Lafayette. I am, general, etc.,

GEORGE W. BRENT, A. A. G."

"Lafayette, Georgia, September 12th, 1863.

"Lieutenant General Polk, Commanding Corps:

"GENERAL,—The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.

"I am, general, etc.,

GEORGE W. BRENT, A. A. G."

<sup>4</sup> Bragg's Report. It appears, however, from Crittenden's own report, that his corps had already

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Rosecrans was at length assured from every possible source that his army was in peril, and that the theory of his movements since the occupation of Chattanooga had been founded upon a gigantic mistake.<sup>1</sup> He had already (on the 11th and 12th) ordered Crittenden to Lee and Gordon's Mill, bringing in his detached forces from the east side of Chickamauga Creek,<sup>2</sup> and directed Thomas to bring McCook and Stanley within supporting distance of his own corps. On the 13th, fully aware of his exposed situation, and that, to use his own words, "it was a matter of life and death to effect a concentration of his army," he began to hurry up his columns with the idea of shutting off the enemy from an advance on Chattanooga by the Lafayette Road. Instead of getting on the rear and flank of the enemy, his task was now to get in his front.

General Thomas, when he received, during the night of September 12th-13th, the order brought by General Mitchell from Rosecrans to bring McCook and Stanley up to his support, understood more perfectly than his commander the nature of the emergency which confronted the Union army. He immediately directed McCook to move two divisions of the Twentieth Corps over the mountain to the left of the Fourteenth, leaving the other divisions to guard the trains. Crittenden, under instructions from Rosecrans, on the 14th, leaving Wood's division at Lee and Gordon's Mill, moved the remainder of his command to Mission Ridge, and sent Wilder's cavalry up Chickamauga Creek to connect with Thomas, whose extreme left under Reynolds then touched Pond Spring.

McCook in the mean time was moving in execution of the orders which he had received; but, unfortunately, instead of taking the mountain road direct to Stevens's Gap, he crossed Lookout Mountain, and, moving down the valley, was obliged to recross at Cooper's Gap, thus losing at least a whole day at the most critical stage of the campaign.<sup>3</sup> This delay came near being fatal to the army.<sup>4</sup> By the night of the 17th McCook's command was in McLemore's Cove, and the three corps of the command were within supporting distance for the first time since the crossing of the Tennessee. The day previous Rosecrans was satisfied that Bragg was receiving re-enforcements from Lee's army. He had been advised by General Halleck to that effect on the 15th.<sup>5</sup> He now calls stoutly for Burnside's assistance. But it is already far too late for that to reach him.

From the morning of the 13th to the night of the 17th Bragg has now had five days since he abandoned his attempt against the detached corps of Rosecrans's army. During this time he has been contemplating an advance around the Federal left to secure the only available approaches to Chattanooga from McLemore's Cove. He has dispatched Wheeler's cavalry to the left to press the Federal forces in the Cove, in order to divert attention from

been concentrated at Lee and Gordon's Mill on the 12th, before the order to attack had been issued to General Polk.

<sup>1</sup> When was it that Rosecrans first became acquainted with the actual situation of Bragg's army? This question is not answered in his report with any degree of precision. On the evening of the 10th he was certain that the main body of Bragg's army "retired by the Lafayette Road, but uncertain whether he had gone far." At 3 30 P.M. on the 11th, he informed Crittenden that "the enemy was in heavy force in the Valley of the Chattanooga." At 3 P.M. on the 12th, he sent General R. B. Mitchell, of the cavalry corps, to General Thomas with verbal orders instructing the latter to direct McCook and Stanley to move up within supporting distance of his corps. The reason given for this movement does not imply that Rosecrans then knew that the Confederate army was near Lafayette; it was ordered "with a view of moving upon the enemy at the earliest practical moment." Mitchell (probably by taking the road east of Lookout Mountain) struck Negley's headquarters. The following is a copy of the letter written by Negley to Thomas upon Mitchell's arrival (1 A.M. on the 13th):

"Major General THOMAS:

"GENERAL,—General Mitchell, of the cavalry corps, has just arrived from General Rosecrans's headquarters, having left there at 3 o'clock P.M. He brings verbal orders from General Rosecrans to the following effect, which he desires me to communicate to you:

"That you order General McCook and Stanley, with his cavalry, to move at once within supporting distance of your corps, with a view of moving upon the enemy at the earliest practicable moment.

"General Rosecrans complains of a want of information in regard to your movements and position, and of the numbers and position of the enemy.

"Feeling confident, from the remarks that General Rosecrans made to General Mitchell, that he is totally misinformed as to the character of the country in this vicinity, and of the position, force, and intentions of the enemy, I write you on that point, so that you can communicate with him at once.

"Also, to inform you that one of my scouts (young Bailey), who is intelligent and reliable, has just returned from the vicinity of Bird's Mills, stating that he was informed by Mr. Paine, and other citizens, that in the affair of yesterday our force was confronted by Buckner's entire command, two other divisions of infantry from the vicinity of Dug Gap, and a force of five or six thousand cavalry. That the enemy expected to hold us at Dug Gap, while Buckner and the cavalry could pass to our rear, and take possession of Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps. That Breckinridge's command was on Pigeon Ridge, or at Lafayette. That Bragg was concentrating his entire force at or near Lafayette. That the rebel cavalry west of Pigeon Ridge had passed through Worthing Gap, and the infantry had fallen back to the top of the ridge and beyond. The smoke from their line of encampment was visible this evening.

"A similar statement was made by two other citizens on hearsay. . . . General Brannan returned from his reconnoissance this evening. He advanced as far as Widow Davis's Cross-roads. He met with only a small cavalry picket, which fled at his approach. Indications were that the enemy were on and beyond Pigeon Ridge. . . .

"I have the honor to remain yours very truly,

JAS. S. NEGLEY, Major General."

The whole tenor of this letter indicates that the order brought by Mitchell was based upon no accurate knowledge by Rosecrans of the enemy's position. Yet it is clear, both from this order and from the instructions already issued to Crittenden to move to Lee and Gordon's Mill, that Rosecrans was, on the 12th, beginning to lose confidence in his scheme for striking the tail end of Bragg's army, and to be alarmed for his own safety. His petulant complaint of Thomas's negligence in forwarding information was an indication of his own fears. On the 13th the ground upon which he had stood slipped clean away from under his feet. On that day he received from Thomas, from McCook, and from Crittenden information which only too clearly demonstrated that Bragg's entire army was concentrated at Lafayette and along the eastern slope of Pigeon Mountain.

<sup>2</sup> What is throughout this chapter called "Chickamauga Creek" is really the West Fork of Chickamauga Creek.

<sup>3</sup> McCook probably moved upon the best instructions he had in regard to the roads. There is some discrepancy, however, between his own and Rosecrans's statements. McCook says, "It was my desire to join General Thomas by the mountain road, *via* Stevens's Gap; but not having any guide, and all the citizens concurring that no such road existed, and General Thomas also stating that the route by Valley Head was the only practicable one, I determined to join him by it." Rosecrans, in his report, states that McCook was ordered to take the mountain road. This might be explained on the supposition that McCook received an order from Rosecrans subsequent to the one received from Thomas.

<sup>4</sup> "The tardy arrival of McCook's corps came near being fatal to us."—Rosecrans's Testimony before the Congressional Committee.

<sup>5</sup> Rosecrans thus writes to Halleck from near Gordon's Mill, 1 30 P. M., September 16: "From information derived from various sources from my front, I have reason to believe what you assert in your dispatch of yesterday, 4 30 P. M., is true, and that they [*i.e.*, Longstreet's forces] have arrived at Atlanta at last. Push Burnside down."



his real movement, and Forrest's to the right to cover his advance. But he has not advanced. His forces, on the night of the 17th, lie along Peavine Creek, east of Pigeon Mountain. Nothing has been in his front between him and Chattanooga, except cavalry, with a small detachment of infantry, for the past four days. Chattanooga itself has only been held by Wagner's brigade, and all the while Bragg appears to have taken it for granted that the Federal army was concentrated in his front. He has been waiting also for Longstreet's corps, three brigades of which, under General Hood, have just arrived, and now, when Rosecrans's army is really concentrated in his front, he issues his orders for the crossing of Chickamauga Creek.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to calculate the advantage of this delay to Rosecrans's army.

West Chickamauga Creek, which now separated the opposing armies, takes its rise from the junction of Mission Ridge with Pigeon Mountain at the southern extremity of the Cove, and runs northeastward down the Cove by Pond and Crawfish Springs, touching the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road at Lee and Gordon's Mill, and, after its junction with the main creek, empties into the Tennessee four miles above Chattanooga. About four and a half miles below Lee and Gordon's Mill, in a straight line, is Reed's Bridge, on one of the roads from Ringgold to Rossville. Here was the extreme right of Bragg's line on the night of the 17th. Between this point and Lee and Gordon's Mill there are several available crossings—at Alexander's Bridge, and at Byron's, Tedford's, Dalton's, and several other fords. The roads leading to these from the east were bad, both from their narrowness and from the mountainous character of the country. The stubborn resistance of Minty's and Wilder's cavalry delayed the crossing of Bragg's forces on the 18th. The right column, proceeding from Ringgold, was commanded by General Bushrod R. Johnson, and consisted of his division—made up of three improvised brigades from Mississippi—and Hood's,<sup>2</sup> which also consisted of three brigades. The two divisions numbered over 7000 men. Forrest's cavalry co-operated with this column, covering its front and right upon the march. At Peavine Creek, between Chickamauga Hill and Pigeon Mountain, an attempt was made by a small detachment of Minty's cavalry to resist the progress of Johnson's column, but without success. The attempt was repeated when the Confederates reached Reed's Bridge, again with insufficient force, and with no better result than before. Johnson succeeded in saving the bridge from destruction, and began to cross his command at 3 o'clock P.M., partly by the bridge, and partly by the ford above. He then swept southward in front of the points where Walker's and Buckner's corps had been ordered to cross.

Walker's corps, nearly 6000 strong, encountered stout resistance at Alexander's Bridge (about three miles south of Reed's), and, the Federal cavalry having, after a sharp skirmish, succeeded in destroying the bridge, was compelled to cross by night at Byron's Ford. One brigade was left east of the creek to guard the ordnance train, which could not cross with the troops.

Buckner's corps, 10,000 strong, started from a point near Rock Spring Church, and crossed Pigeon Mountain, following the route taken by Walker's, but, turning southward upon approaching the Chickamauga, secured the crossing at Tedford's Ford, but, waiting Walker's movements on the right, did not cross till the next morning.

Thus, before daylight on the 19th, Bragg had, including cavalry, over 15,000 men across the creek. Buckner's corps consisted of Stewart's and Preston's divisions. It was ready to cross, as was also Cheatham's division of Polk's corps. These, crossing early on the morning of the 19th, increased the force on the east of the creek by 16,000 men. Hindman's division of Polk's corps, and Breckinridge's and Cleburne's of Hill's corps, held the left, south and west of Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the opposite side of the creek, and did not cross until the afternoon and night of the 19th.

These movements indicate clearly the enemy's plan of operations. Anticipating no serious opposition on his extreme right, Bragg expected to secure the approach to Chattanooga by the Lafayette Road, and then to close down upon the Federal army and fight the battle upon a field from which, even in the improbable event of his defeat, he could fall back upon the strong-hold which a fortnight before he had been compelled to abandon on account of his weakness, but which now, with his army heavily re-enforced—nearly doubled, in fact<sup>3</sup>—he could easily hold against the combined armies of Burnside and Rosecrans. For Bragg to gain the front which he sought, and extend his army across the Lafayette and Dry Valley Roads and the intervening ridges, would have been to win the battle's prize before the battle itself had been fought. But here Bragg was again disappointed. His advance had been too long delayed, and his movements on the 18th had been unexpectedly retarded. And thus it happened that the battle of Chickamauga came to be fought for the very position which Bragg had hoped to gain before fighting it.

<sup>1</sup> The following is a copy of these orders.

"I. Johnson's column, on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mill.

"II. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"III. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mill.

"IV. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mill, and, if met by too strong resistance to cross, will bear to the right, and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be.

"V. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the Cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is re-enforcing at Lee and Gordon's Mill, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"VI. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the Gap in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left, and bring up the stragglers.

"VII. All teams, etc., not with the troops, should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, Georgia, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.

"VIII. The above movements will be executed with the utmost promptitude and perseverance."

<sup>2</sup> Hood did not take command of his division until it had crossed the creek.

<sup>3</sup> "Nearly half our army consisted of re-enforcements just before the battle."—Bragg's Report.

For Rosecrans's army had been, the last five days, marching for dear life, and when Bragg crossed the Chickamauga he found this army, which he had expected to strike near Lee and Gordon's Mill, upon his front and right, prepared to contest inch by inch the possession of the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road.<sup>1</sup> Its own celerity of movement, and Bragg's delay (in this case due to excessive caution), had again saved the Federal army.

While awaiting the arrival of McCook's corps, Thomas's and Crittenden's extended from the Dry Valley Road in front of Stevenson's Gap to Crawfish Spring, being connected at Pond Spring by Wilder's cavalry. Wood's division of Crittenden's corps still held a strong defensive position at Lee and Gordon's Mill,<sup>2</sup> and the river below that point was guarded by Minty's cavalry, which crossed and reconnoitred the country on the left front, occasionally meeting and skirmishing with the enemy. The gaps of Pigeon Mountain to the south were also carefully guarded by Thomas's command. As soon as McCook came up he closed in on Thomas's right, and Crittenden drew in his right upon Crawfish Spring, to give place for Thomas. Wilder's cavalry was then detached and sent to the left.

The 18th was a day of terrible anxiety to General Rosecrans. Reports at different periods of the day came in from Wood and Wilder of the enemy's advance upon the left. The Lafayette Road must be secured, if possible, at any hazard. Before night Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions of Crittenden's corps were upon the creek to Wood's left and right, and all night long Thomas was marching by the road to Widow Glenn's, and past the slopes of Mission Ridge, toward Kelly's Farm on Chickamauga Creek, away off to the left of Crittenden; so that on the morning of the 19th the right of the army rested at Crawfish Spring, which the day before had been its left. Negley's division had been left by Thomas to guard the fords of the Upper Chickamauga in the vicinity of Crawfish Spring. Granger, with the reserve corps, was at Rossville.

The battle of the 19th was opened by General Thomas. The head of his column reached Kelly's at daylight, and went in on the left of Wilder (who had the night before been driven back to the heights east of the Widow Glenn's), Baird taking position first, then Brannan upon his left. At this point, Dan McCook, commanding a brigade of Granger's reserve corps, reported the presence of an isolated brigade of the enemy between Kelly's house and Reed's Bridge, and Brannan, with two brigades, was advanced on the road to the bridge to secure the capture of this detached force. Baird also advanced to keep in line with Brannan. These dispositions were made at 9 A.M. Soon after, Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, came up on Baird's right. The fight began at about ten o'clock.<sup>3</sup> It consisted at first of sharp skirmishing with Forrest on the Reed's Bridge Road. The movements of Johnston and Hood the night before toward Lee and Gordon's Mill had left Walker's corps in a somewhat isolated position on the Confederate right. Wilson's brigade, of this corps, after conducting the ordnance train across the creek, was called upon to support Forrest. Coming in contact with this force, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, had become engaged, and drove the enemy for half a mile, when the latter was re-enforced by Ector's brigade, and it was necessary to send in Baird's division. The small force of the enemy engaged at this point was steadily pressed back until it was supported by the remainder of Walker's corps.<sup>4</sup> After an hour's severe fighting, Croxton's brigade had been withdrawn, and Baird and Brannan, uniting their forces, drove the enemy from their front.

In the mean time, Cheatham's division came up to Walker's support at noon, and, forming in rear of the latter, advanced upon Baird, striking him in the flank, and throwing two of his brigades into confusion. Baird was driven back before overwhelming numbers for some distance, when the fortunate arrival of Reynolds's and Johnson's divisions on his right again turned the tide of battle. These fresh divisions, advancing with Palmer's (which had been opportunely sent by Crittenden), struck Cheatham's flank, and thrust him back in disorder upon Walker's corps, Brannan's troops attacking him at the same time in front, and recapturing the artillery which Baird had lost in his retreat. While Cheatham was thus hotly engaged, and being driven in confusion, Stewart's division, of Buckner's corps, coming from the Confederate left to his support, attempted in vain to drive Thomas back from his advanced position. His three brigades—Clayton's, Brown's, and Bate's—advanced each in its turn. In one hour's fighting Clayton lost nearly 400 officers and men,<sup>5</sup> and, being withdrawn, Brown took his place, and gallantly charged through a dense underwood extending along his front, when he encountered a terrific fire from all arms. He was unable to use his artillery, while the batteries in his front and on his right flank poured into his ranks murderous volleys of grape and canister. Checked for a brief moment, he again pushed forward and up the slope, where the strength of the Federal position and an attack on his right compelled him to retreat, after the loss of many of his best officers and a large number of his men. Bate relieved him then, meeting the same fire which had driven back his brother commanders, but, with Clayton's support, succeeded in driving the Federal force in his front beyond the Chattanooga Road.

<sup>1</sup> "The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mill when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed disposed to dispute, with all his ability, our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga in his rear."—Bragg's Report.

<sup>2</sup> "A stronger position naturally than that which General Wood occupied can scarcely be imagined. The creek at Gordon's Mill bends round in the form of a semicircle, the convexity being toward the south, whence the enemy would have advanced toward General Wood. An eminence, forming what would be a diameter of the circle if completed, runs from east to west, uniting the extremities of the bend. Upon this General Wood had placed his artillery. The creek itself, of considerable depth, and with a bank several feet high upon our side of it, constituted a splendid ditch, and all along its bank lay Wood's men, behind a rude but efficient breastwork of logs and rails."—National Account, Rebellion Record, vii., p. 409.

<sup>3</sup> Forrest reports the capture of two batteries at an early stage of the engagement, but that he was unable to bring them off for want of horses.

<sup>4</sup> General A. P. Stewart's Report.





POSITION OF FORCES JUST BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE 19th.



The battle had already extended far up the creek. By two o'clock Hood and Johnson had become involved in the struggle, and the entire Confederate line, as it then stood, below Lee and Gordon's Mill, had been engaged with the exception of two brigades of Preston's division (Buckner's corps), which, on rising ground, held the extreme left of Bragg's army west of the Chickamauga. On the Federal line, division after division had been sent in—Van Cleve's, of Crittenden's corps; then Davis's, of McCook's; then Wood's, from Lee and Gordon's Mill; and, finally, Sheridan's. Each in its turn had driven the enemy, and then, outflanked, had been thrust back. The arrival of Sheridan's division finally stayed the enemy's progress on the Federal right.

On the centre the Confederates had in the mean time gained considerable advantage, and the shells from their batteries almost reached the Widow Glenn's house, where Rosecrans's headquarters were. Negley's division had therefore been withdrawn from Crawfish Spring, arriving upon the field at 4 30 P.M. This division was dispatched to the centre, where it found that Van Cleve had been dislodged from the line. Negley immediately attacked, and drove the enemy steadily till night. Palmer had been endangered by the disaster to Van Cleve, but the advance of the enemy upon his flank was checked by General Hazen, who, driven back upon an elevation of ground, promptly manned twenty guns and poured a cross-fire into the enemy's charging column, which threw it back in disorder.

The attack which had for a time broken the Federal centre had begun on Reynolds's right. After Cheatham's repulse there had been a lull in the battle in front of the Federal left from 4 o'clock till about 5, during which Brannan and Baird had reorganized their commands, and had been withdrawn to a strong position on the extreme left, in which direction Thomas expected the next attack. But the enemy made his advance some distance farther to the right. Brannan's division and the greater portion of Baird's were promptly sent to Reynolds's assistance, arriving just in time to prevent disaster. Even while Van Cleve was being driven in the centre, Thomas was driving the enemy on the left.

In pursuing the enemy Thomas's lines became very much extended, and were now concentrated upon more commanding ground. It was supposed that the battle for that day was over. But Thomas had scarcely completed the disposition of his forces before he was again attacked by the enemy. Pat Cleburne's division, of Hill's corps, having crossed the river at Bedford's Ford, had reached the Confederate right soon after sunset. Passing over the line which Thomas had just driven back, and supported on his left by Cheatham, he made an unexpected charge upon Johnson and Baird's divisions, producing considerable confusion in their ranks; but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed.<sup>1</sup> In this night attack General Preston Smith, of Cheatham's division, was killed. This engagement terminated the battle of the 19th.

The battle thus far had been waged for a position. When it began in the morning neither of the two armies had formed its line, though in this respect the advantage had been with the Confederates. If Bragg had been aware of Thomas's movement made on the night of the 18th, the result of the morning's, and, probably, of the whole day's fighting would have been far different. Supposing the Federal forces to be in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's Mill, Bragg had moved his own too far up the creek, leaving Forrest only on his extreme right; and while he had been moving them back to the right to meet the emergencies arising out of the engagement with Thomas, Rosecrans was given time to bring up his divisions to Thomas's support. In this way Thomas's movement to the left had spoiled the enemy's preconceived plan of operations. Every assault which had been made during the day upon the vital point of the Federal line, its extreme left, had been severely repulsed. Whatever ground had been gained by Bragg had been upon the centre, where Van Cleve had been driven back so far that, until Negley's arrival, the communication was cut off between Thomas and Rosecrans's headquarters at the Widow Glenn's.<sup>2</sup> Earlier in the day (say at 2 o'clock P.M.) the line of each army had extended along the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road. But upon the restoration of the Federal line, after the break on its centre, the left and centre had been refused, leaving this road, from Lee and Gordon's Mill to within less than a mile of Kelly's house, in possession of the Confederates. This refusal of the line was rather an advantage to Rosecrans than to Bragg, since it gave the Federal army a stronger position.

It is impossible to estimate, with any degree of precision, the comparative injury inflicted upon the two armies in this first day's battle. Unquestionably the Confederates sustained the heavier loss. They had little opportunity for using artillery, on account of the thickly wooded country over which they moved.<sup>3</sup> Of the Federal divisions, Baird's and Johnson's had suffered the most severely. The former, when flanked and driven back by Walker's corps, had lost a regiment of regulars, 411 strong, besides 100 other prisoners and two batteries. One of these was the First Michigan, formerly "Loomis's" battery. Its commander, Lieutenant Van Pelt, stood by his guns to the last, and gave up his life with them, falling into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded.<sup>4</sup>

Rosecrans's headquarters had been all day at the Widow Glenn's, where he could receive by a direct road communications from General Thomas. His immediate presence upon the field was at some portions of the day extremely necessary. If, just before noon, he had been with Crittenden, he would have sent in supports to Thomas's right with such promptness that Walker's corps must have been completely destroyed or driven into the river. Instead of being there, he was pacing his headquarters at the Widow Glenn's in nervous excitement, while his aids, with the assistance of the distressed widow, were attempting to locate the line of battle by the sound of the firing. The general ought to have known that he could most effectually assist Thomas by his personal direction of the battle to the right of the latter.

Leaving out the reserve corps under General Granger at Rossville, Rosecrans's whole army on the field, except two brigades, had been engaged on the 19th. Curiously, both General Bragg and General Rosecrans claim that they were opposed to superior numbers on this day. In fact, however, the forces engaged had not been far from equal; if there was any superiority, it was in Rosecrans's favor. But Bragg had full 15,000 men who had not been under fire, if we include Kershaw's and Humphreys's brigades of Longstreet's corps, which came up in time for the next day's battle. Breckinridge's and Hindman's divisions were across the river by night, but had taken no part in the battle.

A council of war was held after dark at Rosecrans's headquarters, and the disposition of forces and the conduct of the battle of the next day were determined upon. That it would be a desperate conflict was certain. The battle already fought had been for the road to Chattanooga. The attempt to secure this road would be renewed the next day with forces which it would be hard to withstand. Failing of success at this point, the enemy would do his best to crush the army which stood in his way.

General Longstreet, in person, arrived at Bragg's headquarters before midnight. To him was given the command of the left wing of the Confederate army, consisting of that portion of the troops which during the day had been under Hood's command—Buckner's corps, and Hood's and Johnson's divisions—with the fresh troops under Hindman and McLaws. The accession of Breckinridge's division was the only change made in the right wing, which had been and would still remain under the command of General Polk. Bragg ordered Polk to attack the next morning at daybreak, meaning that from his extreme right the battle should extend, division by division, to the extreme left.

The Federal line during the night was reorganized. Thomas's front remained as he had already established it, with part of Brannan's division in reserve. It extended in a semicircular form (at least its formation may be thus characterized with sufficient accuracy for our purpose) around Kelly's house, covering the road in front and on either flank. From the point where it crossed the road on the south side it was refused, to conform with the refusal of the left and centre extending southwestwardly. McCook's corps closed up on Thomas, and refused its right upon the ground north of and covering the Widow Glenn's house. Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were placed in reserve, in a position to support either Thomas or McCook. Neither of the corps organizations was intact. Palmer, of Crittenden's, and Johnson, of McCook's corps, were with Thomas, while Negley, who belonged to Thomas, was with McCook. The line extended thus from left to right: Baird (his left refused to cover the road), Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, Davis, Sheridan; with Wood and Van Cleve in reserve. Johnson's and Palmer's divisions extended from Baird's lines to the road south of Kelly's house, Reynolds's and the other divisions being to the west of the road. In the rear of Johnson and Palmer was an open field, while farther back, on the other side of the road, were dense woods. The road from Ringgold to Rossville was well guarded by the cavalry and Granger's corps.

The Confederate right wing, confronting the three divisions of Thomas east of the Lafayette Road, consisted of four divisions—Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, Cheatham's, and Walker's. The two latter were in reserve. Longstreet's command extended from Cleburne's position, with Stewart on the right, then Johnson, then Hindman holding the left. Hood was in reserve, to Johnson's rear. Preston was held in reserve on the left rear. Humphrey and Kershaw, when they came up, were also held in reserve.

Bragg's army had a hard day's work before it, and it was all-important that it should be begun early. But his orders to Polk were for some reasons (certainly unsatisfactory ones to Bragg) not carried out. The attack was not begun on the right until nearly 10 o'clock A.M. Every moment of this delay had been of great advantage to Thomas, whose troops had been all night felling timber and strengthening their line by temporary breastworks.<sup>1</sup> And when the fight began it progressed slowly. The work assigned to Polk—namely, to thrust Thomas back from his position, and thus double

recaptured by Brannan. Hood captured a battery from Jeff C. Davis's division, but it was afterward recaptured. On the Federal side it was claimed that there was a balance against the Confederates of three guns.

<sup>1</sup> "At dawn General Bragg was in the saddle, surrounded by his staff, eagerly listening for the sound of Polk's guns. The sun rose and was mounting in the sky, and still there was no note of attack from the right wing. Bragg chafed with impatience, and at last dispatched one of his staff officers, Major Lee, to ascertain the cause of Polk's delay, and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. General Polk, notwithstanding his clerical antecedents, was noted for his fondness for military ostentation, and carried a train of staff officers whose numbers and superb dress were the occasion of singular remark. Major Lee found him seated at a comfortable breakfast, surrounded by brilliantly dressed officers, and delivered his message with military bluntness and brevity. General Polk replied that he had ordered Hill to open the action, that he was waiting for him, and he added, 'Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack—overflowing with anxiety, sir.' Major Lee returned to the commanding general, and reported the reply literally. Bragg uttered a terrible explanation, in which Polk, Hill, and all his generals were included. 'Major Lee,' he cried, 'ride along the line, and order every captain to take his men instantly into action.' In fifteen minutes the battle was joined, but three hours of valuable time had been lost, in which Rosecrans was desperately busy in strengthening his position."—Pollard's *Lost Cause*, p. 450.

<sup>1</sup> *Thomas's Report*. But Cleburne claims that he drove the Federals a mile and a half, taking two or three hundred prisoners and two or three guns.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas, hearing of this break, feared that the entire right would be routed, and began to dispose his line with reference to covering its retreat to the Dry Valley Road, but he was soon relieved of his apprehensions by Negley's arrival.

<sup>3</sup> "As most of the ground over which the battle was fought was very thickly wooded, we could not see more than three hundred yards to the front, consequently could seldom use artillery."—*Report of Major Potter, commanding the Artillery of Buckner's Corps*.

<sup>4</sup> Bragg reports the capture of several batteries by Walker's corps, but only these two were secured. A. P. Stewart reports the capture of twelve guns, but only four were sent to his rear. Jackson, of Cheatham's division, reports the capture of six guns, but these were probably among the





THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 19th.



up the Federal line, pressing it back upon Longstreet—was not found easy to execute.

Breckinridge opened the attack. He had not reached Cleburne's right until after dawn, and knew nothing of the ground. Of his three brigades Helm held the left, Stovall the centre, and Adams the right, being the extreme right of the whole line. The division extended so far to the right that only a portion of Helm's brigade encountered the Federal line in a direct advance westward, and thus Stovall and Adams, meeting no resistance, pushed forward, seriously threatening Thomas's flank. Baird's division did not quite reach the Lafayette Road; Thomas had, therefore, as early as two o'clock A.M., written to Rosecrans, asking for Negley's division to supplement his line. Rosecrans had promised that it should be sent forthwith. Seven o'clock came, an attack was momentarily expected, but Negley had not arrived. The request was repeated, and was received by Rosecrans at eight o'clock. Some demonstration of the enemy in Negley's front led Rosecrans to retain this division until it was relieved by McCook. McCook having been ordered to promptly relieve Negley, Rosecrans, accompanied by General Garfield, rode along his entire line. Upon returning to the right he found Negley where he had left him, not having been relieved.

Beatty's brigade was immediately sent to Thomas, the other two being ordered to follow as soon as other troops were ready to take their position. Beatty reached Thomas in time, fortunately, to secure his line. Breckinridge's left brigade had already been severely cut up, having been exposed to a front and enfilading fire from a foe concealed behind breastworks, and, after two assaults, in which General Helm, commanding the brigade, and a large number of his subordinate officers, had been killed, this portion of the line was withdrawn. Stovall and Adams, however, had advanced, driving back two lines of Baird's skirmishers. Stovall halted at the road, but Adams pressed forward, his line and Stovall's being now formed perpendicular to the road, to conform to Baird's position. The advance now was through the woods west of the road. Stovall attacked the angle of the works, and was soon forced to retire. Adams, encountering Baird's left, now re-enforced by Beatty and some regiments from Johnson's, Brannan's, and Wood's divisions, was severely beaten. Adams, wounded, and a large number of prisoners, were captured. Thus, before noon, Breckinridge had been driven from the field. To prevent a repetition of the attack at this point, Negley was ordered to mass all the artillery which could be spared upon a position commanding the enemy's approach, but, from some misunderstanding, Negley took a very different position from that which had been indicated.

Cleburne, on Breckinridge's left, had advanced against Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds's divisions with no better success. Owing to Polk's utter neglect of his line in the morning, there was no well-arranged plan of attack. Cleburne, in the hurry occasioned by orders to dress upon Breckinridge's left, had got into some confusion. His left, also, in advancing, converged with Longstreet's line of advance in such a manner that part of Wood's brigade passed over some of Stewart's division, and Deshler's was thrown entirely out of line in Stuart's rear. Thus a part of Wood's brigade moved against that part of Thomas's line which turned westward upon the road. Crossing a field bordering the road, near Poe's house, this brigade received a heavy oblique fire, and in a few minutes sustained a loss of 500 men, killed and wounded. Deshler might then have been sent in; but Polk's brigade, on Wood's right, had also been repulsed, and Cleburne's whole line was withdrawn to a safe position some 400 yards in the rear. On the retreat General Deshler was killed, a shell piercing "fair through his chest."<sup>1</sup>

In the mean time, the Federal divisions on Thomas's right have met with a terrible misfortune. Upon the failure of McCook to relieve Negley in the morning, Crittenden had been ordered to do so, sending in Wood's division. But this movement had been delayed until half past nine o'clock. McCook's line, holding the extreme right, was not satisfactory to Rosecrans, being too far removed from the troops on its left. After repeated orders from Rosecrans, this difficulty was only partially remedied. Messages still continued to come from Thomas, asking for re-enforcements. Van Cleve's division was sent to his aid. Shortly after this a most unfortunate event took place. Captain Kellogg, coming across the field to bring further tidings to Rosecrans that Thomas was still heavily pressed, thought he discovered a break in the line on Reynolds's right. In fact there was no such break, but Brannan's division, from its arrangement in *echelon* at this point, had occasioned the delusion. Rosecrans forthwith ordered Wood, who had relieved Negley, to close up and support Reynolds. Wood, misapprehending the intent of the order, moved his division entirely out of line, "at double quick," and passed to Brannan's rear. Thus a gap *was made* where previously none had existed, and through this gap the enemy advanced, throwing the entire right wing into confusion, from which it did not recover.<sup>2</sup>

Longstreet had waited until 11 o'clock, and then, seeing that Polk was making no serious impression upon the enemy, began the attack with the left wing. Stewart was closed up to the right, to make room for Hood in the front line. Humphreys's and Kershaw's brigades (McLaws's division), were, on their arrival, brought up as supports to Hood, whose division was made the main column of attack. Longstreet's order of battle was entirely reversed by the character which the conflict had assumed on the right. His left, instead of his right, became the movable column. Stewart's division, upon reaching the Lafayette Road, was there stationed, forming the pivot upon which Longstreet's wing turned. Hood's column was up just in time to take advantage of the break occasioned by Wood's sudden withdrawal, above alluded to, and the troops on his right and left pushed the attack with great vigor. General Hood received a severe, and it was then thought mortal wound, just after his column had penetrated the Federal lines, and General Law, commanding one of his brigades, succeeded to the command. But, notwithstanding the loss of their old commander, the troops pressed their advantage, flanking Jeff Davis on the one side, and Brannan on the other, cutting off five brigades from the right of the army, and driving them to the rear. The blow had fallen just as Rosecrans was weakening his right by sending two of Sheridan's brigades to Thomas. These brigades were recalled to oppose the enemy's advance, and Davis closed up to the left for the same purpose. But the enemy's charge could not thus be resisted. The attack now extended from beyond Brannan's right to a point west of the Dry Valley Road. The Confederates at the weak point outnumbered the Federals three to one. McCook's five brigades were driven back, with a loss of nearly half their men. The right of Brannan was driven back, and two of his batteries, moving to a new position, were taken in flank, and thrown back through two of Van Cleve's brigades, then on their way to Thomas, producing inextricable confusion. In this way these two brigades of Van Cleve, with the five already mentioned, were driven from the field on the road to Rossville. Davis and Sheridan strove in vain to make a stand. Hindman's division had advanced far to their right, making resistance useless. Johnson had advanced on Hindman's right, swelling the volume of the assaulting column. In this charge of Longstreet's command the Confederates claimed a capture of seventeen guns.

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had all been swept from the battlefield. Thomas alone was left, with one of Negley's brigades, and the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and such portions of Wood's and Brannan's as had not been involved in the disaster, to withstand the entire Confederate army. Negley had taken some fifty pieces of artillery to the rear, in obedience, as he supposed, of Thomas's orders. He thus saved a large number of guns from capture, and offered a somewhat formidable resistance to the enemy's advance. But the Confederate success against McCook's line compelled him to withdraw, and he went to Rossville, where he was very efficient in the reorganization of Rosecrans's scattered troops.<sup>3</sup>

on General Reynolds and support him,' in taking his division out of the line of battle and in rear of Brannan's division, to a reserve position in rear of Reynolds. My report, dealing with facts, and avoiding personal censure, shows that General Reynolds sent me word, by Captain Kellogg, A.D.C. to General Thomas, that there were no troops on his immediate right, and that he wanted support there; that, supposing Brannan's division had been called away, I told an aid to write to General Wood an order to close up on Reynolds and support him, who wrote as follows:

"Headquarters, September 20, 10 45 A.M.

"Brigadier General T. J. Wood, Commanding Division, etc.:  
"The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him.  
Respectfully,  
FRANK S. BOND, Major and A.D.C."

"Now, with this order in his hand:  
"1st. When General Wood found there was no interval to close, because Brannan's troops had not left, his plain duty as a division commander was to have reported that fact to the general commanding, who was not more than six hundred yards from him, and asked farther orders. His failure to do so was a grave mistake, showing want of military discretion.

"2d. When about to move, notwithstanding this, his duty, on being informed, as he was by one of his brigade commanders, that his skirmishers were engaged, and the enemy in line of battle opposite his position, General Wood was renewedly bound to have reported the facts and taken orders before leaving his position at such a critical time. But, instead of doing so, he privately withdrew his troops from the line, and let the enemy in, in the face of an order the wording of which shows that no such operation as the *opening*, but, on the contrary, the *closing* of a gap, was intended by it.

"3d. This conduct of General Wood, treated in the report with all the reserve consistent with the truth of history, contrasts most unfavorably with that of General Brannan, commanding the division next on his left, who, a little earlier in the day, when he received an order to leave his position and support the left, finding his skirmishers engaged, reported the fact to General Thomas, desiring to know if, under such circumstances, he should execute the order. He was told, 'No; stay where you are.'

"4th. It also contrasts with General Wood's own conduct and correspondence only a few days previously, when he protested against a reprimand of his corps commander for not occupying a position at Wauhatchie, lecturing his senior on the impropriety of what he termed 'blind obedience to orders,' and in upward of fifty pages of manuscript trying to prove his conduct consistent with that sound discretion which a division commander ought to exercise in removing his troops from the danger threatened by the literal execution of orders.

"The material difference of circumstances in the two cases, as appears from his own writings, being that the discretion he exercises at Wauhatchie, and the 'blind obedience' he pleads at Chickamauga, both have the effect of getting his troops out of danger.

"As the best of generals are liable to mistakes, I should have been content to leave those of General Wood to the simple historical statement of them, presuming he regretted them far more deeply than even myself. And, so feeling, I called attention to his military virtues—vigilance, discipline, providence of his commissariat, and care of his transportation. But his mean and unsoldierly defense of error shows him wrong both in head and heart.

"Respectfully, your humble servant, (Signed), W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.  
"Brigadier General L. THOMAS, Adjutant General U. S. A.  
"Official: R. S. THORN, Captain, A.D.C."

<sup>1</sup> Both Generals Wood and Brannan, in their reports, endeavor to disparage General Negley's conduct in this connection. Brannan says:

"General Negley, so far from holding my right as he had promised, retired with extraordinary deliberation to Rossville at an early period of the day, taking with him a portion of my division, as will be seen by the report of Colonel Conwell, commanding First Brigade, leaving me open to attack from the right, as well as from the left and front (from which point the rebels attacked simultaneously on four several occasions), and my rear so far exposed that my staff officers, sent back for ammunition, were successfully cut off, and the ammunition, of such vital importance at that time, prevented from reaching me, thus necessitating the use of the bayonet as my only means of defense."

General Wood says:

"Before closing my report, I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of the commanding general certain facts which fell under my observation during the progress of the conflict on the 25th. As I was moving along the valley with my command, to the support of General Reynolds, in conformity with the order of the commanding general, I observed on my left, to the west of me, a force posted high up on the ridge. I inquired what force it was, and was informed that it was a part (a brigade, perhaps) of General Negley's division. I was informed that General Negley was with the force in person. I remember distinctly seeing a battery on the hill-side with it. At the

<sup>1</sup> Cleburne's Report.

<sup>2</sup> General Wood having claimed that he did right in moving out of line, and had no discretion to do otherwise, General Rosecrans, on the 12th of January, 1864, wrote to Adjutant General Thomas the following letter:

"GENERAL.—The report of the general in chief shows that a letter from one of my division commanders at the battle of Chickamauga, commenting on the report of his commanding general, has been received at the War Department, and subsequently published by its authority. The general in chief refers to that letter as a rival authority to my own, and as raising a doubt on the accuracy of a point in my report. The letter, dated October 23, ult., four days after I left the command, is based on a quotation from my official report, to which, evidently, the writer was not at that time entitled, and which, therefore, *prima facie*, was surreptitiously obtained. It has been received and publicly used as a document disparaging my report, without having been referred to me, or passing through my hands, as required by military courtesy and army regulations.

"The War Department is therefore respectfully requested, as an act of justice, to cause the above and following observations to be filed and published as an appendix to my official report of the battle of Chickamauga:

"Brigadier General T. J. Wood writes and sends to the War Department a clandestine letter to show, contrary to the inference drawn in my report, that he did right, under an order to 'close up





THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 20th.



On the Federal right there was indescribable confusion. The trains had all been pushed along the Dry Valley Road, and mingled with the disorganized troops, blocked up the road to Rossville. Rosecrans and Garfield, his chief of staff, left the field together, taking the Rossville Road. To a retreat from this part of the field there was no alternative. As far as the eye could reach, there was no orderly array of battle, and no direct communication with the left. Was Thomas beaten also? This was the question which now agitated the minds of the general and his staff officer. If he was routed, then clearly Rosecrans's place was at Chattanooga, where he could best provide for the safety of his army and of his trains. Finally, the two officers, before reaching Rossville, came to a point where two roads led, one to Chattanooga, and the other around to Thomas's position. Firing could be heard in the latter direction with considerable distinctness. Apart from this firing, there was no hint to guide General Rosecrans. The two officers listened most intently, and reached exactly opposite conclusions. Rosecrans had already arrived at a conviction that the entire army was defeated. He judged that the firing which he heard was scattered, and indicated disorganization. Garfield, who doubtless had a more correct ear, thought it was the firing of men who were standing their ground. He felt that Thomas was not beaten, and, as General Rosecrans was determined himself to go to Chattanooga, he asked permission to go to Thomas. This was given. Rosecrans went to Chattanooga, and telegraphed to General Halleck that his army was beaten. Garfield went to Thomas; what he found there we shall soon discover.

It is scarcely strange that Rosecrans should have jumped at the conclusion that Thomas was defeated. That he was not seems almost a miracle; but it was just such a miracle as had twice already during this campaign saved the army from destruction. If Longstreet had known the full extent of the disorder which his first assault had produced, he would have thrown caution to the wind, and have pursued with abandon. But, fortunately, he did not know. His divisions on the right had met with obstinate resistance. Hindman, instead of pursuing the advantage gained on the extreme left, was moved eastward to support Johnson. Thus time was given for the formation of a new Federal line from Thomas's right, across the commanding heights which constitute the southern spurs of Mission Ridge, east of McFarland's Gap.

Thomas, meanwhile, knew nothing of the disaster to the Federal right. Just before the repulse of the enemy on his extreme left, a little after noon, he sent to Rosecrans to hurry up Sheridan's division, which had been promised him. Captain Kellogg, his aid sent for this purpose, proceeding to the right, met a large force of the enemy in the open corn-field to the rear of Reynolds, advancing cautiously. This force was at first supposed to be Sheridan's troops, but the mistake was soon discovered, and the enemy was driven back. The gap between Reynolds and Brannan was filled, and Wood's division—so much of it as remained—was placed on the right, in prolongation of Brannan's line.

It can easily be seen that if, during the formation of this line, or previous,

time it was certainly out of reach of any fire from the enemy. This was between 11 and 12 o'clock in the day. A little later in the day, perhaps half or three quarters of an hour, when I became severely engaged, as already described, with the large hostile force that had pierced our lines and turned Brannan's right, compelling him to fall back, I looked for the force that I had seen posted on the ridge, and which, as already remarked, I had been informed was a part of General Negley's division, hoping, if I became severely pressed, it might re-enforce me, for I was resolved to check the enemy if possible. But it had entirely disappeared; whether it had gone I did not then know, but was informed later in the day it had retired to Rossville, and this information I believe was correct. By whose orders this force retired from the battle-field I do not know; but of one fact I am perfectly convinced: that there was no necessity for its retiring. It is impossible it could have been at all seriously pressed by the enemy at the time—in fact, I think it extremely doubtful whether it was engaged at all.

It is not necessary here to attempt any defense of so brave and skillful an officer as General Negley against such charges as these. We will simply quote the opinion of the Court of Inquiry called upon to investigate General Negley's conduct in the spring of 1864. The finding of this court was as follows:

"No question has any where been raised as to the conduct of General Negley on the 19th of September, the first day of the battle of Chickamauga. He commanded on that day his entire division, and it appears from the evidence that his conduct throughout was creditable.

"Early on the second day General Negley was assigned a position in the line on the right of General Brannan, from which he was relieved between 8 and 10 o'clock by Wood's division.

"He was then ordered to take a position on the extreme left; but his division having been relieved at a later hour than was expected, his reserve brigade was sent meantime in advance of the others, and became separated from him, taking a place in the line under General Baird. Subsequently another of his brigades was placed in line on the left of General Brannan, and under the command of that officer. A little later in the day, as General Negley was moving to a position on Missionary Ridge, to which he had been ordered by General Thomas, he gave up to General Brannan, on his urgent appeal for support, the largest regiment of his last brigade, retaining for himself only two weak regiments and four companies of another regiment. The point to which he was directed was in rear of the centre of the line. Here he found a battery; other batteries and parts of batteries joined him, and it appears on evidence that he had at last fifty guns under his care, with only the small infantry support above referred to, namely, two small regiments and four companies of another regiment, in all 600 or 700 men.

"The gap in the line made by the withdrawal of Wood's division, the rout of the entire right, and the unresisted advance of the enemy from that direction, as well as the advance of the enemy from the left of the line, the enemy having outflanked and driven in a portion of the left also, subjected General Negley to such hazard of losing this large park of artillery as made it expedient, in his judgment, to withdraw it to a point on the Dry Valley Road, about two or three miles from Rossville. It appears in evidence that this movement was executed in good order, and all the artillery saved.

"Here General Negley met Generals Davis and Sheridan, with portions of their command, and considerable bodies of disorganized troops from various commands. He co-operated with the division commanders above referred to in taking such measures as the exigencies of the occasion seemed to require, and toward evening retired to Rossville.

"General Negley exhibited throughout the day (the second of the battle) and the following night great activity and zeal in the discharge of his duties, and the court do not find in the evidence before them any ground of censure.

"The impression which seems to have been entertained by General Brannan that General Negley had ordered one of his brigades to the rear is not sustained by the testimony.

"It appears in the evidence that Brigadier General Wood, on one or more occasions, at the headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland, and in presence of the commander of that army and a portion of his staff, indulged in severe reflections upon the conduct of Major General Negley, applying to him coarse and offensive epithets. When placed upon the stand before the court he failed entirely to substantiate any charge or ground of accusation against him. The court deem it their duty to express their marked condemnation of such conduct, leading to vexation and unprofitable investigation prejudicial to the service.

"II. The record and opinions in the foregoing cases have been submitted to the President of the United States. He is of opinion that no farther action is required, and the Court of Inquiry is dissolved.

By order of the Secretary of War,

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G."

the enemy had assaulted the Federal right with any considerable force, he must have made himself complete master of the position. Not less fortunate, nor less decisive than Longstreet's delay, was General Gordon Granger's arrival upon this part of the field just as Wood had got into position on the new line. Granger had started from Rossville at 11 o'clock with General Whittaker's and Colonel Mitchell's brigades, under the immediate command of General Steedman, leaving Colonel Dan McCook's brigade to guard the Ringgold Road. He had heard heavy firing, and judging, from the sound, that Thomas was being hard pressed, he felt that his presence upon the field was necessary. It was about three and a half miles from Rossville to the point where Thomas was then engaging Breckinridge. Granger had gone over two thirds of this distance when the enemy made his appearance in the woods to the left. This hostile force was found to be only a party of observation, and Granger pressed on with his column, leaving the enemy at this point to be taken care of by Dan McCook.

While Granger is advancing the battle has been steadily swaying to the left along Thomas's line, until it has reached Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions. Against these McLaws and Stewart, with a part of Cleburne's division, have been directing assaults as violent as those which Breckinridge and Cleburne have been making against the stronger line north and west of the Lafayette Road—stronger, because situated on more favorable ground, and more thoroughly fortified by breastworks. The result had been different: while Breckinridge and Cleburne are being driven back, Longstreet's division, though sustaining terrible loss and repeated repulse, are at length gaining ground. It is at this point that Wood withdraws from Brannan's right, and the disaster follows on the Federal right which we have already described. Brannan now withdraws from his works, and the whole of Thomas's line east of the Lafayette Road is refused, moving back upon the spurs of Mission Ridge. All this has taken place as Granger is marching for the field. Longstreet is preparing for a fresh assault upon the new position with overwhelming numbers, and, when that assault comes, Thomas feels that, so far as he can see, there is no hope for his army—no possible alternative to defeat.

At this critical moment clouds of dust are seen rising to the left and rear. In those phantom-like columns lurk hope or disaster. Some new element is about to enter into the chemistry of this doubtful battle, which now waits for the development of this approaching force for its solution. The direction from which this force is coming gives no clew as to its character: it is as like to prove hostile as friendly. At length long lines of men are seen emerging from the woods, crossing the Lafayette Road in perfect discipline, their banners fluttering above, and their bayonets glittering in the sunlight. An aid has reconnoitred, and reports that it is an infantry force. But *whose*? Soon this vital question was answered from the advanced colors—the red and blue, with the white crescent, marking Granger's battle-flag.

Granger had come up in time. Already Longstreet had gathered his columns for an assault in front and on either flank. He had called for assistance from General Polk, but the latter had been too badly beaten to respond.<sup>1</sup> Thomas's right rested upon a chain of heights beginning about a fourth of a mile west of Kelly's house, and extending westward about one mile toward the Dry Valley Road. These heights are covered with open woods, have a gentle but irregular slope on the south, north, and east, and their summits are a hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country.<sup>2</sup> McFarland's Gap—now the great strategic point of the battle-field—was on the extreme right. This gap is the entrance from the battle-field into Chattanooga Valley. The Dry Valley Road from this point to Rossville was crowded with the trains of the Federal army. The stand which was now taken by Thomas, if obstinately held till nightfall, would secure the safe retreat of the army to Rossville.

Granger, as he came up, was sent in on Brannan's right. Wood had already been formed on Brannan's left. Steedman led Granger's men up the crest of the hill, contending as he advanced against an assaulting column of the enemy which had gained the summit of the ridge. Moving forward his artillery, he dislodged the enemy and drove him down the southern slope, inflicting upon him a fearful loss in killed and wounded. The arrival of fresh troops had revived the courage of the Federals at this point, and every assault of the enemy from this time until nightfall was repulsed with great slaughter. The conflict here was desperate. Granger's command consisted in great part of troops which had never before tasted battle; but they fought with heroic obstinacy, losing nearly half their numbers. With great difficulty Longstreet succeeded in bringing his men to charge again, after they had been driven from the ridge and the gorge to the south of it. He had put in now his last division, and his troops were exhausted by their repeated assaults.

In the mean time, General Garfield, about four o'clock P.M., after running the gauntlet of the enemy's fire on the left, reached Thomas, bringing him the first official intelligence of the disaster which had befallen the right of the army at noon. Garfield had left the field with Rosecrans, as we have seen, at the time of the disaster; as he now returned to it, he found the ridge just in rear of the point where the right had been beaten, held by

<sup>1</sup> "About 3 o'clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten so badly that they could be of no service to me. I had but one division [Preston's] that had not been engaged, and hesitated to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right."—Longstreet's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Such is the description given in Buckner's report. In regard to the topography of the battle-field, the writer of this chapter has been compelled to depend upon Confederate reports, not finding any fair description elsewhere. Rosecrans is usually very minute in the description of the topography of his campaigns; but he probably never sufficiently explored the battle-field of Chickamauga to describe it with any degree of accuracy.



Thomas's line, which at the same time still retained the Lafayette Road. It was to him a glorious moment. He alone, of all the army which then held the field, had witnessed the advance of Hood's irresistible columns and the wreck of a whole line of battle; and he alone, of all those who had left the field, was permitted to witness the magnificent spectacle of Longstreet's repulse from the ridge. It was the fulfillment of the promise which his own heart had whispered to itself when he parted company with Rosecrans near Rossville.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after Garfield's arrival, Thomas received a dispatch from General Rosecrans suggesting the withdrawal of the army to Rossville. Rosecrans had already learned from Garfield that Thomas was making a bold stand in the old tracks of the morning, and that the enemy was being repulsed. At half past five General Thomas ordered Reynolds to withdraw from his position. The line which had been assumed and obstinately held thus far, though strong in position, was weak in numbers. Only about twenty thousand men held the entire front from the Lafayette to the Dry Valley Road. Thomas, since noon, had been with his right. He saw that against the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy he could not hold out much longer. He, therefore, prepared to retire from the field. In passing from Wood's rear to Reynolds's position, to point out to the latter officer the position where he wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the divisions farther to the left, he found the enemy advancing in this direction to his rear. Upon this hostile force Reynolds was ordered to charge, and the enemy was driven beyond the left of the line. Wood, Brannan, and Granger were then withdrawn. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked just as they were retiring, but they succeeded in moving from the field in order, and without serious loss.<sup>2</sup>

General Negley's presence at Rossville, where, with Sheridan's and Davis's assistance, he had rallied a considerable body of troops, and provided them with rations, was of very material assistance to General Thomas. But for these generals the retreat of the disorganized troops would have been continued to Chattanooga. Upon Thomas's arrival at Rossville, he posted Negley's division on the Ringgold Road; Reynolds's on Negley's right, stretching to the Dry Valley Road; Brannan's in reserve to Reynolds's right and rear; while McCook's corps extended from the Dry Valley Road nearly to Chattanooga Creek.

Bragg's army was too tired and too sadly worsted to attempt pursuit on the night of the 20th. On the 21st a few straggling blows were directed against the Federal army at Rossville. Thomas, feeling that he could not hold his position there against the Confederate army, suggested to Rosecrans that he be ordered to Chattanooga. The order was issued at 6 P.M. on the 21st, and by 7 o'clock the next morning Rosecrans's army was withdrawn to that place without opposition from the enemy.

Thus ended the battle. Though driven from the battle-field, the Federal army had succeeded in shutting the enemy out of Chattanooga. It had fought bravely, and had retired in good order, after having for two days held its position. Even the disaster upon its right on the 20th, taking from the field over 10,000 men, had not crushed its power of resistance. While it held the battle-field it repulsed every assault of the enemy, and withdrew only when its ammunition and supplies had given out, and it had become certain that its position could not be held for another day. The solitary advantage which the enemy had to show as a proof of his victory was his final possession of the battle-field. As to the numbers engaged on the Confederate side there are widely varying estimates.<sup>3</sup> After an investigation

<sup>1</sup> There is a general misapprehension in regard to this ride of Garfield's to the front from Rossville, caused probably by the publication of explanatory letters from sources which ought to be authentic, but which are not so. Of this nature is a letter recently (during March, 1867) published in the *New York Citizen*. This letter, entitled "Rosecrans at Chickamauga—The Question Solved," is based entirely upon information given by a member of Rosecrans's staff. Now this member of Rosecrans's staff knew absolutely nothing of what he relates as to this matter. He makes Rosecrans "fall in" with Garfield at or near Rossville, whereas it was at this very point that Garfield parted with Rosecrans, after having been with him all the time from the beginning of the battle on the 19th. By a still wider error he makes Rosecrans receive reports at this point that Thomas continued to hold his position. Rosecrans received no such reports. Neither Garfield nor Rosecrans had any thing to guide them in their conduct at this time save their own inferences. As to Rosecrans "knowing that the fate of our army depended upon our holding Chattanooga," it is clear that any such dependence upon Chattanooga could only follow upon the defeat of the entire army. Until this utter rout was established the case was exactly reversed: the ability to hold Chattanooga depended upon the fate of the army. Again, Rosecrans is made to send Thomas orders by Garfield "to hold his position at all hazards until nightfall, and then to retire to Rossville." Rosecrans sent no order to Thomas by Garfield. A dispatch was sent later in the day to Thomas, ordering the latter to retire to Rossville. Moreover, it is stated that the only way for Rosecrans to reach Thomas "was via Rossville, and thence out on the east side of the ridge, it being impossible to cross the ridge at any intermediate point." Certainly the advance of the enemy had not been continued so far as to prevent the crossing of the ridge at any point north of McFarland's Gap; and there was no other difficulty. From McFarland's Gap Rosecrans could have certainly gone on horseback to Thomas with as much ease as troops were a short time afterward brought over *precisely the same route* which he would have taken, the only difference being that the *direction* was opposite. The enemy at no time during the battle penetrated to the road which Rosecrans would have taken. But did Rosecrans *know* that this route was clear for him? We answer, no. And it is *here*, and not in the fact that there was no such route, that Rosecrans can find his only apology. From what he could see, he suspected that Thomas was also defeated. He says in his official report:

"Giving the troops direction to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley Road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape and canister and musketry, for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far toward the left; and, hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and farther reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position."

The simple fact is that Rosecrans made a great mistake. He arrived too soon at the conviction that his whole army was defeated, and upon that conviction he went to Chattanooga, because he deemed it his duty to do so. The charge of cowardice, or of an apathetic abandonment of the field, which have been made against him, are too ridiculous to be even mentioned. Rosecrans was a general against whose bravery or patriotism there can rest no reproach.

<sup>2</sup> The Confederate reports indicate that the entire line was carried by assault, and that Thomas was driven. This was not the case. There was no serious assault. The enemy simply occupied a position deliberately abandoned by Thomas.

<sup>3</sup> Rosecrans's estimate of the numbers opposed to him seems to us to be extravagant. He says

of the official returns of numbers from Bragg's army before the battle, and of the Confederate reports of the battle (which are very minute), we judge that the effective force of the enemy, including re-enforcements, amounted to 70,000 men, of whom 55,000 infantry and cavalry were directly engaged on the battle-field. Rosecrans was clearly outnumbered.<sup>1</sup> His entire army, including cavalry, was not far from 60,000 strong. His force actually engaged in the battle amounted to from 43,000 to 47,000 men.

The Federal army lost in the battle 1644 killed, and 9262 wounded. Bragg reports a capture of 8000 prisoners. Halleck's report (for 1863) estimates Rosecrans's missing as 4945. The loss in cavalry was 500, making a total Federal loss of 16,351. The Federal loss in artillery Bragg makes 51 guns, and Rosecrans 36 (meaning probably the net loss, subtracting from his entire loss the guns which had been captured from the enemy). The Confederate loss in killed and wounded largely exceeded that sustained by Rosecrans. Bragg reports a loss of two fifths of his command, but does not give the exact figures. Halleck, in his report, says that the Confederate journals admitted a total loss of 18,000. This is probably not far from the truth.<sup>2</sup> Bragg lost 2003 prisoners, leaving his loss in killed and wounded about 16,000.

(in a letter published after the battle): "The enemy reports a loss of 18,700 killed and wounded, and admits his loss to have been 20 per cent. of his entire command—a very large loss—which gave him 93,500 at Chickamauga." But this calculation is based upon a mistake which would actually double the enemy's numbers. Bragg distinctly states in his report that his loss amounted to *two fifths* (40 per cent.) of his entire command, which would give him—supposing his loss 18,700 (Bragg, however, does not state the exact number), 46,750 instead of 93,500. Rosecrans thinks one fifth of the numbers engaged "a very large loss." But in his official report of the battle he says, "I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours." Now Rosecrans lost in killed and wounded 11,406, or more than one fifth of his own army.

Rosecrans (in the letter alluded to) arrives at this estimate of the enemy's numbers in another way. "Bragg," he says, "had 32,000 troops when driven from his intrenched camps at Shilbyville and Tullahoma, across the mountains and the Tennessee. Buckner joined with about 10,000 troops from East Tennessee, Johnston with about 25,000, and Longstreet with about 25,000 more, giving again 92,000 as his whole force." This also is a gross miscalculation. Bragg's force and Buckner's united, on June 20th (four days before Rosecrans advanced from Murfreesborough), amounted to 46,000 effectives—a larger estimate than Rosecrans gives. But we can find no evidence that Bragg had received 50,000 re-enforcements. At any rate, no such number was engaged in the battle. From the Army of Virginia about 12,000 men were sent under Longstreet, but Bragg reports that only 5000 of these arrived in time to participate in the battle. The re-enforcements from other sources actually engaged were B. R. Johnson's and Walker's commands, or about 15,000 men. Of Bragg's own army (the Army of Tennessee, including Buckner), the Confederate reports indicate that there were engaged about 27,000, exclusive of cavalry. This estimate would give the enemy about 47,000 infantry actually engaged at Chickamauga.

The estimate, as made up from the Confederate official reports, is the following:

LONGSTREET'S COMMAND.		POLK'S COMMAND.	
Buckner's Corps.....	9,207	Breckinridge's Division.....	3,769
Hindman's Division.....	6,122	Cleburne's Division.....	5,115
B. R. Johnson's Division.....	3,653	Walker's Corps.....	6,975
Longstreet's Corps (proper), consisting of Hood's and McLaws's Divisions.....	5,000	Cheatham's Division (approximate).....	7,500
	24,012		25,359
		Total, exclusive of Cavalry.....	47,371

There is good reason to believe that Bragg underestimates the number of Longstreet's own troops when he puts it at 5000. Longstreet had five brigades, three under Hood (Law's, Benning's, and Robertson's), and two under McLaws (Kershaw's and Humphreys's). Kershaw had all the regiments which he had at Chancellorsville, and the Eighth North Carolina in addition. He must have had at least 2000 men. Giving Humphreys 1500 men, and Hood's three brigades 3500 (a moderate estimate in either case), Longstreet's proper command (engaged) numbered 7000. This would make the entire infantry force of the enemy, in round numbers, 50,000. The cavalry force engaged probably numbered 5000, making a total of 55,000.

This army was composed of regiments from each of the eleven Confederate States, and from Kentucky. All together there were about 115 regiments and 11 battalions; and the battalions would have made about four regiments of the average size. The average for each regiment was little over 400 men. Forty-four regiments—a little over one third of the army—were from Tennessee. Over 20 were from Alabama; 19 from Mississippi; 5 from Kentucky; 13 from Arkansas, and about the same number from South Carolina; 5 from Texas; 15 or 16 from Georgia; 6 from Louisiana; 8 from Florida; 7 from North Carolina; and from Virginia only 2. The Virginians were all in Buckner's command. B. R. Johnson's command, which Greeley (*Am. Conflict*, vol. ii., p. 415) makes consist of Virginians, had not a Virginia regiment. Cheatham's division consisted almost wholly of Tennesseans. Humphreys's brigade was made up of Mississippians entirely, and Kershaw's entirely of Carolinians.

The estimate of Bragg's army which we have been considering is for the forces actually engaged. The estimate for his whole army would be largely above this. Just before his retreat from Chattanooga he had 45,000 effectives. His re-enforcements, and the additions made to his cavalry by recruiting, before the battle, increased this force to over 70,000.

<sup>1</sup> The last official returns from Rosecrans's army before the battle are those of August 31st. C. Goddard, A. A. G. of Rosecrans's staff, quoting from these returns, gives the following as the effective force of the several divisions:

Fourteenth Corps	Baird's.....	5,702	Twenty-first Corps	Wood's.....	2,964
	Negley's.....	5,130		Palmer's.....	5,703
	Brannan's.....	6,615		Van Cleave's.....	5,308
	Reynolds's.....	6,615			13,975
		24,072	Granger's Reserve Corps.....		4,500
Twentieth Corps	Davis's.....	4,356			13,475
	Johnson's.....	5,607			14,345
	Sheridan's.....	4,352			24,072
		14,345	Total.....		56,822

This estimate includes the entire infantry force, with the exception of Wagner's brigade left at Chattanooga. Goddard says: "I am morally certain that these returns, made previous to crossing the Tennessee, show a considerably larger force than took active part in the battle. What percentage should be deducted I can not well say. . . . There was a regiment left at Crawfish, I think to guard the hospital. That, with the details for train guards, hospital and ambulance attendance, etc., would, I think, reduce the fighting strength at least 3000 men. I made a rough estimate at Crawfish, and put down our effectives at about 42,000, which was, I think, not far from right."

It is probable that much more than 3000 men were detailed—it would not be unfair to say 5000. Deducting this and Granger's force—which only came up at the close of the battle, and after a force more than double his own had been swept from the field—and we have left 37,392. As the cavalry on the 19th and 20th was almost entirely detached to guard the exposed flanks of the army, it ought not to be estimated as a part of the force actually engaged on the field. Rosecrans's army, all told, cavalry and infantry, numbered nearly 60,000 just before the battle.

<sup>2</sup> The Confederate reports give the losses in all the brigades excepting those of Gist's, Ector's, and those of Hood, McLaws's, and Cheatham's divisions. Leaving out these 10 brigades, the loss in these several commands is as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
Wilson's Brigade.....	99	436	80	605	.50
Buckner's Corps.....	303	2576	90	2,969	.43
Breckinridge's Division.....	166	909	165	1,240	.33
Cleburne's Division.....	204	1539	6	1,749	.34
Hindman's Division.....	272	1489	98	1,859	.30
Liddell's Division.....	162	963	277	1,402	.44
B. R. Johnson's Division.....	188	1081	166	1,435	.42
Total.....	1394	8974	882	11,250	.36

Ector's loss was about the same as Wilson's. Ector and Wilson's brigades numbered together 2400 before going into action. They lost more than half. Gist's loss is not reported, but was at least 400. The greater part of Cheatham's division was held in reserve on the 20th; but his loss on the 19th was severe. In all he must have lost 1600 men. Thus, leaving out the casualties in Longstreet's own corps, we have,

From precise data.....	11,250
Ector's Brigade (estimated).....	600
Gist's Brigade (estimated).....	400
Cheatham's Division (estimated).....	1600
	13,850, or about 34 per cent.



Eighteen days after the Army of the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee it was concentrated in Chattanooga. The campaign, so far as it concerned this army alone, was over. It had been a tedious campaign of wearisome marches, terminating in a doubtful and unnecessary battle. Many mistakes had been made by both the Federal and Confederate commanders. Risks had been run on the one side which imperiled a whole army, and the disastrous results of which were only averted by delays and neglect of opportunities on the other. The battle itself was badly managed by General Rosecrans. His personal supervision of its details on the 19th would have enabled Thomas to strike blows so decisive that it is doubtful if there would have been a second day's battle. On the 20th there was, from the beginning of the fight, nothing but disorder and confusion on the right; nearly every order was either disobeyed or misunderstood. If on this day Rosecrans had devoted himself to seeing that Thomas was supported, and to such a disposition of his right as the transfer of troops to the left made necessary, there would have been no disaster, no serious loss of artillery or prisoners, and no necessity of abandoning the field to the foe. Rosecrans relied upon McCook and Crittenden to do what he ought to have known—if he knew any thing of men—would not be done by those commanders. Herein consisted his greatest blunder at Chickamauga.<sup>1</sup> All else—that, indeed, for which he was chiefly blamed—the historian will regard as the result of a natural mistake.

The missing, as precisely reported, we have found amounted to 882. It would be fair to suppose that the missing of Ector's and Gist's brigades and of Cheatham's division would increase this number to at least 1000. Subtracting this from the entire loss thus far estimated, we have left 12,850 as the killed and wounded, leaving out those of Longstreet's corps. Now, taking the very lowest estimate of Bragg's infantry force (as made up from official reports), it amounts to 48,000. Forty per cent. of this would give 19,200 as the number of killed and wounded in infantry alone. This would make the loss in Longstreet's corps the difference between 19,200 and 12,850, or 6350. But Bragg reports that only 5000 of Longstreet's corps took part in the battle. This estimate excludes prisoners captured from Bragg, which Rosecrans reports as 2003. We have already estimated the missing from all the other commands except Longstreet's corps as 1000; the other thousand, therefore, must have been from this corps. This would make the entire Confederate loss in infantry—killed, wounded, and missing—21,200, and Longstreet's entire loss 7350, or 2350 more men lost than, according to Bragg's report, he brought into battle.

The precise reports we are compelled to assume as correct. The error, therefore, is either in an extravagant overestimate on Bragg's part of his loss, or an equally extravagant underestimate of the number of Longstreet's corps engaged in the battle. One thing, however, is certain—namely, that the loss in Longstreet's corps was considerably above the general average. Hood's three brigades fought both days, and suffered severely on both. Kershaw's and Humphreys's brigades were engaged only on the 20th, but they sustained a fearful loss in their assaults on the afternoon of that day. It would not be extravagant, therefore, to estimate Longstreet's loss as 45 per cent. of his command. Then, supposing the entire loss of the army to have been about what Halleck says the Confederate journals stated it, 18,000, and deducting 1000 for casualties in the cavalry force, Longstreet's loss would be the difference between 17,000 and 13,850, or 3150, which would be 45 per cent. of 7000, the latter being the number which in a preceding note we gave as the probable estimate of Longstreet's force actually engaged. This calculation would decrease the percentage of loss in killed and wounded from 40 to about 30 per cent., and give Longstreet 2000 more men than Bragg gave him in his report.

The loss in some brigades of Bragg's army was almost incredible. Helm's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, went into battle with 1763 men, and came out with 432, losing over two thirds, besides its commander. Bate's brigade, of Buckner's corps, lost 608 out of 1085. Liddell's division lost 1402 out of 3175, nearly 50 per cent. In the space of a single hour, on the afternoon of the 20th, Gracie's brigade, of the same corps, lost 698 out of 2003. Another brigade (Kelly's) of this corps reports a loss of 300 out of 876. Still another reports a loss of 50 per cent. B. R. Johnson's division out of 3683 lost 1435, nearly one half. Maney's brigade, of Cheatham's division, lost half its numbers. Jackson's brigade, of the same division, lost 490 out of 1405; the loss in one of its regiments (the Fifth Georgia) was 55 per cent. Wilson's brigade lost 50 per cent., and Ector's in the same proportion.

<sup>1</sup> Rosecrans made no charges against McCook or Crittenden. On the contrary, in his report, he accorded them only praise. The court of inquiry which investigated Negley's conduct also considered the cases of McCook and Crittenden. We quote below the findings of the court in each case. But these opinions do not in the least affect General Rosecrans's responsibility.

#### Decision in McCook's Case.

"It appears from the investigation that Major General McCook commanded the Twentieth Army Corps, composed of Sheridan's, Johnson's, and Davis's divisions.

"His command on the 19th of September, 1863 (the first day of the battle of Chickamauga), consisted of Davis's and Sheridan's divisions, and of Negley's temporarily, and occupied the right of the line, Johnson's having been detached to Thomas's command. The evidence shows that General McCook did his whole duty faithfully on that day with activity and intelligence.

"Early on the 20th of September General McCook had under his command the divisions of Sheridan and Davis (the latter only 1300 to 1400 strong), and Wilder's brigade, and the senior officers of the cavalry were told they must take orders from him, though attend to their own business.

"The posting of these troops was not satisfactory to the commanding general, who in person directed several changes between 8 and 10½ o'clock P.M.

"During these changes, involving a flank movement of the whole right to the left, the enemy made a fierce attack, taking advantage of a break in the line caused by the precipitate and inopportune withdrawal of his division by Brigadier General T. J. Wood, passing through the interval, and routing the whole right and centre up to Brannan's position.

"The court deem it unnecessary to express an opinion as to the relative merits of the position taken by General McCook and that subsequently ordered to be taken by the commanding general, but it is apparent from the testimony that General McCook was not responsible for the delay in forming the new line on that occasion.

"It further appears that General McCook not only had impressed on him the vital importance of keeping well closed to the left and of maintaining a compact centre, but he was also ordered to hold the Dry Valley Road. This caused the line to be 'attenuated,' as stated in the testimony of the commanding general, who says that its length was greater than he thought it was when assumed.

"It is shown, too, that the cavalry did not obey General McCook's orders.

"The above facts, and the additional one that the small force at General McCook's disposal was inadequate to defend against greatly superior numbers the long line hastily taken under instructions, relieve General McCook entirely from the responsibility for the reverse which ensued.

"It is fully established that General McCook did every thing he could to rally and hold his troops after the line was broken, giving the necessary orders, etc., to his subordinates.

"The court are of opinion, however, that in leaving the field to go to Chattanooga, General McCook committed a mistake, but his gallant conduct in the engagements forbids the idea that he was influenced by considerations of personal safety.

"Bearing in mind that, the commanding general having previously gone to Chattanooga, it was natural for General McCook to infer that all the discomfited troops were expected to rally there, as well as to presume that a conference with the commanding general on that important subject was both desirable and necessary, the court can not regard this act of General McCook as other than an error of judgment."

#### Decision in Crittenden's Case.

"General Crittenden commanded the Twenty-first Army Corps, composed of Palmer's, Wood's, and Van Cleve's divisions.

"On the 19th of September, 1863 (the first day of the battle of Chickamauga), his command consisted of those divisions, except Wagner's brigade, which garrisoned Chattanooga.

"The evidence adduced respecting General Crittenden's operations on that day not only shows no cause for censure, but, on the contrary, that his whole conduct was most creditable; for by his watchfulness, and prompt and judicious support of troops engaged, serious consequences to our army were prevented, and the enemy's plans for the day disconcerted.

"Early on the morning of the 20th General Crittenden's command consisted of Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions; but as, about 8 o'clock A.M., Wood's division was detached, to take post in Thomas's line, General Crittenden is not responsible for its subsequent conduct.

"Van Cleve's division was shortly after ordered to the left, and General Crittenden was to accompany it.

The battle left Rosecrans with an army in and about Chattanooga 45,000 strong. Bragg was left with an army numbering over 50,000 men, to which re-enforcements were daily being added. It was evident, therefore, that nothing farther could be accomplished by the Army of the Cumberland until it should be largely re-enforced. Rosecrans proceeded to fortify Chattanooga. Hooker's corps was sent to him from the East on the 23d of September. Other re-enforcements were on the way from Grant's army. As soon as the latter arrived Rosecrans was relieved of his command, on the 19th of October,<sup>1</sup> and General Grant, with the armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee, entered upon that brilliant campaign which terminated in General Bragg's utter defeat before the close of the year.<sup>2</sup>

## CHAPTER XXXV.

### THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

#### V. THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

The Campaign for Chattanooga involved the East Tennessee Problem.—Halleck's Mistake; his Contradictory Orders.—The tardy and feeble Effort toward co-operation with Rosecrans.—Plans for subsequent Movements suggested by Burnside.—Halleck still insists upon the Occupation of the Upper Valley of the Holston and Co-operation with Rosecrans at the same Time.—Why Bragg did not move on Rosecrans's Rear directly after the Battle of Chickamauga.—The Confederates occupy Lookout Mountain, abandoned by Rosecrans.—The Mistake of Rosecrans deprives him of his shortest Line of Communication.—Wheeler's Raid north of the Tennessee.—Destruction of a Federal Train.—Capture of McMinnville.—Conflict with Crook's Federal Cavalry near Farmington.—The Difficulty of supplying Chattanooga prevents the accession of Burnside's Army to the Defense of that Place.—The Campaign against Sam Jones in East Tennessee.—Longstreet crosses the Tennessee, November 14, 1863.—Burnside, in accordance with Grant's Instructions, falls back toward Knoxville.—The Battle at Campbell's Station.—Burnside's Situation after reaching Knoxville.—Longstreet, needed by Bragg, can not afford to wait, and Assaults on the 18th.—Death of General Sanders.—Defeat of Longstreet's second Assault, November 29th.—Grant sends Sherman to the Relief of Knoxville.—The Siege is raised, and Longstreet retreats eastward.

IN the campaign of General Rosecrans against Bragg, General Burnside's army had been utilized only to a very small extent. The advance upon Knoxville had been unresisted. The occupation of that point was of considerable importance. By his possession of the railroad connecting East Tennessee with Virginia, Burnside compelled the Confederate re-enforcements to Bragg's army from the east to make an extensive detour by way of Atlanta. His presence on Rosecrans's left and rear made his army a large reserve force relatively to Rosecrans; but the Army of the Ohio was too distant to answer the chief use of a reserve corps—that of active co-operation in case of necessity. The idea that Burnside's army, by remaining in the Valley of the Holston, secured the possession of East Tennessee, is simply absurd. It was security enough, doubtless, against Sam Jones's little army, or any other inconsiderable detachments which might straggle across the mountains from West Virginia. But these were only demonstrating columns sent for the purpose of keeping Burnside's army where it was. The Confederate force which was really fighting for East Tennessee was Bragg's army. The only force which actually contested Bragg's possession of this prize was the Army of the Cumberland; and it maintained the contest single-handed, while Burnside's army accomplished little beyond the illustration of General Halleck's pet theories. The enemy thoroughly understood that the defeat of General Rosecrans was the recovery not only of Chattanooga, but of all else which Bragg and Buckner had abandoned. If Rosecrans could be cut off from Chattanooga—and at one stage of the campaign this seemed likely to be accomplished—there was no alternative to Burnside's retreat but overwhelming disaster. The continued separation of the two armies was too auspicious to the Confederate government to be counted upon, and, therefore, Longstreet had been sent to Bragg.

"As it was moving the attack took place, and the troops were broken by our retreating artillery and infantry, as well as by the furious attack of the enemy.

"For the disaster which ensued he is in no way responsible.

"Changes were ordered to be made in the line. The break which occurred while the troops were moving by flank from the right to the left to conform to these changes was taken advantage of by the enemy, and disaster and rout ensued. It is amply proven that General Crittenden did every thing he could, by example and personal exertion, to rally and hold his troops, and to prevent the evils resulting from such a condition of affairs, but without avail.

"Believing that by his presence on the field nothing more could be effected, he left for Ross-ville, where he learned little else than that the commanding general had gone to Chattanooga.

"He repaired thither, where one of his brigades was stationed.

"In the opinion of the court, General Crittenden is not censurable for this act."

<sup>1</sup> The following is a copy of General Rosecrans's order upon leaving his army:

"General Orders, No. 242.

"Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, Chattanooga, Tenn., October 19th, 1863.

"The general commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them, under orders from the President.

"Major General George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume the command of this army and department.

"The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him.

"In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms—officers and soldiers—he congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you as he did, a stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its first organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism you may look with confidence that under God he will lead you to victory.

"The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

"To the division and brigade commanders he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken.

"To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates whom he leaves behind he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

"Companions in arms—officers and soldiers—farewell; and may God bless you!

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General."

<sup>2</sup> We have dealt thus elaborately with the history of Rosecrans's Chickamauga campaign on account of the general misapprehension which exists in regard to many of its most important features. We have endeavored to do justice to all the actors concerned. The writer has made no statement in regard to any point in dispute without substantiating it. His materials have been abundant, consisting in no small proportion of unpublished official documents. If he has erred in any important particular, it has not been from prejudice, but because the evidence before him was, after all, incomplete. Whatever mistakes may have been made on this account, time alone can correct. A fair history of any event is not often written while the historian rests under its shadow. If the present writer has failed to do justice, still justice will be done; if he has not told the exact truth, still, sooner or later, the exact truth will be told.



Burnside had received orders instructing him to co-operate with Rosecrans, but it had all the while been insisted upon that he must hold the Valley of the Holston from Rosecrans's left to the Virginia boundary, a line of nearly 200 miles. Not till it was too late did he receive an explicit order to move to Chattanooga. The first order to this effect he got on the 16th, only three days before the battle of Chickamauga. The Ninth Corps, which had been resting for the last fortnight after its struggle in Mississippi, was now ordered to move. But the necessity for haste does not seem to have been appreciated. The next night a more urgent dispatch was received from General Halleck, who wrote, "There are several reasons why you should re-enforce Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." On the 21st a peremptory order came from the President, commanding Burnside to join Rosecrans without delay. By this time all the forces had been, with great deliberation, put in motion, except a small detachment of infantry and cavalry confronting the enemy on the Watauga River. With this latter force Burnside remained. Not venturing to withdraw while the enemy was in his front, he determined to wait until the next morning, and fight a battle before obeying the President's order. The next morning disclosed the fact that the enemy had retreated, burning the bridge behind him. The Federal column at this point was then started for Knoxville, where, by the 25th, the troops were all concentrated. It was then known that the battle of Chickamauga had been fought, and the emergency was past. Some correspondence followed between Halleck and Burnside, the result of which was that the command of the latter remained in East Tennessee. Burnside proposed to the general-in-chief three separate plans for the future operations of his army.

The first of these contemplated the abandonment of the railroad and East Tennessee, leaving only a small garrison at Cumberland Gap. This would leave free an army of full 20,000 men to move down the Tennessee and re-enforce Rosecrans.

The second plan suggested the movement of his main body—say 18,000 men—along the line of the railroad against Bragg's right at Cleveland, leaving garrisons at Knoxville and Loudon, also at Cumberland Gap, and at Bull's Gap and Rogersville, to cover Cumberland Gap.

The third plan proposed the movement of a force, consisting of 7000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, south of the Tennessee River, through Athens, Columbus, and Benton, past the right flank of the enemy, "down the line of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad to Dalton, destroying the enemy's communications, sending a cavalry force to Rome to destroy the machine works and powder-mills at that place, the main body moving on the direct road to Atlanta, the railroad centre of Georgia, and there entirely destroying the enemy's communications, breaking up the dépôts, etc., thence moving to some point on the coast where cover could be obtained." No trains were to be taken. The troops were to live upon the country. This would divert the attention of the enemy, and materially relieve Rosecrans. The chances of escape from pursuing columns of the enemy Burnside thought were in his favor.

Burnside was partial to the plan last described, which, by the way, on a miniature scale resembled Sherman's brilliant march from Atlanta to the sea, undertaken more than a year afterward. Halleck replied somewhat testily, decidedly objecting to Burnside's proposed raid. He was in favor of immediately co-operating with Rosecrans by a movement on the north side of the Tennessee. But he still insisted upon Burnside's holding the upper valley of the Holston, 200 miles away from Chattanooga.<sup>1</sup>

Rosecrans favored the first of the plans proposed by Burnside, but events soon occurred which made this impracticable. While the Federal commanders had been forming plans, General Bragg had not been idle. The very next day after the battle of Chickamauga, Longstreet had suggested a movement to Rosecrans's rear, above Chattanooga, to cut off his communications, and compel him to fall back to Nashville. At first Bragg seemed inclined to adopt this plan—at least Longstreet so understood. But if Bragg for a moment entertained such a scheme, he soon gave it up as impracticable.<sup>2</sup> But, while keeping his main army south of the Tennessee, Bragg assumed the offensive with considerable energy.

Rosecrans's most convenient line of communication with Murfreesborough

was through Bridgeport, and the shortest road from Chattanooga to this point lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. This route could be rendered secure only by holding the point of Lookout Mountain, and Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps. Rosecrans, after retreating to Chattanooga, gave up these important positions to the enemy. He claims that he could not have held them and Chattanooga at the same time.<sup>1</sup> The enemy immediately occupied Lookout Mountain, and thus compelled Rosecrans to transport his supplies by the more difficult route across the mountains. But even this latter route was not left undisturbed. Bragg sent Wheeler, with a large cavalry force—Wharton's, Martin's, Davidson's, and Armstrong's commands—against this line of communication. Wheeler's command crossed the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and on the 2d of November reached the Sequatchie Valley. Proceeding around Chattanooga on the north side to Jasper and Anderson's Cross-roads, two wagon trains were captured, one of them ten miles in length, consisting of from 800 to 1500 wagons, and heavily loaded with ordnance and provisions. This train was destroyed, and during the night Wheeler crossed the Cumberland Mountains, and the next morning headed his columns toward McMinnville. Although the Federal cavalry was in close pursuit, he succeeded in capturing the place, with its fortifications, and its garrison of 587 men and 200 horses. Then he moved westward to Murfreesborough. Only time was allowed for a feint on this point, but the stockade guarding the railroad bridge over Stone River was captured, and the bridge, together with the track for a distance of three miles, was destroyed. On the 5th the railroad bridges and trestles between Murfreesborough and Wartrace were destroyed, also a large quantity of stores at Shelbyville. Wheeler was now ready to withdraw; but Davidson, on the Duck River, did not retire with sufficient promptness, and was overtaken by the Federal cavalry. Rosecrans, after the battle of Chickamauga, had sent most of his cavalry north of the Tennessee to guard the fords of the river. Those nearest Chattanooga were guarded by Colonel Miller, commanding Wilder's brigade. Farther up the river were Minty's and Long's brigades, under the command of General Crook. Wheeler, as we have seen, was not thus prevented from crossing into Sequatchie Valley; but, as soon as he had crossed, the cavalry brigades along the river combined under General Crook's command, and pressed on in the pursuit. This force was soon joined by Mitchell's cavalry division. The pursuit was close, though it did not prevent the enemy from doing very great injury. There were some inconsiderable fights with the rear of Wheeler's column, but no battle until Davidson's command was engaged near Farmington. Wheeler, with Martin's division, came up just in time to relieve Davidson from his perilous situation. Both Crook and Wheeler claim each to have driven the other. Certainly Wheeler stood only long enough to secure the safety of his trains, when he withdrew.

There was, apart from any interruption from the enemy, great difficulty in supplying Rosecrans's army. Wheeler's movement had added to the embarrassment rising from this cause. Under such circumstances, the addition of Burnside's army to that which was already encamped at Chattanooga was inexpedient, unless absolutely necessary.

In the mean time the enemy, under General Sam Jones, was again threatening Burnside's left. He had advanced, by the 8th of October, as far as Blue Springs. Burnside had a small body of infantry at Morristown, and a cavalry brigade at Bull's Gap. The Ninth Corps, re-enforced by Willecox's division and Shackleford's cavalry, were on the 10th led against the enemy in front, while Colonel Foster's brigade of cavalry was sent *via* Rogersville to the enemy's rear, to intercept his retreat. The Confederates were driven by the attack in front, but escaped Foster's blow by withdrawing during the night. Shackleford pursued, driving the enemy into Virginia. Burnside lost about 100 killed and wounded, and took 150 prisoners.

A week or more after the fight at Blue Springs General Grant assumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," which was now made to comprise the three departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. Thomas succeeded Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and McCook and Crittenden were ordered to Cincinnati. Sherman commanded the Army of the Tennessee, and Burnside retained his present command. Hooker's corps had come from the East, and there were now four different Federal armies operating upon the soil of Tennessee. Halleck, after so long a time, saw the necessity of unity in the action of these various commands in order to their effective co-operation, and the control of these four armies was therefore given to General Grant.


<sup>1</sup> In his evidence before the Congressional Committee, Rosecrans says: "General Halleck, in his annual report, says I abandoned the passes of Lookout Mountain, leaving the public to imagine that these passages were within the possible control of my army, and their abandonment not justified as a military measure. I call the attention of the committee to the fact that one of these passes was forty-two miles south of Chattanooga, and the next nearest twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and the nearest at the extremity of Lookout Mountain in front of our lines. This latter may have been the one which gave rise to his report, and if so it ought to have been so stated. I was satisfied that I could not even hold *this* pass and Chattanooga at the same time if the enemy did his duty, and therefore withdrew my troops from it, but established batteries on the other side of the river, which rendered it practically of little, if any use to them. Subsequent events amply justified the wisdom of this decision, for the enemy, with a division and a half, were unable to hold it against General Hooker, and it was their attempt to capture this point which was one of the causes of their being beaten so easily at Missionary Ridge."

This apology is exceedingly weak. In the first place, Rosecrans, after abandoning the point of Lookout Mountain overlooking Chattanooga and its approach *via* the south bank of the Tennessee, and finding that the enemy had immediately occupied it, saw that he had made a mistake in giving it up, and ordered McCook to storm and recapture the position. McCook stoutly objected that the thing couldn't be done, and was supported in this opinion by the judgment of some of the best officers in the army. As to the other point, namely, the enemy's inability to hold the same position subsequently against Hooker, the argument is no more pertinent. Hooker did not, and could not have succeeded in a direct attack upon the position, such as McCook was ordered to make. He surprised the enemy by taking their works in flank. Now such a movement was impossible to the enemy in the case of Rosecrans's holding the position. This is as clear as daylight. For, of course, the Federal works would have fronted the enemy, and the entire disposition, both of the forces holding the position as well as of the fortifications themselves, would have been altered, so that Bragg must have assaulted in front, or not at all.

<sup>1</sup> Halleck says: "The purport of all your instructions has been that you should hold some point near the upper end of the valley, and with all your available force move to the assistance of Rosecrans. Since the battle of Chickamauga, and the wear of our force to paper, you have been repeatedly told that it would be dangerous to form a connection on the south side of the Tennessee River, and consequently that you ought to march on the north side. Rosecrans has now telegraphed to you that it is not necessary to join him at Chattanooga, but only to move down to such a position that you can go to his assistance should he require it. You are in direct communication with Rosecrans, and can learn his condition and wants sooner than I can. Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object is to hold East Tennessee by forcing the enemy south of the passes, and closing the passes against his return."

<sup>2</sup> "The suggestion of a movement by our right, immediately after the battle to the north of the Tennessee, and thence upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place among the files of the department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of re-enforcements just before the battle, without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and in all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river, except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut—a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposition was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication, and laid open to him our dépôts of supplies, while it placed us, with a greatly inferior force, beyond a difficult, and, at times, impassable river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only ten miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain the enemy's rear, and cut him off from his dépôt of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route of half the length on the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may be the inferences drawn from subsequent movements."—*Bragg's Report.*





OFFICIAL MAP ILLUSTRATING THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

About the middle of October, just after Wheeler's return from Middle Tennessee, there had been indications of a movement by the enemy toward Knoxville. Bragg's right flank had begun to extend beyond Cleveland. On the 20th, Colonel Woolford, holding the Sweetwater Valley, south of the Tennessee, was attacked by a superior force of the enemy near Philadelphia, and, after several hours' fighting, finding that he was being surrounded, retired to Loudon, leaving in the enemy's hands thirty-eight wagons, six small howitzers, and between 300 and 400 prisoners. It soon became evident that Bragg was threatening Burnside with a formidable force, and the latter withdrew all his troops to the north side of the river, occupying the heights about Loudon. To this point Burnside moved his headquarters on the 28th, where he remained until the 31st, when the emergency appeared to have passed, and he returned to Knoxville. The enemy, in his operations south of the river, had captured 650 prisoners. On the 10th of November the Federal garrison at Rogersville was attacked by forces from Virginia and driven back to Morristown, with a loss of 500 prisoners, four guns, and thirty-six wagons.

Early in November, Longstreet's corps, now consisting of 12,000 men, was detached from Bragg's army, and, accompanied by 5000 cavalry under Wheeler, began to move against Burnside. Upon learning this fact, General Grant urged Burnside to concentrate his army at Kingston, where he would be in more intimate connection with the forces at Chattanooga. Burnside preferred Knoxville to Kingston. It had already been partially fortified under the superintendence of Captain O. M. Poe, who had erected two earth-works near the town. His reluctance to abandon East Tennessee was also an argument in favor of this point. About this time Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of Grant's staff, visited Knoxville. These gentlemen agreed with General Burnside, and Grant yielded the point. It seemed also to be a great advantage to Grant that Longstreet should be diverted as far as possible from Chattanooga. The movement of his corps into East Tennessee, though he had urged it at an earlier period, was at this time, it appears, opposed by Longstreet; but both Davis and Bragg insisted upon the undertaking. Longstreet was promised the support of Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions, which would have increased his strength to over 27,000 men; but upon reaching Sweetwater (near Loudon) he discovered that they were ordered in the opposite direction. There were no indications, either, of the supplies, of which he was in pressing need, and which had been promised him. He was obliged to halt for some days at Sweetwater, losing most precious time, while he sent out his foraging expeditions in every direction to gather up corn stacked in the fields, which was then threshed and baked. His men were thinly clad; their shoes were unserviceable; they had few blankets, and no tents; but they had marched before in the same plight, and uttered no complaint.


On the morning of November 14th Longstreet's advance crossed the Tennessee at Hough's Ferry, six miles below Loudon, demonstrating against Knoxville with his cavalry at the same time. At Lenoir's General Potter was stationed, with the Ninth Corps and one division of the Twenty-third, under Brigadier General Julius White. Longstreet did not cross the river without resistance. General White fell upon his advance in the afternoon, and drove it back for two miles to the river. Burnside would have attacked again on the morning of the 15th, but he received late at night an order from General Grant to withdraw his troops. The design was to draw Longstreet on to Knoxville. The order was promptly obeyed. "If General Grant," said Burnside, "can destroy Bragg, it is of no great consequence what becomes of ourselves. Order the troops to be ready to march in the morning." Burnside fell back to Lenoir's on the 15th, and on the night of that day prepared to continue his retreat to Campbell's Station.

The enemy endeavored by a flank movement to anticipate General Burnside in the possession of Campbell's Station, but the Federal troops reached this important position first. Here a stand was made on the 16th by Hartranft's division, while the main portion of the Federal army and the trains passed along the Loudon Road toward Knoxville. Hartranft had reached the Station a quarter of an hour before Longstreet's advance came up. He succeeded in holding his ground and covering the retreat until the army and the trains had passed the threatened point. Then Burnside, forming his army upon a low range of hills, half a mile from Campbell's, covering the approaches to Knoxville, awaited the enemy's attack. Several assaults were made upon this position, which were repulsed with great loss to the enemy. Longstreet advancing upon his rear in the afternoon, Burnside withdrew to a second position, equally strong, 1000 yards in rear of the first. The enemy repeated his attack with determination, but was finally forced to withdraw, and that night Burnside's army retired within its intrenchments at Knoxville.


In the mean time General Sanders had met the enemy's cavalry south of the Holston, on the opposite bank from Knoxville. General Parke, now Burnside's chief of staff, had been left in command of the town. A pontoon bridge was thrown across the Holston, by means of which Sanders kept up communication with the garrison defending the town. Holding this position, General Sanders successfully maintained it until Burnside's army entered Knoxville.

General Burnside held a position of great strength. His force was fully equal to that of the enemy, and the hills around Knoxville, previously fortified by General Buckner, and now connected by means of rifle-pits, formed a vast fortified camp. General Sanders's force was now drawn across the river, and covered the Loudon Road. Longstreet had already lost much time. Grant was ready to move upon Bragg, and if Longstreet would be





Fort Sanders.



VIEW OF KNOXVILLE FROM KURTIS HILL.

back in time to assist the latter, his work at Knoxville must proceed rapidly. This necessity of haste led Longstreet to make an immediate assault on the Federal works on the 18th. During the 17th there had been skirmishing on the Lenoir Road, while the Federal army was busily occupied in getting into position, collecting supplies, and strengthening its fortifications. The attack of the 18th fell mainly upon Sanders's cavalry. It was the enemy's design to push back this cavalry force into the town, and then enter with a triumphant charge; but Sanders's men, though unrelieved for several days, and though opposed by superior numbers, were not thus easily driven. After a gallant resistance of three hours they were pushed back, but Ferrero's guns at Rebel Point checked the enemy. Sanders then renewed the unequal conflict. He made a charge, and was repulsed by superior numbers. At 4 o'clock P.M. he fell, mortally wounded, and the hill and the fort which he had maintained so long was surrendered to the enemy. His death was a sad misfortune to the army. Three weeks before, he had been promoted to a brigadier generalship at General Burnside's earnest solicitation, and had been assigned to the command of a cavalry division. Burnside felt his loss most keenly, and ordered that the earth-work in front of which he fell should be named Fort Sanders in honor of his memory. On being informed that the wound was mortal, General Sanders replied, "Well, I am not afraid to die. . . . I have done my duty, and have served my country as well as I could." Burnside and his staff stood by his bedside when he died. His midnight burial was the saddest among the many sad incidents connected with the siege of Knoxville.

7 A

The partial success gained by Longstreet on the 18th proved of little value. To push this slight advantage against works so gallantly defended could only result in increased loss to his command, without any reasonable chance of victory. He therefore determined to reduce the garrison to surrender by famine. Burnside's army held the roads approaching Knoxville from the west; on each side of the city ran the Holston. The assault on the 18th had been on the Federal left.

Burnside was fairly besieged on the night of the 18th. The enemy had cut off communication with Cumberland Gap, and held the approaches to Knoxville on the northwest and southwest. The Federal army was supplied for three weeks; the fortifications were hourly strengthened; a *chevaux de frise* of pikes was set up in front of the rifle-pits, and the heights on the opposite side of the Holston were securely held and fortified. Burnside was urged by Grant to hold on to Knoxville. Fortunately, he was better supplied with provisions than the enemy conjectured, and had lost no time in his work upon the fortifications, which had become almost impregnable. His only hope now was Grant's speedy victory over Bragg, and the approach of a relieving force.

Grant's work, as we shall see in the next chapter, was speedily and effectually accomplished. One week after Longstreet's assault on the 18th, Bragg was defeated before Chattanooga, and Longstreet's position was rendered extremely perilous. But the latter determined to make a final effort, risking every thing upon the chances of a bold assault on Burnside's lines before a Federal force could reach his own rear. He had in the mean while





JOHN G. PARKE.

been re-enforced by two brigades of B. R. Johnson's division. The morning of the 29th of November was fixed for the assault.


The point selected for the attack was Fort Sanders, which commanded the Kingston Road, and overlooked Knoxville. The capture of this fort would be decisive, and every nerve was strained for its accomplishment. This position was held by a portion of the Ninth Corps. It was well protected by a wide ditch in front, by thickly laid abatis, and by a network of wires stretched from stump to stump.

In the gray of the morning three picked brigades of McLaws's division

appeared in front of the fort, while a Georgia regiment of sharpshooters silenced the Federal guns. Leaving the shelter of the woods, the storming column advanced up the slope. Only at the edge of the ditch did the enemy halt. Here it was found that an important feature in the assault had been forgotten. There were no means at hand for crossing this ditch. It was now the moment of glorious opportunity to the defenders of the fort, who poured a deadly fire upon the hesitating column, checking the first impetus of its assault. But, though retarded in their movement, the courage of the assailants was indomitable. They broke through the entanglement of wires, they cut their way through the abatis; the carnage made among them by musketry and artillery could not daunt their brave spirits; they filled the ditch; some of them assailed the scarp of the fort, pushing each other up to reach the parapet; a few forced their way through the embrasures. Here, with these few, a hand-to-hand conflict was waged. One officer advanced with a flag and boldly demanded the surrender of the fort, and was dragged inside a prisoner. Those who had reached the parapet were shot and hurled back into the ditch, which now writhed with its dead and wounded, while, to increase the maddening torment, hand grenades were thrown into their midst. Meanwhile, into the rear the artillery hurled its fatal missiles, until at length, entirely baffled, this column was withdrawn and another took its place, and the carnage was renewed. But no impression was made upon the garrison. After a display of courage probably unequalled by that exhibited in any assault during this war, and never surpassed in any other war, the attack was abandoned. There followed a truce, to permit the enemy to gather up his dead and wounded—over 500 all told—and here from the lips of the enemy was heard the first tidings of Grant's victory. The loss in the fort was 8 killed, 5 wounded, and about 30 captured. An assault made at the same time upon General Shackleford on the south side of the Holston had also been repulsed.


This repulse of the enemy, though it did not immediately terminate the siege, was its last important event. The day before the assault Sherman had been ordered with 25,000 men to march to the relief of Knoxville. Elliot's cavalry division were sent in the same direction. Sherman advanced along the south side of the Tennessee, cutting off Longstreet's retreat, and by the 4th of December his army was within two or three marches of Knoxville. On the 5th the enemy retired and the siege was raised. Longstreet retired up the Holston River, but there was no pursuit. He did not entirely abandon East Tennessee until the following spring, when his command rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> With the siege of Knoxville closed the active services of General Burnside in East Tennessee. The command was transferred to General Foster. The transfer was actually made on the 11th of December. Three days afterward Burnside left Knoxville, and reached his home in Providence, R. I., on the 23d. On January 28th, 1864, President Lincoln approved a resolution "that the thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, and through him to the officers and men who have fought under his command, for their gallantry, good conduct, and soldier-like endurance."



LONGSTREET'S ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS.





LONGSTREET'S SHARPSHOOTERS ATTACKING A FEDERAL TRAIN ABOVE CHATTANOOGA.

## CHAPTER XXXVI. THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

### VI. DEFEAT OF BRAGG.

General Grant after the Vicksburg Campaign.—He assumes Command of the Military District of the Mississippi, and of the Armies under Sherman, Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker.—His available Force for the final Struggle of the Chattanooga Campaign.—The Condition of his four Armies.—Hooker's Arrival in the West.—Chattanooga besieged by Bragg's Army.—Rosecrans's Plan for the recovery of Lookout Valley executed by Grant.—Longstreet's Signals from Lookout Mountain interpreted by General Geary.—The Battle of Wauhatchie.—Importance of this Success.—Chattanooga relieved.—The Understanding between Grant and Burnside.—Longstreet sent against Knoxville.—Position of Bragg's Army.—Confidence of the Confederate Commander.—Grant's Plan of Attack.—Waiting for Sherman.—March of the Army of the Tennessee.—Sherman confers with Grant at Chattanooga.—Rumor of Bragg's intended Retreat.—Thomas's Reconnoissance, November 23d.—Orchard Knob carried.—Bragg strengthens his Right.—Operations on the 24th.—Sherman's attack on Tunnel Hill.—Hooker carries Lookout Mountain; the "Battle above the Clouds."—Operations on the 25th.—Bragg's altered Position.—General Corse's assault on Cleburne's Position.—Waiting for Hooker.—Thomas storms Missionary Ridge.—The Confederate Centre broken.—Hooker drives the Left.—Retreat and Pursuit.—A decisive Victory.

WE will now turn from the siege of Knoxville—an important episode in the Chattanooga campaign—to the movements of Grant's army at Chattanooga, which terminated on November 25th in the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Missionary Ridge.


Immediately after the reduction of Vicksburg, Grant dispatched expeditions in various directions in the State of Mississippi. In one of these, sent to Natchez, under General Ransom, 5000 head of cattle, which were being crossed over the Mississippi at that point for the enemy's supply, were captured. His army now became dispersed. Ord and Herron were sent to the Department of the Gulf. Steele was dispatched to Helena, to re-enforce Schofield in the Department of the Missouri. Toward the last of August General Grant proceeded upon a tour of inspection through his department. He reached New Orleans on the 2d of September. As he was returning to his hotel in that city from a review of Ord's corps, on the 4th, his horse be-

came frightened, and, violently striking a carriage, General Grant was thrown into the street, and so severely injured in the hip that he was unable either to walk, or mount his horse without assistance, until his arrival at Chattanooga, toward the close of October. Secretary Stanton met him at Indianapolis, and both together proceeded to Louisville. Here, on the 18th, the Secretary handed him the order of the President, giving him the command of the "Military District of the Mississippi," comprising the departments of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Cumberland. By the same order Rosecrans was relieved of his command, being superseded by General Thomas.

This order gave Grant the military control of all the territory in possession of the government from the Mississippi River to the Alleghany Mountains, and of four large armies under Sherman (who succeeded Grant in the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee), Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker. These armies, together, numbered probably 150,000 effective men. Two thirds of this force, or about 100,000 men, was available for the Chattanooga campaign. Deducting 20,000 for Burnside's effective command, and we have left a force 80,000 strong, which could be used directly against General Bragg. General Hooker's army was 23,000 strong, and consisted of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps. The Army of the Cumberland, now reduced to a little over 40,000 men, had been reorganized. McCook and Crittenden had been sent to Cincinnati, and their two commands, consolidated with the reserves, now constituted the Fourth Corps, under Gordon Granger. General Palmer commanded the Fourteenth, Thomas's old corps. The remaining portion of the forces brought against Bragg were to come from the Army of the Tennessee. Of this latter army, McPherson's corps remained at Vicksburg, and, by demonstrations along the Big Black, prevented Johnston from sending farther reinforcements to Bragg. Hurlbut's corps was retained at Memphis. Upon Sherman's taking command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Blair had been assigned to that of the Fifteenth Corps.

The transfer of General Hooker's army westward to the Tennessee was





THE THOMAS MEDAL.

accomplished with marvelous expedition. Although accompanied by its artillery, trains, baggage, and animals, this army moved from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson, in Alabama, a distance of 1192 miles, in seven days, crossing the Ohio twice.<sup>1</sup> General Hooker reached Cincinnati in person on the 29th of September, and during the first week in October his army was on Rosecrans's right flank at Stevenson. At the time of, and for a long period subsequent to Hooker's arrival, Rosecrans's army was in a state of partial siege. Bragg commanded the river road to Bridgeport, and his cavalry interrupted the communications with Bridgeport by way of Walden's Ridge, and even assailed the Nashville Railroad.<sup>2</sup> Rosecrans feared that the enemy would cross above Chattanooga, on his left, separating him from Burnside; but this was not his greatest danger. What Rosecrans had most reason to be apprehensive about was the subsistence of his army. To recover Lookout Valley, and the command of the river road to Bridgeport, was the important necessity of the moment. Rosecrans had already planned the movement which was to secure this road when he was relieved.

Grant met Rosecrans and Hooker at Nashville October 21st. He immediately put into execution the plan which had been adopted, and there could be no delay. The route from Stevenson over Walden's Ridge was from 60 to 70 miles in length, and the supply trains were shelled from Lookout Mountain from the very day that Rosecrans had abandoned that important position to the enemy. The roads were so bad that Wheeler's cavalry did not venture upon a raid. The animals were walking skeletons, and were dying by thousands for want of forage, and the wagons were worn out by the difficult roads. The troops were reduced to half rations. On the 19th, immediately after assuming his new command, Grant had telegraphed to Thomas to hold on to Chattanooga. Thomas replied, "I will hold the town till we starve."<sup>3</sup> And, as matters stood, his chance of starving was very

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Stanton's Report, November 2d, 1865.

<sup>2</sup> Rosecrans's letters to Halleck, at this time, indicate great anxiety for the safety of the Federal army. October 12th, he writes:

"Line from here to Kingston long; our side is barren mountain; rebel side has railroad. Our danger is subsistence; we can not bring up Hooker to cover our left, against a crossing above us, for want of means to transport provisions and horse-feed. Enemy's side of valley full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we have, and gain more, after which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those who truly trust."

Again, on the 16th:

"Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy this army. They are bringing up troops to our front. They have prepared pontoons, and will probably operate on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them, or lose our communication. They will thus separate us from Burnside. We can not feed Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our right depôts and communications; nor has he transportation. The rains have raised the river, and interrupted our pontoon bridge; the roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not, probably, outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to the barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least, McMinnville should be made a strong, fortified depôt, Kingston the same, and, for ulterior operations, 20,000 or 30,000 more troops put into Tennessee, at easy points to cover the railroad, and subsist, until called to the front for advance on the enemy. Additional cavalry force is indispensable to a good future for this army. Burnside must be within supporting distance of us; if we lose this point, his hold on East Tennessee is gone; if we hold it, the Rebs can not make much use of the country above, and we shall dispossess them."

<sup>3</sup> The accompanying illustration is a fac-simile of a medal presented to General Thomas by the State of Tennessee, after the defeat of Hood at Nashville. The resolution in favor of the present-

good. Two weeks longer, and without relief from its embarrassment, the Federal army must have abandoned its position.

Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d of October. The next day, with General Thomas and W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, chief engineer, he made a reconnaissance of Brown's Ferry (below the mouth of Lookout Creek) and of the country lying southward. It was then decided that, in accordance with the plans already formed by Rosecrans, Hooker should cross at Bridgeport, and advance to Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, threatening the enemy's flank. This movement was open to the observation of the enemy. So also was the movement of one of Palmer's divisions down the river to a point opposite Whiteside (11 miles west of Wauhatchie), where he was to cross and move up to Hooker's support. While attention was fixed on these movements, General Smith, with 4000 men, was to move secretly, under cover of the night, across Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of steep hills at the head of Lookout Valley, three miles below Lookout Mountain. A pontoon bridge was then to be thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and a line of communication being thus opened between Thomas and Hooker, the latter would be enabled to advance without danger of an attack on his left flank.

This plan was successfully carried out. The position to be gained was held by a portion of Longstreet's command, which had not yet been detached from Bragg's army. The enemy's line stretched from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge. But a single brigade was posted in Lookout Valley, though the Confederate pickets lined the river down to Bridgeport. The position, from the occupation of which there was especial apprehension on the part of the Federal army, was the most feebly defended of any on the Confederate line. Hooker sent Geary's division, of Slocum's corps, across on the 26th, and by the 28th this force had reached Wauhatchie. Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, held Geary's left toward Brown's Ferry. Palmer, with the Fourteenth Corps, was moving up in the rear. Smith also had accomplished the duty assigned to his command. Of the 4000 men detailed to this command, 1800, under Hazen, embarked on sixty pontoon-boats, had floated down the river from Chattanooga on the night of the 27th, past the Confederate pickets lining the left bank, and, landing at Brown's Ferry, had taken their appointed post with a loss of only four or five men wounded. The rest of Smith's force was ferried across and joined Hazen before morning. By 10 A.M. on the 28th a pontoon bridge had been thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and before night Howard had connected with Smith.

This movement was, however, not accomplished without a struggle. Longstreet had a signal-station on the top of Lookout Mountain, overlooking the whole field over which Howard and Geary moved. When, on the evening of the 28th, he saw, too late, the vital importance to the Federal army of the position seized by Hooker's command, he at once communicated with Bragg, explaining the altered situation, and was directed to attack and drive back Geary and Howard at all hazards. Longstreet had already seen enough from "Signal Rock" to convince him that it was useless to attack the superior numbers on his flank directly or by daylight; but, noting the situation

action passed the Legislature November 2, 1865. The medal is of gold, is three inches in diameter, and was wrought by Tiffany and Co., of New York City.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE.





GENERAL HAZEN'S BRIGADE DESCENDING THE TENNESSEE.

of Geary's weak division at Wauhatchie, holding the road leading from Kelly's Ferry up Lookout Valley, he conceived the plan of striking this force by surprise during the night. If he succeeded in routing this force—Hooker's right flank—an easy matter as it seemed to him then—he would pursue the advantage thus gained by extending his attack against Hooker's centre and left. It was an admirable conception. But there was an important element involved in its execution which Longstreet was not, and could not be aware of, namely, Geary's precise knowledge of every movement which he might order from "Signal Rock." For some months the Federal officers had been in possession of the signal code of the enemy, and every flourish of Longstreet's signal torches on the top of Lookout, directing the assault, was at the same moment as significant to Geary as it was to Longstreet's commanders.

Thus, when, a little after midnight on the morning of the 29th, Law's division attacked Geary, the latter was fully prepared. Between the force at Wauhatchie and Howard's right was an interval of three miles. For three hours Geary defended his position without assistance, and repulsed every charge of the enemy, finally driving him from the field.<sup>1</sup> The success of the enemy at this point might have easily defeated the entire movement of Hooker. Of the two roads leading to Kelly's Ferry from Lookout Valley, Howard held one and Geary the other; the abandonment of one of these roads would have seriously imperiled the force holding the other.

A portion of Howard's command had in the mean time been engaged on Geary's left with equal success, and Longstreet was compelled to withdraw his command east of Lookout Creek. He still continued, however, to hold Lookout Mountain. Hooker's success, gained at the expense of only 437 men, recovered Lookout Valley, and gave Grant two good roads to Bridgeport from Brown's Ferry—one thirty-five miles long, running through Wauhatchie, Whiteside, and Shellmound; the other, from Brown's to Kelly's Ferry, a distance of eight miles by wagon, and thence by boat to Bridgeport. The enemy's position on Lookout commanded these roads, but the batteries which had been posted on Moccasin Point, north of the river, prevented the Confederate artillery from inflicting any serious damage to the supply trains. The siege of Chattanooga had been raised, and Bragg from this time was put upon the defensive. The only aggressive movement possible to him was that which he now attempted against Burnside with Longstreet's column; and this movement, unsuccessful in its special object, only accelerated his ruin. Longstreet's campaign against Knoxville was probably the result of President Davis's visit to Bragg's army, October 12.

<sup>1</sup> "For almost three hours, without assistance, he repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field. At one time they had enveloped him on three sides, under circumstances that would have dismayed any officer endowed with an iron will and the most exalted courage. Such is the character of General Geary."—*Hooker's Report.*

When Grant first heard of the proposed movement against Knoxville, he seems to have regarded it as unfavorable to the development of his own plans, and intended to immediately attack Missionary Ridge in order to detain Longstreet. But after a reconnoissance he found that such an assault did not promise success, and determined to await the arrival of Sherman's troops, now well on their way from Memphis. In the mean time he established between himself and Burnside a good understanding as to the plan




JOHN W. GEARY.





VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA






AND THE FEDERAL ENCAMPMENT.







LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, FROM THE FEDERAL WORKS ON CHATTANOOGA CREEK.





It now became evident to Bragg that an attempt would be made against his right flank, with a view of severing his communication with Longstreet. To strengthen this portion of his line, Walker's division was withdrawn from the western slope of Lookout Mountain, leaving Stevenson and Cheatham to hold the left.

During the night of the 23d, Giles A. Smith's brigade, of Morgan L. Smith's division, consisting of about 3000 men, manned the boats of which the pontoon bridge was to be constructed, and, dropping down the river at midnight, captured the Confederate pickets above the North Chickamauga, and landed below the mouth of the creek. By means of these boats and the steamer Dunbar, the rest of the division, together with John E. Smith's, were ferried across before daylight, so that on the morning of the 24th Sherman had a force of 8000 men ready to advance against the enemy's right. The whole valley between Citico and Chickamauga Creeks was an immense corn-field. Through this valley Howard moved on the forenoon of the 24th to connect with Sherman. The pontoon bridge had in the mean time been constructed, under "Baldy" Smith's immediate supervision. "I have never," says Sherman, "beheld any work done so quickly, so well; and I doubt if the history of the war can show a bridge of that extent (namely, 1350 feet) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith." By 1 o'clock P.M. the whole corps had crossed, and Davis's division was prepared to co-operate, as a reserve force, in the attack on Missionary Ridge.

Sherman's three divisions were now ordered to advance, M. L. Smith on the left, J. E. Smith in the centre, and Ewing on the right. A drizzling rain began to fall, and the clouds, resting upon the river, and low down upon the mountain sides, cloaked Sherman's movement. By 3 o'clock the northern spurs of the ridge were gained without loss. The enemy had not occupied these hills (north of the railroad tunnel) with any considerable force. Sherman fortified the heights gained by his troops, and brought up his artillery. He had supposed, from the map, that the ridge was continuous, but he now found that he was separated from the enemy by a deep gorge. The enemy attempted, later in the day, to regain the hill, attacking Sherman's left. The attack was repulsed, but in the fight Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and carried to the rear.

While Sherman was thus confronting the enemy across the railroad on Missionary Ridge, Hooker had made better progress in his movement against the Confederate left on Lookout Mountain. The idea of an advance from Lookout Valley had been abandoned when Howard's corps was withdrawn from Hooker on the 22d. Indeed, Hooker, wishing to be with that portion of his command which would be in the fight, was on the point of following Howard, when he was ordered to remain and make a demonstration against Lookout Mountain, to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman's movements. His command consisted of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Osterhaus's of the Fifteenth, and Cruft's of the Fourth, with a small detachment of cavalry, making an aggregate of about 10,000 men. It was a conglomerate organization, no one of these three divisions having ever before seen either of the others. The presence of Osterhaus's division at this point led General Grant to resume his original plan, and he ordered Hooker to make a determined attack, and to carry the mountain if possible.

The enemy's pickets lined the east bank of Lookout Creek. His main force, under Cheatham, was encamped in a hollow midway up the slope of the mountain. The summit east of the palisaded crest was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division. The Confederate position was well protected by batteries and rifle-pits against an attack from the Tennessee or from the valleys on either side, and in the valleys also were strong lines of earth-works.

Geary, who had ascended Lookout Creek, supported by Whittaker's brigade of Cruft's division, crossed near Wauhatchie at 8 A.M. on the 24th, surprising and capturing the Confederate picket of 42 men on the river bank, and moved down the valley, his right keeping close up under the palisades, and thus avoiding the batteries on the crest. Osterhaus, with Cruft's other brigade (Grose's), at the same time gained a bridge on the road just below the point where the railroad to Chattanooga crosses the creek, and began to repair it. The enemy, not aware of the force marching in its rear, fled down from his encampment and moved into his rifle-pits in Osterhaus's front, a small force taking a position behind the embankment, which enabled it to enfilade the road which the Federal troops must take if they crossed the creek at this point. Holding the enemy here, another crossing was prepared 800 yards above. Batteries were posted enfilading the route by which the Confederates had left their encampment, and also preventing their sending re-enforcements to oppose Geary.

Before noon Geary had advanced close up to the Confederate rear. Grose's brigade, with another (Wood's) of Osterhaus's division, sprang across the creek and connected with Geary's left. All the batteries opened, and those of the enemy who escaped their fury were captured by the Federals in their rear. Meanwhile Geary, winding around the palisades, passed, says Hooker, "directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up hill and down, driving the enemy from his camp, and from position after position."

By noon Geary's advance rounded the peak of the mountain. Directions had been given to halt here, as it was not known to what extent the Confederates farther to the east might have been re-enforced. But there was no such thing as "halt" for troops who, fired with success, were pressing on toward the consummation of their victory! Passing around to the eastern slope of the mountain, Osterhaus on the left, Cruft in the centre, and Geary on the right, Hooker's columns met with no formidable resistance until they emerged from the woods against the enemy's intrenchments,

which ran diagonally across an open field covering the road which leads up the mountain from Chattanooga to Summertown. Here progress was for a time interrupted. Much had been already gained. Upward of 2000 prisoners had been captured, and communication was now open across Chattanooga Creek with General Thomas. But Hooker's success thus far had been mainly the result of strategy. The enemy had been surprised. But for this, Lookout Mountain could easily have been held against Hooker's 10,000 men. The main object of the battle at this point had been secured. All that remained was to make the victory decisive by breaking Cheatham's line on the eastern slope of the mountain, thus cutting off the brigades still holding the summit.

During the operations thus far the batteries on Moccasin Point, north of the Tennessee, had been engaging the enemy's artillery on the extreme point and highest peak of Lookout. The heavy clouds, which in the morning had enveloped the mountain's summit, and thus, to some extent, favored Hooker's movement, had gradually settled into the valley, veiling it completely from view. Thus the battle of the afternoon was literally "a Battle above the Clouds."

The Confederate line had been contracted in order to give it greater strength, so that there was a considerable interval between the plateau which it held and the palisades. Geary, taking advantage of this interval, got in upon the enemy's left flank, and an advance being made by Cruft and Osterhaus in front, the entire line was carried. But it was not held by the Federals undisturbed. No sooner had it been occupied by them than the enemy turned upon it and made an assault. In the continual skirmishing which had been going on, Hooker's troops had now nearly exhausted their ammunition, and unless a fresh supply could be had from some source it seemed probable that the position which had been gained would have to be abandoned. Hooker had sent for ammunition, but it had been delayed. Just in time, fortunately, Carlin's brigade of Johnson's division arrived from Thomas, having crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought with it 120,000 rounds strapped on the backs of the men. This fresh brigade relieved Geary's exhausted troops. The enemy was repulsed, driven back from the last position where he could make a stand, and hurled over the rocky heights down into the valley.

By this time the darkness upon the mountain rendered farther progress extremely dangerous, and Hooker's troops encamped for the night on the slope which they had so gallantly won. Lookout Mountain had been captured. The only drawback to the utmost completion of the victory was the fact that a route was left open for the retreat of Stevenson's brigades from the crest above. Before daylight the colors of the Eighth Kentucky waved from the peak of Lookout. But the enemy had abandoned his encampment, leaving behind him, in the hurry of his flight, all his camp and garrison equipage.

The morning of November 25th found Bragg's entire army stretched along Missionary Ridge from Tunnel Hill to Rossville, the valley of the Chattanooga being entirely abandoned. Lieutenant General Hardee commanded the right wing, consisting of Cleburne's, Walker's, Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. The left wing—consisting of Breckinridge's old division,<sup>1</sup> and those of Stewart and Anderson—was under General Breckinridge. The breastworks at the foot of the rugged slope were occupied by pickets, while the infantry and artillery stretched along the ridge. Where the ascent was easy, special fortifications had been constructed to resist an assailing force. The troops on Breckinridge's right had been beaten at Lookout Mountain, had taken their position hurriedly, and had not yet recovered from the demoralization of defeat. Breckinridge's left was refused at McFarland's Gap, occupying the breastworks in which the Federals had stood in their retreat from McLeMORE's Cove two months before. This point connected the old battle-field of Chickamauga with that upon which the opposing forces were now contending.

About midnight on the 24th orders came from Grant, whose headquarters were on Orchard Knob, for Sherman to attack at daylight the next morning. Sherman was early in the saddle. The clouds of the previous day had cleared away, and his own position, as well as that of the enemy, was fully revealed to him as he rode along from Lightburn's brigade on the left to the position held by Ewing's division on the right. The hill held by the enemy on his front was of steep ascent, its crest narrow and wooded. Cleburne's position was well protected by log breastworks, and a higher hill beyond was held by the enemy, commanding the disputed ground. Three brigades—Lightburn's, Alexander's, and Cockrell's—one from each division, were to hold the hill, and Corse's brigade, of Ewing's division, on the right centre, was to form the assailing column, assisted by a regiment from Lightburn, and three brigades—Loomis's, of Ewing's, and Matthias's and Raum's, of John E. Smith's divisions. Morgan L. Smith, with his remaining brigade, was to connect with Corse's left, and move around the eastern base of the ridge.


Corse moved to the attack at sunrise, and, advancing to within eighty yards of the enemy's intrenchments, established himself upon a secondary ridge. To this point the reserves were brought up. His preparations having been completed, Corse assaulted the works on Tunnel Hill. A severe conflict of more than an hour's duration followed, the issue of which was that, after gaining and losing ground, Corse made no progress beyond the

<sup>1</sup> Generals Polk and Hill had been relieved for disobedience of orders in the Chickamauga campaign. We also miss Hindman and Buckner. Walker, too, is absent, his division being commanded by General Gist. Hardee comes from Enterprise, Mississippi, where he had at the end of August taken command of "the paroled prisoners of Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, and Louisiana, recently forming the garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson." These prisoners had not been exchanged up to the time of which we are writing. All of Stevenson's division, including its commander, must have violated their parole.





TOP OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. SUNRISE. NOVEMBER 25 1863




REBEL BATTERY ON THE TOP OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.



GENERAL HOOKER'S COLUMN STORMING LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.



THE CREST OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.



TO THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN.





CAPTURE OF CONFEDERATE WORKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.





MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA.





THE STORMING OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.



position originally taken. Morgan L. Smith, in the mean time, had made considerable progress on the eastern slope. Loomis's brigade had got abreast of the tunnel, and, by diverting the enemy's attention, afforded some relief to General Corse. The two reserve brigades (those of John E. Smith) supporting Corse's movement had been repulsed, but the real attack was sustained. The enemy had brought to this part of the field extensive reinforcements, and the most that Sherman could do was to maintain his position until the success of Thomas and Hooker, on the centre and right, should give him an opportunity to attack with advantage.

But the centre and right of the Federal army had been delayed. Thomas's attack was to depend upon the movements of Hooker. The latter was unexpectedly retarded in his movement from Lookout Mountain. Osterhaus's division began its march to Rossville at 10 o'clock, and the rest of Hooker's command followed, with the exception of two regiments left upon the summit of Lookout. On arriving at Chattanooga Creek it was found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and here Hooker was delayed for full three hours. Osterhaus was soon got across, and, pushing on to the gap in Missionary Ridge, flanked the enemy at this point, capturing artillery, ammunition, and wagons. Hooker's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 3 30 P.M. Cruft advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus to the east of it, and Geary, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

Thomas in the mean time had sent Baird's division to the support of Sherman, on Granger's left. This division got into position at 2 30 P.M. Thomas then assaulted the enemy's line with his whole force, driving the enemy from his rifle-pits at the foot of the hill on the centre of his line. The troops to the right of Wood advanced up to the crest, and gained the summit of the ridge, capturing large numbers of the enemy in their trenches.<sup>1</sup> Against Sherman, and Baird's and Wood's divisions, the enemy still held his ground; but Hooker was well up against his left, which now, attacked in front and flank, was entirely routed, leaving behind forty pieces of artillery. Here a large number of prisoners, driven by Hooker against Palmer and Johnson, were captured. Osterhaus alone took 2000 prisoners. It was not until nightfall, however, that the enemy's right was dislodged, and the entire ridge abandoned.

At daylight on the 26th Sherman and Hooker pursued the enemy's routed columns, the former by way of Chickamauga Station, the latter by Greysville and Ringgold. The rear-guard, under Gist, was overtaken and broken up, and three more guns captured. Hooker's force came upon Cleburne in a gap in Taylor's Ridge, near Ringgold, and, attacking him, was severely repulsed, losing 65 killed and 367 wounded. Finally Cleburne was flanked and driven from his strong position, leaving 180 killed and wounded on the field. There was no farther pursuit. Grose's brigade visited the battle-field of Chickamauga, and buried the remains of many of the Federal dead, which had been left by Bragg to lie mouldering where they had fallen.

Bragg attributes his defeat to a disgraceful panic on the part of his men.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Thomas gives the following description of this movement:

"Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, whither they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a few moments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill, General Sherman pushed forward in pursuit, and drove those in his front who escaped capture across Chickamauga Creek. Generals Wood and Baird, being obstinately resisted by re-enforcements from the enemy's extreme right, continued fighting until darkness set in, but steadily driving the enemy before them. In moving upon Rossville, General Hooker encountered Stewart's division and other troops. Finding his left flank threatened, Stewart attempted to escape by retreating toward Greysville; but some of his force, finding their retreat threatened in that quarter, retired in disorder toward their right, along the crest of the ridge, where they were met by another portion of General Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners."

<sup>2</sup> The following is General Bragg's report of the battle:

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Dalton, Georgia, 30th November, 1863.

Inspector General, Richmond:

"SIR,—On Monday, the 23d, the enemy advanced in heavy force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary Ridge, but made no farther effort."

"On Tuesday morning early they threw over the river a heavy force opposite the north end of the ridge, and just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, at the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. After visiting the right, and making dispositions there for the new development in that direction, I returned toward the left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's batteries on our forces occupying the slope of Lookout Mountain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only, Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was finally compelled to yield ground. Why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field, Major General Stevenson, had six brigades at his disposal. Upon his urgent appeal, another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support—though it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action—and I proceeded to the scene."

"Arriving just before sunset, I found that we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately given for the ground to be disputed until we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga Creek, and the movement was commenced. This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to meet the movement in that direction."

"On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, now under Lieutenant General Hardee, and threatened by a heavy force, while strong columns could be seen marching in that direction. A very heavy force in line of battle confronted our left and centre."

"On my return to this point, about 11 A.M., the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout and beyond to our front, while those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines with great deliberation, just beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our position."

"Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time they had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed, with very heavy loss, by Major General Cleburne's command, under the immediate direction of Lieutenant General Hardee. By the road across the ridge at Rossville, far to our left, a route was open to our rear. Major General Breckinridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two regiments and a battery. It being reported to me that a force of the enemy had moved in that direction, the general was ordered to have it reconnoitred, and to make every disposition necessary to secure his flank, which he proceeded to do."

"About half past 3 P.M., the immense force in the front of our left and centre advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced before they reached musket range. In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent that the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front."

"While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line

The real causes were the weakness of his line—a weakness not of position, but of numbers—and the demoralization which had resulted from the defeat on Lookout Mountain."

The Federal losses in the battles of the 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th were 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and 330 missing: total, 5616. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was probably much less; but Bragg's loss in prisoners alone amounted to 6142, of whom 239 were commissioned officers; 7000 stand of small arms had also been captured by Grant's army. By these battles Bragg's army must have been diminished by at least 10,000 men. Grant probably had engaged about 65,000 men, and Bragg between 40,000 and 45,000.

General Bragg's defeat terminated the contest for Chattanooga and East Tennessee. The tidings of Grant's victory electrified the loyal portion of the country, and President Lincoln, on the 7th of December, issued a proclamation recommending the people "to assemble at their places of worship, and render special homage and gratitude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the national cause." From this time the prospects of the Southern Confederacy were indeed desperate. The resources of the Southern States were rapidly being exhausted, while the national armies were being recruited by immense numbers, at whose backs stood thousands more ready to take the field the moment their services should become necessary. Thus closed the year 1863. It had begun with the disaster at Fredericksburg, followed soon by the defeat at Chancellorsville; but the victories of Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Missionary Ridge crowned it with imperishable glory.<sup>1</sup>

was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point, under Brigadier General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retreating troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally."

"Lieutenant General Hardee, leaving Major General Cleburne in command of the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its right, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here, the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed, and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, General Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the dépôt at Chickamauga. Fortunately, it was now near nightfall, and the country and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally unknown to the enemy. The routed left made its way back in great disorder, effectually covered, however, by Bate's small command, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. After night, all being quiet, Bate retired in good order, the enemy attempting no pursuit. Lieutenant General Hardee's command, under his judicious management, retired in good order and unmolested."

"As soon as all the troops had crossed, the bridges over the Chickamauga were destroyed, to impede the enemy, though the stream was fordable in several places."

"No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column; and, wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in disorder, after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion, from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them."

"Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and, turning our guns upon us, enfiladed our lines both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, who had never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous. They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. As yet, I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled, and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however, and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad."

"After arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in motion for a point farther removed from a powerful and victorious army, that we might have some little time to replenish and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pursuit as far as Ringgold, but was so handsomely checked by Major General Cleburne and Brigadier General Gist, in command of their respective divisions, that he gave us but little annoyance."

"Our losses are not yet ascertained, but in killed and wounded it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and stragglers I fear it is much larger."

"The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty (40) pieces."

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"BRAXTON BRAGG, General Commanding."

President Davis also seems to have concurred with General Bragg in attributing the blame to the troops. In his message to Congress (December 7th, 1863) he says:

"After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great strength, and by a disorderly retreat compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and, finally, to retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested in this battle on other parts of the lines, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification, of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by the troops."

<sup>1</sup> Near the close of 1863 General Grant issued the following congratulatory order to his soldiers:

Chattanooga, December 10th, 1863.

"The general commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and their comrades from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. In a short time you have recovered from him the control of the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Knoxville. You dislodged him from his great stronghold upon Lookout Mountain, drove him from Chattanooga Valley, wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary Ridge, repelled with heavy loss to him his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there, driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the state. By your noble heroism and determined courage you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining the possession of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. For all this the general commanding thanks you collectively and individually. The loyal people of the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You will yet go to other fields of strife; and with the invincible bravery and undiminished loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defenses, however formidable, can check your onward march."





CAPTURED CONFEDERATE CANNON IN FRONT OF GENERAL THOMAS'S HEADQUARTERS.



## CHAPTER XXXVII.

## SHERMAN'S MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN.

Object of the Meridian Expedition.—Condition of the Confederate Commissary.—Sherman's Plan.—Co-operative Column under W. S. Smith.—Sherman starts from Vicksburg February 3d, 1864.—His third Visit to Jackson.—The Confederate Forces, under Polk, in the Department of Mississippi.—Polk retires into Alabama.—Sherman's March unopposed.—He enters Meridian on the 14th.—Defeat of Smith's Column by General Forrest.—Sherman's Return to Vicksburg.—Forrest's Raid into Tennessee.—The Fort Pillow Massacre.—Expeditions sent against General Forrest from Memphis, under Sturgis and A. J. Smith.

SINCE the capture of Vicksburg there had been no important military movements in Mississippi during 1863. About the middle of August a small force of 1600 men, sent from General Hurlbut's command, had penetrated through the northern portion of the state to Grenada, where it captured and destroyed over 50 locomotives and about 500 cars. General McPherson two months later, with about 8000 men, comprising Logan's and Tuttle's divisions, and Colonel Winslow's cavalry, pushed out from Vicksburg nearly to Canton, driving back Wirt Adams's cavalry and three brigades of Confederate infantry. Finding himself confronted by a superior force of the enemy, he retreated to Vicksburg.

After Bragg's defeat a more formidable expedition was organized by General Sherman, having for its object the completion of the work which had been begun by the reduction of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. By the capture of those strong-holds the river itself had been conquered, and Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee had been cut off from any possible connection with the main theatre of the war, which was now confined to Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, Northern Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. Winter had proclaimed a truce, so far as conflicts between the main armies were concerned. But the possession by the national troops of the east bank of the Mississippi furnished a convenient basis for a winter campaign in Mississippi and Alabama. Such a campaign would be an important preparation for the advance upon Atlanta in the following spring. If the reader will examine the map he will observe that, by the successful issue of the Chattanooga campaign, the entire network of railroads north of and including the road running from Memphis eastward to Virginia, had been secured by the national government. By General Grant's victory not only had Bragg's army been defeated and driven, but had been deprived of one of the chief sources upon which it had relied for subsistence.<sup>1</sup> It was forced

<sup>1</sup> Says the Knoxville Register (published at Atlanta, Georgia, after the Federal occupation of East Tennessee), "If any one doubts the necessity which would compel President Davis to sacrifice Richmond, Charleston, and Mobile, all to reacquire East Tennessee, he need only ask the commissary general by what agencies and from what sources the armies of the South have been sustained during the first years of the war. East Tennessee furnished the Confederate States with 25,000,000 pounds of bacon. Last year the State of Tennessee fed the army." The Richmond Examiner of October 31st corroborates this testimony in the following terms: "Except what was furtively obtained from Kentucky, the whole army supply of pork came from East Tennessee, and the contiguous counties of the adjoining states. The product of corn in that region was very heavy, and no portion of the Confederacy, equal in extent, afforded as large a supply of forage and winter pasturage."

The following circular, issued in November, 1863, from the office of the chief commissary in Florida, indicates the beginning of a sad era for the armies of the Confederacy:

"Office of Chief Commissary, Quincy, Fla., November 2, 1863.

"It has been a subject of anxious consideration how I could, without injury to our cause, expose to the people throughout the state the present perilous condition of our army. To do this through the public press would point out our source of danger to our enemies. To see each one in person, or even a sufficient number to effect the object contemplated, is impossible; yet the necessity of general and immediate action is imperative to save our army, and with it our cause, from disaster. The issues of this contest are now transferred to the people at home. If they fail to do their duty and sustain the army in its present position, it must fall back. If the enemy break through our present line, the wave of desolation may roll even to the shores of the Gulf and Atlantic. In discipline, valor, and the skill of its leaders, our army has proven more than a match for the enemy. But the best-appointed army can not maintain its position without support at home. The people should never suffer it to be said that they valued their cattle and hogs, their corn and money, more than their liberties and honor, and that they had to be compelled to support an army they had sent to battle in their defense. We hope it will not become necessary to resort to impressments among a people fighting for their existence, and in defense of their homes, and country, and institutions. We prefer rather to appeal to them by every motive of duty and honor—the love they bear their wives and daughters—by the memory of the heroic dead, and the future glory and independence of their country, to come to its rescue in this darkest hour of its peril.

"A country which can afford to send forth in its defense the flower of its youth, and the best of its manhood, can afford, and are in honor bound to sustain them at any cost and sacrifice of money and property. They have sacrificed home and ease, and suffered untold hardships, and with their lives are now defending every thing we hold most sacred. Florida has done nobly in this contest. Her sons have achieved the highest character for their state, and won imperishable honors for themselves. These brave men are now suffering for want of food. Not only the men from Florida, but the whole army of the South, are in this condition. Our honor as a people demands that we do our duty to them. They must be fed. The following extracts from official letters in my possession do but partially represent the present condition of the armies of Generals Bragg and Beauregard, and their gloomy prospect for future supplies:

"Major J. F. Cumming, who supplies General Bragg's army, writes, 'It is absolutely and vitally important that all the cattle that can possibly be brought here shall be brought as promptly as possible.' And again, on the 5th of October, he says, 'I can not too strongly urge upon you the necessity, yes, the urgent necessity, of sending forward cattle promptly. It appears that all other sources are exhausted, and that we are now dependent upon your state for beef for the very large army of General Bragg. I know you will leave no stone unturned, and I must say all is now dependent on your exertions, so far as beef is concerned. In regard to bacon, the stock is about exhausted—hence beef is our only hope. I know the prospect is very discouraging, and it only remains with those of us having charge of this important work to do all we can to exhaust our resources; and when we have done this, our country can not complain of us. If we fail to do all that can be done, and our cause shall fail, upon us will rest the responsibility; therefore let us employ every means at our command.' Again, on the 6th, he says, 'Major A. can explain to you the great and absolute necessity for prompt action in the matter; for, major, I assure you that nearly all now depends on you.' And on the 19th of October he says, 'Captain Townsend, A. C. S., having a leave of absence for thirty days from the Army of Tennessee, I have prevailed on him to see you and explain to you my straitened condition, and the imminent danger of our army suffering for the want of beef.' And on the 20th of October he wrote, 'The army to-day is on half-rations of beef, and I fear within a few days will have nothing but bread to eat. This is truly a dark hour with us, and I can not see what is to be done. All that is left for us to do is to do all we can, and then we will have a clear conscience, no matter what the world may say.'

"Major Locke, Chief Commissary of Georgia, wrote, 'I pray you, major, to put every agency in motion that you can to send cattle without a moment's delay toward the Georgia borders. The troops in Charleston are in great extremity. We look alone to you for cattle; those in Georgia are exhausted.'

"Major Guerin, Chief Commissary of South Carolina, wrote, 'We are almost entirely dependent on Florida, and it is of the last importance, at this time, that the troops here should be supplied.' Again he says, 'As it is, our situation is full of danger from want of meat, and extraordinary efforts are required to prevent disaster.' And on the 9th of October he says, 'We have now 40,000 troops and laborers to subsist. The supply of bacon on hand in the city is 20,000 pounds, and the cattle furnished by this state is not one tenth of what is required. My anxieties and apprehensions, as you may suppose, are greatly excited.'

"Major Millen, of Savannah, on the 10th of October says, 'I assure you, major, that the stock of bacon and beef for the armies of the Confederate States is now exhausted, and we must depend

to mainly depend upon Florida for its meat, while its supply of corn was principally derived from the rich valleys of the Alabama and Tombigbee Rivers. The Confederate Army of the West was already cut off from the immense cattle-growing region west of the Mississippi, and from the corn and bacon of Tennessee. It was proposed to still farther restrict its dependencies by operations, during the winter of 1863-4, directed against the railroads leading to Atlanta from Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Thus the campaigns undertaken in the beginning of 1864 by Seymour in Florida, and Sherman in Mississippi, were calculated to have an important bearing upon the progress of the main Federal army southward in the spring and summer.

Probably the principal object of Sherman's expedition against the railroads west of Atlanta was to prevent the possibility of the future concentration of a Confederate army on the east bank of the Mississippi. The destruction of these railroads would render it impossible for the enemy to approach the river with artillery and trains, and the occupation of prominent points in the interior would subject any Confederate infantry column, seeking to gain a position on the river, to an attack in its rear. In this way Sherman's army would be liberated from the necessity, hitherto imposed upon it, of remaining in strong force at Vicksburg, or some other point on the Mississippi.

The plan adopted by General Sherman was the following: He was himself to move from Vicksburg with four divisions of infantry—two of McPherson's and two of Hurlbut's corps—and Colonel Winslow's cavalry brigade, and, advancing westward, was to destroy the Southern Mississippi Railroad. At Meridian, General William Sooy Smith, General Grant's chief of cavalry, was to meet him with all the cavalry of the department, having advanced along the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Memphis, destroying the road as he moved. General Smith had a long ride of 250 miles, which he was expected to accomplish in ten days, starting from Memphis on or before the 1st of February, moving by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, and Columbus, and reaching Meridian on the 10th. He was instructed to disregard all small detachments of the enemy, and to advance rapidly to his appointed destination. Simultaneously with these movements, the Eleventh Illinois and a colored regiment, with five tin-clad gun-boats, were sent up the Yazoo to create a diversion and to protect the plantations along the banks of that river; and another force, under Brigadier General Hawkins, was to patrol the country toward the Big Black, in the rear of Vicksburg, and to collect 50 skiffs, by means of which detachments of 200 or 300 men might be moved at pleasure through the labyrinth of bayous between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, for the purpose of suppressing the bands of guerrillas then infesting that region.

Sherman began his march on the 3d of February. Hurlbut moved across the Big Black by way of Messenger's Ferry, and McPherson by the railroad bridge six miles below. The two columns, with the cavalry, numbered about 25,000 men. On the 5th both columns met the enemy, Hurlbut's at Joe Davis's plantation, and McPherson's at Champion Hills, and there was skirmishing all day, with small loss on either side, but without materially impeding the progress of the troops, who the next day entered Jackson. This was the third time that Sherman's troops had entered and occupied the capital of Mississippi, and it is fair to presume that this third occupation pretty nearly completed the work of destruction so shamelessly indulged in on two previous occasions.<sup>1</sup>

entirely upon what we may gather weekly. Starvation stares the army in the face—the handwriting is on the wall.' On the 26th of October he says, 'From the best information I have, the resources of food (meat) of both the Tennessee and Virginia armies are exhausted. The remark now applies with equal force to South Carolina and Georgia, and the army must henceforth depend upon the energy of the purchasing commissaries, through their daily or weekly collections. I have exhausted the beef cattle, and am now obliged to kill stock cattle.'

"From these you perceive that there is too much cause for the deep solicitude manifested by the writers. They should excite the fears and apprehensions of every lover of his country. Truly the responsibility upon us is great, when we are expected to feed these vast armies, whether the producers will sell to us or not. The slightest reflection would teach any one that it is impossible to provide for such armies by impressments alone. The people must cheerfully yield their supplies, or make up their minds to surrender their cause. It is their cause. It is not the cause of the government. The government is theirs. The army, the government, you and I, and every one, and every thing we have, are staked upon this contest. To fail is total and irretrievable ruin, universal confiscation of every thing, and abject and ignominious submission and slavery to the most despicable and infamous race on earth. Whoever has any other thought but to fight on, at any cost of life and property, until we achieve our independence, or all perish in the struggle, deserves to be the slave of such an enemy. But, under the guidance of Providence, our cause is safe in the hands of our army, provided we do our duty at home. But Providence will not help a people who will not help themselves. Our enemies have no hope of conquering us by arms. Their only hope is that we will be untrue to ourselves, and in the blind pursuit of gain, lose sight of our country, and thus suffer our army, and with it our cause, to perish. How stands the case? You know the resources of Tennessee are lost to us; the hog cholera and other causes have cut short the prospect in Georgia and other states. It is ascertained that the last year's crop of bacon is about exhausted, and it is certain that the crop of this will be much shorter than that of last year. Now two large armies look almost solely to Florida to supply one entire article of subsistence. The entire surplus of this year's crop of bacon throughout the Confederacy, even when husbanded with the utmost economy, will be inadequate to the demands of the government. This makes it the duty of every man to economize as much as possible—to sell not a pound to any one else while there is any danger of our army suffering, and to pledge at schedule rates his entire surplus—bacon, beef, sugar, and sirup—to the government. I solemnly believe our cause is hopeless unless our people can be brought to this point.


"I have thought it my duty to address this confidential circular to the principal men in various sections of the state, and invoke their aid and co-operation with the purchasing commissaries and government agents in their districts, in inaugurating and putting into operation some system by which our armies can be more promptly supplied, and all of our resources which are necessary secured to the government. The appeals to me are more and more urgent every day; the pressure upon our state is very great. Should she now respond to the call made upon her resources as she has upon the bloodiest battle-field of the war, the measure of her glory will be full. But if we withhold our supplies, we cripple our army, and render it impossible for them to advance after achieving the most signal victories. The people at home must put themselves upon a war footing. This they have never yet done. They must sow, and plant, and gather for the government. Then, and not till then, will the bright rays of peace break through the clouds of war which overhang us.

P. W. WHITE, Major and Chief Commissary."

<sup>1</sup> The Northern accounts of Sherman's march indicate its character in this respect. The following extract is taken from "A National Account," published in volume viii. of the *Rebellion Record*:

"It was the expectation, when the expedition started out, that they would draw most of their supplies, and all their forage for horses and mules, from the country. There was very little difficulty in finding enough for our purpose, even in the most barren parts of the country we passed





Sherman's troops marched with little other baggage than their ammunition and twenty days' provisions, and the rapidity of his movements met with very few obstacles from the enemy, who was too weak to oppose to them any formidable resistance. The entire Confederate force in the Department of Mississippi (now under General Polk's command), amounted to less than 16,000 effective men. The most which General Polk could do was to transport the supplies accumulated at the several railway stations into Alabama, behind the Tombigbee River.

Thus unopposed by the enemy, Sherman's march to Meridian was simply a promenade. He crossed the Pearl River on the pontoons which the ene-

my had left behind in his hurried retreat from Jackson. On his route he was joined by thousands of negroes—men, women, and children—who swelled the vast column of the march. The railroad was completely demolished along the route. On the 14th, having marched 150 miles in 11 days, Sherman entered Meridian.

But where was General Smith, due four days ago? While the enemy was giving Sherman "a wide berth," he had not been blind to the importance of cutting off the supporting column of cavalry on its way to Meridian from Memphis. In fact, it was only Smith's junction with Sherman that Polk really feared. That must be prevented at all hazards. The accession of this cavalry force to Sherman's army would be the preliminary to a successful advance to Selma and Montgomery, and where not? Polk, covering his infantry behind the Tombigbee, ordered his cavalry to join Forrest, to whom was assigned the difficult task of heading off Smith's column.

Associated with General Smith was General B. F. Grierson, who had become thoroughly acquainted with the country on his previous raid. The column had not left Memphis till the 11th, and thus the enemy had been given time to organize his forces for effective resistance. The Federal force numbered 7000 men, and to oppose this Forrest had at length collected to-

through. There was nothing left, however, after our passage, and in many instances the people must suffer for want of food."

This was no doubt legitimate warfare, but we question whether the same excuse may be urged for the destruction of property at Jackson, described as follows by a soldier of Sherman's army (F. McC., of the Sixteenth Iowa):

"It was truly a vivid picture of war to see the streets filled with armed men, squares of large brick buildings on fire, furniture of every description, from rocking-cradles to pianos, clothing, books—in fact, almost every article of domestic utility and ornament, piled upon the sidewalks. Women and children running hither and thither, pictures of the most abject despair. There was no protection given the town, and but little mercy shown, as this was the third time our army had been compelled to come here, and we judge General Sherman rightly concluded that he would obviate all necessity of having to come again."





W. S. SMITH.

gether about the same number at Okalona, nearly 100 miles north of Meridian. Up to this point Smith and Grierson continued their march without serious resistance. Thus far they were permitted by the enemy to revel in a carnival of devastation, destroying corn estimated by the millions of bushels (one account makes it 1,000,000 bushels, another 3,000,000), and two or three thousand bales of cotton. Either by lack of discipline, owing to the character of such a march, or on account of the sudden and formidable opposition encountered, the Federal command did not behave well when on the 22d it reached Okalona, as was its wont in the presence of the enemy. Almost the first onset of Forrest's cavalry was decisive. Six guns were lost by the Federals in the first attack. Probably even after the first reverse the Confederates would have been checked had it not been for the impediment to Smith's fighting force of the crowd of camp-followers, who gave way to panic, and fled to the rear, sweeping with them a portion of the troops coming into position. It was with great difficulty that Smith covered his retreat and saved his trains. The Fourth Missouri Cavalry, acting as rear-guard, stood well its ground, checking the enemy until night-fall. Under cover of night the Federals fell back to Okalona (the battle had been fought south of that place, on the border of the prairie country), where order was restored. Smith and Grierson, after losing over 300 men and a large number of horses, continued their retreat over the country which for ten days they had been laying waste.

This disaster, of course, forbid any farther advance on the part of Sherman, who had in the mean time been destroying the railroads centring in Meridian.<sup>1</sup> He then, with one of his columns, marched northward to Canton, continuing his work of destruction in that direction. Finding that the column from Memphis had been driven back, he returned to Vicksburg. His loss had been probably about 200 men. He brought away with him 1000 white and 5000 colored refugees. He had done the enemy very great injury, which, unfortunately, in a large measure, fell upon the population rather than the army; had, by the destruction of the railroads between Vicksburg and Meridian, secured the east bank of the Mississippi against any future attack on the part of the enemy—one of the chief objects of the raid—and had learned a lesson in regard to the facility of marching through the southern portion of the Confederacy, which was of the greatest value to him at a later period of the war.

It is possible that, but for the failure of Sherman's supporting cavalry column, an attempt would have been made in conjunction with Farragut's naval force against Mobile. Farragut did indeed make a strong demonstration against Mobile, assaulting Fort Powell, and losing a gun-boat in the operation. But this attack was only a feint, to divert attention from a pet project which the government was at this time nursing, and which regarded affairs on the other side of the Mississippi.

Forrest did not stop with his defeat of Smith and Grierson at Okalona. If he could meet all the cavalry of Grant's department in the open field, what was to hinder him—now that the garrisons of Tennessee were continually being weakened by the concentration of forces for the spring campaign—from moving into Western Tennessee and Kentucky? He passed

over the frontier of Tennessee late in March, and his expedition throughout was characterized by brutality and cowardice such as is not surpassed in the record of even savage warfare. It is possible that his command was infuriated by the devastation which had marked the progress of Sherman's Mississippi expedition. But this is no fair excuse for such conduct as that which it is now our duty to expose. Wherever Sherman's troops departed from the recognized customs of war, the reader will bear us witness that we have offered no excuse in their behalf. But if against them rebuke naturally rises to our lips, our cheeks burn with shame for the brutal capabilities of our human nature as we follow the career of General Forrest from his entrance into Tennessee to the massacre at Fort Pillow.


Forrest advanced from Okalona northward by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. His command numbered between 5000 and 6000 men.<sup>1</sup> The force which stood in his way, even if he looked to Cairo as his destination, did not amount to more than half his own. Jackson, in Tennessee, was captured on the 23d of March. Forrest's line of march was west of the Tennessee River, toward the Mississippi. He captured Union City, near the northern border of Tennessee, on the 24th of March. This post had been occupied by Colonel Hawkins with about 500 men. Hawkins was attacked by over three times that number, but easily repulsed four several charges of the enemy. Then a flag of truce was sent demanding a surrender, and throwing upon Colonel Hawkins the consequence of a refusal. Against the wishes of the garrison the demand was complied with, although a relieving force of 2000 men was within six miles of him. His conduct was probably influenced by the fear that the enemy in his front would soon be strongly re-enforced.<sup>2</sup>

The Mississippi from Paducah to Island No. 10, about 160 miles, together with the adjacent portions of Tennessee and Kentucky, was under the command of Brigadier General Mason Brayman. His whole force—distributed at Paducah, Cairo, Columbus, Hickman, Island No. 10, and Union City—amounted to 2329 men, three fourths of whom were negroes. General Hurlbut, in command of the department, had, in compliance with orders from the War Department, sent all his veteran regiments home on furlough. All his cavalry was gone save about 2000. He did not dare to leave Memphis exposed, and was therefore able to afford very little assistance to the garrisons on the Mississippi River against which Forrest was moving. As soon as Forrest approached Jackson, Grierson, with his cavalry, was sent out to develop his force, and soon reported that the enemy "was a little too strong for him."

From Union City Forrest moved upon Hickman, about fourteen miles distant on the Mississippi. The garrison at this point was withdrawn. The enemy then advanced to Wayfield, Kentucky, which is about equally distant from Paducah, Cairo, and Columbus. He was at the centre of a circle, about the edge of which General Brayman's forces were situated. The lat-

<sup>1</sup> Hurlbut thinks it could not have been less than 8000.—*Report on the Conduct of the War.*

<sup>2</sup> General Hurlbut says, "Contrary to the entreaties, prayers, and advice of all his officers and all his men, he did surrender his post with a relieving force within six miles of him, and surrendered it, as I have no doubt, from pure cowardice."—*Report on the Conduct of the War.* It was a tame surrender, doubtless, but other testimony before the committee fully relieves Colonel Hawkins of the charge of cowardice.



MAP ILLUSTRATING FORREST'S TENNESSEE EXPEDITION.

<sup>1</sup> "The dépôts, store-houses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments in the town were burned, and, during the next five days, with axes, sledges, crow-bars, clam-bars, and fire, Hurlbut's corps destroyed on the north and east 60 miles of ties and iron, one locomotive, and eight bridges; and McPherson's corps, on the south and west, 55 miles of railway, 53 bridges, 61,075 feet of trestle-work, 19 locomotives, 28 steam-cars, and 3 steam saw-mills. Thus was completed the destruction of railways for 100 miles from Jackson to Meridian, and for 20 miles around the latter place, in such a manner that they could not be used against us in the approaching campaigns."—Bowman's *Sherman and his Campaigns*, p. 163.



ter could only await attack, and send re-enforcements to such weak points in turn as the emergency might demand. "One evening," he says, "I sent 400 men to Columbus, expecting trouble there, and the next morning had them at Paducah, seventy-five miles distant." No such thing as an offensive movement against Forrest could of course be contemplated, and the latter remained for three weeks subsisting upon captured stores in the very heart of a region which, almost from the beginning of the war, had been securely held by the national government. On the 25th of March an attack was made on Paducah, held by Colonel S. G. Hicks with a garrison of 650 men. The garrison retired into Fort Anderson, and there made a stand, assisted by two gun-boats, effectually repelling the enemy's assaults. Forrest then, failing to make an impression upon the defenders of the fort, demanded an unconditional surrender, closing his communication to Colonel Hicks in these words: "If you surrender you shall be treated as prisoners of war, but if I have to storm your works you may expect no quarter." Hicks refused, stating, like a faithful soldier, that he had been placed there by his government to defend that post, and he should do so. Three assaults from the enemy followed, each of which was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants. In the last, one of the Confederate general officers, General Thompson, was killed.<sup>5</sup> The next day Forrest retired, having suffered a loss of nearly 1500 men. The national loss was 14 killed and 46 wounded.<sup>2</sup> Columbus, on the Mississippi, stood out as defiantly as had Paducah, and the enemy retired without making an attack.

General Forrest appeared before Fort Pillow, 65 miles above Memphis, on the 12th of April. The garrison at this point consisted of 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were negroes, commanded by Major L. F. Booth. The attack was sudden, no intimation of it being given before the pickets were driven in. Major Booth was killed early in the engagement, and Major W. F. Bradford succeeded to the command, and withdrew the forces from their outer intrenchments into the fort. The fort was situated on a high bluff, which descended precipitately to the river's edge. On either side was a ravine—the one below the fort containing several private stores and a few dwellings, constituting what is called the town. In front of the fort was an open space of level ground. The artillery defense consisted of 6 guns. The troops fought gallantly, aided by a gun-boat, and up to 2 P.M. the enemy had not gained any decisive advantage. A flag of truce was then sent in, conveying a demand for the unconditional surrender of the fort. Major Bradford asked an hour for consideration. Shortly a second flag appeared, and Bradford was allowed 20 minutes; if not out of the fort by that time an assault would be made. Bradford replied that he would not surrender. During all this time the enemy, regardless of his own flag of truce, was gaining an advantageous position for the assault. His forces were now within 100 yards of the fort, closely surrounding it. As soon as Major Bradford's reply was received, the bugle was sounded, and the Confederates, with a yell, rushed over the fortifications, raising the cry of "No quarter!" The troops composing the garrison, black and white, threw down their arms and sought to escape by running down the steep bluff on the river side, hiding behind trees, logs, bushes—any thing which could afford them cover against the maddest fiends which at that moment the sun shone upon. No wonder they fled, as it soon clearly appeared it was not a contest of men with men, but of men with brutal, fiendish murderers. The captured fort and its vicinity became at once a human shambles. Without discrimination of age or sex, and without mercy, men, women, and children were butchered until night put an end to the horrible tragedy, which was again renewed on the following morning. Not even sleep could quench the fiery hate of Forrest's men. Even the officers, with a few exceptions, assisted in the bloody carnival. It was exactly three years to a day since the attack on Fort Sumter had been made, and the same violence which had incited men to treason against their government was perhaps fitly displayed on this anniversary by the shameless massacre of United States soldiers at Fort Pillow.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Report on the Conduct of the War.

<sup>2</sup> General Sherman writes to Colonel Hicks from Nashville, April 5th, 1864:

"Your defense at Paducah was exactly right. Keep cool, and give the enemy a second edition if he comes again. I want Forrest to stay just where he is, and the longer the better. Don't credit any of the foolish and exaggerated rumors that are put afloat by design. I know what Forrest has, and will attend to him in time."

<sup>3</sup> "The operations of the enemy at Paducah were characterized by the same bad faith and treachery that seemed to have become the settled policy of Forrest and his command. The flag of truce was taken advantage of there, as elsewhere, to secure desirable positions which the rebels were unable to obtain by fair and honorable means, and also to afford opportunities for plundering private stores as well as government property. At Paducah the rebels were guilty of acts more cowardly, if possible, than any they have practiced elsewhere. When the attack was made, the officers of the fort and of the gun-boats advised the women and children to go down to the river for the purpose of being taken across out of danger. As they were leaving the town for that purpose, the rebel sharpshooters mingled with them, and, shielded by their presence, advanced and fired upon the gun-boats, wounding some of our officers and men. Our forces could not return the fire without endangering the lives of the women and children. The rebels also placed women in front of their lines as they moved on the fort, or were proceeding to take positions while the flag of truce was at the fort, in order to compel our men to withhold their fire out of regard for the lives of the women who were made use of in this most cowardly manner."—Report on the Conduct of the War.

<sup>4</sup> We have not described this disgraceful tragedy in its details. The following extract from the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War will enable the reader to examine its features more minutely. All the statements made are supported by abundant and unimpeachable evidence:

"Then followed a scene of cruelty and murder without a parallel in civilized warfare, which needed but the tomahawk and scalping-knife to exceed the worst atrocities ever committed by savages. The rebels commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, sparing neither age nor sex, white nor black, soldier or civilian. The officers and men seemed to vie with each other in the devilish work; men, women, and even children, wherever found, were deliberately shot down, beaten, and hacked with sabres; some of the children, not more than ten years old, were forced to stand up and face their murderers while being shot; the sick and the wounded were butchered without mercy, the rebels even entering the hospital building and dragging them out to be shot, or killing them as they lay there unable to offer the least resistance. All over the hill-side the work of murder was going on; numbers of our men were collected together in lines or groups and deliberately shot; some were shot while in the river, while others on the bank were shot and their bodies kicked into the water, many of them still living, but unable to make any exertions to save themselves from drowning. Some of the rebels stood on the top of the hill, or a short distance down its side, and called to our soldiers to come up to them, and as they approached, shot them down in cold blood; if their guns or pistols missed fire, forcing them to stand there until they were again

Forrest, in the face of his own statement that, while he lost only 20 killed and 60 wounded, he buried 228 Federals on the evening of the assault, coolly claims that all these were killed in fair fight! After this affair the enemy retreated into Mississippi. A fortnight later General S. D. Sturgis, with 12,000 men, was sent after Forrest, but the movements of the enemy were so rapid that he easily escaped this pursuing column. Early in June Sturgis was again sent against Forrest, with instructions to find and defeat his command, in order to prevent its junction with General Johnston, then resisting General Sherman's advance in Northern Georgia. The Federal column dispatched for this purpose consisted of 9000 infantry (including most of A. J. Smith's division), and 3000 cavalry under General Grierson. The campaign was terribly mismanaged by Sturgis. After advancing through West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi to Guntown on the Mobile Railroad, Grierson's cavalry encountered Forrest, pushing his cavalry back on his infantry, which was strongly posted on a semicircular ridge, protected by a creek in front. Sturgis, with the infantry, was five or six miles behind. Getting information of Grierson's position, he pushed his command forward at double-quick, and as it was a very hot day, the troops, upon confronting the enemy, were thoroughly exhausted. To make matters still worse, the train of over 200 wagons was allowed by Sturgis to rush forward with his men, filling the road and impeding their movements. No rest was given the troops, who were immediately sent to the support of the cavalry already engaged. No attempt was made to turn the enemy's strong position, and from the attack which was made no other consequence could be expected than that which followed. Both cavalry and infantry were soon routed, and driven in disorder back upon and over the abandoned train. The pursuit was momentarily checked at Ripley, but was continued with some vigor almost to Memphis. In this expedition Sturgis lost between 3000 and 4000 men, most of whom were captured.

A month later (July 7th) another command was sent against Forrest, consisting of the same number of men, but this time under command of A. J.

prepared to fire. All around were heard cries of 'No quarter!' 'No quarter!' 'Kill the damned niggers; shoot them down!' All who asked for mercy were answered by the most cruel taunts and sneers. Some were spared for a time, only to be murdered under circumstances of greater cruelty. No cruelty which the most fiendish malignity could devise was omitted by these murderers. One white soldier, who was wounded in one leg so as to be unable to walk, was made to stand up while his tormentors shot him; others who were wounded and unable to stand were held up and again shot. One negro, who had been ordered by a rebel officer to hold his horse, was killed by him when he remounted; another, a mere child, whom an officer had taken up behind him on his horse, was seen by Chalmers, who at once ordered the officer to put him down and shoot him, which was done. The huts and tents in which many of the wounded had sought shelter were set on fire, both that night and the next morning, while the wounded were still in them—those only escaping who were able to get themselves out, or who could prevail on others less injured than themselves to help them out; and even some of those thus seeking to escape the flames were met by those ruffians and brutally shot down, or had their brains beaten out. One man was deliberately fastened down to the floor of a tent, face upward, by means of nails driven through his clothing and into the boards under him, so that he could not possibly escape, and then the tent set on fire; another was nailed to the side of a building outside of the fort, and then the building set on fire and burned. The charred remains of five or six bodies were afterward found, all but one so much disfigured and consumed by the flames that they could not be identified, and the identification of that one is not absolutely certain, although there can hardly be a doubt that it was the body of Lieutenant Akerstrom, quartermaster of the Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, and a native Tennessean; several witnesses who saw the remains, and who were personally acquainted with him while living, have testified that it is their firm belief that it was his body that was thus treated.

"These deeds of murder and cruelty ceased when night came on, only to be renewed the next morning, when the demons carefully sought among the dead lying about in all directions for any of the wounded yet alive, and those they found were deliberately shot. Scores of the dead and wounded were found there the day after the massacre by the men from some of our gun-boats who were permitted to go on shore and collect the wounded and bury the dead. The rebels themselves had made a pretense of burying a great many of their victims, but they had merely thrown them, without the least regard to care or decency, into the trenches and ditches about the fort, or the little hollows and ravines on the hill-side, covering them but partially with earth. Portions of heads and faces, hands and feet, were found protruding through the earth in every direction. The testimony also establishes the fact that the rebels buried some of the living with the dead, a few of whom succeeded afterward in digging themselves out, or were dug out by others, one of whom your committee found in Mound City Hospital, and there examined. And even when your committee visited the spot, two weeks afterward, although parties of men had been sent on shore from time to time to bury the bodies unburied and rebury the others, and were even then engaged in the same work, we found the evidences of this murder and cruelty still most painfully apparent; we saw bodies still unburied (at some distance from the fort) of some sick men who had been met fleeing from the hospital, and beaten down and brutally murdered, and their bodies left where they had fallen. We could still see the faces, hands, and feet of men, white and black, protruding out of the ground, whose graves had not been reached by those engaged in reintering the victims of the massacre; and although a great deal of rain had fallen within the preceding two weeks, the ground, more especially on the side and at the foot of the bluff, where the most of the murders had been committed, was still discolored by the blood of our brave but unfortunate men, and the logs and trees showed but too plainly the evidences of the atrocities perpetrated there.

"Many other instances of equally atrocious cruelty might be enumerated, but your committee feel compelled to refrain from giving here more of the heart-sickening details, and refer to the statements contained in the voluminous testimony herewith submitted. Those statements were obtained by them from eyewitnesses and sufferers; many of them, as they were examined by your committee, were lying upon beds of pain and suffering, some so feeble that their lips could with difficulty frame the words by which they endeavored to convey some idea of the cruelties which had been inflicted on them, and which they had seen inflicted on others.

"How many of our troops thus fell victims to the malignity and barbarity of Forrest and his followers can not yet be definitely ascertained. Two officers belonging to the garrison were absent at the time of the capture and massacre. Of the remaining officers but two are known to be living, and they are wounded and now in the hospital at Mound City. One of them, Captain Potter, may even now be dead, as the surgeons, when your committee were there, expressed no hope of his recovery. Of the men, from three hundred to four hundred are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least three hundred were murdered in cold blood after the post was in possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance. Of the survivors, except the wounded in the hospital at Mound City, and the few who succeeded in making their escape unhurt, nothing definite is known; and it is to be feared that many have been murdered after being taken away from the fort.

"In reference to the fate of Major Bradford, who was in command of the fort when it was captured, and who had up to that time received no injury, there seems to be no doubt. The general understanding everywhere seemed to be that he had been brutally murdered the day after he was taken prisoner.

"There is some discrepancy in the testimony, but your committee do not see how the one who professed to have been an eyewitness of his death could have been mistaken. There may be some uncertainty in regard to his fate.


"When your committee arrived at Memphis, Tennessee, they found and examined a man (Mr. McLagan) who had been conscripted by some of Forrest's forces, but who, with other conscripts, had succeeded in making his escape. He testifies that while two companies of rebel troops, with Major Bradford and many other prisoners, were on their march from Brownsville to Jackson, Tennessee, Major Bradford was taken by five rebels—one an officer—led about fifty yards from the line of march, and deliberately murdered in view of all there assembled. He fell—killed instantly by three musket-balls, even while asking that his life might be spared, as he had fought them manfully, and was deserving of a better fate. The motive for the murder of Major Bradford seems to have been the simple fact that, although a native of the South, he remained loyal to his government."



THE FORT PILLOW MASSACRE.







FORREST'S RAIDERS ATTACKING IRVING PRISON.

Smith, who advanced to Tupelo, where the enemy, about 14,000 strong, was then concentrated. A battle was here fought (July 14th), in which the enemy, thrice attacking the Federal lines, was each time repulsed. It was a drawn battle, and Smith, without advancing farther, retreated to Memphis, whence he again set out with 10,000 men on the 4th of August, moving by way of Holly Springs to the Tallahatchie River. But this time Forrest was not to be found, and Smith, after remaining in this vicinity for several days, again returned to Memphis, and was sent to the Department of the Missouri.

While General Smith was looking for Forrest in Mississippi, the latter had moved upon Memphis with 3000 men. He charged into the town on the morning of August 18th. He had heard that Generals Hurlbut, Washburne, and Buckland made their quarters at the Gayoso Hotel, but, paying them a visit at that place, he found them "not at home." He captured several staff and other officers, however, and about 300 soldiers. A number of Confederate prisoners were confined in Irving Prison. Failing in an attempt to gain possession of this prison, General Forrest left the town, and beat a hasty retreat back into Mississippi.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### THE FLORIDA EXPEDITION.

Gillmore lands 10,000 Men at Jacksonville.—Object of the Expedition in large measure Political.—Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation.—The President's Motives.—The Enemy surprised.—Number of Confederate Troops in Florida.—The Federal Troops occupy Baldwin.—Gillmore returns to Hilton Head.—His Instructions to General Seymour disregarded by the latter.—The Battle of Olustee.—Seymour's Blunder.—Disastrous Termination of the Expedition.

WHILE Sherman was advancing upon Meridian, a force of 10,000 men was landed at Jacksonville, on the eastern coast of Florida. These were a portion of the Tenth Army Corps, under General Q. A. Gillmore, who, on the 16th of July, 1863, had succeeded General Hunter in command of the troops operating in South Carolina. The object of this Florida expedition was in large measure a political one. President Lincoln had included in his first message to the Thirty-eighth Congress (December 7th, 1863) a proclamation of amnesty, offering a free pardon to all such rebels as would take an oath to support the Federal Constitution and Union, "and abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court." Exceptions were made in the cases of those who were or had been officers or agents of the Confederate government; of those who had left judicial stations under the United States, or seats in Congress, or had resigned commissions in the Federal army or navy to take part in the rebellion; of Confederate military and naval officers above the rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the navy; and of all who had in any way treated white or black soldiers otherwise than as prisoners of war. It was also proclaimed that, as soon as in any of the Confederate States "a number of persons, not less than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such state at the presidential election of 1860, each having taken the oath aforesaid, and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the state existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a state government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the state; and the state shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitu-

tional provision which declares that 'the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the Legislature or the executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence.'" The President entertained somewhat extravagant expectations as to the results of this proclamation. It is not necessary to say that he had no partisan motive in issuing it; he only wished to begin the reorganization of governments in the Southern States. The movement was premature; perhaps it was ill considered. If successful, some foreign complications might be avoided; but, so far as any real reconstruction was concerned, that could only come as the consequence of final victory in the war. Unfortunately, the President's too sanguine hopes conduced to the embarrassment of military operations. Expeditions were undertaken which distracted forces from vital centres, and which, contemplating nothing beyond the possession of a small slice of territory in Florida and Texas, and being undertaken with numbers only adequate to such a result, had not the remotest connection with the progress of the war from a military stand-point. The disastrous results of these expeditions are not fairly attributable to the President's plan; but, apart from their unfortunate results, no such half-military and half-political projects were in place.

The objects sought to be attained by the Florida expedition are thus stated by General Gillmore:

1. To procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, etc.
2. To cut off one of the enemy's sources of commissary supplies.



S. D. STURGIS.



3. To obtain recruits for any colored regiments.

4. To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance, in accordance with instructions which I had received from the President by the hands of Major John Hay, Assistant Adjutant General.<sup>1</sup>

The troops, consisting of twelve regiments—one half of them colored troops—under the immediate command of Brigadier General Truman Seymour, left Hilton Head on the 6th of February, and landed the next day at Jacksonville, at the mouth of St. John's River. The landing of this force was a complete surprise to the enemy. In the Confederate Departments of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, there were at this time about 33,000 effective troops. Of these there were about 5000 in Florida, under the command of General Finnegan. The progress of the Federal troops from Jacksonville to Baldwin, in the interior, met with no opposition. Finnegan made an attempt to stand at Camp Vinegar, seven miles west of Jacksonville, but on the approach of the Federal columns he abandoned his position, having sunk the steamer *St. Mary's*, and burned 270 bales of cotton. On the morning of the 9th General Gillmore reports: "We have taken, without the loss of a man, about 100 prisoners, eight pieces of artillery in serviceable order and one well supplied with ammunition, and other valuable property to a large amount." Baldwin, which the Federal troops now occupied, was eighteen miles west of Jacksonville, and was the point of junction of two railroads, one running from Fernandina, a short distance north of Jacksonville, southwestwardly to Cedar Keys, on the western coast: the other from Jacksonville, across the northern part of the state to Tallahassee, the state capital. A portion of Seymour's command, under Colonel Henry, pursued the enemy almost to Lake City.

General Gillmore had accompanied the expedition in person, and remained until the 15th, when he returned to Hilton Head. On the 11th he had instructed General Seymour not to risk a repulse by an advance on Lake City, but, if possible, to hold Sanderson (forty miles west of Jacksonville), and, at any rate, the south fork of the St. Mary's. The next day he ordered the entire force to concentrate at Baldwin. Before his departure for Hilton Head he made arrangements for the construction of fortifications at Jacksonville, Baldwin, and on the south fork of the St. Mary's. At that time it was understood that no advance should be made without farther instructions from Gillmore, nor until the defensive works were well advanced.<sup>2</sup>

General Gillmore was therefore astonished by receiving a communication from Seymour on the 18th (dated the 17th), stating that he intended to advance to the Suwanee River, 100 miles distant from Jacksonville, and that he was already moving his troops westward. Not being able to accumulate supplies sufficient to permit him to make the movement, Seymour declared his purpose to move without supplies, even if compelled to retrace his steps to procure them. He urged Gillmore to prevent any force re-enforcing the enemy from Georgia by a naval demonstration against Savannah. He asked, also, for a general to be sent him to command his advanced troops. General Gillmore, having no intention to occupy the western part of Florida, at once dispatched General Turner, his chief of staff, to Jacksonville to prevent the movement. Upon arriving in Florida with a letter to Seymour from Gillmore protesting against the advance of the former, Turner found that the troops were already at Olustee, and engaged with the enemy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following letter was addressed to General Gillmore by President Lincoln, January 13th, 1864:

Major General GILLMORE:

"I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a legal state government in Florida. Florida is in your department, and it is not unlikely that you may be there in person. I have given Mr. Hay a commission of major, and sent him to you with some blank books and other blanks, to aid in the reconstruction. He will explain as to the manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the subject. It is desirable for all to co-operate, but if irreconcilable differences of opinion shall arise, you are master. I wish the thing done in the most speedy way possible, so that when done it may be within the range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor will of course have to be done by others, but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find consistent with your more strictly military duties. A. LINCOLN."

On the 31st of January General Gillmore issued the following order:

"Headquarters Department of the South, Hilton Head, South Carolina, January 31st, 1864.

"In accordance with the provisions of the presidential proclamation of pardon and amnesty, given at Washington on the 8th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1863, and in pursuance of instructions received from the President of the United States, Major John Hay, Assistant Adjutant General, will proceed to Fernandina, Florida, and other convenient points in that state, for the purpose of extending to the citizens of the State of Florida an opportunity to avail themselves of the benefit of that proclamation, by offering for their signature the oath of allegiance therein prescribed, and by issuing to all those subscribing to said oath certificates entitling them to the benefits of the proclamation. Fugitive citizens of the State of Florida within the limits of this department will have an opportunity to subscribe to the same oath, and secure certificates in the office of the post commander at Hilton Head, South Carolina.

"E. W. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant General."

"By command of Major General Q. A. GILLMORE.

<sup>2</sup> General Gillmore's Report.

<sup>3</sup> The following are copies of the letters—General Seymour's announcing his movement, and General Gillmore's reply:

"Headquarters Department of the South, February 17th, 1864.

"GENERAL,—The excessive and unexpected delays experienced with regard to the locomotive, which will not be ready for two days yet, if at all, has compelled me to remain where my command could be fed. Not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me to execute my intention of moving to the Suwanee River.

"But I now propose to go without supplies, even if compelled to retrace my steps to procure them, and with the object of so destroying the railroad near the Suwanee that there will be no danger of carrying away any portion of the track.

"All troops are therefore being moved up to Barber's, and probably by the time you receive this I shall be in motion in advance of that point.

"That a force may not be brought from Georgia (Savannah) to interfere with my movements, it is desirable that a display be made in the Savannah River; and I therefore urge that upon the reception of this, such naval force, transports, sailing vessels, etc., as can be so devoted, may rendezvous near Pulaski, and that the iron-clads in Warsaw push up with as much activity as they can exert.

"I look upon this as of great importance, and shall rely upon it as a demonstration in my favor.

"There is reason to believe that General Hardee is in Lake City, now possibly in command, and with some force at his disposal.

"But nothing is visible this side of Sanderson. Saddles, etc., for mounting the Seventh New Hampshire as rapidly as possible, are greatly needed, and I shall send a portion of that regiment to this point as soon as it can be spared subsequent to my advance.

General Seymour had begun his movement on the 18th, and expected no encounter with the enemy before reaching Lake City. On the night of the 19th he halted at Barber's, a small station on the railroad 30 miles west of Jacksonville. The Confederate General Finnegan had, in the mean time, been apprized of the hostile movement, and, instead of awaiting attack at Lake City, he preferred to choose his own battle-ground, and advanced to Olustee, about 15 miles eastward, where his army took a strong position on a swamp which runs southward some distance from Ocean Pond, a small lake north of the railroad. His centre was protected by the swamp; his right rested on an earthwork protected by rifle-pits, while his left was posted on a slight elevation, sheltered by pines, and still farther guarded by cavalry. It was a position absolutely impregnable against double the numbers which held it, and the force under General Seymour was only about equal to that of the enemy; his only advantage was in artillery, of which he had sixteen pieces to the enemy's four.<sup>1</sup>

Seymour, without knowing any thing of the enemy's position, advanced from Barber's on the 20th, and, after a wearisome march of 15 miles over the sandy road, came suddenly upon the enemy's pickets near Olustee. The road at this point crossed the railroad to the right, to avoid the swamp on the south side. There was also a swamp on the right of the road, and between these two swamps lay the sole approach to the enemy's position. The action commenced about 2 o'clock P.M. The Federal troops, tired by their long march, went into battle under a great disadvantage. The artillery was pushed up so far to the front that both the gunners and horses were shot down with such rapidity that some of the guns were abandoned and others rendered useless. The infantry, poorly armed, were put in regiment by regiment as it arrived on the ground. There was no tactics, and the situation gave no opportunity for any. The road was so narrow that many of the men had to wade knee-deep in mud and water in order to get into action. One regiment after another went in beyond the swamps, and each fired away its ammunition, and, exposed to a murderous fire from the enemy, retired, giving place to another. The Seventh Connecticut, under the brave Colonel T. R. Hawley (late governor of Connecticut), held the advance after the preliminary skirmish. The field soon becomes too hot for this regiment,

"I have sent for the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts entire to come to this point. The Tenth Connecticut (eight companies) is to remain at St. Augustine, two companies to go to Picolata.

"I shall not occupy Picolata or Magnolia at this moment; when I do, portions of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts will be sent from Jacksonville. The Fifty-fifth Massachusetts will remain here for the present, or until the Twenty-fourth relieves it.

"The Second South Carolina and Third South Carolina are at Camp Shaw (late Finnegan), for instruction and organization.

"The First North Carolina will be left at Baldwin, detaching three companies to Barber's.

"Colonel Barton will have the Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth, and One Hundred and Fifteenth; Colonel Hanley will have the Seventh Connecticut, Seventh New Hampshire, and Eighth United States Colored; Colonel Montgomery the Third United States and Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Colored; Colonel Henry the cavalry and Elder's battery, and Captain Hamilton the artillery. As soon as possible, Metcalf's section will be sent back. At present I should like to use it.

"Colonel Goss is ordered to keep six companies in motion from Fernandina constantly, and at least five days out of seven (every seven) toward and beyond Camp Cooper.

"Nothing appears to have been done upon the locomotive while at Fernandina. So it is reported to me.

"The prompt use of a locomotive and a printing-press with this movement were of the most vital importance, and will continue so to be. I trust both will be economized.

"And I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. SEYMOUR, Brigadier General Commanding.

"Brigadier General S. W. TURNER, Chief of Staff:

"Send me a general for the command of the advanced troops, or I shall be in a state of constant uncertainty. T. S."

"Hilton Head, South Carolina, February 18th, 1864.

"Brigadier General T. SEYMOUR, Commanding District of Florida:

"I am just in receipt of your two letters of the sixteenth and one of the seventeenth, and am very much surprised at the tone of the latter, and the character of your plans as therein stated. You say that by the time your letter of the seventeenth should reach these headquarters, your forces would be in motion beyond Barber's, moving toward the Suwanee River, and that you shall rely upon my making a display in the Suwanee River 'with naval force, transports, and sailing vessels,' and with iron-clads up from Warsaw, etc., as a demonstration in your favor, which you look upon as of 'great importance.' All this is upon the presumption that the demonstration can and will be made, although contingent not only upon my power and disposition to do so, but upon the consent of Admiral Dahlgren, with whom I can not communicate in less than ten days. You must have forgotten my last instructions, which were for the present to hold Baldwin and the St. Mary's south prong as your outposts to the westward of Jacksonville, and to occupy Picolata and Magnolia on the St. John's.

"Your prospect distinctly and avowedly ignores these operations, and substitutes a plan which not only involves your command in a distant movement without provisions, far beyond a point from which you once withdrew on account of precisely the same necessity, but presupposes a simultaneous demonstration of 'great importance' to you elsewhere, over which you have no control, and which requires the co-operation of the navy. It is impossible for me to determine what your views are with respect to Florida matters, and this is the reason why I have endeavored to make mine known to you so fully. From your letter of the eleventh instant from Baldwin (a very singular letter, by the way, and which you did not modify or refer to at all when you afterward saw me), I extract as follows:

"I am convinced that a movement upon Lake City is not, in the present condition of transportation, advisable, and, indeed, that what has been said of the desire of Florida to come back now is a delusion. This movement is in opposition to sound strategy," etc.

"And again: 'The Union cause would have been far more benefited by Jeff Davis having removed this railroad to Virginia, than by any trivial or non-strategic success you may meet. By all means, therefore, fall back to Jacksonville.'

"So much from your letters of the eleventh; and yet, five days later, you propose to push forward without instructions and without provisions, with a view to destroying the railroad which you say it would have been better for Jeff Davis to have got; and furthermore, you say in your letter of the sixteenth: 'There is but little doubt in my mind (but) that the people of this state, kindly treated by us, will soon be ready to return to the Union. They are heartily tired of the war.'

"As may be supposed, I am very much confused by these conflicting views, and am thrown into doubt as to whether my intentions with regard to Florida are fully understood by you. I will, therefore, reannounce them briefly.

"1st. I desire to bring Florida into the Union under the President's proclamation of December 8th, 1863, as accessory to the above.

"2d. To revive the trade on the St. John's River.

"3d. To recruit my colored regiments, and organize a regiment of Florida white troops; and,

"4th. To cut off in part the enemy's supplies drawn from Florida.

"After you had withdrawn your advance, it was arranged between us, at a present interview, that the places to be permanently held for the present would be the south prong of the St. Mary's, Baldwin, Jacksonville, Magnolia, and Picolata, and that Henry's mounted forces should be kept moving as circumstances might justify or require. This is my plan of present operations. A raid to tear up the railroad west of Lake City will be of service, but I have no intention to occupy now that part of the state.

"Very respectfully, etc., Q. A. GILLMORE, Major General Commanding.

"ROBERT N. SCOTT, Captain of U. S. Infantry, A. D. C.

"Headquarters of the Army, Washington, March 16th, 1864."

<sup>1</sup> Only about half of Seymour's force was engaged, the rest being left to hold the posts on the coast and St. John's River.



and the Seventh New Hampshire is brought up to its support, and this becoming confused, the Eighth United States colored regiment comes into action, some of the men with empty guns, standing its ground with heavy loss for nearly two hours. Barton's brigade of New York troops has at length formed on the right of the line, and Colonel Montgomery, with the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts and First North Carolina (colored), has got into position on the left. All the troops, black and white, fight nobly; but their loss had already been heavy, particularly in officers. Along the railroad an uninterrupted stream of wounded men flows to the rear, and hundreds more of wounded are left behind upon the field, as the line now is driven back, having lost nearly thirteen hundred men in this brief battle. The enemy has lost little over half that number, and nothing but the exhaustion of his ammunition holds him back from pursuit.

Such was the battle of Olustee, fought against orders, and upon the enemy's chosen field. General Seymour was present in the hottest of the fight, but neither his bravery nor that of his troops could avert the disaster which followed inevitably from the very conditions of the conflict. With this defeat active operations in Florida terminated, though the Federal troops continued to hold their position upon the coast.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.

Another semi-Political Expedition.—Diplomatic Considerations.—Apprehensions of French Intervention.—Every military Motive in favor of a Campaign against Mobile.—The Government decides in favor of a Campaign in Texas.—The Sabine Pass Expedition; its Failure.—Coast Operations.—Occupation of Brazos Santiago, November 2, 1863; of Brownsville, November 6th; of Point Isabel, November 8th; of Aransas Pass, November 17th; and of Cavallo Pass, November 19th.—Mistake made in continuing a trans-Mississippi offensive Campaign.—Halleck advises a Movement on Shreveport.—Banks's Opinion of the Conditions necessary to a successful Red River Campaign.—These Requirements not met.—Halleck leaves the whole Affair to be settled between Banks, Sherman, and Steele.—Banks ought to have decided against the Movement.—Extent of his Responsibility.—Sherman meets Banks at New Orleans.—He sends A. J. Smith's Command to General Banks.—Steele not prepared.—Kirby Smith's Command.—Banks being detained at New Orleans, General Franklin is intrusted with the immediate command of the Expedition.—Franklin reaches Alexandria March 25th, 1864.—Admiral Porter's Co-operation.—Capture of Fort De Russy.—Difficulty in getting the Gun-boats over the Rapids at Alexandria.—Dépôt established at Alexandria, and Grover's Division detached to guard it.—Ellet's Marine Brigade recalled to Vicksburg.—T. K. Smith's division used for the Protection of Transports.—The Military Branch reduced by 8500 men on account of these Detachments.—Cotton Seizures.—The Army reaches Natchitoches April 2d and 3d, while the Navy proceeds to Grand Ecore.—The Difficulty of Navigation increases.—The Advance toward Mansfield.—Skirmishing with Confederate Cavalry.—The Enemy encountered beyond Pleasant Hill.—Banks arrives at the Front and ventures an Engagement.—He makes a great Mistake.—Federal Defeat at Sabine Cross-roads.—Causes of the Disaster.—A Stand made at Pleasant Grove.—Emory repulses the Enemy and covers the Retreat.—The Retreat continued to Pleasant Hill.—Battle of Pleasant Hill, April 9th.—Importance of this Conflict.—It is decided against the Confederates.—Retreat continued to Grand Ecore.—Admiral Porter's Troubles.—The Confederate Infantry charge upon the Gun-boats, and are worsted.—The Army and Fleet return to Alexandria.—On the way General Banks defeats the Enemy at Cane River.—The Fleet can not pass the Rapids, and is relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey's Dams.—The Army retreats to Simmsport.—Operations of General Steele's Co-operative Column.—Review of the military Operations in Arkansas in 1863.—Quantrell's Raid.—Capture of Little Rock by General Steele.—Steele advances upon Shreveport from the North.—A Slow March.—Fight at Prairie d'Anne.—Steele hears of Banks's Reverse, and retreats to Little Rock.—The Political Situation in Arkansas as affected by the Campaign.

FROM the Florida expedition we turn naturally to the Red River campaign. This latter was also urged by the government without much regard to its military importance. The motives which led to its inception were more complex than those which led to the Florida expedition. In addition to political reasons, there were diplomatic considerations of still greater importance. In defiance of the Monroe Doctrine—a doctrine first promulgated in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, and indorsed by the whole American people, and which pronounced any interference with the affairs or destiny of any portion of the New World by the powers of the Old a hostile measure to this country, "dangerous to our peace and safety"—three European nations, France, England, and Spain, had in 1861 embarked upon an expedition against Mexico. The originally declared purposes of this joint expedition had appeared to be perfectly legitimate. The civil commotions in Mexico had endangered the liberties of foreign residents in that country, and undermined the security for its large liabilities by debt to foreign powers. The expedition proposed simply to remedy these abuses. The United States government, although its grievances were greater than those of either of the allied powers, except Great Britain, had refused to participate in the expedition, but acceded the legitimacy of its objects as openly declared. Afterward, however, the character of the movement against Mexico was essentially changed. England and Spain withdrew from the alliance, and the Emperor Napoleon entered upon the execution of a scheme which was intended to revolutionize the Mexican government, and to erect an empire upon the ruins of the republic. This was a policy hostile to this country, and, taken in connection with Louis Napoleon's expressed desire to unite with the British government in the recognition of the Confederacy, excited serious apprehension. It was deemed necessary, therefore, that the Federal government should occupy and strongly hold some point in Texas, in order to meet any emergency which might arise out of this foreign complication.

Both General Banks and General Grant, after the capture of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, were in favor of an immediate expedition against Mobile. There were good military reasons for such a movement. The full reward for the sacrifice of the army which had purchased the Mississippi could only be realized by leaving the entire trans-Mississippi region—at least all below

the Arkansas River—out of the field of active military operations. The navy, with the co-operation of a few small garrisons, not amounting in the aggregate to more than 20,000 men, would have held the Mississippi against any operations of the enemy. The coast of Texas should have been occupied, and held by about 10,000 men. There should also have been an army of 20,000 men to keep down guerrillas in Missouri and Arkansas, and to prevent the enemy from advancing north of the Arkansas. Thus a Federal army, amounting in all to 50,000 men, would have maintained the defensive on and west of the Mississippi, and 50,000 men<sup>1</sup> would thus have been liberated for the more important, because more decisive operations in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. The campaign against Mobile, if it had been undertaken immediately after the opening of the Mississippi, would have accomplished four important results:

1. It would have relieved Rosecrans—then operating against Chattanooga—more effectively than any other movement could have done.
2. It would have forestalled Sherman's Meridian raid.
3. It would have resulted in the possession of Mobile and of the fertile valleys of the Alabama and Tombigbee Rivers, upon which the Confederate Army of the West mainly relied for corn, and would have secured the Mississippi River against hostile operations from the east.
4. It would have acquired the best possible base for co-operative movements in the event either of an advance of the Federal armies southward upon Atlanta, or westward from South Carolina and Florida. Its success would have justified more formidable expeditions in the two latter states in the winter of 1863–1864, and these would in turn have materially weakened Lee's army in Virginia.

These advantages were fully appreciated by General Grant. But the government decided in favor of a trans-Mississippi campaign, the motives for which were purely of a diplomatic and political character.<sup>2</sup> The earliest

<sup>1</sup> The entire Federal force west of the Mississippi numbered at least 100,000 men.

<sup>2</sup> For further illustration, we copy the correspondence on this subject between Generals Banks, Halleck, and Grant.

On the 18th of July, 1863, Banks writes to Grant:

"It is my belief that Johnston, when defeated by you . . . will fall back upon Mobile. Such is also the expectation of the rebels. The capture of Mobile is of importance, second only in the history of the war to the opening of the Mississippi. I hope you will be able to follow him. I can aid you somewhat by land and by sea, if that should be your destination. Mobile is the last strong-hold in the West and Southwest. No pains should be spared to effect its reduction."

On the 26th of July he writes to Halleck:

"There is still strength in Mobile and in Texas which will constantly threaten Louisiana, and which ought to be destroyed without delay. The possession of Mobile and the occupation of Texas would quiet the whole of the Southwest, and every effort should be made to accomplish this. Its importance can hardly be overestimated."

And again, July 30:

"Information from Mobile leads us to believe that the force at that point is now about 5000, which is engaged industriously on the land side in strengthening the position. My belief is that Johnston's forces are moving to the East, and that the garrison of Mobile will not be strengthened, unless it be by paroled men from Vicksburg and Port Hudson; while the rebel army of the East is occupied at Charleston and at Richmond by our forces, it would be impossible for them to strengthen Mobile to any great extent. It seems to be a favorable opportunity for a movement in that direction. An attack should be made by land. Troops can be transported by the river to Mobile, with the intervention of a march of 25 miles from Portersville, on the west side of the bay and the rear of the city. We have outlines of their works, and can estimate very well their strength. I am confident that a sudden movement, such as can be made with 15,000 or 20,000 men on this line, will reduce that position with certainty and without delay. The troops of the West need rest, and are incapable of long or rapid marches. It is therefore impracticable to attack Mobile except by the river and Mississippi Sound. A portion of General Grant's forces could be transported there with but little labor to themselves, and the place could be invested before the enemy could anticipate our movement."

On August 1 he writes:

"The possession of Mobile gives the government the control of the Alabama River and the line of railways east and west from Charleston and Savannah to Vicksburg, via Montgomery, and places the whole of the State of Mississippi and Southern Alabama in position to return to the Union. If the rebel government loses this position, it has no outlet to the Gulf except Galveston. The operation need not last more than 30 days, and can scarcely interfere with any other movements East or West. I understand it to meet with General Grant's approval, if it be consistent with the general plans of the government, upon which condition only I urge it."

August 10, Banks writes to Grant:

"I have the honor to inclose you some memoranda concerning Mobile. I still think it of the utmost moment that that post should be in our hands. Except for Johnston's army, we should have no difficulty. He seems to occupy a position intended to cover Mobile, and if he is in force 30,000 or 40,000 strong, as I suppose, he could embarrass the operations against that point very seriously. I am unable, however, to see how he can hold his position in the Southwest with Rosecrans's army pressing down upon the rebel centre. A line extending from Mobile to Richmond, in the present shattered condition of the rebel armies—the right, centre, and left having been disastrously defeated—it seems to me impossible that they can maintain their positions if Rosecrans, with a heavy force, pushes down upon their centre, or if Charleston shall fall into our hands through the operations of the fleet and army combined. A successful movement in either direction, from Charleston or by Rosecrans, will cut their centre, and place Bragg and Johnston with their forces between the troops under Rosecrans, your troops, and mine at New Orleans. I do not believe that that condition of things can be maintained."

Halleck, on the 12th of August, replies to Banks's dispatches in regard to Mobile:

"I fully appreciate the importance of the operation proposed by you in these dispatches, but there are reasons other than military why those heretofore directed should be undertaken first. On this matter we have no choice, but must carry out the views of the government."

The operations "heretofore directed" were against Texas.

On the 8th of January, 1864, Halleck writes to Grant:

"In regard to General Banks's campaign against Texas, it is proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of state policy. As a military measure simply, it perhaps presented less advantage than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama River, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines, and effect a diversion in favor of our armies at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter of political or state policy connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so considered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and to his cabinet, and it was therefore unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage."

When General Banks assumed the command of the Gulf Department, his instructions from General Halleck (dated November 9, 1862) allude to operations to be undertaken after the opening of the Mississippi in the following terms:

"The river being opened, the question arises how the troops and naval forces there can be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy of your attention:

"First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly East to destroy the railroads at Jackson and Marion, and thus cut off all connection by rail between Northern Mississippi and Mobile and Atlanta. The latter place is now the chief military dépôt of the rebel armies in the West.

"Second, To ascend, with a naval and military force, the Red River as far as it is navigable, and thus open an outlet for the sugar and cotton of Northern Louisiana. Possibly both of these objects may be accomplished, if the circumstances should be favorable. It is also suggested that, having Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas."

On July 24, 1863, Halleck writes to Banks:

"I suppose the first thing done by your army, after the fall of Port Hudson, was to clean out the Teche and Atchafalaya counties. That being accomplished, your next operations must depend very much upon the then condition of affairs. Texas and Mobile will present themselves to your attention. The navy are very anxious for an attack upon the latter place, but I think Tex-