

SHERMAN AT SHILOH.

[APRIL 6 AND 7, 1862.]

The part of SHERMAN, in which he figured so conspicuously as the tactician in the manœuvres leading up to the clash and the fighter in the stubborn onset of contending Americans, may be briefly outlined.

It was about 7 a. m. when SHERMAN descried the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry on the left beyond the point at which he was fired upon. He was now convinced of the design to press a general engagement.

At the opening of the battle SHERMAN's division occupied position.


First Brigade.—Colonel McDowell on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek.

Second Brigade.—Colonel Stuart on the extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick Creek.

Third Brigade.—Colonel Hildebrand on the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh Meeting House.

Fourth Brigade.—Colonel Buckland on the right of the Corinth road, its left resting on the Shiloh Meeting House.

Taylor's battery in position at Shiloh Meeting House and Waterhouse's battery on a ridge to the left, with a front fire over the open ground between Mungen's (Fifty-seventh Ohio) and Appler's (Fifty-third Ohio) regiments. The cavalry of the division (Dickey's—Fourth Illinois), on account of the heavy musketry fire, occupied a large open field to the left under cover near Shiloh Meeting House, and was moved according to circumstances from 8 a. m. Sunday until 4 p. m. Monday, when it was brought into requisition for pursuit.



BATTLE OF SHILOH, TENN.

The positions of the troops under Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman at its beginning and close.

THE BATTLE.

The lines of SHERMAN, supported by McClelland's division, were well posted to meet the brunt of the two days' work at Shiloh.

The battle was opened by a battery of the enemy in the woods on SHERMAN's right front throwing shells into his camp. Simultaneously the masses of infantry advanced directly upon his division front, the Third (Hildebrand's) and Fourth (Buckland's) Brigades becoming engaged at 7.30 a. m. This force, strengthened by Raith's brigade of the First Division, held its position until 10 a. m.

The importance of Shiloh Meeting House as the key to success led SHERMAN to make the most desperate efforts to maintain his position.

At 10 a. m. the enemy, by the yielding of the supporting division on SHERMAN's flank (Prentiss's division), was enabled to bring his artillery in the rear of SHERMAN's left, which necessitated a change of position to a new line lying on the Purdy and Hamburg road. During this movement both brigades, becoming disorganized, withdrew to Hamburg and Savannah road, parts only of regiments remaining in line.

From his position SHERMAN saw other masses directing their movements with the evident intention of passing his own left flank and falling upon the divisions of McClelland and Prentiss (the latter giving way at his second position at 9 a. m.), whose lines paralleled the Tennessee River, 2 miles distant. SHERMAN's left, turned by the giving way of Prentiss, made the enemy's movement severely felt. The enemy's infantry and artillery soon opened along the whole line, and the battle became general.

By half past 10 the enemy was making a furious attack on McClelland's whole front, to meet which, being hard pressed,

SHERMAN quickly moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, which was forced back. He then directed his men to avail themselves of every cover—logs, stumps, and trees—and hold their ground at every cost. This they did for four hours of as vicious musketry fire as had ever been delivered between two lines of battle.

In this desperate strait the ultimate success was due largely to the perfect accord which existed between SHERMAN and McClernand in the struggle to maintain this line. It was impossible to bring up reinforcements, owing to the furious fire which swept every part of the field around them.

At 3 p. m. General Grant visited SHERMAN in this position.

At 4 p. m. Hurlbut's line was driven back to the river.

In the meantime Gen. Lew Wallace was making the best of his way with reinforcements from Crumps Landing. In cooperation with this SHERMAN and McClernand shifted to a new line, having their right cover a bridge by which Wallace was obliged to approach.

A charge of the enemy's cavalry in an effort to thwart this maneuver was splendidly repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Volunteers and Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come forward and held the enemy in check for some time. Taylor's battery in position, with a flank fire on the enemy's column which was crowding McClernand, checked the advance, when McClernand's division, charging in return, drove the enemy back into the ravine on front and right. SHERMAN had now a clear field of 200 yards on his front, where he succeeded in holding the enemy during the rest of the day.

By 2 p. m., in SHERMAN's own words, his "division was very much mixed," Buckland's brigade being the only one left intact as to organization. Colonel Hildebrand was on the field, but his brigade was not. McDowell had been injured and gone

to the rear, his three regiments not being in line. The Thirteenth Missouri (Wright) reported to SHERMAN on the field and fought bravely, retaining its formation as part of his line Sunday night and to the end on Monday. Fragments of many regiments and companies fell into his division and acted with it during the rest of the battle.

Generals Grant and Buell visited SHERMAN at his bivouac during the night. From them this hero of the bloody day learned the situation of affairs on other parts of the field. The men, in excellent spirits and eager to renew the conflict, lay on their arms with only such rations as could be brought to them from the neighboring camps.

At dawn on the second day (Monday) SHERMAN received General Grant's order to assume the offensive and recapture his original camps. He also mentioned that General Buell had reached the banks of the Tennessee, opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was ferrying his troops over. Having gathered his forces well in hand during the night, SHERMAN awaited the advance on the main Corinth road of Wallace's division of Grant's army, which early on the night of the first day had arrived from Crumps Landing, on the Tennessee, advancing by Snake Creek.

At 10 a. m., hearing a heavy cannonade, which he construed to indicate the advance of Wallace on his right flank, SHERMAN in person led the head of his column toward McClernand's right and formed line of battle facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge and Stuart's on its right in the woods. In this formation they advanced under a withering fire of musketry and artillery. At the same time three guns of Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, advanced by hand, and, firing, did effective execution.

On reaching a point where the Corinth road crossed the line

for McClernand's camp SHERMAN was joined by part of General Buell's Kentucky forces. Willich's regiment advanced and entered the thicket in front in grand style. The enemy had rallied at this point under cover, which led to twenty minutes of the severest musketry fire, as SHERMAN afterwards said he had "ever heard."

This grove of water oaks, 500 yards east of Shiloh Meeting House, had now become the scene of the struggle, as SHERMAN had foreseen in the beginning, which would decide the mastery of the national or the rebel forces in Kentucky and Tennessee and possibly in that part of the Mississippi Valley lying south of the mouth of the Ohio to Baton Rouge.

The enemy could be seen massing his lines to the south. McClernand calling for artillery, SHERMAN sent him Wood's three guns, which had done such excellent work in the earlier part of the day and which again drove the enemy back in disorder.

At the same moment dispatching one of his aids to hurry up the two 24-pounder howitzers of McAllister's battery, SHERMAN brought them into position and began to play on the enemy's ranks at the very timely instant of the crisis of attack.

It was now 2 p. m. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh Meeting House and another near the Hamburg road pouring grape and canister upon SHERMAN's column advancing to the copse of water oaks. One regiment, almost decimated, had been driven back. An active brigade (Rousseau's) of McCook's division was now deployed, and advancing splendidly entered the dreaded wood abreast of the Second and Fourth Brigades of SHERMAN's division, together sweeping everything before them. Under his personal direction the 24-pounders had silenced the enemy's guns on the left and later those at Shiloh Meeting House.

At 4 p. m. SHERMAN and his fighters had the glorious satisfaction of occupying their original front line and of seeing the enemy in full retreat. He directed all his brigades to at once resume their old camps.^a

Several times during the action his supply of ammunition became exhausted, notwithstanding General Grant's constant forwarding of supplies.

At a critical pass SHERMAN urged his regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges. After the battle he specially commended the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri "for holding their positions under heavy fire, notwithstanding their cartridge boxes were empty." With bayonets fixed these

^a The following is an outline of the part taken by each of SHERMAN'S brigades:

The First (McDowell's) Brigade, at first alarm, Sunday morning, each regiment formed on its color line. About 8 a. m. it advanced to the brow of the hill overlooking Shiloh Branch and joined the right of Buckland's brigade. At 10 a. m. it was ordered to retire to Purdy road, moving to the left to connect with Buckland's brigade near the crossroads. Finding a Confederate force interposed, it engaged and drove back the enemy, moving into Crescent field. It continued its movement until it connected with McClernand at 11.30 a. m. At 12 m. the brigade was attacked on the right flank and engaged until 1.30 p. m. with severe loss. At 2.30 p. m. it retired to the landing and later formed behind Hurlbut.

The Second (Stuart's) Brigade took warning from its pickets of the approach of the enemy, about 8 a. m., and instantly formed on regimental color lines, but being exposed to artillery fire (Chalmers), at 10 a. m. moved to the left. A part of this brigade, attacked by Jackson, retired from the field. Stuart in person, with two regiments, resisted the attacks of Chalmers until 2 p. m., when, running out of ammunition, he was compelled to fall back to the landing, reforming at the log house, where part of this brigade was engaged in resisting Chalmers's attack on Sunday night. Stuart, its commander, wounded on Sunday, was succeeded by Col. T. Kilby Smith, who fought on the right next to Lew. Wallace all day Monday.

The Third (Hildebrand's) Brigade formed at 7 a. m. to meet the enemy, two of the regiments in advance of their camps in the valley of Shiloh Branch. The brigade was attacked in front by Cleburne's and Wood's brigades. This attack falling on the exposed flanks of one of the regiments, in an effort to change front it fell back disorganized. Part of this brigade, reinforced by Raith's brigade of the First Division, held its position for some time and then also fell back disorganized and was not in line again as regiments. Eight companies of the Fifty-third Ohio, which reformed at the landing on Monday, advanced with Marsh's command in McClernand's corps.

The Fourth (Buckland's) Brigade from about 7 a. m. having withstood the attacks of Cleburne, Anderson, and Johnson until 10 a. m., threatened on the right flank, under orders, fell back to the Purdy road. In doing so it was disorganized and scattered, but fought in fragments until reorganized, and participated in the 4.30 p. m. affair. On Monday the brigade, reunited with Stuart's brigade, formed SHERMAN'S line which advanced to the right of McClernand's camps, thence southwesterly to Shiloh Meeting House, where the brigade occupied its old camp at 4 p. m.

brave men were prepared for a hand-to-hand encounter should the enemy invite that mode of fighting.

In commenting upon the battle and giving personal credit, the general reported that McCook's division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along Corinth road, which was the center of the part of the field where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's divisions. General Albert Sidney Johnston, to whom SHERMAN in one of his earlier opinions referred as a "real" general, and who was in chief command, was killed at 2.30 p. m. on the first day on the Union left by a minie ball severing the main artery of the calf of the leg.

The valorous deeds of SHERMAN'S men is the more remarkable when it is remembered that the regiments were perfectly new, many having received their muskets at Paducah and none having ever before been under fire. These facts demonstrated the magnetic power of SHERMAN.

The regiments of his division in action and which suffered losses were:

Infantry: Illinois, Fortieth, Fifty-fifth; Iowa, Sixth; Ohio, Forty-sixth, Forty-eighth, Fifty-third, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-seventh, Seventieth, Seventy-first, and Seventy-seventh.

Artillery: Taylor's, Behr's, and Waterhouse's batteries.

Cavalry: Fourth Illinois.

His losses were: Killed—officers, 16; men, 309. Wounded—officers, 52; men, 1,225. Missing—officers, 7; men, 292. Total, 1,901.

Total force of SHERMAN'S (5) division (April 6-7), 8,580.

In the entire battle the national loss was: Officers and men killed, 1,754; wounded, 8,408; prisoners, 2,885; total, 13,047, of which number General Buell's army lost 2,103, leaving

Grant's loss 10,944, which General SHERMAN regarded the proper proportion of fighting by each army.

The enemy captured 8 of SHERMAN'S 18 guns in action on Sunday, and SHERMAN captured the same number on Monday. The entire loss of the enemy was 10,699.

Of the national forces the strength of Grant's five divisions engaged was 39,830 men. The enemy had 43,968, with the momentum of attack until 2.30 p. m. Sunday, when General Johnston was killed.

SELF-VINDICATION.

In after years General SHERMAN frequently stated that he had made up his mind in the first battle to demonstrate to his countrymen how far the infamous stories of "insanity" were true. He regarded his part in the battle of Shiloh, named after his camp, in the thickest of the fray as his answer to the allegation. He also added:

By this time the good people North had begun to have their eyes opened and to give us in the field more faith and support.

The men utterly exhausted by the time of the regaining of their camp, the division was unable to follow the retreating enemy, who could be seen in dense masses getting out of reach in the greatest confusion.

The men of the North held their ground. It was the first real test of determination under fire. The prestige was won. From this point it became a game of grand war. The armies were of equal bravery; victory resolved itself into skill and generaiship.

Next day after the battle (April 8), in a reconnoissance of cavalry and two brigades of infantry on the Corinth road, the deserted camps which were destroyed showed a very large force

engaged; also the guns taken in the battle were found broken up and abandoned, 280 Confederate wounded were captured and 50 of our own recovered.

General SHERMAN referred in after life to the criticisms on this battle, which seemed "to be sustained by hasty reports of officers at the steamboat landing." He mentions, however, specifically seeing General Grant on the field at 10 a. m. on the first day, when he was desperately engaged, but had checked the assault of the enemy and was holding his ground, which gave his commanding officer great satisfaction, as matters were not so favorable on the left.

The spot upon which stood SHERMAN, surrounded by his unconquerable men of the Army of the Tennessee in defense of the American Union, gave name to the first and fiercest of the decisive battles of the civil war in America.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF SHILOH.

This success wisely utilized might have determined the struggle in that western field of operations, then and there. The enemy was forced to evacuate Columbus, his last stronghold in Kentucky. From his new position at Island No. 10, in the Mississippi River, after a land and gunboat attack, he was driven with the loss of a large part of his force.

The open way down that great artery of national life was inviting to a further successful move. General Halleck, still in command as chief from St. Louis, transferred the army cooperating with the flotilla from the Mississippi to the Tennessee.

The flotilla, which in cooperation with the Army of the Mississippi had performed such wonders at Island No. 10 unsupported by a land force, found itself held up by the ponderous batteries of Fort Pillow, which defended the city of Memphis

50 miles below, necessitating an intricate concert of movements overland.

The capture of Memphis, then entirely feasible, by the same force which reduced Island No. 10 would have opened the way to the flotilla of Foote to shake hands across the bows of the fleet of Farragut at Vicksburg.

After Shiloh, in order to be prepared for the offensive at any moment, SHERMAN consolidated his division of four brigades into three. First, Gen. Morgan L. Smith; second, Col. J. A. McDowell; third, Brig. Gen. J. W. Denver.

MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS—A NEW SHUFFLE.

[1862.]

In recognition of his heroic conduct at Shiloh SHERMAN was promoted to the three-starred badge of rank, as major-general of volunteers.

About the same time the commander in chief for the first time appeared on the scene of action, took command of all the armies and "reorganized," Grant, the captor of Henry and Donelson and commander at Shiloh, "second in command," "with no defined duty or authority." Employing SHERMAN's words:

For more than a month he thus remained without any apparent authority, frequently visiting me and others and rarely complaining, but I could see that he felt deeply the indignity of the insult heaped upon him.

In this new shuffle with his division of the old army of the Tennessee SHERMAN fell in the right wing under Gen. George H. Thomas, with whom he had always acted in perfect harmony, having been classmates and having served together in the old army and in California.

It should be mentioned in this arrangement Gen. Thomas W. Sherman, having the same initials, inverted, of our hero,

without even remote family relationship, yet which often cause great confusion, was assigned to the same wing. During these delays the enemy found ample time for reorganization, accumulation of supplies, and generally getting away, in defeat, with all the advantages gained by the Union victories on the Tennessee and the Mississippi.

SHERMAN AT CORINTH.

The enemy had concentrated at Corinth, 22 miles distant.

The national forces at the end of April were concentrated between Snake Creek on the right and the Tennessee River at Hamburg on the left, 100,000 strong, now up to one-half the full strength of that "insane request" of SHERMAN only six short months before.

In the movement on Corinth which now began SHERMAN held the position of honor on the extreme right of the right wing.

On May 19, within 2 miles of its northern entrenchments, SHERMAN drew the first blood of the enemy.

On the 27th he received orders from Halleck "to send a force the next day to drive the rebels from the house in the front on the Corinth road; to drive in their pickets as far as possible, and to make a strong demonstration on Corinth itself." SHERMAN not only carried the position with a sweep, but pursued to the crest of a ridge, from which he could overlook the enemy's works and hear the drum rolls and the bugle calls inside. Generals Grant and Thomas, anticipating something brilliant, accompanied him to witness the affair. In this action SHERMAN requested the assistance of Generals Veatch and John A. Logan, respectively from Hurlbut's and McClelland's divisions.

It was the bringing of these two soldiers to the front under the immediate eye of Grant and SHERMAN.

On the 29th the whistling of locomotives and tremendous explosions suggested something unusual. SHERMAN, ever upon the alert, received orders to advance his division and "feel the enemy," if still on his front. Hastily pressing forward he found the parapets vacant and pushed "straight for the abandoned town."

He at once sent one of his brigades in pursuit, which was, however, barred from further rapid movement at Tuscumbia River bridge, 4 miles, which was burned. He found the woods full of deserters, but instead of encumbering himself with them as prisoners extended the fatherly advice "to go home and stay there."

The movement on Corinth was the last of General Halleck's strategy. In the latest reorganization he went East and Grant remained West.

The possession of Corinth formed an excellent base, being at the junction of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston railroads and the focal point of wagon roads leading into Mississippi and other objective points of any strategical movements in an extensive surrounding area.

By way of comment after, SHERMAN expressed the opinion—

Had Halleck held his force as a unit he could have gone to Mobile or Vicksburg, and by one move have solved the whole Mississippi problem.

This was left for Grant and SHERMAN, and at a vast and useless outlay of blood and treasure.

But again, as at Shiloh and Island No. 10, no sooner was Corinth taken and "the real opportunity opened to this really grand army" than it was again scattered. Pope was called East and his army (Mississippi) broken up. Thomas was reassigned to his old division in the Army of the Ohio, and, with Buell in command, moved to Chattanooga, while Halleck, with his reduced force, remained at Corinth.

HOW SHERMAN SAVED GRANT TO THE COUNTRY.

About this time, during a visit of SHERMAN to Halleck's headquarters, the latter casually referred to the intended departure the next morning of General Grant on thirty days' leave, alleging that to him the cause was not known. SHERMAN readily surmised it.

Hastening to General Grant's camp on the Monterey road, he was surprised to find him located in an obscure wood, occupying, with his staff, five small tents, with camp chests and equipage piled around, and Grant himself in the midst, seated on a camp stool, assorting letters.

"General," said SHERMAN, having dismounted, "is it true you are going away?"

"Yes," replied Grant, going on with his assorting.

"And may I ask the reason?" persisted this faithful friend.

"SHERMAN, you know. You know that I am in the way here. I have stood it as long as I can. I can endure it no longer."

"Where are you going?"

"To St. Louis."

"Have you any business there?"

"Not a bit."

This tried comrade in arms begged him in most earnest terms "not to quit," illustrating his case by his own, adding:

"Before the battle of Shiloh I was cast down by a mere newspaper assertion of being crazy; that single battle gave me new life, and now I am in high feather."

Grant was silent for some moments, but, consciously impressed, at length gave utterance to his resolve:

"SHERMAN, I promise to wait, or not to go without seeing you again."

What an ante-climax in the career of the two greatest soldiers of the civil war!

A few days later, SHERMAN having received orders to occupy Chewalla, 14 miles northwest of Corinth, to repair and protect the railroad and reconnoiter to Grand Junction, 50 miles beyond, Grant formally accepted his advice in a letter of June 6, to which SHERMAN on the same day from his camp made this characteristic response:

I am rejoiced at your conclusion to remain, for you could not be quiet at home for a week when armies were moving, and rest could not relieve your mind of the gnawing sensation that injustice had been done you.

The mistake of withdrawing the Army of the Mississippi from its victorious career at Island No. 10 was not expiated by the strategic effect of the successful Corinth operations in compelling the enemy's evacuation of the formidable defenses of Fort Pillow (June 1), the important city of Memphis (June 7), and destruction of the enemy's gunboats now wedged between Memphis on the north and Vicksburg on the south.

About two weeks previously (May 24) Farragut had taken New Orleans and advanced his fleet as far north as that stronghold on the banks of the great river.

In the language of SHERMAN—

It now looks as if the river has been captured. [* * *] It was a fatal mistake, however, that halted General Halleck at Corinth and led him to disperse and scatter the best materials for a fighting army that up to that date had been assembled in the West.

During the last half of June and first half of July SHERMAN had his now famous division stretched between Grand Junction, Lagrange, Moscow, and Lafayette, along the boundary between Tennessee and Mississippi, engaged in the task of railroad repair instead of thrashing the enemy. He found some diversion, however, in fighting cavalry "to save the railroad, and also planters to save their negroes and fences." The latter were bent upon raising corn, even between the hostile lines of the

opposing armies, as the only means of keeping their friends in the field.

It was small business for one of the greatest military heroes of the century, but he uttered not a word of objection.

IN COMMAND OF THE DISTRICT OF MEMPHIS.

About the middle of July, at Moscow, SHERMAN received a dispatch from Halleck communicating information of the defeat of McClellan by Lee, announcing, as he had been summoned to Washington, his command would be transferred to General Grant, who would come from Memphis to Corinth, and SHERMAN should go into Memphis to take command of the district of that name.

It was while SHERMAN was in camp (June 23) at Lafayette that General Grant, accompanied by his staff and a small escort, halted on his way from Memphis to Corinth, having been assigned to the command of the district of West Tennessee. Up to this time SHERMAN had received orders direct from Halleck. In the new combinations he fell under command of Grant, in which relation he stood until the end of the war. General SHERMAN entered Memphis on July 21 with his own and Hurlbut's divisions.

The victorious army which General Halleck had assembled was now on the defensive.

The reorganized enemy was prepared to assume an offensive attitude against Nashville and Louisville, which had forced Buell back to the Ohio at the latter city. With the reenforcements brought by Van Dorn and Price from west of the Mississippi and a large body of cavalry centered at Holly Springs, the enemy was in condition to act.

To meet this force and divert its strategic purposes General Grant had about 50,000 men. With these he inaugurated a series of concerted movements, the first contact being at Iuka,

where, after some desperate fighting, victory declared for the national forces.

At the end of September SHERMAN with about 6,000 men still occupied Memphis. With his entire force Grant held a front of 150 miles, guarded 200 miles of railroad, and as much of the Mississippi River.

The army under Van Dorn with 40,000 men was free to strike as he pleased. SHERMAN, who had greatly strengthened Memphis as a measure of precaution, moved out under orders to threaten the enemy's stores, especially at Holly Springs.

On October 1 General Grant, who occupied a central point at Jackson, Tenn., with a small reserve, felt assured of an attack on Bolivar or Corinth. The next day Van Dorn with his entire army was before Corinth, which was held by Rosecrans with 20,000 men, and made a fierce attempt, his attacking column at one time having carried part of the defenses. On the 3d, however, his rout was complete, with a loss of 6,000 men. On the 5th Ord again defeated the fleeing enemy at the Hatchie crossing to the south. The delay in this movement, for which, however, General Ord was not responsible, caused great indignation on the part of General Grant. It saved Van Dorn his army from complete destruction or disintegration, but led to the appointment of Lieutenant-General Pemberton in his place.

Grant placed under SHERMAN'S command a number of new regiments. Out of these he organized the new brigades, which he officered by men who had come under his own eye for skill and experience in the field and battle, and found himself at the head of a really formidable body of veterans.

THE RULER OF A CITY.

The remarkable range of genius and application with which SHERMAN was endowed now takes a novel departure in his new attitude as the ruler of a city.

Under instructions he took post, as we have seen, at Memphis. With his fifth division he occupied Fort Pickering near by, with Hurlbut's division a few miles below on the banks of the Mississippi.

For the next five months (July to December 3, 1862) his efforts were directed to bringing order out of chaos in the affairs of the community about him. He reopened stores, churches, schools, theaters, and all else in the everyday lives of the people, and restored the mayor and municipal functions.

An insight into the breadth of SHERMAN'S methods is set forth in his official declarations.

Two days after his occupation of the city, in reply to a petition of physicians asking a modification of an order of his predecessor permitting the departure south of all persons subject to the conscription laws of the Southern Confederacy, he wrote:

It is now sunset, and all who have not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority and who remain in Memphis are supposed to be loyal and true men. I can not allow the personal convenience of even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to make Memphis a safe place of operations of an army, and all people who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such direction as I may hereafter indicate.

Concluding with a burst of irony:

Surgeons should not reside within the limits of an army which they regard as hostile. The situation would be too delicate.

The next day in his refreshing manner of not making many words nor of mincing those which he employed, he dealt with the press in a serio-comic vein:

It is well [wrote he to an editor of prominence] to come to an understanding at once with the press, as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered to command, which means to control for the interest, welfare, and glory of the whole Government of the United States.

Referring to a sketch intended to be complimentary, but full of errors, he wrote:

I want no more, as I don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It is enough for the world to know that I live, and as a soldier bound to obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to venerate its constitution; and where discretion is given me I shall exercise it wisely and account to my superior.

After a highly regaling epistolary presentation of the duties of editors, based upon a most comical retrospect of the ignorance of facts shown respecting his own career, he naively continues:

I will attend to the judge, mayor, board of aldermen, and policemen in good time. * * * Use your influence to establish system, order, and government. If I find the press of Memphis actuated by high principles and a sole devotion to their country I will be their best friend, but if I find them abusive personally, they had better look out, for I regard such persons as greater enemies to their country than the men who, from mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets and fight us as hard as we care about.

Three days later to the mayor whom he restored:

I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law, courts, and authority. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal authority not only in existence but in the coexercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crime, which the military will have neither time nor inclination to interfere with.

On these points, elaborating succinctly, he shows in a nutshell his mastery of municipal administration. This phase of his management and expansion of city government is more broadly presented in his letter of instructions of August 7 to the assistant quartermaster at Memphis on the subject of confiscation and taking possession of and applying the proceeds of property vacated by disloyal persons; also his answers to certain questions propounded by the agent conducting this business.

THE COTTON QUESTION.

On August 11 he sent a long communication to the Secretary of the Treasury, who had invited "his discussion of the cotton question." This, as all know who were there, was one of the most difficult subjects with which department and district commanders in the Lower Mississippi and Gulf fields of military movements had to contend.

In the opportunity officially opened, SHERMAN began operations by stating (Salmon P. Chase was then Secretary), "I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles." The entire document shows not only the scope of a great soldier, but of a public economist, and is a valuable contribution not only to the literature of the war, but on the politico-military phases of it. We are simply dealing in epigrams from the general mass. He was being pursued by a cloud of speculators up to all the tricks of the trade. The business had been taken from the military and turned over to an agent of the Treasury.

There is not a garrison in Tennessee [he wrote] where a man can go beyond the sight of the flagstaff without being shot or captured.

It so happened that the people had cotton. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it.

But commercial enterprise soon discovered that 10 cents would buy a pound of cotton behind our Army, that 4 cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive for it 30 cents in gold.

When here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, firearms, percussion caps, etc., were worth as much as gold, and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted, but encouraged.

Before we, in the interior, could know it, thousands of barrels of salt and millions of dollars of money had been disbursed. I doubt not Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved their armies in mass. From 10,000 to 20,000 fresh arms and cartridges have been gotten, I am satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis I ordered, as to my own command, that gold, silver, and Treasury notes were contraband of war.

Every gold dollar spent for cotton is sent to the seaboard to be

exchanged for bank notes or Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here. I required cotton to be paid for in notes by an obligation to pay at the end of the war or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee, viz, the United States quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained and yet the enemy receives no aid or comfort.

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question. [Apparently, from his views expressed, he understood it thoroughly.]

The Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the alliance of England in order to get arms and ammunition in exchange for their cotton, as the South knows that in Old England her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in New England.

On September 4 he informed the Assistant Adjutant-General at Washington that he had modified his first instructions about cotton as ordered, adding:

Trade in cotton is now free, but in all else I endeavor so to control that the enemy shall receive no contraband goods or any aid or comfort.

During the same month, in reply to persistent complaints, he concludes:

I know, moreover, in some instances here our soldiers are complained of; I also know that they have been insulted by sneering remarks. * * * People who use such language must seek redress through some one else, for I will not tolerate insults to our country or cause.

MEMPHIS AS A MILITARY BASE.

In the midst of these harassing duties SHERMAN had brought his city up to the position of one of the most important depots of supplies on the great river, especially, situated as it was, near the seat of present and prospective operations. Fort Pickering had been strengthened and made defensible by a minimum garrison.

Things by November began to again look aggressive with SHERMAN. About the middle of that month General Grant, from Lagrange, whence he was operating south toward Jackson and Vicksburg, dispatched: "Meet me at Columbus, Ky. If you have a good map, bring it." At that famous meeting, the two officers being closeted alone, Grant explained that he

proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on a line behind the Tallahatchie River, below Holly Springs. As a concerted movement he wished SHERMAN, leaving a proper garrison at Memphis, to form a junction with him at that point. SHERMAN suggested a contributory expedition from Helena, Ark., toward Grenada, Miss., to threaten Pemberton's rear, which was accepted.

The SHERMAN movement got under way in nine days, command reorganized and equipped, Memphis provided for, and all secure in his rear, and was in communication with Grant at Holly Springs eight days (December 2) later. Pemberton, compelled by these strategic moves to let go his Tallahatchie line with all its costly defenses, re-formed on the Yalabusha, near Grenada. At Oxford, SHERMAN, with his entire command, reported to Grant.

THE RIVER CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG.

[1862-63.]

At this point the two commanders had another of their "confidential talks," and as a result on December 3 SHERMAN was assigned to the command of the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee. The possession of the Mississippi was the possession of the heart not only of the continent but of the territory and trade of the United States.

The capture of Vicksburg, the stronghold of the lower river, was therefore an imperative necessity. He was to return to Memphis, organize his forces, and, in cooperation with Admiral Porter's fleet, descend the river to make a lodgment up the Yazoo, and capture Vicksburg by surprise from the rear while the garrison was small. Meanwhile Grant from Oxford would handle Pemberton, keeping him away from Vicksburg or pursue him if he retreated.

For his task SHERMAN had about 33,000 men—21,000 his own and 12,000 part of Curtis's men—west of the Mississippi, all of which Grant authorized him "to organize in his own way."

On December 22 the entire imposing procession of transports and convoys, several gunboats in the lead, others distributed through the column, and several forming a rear guard, steamed to Friars Point as the place of rendezvous, and thence four days after ascended the Yazoo a distance of 13 miles to a position within striking distance of the forts on Walnut Hills, which encircled the landward side of the city as far as Haines Bluff. These forts were manned by an estimated force of 15,000 men. By noon of the 29th, the time set for assault, a combination of natural obstacles—fogs, rains, and floods—added to the strength of the position, and a stronger garrison than was supposed rendered all efforts fruitless. Prudence, decidedly the better part of valor under these conditions, dictated withdrawal, which was accomplished with ease on the night of New Year's Day of 1863. The reverberations of the guns of Grant, for which SHERMAN had listened night and day from Yazoo City, did not materialize. From the time of leaving Memphis he had had no word from his chief. It was evident from the rapid movement of trains, indicated by the whistles of locomotives entering the city, and the new men manning the batteries that something not counted in their plans at Oxford had transpired. But one course was left—prompt withdrawal before a superior force.

The losses sustained in this attack were* 127 killed, 930 wounded, and 743 prisoners, mostly on the 29th. The enemy's loss, fighting from behind breastworks, was slight.

COMMAND OF THE SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

[1863.]

At the same time General McClernand appeared with special orders assigning him to the command of the expeditionary forces on the Mississippi. SHERMAN, ever actuated by the most exalted patriotism, accepted the unexpected and explained what had been done. From this source he first learned that Van Dorn had captured Grant's stores at Holly Springs nine days before (December 20), and compelled Grant to fall back, which accounted for the sudden and suspected reinforcements of the defenses of Vicksburg. Grant had sent word to SHERMAN of the mishap, which, however, did not reach him until after his attempt. Under the McClernand order, January 5, 1863, SHERMAN assumed command of the second of the two corps of the Army of the Mississippi.

The assignment of McClernand to the command of this army was by confidential order of the War Department of October 21, 1862, indorsed by President Lincoln. This transfer of command possessed sufficient material to set aflame another batch of fabrications of "failure," "repulse," "bungling," etc.

The best military critics then and since pronounce the handling of the movement skillful and the ground impregnable. In SHERMAN's own words:

Although in all official reports I assumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that had General Morgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank Blair's brigade we should have broken the rebel line and effected a lodgment in the hills behind Vicksburg; [adding] but had we succeeded, we might have been in a worse trap when Pemberton's whole force was released.

The new commander was for "cutting his way to the sea," to which SHERMAN sardonically replied, "but the *modus operandi* of it was not so clear."

ARKANSAS POST.

The audacious dashes of the enemy from Arkansas Post upon steamboats plying up and down the river without convoys suggested to SHERMAN the advantage of destroying that troublesome position. To this his new chief assented. The morale of the men of SHERMAN'S expedition, owing to the masterly control of the complications at Chickasaw Bluffs, was unaffected. On January 8, but ten days after the withdrawal from the rear of Vicksburg, the entire force, men and boats, was at the mouth of the river, the next day within striking distance of Fort Hindman. SHERMAN quickly disembarking his troops moved up so close "to the fort that at 4 a. m.," as he notes, "the bugler in the rebel camp sounded as pretty a reveille as I have ever listened to."

The gunboats having opened the attack, SHERMAN assaulted across an open field under a brisk fire of sharpshooters. It was not long before a white flag appeared on the parapets in his front. The fort was taken, together with 150 dead and 4,791 prisoners, and dismantled. The loss to SHERMAN'S corps was 519 all told.

On January 13, 1863, having accomplished its purpose, the expedition, in a heavy snow storm, fell down the Arkansas River to Napoleon, at its mouth.

FORGING AHEAD.

The relations of General SHERMAN to military events were now assuming their natural proportions. The panic at Bull Run, disasters on York Peninsula, and varying turn of affairs later in the East, might have resulted in disruption or equally fatal compromise but for the successes of Forts Henry and Donelson, the decisive field of Shiloh, capture of Island No. 10,

triumphs at Iuka and Corinth, and occupation of Memphis in the West. SHERMAN, the "rock of Shiloh," the "ruler of a city," had now reached a place in military movements from which his greatness as a soldier and military statesman had every opportunity of development. General Grant appreciated him at his full worth and on every occasion sought the benefit of his judgment, moral aggressiveness, physical courage, and indefatigable personal exertion and sacrifice.

COMMAND OF THE FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

[1862-63.]

Under orders from Washington, December 18, 1862, he was assigned to command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee, which he assumed on January 12, 1863.

On January 18, 1863, while moored in front of Napoleon, General Grant joined the fleet and land force. He had control over General McClelland's expeditionary incident by reason of his general command of the Army of the Tennessee. On the 21st this entire force proceeded to Milliken's Bend.

During his participation in the attack on Arkansas Post, SHERMAN received information of another shake up in the Western armies by a War Department order (December 18, 1862) grouping them into five corps d'armées, four of which should constitute the Army of the Tennessee under Grant, the command of the Fifteenth Corps in the field being assigned to SHERMAN.

Before leaving Napoleon on the 18th, General Grant ordered the corps of SHERMAN (Fifteenth) and McClelland (Thirteenth) to return to the movement against Vicksburg, with instructions to disembark on the west bank of the river and resume work on the canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, begun the summer before, with the purpose of opening a

way for gunboats and transports below without encountering the shore batteries of the city. McPherson's corps (Seventeenth) was ordered from Memphis to Lake Providence, 60 miles above. General Grant in person took command of the general movement.

The canal project, which occupied January and February, was not a success, owing to the deluge of waters, which flooded the swollen rivers and bayous threatening to engulf everything in its path. The entire army was forced to seek high ground and the levees, abreast of which the steamboats lay ready to take the men aboard should the levees be swept away.

Early in February two gunboats successfully tested the feasibility of running the batteries at the city by the main channel of the river.

OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG.

SHERMAN's force operating, or rather digging, on the proposed canal opposite Vicksburg furnished a detail of 500 men daily. His headquarters, in the midst of the rushing waters, were entirely surrounded, with access to the levee only by means of a foot walk on posts. By March the waters had reached a point which not only imperiled the army but threatened to wipe it out. On the 16th of that month SHERMAN received orders from Grant to reconnoiter certain bayous, to determine the feasibility of getting to the east bank of the Yazoo River at a point from which an army could act advantageously against Vicksburg.

In pursuance of this preliminary, he placed at his disposal every facility of steamboats and troops. Admiral Porter in person led the floating part of the reconnoissance. After slow progress, Porter found himself entangled in an overhanging forest and beset by a severe attack of infantry and

artillery. By means of a tissue dispatch concealed in a plug of tobacco, intrusted to a reliable "contraband," SHERMAN received information of the fleet's extremity. The needed succor was immediately hurried forward, SHERMAN himself paddling about in a canoe, giving orders and getting his forces together. The night was dark. When he again disembarked, having made but $2\frac{1}{2}$ of the 4 miles necessary, he pushed through the cane-break, only keeping his way by the dim light of candles distributed through his wet and toiling column, until it reached the open. There was not a horse in the command. General, officers, and men were struggling forward together in water often more than hip deep. The drummer boys carried their drums on their heads and the men their belts and cartridge boxes around their necks. In the words of SHERMAN, "the soldiers generally were glad to have their general and field officers afoot, but we gave them a fair specimen of marching, accomplishing about 21 miles by noon." The admiral's guns were sounding fierce and rapidly. The forest and underbrush were thick with guerrillas. It was evident that the enemy proposed to defend Vicksburg to the last extremity.

An officer, advancing in great haste, explained the situation of the fleet. Offering SHERMAN his solitary animal, the general mounted, and, bareback, dashed up the levee with an alacrity which must have astonished even the quadruped itself by its expedited powers of locomotion. As he passed, the sailors coming out of their ironclads cheered lustily. His own men, imitating this example of dash and daring of their general, swept across the cotton field in full view of the beleaguered flotilla and in the face and flank of a rattling fire. The admiral was on deck, sheltered by a shield made of a section of a smoke-stack. In SHERMAN's words, "I doubt if he ever was more glad to meet a friend than he was to see me."

Having almost reached its destination, the fleet encountered a body of sharpshooters sheltered by the dense forest on the banks. Under such conditions it was impossible to handle the cumbersome boats in the narrow channel.

The opposing force thus suddenly developed had been hurried by forced marches from Haynes Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling Fork in anticipation of this movement. Under cover of this force obstructions were thrown in the channel to prevent advance. At the moment of SHERMAN'S timely appearance 400 of the enemy with axes were passing below the flotilla, intending in the same manner to hew trees and cut off its retreat. This was the force which had been struck and hurled back.

The movement showed the vigilance and determination of the defenders of Vicksburg. When the general arrived the only recourse of the admiral was "to get his boats out of the scrape." Had not SHERMAN at that moment relieved him, it was his purpose to blow them up and escape with his men through the swamps. The flotilla now withdrew to the mouth of the Yazoo and the troops to their camp at Youngs Point, reaching there on the 27th.

The disappointment of Grant was great, but not more so than of SHERMAN, who had done all that human endurance could plan and pursue. Grant regarded the attempt in the same light.

This was but one of repeated efforts to secure a footing from which to operate against Vicksburg from above.

OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

In the beginning of April SHERMAN'S corps was enlarged to three divisions—Steel's, Blair's, and Tuttle's. By this time in the contest of muscle versus the Father of Waters it was decided that human ingenuity, skill, and toil could not divert

the mad waters from the channel of their own choosing nor get access to the east bank in the rear of Vicksburg by any of the passes.

The headquarters of Grant were at Millikens Bend and his army strung from SHERMAN'S position opposite Vicksburg to McPherson's camp, at Lake Providence—60 miles.

In their repeated conferences SHERMAN always favored the inland movement of the early winter, the weight of which his chief always conceded, but did not feel safe in readopting—for reasons other than military [being unwilling] to take any course which would look like a step backward, [Grant] then concluded on the river movement below Vicksburg, as it would appear like connecting with General Banks, who at the same time was besieging Port Hudson from the direction of New Orleans.

NIPS A CONSPIRACY.

On the first days of April at general headquarters a powerful intrigue against General Grant, in which newspaper clamor, politics, and hue and cry generally were important factors, was under discussion. SHERMAN promptly declared his adherence to his chief, as did practically all the officers of his army.

A week later SHERMAN, from his camp near Vicksburg, addressed a communication to Adjutant-General Rawlins suggesting to General Grant to call upon his corps commanders for their opinions. He pointed to the Army of the Tennessee, now far in advance of any of the grand armies of the United States.

In his usual terse and comprehensive style he gave his "opinions" as an example to others. He proposed to establish a force at Little Rock, Ark.; to fortify Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie; to open the road back to Memphis, Tenn.; to secure Grenada, Miss.; to patrol the swamp road to Helena, Ark., by cavalry; to make the line of the Yalobusha

the base of operations to points where the railroads crossed the Big Black, one above Canton and the other below; the fall of Vicksburg being the inevitable result.

As a cooperating force 10,000 men, and boats to float and transport them to any point desired, was to be maintained in their vicinity, always near enough at hand to act with the army when known to be near Vicksburg, Haynes Bluff, or Yazoo City.

With the same clearness he demonstrated the facilities afforded by certain water routes to supply the army operating against Jackson or the Big Black bridge, both vulnerable. He regarded the occupation of northern Mississippi as imperative in order to prevent planters, under protection of the enemy, from making crops. To these "opinions" he added that he "did not wish an answer." "Whatever plan of action he [Grant] may adopt will receive from me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived by myself."

This letter was construed by some as a "protest," which, however, SHERMAN emphatically denied, observing, "We never had a council of war at any time during the Vicksburg campaign." We "often met casually, regardless of rank, and gossiped of things in general, as officers do and should."

As SHERMAN said, "the letter speaks for itself," and simply showed his "opinions at that stage of the game." It "was meant to induce General Grant to call upon General McClelland for a similar expression of opinion."

It is not known that anything further came of SHERMAN's well-meant stroke of finesse. He said later that Grant told him after the war—

if we had possessed in December, 1862, the experience of marching and maintaining an army without any regular base, he would have gone on

from Oxford as he at first contemplated, and would not have turned back on account of the destruction of his depot at Holly Springs.

SHERMAN always disclaimed any disposition at any time to criticise the strategy of his chief, but did think—

that he lost an opportunity, as he might have captured Vicksburg from Oxford in January, as was done from Bruinsburg in July.

On April 20 SHERMAN received orders to bring up the rear of a general movement to the south of Vicksburg. A few nights before 7 ironclads, led by Admiral Porter in person, 3 transports, and 10 barges ran the batteries. SHERMAN, anticipating a scene—

had 4 yawl boats hauled across the swamp to the reach of the river below the city, manned by soldiers, ready to pick up any of the disabled wrecks floating by.

From his own yawl SHERMAN, in the thickest, mentions the scene as—

truly sublime. The batteries belched forth a constant flash of light and iron. The burning houses on shore brought the entire fleet out in weird relief, affording an excellent target for the guns on shore.

As the Admiral, on his flag boat, the *Benton*, passed, SHERMAN boarded, exchanged a few words, and pulled back to the bank.

The running of the batteries for supply transportation was now the thing. A few more successful attempts gave sufficient boats and stores below to cross and proceed as soon as Grant was ready to give the command "Advance!" On May 1 SHERMAN found the roads clear of troops. At the head of his corps, he brought up the rear of the army at Youngs Point, prepared to take the lead in the operations which eventuated in the fall of the stronghold of the lower Mississippi.

SHERMAN MAKES A FEINT, GRANT A MOVE.

While awaiting the opportunity of a clear road to close up the column of movement to the south of Vicksburg, SHERMAN received a communication from Grant informing him of his intention to cross to the east side of the Mississippi and attack Grand Gulf about the end of April, and thought that he "could put in time usefully by making a 'feint' on Haynes Bluff, but did not like to order it, because it might be reported at the North that he had again been repulsed, etc." SHERMAN replied that he "would undertake the 'feint' regardless of public clamor at a distance." He made the "feint" with but ten small regiments of the Fifteenth, with brilliant success and results, affecting favorably the entire general plan of operations.

It was afterwards learned Pemberton in Vicksburg, hearing of the movement through spies, detached a large part of his strength intended to oppose the landing of Grant at Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, and by a forced march of 60 miles transferred it to meet the operations mentioned. As a result Grant found but a minor force antagonizing his crossing at Bruinsburg and afterwards at Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE REAR OF VICKSBURG.

[MAY-JULY, 1863.]

The waters had now so far receded that the canals were useless and the roads fair. SHERMAN joined the main army at Hard Times May 6, crossed to the Vicksburg side of the Mississippi, and moved forward to Hankinsons Ferry, 18 miles, the next day. The battle of Port Gibson, the first of the progressive series up to the defenses of the city, was fought on the 11th.

At Auburn the Fifteenth overtook Grant in person, who accompanied the corps to Jackson, reaching there on the 14th. McPherson, having fought the battle of Raymond, formed a junction at that point, where SHERMAN had engaged the enemy just outside the town, capturing three full batteries of artillery, a number of prisoners, and hurling the opposing force north on the Clinton road.

Grant, having obtained important information through intercepted dispatches, quietly informed SHERMAN "he would have to be smart" in order to thwart the proposed junction of Pemberton's forces from Vicksburg and Johnston's from the interior. McPherson was hastened back on the morning of the 15th to join the rest of the army. SHERMAN, after destroying the railroad, arsenal, foundry, factories, and other establishments which might be used for hostile purposes, was to follow.

The next day, regarding a battle imminent, he received orders to push to the support of the main column what troops he could spare, and to finish and hasten up with the rest.

The celebrated battle and victory of Champion Hills on the same day, under the immediate command of Grant, in which a division of SHERMAN'S corps participated, was the result.

The enemy fleeing in great disorder toward the city, SHERMAN with his entire force came up at the Big Black bridge. The river was "swimming deep," and a body of the enemy intrenched on the other side. On all fours he reached the river brink, and from behind a corncrib had a deliberate view of the works across the stream. Ordering forward a section of a battery by hand from behind his improvised shelter, a few well-directed shells speedily brought the entire body of defenders down to the bank. A rubber boat belonging to his train ferried them over prisoners in his hands.

A pontoon bridge having been thrown across the river, during the night the entire army passed over by the light of enormous fires of pitch pine. Grant and SHERMAN, seated on a log, watched the movement, which SHERMAN described as a "weird scene of war."

The next day, at 10 a. m., the head of his column occupied a position which gave him control of the peninsula between the Yazoo and Big Black. The day following a detachment of his cavalry made a dash at Haynes Bluff, "scooping" all the enemy's guns, a magazine full of ammunition, and a hospital full of sick and wounded.

Thus was fully triumphant the several hard knocks he had experience in aiming at the possession, in the primary movements, of this very ground. Renewing his march by General Grant's personal order, SHERMAN advanced by the "graveyard" road, which entered the city near a cemetery. At the same time, the rest of the army not being up, he took, with part of his force, the Jackson road, on the heels of the enemy's skirmishers, making their best efforts to get within their parapets ahead of what was for a while a neck-and-neck sprint for possession.

ATTEMPTS TO STORM THE CITY UNSUCCESSFUL.

As he approached SHERMAN deployed forward, but the works were found almost impregnable by nature, well advantaged by art, and determinedly garrisoned by man. Instead of further demonstration, without orders he sagaciously worked his way to the right, down the ridge to Haynes Bluff, in order to connect with the fleet in the Mississippi, which proved a master stroke of strategic vantage in the interest of the assaults and long siege which followed.

When the entire army was planted upon its beleaguering

lines, SHERMAN occupied the right of investment, McPherson the center, and McClernand the left, which covered about three-fourths of the hinterland front of the fortifications.

On the natural supposition of the terror and demoralization of the enemy within the circumvallations, a general assault was essayed almost immediately, in which SHERMAN's men reached the top of the parapet, but could not cross. He held his ground, however, up to the ditch. Under cover of the night he withdrew sufficiently to counter trench within 50 yards of the enemy.

The attempt was renewed two days later (20th). SHERMAN in person reconnoitered his front and determined the form of attack. From his point of observation, 200 yards from the enemy's works, he could witness and control the storming lines of his heroes. The assault, lasting two hours, was "fierce and bloody," but the defenders, covered by their parapets which had the advantage of overlooking elevation, held their position.

At this point the wounded drummer boy, Orion P. Howe, in the height of battle, handed SHERMAN a slip of paper from one of his officers asking a hurried supply of cartridges, "caliber 54." This incident was the subject of official report and of "song and story."

During the thickest of the assault, having left his horse in a ravine, General Grant came up on foot. SHERMAN pointed out the strength of the works. The assault had been repulsed along the line of the entire army.

While conversing, an orderly handed Grant a message. Having read it he passed it to SHERMAN. It was from General McClernand, that "his troops had captured the rebel parapet on his front," that "the flag of the Union waived over the stronghold of Vicksburg," and urged "orders to SHERMAN and McPherson to press their attacks else the enemy should

concentrate on him." Grant in his imperturbable way quietly retorted, "I don't believe a word of it."

Whereupon SHERMAN reasoned that the message was official and could not be ignored, at the same time offering "to renew the assault at once with new men."

Grant instantly started for McClernand's front with the parting instruction, "If you do not receive orders to the contrary by 3 p. m. try it again."

SHERMAN, having promptly advanced new troops, at the limit hour hearing heavy firing on his left and "no orders to the contrary," repeated the attempt, which was "equally unsuccessful and bloody." The result to McPherson was similarly unfortunate in the loss of most valuable officers and men.

In SHERMAN's words:

General McClernand, instead of taking any single point of the rebel main parapet, had only taken one or two small outlying lunettes open at the rear where his men were at the mercy of the rebels behind their main parapet, and most of them were actually captured.

This affair, and a published congratulatory order to his troops, claiming they had made a lodgment in Vicksburg but lost it, owing to SHERMAN and McPherson not performing their parts in the general plan of attack, all of which SHERMAN declared "simply untrue," led to General McClernand's removal from his command of the Thirteenth Corps.

THE CITY BESIEGED.

The natural strength of the position and determination of the garrison of upward of 30,000 trained men made it evident that Vicksburg was not to be taken by assault. It might be said here that SHERMAN, after visiting Sebastopol the celebrated Russian stronghold in the Crimea, pronounced "Vicksburg the more difficult of the two."

The siege now began. The city was completely invested. SHERMAN'S corps lay on the right, with one of his divisions on the west bank of the river opposite the city, to prevent escape in that direction. The Yazoo River, which SHERMAN had fought over so hard, was, as originally contemplated, the base of supplies. His headquarters were on his center, close up to the works, and those of Grant very near by.

During these events the enemy, having recovered from his haste in getting out of the way of SHERMAN at Jackson, was organizing a force on the Big Black, which had to be watched, its purpose being well understood as a demonstration in the rear in hope of enabling the garrison of Vicksburg to extricate itself from the clutches of Grant.

SHERMAN DEFENDS THE BESIEGING ARMY FROM THE REAR.

[JUNE-JULY, 1863.]

To meet this menace an improvised army of observation composed of one division detailed from each corps in the trenches, making a force of 30,000 to 40,000 men, was assigned to SHERMAN, who took an intrenched position on the west bank of the Big Black, while the enemy in plain view occupied works on the east. The enemy showing no disposition to cross, and SHERMAN having no orders to attack, these two forces remained in the same relative position from June 20 to July 4.

On July 3 Grant wired SHERMAN that negotiations for surrender were in progress. Therefore to be prepared "at a moment's notice to cross the Big Black" and "go for Joe Johnston."

The General had high regard for the military genius of his antagonist, which was shared by Grant, who said "Johnston was about the only general on that side whom he feared."

On the 4th, the birthday of the Republic, Vicksburg surrendered. The event was celebrated by SHERMAN at once "going for Joe Johnston."

COMMANDS AN EXPEDITION AGAINST JACKSON.

[JULY, 1863.]

For this purpose on July 6 he was placed in command of an expeditionary army composed of the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Corps. During the next two days he pressed the enemy out of his defenses on the river and concentrated at Bolton. The news of the surrender, however, had preceded him, for which reason, without even a parting argument of shot and steel, the enemy beat a hurried retreat to Jackson, where he turned from behind strong intrenchments. SHERMAN closed with him on July 11. After a siege of six days Johnston again "pulled out," pursued for 11 miles.

Owing to the intense heat of a Mississippi midsummer sun and fearing fatalities to his command, which he reported, Grant ordered his return to his old camp on the Big Black. On July 22 he resumed command of the Fifteenth Corps.

Port Hudson surrendered four days after Vicksburg, as a natural result of that triumph.

THE MISSISSIPPI CONTROLLED "UNVEXED TO THE SEA."

Thus ended in complete success the most important strategic feature of the civil war, the control of the Mississippi River, as President Lincoln declared, "unvexed to the sea."

The losses of SHERMAN'S corps all told during the immediate operations around the city were, May 19, about 200; 22d, 600; and after, between July 11-16, less than 1,000.

In commenting upon this remarkable campaign General SHERMAN in his Memoirs records—

The campaign of Vicksburg in conception and execution belongs exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole, but in the one thousand details. * * * No commanding general in any army ever gave more of his personal attention to details or wrote so many of his own orders, reports, and letters as General Grant.

In reward for these achievements Grant was promoted to major-general and SHERMAN and McPherson to brigadier-general in the Regular Army.

SHERMAN'S VIEWS SOUGHT ON RECONSTRUCTION.

A transformation had taken place not in the marches and sieges of war. While in his camp on Big Black about the last of August SHERMAN received an unofficial letter from General Halleck suggesting that the "question of reconstruction in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas will soon come up for decision of the Government," and requested him to "consult with Grant, McPherson, and others of cool, good judgment, and write fully your views, as I may wish to use them with the President," but "not officially." From camp on September 17 he replied, in a letter bristling with foresight, philosophy, politics, judgment, and clothed in his most incisive style. The letter answers no purpose forty years after. When written if carried into effect as events progressed many complications and anomalous conditions might have been avoided. This letter, indicative of the greatness of a master mind, which is given in the General's Memoirs for the first time, makes instructive reading for the students of that era and phase of United States history. President Lincoln was so taken with it that he instructed General Halleck to secure its author's consent for publication, which, however, was declined, "not wishing to be

drawn into a newspaper controversy." The President, however, often recalled it approvingly.

In another letter, written on the same day, to General Rawlins, on the staff of General Grant, also inclosing the above for perusal by General Grant and to be forwarded to General Halleck, SHERMAN adverted to a point or two personal to himself which are worth repeating. After calling attention to Professor Mahon's letter, inclosed, passing "a very marked encomium upon the campaign of Vicksburg," which "the General (Grant) might keep if he values such a testimonial," and disclaiming writing to General Halleck since the Chickasaw affair, except to thank him for the kind manner of transmitting his appointment of brigadier-general, he continues:

I know that in Washington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset I would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared and with an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose. I was then construed unsound, and now that I insist on war pure and simple, with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed to be vindictive. You remember what Polonius said to his son, Laertes: "Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it that the opposed may beware of thee." What is true of a single man is equally true of a nation.

The Army of the Tennessee had done its full share of war up to date and was resting on its honors in and about Vicksburg. The defensive battle of Gettysburg had hurled back the tide of invasion. But troubles thickened as the autumn months rolled up in the central zone of the thousand miles of front between the Mississippi and the Potomac. General Grant was on a visit of conference with Banks at New Orleans. SHERMAN was making himself and his corps of four divisions (Osterhaus, M. L. Smith, Tuttle, and Ewing) comfortable along the west bank of the Big Black, about 20 miles east of Vicksburg, with his eye on four brigades of rebel cavalry, which in turn were eying him.

A HURRY ORDER.

This sylvan scene of a sudden was disturbed by the startling intelligence that Bragg, reenforced from Virginia, had fallen on Rosecrans at Chickamauga, had defeated and run him into Chattanooga, where he was in danger of finding himself short of rations. Coming so soon after the decisive successes at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, in the language of SHERMAN, "the whole country seemed paralyzed and the authorities at Washington were thoroughly stampeded." Troops were hurried from all directions to Rosecrans's relief. SHERMAN received orders (September 22) from Grant, at Vicksburg, to send one of his divisions into the city, which he did the same day. On the following day SHERMAN himself was summoned. Grant, showing the dispatches he had received from Halleck, gave him orders to leave one of his divisions on the Big Black, and with the rest of his corps prepare to follow at once. On the 28th two divisions of the corps, with SHERMAN in the lead, were embarked and reached Memphis October 12. At that point the overtaxed lines of Rosecrans's supply necessitated a movement by SHERMAN (who had received special orders to that effect), who marched east from Memphis, repairing the railroad from Corinth as far as Decatur, Ala., from which point he was to report to Rosecrans by letter. To SHERMAN, at Corinth, on the 16th, Grant announced his arrival at Memphis (October 14), with orders to proceed to Cairo and report by telegraph.

The same day he received a dispatch from Halleck, at Washington, relating to supplies for Rosecrans, and if not in strength sufficient to reach Athens he will at all events "have assisted greatly by drawing away any part of the enemy's forces," leaving all matters "to his judgment as circumstances may arise."

At Iuka SHERMAN received orders by special messenger from Grant to drop all repairs of railroads and proceed as rapidly as possible to Chattanooga.

At Eastport, while crossing the Tennessee and pressing toward Florence, SHERMAN was apprised of the assignment of General Grant "to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, comprising the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, with authority to change them as he deemed most practicable;" "any changes to be made on his request by telegram."

COMMANDS THE DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

[OCTOBER 19, 1863-MARCH 12, 1864.]

Under General Orders, No. 2, Military Division of the Mississippi, Louisville, Ky., October 19, 1863, SHERMAN was assigned to command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, which he assumed on October 19. The army of that name now comprised the Fifteenth Corps (Blair), moving toward Chattanooga; Sixteenth (Hurlbut), at Memphis, and Seventeenth (McPherson), at Vicksburg. About the middle of October, near Tusculum, he received a message from Grant "to drop all work on the railroad, cross the Tennessee, and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch towards Bridgeport until he met further orders."

At Iuka, having issued all orders necessary for his Department, including giving McPherson full power in Mississippi and Hurlbut in west Tennessee during his absence, and having ordered the assembling of a force of about 8,000 men out of the Sixteenth Corps, to be commanded by Gen. G. M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far as Athens for further instructions, he continued to Florence, arriving November 1, and twelve days later arrived at Bridgeport in advance of his column, which was, however, near by, approaching by several roads.

As an illustration of his methods and his appreciation of the services of his officers it may be mentioned, during his forced march with his corps (fifteenth) from Memphis to Decatur, at Corinth, SHERMAN found General Dodge in command, to whom he had an open letter from General Grant. General Dodge being ill he sat by his bedside and read the letter, which directed him to take two divisions from his command and accompany SHERMAN.

"Now, are you well enough to do what General Grant suggests?"

"Yes."

"All right; I will give you plenty of time. You can bring up the rear. I will issue the orders."

This was their first meeting. The two divisions were organized into a corps. The services rendered by this officer form a conspicuous feature in the movements which led up to the victory of Chattanooga and the success of the campaigns against Atlanta.

AT CHATTANOOGA.

[1863-64.]

At Chattanooga SHERMAN received word from Grant to "come to Chattanooga at once in person," leaving his troops to follow as rapidly as possible.

As he left the boat the General found one of Grant's private horses to carry him to Chattanooga, where he arrived November 15. He was most cordially welcomed by Grant, Thomas, and others, each of whom fully appreciated his herculean efforts to bring them succor.

After surveying the scene the next morning from the parapet of one of the defenses, with Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge held by the enemy's batteries and a line of sentinels not 1,000 yards distant in full sight,

"Why," said SHERMAN, addressing Grant, who accompanied him, "you are besieged."

"Yes," he responded, quite undisturbed; "it is too true;" then explaining the situation, which was far worse than SHERMAN had expected.

The only recourse to instill new fire, in Grant's opinion, was for SHERMAN to take the initiative in an attack at the earliest moment on the enemy's position.

In his personal inspection Grant had discovered that the opposing lines from Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga were not fortified on the northern acclivity of Missionary Ridge. He therefore directed SHERMAN to lay a new pontoon bridge over the river by night, cross, and attack on the right flank on that part of the ridge abutting on Chattanooga Creek near the tunnel. To better understand the work ahead, he proposed an examination of the ground. At a distance of 4 miles from a hill Grant and SHERMAN, accompanied by Thomas and several other officers, could take in the prospect they sought. SHERMAN, to be better satisfied, leaving the party, attended by an officer, crept to the fringe of timber on the river bank at the point for the new bridge. Here he concealed himself for some time, having plain sight of the enemy's pickets, "almost hearing their words."

The prospecting party having returned to Chattanooga, in order to act promptly, upon which alone depended success, SHERMAN set out to instruct his divisions in person. Missing the steamboat he obtained a rough boat manned by four soldiers, in which he floated down the stream by night, often taking a hand himself with the oars. By daylight he reached Bridgeport, his destination. Putting one division in motion toward Trenton, with the purpose of making the enemy think his objective was to turn his left, the other three pursued the main road.

FORTY ROUNDS IN THE CARTRIDGE BOX AND TWENTY IN
THE POCKET.

It was during this march that the badge of SHERMAN'S Fifteenth Corps had its origin. On the route an Irishman of the Fifteenth, having joined a camp fire of a party of the Twelfth, in the exchange of words Pat noticed everything marked with a star (the badge of the Twelfth Corps). Not having had time in the duty of a soldier of the "bloody Fifteenth" to learn of such new-fangled notions, he was naturally much nonplussed, but finally settled himself in the opinion that the Twelfth had a good many brigadiers.

At length one of the men inquired to what corps Pat belonged. He replied with decided emphasis, "The Fifteenth, to be sure."

"What is your badge?" asked the musket bearer of the Twelfth.

Much perplexed, Pat retorted: "The devil wid your badge! Forty rounds in the cartridge box and twenty in the pocket, that's the badge for ye."

General Logan, then in command of the Fifteenth, hearing of the incident, adopted Pat's "cartridge box" and legend "forty rounds" as the insignia of the Fifteenth.

AGAIN ON THE OFFENSIVE.

General SHERMAN and his Corps had marched about 275 miles from Memphis over fearful roads, but notwithstanding the exhausted condition of his men and animals, owing to the extremity of the situation, General Grant ordered him into action the next day, November 21, although but one division had come up. Seeing the situation, the attack was postponed for two days, by which time, by the most extraordinary efforts,

he succeeded in posting three divisions behind the hills opposite the mouth of Chattanooga Creek prepared to open the decisive battle of Chattanooga. He dispatched a brigade under cover of the hills to North Chattanooga Creek to man the boats for the pontoon bridge, and at midnight dropped to a point above South Chattanooga Creek, where he landed two regiments. This advance force moved quietly down the creek, capturing the entire enemy's river picket save one man. This important advantage gained, he moved the entire brigade below the mouth of the creek, where he disembarked, his boats returning for the rest of the command. By daylight (24th) he had 8,000 men on the east bank of the river where, he threw up rifle trenches as a tête-de-pont. During the same day he placed his pontoons over Chattanooga Creek, which formed a connection with two regiments left on the north side. SHERMAN says of this remarkable piece of work, "I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent, 1,350 feet long, laid so noiselessly and well in so short a time." By noon pontoons were in position and his entire three divisions, men, horses, and artillery, safely over without a blow.

MISSIONARY RIDGE.

At 1 p. m. he advanced from the river in three columns in echelon, the column of direction following the Chattanooga Creek, the center in columns doubled on the center at one brigade interval right and rear, and the right in column at the same distance to the right rear, prepared to deploy to right to face if need be an enemy in that direction. A line of skirmishers with strong supports was thrown out along the front.

A drizzling rain was falling. The clouds hung low, completely covering the movement from the enemy. He soon found himself in force at the foothills, his skirmishers creeping

up the steep acclivity. By 3 p. m. he had gained without loss or the knowledge of the enemy the point desired.

A brigade from each division now pushed to the top of the hill. Not until then was the movement even suspected, and then too late, for the troops were in full possession. The enemy at once opened with artillery, to which SHERMAN promptly replied. At 4 p. m. the enemy feeling his left flank led to a lively engagement without effect. The troops were now in position to make the main assault upon the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge.


At midnight he received Grant's order to engage at the "dawn of day," with assurance that Thomas would strike "early in the day."

The attack in the direction of the ridge was involved in many difficulties, of nature chiefly an intervening valley, beyond which, on the crest of the hill, stretched the enemy's breastworks of logs and earth. After this first line the enemy in force held a higher range beyond the tunnel, and was also massed to resist, turning the left flank, thus endangering his depot at Chickamauga station.

At sunrise the bugles of Corse's troops sounded "Forward."

This advance moved with effective impetus, gaining ground. By 10 a. m. both armies were engaged in a furious encounter, in which the mettle of both was put to the severest test. By 3 p. m. SHERMAN had gained every advantage. Below him spread the vast amphitheater of Chattanooga, across which as far as the eye could scan he watched in vain for the attack of Thomas.

At this point his position was not only critical but appalling even to his calmness under the utmost pressure of battle. The enemy, not yet drawn off, determined by one desperate effort to overwhelm him, pushing his guns and men forward. From



MISSIONARY RIDGE, TENNESSEE, SHOWING THE POSITIONS ATTACKED BY THE FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJ. GEN. W. T. SHERMAN
NOVEMBER 24 AND 25, 1863.

every hill and spur SHERMAN was now the target of a heavy, concentrated fire.

Suddenly, to his intense relief, at 3 p. m., he detected the thin, white thread of musketry fire in front of Orchard Knoll, which indicated the movement of Thomas on the enemy's center.

SHERMAN had the satisfaction of knowing that his own attack had concentrated the masses of the enemy to his own flank, and therefore felt certain of the result on the center. The fire, but a few moments before focused upon him, was now hurriedly turned to meet the advance of Thomas.

As night closed over the scene SHERMAN enjoyed all the satisfaction of knowing that the troops in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the center.

The victory was complete. The enemy, breaking in every direction, had abandoned his depot and supplies and everything else portable, being content to get beyond the mesh set for him by Grant. In his own words, "It was a magnificent battle in its conception, in its execution, and glorious results; nothing left for cavil or fault-finding."

It seemed as if nature were acting in alliance with the martial splendor of the scene. The first day a lowering veil of mist obscured the movements for position from the overlooking enemy on the mountain top. The second was resplendently bright, as SHERMAN recalled it: "Many a time in the midst of its carnage and noise I could not help stopping to look across that vast field of battle to admire its sublimity." SHERMAN the next day, under orders from Grant, moved to sever connection between Bragg, now in full retreat, and Longstreet at Knoxville.

In his part of the battle at Chattanooga SHERMAN lost 1,686 men, all told, out of his corps, including some very valuable officers.

At Ringgold General Grant in person directed SHERMAN to discontinue his pursuit. That night they passed together at Graysville talking over the supposed danger to Burnside 130 miles to the northeast.

RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE.

The next few days moving his column in the direction of the Hiawasse in search of forage and rest for his troops and horses, SHERMAN received an apologetic dispatch from Grant, "I am inclined to think I shall have to send you in command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee," to relieve Burnside. "I leave this matter to you," he added, "knowing that you will do better acting upon your own discretion than you could trammelled with instructions."

Accordingly SHERMAN organized and cut loose. On the night of December 3, the limit set by Burnside of his ability to hold out, the advance of SHERMAN'S cavalry entered the beleaguered town with the head of his infantry but 15 miles distant. Longstreet on his approach raised the siege, retreating up the valley toward Virginia.

As SHERMAN himself rode in he records, "In a large pen I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look like starvation." I found Burnside in a large, fine mansion, very comfortable.

Their conversation turned on the pursuit of Longstreet, in which SHERMAN agreed to participate, although his men were utterly worn out with their forced march and suffering from the colder temperature of the mountains.

They sat down to a "turkey dinner" with all the equipments of home surroundings. In the words of SHERMAN:

I had seen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could not help exclaiming that I thought they were starving. * * * Had I known of this I should not have hurried my men so fast, but until I reached Knoxville I thought his troops actually were in danger of starvation.

Having relieved Burnside of his supposed embarrassment, SHERMAN returned in a leisurely march to Chattanooga, where he arrived about the middle of December. There he received orders to take his corps into winter quarters in northern Alabama. He established himself at Bridgeport and distributed the four divisions of the Fifteenth along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and part of the Sixteenth, under Dodge, along the railroad from Decatur to Nashville. The programme in Grant's thoughts at that time was to open the spring campaign up the valley of the Tennessee into Virginia, as he even then regarded the campaign of 1864 as the last and most important of the war.

THE THANKS OF CONGRESS.

On February 21, 1864, by public resolution, approved on that day, "the thanks of Congress and of the people of the United States" were—

tendered to Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN, commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and the officers and soldiers who served under him for their gallant and arduous service in marching to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of our armies in that glorious victory.

This resolution was promulgated to the Army in general orders on the same day.

THE EXPEDITION TO MERIDIAN, MISS.

[FEBRUARY, 1864.]

The Department of the Tennessee, over which SHERMAN held command, embraced the east bank of the Mississippi from Natchez to the Ohio River and thence up the Tennessee to Decatur and Bellefont, Ala., with McPherson (Seventeenth Corps) at Vicksburg, Hurlbut (Sixteenth Corps) at Memphis, and Dodge (part of the Sixteenth Corps) along the railroad

toward Chattanooga. The enemy, with a large body of cavalry, ranged at large in Mississippi, and Johnston, with a formidable force of infantry, occupied his old territory.

SHERMAN felt convinced that he could simplify matters by two quick movements inland, thus relieving a strong part of his command for operations on a better field. He placed his case before Grant, still at Nashville, and obtained permission to return to Vicksburg and strike one blow to the east, while Banks, from New Orleans, would deliver one to the west.

SHERMAN proceeded to Memphis, where he organized a select force to unite with another at Vicksburg, in all 20,000 men, for a sudden movement upon Meridian in February.

Another force of 7,000 cavalry was collected from the garrisons between Columbus, Ky., and Corinth, Miss., to move from Memphis simultaneously direct to Meridian "to do up" the enemy's cavalry, threatening railway communications and middle Tennessee. Through spies he obtained all necessary information concerning the force he might expect to encounter. Having suffered much from hasty public criticism, the General made it known that any person not associated with the Army found with the expeditionary column would be arrested, tried by drumhead court-martial, and shot. A correspondent who had been with him on many occasions, knowing his fixity in matters of that kind, as shown by an example on record, calling at his headquarters at Vicksburg for information, said:

"General, I hear you propose to treat civilians as spies if found with the expedition."

"Quite so, quite so."

"Then it behooves me to remain in the rear."

"What are you talking about? You are not one of those fellows. You are a volunteer aid on McPherson's staff."

"Oh, yes; beg pardon," and rode off.

The writer accordingly was the only member of the press present on that march, and his story the only one written by an eyewitness of its terrible warlike realities.

On the 2d day of February the column, lightly equipped, began its march, without deployment, to Meridian, 150 miles distant. The enemy's cavalry vanished, and several attempts at infantry concentration gave way, as it approached. The enemy's light parties constantly hovered upon the flanks, in advance and rear, but finding the columns compact did not venture to engage. Showing the vigilance of the enemy, near Decatur, owing to a misunderstanding in the orders of a regiment, SHERMAN, for a few moments left unprotected, was aroused out of a much-needed sleep by shouts and firing. Gathering his orderlies and the few headquarters clerks, from an improvised defense in a corn crib he held the attacking party at bay until relieved by a regiment coming up on the run, which, deploying as it advanced, set the attackers scampering in all directions.

About the middle of February, arriving at Meridian, the work of destruction of an arsenal, depots, and the railroads in all directions was carried to an extent not likely to cause trouble for many months.

After a delay of five days and several reconnoissances and no word of his cavalry cooperating force, the column took up its return march to Vicksburg.

A story spread abroad that the ultimate destination of the expedition was Mobile was without foundation, being simply a ruse de guerre. In a letter before the expedition started SHERMAN informed General Banks of an intention to keep up that delusion, while his real purpose was to be back in Vicksburg by March 1 in order to cooperate with him in his attack on Shreveport.

The object of his expedition was accomplished, being able to transfer 10,000 men for operations in Georgia.

As for his cavalry from Memphis, they got off ten days behind time, were headed off, and "done up" by an inferior force. SHERMAN'S first information of what befell them greeted him after his return.

AT NEW ORLEANS.

At Vicksburg he received letters from Banks about the Red River expedition and from Grant permitting him to give aid for a limited time, but insisting upon his return in person to Huntsville, Ala., to prepare for the spring campaign. Before doing so he visited General Banks at New Orleans on the business in view. He found the military movement delayed in order to assist in inaugurating a civil governor of Louisiana. In urging upon him the importance of the civic occasion, SHERMAN mentions, among the inducements presented to him, "an anvil chorus by the united bands of the army, the ringing of church bells, and firing of cannon by electricity." He regarded "all such ceremonies out of place at that time, when it seemed that every hour and every minute were due to war."

As a consequence, he had no time for the "grand pageant," but left to join Grant at Nashville. The Red River expedition, to quote SHERMAN, was, in its result, "the most discredited affair of the national arms."

At that time Banks was not under the authority of Grant, who, however, did concede a loan of 10,000 men for thirty days, much of which was spent in celebrating. Meanwhile SHERMAN'S Army of the Tennessee contingent got away from Vicksburg on time, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet. One division landed and marched up and captured a fort below Alexandria, when the whole fleet of transports and convoys ascended,

arriving on the day appointed (March 17); the Banks end did not join them for some days later.

The two divisions of SHERMAN'S army were so long delayed on this unfortunate Red River expedition, and subsequently on the Mississippi, that they did not share with their comrades the achievements of the Atlanta campaign. In fact, did not join SHERMAN'S army again until just in time to assist General Thomas to defeat Hood before Nashville nine months after.

GRANT'S APPRECIATIVE TRIBUTE TO SHERMAN.

On his way up the Mississippi occurred an incident which gives new luster to the characters of Grant and SHERMAN as soldiers and friends, as it brings into full light their inner consciousness of themselves and of each other.

The story is told in an exchange of letters between the two distinguished parties, the first, dated March 4, 1864, from Grant to SHERMAN, delivered by an aid to the commanding general.

After announcing the revival of the grade of lieutenant-general, and of his name being sent to the Senate for the place, he continues:

While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or a less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you can not know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction. The word "you" I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now. Your friend.

SHERMAN'S PATHETIC TRIBUTE TO GRANT.

In acknowledging from near Memphis on March 10 "your more than kind and characteristic letter," SHERMAN replies, "private and confidential," in an equally "characteristic" tone:

You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as heretofore to be yourself—simple, honest, and unpretending—you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends and the homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large share for securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability. I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you. Until you had won Donelson I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which I have followed ever since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be; but the chief characteristic of your nature is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his Savior. This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also when you have completed your best preparations you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts, no reserves; and I tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew wherever I was that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you would come—if alive. My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand strategy and of books of science and history; but I confess your common sense seemed to have supplied all this. Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come out West, take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley; let us make it dead sure. * * * Even in the seceded States your word now would go further than a President's proclamation or an act of Congress. For God's sake and for your country's sake come out of Washington. I now exhort you to come out West. * * * There lies the seat of coming empire, and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic. Your sincere friend.

COMMANDS THE MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

[MARCH 12, 1864-JUNE 27, 1865.]

General SHERMAN reached Memphis three days later. He there received a dispatch to come to Nashville in person by the 17th (March). Upon his arrival General Grant informed him that he had been to Washington and had orders to return East to command all the armies of the United States and personally the armies of the Potomac and the James. At the same time he (SHERMAN) would succeed to the command (G. O., 48, War Department, March 12, 1864) of the Military Division of the Mississippi—(Departments of the Ohio (Schofield), Cumberland (Thomas), Tennessee (McPherson), and Arkansas (Steele).

On March 18, in orders, General SHERMAN announced his assumption of his new command.

A CHAPTER OF INCIDENTS.

It is necessary to digress here, else the story may not be told, as SHERMAN himself is its authority. General Grant announced that "they" were about to present him with a sword and desired SHERMAN to witness the ceremony. "They" strolled into the dining room, where Grant introduced his fellow-townsmen, the mayor, and another citizen of Galena, Ill., no others being present except Mrs. Grant and family and the General's personal aids.

The mayor read a finished speech, at the close of which he handed General Grant the formal resolutions of the city council engrossed on parchment, with a ribbon and broad seal.

In reply, Grant said: "Mr. Mayor, as I knew that this ceremony was to occur, and as I am not used to speaking, I have written something in reply."

SHERMAN adds:

He then began to fumble in his pockets, first in his breast coat, then his pants, vest, etc., and after considerable delay pulled out a crumpled

piece of common yellow cartridge paper, which he handed to the mayor.
* * * When read, however, the substance of his answer was most excellent, short, concise, and if it had been delivered by word of mouth would have been all that the occasion required.

As SHERMAN well adds:

I could not help laughing at a scene so characteristic of the man who then stood prominent before the country, and to whom all had turned as the only one qualified to guide the nation in a war that had become painfully critical.

Another incident in point may be mentioned. The corps commanders were assembled at Nashville to meet Generals Grant and SHERMAN, the former as commander of all the armies of the United States, and the latter of the Military Division of the Mississippi. In order to while away the evening SHERMAN suggested the theater. They paid their way in as the rest and sat down in the front balcony row. "Hamlet" was the bill. The place was crowded with soldiers. Unable to stand such foul murder of his favorite hero, SHERMAN exclaimed excitedly: "Dodge, that is no way to play Hamlet."

"General, don't talk so loud, some of the boys will discover us, and then there'll be a scene not in the play."

But his indignation was hard to repress.

In the grave scene, during the soliloquy over the skull of Yorick, a soldier jumped up yelling from a back seat: "Say, pard, was it Yank or Reb?"

The house came down. Grant making for the exit, observing sotto voce.

"SHERMAN, we had better get out of here or we'll be in a worse scrape than the enemy can set up for us."

Out they went, in hasty retreat, just as the boys caught on.

The effect of the Meridian expedition, as SHERMAN foresaw, was the transfer of two fine veteran divisions of 5,000 men each, idle in Vicksburg, to the main body of the Army of the Tennessee preparing for operations in Georgia.

And showing a touch of love in his instructions (March 14) to McPherson interposes, "steal a furlough and run to Baltimore incog, but get back in time to take part in the next great move."

The visit suggested was to his lady love. He did not go, but sent a letter instead, by the hand of a newspaper friend (the writer), to a post-office beyond the lines, explaining the situation. The close of the campaign was expected to find him at the nuptial altar, instead he filled a soldier's grave.

PLANNING A CLOSING CAMPAIGN.

General SHERMAN accompanied General Grant as far as Cincinnati on his way East to assume the duties of his enlarged command in order to privately discuss a multitude of details incident to the preparations for the combined military movements in view.

It was one of the favorite projects of Grant to make suitable provision in an active way for some of the officers of merit and prominence who had been elbowed out of command and shelved in the numerous shuffles of the earlier stages of the war, among them, McClellan, Burnside, and Fremont of the armies of the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden of the armies of the West. Grant had reached a quasi supreme authority which enabled him to venture on so bold a stroke, as a balm to former humiliations and to allay discontent and as well to give these officers proper commands and a chance to regain lost prestige.

In these pleasing abstractions SHERMAN heartily coincided and was specifically directed by Grant in his reorganization to keep this point in mind with reference to officers formerly in the armies under his command, indicating that he would do the same with reference to his.

The scheme, so reassuring in conversation, fell through, in some cases owing to the unwarranted expectations of the officers themselves and in others the failure to win the approval of the still uppermost element in the original contention. The course of Grant had been entirely voluntary, yet he, and SHERMAN as well, got nothing but criticism and censure for their magnanimity and their pains.

During this conference General Grant also expressed a wish to take some of the officers who had served under him in the West for positions of command in his new field. To this, however, General SHERMAN strongly objected, wishing to have the old armies left intact. General Grant finally relented but insisted on Sheridan, notwithstanding the most urgent appeals.

Both now turned their attention to the substantial of the task before them.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF GEORGIA.

[APRIL-MAY, 1864.]

Returning to Nashville, SHERMAN began making his arrangements for the complete control of the vast region already conquered, the protection of his lines of supply, and the mobilization and equipment of the proposed army of invasion of Georgia, which was to move in concert with Grant against Richmond. Thomas was at Chattanooga, McPherson at Huntsville, and Schofield at Knoxville. The enemy, under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, was entrenched at Dalton with 40,000 to 50,000 men and receiving reinforcements from Mississippi and Georgia.

SHERMAN'S ARMY OF INVASION.

The time originally fixed by General Grant for a simultaneous advance of the armies, east and west, was May 1.

The subject of transportation, the most difficult problem in aggressive war, engaged SHERMAN'S most minute attention, for, despite the unbounded valor of his men, he well understood the indispensable adjunct of abundant supplies of food, munitions, and clothing. He also made efforts to secure the return of his two loaned divisions, but the disaster on the Red River precluded any expectations from that source.

His other department, that of Arkansas, was not only remote, but so hopelessly involved in extricating Banks from his Red River dilemma that no dependence could be placed upon it to contribute to the campaign.

This department was subsequently transferred to the Military Division of the Gulf.

The general of the Division was fortunate in having as army commanders men like Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, distinctive in adaptivity to their coordinate parts and en masse an invincible whole.

The relative strength of the three armies at this time was:

	Present and absent.	Present for duty.
Army of the Cumberland	171,450	88,883
Army of the Tennessee	134,763	64,957
Army of the Ohio	46,052	26,242
Total	352,265	180,082

From which deduct garrisons and railroad guards or net organized for field work:

Army of the Cumberland	50,000
Army of the Tennessee	35,000
Army of the Ohio	15,000
Total	100,000

The organization of this force April 10, 1864, was:

Army of the Cumberland.—Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding; department staff, Brig. Gen. W. D. Whipple; Fourth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard; Fourteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. M. Palmer; Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. Hooker; besides district commands, detachments, and unassigned infantry, cavalry, and artillery, 350 guns and 12,733 serviceable horses.

Army of the Tennessee.—Maj. Gen. J. B. McPherson, commanding; department staff, Col. W. T. Clark; Fifteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. John A. Logan; Sixteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. G. M. Dodge; Seventeenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair. Signal detachment, 280 guns and 9,807 serviceable horses.

Army of the Ohio.—Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, commanding; Twenty-third Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox; Cavalry Corps, Maj. Gen. G. Stoneman. Besides districts. Six hundred and two guns, defenses of Knoxville, and 2,032 serviceable horses.

FIELD ORDERS CONCERNING IMPEDIMENTA.

To insure the mobility of this force the impedimenta were reduced to a minimum. Each officer and soldier in addition to equipment was ordered to carry on his person rations and clothing for five days. Each regiment was limited to one wagon and one ambulance. Officers of each company were allowed but one pack horse or mule. Each division was to have a fair proportion of wagons for its supply train, limited to food, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbidden, except to the sick and wounded, and only one allowed to headquarters, for office use.

The General set the example, he and all officers about him being supplied each with a wall-tent fly, with no poles nor furniture, the former improvised on the spot by saplings, fence rails or posts. This example was uniformly followed by general officers, except General Thomas, who, though often quasi-seriously joked about it by the chief, took with him a regular headquarters camp, which got the name "Thomas's circus" among the troops. SHERMAN speaks of finding quartermasters hidden away in the rear, surrounded by the luxury of tents

and mess fixtures, which when discovered were broken up and the tents distributed to surgeons of brigades.

As a result of these stringent orders, says SHERMAN:

It is doubtful if ever any army went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta and where the required and necessary supplies of food, ammunition, and clothing were issued as called for so regularly and so well.

On May 1 the actual armies ready to follow the lead of SHERMAN into Georgia were:

	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Total.	Guns.
Army of the Cumberland.....	54,568	2,377	3,828	60,773	130
Army of the Tennessee.....	22,437	1,404	624	24,465	56
Army of the Ohio.....	11,183	679	1,627	13,559	28
Total effective strength.....	88,188	4,460	6,149	98,797	254

The Army of the Tennessee was short two divisions not freed from the Red River service and part of the Seventeenth Corps on "veteran furlough," which joined later.

To these armies were reported belonging April 10 24,572 serviceable horses, but in the returns available not differentiated as to field, garrison, and supply service. The number of guns, in all 1,240, attached to each army, already given, shows the relative strength of artillery assigned to field and garrison service.

The above figures do not include the detached cavalry commands, as Stoneman, 4,000, Garrard, 4,500, and others smaller, constantly changing in strength and whereabouts on flying service on the extreme flanks or special detached duty.

The strength of General Johnston's army at Dalton, Ga., on the same day was—

Infantry	37,652
Artillery	2,812
Cavalry	2,392
Total	42,856

GRANT'S FINAL ORDERS AND SHERMAN'S REPLY.

In letters of April 4 from Washington and 19 from Culpeper General Grant directed that under all orders received by SHERMAN respecting the armies under his command the details were left to him as to plan and execution, that his objective was Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, then in defensive intrenchments at Dalton, Ga., "to follow him up closely and persistently so that no part might assist General Lee in Virginia," General Grant himself "undertaking to keep Lee busy."

SHERMAN replied to the first letter on April 10:

We are now all to act on a common plan converging on a common center, which looks like enlightened war. Like yourself you take the biggest load and from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation.

After outlining his plan of operations, SHERMAN closes in his epigrammatic way:

Georgia has a million inhabitants. If they can live we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we can find.

I will inspire my command with the feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that very ground.

In his letter of 19th Grant cautioned him against a possibility in event of great success of a concentration on one or the other.

If the enemy therefore [says Grant] on your front shows signs of joining Lee follow him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front if it is in the power of this army to do it.

On April 28 SHERMAN removed his headquarters to Chattanooga. May 5 was the alternate day fixed upon for the simultaneous advance of Grant in the East and SHERMAN in the West.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA.

[MAY 5-DECEMBER 21, 1864.]

On the day appointed SHERMAN accompanied by his field staff rode to Ringgold, where he gave the portentous command "Forward." The campaign in Georgia then began.

It is not relevant nor practicable in the circumscribed space of a sketch of this character to follow the armies in their respective details, but simply to convey an idea of the movement in illustration of the genius of its master mind.

Fighting whenever and wherever necessary was SHERMAN's motto. Therefore only trimonthly reports of effective strength were called for. SHERMAN proceeded to deliver the deathblow to the Confederacy with his sword in one hand and a United States census table of 1860 and report of the comptroller of Georgia in the other.

General Dodge having completed the rebuilding of the railroad from Decatur to Nashville several months before, was lying along that road and guarding the Tennessee River from Decatur west when he received an order to hasten to Chattanooga, arriving May 5. SHERMAN read to him the dispatches which had passed between General Grant and himself.

"Now, Dodge, you see what you have to do. Where are your troops?"

"They are unloading."

Turning to McPherson, "I think you had better send Dodge to take Ships Gap to-night."

"General," said McPherson, "that is 30 miles away."

"No matter," said SHERMAN, "let him try it."

SHERMAN gave Dodge a map of the road and gap.

Dodge did "try it," captured the gap, and pushed through. This movement enabled him to take Snake Creek Gap on the 8th of May, placing him in the enemy's rear.

The movement was so successful that SHERMAN thought the Army of the Tennessee (McPherson) should have planted itself across the railroad near Resaca in Johnston's rear, which would have compelled Johnston to abandon his trains and fight or make a long detour to the east. The general always insisted had the 15,000 men in the movement planted itself squarely in front of Resaca it would have broken up Johnston's army right there. The quick surprise forced Johnston out of his impregnable position at Dalton and drove him south of the Oostenaula River.

The next day Schofield (May 7), Thomas leading the column of direction in force, advanced against Tunnel Hill.

In principle SHERMAN proposed to depend more upon strategic maneuvering than frontal attack. When possible, therefore, to merely—

press strongly at all points in front, ready to rush in upon first appearance of letting go and to catch the enemy in the confusion of retreat.

After the battle of Dalton on May 14, as soon as Johnston discovered the Army of the Tennessee across the railway in front of Resaca and holding Snake Creek Gap, he immediately fell back towards Resaca. After the battle at that point he retreated south of that place.

In the words of SHERMAN:

We should have captured half of Johnston's army and all his artillery and wagons at the beginning of the campaign, [but] McPherson was justified by his orders.

By the 15th Johnston had his army safe across the bridges in his rear, and was moving quickly to his next point of retrograde defense. While SHERMAN's army was double that of the enemy, the latter had the advantage of natural obstacles, choice of position, and, to a degree, selection of time and place of battle.

The advance of pursuit encountered on the 17th the rear guard of the enemy near Adairsville. He, however, continued his retreat to Kingston where, on the 19th, Thomas deployed for action, but was refused, the enemy falling back "in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superb order" into Cassville, May 19, all the way making strong resistance, seemingly for a fight at that point. The advancing armies had orders to close down on the place the next morning (20th), but the enemy had evacuated the position. On the 18th Rome was occupied by part of SHERMAN'S force.

The cavalry continued the pursuit, a few days being utilized by the infantry for rest, repair of the railroad, and bringing up supplies. The country was practically depopulated, the inhabitants fleeing and much encumbering Johnston's movements.

An order of Johnston, picked up on the road, dated at Adairsville, stated that "he (Johnston) had retreated as far as strategy required; that the army must be prepared for battle at Cassville." The Southern newspapers were indulging in a fusillade of denunciation for falling back without a battle. His friends, however, insisted that his retrograde was designed to allure SHERMAN into his meshes so that he might suddenly assume the offensive and the more easily overwhelm him.

This was playing precisely into SHERMAN'S hands, as he was particularly desirous of one grand decisive test of strength at this period in his work, when his armies in numbers and freshness were at their best, and before they had been necessarily depleted by drafts for railroad guards.

The entire corps of Polk had now come up from Mississippi, which gave Johnston a formidable army of three corps—Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's—aggregating 60,000 men.

securing complete control of as difficult a country as was ever fought over by a civilized army. This included the tenable positions of Dalton, Resaca, Cassville, Allatoona, and Dallas, with the army in condition to follow up this success by an immediate movement.

The aggregate losses for May were, Army of the Cumberland, 6,859; of the Tennessee, 1,271; and of the Ohio, 1,172; a total of 9,295, allowing one-fifth for killed.

This may be regarded as showing approximately the proportion of fighting by each army.

The reenforcements received by General Johnston before reaching Cassville were:

Polk, Third Division	12,000
Martin, division of cavalry	3,500
Jackson, division of cavalry	3,900
Quarles, at New Hope Church	2,200

Total	21,600
Army at Dalton, opening of the campaign	42,856

Johnston's total at Kenesaw..... 64,456

The enemy's losses from Dalton to New Hope Church were 5,893—killed, 721; wounded, 4,672—which does not include missing or prisoners.

The whole number of these for the campaign of four and one-half months was 12,893 by name, which in due proportion would add 3,245 to the enemy's losses for May, or total 8,638 against SHERMAN'S 9,299.

ESTABLISHES A SECONDARY BASE.

The immediate attention of SHERMAN besides the recuperation of his army was the repair of the railroad to Allatoona station and the fortification of the place, leaving a garrison of 1,500 men as a secondary base. The three armies were

well in hand. The new regiments received and "furlough men" returning about equaling the losses by casualties of battle, climate, and exposure. Their total numerical strength was therefore about 100,000 men.

MOVEMENTS ON KENESAW.

[MAY 28-JUNE 10, 1864.]

On June 10 the entire army advanced 6 miles to Big Shanty, on the railroad. From this point the enemy's position was in plain view on the advance slopes of the three prominent elevations of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. The signal stations were conspicuous. The parapets were manned by masses of infantry on ground well chosen and prepared for battle.

The defect of position afterwards remedied was length of line, 10 miles, for which the enemy's force of 64,000 men was inadequate.

On the 11th SHERMAN'S skirmish line was within hailing distance of the enemy. An incident is mentioned of one of his locomotive engineers. A water station in advance was within range of the opposing batteries. The locomotive being "thirsty," the engineer proposed to satisfy it. He moved up and filled his tank, the enemy meanwhile firing at him with all his might. He then gracefully backed off, blowing his whistle exultantly, while the troops cheered lustily. The iron horse stood his ground and got off without a scratch.

The defeat of Sturgis's cavalry on June 10 by Forrest's roving troopers increased the anxiety of SHERMAN of a raid on all the railroads in Tennessee. But the defeat of that doughty raider by A. J. Smith in July at Tupelo kept things so lively in Mississippi that Forrest was unable to trouble matters in Tennessee.

The extent of SHERMAN'S lines confronting the enemy's position on the three mountains was about the same—10 miles. He now gave his personal attention to reconnoitering his adversary's position with a view to piercing his line between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. The opposing battle fronts were not 800 yards apart.

While on this duty, not satisfied with the artillery practice, the General ordered a battery in position about 600 yards from the enemy, to give him three volleys in quick succession, and rode on. He heard the shots, but paid no attention to the effect.

The signal officers, having discovered the "key" to the signals of the enemy, almost instantly interpreted a message from Pine Mountain to Marietta, "Send ambulance for General Polk's body," which was repeated later in the day, evidently on account of delay. This intelligence was confirmed by prisoners brought in toward night. General SHERMAN always denied the well-meant romance that he fired the gun which killed Maj. Gen. (Bishop) Leonidas Polk. He did order up the battery and told it what to do, so constructively he was personally associated with that unexpected blow to the personnel of command in Johnston's army.

On the 15th SHERMAN, feeling his way forward, intending to attack any weak point he might develop between the two mountains, found that Johnston had contracted his lines to connect Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. The assets of the movement, however, were many prisoners, among them an entire Alabama regiment (Fourteenth) of 320 men.

On the 18th, in another general advance, Lost Mountain was found abandoned. The enemy's position thus concentrated was evidently as dangerous for assault as a permanent fort.

FIELD DEFENSES—A NOVELTY IN WAR.

These impromptu line-of-battle defenses became a part of the tactics of both armies.

They were then a novelty in the art of war, of purely American origin, but are now generally adopted by all armies as among the exigencies presented by scientifically developed high-power long-range arms, great and small. These improvised hand-to-hand defenses, as it were, may be explained by way of description of the defensive strength of the confronting lines at Kenesaw Mountain and throughout the campaign. Upon reaching its forward or battle line of advance, the command felled trees and bushes for a distance of 100 yards on its front, which served as an abattis. A parapet of earth from 4 to 6 feet high was thrown up from the ditch on the outside and formed a covered way inside. The parapet was surmounted by a head log 12 to 20 inches at the butt, laid along the interior of the crest, and rested in notches cut in other trunks, which extended to the rear, forming an inclined plane in event of the head log being forced inward by a cannon shot.

The troops on both sides became very expert in this sort of field constructions. As soon as the command got into position, if the enemy were near, the work began. In a single night the position was secured against reasonable odds. To this extent every fighting command was its own pioneer corps. General SHERMAN improved on this system by organizing in each division a pioneer corps of negroes seeking refuge within his lines, whom he fed and paid \$10 a month. The scheme acted to a charm. The negroes, backed by the incentive of hallelujahs and freedom, grub and greenbacks, made good use of the night and slept as chance offered during the day, while

the worn and tired soldier took his rest as he could at night, and was ready, fresh, and fierce for the fray during the day.

On June 19 the enemy fell back on his flanks, which effected still greater concentration of his strength, at the same time covering Marietta and the railroad behind Kenesaw.

THE BATTLE OF KENESAW.

[JUNE 20-JULY 2, 1864.]

On the 23d, at 2 p. m., a spirited brush took place at "Culp House."

After a consultation with his army commanders the General decided to make no change of plan, but to boldly attack the fortified lines of the enemy.

On the 27th, at 9 a. m., the troops swung to the assault. The impact was furious. McPherson fought desperately up the face of Lesser Kenesaw, but could not reach the summit. The assault of Thomas, a mile to the right, below the Dallas road, carried the enemy's parapet only, but could go no farther. By 11.30 the assault was halted. It was unsuccessful in that it had not succeeded in breaking the enemy's line at either point. But the men of both armies held their ground within a few yards of each other. This they secured by trenches of their own, which sprung up as if by magic.

In the assault McPherson lost 500 and Thomas 2,000 killed and wounded. But the vantage of a foothold in the very teeth of the enemy, according to the humanities of war, was a fair equivalent. This was the severest struggle the armies had so far encountered. During the action Schofield was also busy, having gained a strong position threatening the enemy's line of retreat. SHERMAN promptly reenforced this advantage with cavalry, which also justified a further movement of this force to Fulton, 10 miles below Marietta.

Orders were issued and the column actually in motion for the fresh advance, when Johnston, detecting the movement, abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw.

SHERMAN at once put his troops in hot pursuit, hoping to overhaul the enemy at the crossing of the Chattahoochee, but the celerity of the retreat found his advance appearing in sight as the enemy's rear disappeared behind a line of powerful earthworks known as Smyrna camp ground.

This feature of the defensive retrograde of the enemy was wholly unexpected. Every energy of the armies was strained in pursuit, in full confidence of catching Johnston in the act of transit from the north to the south side of that important natural obstacle.

On July 3 SHERMAN rode into Marietta as the enemy's rear guard made its exit.

The same night Thomas ran up against strong intrenchments which covered the retreating force at Smyrna, 6 miles below Marietta.

A REAL FOURTH OF JULY CELEBRATION.

[1864.]

It was part of the plan of SHERMAN to celebrate the "Fourth" by keeping the enemy interested in his patriotic demonstrations, while McPherson and Schofield were getting into position. The assault on Ruff's station, as it was known, was made on July 4 by the Sixteenth Corps when it attacked Hood's corps and carried that line of intrenchment, the only line carried by assault during the campaign.

At night Johnston retreated and sheltered his troops and trains inside of his formidable tête-de-pont at the Chattahoochee crossing, as it afterwards proved, constructed in advance by his

orders, on the north bank of the Chattahoochee, covering the railroad crossing and his pontoon bridges. It was apparently his purpose to make this his last stand in defense of the important strategic city of Atlanta.

This defensive construction was strong and well manned. About 3 miles out from the river the main road forked, the right extending along the railroad and the left to Paice's ferry, on the straight way to Atlanta. The latter route, strangely enough, was without defenses, which enabled Schofield to reach the ferry without a conflict.

The right-hand road was covered by the tête-de-pont, which made the approach of Thomas difficult and combative. The first supposition of SHERMAN was that this opposition was a ruse to gain time for the enemy to swing his troops and wagons across the stream, but upon closer inspection he discovered that, by abattis and redoubts, presumably, the enemy designed to contest his crossing. From an escaped negro he also learned about 1,000 slaves had been employed on these constructions for a month or more, and their front extended from the river about 1 mile above the railroad bridge to Turner's ferry, about 6 miles below.

There had been a continuous battle from June 10 to July 3, when Johnston, despite the courage of his men and the skill of his formations, was again forced to take the "back track."

The losses of SHERMAN's armies were: Cumberland, 5,531; Tennessee, 1,834; Ohio, 665; total, 7,530; the proportion of killed being about 24 per cent. The enemy, 3,948 killed and wounded—about 14 per cent killed—and 2,000 prisoners; total, 5,948; or, comparatively, SHERMAN, 7,530; Johnston, 5,948.

CAMPAIGN GALLANTRY.

During the operations in the vicinity of the Chattahoochee Garrard's cavalry, beyond the extreme left about 40 miles, captured Roswell, a town of cotton and woolen factories. The factories were committed to the flames, but the disposition of the dimity heroines of the Confederate looms was a mooted question.

The general, a gallant man, hit it. A blare of bugles sounded "Boots and saddles." A regiment of bold sabreurs was paraded. Each trooper took a pretty maid upon an improvised saddle-blanket pillion and so rode from Roswell to Marietta. As the cavalcade approached, the bands struck up and the men shouted to "The girl I have behind me."

The general, thoughtful of their safety, sent them north out of harm's way.

At Roswell the proprietor of the mills flew the French flag, which interrupted General Dodge in his hurried labors on the bridge. Writing to General SHERMAN setting forth a few points of possible international consequences, SHERMAN replied (July 11): "The bridge is important. You may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong." This bridge was one of the most remarkable feats of the war. In two and one-half days a double-track trestle road bridge 710 feet long and 14 feet high was constructed and the Army of the Tennessee crossing.

SHERMAN, having driven the enemy behind these works, held the river above for 18 miles to Roswell and 10 miles below to the mouth of the Sweetwater. He also occupied high ground overlooking the enemy's intrenched position and movements. The conditions in this respect were the reverse of Kenesaw.

CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE—APPROACHING ATLANTA.

[JULY 12-17, 1864.]

From the hill back of Vinings Station the general could distinguish in faint outline the spires and even less conspicuous habitations of Atlanta, 9 miles off, and detect every movement in the intervening valley of the Chattahoochee.

The activity of the enemy and the sight of extensive camps, train packs, and cavalry moving hither and thither led to an assumption that Johnston had transferred his main army south of the river, leaving a corps to cover the bridges and set up a show of opposition. Developments revealed that the cavalry and trains only had moved over and the main army was really confronting Howard at Paices Ferry and Thomas at the tête-de-pont.

The position of the enemy thus disposed on the north bank was strategically weak in the fact that SHERMAN, in control of the crossings above and below, could threaten his entire rear, or even Atlanta, the retention of which was of incalculable importance, not only to the very existence of the opposing army, but to what little was left of the prestige of the Confederacy.

In his withdrawal from Kenesaw, Johnston left two breaks in the railroad, one above Marietta and the other near Vinings Station. Both were now restored, and a field wire was in touch with his bivouac.

In this favorable situation of affairs the troops were posted in order of battle, away from the river, with a display of pickets and a few batteries at random for effect. From his left rear in a single move SHERMAN could reach the Chattahoochee above the railroad bridge, where there was a ford, besides pontoons available for four bridges. Owing, however, to the

regular crossings being covered by forts of long construction, it was determined to manoeuvre instead of making a frontal attack.

It was now in the General's power to strike Atlanta or any of its forts direct, or by a circuit destroy the railroads in Johnston's rear. The weather was intensely hot, but the country high and healthy.

In prosecution of the strategy of the moment the cavalry were specially active on the right, apparently searching the river below Turners Ferry. McPherson was in position near that ferry. Thomas held the front of the enemy's work in formation on the left in echelon, to Paices Ferry. The Sixteenth Corps and the cavalry were at Roswell.

The theory of the movement was to feign on the right and move on the left. The Roswell crossing was in hand, but too distant to effectively support a frontal attack. During his maneuvers Schofield located what was needed at the mouth of Soaps Creek, whereupon, under orders, crossing, he entrenched on the east bank.

A CAVALRY DIVERSION.

[JULY, 1864.]

During these movements in the main arena Rousseau, at Nashville, received orders to collect approximately 2,000 cavalry from the garrisons of Tennessee, rendezvous them at Decatur, Ala., and thence by rapid marches strike Opelika, at which point sever the railroad links between Georgia and Alabama and thence join the main army about Atlanta, and if forced by circumstances, continue to Pensacola or strike for some garrisoned post on the Mississippi. Rousseau, at his own request, was placed in command. He moved with laudable expedition, on July 9 crossing the Coosa below Ten Islands, thence the

Tallapoosa below Horseshoe Bend, passing through Talladega, striking the railroad west of Opelika, destroying 20 miles of track, thence turning north, reaching Marietta and reporting to SHERMAN before Atlanta within thirteen days of leaving Decatur. His loss on the expedition was but 12 killed and 30 wounded. He brought in with him 400 captured mules, 300 horses, and, as SHERMAN tells us, a good story.

As for the story. One day on the march Rousseau halted at the inviting home of a planter and was met most affably by the host. During the conversation the vigilant eye of the trooper espied a corral of fine mules.

"My good sir," said the trooper, "I fear I must take some of your mules."

"I contributed most generously," said the planter, "to the good cause only a week ago, giving General Roddy ten of the best."

"Well," said the trooper, "in this war you should at least be neutral, or at all events as liberal to us as to Roddy."

"Arn't you on our side?" rejoined the planter.

"Oh, no; I am General Rousseau. All these men you see around are Yanks."

"Great God, sir, Yanks! Who'd areckoned they'd ever come down here to bother us," sighed the overhasty planter.

The clouds of dust which envelope a column of cavalry on a dry, midsummer day had so completely hidden the "blue" that the host assumed his unbidden guest to be of the "gray."

An equal number of mules accompanied the Yankee raiders within the lines of the army pressing Johnston on the road to Atlanta.

Schofield was across with his army and entrenched, with two pontoons finished and prepared to resist assault by the entire strength of the enemy.

The same day Garrard's cavalry takes the advance from Roswell, driving in the pickets and holding his ground until temporarily relieved by the Sixteenth Corps, followed by the whole of the Army of the Tennessee.

That night Johnston decamped, leaving his well-laid plans and untenable trenches. As he left the Chattahoochee he burned the railroad bridge, his pontoons, and trestles. SHERMAN was now in control of both banks. Johnston here lost his opportunity in making no strike while SHERMAN was deliberately and surely weaving his strategic web.

On the far side of the Chattahoochee, hopelessly away from his original base and in sight of Atlanta, SHERMAN resolved on the utmost caution in all his movements, tactical or strategic, and so advised his army commanders. Thomas held the right, Schofield the center, and McPherson the left. A large quantity of stores had been assembled at Allatoona and Marietta. Both posts were well fortified and manned.

The General spent from July 6 until he was ready to move on the 17th in strengthening his posts, crossing the Chattahoochee, and rearranging his garrisons in the rear. As long as the army in his front had its hands full there was no occasion for anxiety in the rear. In event of any let-up in aggressive operations, detached parties let loose might be expected to play havoc with his communications.

ATLANTA NEXT.

On July 17 the direct movement against Atlanta, the objective of the campaign in its entirety, began. After crossing the Chattahoochee on pontoons Schofield moved to Cross Keys and McPherson to Lone Mountain, neither meeting with opposition except from cavalry.

On the 18th, the army swinging on a right wheel, Thomas

advanced to Buckhead, his line of battle facing Peach Tree Creek, Schofield on his left, and McPherson toward the railroad, between Lone Mountain and Decatur.

At 2 p. m. the latter had reached a point 4 miles from Stone Mountain, 7 miles east of Decatur. Thence he turned toward Atlanta, destroying the railroad, and reached Decatur the same night, where he came in communication with Schofield.

BEFORE ATLANTA.

On the morning of the 18th, through his spies, the General was apprised of the relief of General Johnston the day before by General Hood, in command of the Confederate army in front of Atlanta. General Schofield, who was a classmate at West Point, spoke of Hood as "bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme." To this SHERMAN added, "Then the change means fight; so I wish to have it. We'll settle it here."

The entire army was notified. Division commanders were directed to be at all times prepared for battle. The enemy, with Atlanta at his back, had the advantage of choosing the time and place of attack; also, working on inner lines, was able to mass a superior force against the weakest points.

On the 19th all the armies were moved on converging routes upon Atlanta, McPherson astride the railroad near Decatur, Schofield along a road leading direct to the city, and Thomas across Peach Tree Creek, in order of battle, building bridges for each division as he deployed. This left a gap between Thomas and Schofield, which was closed by bringing part of Howard's corps nearer Schofield.

COMBATS OF PEACH TREE CREEK.

[JULY 19-21, 1864.]

On the 20th the enemy unexpectedly poured out of his trenches on the Peach Tree line, which Johnston had prepared as the point of battle outside of Atlanta. The impact fell upon SHERMAN'S right, commanded by General Thomas (the Twentieth and parts of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps). The opposing lines were soon at close quarters, at many points hand to hand. Thomas, who was on the spot, by ordering up his field batteries at a gallop to position on the north side of Peach Tree Creek, opened an enfilading fire on the exposed flank. After several hours of this crucial test of the staying powers of the combatants the enemy drew off, leaving 400 dead on the ground. The wounded, abandoned or carried off, were estimated at 4,000.

The losses of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps were light, being covered by slight parapets. The brunt of the sally having fallen upon the Twentieth (Hooker), that corps lost 1,500.

The failure of the attack was not only a great defeat to Hood's army, but resulted in a great derangement of his plans.

This experience at once changed the character of the methods by which SHERMAN proposed to handle his vigorous antagonist.

On the evening of the 21st of July he closed up to within 2 miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's brigade of Leggett's division of Blair's (Seventeenth) army corps carried a prominent hill, known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, which gave a view of Atlanta, and placed the city within range of his guns.

The houses inside of Atlanta were in plain sight, yet between himself and this goal of his wonderful campaign lay parapets

with ditches, fraise, cheveux de frise, abattis, and a powerful enemy.

A strategic point had been gained, and unless the swing of SHERMAN'S left was stopped it would dangerously interfere with Hood's communications toward the south. Hood fully appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of General SHERMAN'S army.

CLOSING UP.

It was SHERMAN'S purpose to destroy all the railroads east of Atlanta, and then withdraw quickly from the right flank and add to the left.

In execution of this programme McPherson received orders not to extend any farther to the left. Dodge, having been crowded out of position, was ordered to destroy the railroad from Decatur up to his skirmish line.

Before these tactical arrangements were fully carried out Hood abandoned his Peachtree line on Schofield's and Thomas's front and fell back to the intrenchments proper of Atlanta, which bore a radius of a half mile. SHERMAN, pressing ahead proportionately, brought his lines so close up to Atlanta that his skirmishers were in touch with the enemy. Schofield kept pressing forward and Thomas could be heard banging away farther to the right.

THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA.^a

During the morning of July 22 certain movements were made with a view to completing the formation before Atlanta.

General McPherson gave verbal orders to General Dodge in

^a The tactical movements of the battle of Atlanta (July 22, 1864) are taken from the comprehensive and carefully prepared paper of Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, read before the New York Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion; also letter to Gen. Green B. Raum, October 20, 1902.

relation to the Second Division of his corps (Sixteenth), which had been crowded out as the forces of SHERMAN neared Atlanta, directing him to take position on the left of the line which Blair had been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning. McPherson cautioned Dodge to make a strong protection of his flank, and rode out to examine it himself, evidently anticipating trouble in that direction.

These movements having been executed at midday, July 22, the position of the Army of the Tennessee was: One division of the Fifteenth Corps across and north of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta, the balance of the Fifteenth and all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the railway along a ridge, with a gentle slope and clear valley facing Atlanta in front and another clear valley in the rear. The Sixteenth Corps was resting on the road, entirely in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps and facing from Atlanta. To the left and left rear the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our lines.

On the night of July 21 Hood had transferred Hardee's corps and two divisions of Wheeler's cavalry to our rear, going around our left flank, Wheeler attacking Sprague's brigade, Sixteenth Army Corps, at Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight Stewart's and Cheatham's corps and the Georgia militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta and in a position to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the plan thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it in rear and front and the capturing of all its trains corralled at Decatur. Hardee's was the largest corps in Hood's army and according to Hood there were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee about 40,000 troops.

The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock