

## APPENDIX.

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### I.

#### *General Sherman Report of the Georgia Campaign.*

Headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Savannah, Georgia, January 1st, 1865. }

Major General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington City, D.C.:

GENERAL,—I have the honor to offer my report of the operations of the armies under my command, since the occupation of Atlanta in the early part of September last, up to the present date.

As heretofore reported, in the month of September the Army of the Cumberland, Major General Thomas commanding, held the city of Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, Major General Howard commanding, was grouped about East Point; and the Army of the Ohio, Major General Schofield commanding, held Decatur. Many changes occurred in the composition of these armies, in consequence of the expiration of the time of service of many of the regiments. The opportunity was given to us to consolidate the fragments, reclothe and equip the men, and make preparations for the future campaign. I also availed myself of the occasion to strengthen the garrisons to our rear, to make our communications more secure, and sent Wagner's division of the 4th Corps and Morgan's division of the 14th Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's division of the 15th Corps to Rome. Also a thorough reconnaissance was made of Atlanta, and a new line of works begun, which required a smaller garrison to hold.

During this month, the enemy, whom we had left at Lovejoy's Station, moved westward toward the Chattahoochee, taking position facing us, and covering the West Point Railroad about Palmetto Station. He also threw a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry detachments to the west, in the direction of Carrolton and Powder Springs. About the same time President Davis visited Macon and his army at Palmetto, and made harangues referring to an active campaign against us. Hood still remained in command of the Confederate forces, with Cheatham, S. D. Lee, and Stewart commanding his three corps, and Wheeler in command of his cavalry, which had been largely re-enforced.

My cavalry consisted of two divisions; one was stationed at Decatur, under command of Brigadier General Garrard; the other, commanded by Brigadier General Kilpatrick, was posted near Sandtown, with a pon-

toon bridge over the Chattahoochee, from which he could watch any movement of the enemy toward the west.

As soon as I became convinced that the enemy intended to assume the offensive, namely, September 28th, I sent Major General Thomas, second in command, to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to arrive, and to make preliminary preparations to meet such an event.

About the 1st of October, some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance on the west of the Chattahoochee, and one of his infantry corps was reported near Powder Springs; and I received authentic intelligence that the rest of his infantry was crossing to the west of the Chattahoochee. I at once made my orders that Atlanta and the Chattahoochee Railroad bridge should be held by the 20th Corps, Major General Slocum, and on the 4th of October put in motion the 15th and 17th Corps, and the 4th, 14th, and 23d Corps, to Smyrna camp-ground; and on the 5th moved to the strong position about Kenesaw. The enemy's cavalry had, by a rapid movement, got upon our railroad at Big Shanty, and broken the line of telegraph and railroad; and with a division of infantry (French's) had moved against Allatoona, where were stored about a million of rations. Its redoubts were garrisoned by three small regiments under Colonel Tourtellotte, 4th Minnesota.

I had anticipated this movement, and had, by signal and telegraph, ordered General Corse to re-enforce that post from Rome.

General Corse had reached Allatoona with a brigade during the night of the 4th, just in time to meet the attack by French's division on the morning of the 5th. In person I reached Kenesaw Mountain about ten A.M. of the 5th, and could see the smoke of battle and hear the faint sounds of artillery. The distance, eighteen miles, was too great for me to make in time to share in the battle, but I directed the 23d Corps, Brigadier General Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base of Kenesaw due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona. I succeeded in getting a signal message to General Corse during his fight, notifying him of my presence. The defense of Allatoona by General Corse was admirably conducted, and the enemy repulsed with heavy slaughter. His description of the defense is so graphic, that it leaves nothing for me to add; and the movement of General Cox had the desired effect of causing the withdrawal of French's division rapidly in the direction of Dallas.

On the 6th and 7th I pushed my cavalry well toward Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and discovered that the enemy had moved westward, and inferred that he would attempt to break our railroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston. Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th, I put the army in motion through Allatoona Pass to Kingston, reaching that point on the 10th. There I learned that the enemy had feigned on Rome, and was passing the Coosa River on a pontoon bridge about eleven miles below Rome. I therefore, on the 11th, moved to Rome, and pushed Garrard's cavalry and the 23d Corps, under General Cox, across the Oos-



tenaula, to threaten the flanks of the enemy passing north. Garrard's cavalry drove a cavalry brigade of the enemy to and beyond the Narrows, leading into the valley of the Chattooga, capturing two field-pieces and taking some prisoners. The enemy had moved with great rapidity, and made his appearance at Resaca, and Hood had in person demanded its surrender. I had from Kingston re-enforced Resaca by two regiments of the Army of the Tennessee. I at first intended to move the army into the Chattooga Valley, to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the Coosa, but feared that General Hood would, in that event, turn eastward by Spring Place, and down the Federal Road, and therefore moved against him at Resaca. Colonel Weaver at Resaca, afterward re-enforced by General Raum's brigade, had repulsed the enemy from Resaca, but he had succeeded in breaking the railroad from Tilton to Dalton, and as far north as the Tunnel.

Arriving at Resaca on the evening of the 14th, I determined to strike Hood in flank, or force him to battle, and directed the Army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to move to Snake Creek Gap, which was held by the enemy, while General Stanley, with the 4th and 14th Corps, moved by Tilton across the mountains to the rear of Snake Creek Gap, in the neighborhood of Villanow.

The Army of the Tennessee found the enemy occupying our old lines in the Snake Creek Gap, and on the 15th skirmished for the purpose of holding him there until Stanley could get to his rear. But the enemy gave way about noon, and was followed through the Gap, escaping before General Stanley had reached the farther end of the Pass. The next day, the 16th, the armies moved directly toward La Fayette, with a view to cut off Hood's retreat. We found him intrenched in Ship's Gap, but the leading division (Wood's) of the 15th Corps rapidly carried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regiment, making them prisoners. The remaining eight companies escaped to the main body near La Fayette. The next morning we passed over into the valley of the Chattooga, the Army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit by La Fayette and Alpine toward Blue Pond; the Army of the Cumberland by Summerville and Melville Post-office to Gaylesville; and the Army of the Ohio and Garrard's cavalry from Villanow, Dirttown Valley, and Goover's Gap to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little encumbered with trains, and marched with great rapidity, and had succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout Range abutting against the Coosa River in the neighborhood of Gadsden. He evidently wanted to avoid a fight.

On the 19th all the armies were grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich valley of the Chattooga, abounding in corn and meat, and I determined to pause in my pursuit of the enemy, to watch his movements, and live on the country. I hoped that Hood would turn toward Gunter'sville and Bridgeport. The Army of the Tennessee was posted near Little River, with instructions to feel forward in support of the cavalry, which was ordered to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Will's Valley, and to give

me the earliest notice possible of his turning northward. The Army of the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon across the Coosa, and to feel forward to centre, and down in the direction of Blue Mountain. The Army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gaylesville, and all the troops were instructed to draw heavily for supplies from the surrounding country. In the mean time communications were opened to Rome, and a heavy force set to work in repairing the damages done to our railroads. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions, but forage was scarce; and General Slocum was instructed to send strong foraging parties out in the direction of South River and collect all the corn and fodder possible, and to put his own trains in good condition for farther service.

Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive, would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as the one I then commanded; and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great Atlantic sea-ports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.

On the 26th of October, satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, I detached the 4th Corps, Major General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and report to Major General Thomas at Nashville.

Subsequently, on the 30th of October, I also detached the 23d Corps, Major General Schofield, with the same destination, and delegated to Major General Thomas full power over all the troops subject to my command, except the four corps with which I designed to move into Georgia. This gave him the two divisions under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, but *en route* for Tennessee, the two corps named, and all the garrisons in Tennessee, as also all the cavalry of my military division, except one division under Brigadier General Kilpatrick, which was ordered to rendezvous at Marietta.

Brevet Major General Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac, to assume command of the cavalry of my army, and I dispatched him back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments, and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and report to Major General Thomas for duty. These forces I judged would enable General Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga back, including Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could successfully cope with Hood, should the latter cross the Tennessee northward.



By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden, and made its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made; he then passed on to Tusculumbia, and laid a pontoon bridge opposite Florence. I then began my preparations for the march through Georgia, having received the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief for carrying into effect my plan, the details of which were explained to all my corps commanders and heads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of secrecy. I had also communicated full details to General Thomas, and had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood of Kingston until he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to cope with Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's force at thirty-five thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry.

I moved the Army of the Tennessee by slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of the Smyrna campground, and the 14th Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point I directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees, etc., to be sent back to Chattanooga; and the 14th Corps above mentioned, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long and difficult march. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of November, when, every thing being ready, I ordered General Corse, who still remained at Rome, to destroy the bridges there, all founderies, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to an enemy, and to move to Kingston.

At the same time the railroad in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. The garrisons from Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and all railroad stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, saving them, ready to be replaced whenever future interests should demand.

The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostenaula was left untouched, because I thought it more than probable that we would find it necessary to re-occupy the country as far forward as the line of the Etowah.

Atlanta itself is only of strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the railroads leading to it are destroyed, as well as all its founderies, machine shops, warehouses, depots, etc., etc., it is of no more value than any other point in Northern Georgia; whereas the line of the Etowah, by reason of its rivers and natural features, possesses an importance which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the Chattahoochee valleys.

On the 12th of November my army stood detached and cut off from all communication from the rear. It was composed of four corps: the 15th and 17th, constituting the right wing, under Major General O. O. Howard; the 14th and 20th Corps, constituting the left wing, under Ma-

for General H. W. Slocum, of an aggregate strength of sixty thousand infantry, one cavalry division, in aggregate strength five thousand five hundred, under Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, and the artillery reduced to the minimum, one gun per one thousand men.

The whole force was moved rapidly, and grouped about Atlanta on the 14th November.

In the mean time, Captain O. M. Poe had thoroughly destroyed Atlanta, save its mere dwelling-houses and churches, and the right wing, with General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesboro' and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day General Slocum moved with the 20th Corps by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn south and reach Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march. In person I left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with the 14th Corps, Brevet Major General Jeff. C. Davis, by Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition and supplies, approximating twenty days' bread, forty days' sugar and coffee, a double allowance of salt for forty days, and beef cattle equal to forty days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three days' forage in grain. All were instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this order of things as long as possible, living chiefly if not solely upon the country, which I knew to abound in corn, sweet potatoes, and meats.

My first object was of course to place my army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston. All my calculations were fully realized. During the 22d, General Kilpatrick made a good feint on Macon, driving the enemy within his intrenchments, and then drew back to Griswoldville, where Walcott's brigade of infantry joined him to cover that flank, while Howard's trains were closing up, and his men scattered, breaking up railroads. The enemy came out of Macon and attacked Walcott in position, but was so roughly handled that he never repeated the experiment. On the eighth day after leaving Atlanta, namely, on the 23d, General Slocum occupied Milledgeville and the important bridge across the Oconee there, and Generals Howard and Kilpatrick were in and about Gordon.

General Howard was then ordered to move eastward, destroying the railroad thoroughly in his progress, as far as Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville, and General Slocum to move to Sandersville by two roads. General Kilpatrick was ordered to Milledgeville and thence move rapidly eastward, to break the railroad which leads from Millen to Augusta, then to turn upon Millen and rescue our prisoners of war supposed to be confined at that place.



I accompanied the 20th Corps from Milledgeville to Sandersville, approaching which place on the 25th, we found the bridges across Buffalo Creek burned, which delayed us three hours. The next day we entered Sandersville, skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry, which offered little opposition to the advance of the 20th and 14th Corps, entering the place almost at the same moment.

General Slocum was then ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia Central Railroad from Station 13 (Tennille) to Station 10, near the crossing of the Ogeechee, one of his corps substantially following the railroad, the other by way of Louisville, in support of Kilpatrick's cavalry. In person I shifted to the right wing, and accompanied the 17th Corps, General Blair, on the south of the railroad till abreast of Station 9½ (Barton)—General Howard in person, with the 15th Corps, keeping farther to the right and about one day's march ahead, ready to turn against the flank of any enemy who should oppose our progress. At Barton I learned that Kilpatrick's cavalry had reached the Augusta Railroad about Waynesboro', where he ascertained that our prisoners had been removed from Millen, and therefore the purpose of rescuing them, upon which we had set our hearts, was an impossibility. But as Wheeler's cavalry had hung around him, and as he had retired to Louisville to meet our infantry, in pursuance of my instructions, not to risk battle unless at great advantage, I ordered him to leave his wagons and all encumbrances with the left wing, and moving in the direction of Augusta, if Wheeler gave him the opportunity, to indulge him with all the fighting he wanted. General Kilpatrick, supported by Baird's division of infantry of the 14th Corps, again moved in the direction of Waynesboro', and encountering Wheeler in the neighborhood of Thomas's Station, attacked him in position, driving him from three successive lines of barricades handsomely through Waynesboro' and across Briar Creek, the bridges over which he burned, and then, with Baird's division, rejoined the left wing, which in the mean time had been marching by easy stages of ten miles a day in the direction of Lumpkin's Station and Jacksonboro'.

The 17th Corps took up the destruction of the railroad at the Ogeechee near Station 10, and continued it to Millen, the enemy offering little or no opposition, although preparations had seemingly been made at Millen.

On the 3d of December, the 17th Corps, which I accompanied, was at Millen; the 15th Corps, General Howard, was south of the Ogeechee, opposite Station 7 (Scarboro'); the 20th Corps, General Slocum, on the Augusta Railroad, about four miles north of Millen, near Buckhead Church; and the 14th Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, in the neighborhood of Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta Railroad.

All were ordered to march in the direction of Savannah, the 15th Corps to continue south of the Ogeechee, the 17th to destroy the railroad as far as Ogeechee Church, and four days were allowed to reach the line from Ogeechee Church to the neighborhood of Halley's Ferry on the Savannah River. All the columns reached their destination on time, and con-

tinued to march on their several roads—General Davis following the Savannah River road, General Slocum the middle road by way of Springfield, General Blair the railroad, and General Howard still south and west of the Ogeechee, with orders to cross to the east bank opposite "Eden Station," or Station No. 2.

As we approached Savannah, the country became more marshy and difficult, and more obstructions were met in the way of felled trees where the roads crossed the creek-swamps on narrow causeways. But our pioneer companies were well organized, and removed these obstructions in an incredibly short time. No opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads of the columns were within fifteen miles of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earth-works and artillery. But these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by the 10th of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah. These followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah River about three miles above the city, across to the head of a corresponding stream which empties into the Little Ogeechee. These streams were singularly favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very marshy, and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled and covered by his heavy artillery. The only approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways, namely, the two railroads, and the Augusta, the Louisville, and the Ogeechee dirt roads, all of which were commanded by heavy ordnance, too strong for us to fight with our light field-guns. To assault an enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to me unwise, especially as I had so successfully brought my army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the operation of time.

I therefore instructed my army commanders to closely invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in their fronts respectively, while I gave my personal attention to opening communication with our fleet, which I knew was waiting for us in Tybee, Wassaw, and Ossabaw Sounds.

In approaching Savannah, General Slocum struck the Charleston Railroad near the bridge, and occupied the river bank as his left flank, where he had captured two of the enemy's river boats, and had prevented two others (gun-boats) from coming down the river to communicate with the city; while General Howard, by his right flank, had broken the Gulf Railroad at Fleming's and Way Station, and occupied the railroad itself down to the Little Ogeechee near Station 1, so that no supplies could reach Savannah by any of its accustomed channels.

We, on the contrary, possessed large herds of cattle, which we had brought along or gathered in the country, and our wagons still contained a reasonable amount of breadstuffs and other necessities, and the fine rice-crops of the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers furnished to our men and animals a large amount of rice and rice-straw.



We also held the country to the south and west of the Ogeechee as foraging ground.

Still, communication with the fleet was of vital importance, and I directed General Kilpatrick to cross the Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to St. Catharine's Sound in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication with the fleet. General Howard had previously, by my direction, sent one of his best scouts down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose. But more than this was necessary. We wanted the vessels and their contents, and the Ogeechee River, a navigable stream close to the rear of our camps, was the proper avenue of supply.

The enemy had burned the road-bridge across the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Camochee, known as "King's Bridge." This was reconstructed in an incredibly short time in the most substantial manner by the 58th Indiana, Colonel Buel, under the direction of Captain Reese, of the Engineer Corps, and on the morning of the 13th December, the second division of the 15th Corps, under command of Brigadier General Hazen, crossed the bridge to the west bank of the Ogeechee, and marched down with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong inclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three of infantry; in all, about two hundred men, and mounting twenty-three guns *en barbette*, and one mortar.

General Hazen reached the vicinity of Fort McAllister about one P.M., deployed his division about the place, with both flanks resting upon the river, posted his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used for abattis, and about five P.M. assaulted the place with nine regiments at three points, all of them successfully. I witnessed the assault from a rice-mill on the opposite bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome manner in which it was accomplished.

Up to this time we had not communicated with our fleet. From the signal-station at the rice-mill our officers had looked for two days over the rice-fields and salt marsh in the direction of Ossabaw Sound, but could see nothing of it. But while watching the preparations for the assault on Fort McAllister, we discovered in the distance what seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer, which became more and more distinct, until about the very moment of the assault she was plainly visible below the fort, and our signal was answered. As soon as I saw our colors fairly planted upon the walls of McAllister, in company with General Howard, I went in a small boat down to the fort, and met General Hazen, who had not yet communicated with the gun-boat below, as it was shut out to him by a point of timber. Determined to communicate that night, I got another small boat and a crew, and pulled down the river till I found the tug Dandelion, Captain Williamson, U.S.N., who informed me that Captain Duncan, who had been sent by General Howard, had succeeded in reaching Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster, and that he was expecting them hourly in Ossabaw Sound. After making communications to those officers, and a short communication to the

War Department, I returned to Fort McAllister that night, and before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff, advising me that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee, near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet me on board his boat. I accordingly returned with him, and met General Foster on board the steamer Nemaha, and, after consultation, determined to proceed with him down the sound, in hopes to meet Admiral Dahlgren. But we did not meet him until we reached Wassaw Sound, about noon. I there went on board the admiral's flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, after having arranged with General Foster to send us from Hilton Head some siege ordnance, and some boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee River. Admiral Dahlgren very kindly furnished me with all the data concerning his fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between the sea and Savannah. I explained to him how completely Savannah was invested at all points save only the plank-road on the South Carolina shore, known as the "Union Causeway," which I thought I could reach from my left flank across the Savannah River. I explained to him that if he would simply engage the attention of the forts along Wilmington Channel at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I thought I could carry the defenses of Savannah by assault as soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from Hilton Head.

On the 15th the admiral carried me back to Fort McAllister, whence I returned to our lines in the rear of Savannah.

Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division commanders, I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as my heavy ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender. On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached King's Bridge, I proceeded in person to the headquarters of Major General Slocum on the Augusta Road, and dispatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the place, and on the following day received an answer from General Hardee, refusing to surrender.

In the mean time, farther reconnoissances from our left flank had demonstrated that it was impracticable or unwise to push any considerable force across the Savannah River, for the enemy held the river opposite the city with iron-clad gun-boats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down by us between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore, which would isolate any force sent over from that flank. I therefore ordered General Slocum to get into position the siege-guns and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and to report to me the earliest moment when he could be ready, while I should proceed rapidly round by the right and make arrangements to occupy the Union Causeway from the direction of Port Royal. General Foster had already established a division of troops on the peninsula or neck between the Coosahatchie and Tullifinney Rivers, at the head of Broad River, from which position he could reach the railroad with his artillery.

I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrangements to re-enforce



that command by one or more divisions under a proper officer, to assault and carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah until it occupied the causeway in question. I went on board the admiral's flagship, the *Harvest Moon*, which put to sea the night of the 20th. But the wind was high, and increased during the night, so that the pilot judged Ossabaw Bar impassable, and ran into Tybee, whence we proceeded through the inland channels into Wassaw Sound, and thence through Romney Marsh. But the ebb tide caught the *Harvest Moon*, and she was unable to make the passage. Admiral Dahlgren took me in his barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon River, we met the army tug *Red Legs*, bearing a message from my adjutant, Captain Dayton, of that morning, the 21st, to the effect that our troops were in possession of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into Savannah, the enemy having evacuated the place during the previous night.

Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon River in his barge, while I transferred to the tug, in which I proceeded to Fort McAllister, and thence to the rice-mill; and on the morning of the 22d rode into the city of Savannah, already occupied by our troops.

I was very much disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his garrison, and had to content myself with the material fruits of victory without the cost of life which would have attended a general assault. The substantial results will be more clearly set forth in the tabular statements of heavy ordnance and other public property acquired, and it will suffice here to state, that the important city of Savannah, with its valuable harbor and river, was the chief object of the campaign.

With it we acquired all the forts and heavy ordnance in its vicinity, with large stores of ammunition, shot and shells, cotton, rice, and other valuable products of the country. We also gain locomotives and cars, which, though of little use to us in the present condition of the railroads, are a serious loss to the enemy, as well as four steamboats gained, and the loss to the enemy of the iron-clad Savannah, one ram, and three transports blown up or burned by them the night before.

Formal demand having been made for the surrender, and having been refused, I contend that every thing within the line of intrenchments belongs to the United States, and I shall not hesitate to use it, if necessary, for public purposes. But, inasmuch as the inhabitants generally have manifested a friendly disposition, I shall disturb them as little as possible consistently with the military rights of present and future military commanders, without remitting in the least our just rights as captors.

After having made the necessary orders for the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah, I ordered Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, to make a thorough examination of the enemy's works in and about Savannah, with a view to making it conform to our future uses. New lines of defenses will be built, embracing the city proper, Forts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski retained, with slight modifications in their armament and rear defenses. All the rest of the enemy's forts will be

dismantled and destroyed, and their heavy ordnance transferred to Hilton Head, where it can be more easily guarded.

Our base of supplies will be established in Savannah as soon as the very difficult obstructions placed in the river can be partially removed. These obstructions at present offer a very serious impediment to the commerce of Savannah, consisting of crib-work of logs and timber heavily bolted together, and filled with the cobble-stones which formerly paved the streets of Savannah. All the channels below the city were found more or less filled with torpedoes, which have been removed by order of Admiral Dahlgren, so that Savannah already fulfills the important part it was designed in our plans for the future.

In thus sketching the course of events connected with this campaign, I have purposely passed lightly over the march from Atlanta to the seashore, because it was made in four or more columns, sometimes at a distance of fifteen or twenty miles from each other, and it was impossible for me to attend but one. Therefore I have left it to the army and corps commanders to describe in their own language the events which attended the march of their respective columns. These reports are herewith submitted, and I beg to refer to them for farther details. I would merely sum up the advantages which I conceive have accrued to us by this march.

Our former labors in North Georgia had demonstrated the truth that no large army, carrying with it the necessary stores and baggage, can overtake and capture an inferior force of the enemy in his own country; therefore no alternative was left me but the one I adopted, namely, to divide my forces, and with the one part act offensively against the enemy's resources, while with the other I should act defensively, and invite the enemy to attack, risking the chances of battle.

In this conclusion I have been singularly sustained by the results. General Hood, who, as I have heretofore described, had moved to the westward, near Tuscumbia, with a view to decoy me away from Georgia, finding himself mistaken, was forced to choose either to pursue me, or to act offensively against the other part, left in Tennessee. He adopted the latter course, and General Thomas has wisely and well fulfilled his part of the grand scheme, in drawing Hood well up into Tennessee until he could concentrate all his own troops, and then turn upon Hood, as he has done, and destroy or fatally cripple his army. That part of my army is so far removed from me, that I leave, with perfect confidence, its management and history to General Thomas.

I was thereby left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's only remaining railroad communications eastward and westward, for over one hundred miles, namely, the Georgia State Railroad, which is broken up from Fairburn Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central Railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton, and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. We have also consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on either side of a line from



Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry, and have carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at one hundred millions of dollars; at least twenty millions of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.

The campaign has also placed this branch of my army in a position from which other great military results may be attempted, besides leaving in Tennessee and North Alabama a force which is amply sufficient to meet all the chances of war in that region of our country.

Since the capture of Atlanta my staff is unchanged, save that General Barry, chief of artillery, has been absent, sick, since our leaving Kingston. Surgeon Moore, United States Army, is chief medical director, in place of Surgeon Kittoe, relieved to resume his proper duties as a medical inspector.

Major Hitchcock, A.A.G., has also been added to my staff, and has been of great assistance in the field and office.

Captain Dayton still remains as my adjutant general. All have, as formerly, fulfilled their parts to my entire satisfaction.

In the body of my army I feel a just pride. Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but for their country and their men.

General Kilpatrick, who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains. His report is full and graphic. All the division and brigade commanders merit my personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well. As to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves, that I doubt if they want a compliment from me; but I must do them the justice to say that, whether called on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make "corduroy," or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they "did some things they ought not to have done," yet, on the whole, they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would in ordinary times rank as respectable battles.

The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good gov-

ernment. The same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions.

I avail myself of this occasion to express my heartfelt thanks to Admiral Dahlgren and the officers and men of his fleet, as also to General Foster and his command, for the hearty welcome given us on our arrival at the coast, and for their ready and prompt co-operation in all measures tending to the result accomplished.

I send herewith a map of the country through which we have passed; reports from General Howard, General Slocum, and General Kilpatrick, and their subordinates respectively, with the usual lists of captured property, killed, wounded, and missing, prisoners of war taken and rescued, as also copies of all papers illustrating the campaign, all of which are respectfully submitted by

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General.

## II.

### *Report of the Campaign of the Carolinas.*

Headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
Goldsboro', N. C., April 4th, 1865. }

GENERAL,—I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months connected with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as clear an understanding of the late campaign as the case admits of. The reports of the subordinate commanders will enable you to fill up the picture.

I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was enabled to leave in the West an army under Major General George H. Thomas of sufficient strength to meet emergencies in that quarter, while in person I conducted another army, composed of the 14th, 15th, 17th, and 20th Corps, and Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to the Atlantic slope, aiming to approach the grand theatre of war in Virginia by the time the season would admit of military operations in that latitude. The first lodgment on the coast was made at Savannah, strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a good sea-port, with its navigable stream inland. Near a month was consumed there in refitting the army, and in making the proper disposition of captured property, and other local matters; but by the 15th of January I was all ready to resume the march. Preliminary to this, General Howard, commanding the right wing, was ordered to embark his command at Thunderbolt, transport it to Beaufort, South Carolina, and thence by the 15th of January make a lodgment on the Charleston Railroad at or near Pocotaligo. This was accomplished punctually, at little cost, by the 17th Corps, Major General Blair, and a dépôt for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.



The left wing, Major General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major General Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosabatchie, South Carolina, with a *dépôt* of supplies at Pureysburg or State's Ferry, on the Savannah River. General Slocum had a good pontoon bridge constructed opposite the city, and the "Union Causeway," leading through the low rice-fields opposite Savannah, was repaired and "corduroyed;" but before the time appointed to start, the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge, overflowed the whole "bottom," so that the causeway was four feet under water, and General Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the Savannah River. He moved up to Sister's Ferry, but even there the river, with its overflowed bottoms, was near three miles wide, and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week of February.

In the mean time General Grant had sent me Grover's division of the 19th Corps to garrison Savannah, and had drawn the 23d Corps, Major General Schofield, from Tennessee, and sent it to re-enforce the commands of Major Generals Terry and Palmer, operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.

On the 18th of January I transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, imparted to him my plans of operation, and instructed him how to follow my movements inland by occupying in succession the city of Charleston and such other points along the sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. The combined naval and land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had, on the 15th of January, captured Fort Fisher and the Rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear River, giving me an additional point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already resolved in my own mind, and had so advised General Grant, that I would undertake at one stride to make Goldsboro', and open communication with the sea by the Newbern Railroad, and had ordered Colonel W. W. Wright, superintendent of military railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern, and to be prepared to extend the railroad out from Newbern to Goldsboro' by the 15th of March.

On the 19th of January all preparations were complete, and the orders of march were given. My chief quartermaster and Commissary Generals Easton and Beckwith were ordered to complete the supplies at Sister's Ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise, looking for my arrival at Goldsboro', North Carolina, about March 15th, and opening communication with me from Morehead City.

On the 22d of January I embarked from Savannah for Hilton Head, where I held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, United States Navy, and Major General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, and next proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotaligo, where the 17th Corps, Major General Blair, was encamped. The 15th Corps was somewhat scattered—Wood's and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, John E. Smith marching from Savannah by the coast road,

and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the storms and freshet in the river. On the 25th a demonstration was made against the Combahee Ferry and Railroad Bridge across the Salkahatchie, merely to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against our supposed *objective*, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitred the line in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river, so that water stood in the swamps for a breadth of more than a mile at a depth of from one to twenty feet. Not having the remotest intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by seeming preparations to cross over, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest our advance on Charleston. On the 27th I rode to the camp of General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tullafinney and Coosahatchie Rivers, and directed those places to be evacuated, as no longer of any use to us. That division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep up the feints already begun, until we should, with the right wing, move higher up and cross the Salkahatchie about River's or Broxton's Bridge.

On the 29th I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become sufficiently free of the flood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in motion, and that he was already approaching Sister's Ferry, whither a gun-boat, the Pontiac, Captain Luce, kindly furnished by Admiral Dahlgren, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the mean time three divisions of the 15th Corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its wagons and was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one corps, the 17th, along the Salkahatchie, as high up as River's Bridge, and the other, the 15th, by Hickory Hill, Loper's Cross-roads, Anglesey Post-office, and Beaufort's Bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo, feigning at the Salkahatchie Railroad Bridge and Ferry, until our movement turned the enemy's position and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.

The 17th and 15th Corps drew out of camp on the 31st of January, but the real march began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had for weeks been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled trees were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the 2d of February the 15th Corps reached Loper's Cross-roads, and the 17th was at River's Bridge. From Loper's Cross-roads I communicated with General Slocum, still struggling with the floods of the Savannah River at Sister's Ferry. He had two divisions of the 20th Corps, General Williams's, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his pontoons the cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Beaufort's Bridge by way of Lawtonville and Allandale, Kilpatrick to Blackville *via* Barnwell, and General Slocum to hurry the crossing at Sister's Ferry as much as possible, and overtake the right wing on the South Carolina



Railroad. General Howard, with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkahatchie and push rapidly for the South Carolina Railroad at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkahatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at River's and Beaufort's Bridges. The 17th Corps was ordered to carry River's Bridge, and the 15th Corps Beaufort's Bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skilfully by Mower's and Giles A. Smith's divisions of the 17th Corps, on the 3d of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather was bitter cold, and Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgment below the bridge, and turned on the Rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it in confusion and disorder toward Branchville. Our casualties were 1 officer and 17 men killed, and 70 men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkahatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina Railroad at Midway, Bamberg (or Lowry's Station), and Graham's Station. The 17th Corps, by threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge, and Walker's Bridge below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy railroad track. From the 7th to the 10th of February this work was thoroughly prosecuted by the 17th Corps from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the 15th Corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the mean time General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned towards Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to be drawn needlessly into a serious battle. This he skilfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterward at Williston and Aiken. General Williams, with two divisions of the 20th Corps, marched to the South Carolina Railroad at Graham's Station on the 8th, and General Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. The destruction of the railroad was continued by the left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the 11th of February all the army was on the railroad all the way from Midway to Johnson's Station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand, Aiken and Augusta on the other.

We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The 17th Corps crossed the south fork of Edisto River at Binnaker's Bridge and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the 15th Corps crossed at Holman's Bridge and moved to Poplar Springs in support. The left wing and cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders to cross the South Edisto at New and Guignard's Bridges, move to the Orangeburg and Edgefield Road, and there await the result of the attack on Orangeburg. On the 12th the 17th Corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg Bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth rampart, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one division (Giles

A. Smith's) close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Giles Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by four P.M. the whole corps was in Orangeburg, and had begun the work of destruction on the railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the 14th; and without wasting time or labor on Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no longer hold, I turned all the columns straight on Columbia.

The 17th Corps followed the State Road, and the 15th crossed the North Edisto from Poplar Springs at Schilling's Bridge, above the mouth of "Cawcaw Swamp" Creek, and took a country road which came into the State Road at Zeigler's. On the 15th, the 15th Corps found the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree Bridge (across Congaree Creek), with a *tête-de-pont* on the south side, and a well constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level, and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. Wood, who commanded the leading division, succeeded, however, in turning the flank of the *tête-de-pont* by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and following up the retreating enemy promptly, he got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree River in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled our camps from a battery on the east side of the Congaree above Granby. Early next morning (February 16th) the head of column reached the bank of the Congaree opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point. It was burned by the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front, we could see people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass's battery was firing at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots at the unfinished State-house walls, and a few shells at the railroad dépôt, to scatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that we needed. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed General Howard not to cross directly in front of Columbia, but to cross the Saluda at the factory, three miles above, and afterward Broad River, so as to approach Columbia from the north. Within an hour of the arrival of General Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of the left wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, and thence to take roads direct for Winnsboro', breaking up *en route* the railroads and bridges about Alston.



General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda near the factory on the 16th, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across Broad River, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's brigade of Wood's division, 15th Corps. Under cover of this brigade a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th. I was in person at this bridge, and at 11 A.M. learned that the Mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage and made formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone, 25th Iowa Infantry, commanding third brigade, first division, 15th Corps. About the same time, a small party of the 17th Corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. In anticipation of the occupation of the city, I had made written orders to General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy absolutely all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, dépôts, and machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and in company with General Howard rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it. Bales were piled every where, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city near the court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day, the 15th Corps passed through Columbia and out on the Camden Road. The 17th did not enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry did not come within two miles of the town.

Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smouldering fires set by Hampton's order were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which by midnight had become unmanageable, and raged until about four A.M., when, the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Wood, and others laboring to save houses, and to protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly "Roman stoicism," but from folly and want of

sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina. During the 18th and 19th, the arsenal, railroad dépôts, machine-shops, founderies, and other buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and destroyed to Kingsville and the Wateree Bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro'.

At the same time, the left wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad Rivers, breaking up railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across Broad River on the Spartanburg Road, the main body moving straight for Winnsboro', which General Slocum reached on the 21st of February. He caused the railroad to be destroyed up to Black-stakes Dépôt, and then turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba River. The 20th Corps reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the 23d. Kilpatrick's cavalry followed, and crossed over in a heavy rain during the night of the 23d, and moved up to Lancaster, with orders to keep up the delusion of a general movement on Charlotte, North Carolina, to which General Beauregard and all the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was also aware that Cheatham's corps of Hood's old army was aiming to make a junction with Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsboro'. From the 23d to the 26th we had heavy rains, swelling the rivers and making the roads almost impassable. The 20th Corps reached Hanging Rock on the 26th, and waited there for the 14th Corps to get across the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the river that the pontoon bridge broke, and General Davis had very hard work to restore it and get his command across. At last he succeeded, and the left wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.

In the mean time, the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro', and thence turned for Pea's Ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, the 17th Corps moving straight on Cheraw *via* Young's Bridge, and the 15th Corps by Tiller's and Kelly's Bridges. From this latter corps detachments were sent into Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad dépôt, stores, etc. A small force of mounted men under Captain Duncan was also dispatched to make a dash and interrupt the railroad from Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry, and, after a sharp night skirmish on Mount Elon, was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's Creek, which delayed the right wing about the same length of time as the left wing had been at the Catawba.

On the 2d of March, the leading division of the 20th Corps entered Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the next day about noon the 17th Corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee and burning the bridge at that point. At Cheraw we



found much ammunition and many guns, which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned, having only broken up in part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw.

Without unnecessary delay the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw and the left wing and cavalry at Sneedsboro'. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the 14th Corps, moving by Love's Bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued unfavorable and the roads bad, but the 14th and 17th Corps reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear River, burning the bridge. During the march from the Pedee, General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the 9th March his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton, detecting this, dashed in at daylight and gained possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men on foot in a swamp near by, and, by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp, and every thing, save some prisoners whom the enemy carried off, leaving their dead on the ground.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the United States Arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry United States Arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined, by the 1st regiment Michigan engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, chief engineer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy was here destroyed or cast into the river.

Up to this period, I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River ahead of me, and could therefore complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke in North Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skillful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville, I had dispatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill Church two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and

my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and on the morning of the 12th of March the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day, this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and General Schofield, at Newbern, my dispatches to the effect that on Wednesday, the 15th, we would move for Goldsboro', feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro', which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day, the gun-boat Eolus, Captain Young, United States Navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to and beyond Averysboro'. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro'. In like manner, General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's Dépôt and Goldsboro', and to hold four divisions light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion. The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmire. Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still, time was so important that punctually, according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on Wednesday, the 15th of March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear-guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning, the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward Goldsboro' through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map, it was manifest that Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and South Rivers, in hopes to hold me to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro'. Hardee's force was estimated at 20,000 men. It was necessary to dislodge him, that we might have the use of the Goldsboro' Road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was therefore ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink every where, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

The 20th Corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the



position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery armed as infantry (Rhett's) posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Casey's) by a circuit to his left that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which rapidly retreated back to a second line, better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery (Winnager's) well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of 20th Corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and, on advancing Ward's division over this ground, General Williams captured three guns and 217 prisoners, of which 68 were wounded, and left in a house near by with a Rebel officer, four men, and five days' rations. One hundred and eight Rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced, he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis's (14th) Corps on the left well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time, Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro' Road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by McLaw's Rebel division furiously, and, though it fought well and hard, the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that next morning he was gone, having retreated in a miserable stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry followed to and through Averysboro', developing the fact that Hardce had retreated, not on Raleigh, but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South River at a mill-dam to our right rear and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Averysboro', at 12 officers and 65 men killed, and 477 wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (108) left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South River, and took the Goldsboro' Road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the mean time, the wagon trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro'. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill Creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column, and camped the night of the 18th with him on the Goldsboro' Road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro', about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro' Road. Howard was at Lee's Store, only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward, to where the two roads came together and became common to Goldsboro'.

All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro' Road, which goes by way of Falling Creek Church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column, with a view to open communications with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Terry from Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment forward to the cross-roads near Cox's Bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum about six miles, when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of Rebel cavalry (Dibbrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the Rebel army, under General Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the 15th Corps, still back near Lee's Store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, and, with the three remaining divisions of the 15th Corps, come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's Bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro' on the 21st; and Terry was at or near Faison's Dépôt. Orders were at once dispatched to Schofield to push for Goldsboro', and to make dispositions to cross Little River in the direction of Smithfield as far as Millard; to General Terry to move to Cox's Bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to General Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek Church; and at daylight, the right wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports, I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March 18th, and first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole Confederate army, he promptly deployed the two divisions of the 14th Corps, General Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the 20th Corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery, and massed on the left. In this position, the left wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none.



Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the 19th, General Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the 15th Corps, which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right wing found Rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition, until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day before. This body of cavalry was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the 15th Corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsboro' Road, interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution until he had made strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by four P.M. of the 20th a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill Creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual, covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and all other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets and swampy obstructions.

Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the 21st of March. On the same day General Schofield entered Goldsboro' with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got possession of the Neuse River at Cox's Bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a brigade across; so that the three armies were in actual connection, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.

On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division of the 17th Corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and had nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course, there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and, it might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly, I ordered at once a general attack by our skirmish line from left to

right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still, he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the 22d, pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill Creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle.

General Slocum reports the losses of the left wing about Bentonville at 9 officers and 145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and 223 men missing, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, 1247. He buried on the field 167 rebel dead, and took 338 prisoners.

General Howard reports the losses of the right wing at 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. He also buried 100 rebel dead and took 1287 prisoners.

The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was 1646.

I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left wing during the afternoon of the 19th; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons.

Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the 21st, and had full possession of Goldsboro', the real "objective," with its two railroads back to the sea-ports of Wilmington and Beaufort, North Carolina. These were being rapidly repaired by strong working parties, directed by Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Railroad Department. A large number of supplies had already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the 22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the following day, all the armies to the camps assigned them about Goldsboro', there to rest and receive the clothing and supplies of which they stood in need. In person I went, on the 22d, to Cox's Bridge, to meet General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into Goldsboro', where I found General Schofield and his army. The left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and the right wing followed on the 24th, on which day the cavalry moved to Mount Olive Station and General Terry back to Faison's. On the 25th the Newbern Railroad was finished, and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from the dépôt at Morehead City full supplies to the army.

It was all-important that I should have an interview with the General-in-Chief; and, presuming that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General Schofield in chief command, and proceeded with all expe-



dition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, reaching General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the 27th of March. I had the good fortune to meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the Army of the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world, from which I had been in a great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I re-embarked on the navy steamer *Bat*, Captain Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and returned *via* Hatteras Inlet and Newbern, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsboro' during the night of the 30th. During my absence, full supplies of clothing and food had been brought to camp, and all things were working well.

I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to Goldsboro', but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate commanders and of staff officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be forwarded and filed with this report. I can not even with any degree of precision recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro', with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, etc. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course, the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast, from Savannah to Newbern, North Carolina, with its forts, dock-yards, gun-boats, etc., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply; but the real object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished on the 21st of March, by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro'.

In conclusion, I beg to express in the most emphatic manner my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal, or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I can not recall an instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities won," and I therefore commend all—generals, staff, officers, and men, for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders, and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them "to the front." I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington City, D. C.

## III.

*Gen. Sherman's Testimony before the Committee on the War.*

Washington, May 22d, 1865.

Major General Sherman being sworn and examined :

*By the Chairman*—Q. What is your rank in the army? A. I am major general in the regular army.

Q. As your negotiation with the rebel General Johnston in relation to his surrender has been the subject of much public comment, the committee desire you to state all the facts and circumstances in regard to it, or which you wish the public to know. A. On the 15th day of April last I was at Raleigh, in command of three armies: the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Tennessee; my enemy was General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate Army, who commanded 50,000 men, retreating along the railroad from Raleigh by Hillsboro', Greensboro', Salisbury, and Charlotte; I commenced pursuit by crossing the curve of that road in the direction of Ashboro' and Charlotte; after the head of my column had crossed the Cape Fear River at Aren's Ferry, I received a communication from General Johnston, and answered it, copies of which I most promptly sent to the War Department, with a letter addressed to the Secretary of War, as follows:

"Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 15th, 1865. }

"General U. S. GRANT and Secretary of War,—I send copies of a correspondence to you with General Johnston, which I think will be followed by terms of capitulation. I will grant the same terms General Grant gave General Lee, and be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy. If any cavalry has retreated toward me, caution them to be prepared to find our work done. It is now raining in torrents, and I shall await General Johnston's reply here, and will prepare to meet him in person at Chapel Hill.

"I have invited Governor Vance to return to Raleigh, with the civil officers of his state. I have met ex-Governor Graham, Messrs. Badger, Moore, Holden, and others, all of whom agree that the war is over, and that the states of the South must resume their allegiance, subject to the Constitution and laws of Congress, and must submit to the national arms. This great fact was admitted, and the details are of easy arrangement.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General."

I met General Johnston in person at a house five miles from Durham Station, under a flag of truce. After a few preliminary remarks he said to me, since Lee had surrendered his army at Appomattox Court-house, of which he had just been advised, he looked upon farther opposition by him as the greatest possible of crimes; that he wanted to know whether I could make him any general concessions; any thing by which he could maintain his hold and control of his army, and prevent its scattering;



any thing to satisfy the great yearning of their people; if so, he thought he could arrange terms satisfactory to both parties. He wanted to embrace the condition and fate of all the armies of the Southern Confederacy to the Rio Grande, to make one job of it, as he termed it.

I asked him what his powers were — whether he could command and control the fate of all the armies to the Rio Grande. He answered that he thought he could obtain the power, but he did not possess it at that moment; he did not know where Mr. Davis was, but he thought if I could give him the time he could find Mr. Breckinridge, whose orders would be obeyed every where, and he could pledge to me his personal faith that whatever he undertook to do would be done.

I had had frequent correspondence with the late President of the United States, with the Secretary of War, with General Halleck, and with General Grant, and the general impression left upon my mind, that if a settlement could be made, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the laws of Congress, and the proclamation of the President, they would not only be willing, but pleased to terminate the war by one single stroke of the pen.

I needed time to finish the railroad from the Neuse Bridge up to Raleigh, and thought I could put in four or five days of good time in making repairs to my road, even if I had to send propositions to Washington; I therefore consented to delay twenty-four hours, to enable General Johnston to procure what would satisfy me as to his authority and ability as a military man, to do what he undertook to do; I therefore consented to meet him the next day, the 17th, at twelve noon, at the same place.

We did meet again; after a general interchange of courtesies, he remarked that he was then prepared to satisfy me that he could fulfill the terms of our conversation of the day before. He then asked me what I was willing to do; I told him, in the first place, I could not deal with any body except men recognized by us as "belligerents," because no military man could go beyond that fact. The Attorney General has since so decided, and any man of common sense so understood it before; there was no difference upon that point as to the men and officers accompanying the Confederate armies. I told him that the President of the United States, by a published proclamation, had enabled every man in the Southern Confederate Army, of the rank of colonel and under, to procure and obtain amnesty, by simply taking the oath of allegiance to the United States, and agreeing to go to his home and live in peace. The terms of General Grant to General Lee extended the same principles to the officers, of the rank of Brigadier General and upward, including the highest officer in the Confederate Army, viz., General Lee, the commander-in-chief. I was therefore willing to proceed with him upon the same principles.

Then a conversation arose as to what form of government they were to have in the South? Were the states there to be dissevered, and were the people to be denied representation in Congress? Were the people

there to be, in the common language of the people of the South, slaves to the people of the North? Of course I said, "No; we desire that you shall regain your position as citizens of the United States, free and equal to us in all respects, and wish representation upon the condition of submission to the lawful authority of the United States as defined by the Constitution, the United States courts, and the authorities of the United States supported by those courts." He then remarked to me that General Breckinridge, a major general in the Confederate Army, was near by, and, if I had no objection, he would like to have him present. I called his attention to the fact, that I had on the day before explained to him that any negotiations between us must be confined to belligerents. He replied that he understood that perfectly. "But," said he, "Breckinridge, whom you do not know, save by public rumor, as Secretary of War, is, in fact, a major general; I give you my word for that. Have you any objection to his being present as a major general?" I replied, "I have no objection to any military officer you desire being present as a part of your personal staff." I myself had my own officers near me at call.

Breckinridge came a stranger to me, whom I had never spoken to in my life, and he joined in the conversation; while that conversation was going on a courier arrived and handed to General Johnston a package of papers; he and Breckinridge sat down and looked over them for some time and put them away in their pockets; what they were I know not, but one of them was a slip of paper, written, as General Johnston told me, by Mr. Reagan, Postmaster General of the Southern Confederacy; they seemed to talk about it *sotto voce*, and finally handed it to me; I glanced over it; it was preceded by a preamble, and closed with a few general terms; I rejected it at once.

We then discussed matters; talked about slavery, talked about every thing. There was a universal assent that slavery was as dead as any thing could be; that it was one of the issues of the war long since determined; and even General Johnston laughed at the folly of the Confederate government in raising negro soldiers, whereby they gave us all the points of the case. I told them that slavery had been treated by us as a dead institution, first by one class of men from the initiation of the war, and then from the date of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln, and finally by the assent of all parties. As to reconstruction, I told them I did not know what the views of the administration were. Mr. Lincoln, up to that time, in letters and by telegrams to me, encouraged me by all the words which could be used in general terms to believe, not only in his willingness, but in his desires that I should make terms with civil authorities, governors, and legislatures, even as far back as 1863. It then occurred to me that I might write off some general propositions, meaning little, or meaning much, according to the construction of parties—what I would term "glittering generalities"—and send them to Washington, which I could do in four days. That would enable the new President to give me a clew to his policy in the



important juncture which was then upon us, for the war was over; the highest military authorities of the Southern Confederacy so confessed to me openly, unconcealedly, and repeatedly. I therefore drew up the memorandum (which has been published to the world) for the purpose of referring it to the proper executive authority of the United States, and enabling him to define to me what I might promise, simply to cover the pride of the Southern men, who thereby became subordinate to the laws of the United States, civil and military. I made no concessions to General Johnston's army or the troops under his direction and immediate control; and if any concessions were made in those general terms, they were made because I then believed, and now believe, they would have delivered into the hands of the United States the absolute control of every Confederate officer and soldier, all their muster-rolls, and all their arms. It would save us all the incidental expense resulting from the military occupation of that country by provost-marshals, provost-guards, military governors, and all the machinery by which alone military power can reach the people of a civilized country. It would have surrendered to us the armies of Dick Taylor and Kirby Smith, both of them capable of doing infinite mischief to us by exhausting the resources of the whole country upon which we were to depend for the future extinguishment of our debt, forced upon us by their wrongful and rebellious conduct. I never designed to shelter a human being from any liability incurred in consequence of past acts to the civil tribunals of our country, and I do not believe a fair and manly interpretation of my terms can so construe them, for the words "United States courts," "United States authorities," "limitations of executive power," occur in every paragraph. And if they seemingly yield terms better than the public would desire to be given to the Southern people, if studied closely and well it will be found that there is an absolute submission on their part to the government of the United States, either through its executive, legislative, or judicial authorities. Every step in the programme of these negotiations was reported punctually, clearly, and fully, by the most rapid means of communication that I had. And yet I neglected not one single precaution necessary to reap the full benefits of my position in case the government amended, altered, or absolutely annulled those terms. As those matters were necessarily mingled with the military history of the period, I would like at this point to submit to the committee my official report, which has been in the hands of the proper officer, Brigadier General Rawlings, Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States, since about the 12th instant. It was made by me at Manchester, Va., after I had returned from Savannah, whither I went to open up the Savannah River and reap the fruits of my negotiations with General Johnston, and to give General Wilson's force in the interior a safe and sure base from which he could draw the necessary supply of clothing and food for his command. It was only after I had fulfilled all this that I learned, for the first time, through the public press, that my conduct had been animadverted upon, not only by the Secretary of War,

but by General Halleck, and the press of the country at large. I did feel hurt and annoyed that Mr. Stanton coupled with the terms of my memorandum, confided to him, a copy of a telegram to General Grant which he had never sent to me. He knew, on the contrary, that when he was at Savannah, that I had negotiations with civil parties there, for he was present in my room when those parties were conferring with me, and I wrote him a letter setting forth many points of it, in which I said I aimed to make a split in Jeff. Davis's dominions, by segregating Georgia from their course. Those were civil negotiations, and, far from being discouraged from making them, I was encouraged by Secretary Stanton himself to make them.

By coupling the note to General Grant with my memorandum, he gave the world fairly and clearly to infer that I was in possession of it. Now, I was not in possession of it, and I have reason to know that Mr. Stanton knew I was not in possession of it. Next met me General Halleck's telegram, indorsed by Mr. Stanton, in which they publicly avowed an act of perfidy—namely, the violation of my terms, which I had a right to make, and which, by the laws of war and by the laws of Congress, is punishable by death and no other punishment. Next, they ordered an army to pursue my enemy, who was known to be surrendering to me, in the presence of General Grant himself, their superior officer; and, finally, they sent orders to General Wilson and to General Thomas—my subordinates, acting under me on a plan of the most magnificent scale, admirably executed—to defeat my orders, and to thwart the interests of the government of the United States. I did feel indignant; I do feel indignant. As to my honor, I can protect it. In my letter of the 15th of April I used this language: "I have invited Governor Vance to return to Raleigh, with the civil officers of his state." I did so because President Lincoln had himself encouraged me to a similar course with the Governor of Georgia when I was in Atlanta. And here was the opportunity which the Secretary of War should have taken to put me on my guard against making terms with civil authorities, if such were the settled policy of our government. Had President Lincoln lived, I know he would have sustained me.

The following is my report, which I desire to have incorporated into and made part of my testimony.

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#### IV.

#### *General Sherman's Report of Operations in North Carolina, and Surrender of Johnston's Army.*

Headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, City Point, Virginia, May 9th, 1865. }

GENERAL,—My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the 1st of April, when the Army of the Ohio, Major Gen-



eral J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsboro', with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to the sea at Wilmington and Morehead City; Major General A. H. Terry, with the 10th Corps, being at Faison's Dépôt; the Army of the Tennessee, Major General O. O. Howard commanding, was encamped to the right and front of Goldsboro', and the Army of Georgia, Major General H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Brevet Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march from Savannah, and in replenishing clothing and stores necessary for a farther progress.

I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States, that the 10th of April would be the earliest possible moment at which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possible limit in order to fulfill that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot guage, we were limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four foot eight and a half inch guage already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major General Terry at Wilmington and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judicious use was made of these, and such industry displayed in the railroad management, by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and Colonel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, that by the 10th of April our men were all reloaded, the wagons reloaded, and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.

In the mean time, Major General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry operating from East Tennessee in connection with Major General George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my orders of January 21st, 1865, had reached the railroad about Greensboro', North Carolina, and had made sad havoc with it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying *en route* bridges, culverts, dépôts, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the break in the railroad down to the Catawba Bridge.

This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies, and as their ultimate line of retreat. Major General J. H. Wilson, also in command of the cavalry corps organized by himself under special field orders No. —, of October 24th, 1864, at Gaylesville, Alabama, had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tennessee; but the roads being too heavy for infantry, General Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the Confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able to receive, as yet, his full and

Weldon. Instead of losing by time, I gained in every way; for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear and improve the condition of our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed and we be forced to make the race of near two hundred miles to head off or catch Johnston's army, then retreating toward Charlotte.

At noon of the day appointed, I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although we had been interchanging shots constantly since May, 1863.

Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that farther war on the part of the Confederate troops was folly, that *the cause* was lost, and that every life sacrificed after the surrender of Lee's army was the "highest possible crime." He admitted that the terms conceded to General Lee were magnanimous, and all he could ask; but he did want some general concessions that would enable him to allay the natural fears and anxieties of his followers, and enable him to maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastations inevitably to result from turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the state.

He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the Confederate armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed to deal finally and authoritatively in regard to any other, but it did seem to me that there was presented a chance for peace that might be deemed valuable to the government of the United States, and was at least worth the few days that would be consumed in reference.

To push an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his inability to cope with me were cowardly, and unworthy the brave men I led.

Inasmuch as General Johnston did not feel authorized to pledge his power over the armies in Texas, we adjourned to meet the next day at noon. I returned to Raleigh, and conferred freely with all my general officers, *every one* of whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and dissolving army back toward Georgia, almost over the very country where we had toiled so long. There was but one opinion expressed; and, if contrary ones were entertained, they were withheld, or indulged in only by that class who shun the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest, and fiercest when danger is past. I again met General Johnston on the 18th, and we renewed the conversation. He satisfied me then of his *power* to disband the Rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command, namely, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia.

The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were, lest their states were to be dismembered and denied representation in Congress,



or any separate political existence whatever, and that the absolute disarming his men would leave the South powerless, and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.

President Lincoln's Message of 1864 ; his Amnesty Proclamation ; General Grant's terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefits of that proclamation to all officers above the rank of colonel ; the invitation to the Virginia Legislature to reassemble in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the approval of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, then on the spot ; a firm belief that I had been fighting to re-establish the Constitution of the United States ; and last, and not least, the general and universal desire to close a war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen the "memorandum" of April 18th, signed by myself and General Johnston.

It was designed to be, and so expressed on its face, as a mere "basis" for reference to the President of the United States and constitutional Commander-in-Chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the military power of the Confederacy which had threatened the national safety for years. It admitted of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into a usurpation of power on my part. I have my opinions on the questions involved, and will stand by the memorandum ; but this forms no part of a military report. Immediately on my return to Raleigh I dispatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock, to Washington, enjoining him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would be sure to infest him by the way, and to say nothing to any body until the President could make known to me his wishes and policy in the matter.

The news of President Lincoln's assassination on the 14th of April (wrongly reported to me by telegraph as having occurred on the 11th) reached me on the 17th, and was announced to my command on the same day in Special Field Orders, No. 56. I was duly impressed with its horrible atrocity and probable effect upon the country ; but when the property and interests of millions still living were involved, I saw no good reason to change my course, but thought rather to manifest real respect for his memory by following after his death that policy which, if living, I feel certain he would have approved, or, at least, not rejected with disdain. Up to that hour I had never received one word of instruction, advice, or counsel as to the "plan or policy" of government, looking to a restoration of peace on the part of the Rebel states of the South. Whenever asked for an opinion on the points involved, I had always evaded the subject. My letter to the Mayor of Atlanta has been published to the world, and I was not rebuked by the War Department for it.

My letter to Mr. N—— W——, at Savannah, was shown by me to Mr. Stanton before its publication, and all that my memory retains of his answer is that he said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently "emphatic, and could not be misunderstood."

But these letters asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclamations and messages, when the people of the South had laid down their arms and submitted to the lawful power of the United States, *ipso facto* the war was over as to them; and, farthermore, that if any state in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the United States, "cease war," elect Senators and Representatives to Congress, if admitted (of which each House of Congress alone is the judge), that state became *instantly* as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for this expression, though it was universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expenses of the war and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity of bringing the war to a close as soon as possible for *financial reasons*.

On the evening of April 23d, Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead City with dispatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsboro', was notified, so as to be ready in the morning for an answer. At 6 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of his coming over our exposed road for prudential reasons.

I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved, without reasons assigned, and I was ordered to give the forty-eight hours' notice, and resume hostilities at the close of that time, governing myself by the substance of a dispatch then inclosed, dated March 3d, 12 noon, at Washington, District of Columbia, from Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied by any part of the voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York journals of the 24th of April. That was the *first* and only time I ever saw that telegram, or had one word of instruction on the important matter involved in it; and it does seem strange to me that every bar-room loafer in New York can read in the morning journals "official" matter that is withheld from a General whose command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.

Within an hour a courier was riding from Durham's Station toward Hillsboro' with notice to General Johnston of the suspension of the truce, and renewing my demand for the surrender of the armies under his immediate command (see two letters, April 24th, 6 A.M.), and at 12 noon I had the receipt of his picket officer. I therefore published my Orders, No. 62, to the troops, terminating the truce at 12 M. on the 26th, and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that hour on the routes prescribed in Special Field Order, No. 55, April 14th, from the positions held April 18th.

General Grant had orders from the President, through the Secretary of War, to direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the troops, and he approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me, or express a wish to assume command. All things were in readiness, when, on the evening of the 25th, I received another letter from General Johnston, asking another interview to renew negotiations.



General Grant not only approved, but urged me to accept, and I appointed a meeting at our former place at noon of the 26th, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was delayed by an accident to his train, but at 2 P.M. arrived. We then consulted, concluded, and signed the final terms of capitulation.

These were taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General Grant, and met his immediate approval and signature. General Johnston was not even aware of the presence of General Grant at Raleigh at the time.

Thus was surrendered to us the second great army of the so-called Confederacy; and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without farther ruin and devastation to the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and challenge the instance during the past four years where an armed and defiant foe stood before me that I did not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I had ever insulted or struck a fallen foe. The instant the terms of surrender were approved by General Grant, I made my Orders, No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate commanders his share of the work, and, with General Grant's approval, made Special Field Orders, No. 66, putting in motion my old army (no longer required in Carolina) northward for Richmond. General Grant left Raleigh at 9 A.M. of the 27th, and I glory in the fact that during his three-days' stay with me, I did not detect in his language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and affection that have existed between us throughout all the varied events of the past war; and, though we have honestly differed in opinion in other cases as well as this, still we respected each other's honest convictions.

I still adhere to my then opinions, that by a few general concessions, "glittering generalities," all of which in the end must and will be conceded to the organized states of the South, that this day there would not be an armed battalion opposed to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States. Robbers and assassins must, in any event, result from the disbandment of large armies, but even these should be and could be taken care of by the local civil authorities without being made a charge on the national treasury.

On the evening of the 28th, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army commander and delegated to him the authority necessary for his future action, I dispatched my headquarter wagons by land along with the 17th Corps, the office in charge of General Webster from Newbern, to Alexandria, Virginia, by sea, and in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah to direct matters in the interior of South Carolina and Georgia. I had received across the Rebel telegraph wires

cipher dispatches from General Wilson at Macon to the effect that he was in receipt of my Orders, No. 65, and would send General Upton's division to Augusta, and General McCook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the surrender of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by the terms of surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for his horses in Southwest Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing, sugar, coffee, etc., by way of Augusta, Georgia, whence he could get it by rail. I therefore went rapidly to Goldsboro' and Wilmington, reaching the latter city at 10 A.M. of the 29th, and the same day embarked for Hilton Head in the blockade runner "Russia," Captain A. M. Smith. I found General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding Department of the South, at Hilton Head, on the evening of April 30th, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and small stores he could spare for General Wilson, and to open up a line of certain communication and supply with him at Macon. Within an hour the captured steam-boats "Jeff. Davis" and "Amazon," both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the Savannah River, were being loaded, the one at Savannah and the other at Hilton Head. The former started up the river on the 1st of May, in charge of a very intelligent officer (whose name I can not recall) and forty-eight men, all the boat could carry, with orders to occupy temporarily the United States Arsenal at Augusta and open up communication with General Wilson at Macon, in the event that General McCook's division of cavalry was not already there. The "Amazon" followed next day, and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders for a brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneaux, to follow by a land march to Augusta as its permanent garrison. Another brigade of infantry was ordered to occupy Orangeburg, South Carolina, the point farthest in the interior that can at present be reached by rail from the seacoast (Charleston).

On the 1st of May I went on to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined me, and the arrangements ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated.

At Savannah I found the city in the most admirable police, under direction of Brevet Major General Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified joy to hear that, so far as they were concerned, the war was over. All classes, Union men as well as former Rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political conditions to be attached to their future state. Any thing at all would be preferable to this dread uncertainty.

On the evening of the 2d of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time, received the New York papers of April 28th, containing Secretary Stanton's dispatch of 9 A.M. of the 27th of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's, from Richmond, of 9 P.M. of the night before, which seems to have been rushed with extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the 28th. You will observe from the dates that these dispatches were running back and forth from Richmond



and Washington to New York, and there published, while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting, to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable Rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi River. Not one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.

The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April 24th) been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Mr. Stanton, of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.

In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army would *not* fight, but, if pushed, would "disband" and "scatter" into small and dangerous guerrilla parties, as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the Rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the Rebel cause of the South was abandoned, that the negro was free, and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were withheld from the public with a seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography of the South, entitled my opinions to at least a decent respect.

Although this dispatch (Mr. Stanton's of April 27th) was printed "official," it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph headed, "Sherman's Truce Disregarded."

I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent him supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry out in Western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and paroling of prisoners made by General Johnston's capitulation of April 26th, and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace or war; but, as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate Generals to disobey my "orders," I explained to General Gillmore that I would no longer confuse him or General Wilson with "orders" that might conflict with those of the Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.

It now becomes my duty to paint in justly severe character the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's dispatch of April 26th to the Secretary of War, embodied in his to General Dix of April 27th.

General Halleck had been chief of staff of the army at Washington, in which capacity he must have received my official letter of April 18th, wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensboro' were "pushed" it would "disperse," an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from Washington to Richmond to command the new Military Division of the James, in assuming charge

of which, on the 22d, he defines the limits of his authority to be the "Department of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina *as may not be occupied by the command of Major General Sherman.*" (See his General Orders, No. 1.) Four days later, April 26th, he reports to the Secretary that he has ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright to invade that part of North Carolina which *was* occupied by my command, and pay "no regard to any truce or orders of" mine. They were ordered to "*push* forward, regardless of any orders save those of Lieutenant General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat." He knew at the time he penned that dispatch and made those orders, that Johnston was not retreating, but was halted under a forty-eight hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrender his command and prevent its dispersion into guerrilla bands, and that I had on the spot a magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required by the occasion.

The plan for cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burkesville and Danville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. When he contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made by competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone himself and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I was bound in honor to *defend* and *maintain* my own truce and pledge of faith, even at the cost of many lives.

When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.

As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as chief of staff or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts contained in his dispatch to the Secretary? No, he did not. If the Secretary of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and escape? No orders or instructions to catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever came to me; but, on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he should effect an escape from the country, if made "unknown" to him. But even on this point I inclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmington on the 25th of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis's movement, designed doubtless to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch *their* treasure for *their* own use.

I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and had acted on it *before* General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I do not believe a word of the treasure story—it is absurd on its face—and General Halleck or any body has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and cabinet with their stolen treasure through any part of the country occupied by my command.

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's dispatch is wherein he goes out of his way and advises that my subordinates, Gen-



erals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.

This is too much ; and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's Truce Disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the New York papers of April 28th.

During the night of May 2d, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the Department of the South, I began my return to meet my troops then marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the 3d we ran into Charleston Harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection ; also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullifinney camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is not *satisfied* with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false doctrine is again preached in our Union.

We left Charleston on the evening of the 3d of May, and hastened with all possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the 4th. I immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability ; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensboro' reported about thirty thousand (30,000) already made, and that the greater part of the North Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers, but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About eight hundred (800) of the Rebel cavalry had gone South, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be encouraged to go and stay ; they would be a nuisance to any civilized government, whether loose or in prison.

With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." When to the number of men surrendered at Greensboro' are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts, I have no doubt fifty thousand (50,000) armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation

made near Durham's Station, North Carolina, on the 26th of April, and that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.

On the 5th of May I received and here subjoin a farther dispatch from General Schofield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide the military remedy.

"By telegraph from Raleigh, N. C., May 5th, 1865.

"To Major General W. T. Sherman, Morehead City:

"When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been extended to embrace this and other states south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this state to trade at once. I hope the government will make known its policy as the organ of state governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done; the people are now in a mood to accept almost any thing which promises a definite settlement.

"What is to be done with the freedmen, is the question of all, and is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this state, it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it can not be done too soon; for he will probably undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from you freely when you have time to write.

"I will send your message to Wilson at once.

"J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major General."

I give this dispatch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters with the military, and how almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act a pure military part.

There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal with no other sort. The marshals and sheriffs with their *posses* (of which the military may become a part) are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and marauders. But I will not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject, but instance the case to show how difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of the rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel embarrassed by them.

General Schofield, at Raleigh, has a well-appointed and well-disciplined command, is in telegraphic communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all strategic points.

In like manner, General Gillmore is well situated in all respects, except as to rapid communication with the seat of the general government. I leave him also with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department; and General Wilson has in the very heart of Georgia the strongest, best appointed, and best equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my com-



mand; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of Savannah River that simplifies his military problem, so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.

I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for any "orders" they may have received from me; and the President of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and willing to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past; and I shall confine my attention to the army composed of the 15th and 17th, the 14th and 20th Corps, unless the commanding General of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.

At four P. M. of May 9th I reached Manchester, on the James River, opposite Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march toward Alexandria.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding.

General JOHN A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

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## V.

### *Testimony before the Committee on the War—Continued.*

Q. Did you have, near Fortress Monroe, a conference with President Lincoln, and if so, about what time? A. I met General Grant and Mr. Lincoln on board a steam-boat lying at the wharf at City Point, and during the evening of the 27th of March; I resumed my visit to the President on board the same steamer anchored in the stream on the following day, General Grant being present on both occasions.

Q. In those conferences was any arrangement made with you and General Grant, or either of you, in regard to the manner of arranging business with the Confederacy in regard to the terms of peace? A. Nothing definite; it was simply a matter of general conversation, nothing specific and definite.

Q. At what time did you learn that President Lincoln had assented to the assembling of the Virginia Rebel Legislature? A. I knew of it on the 18th of April, I think, but I procured a paper with the specific order of General Weitzel, also a copy of the Amnesty Proclamation on the 20th of April.

Q. You did not know at that time that that arrangement had been rescinded by the President? A. No, sir; I did not know that until afterward; the moment I heard of that I notified General Johnston of it.

Q. Then at the time you entered into this arrangement with General Johnston, you knew that General Weitzel had approved of the calling together of the Rebel Legislature of Virginia by the assent of the President? A. I knew of it by some source unofficially; I succeeded in getting a copy of the paper containing General Weitzel's order on the 20th or 21st of April.

Q. But at the time of your arrangement you did not know that that order had been rescinded? A. No, sir; I learned that several days afterward, and at once sent word to General Johnston.

Q. At the time of your arrangement you also knew of the surrender of Lee's army and the terms of that surrender? A. I had that officially from General Grant; I got that at Smithfield on the 12th of April; I have what purports to be a letter from you to Johnston, which seems to imply that you intended to make the arrangement on the terms of Lee's surrender. The letter is as follows:

"Headquarters, Division of the Mississippi, in the Field,  
Raleigh, N. C., April 14th, 1865."

"General J. E. Johnston, Commanding Confederate Army:

"GENERAL,—I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any time for the suspension of farther hostilities as between the armies commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column to-morrow to Morristown, and the cavalry to the University, and I expect you will maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

"Thus a basis of action may be had. I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-house, of the 9th instant, relative to the two armies, and furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my orders will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add, that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the state.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General."

Those were the terms as to his own army, but the concessions I made him were for the purpose of embracing other armies.

Q. And the writings you signed were to include other armies? A. The armies of Kirby Smith and Dick Taylor, so that afterward no man within the limits of the Southern Confederacy could claim to belong to any Confederate army in existence.

Q. The President addressed a note to General Grant, perhaps not to you, to the effect of forbidding officers of the army from entering into any thing but strictly military arrangements, leaving civil matters entirely to him? A. I never saw such a note signed by President Lincoln;



Mr. Stanton made such a note or telegram, and says it was by President Lincoln's dictation; he made it to General Grant, but never to me; on the contrary, while I was in Georgia, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to me encouraging me to discuss matters with Governor Brown and Mr. Stephens.

Q. Then you had no notice of that order to General Grant? A. I had no knowledge of it, official or otherwise.

Q. In the published report of your agreement there is nothing about slavery, I believe? A. There was nothing said about slavery, because it did not fall within the category of military questions, and we could not make it so. It was a legal question which the President had disposed of, overriding all our actions. We had to treat the slave as *free*, because the President, our commander-in-chief, said he was free. For me to have renewed the question when that decision was made, would have involved the absurdity of an inferior undertaking to qualify the work of his superior.

Q. That was the reason why it was not mentioned? A. Yes, sir; subsequently I wrote a note to Johnston, stating that I thought it would be well to mention it for political effect when we came to draw up the final terms with precision; that note was written pending the time my memorandum was going to Washington, and before an answer had been returned.

Q. At the time you entered into those negotiations was Johnston in a condition to offer any effectual resistance to your army? A. He could not have resisted my army an hour if I could have got hold of him; but he could have escaped from me by breaking up into small parties, or by taking the country roads, traveling faster than any army with trains could have pursued.

Q. Then your object in negotiating was to keep his army from scattering into guerilla bands? A. That was my chief object; I so officially notified the War Department.

Q. And not because there was any doubt about the result of a battle? A. There was no question as to the result of a battle, and I knew it; every soldier knew it; Johnston said in the first five minutes of our conversation that any farther resistance on his part would be an act of folly, and all he wanted was to keep his army from dispersing.

By Mr. Loan—Q. In your examination by the chairman you stated that you were acting in pursuance of instructions from Mr. Lincoln, derived from his letters and telegrams at various times? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any of these letters and telegrams which you can furnish to the committee? A. I can furnish you a copy of a dispatch to General Halleck from Atlanta, in which I stated that I had invited Governor Brown and Vice-president Stephens to meet us, and I can give you a copy of Mr. Lincoln's answer, for my dispatch was referred to him, in which he said he felt much interested in my dispatch, and encouraged me to allow their visit; but the letter to which I referred specifically was a longer letter, which I wrote to General Halleck from my camp on

Big Black, Mississippi, at General Halleck's instigation, in September, 1863, which was received in Washington, and submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who desired to have it published, to which I would not consent; in that letter I gave my opinions fully and frankly, not only upon the military situation, but also the civil policy necessary; Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly pleased with my views, and desired to make them public, but I preferred not to do so.

Q. And by subsequent acts he induced you to believe he approved of these views? A. I *know* he approved of them, and always encouraged me to carry out those views.

*By the Chairman*—Q. The following is a letter published in the newspapers, purporting to have been addressed by you to Johnston, dated April 21st, 1865:

“Headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi,  
in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 21st, 1865.”

“General J. E. Johnston, Commanding Confederate Army:

“GENERAL,—I send you a letter for General Wilson, which, if sent by telegraph and courier, will check his career. He may mistrust the telegraph; therefore better send the original, for he can not mistake my handwriting, with which he is familiar. He seems to have his blood up, and will be hard to hold. If he can buy corn, fodder, and rations down about Fort Valley, it will obviate the necessity of his going up to Rome or Dalton.

“It is reported to me from Cairo that Mobile is in our possession, but it is not minute or official.

“General Baker sent in to me, wanting to surrender his command, on the theory that the whole Confederate army was surrendered. I explained to him, or his staff officer, the exact truth, and left him to act as he thought proper. He seems to have disbanded his men, deposited a few arms about twenty miles from here, and himself awaits your action. I will not hold him, his men, or arms, subject to any condition other than the final one we may agree upon.

“I shall look for Major Hitchcock back from Washington on Wednesday, and shall promptly notify you of the result. By the action of General Weitzel in relation to the Virginia Legislature, I feel certain we will have no trouble on the score of recognizing existing state governments. It may be the lawyers will want us to define more minutely what is meant by the guaranty of rights of persons and property. It may be construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to the rights of slaves and leases of plantations on the Mississippi of vacant and abandoned plantations. I wish you would talk to the best men you have on these points; and, if possible, let us in our final convention make these points so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy. I believe if the South would simply and publicly declare what we feel, that slavery is dead, that you would inaugurate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface the ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in the South, and afford you abundance of cheap labor,



which otherwise will be driven away; and it will save the country the senseless discussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years.

"Although, strictly, this is no subject for a military convention, yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declarations of a result will be accepted as good law every where. Of course, I have not a single word from Washington on this or any other point of our agreement, but I know the effect of such a step by us will be universally accepted.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General U.S.A."

Q. This is the letter in which you say that it would be well to declare publicly that slavery is dead? A. Yes, sir, that is the letter.

By Mr. Loan—Q. Will you furnish the committee a copy of the letter written by you to Mr. Stanton in January last from Savannah? A. I will do so.

Mr. Chairman. And when the manuscript of your testimony is prepared it will be remitted to you for revision, and you can add to it any statement or papers that you may subsequently desire or consider necessary.

I have the above, and now subjoin copies of letters from my letter-book in the order of the bringing in the questions revised by this inquiry.

"Headquarters Middle Department of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18th, 1865.

"Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, or Major General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :

"GENERAL,—I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at the conference in the capacity of major general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to simply indorse the copy and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authorities of the United States, and disposes his army absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the disposition and dispersment of the armies is done in such a manner as to prevent them breaking up into a guerrilla crew. On the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agree to the mode and manner of the surrender of armies set forth, as they give the state the means of suppressing guerrillas, which we could not expect to do if we strip them of all armies.

"Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist in embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the states in detail. I know that all the men of substance in the South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare

five corps, and will ask for and have General Schofield here with the 10th Corps, and go myself, with the 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th, and 23d Corps, *via* Burkesville and Gordonsville, to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.

"The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed, to go home at work. I would like to be able to begin the march north by May 1st.

"I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is important to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well as our own.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

"Headquarters Middle Department of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18th, 1865. }

"General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. :

"GENERAL,—I received your dispatch describing the man Clark detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry, or he will be too late. The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on our troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses, but now it has softened down, and can easily be quieted. None evince more feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue, and he contended that the loss was most severe to the South, who had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend the South had.

"I can not believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical plot, but think it the emanation of a lot of young men of the South, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South the care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrious class as to us.

"Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would have dispersed and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now about Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me.

"General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at Columbus, Georgia, and he wanted me to arrest his progress. I leave that to you. Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our interest is to cease all destruction. Please give all orders necessary according to the views the Executive may take, and inform him, if possible, not to vary the terms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that the Confederate armies are dispersed. We can adjust all else fairly and well. I am yours, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

Lest confusion should result to the mind of the committee by the latter part of the above letter, I state it was addressed to General Halleck as chief of staff, when he was in the proper "line of order" to the Commander-in-Chief. The whole case changed when, on the 26th of April, he became the commander of the separate division of the James.

As stated in my testimony, General Grant reached Raleigh on the 24th, and on the 25th, on the supposition that I would start next day to



chase Johnston's army, I wrote him the following letter, delivered in person :

"Headquarters Department of the Mississippi, in the Field,"  
Raleigh, N. C., April 25th, 1865.

"Lieutenant General U. S. Grant,—Present :

"GENERAL,—I received your letter of April 21st, with inclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as you must have observed that I held the military control, so as to adapt it to any phase the case might assume.

"It is but just that I should record the fact that I made my terms with General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you extended to the army of General Lee, at Appomattox Court-house, on the 9th, and the seeming policy of our government as evinced by the call of the Virginia Legislature and governor back to Richmond under your and President Lincoln's very eyes. It now appears this last act was done without any consultation with you or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but, rather, in opposition to a previous policy well considered.

"I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our government, but would shun it as something not to my liking : but occasions arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper authority. It is possible that the terms signed by General Johnston and myself were not clear enough on the point well understood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to any parties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been remedied.

"No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of the antagonist was ever made without 'terms,' and those always define the military status of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officers and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence. I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition of the state governments in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusion, to await the solution of the future.

"Such action on one point in no manner recognizes for a moment the so-called Confederate government, or makes us liable for its debts or acts. The laws and acts done by the several states during the period of rebellion are *void*, because done without the oath prescribed by our Constitution of the United States, which is a condition precedent. We have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military results, and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to use the civil government in *actual existence* as a means to an end. I do believe he could and can use the present state governments lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired, viz., entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the United States.

"As to the punishment of past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts ; and, so far as I can,

I will use my influence that Rebels shall suffer all the personal punishment provided by law, as also the civil liabilities accruing from this past act.

"What we now want is the new form of law, by which common men may regain their position of industry, so long disturbed by the war.

"I now apprehend that the Rebel army will disperse, and, instead of dealing with six or seven states, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not for danger and its consequences. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General."

On the same day I wrote and mailed to the Secretary of War the following:

"Headquarters Middle Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 25th, 1865. }

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington:

"DEAR SIR,—I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21st to General Grant, signifying your disapprobation of the terms on which General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents on condition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing in a military convention any civil matter; but unfortunately, such is the nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, and I understand from you at Savannah that the financial state of the country demanded military success, and would warrant a little leaning to policy.

"When I had my conference with General Johnston, I had the public example before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature to assemble. I still believe that General Grant, of the United States, has made a mistake, but that is none of my business. Mine is a different task, and I had flattered myself that, by four years of patient and unremitting and successful labor, I deserved no reminder such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to General Grant.

"You may assure the President that I heed his suggestion.

"I am truly, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

The last sentence refers to the fact that General Grant had been sent to Raleigh to direct military movements. That was the first time in my life I had ever had a word of reproof from the government of the United States, and I was naturally sensitive. But all I said to any one was to General Meigs, who came with General Grant: "It was not kind on the part of Mr. Secretary Stanton." The fact known did not gratify my military conduct. The first interview with General Johnston followed, and the terms of capitulation were agreed upon and signed, and General Grant started for Washington bearing the news.

When, on the 28th of April, I received in the *New York Times* the most extraordinary budget of Mr. Stanton, which for the first time startled me, and I wrote to General Grant this letter:



"Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,  
in the Field, April 28th, 1865.

"Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. :

"GENERAL,—Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New York *Times* of the 24th instant, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, which is grouped in such a way as to give very erroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston of April 18th, with commentaries which it will be time enough to discuss two or three years hence, after the government has experimented a little more in the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the vast country known as the South. But, in the mean time, I do think that my rank (if not past services) entitled me at least to the respect of keeping secret what was known to none but the cabinet until farther inquiry comes to be made, instead of giving publicity to documents I never saw, and drawing inferences wide of the truth.

"I never saw, or had furnished me, a copy of Mr. Stanton's dispatch to you of the 3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey to me its substance, or any thing like it; but, on the contrary, I had seen General Weitzel in relation to the Virginia Legislature made in Mr. Lincoln's very person, and had failed to discover any other official hints of a plan of reconstruction, or any idea calculated to allay the fears of the people of the South after the destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them without any government at all.

"We should not drive a people in anarchy, and it is simply impossible for one military power to waste all the masses of this unhappy country.

"I confess I did not want to drive General Johnston's army into the hands of armed men going about without purpose, and capable only of indefinite mischief.

"But you saw on your arrival at Raleigh that I had my armies so disposed that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape; and as you did not choose to direct military operations in this quarter, I infer that you were satisfied with the military situation.

"At all events, the moment I learned—what was proper enough—the disapproval of the President, I wished in such manner to compel the surrender of Johnston's whole army on the same terms you had prescribed to General Lee's army when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.

"Mr. Stanton, in stating that my order to General Stoneman was likely to result in the escape of 'Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,' is in deep error.

"General Stoneman was not at Salisbury then, but had gone back to Statesville. Davis was supposed to be between us, and Stoneman was beyond him.

"By turning toward me, he was approaching Davis; and had he joined me as ordered, I then would have had a mounted force needed for that and other purposes. But even now I do not know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught. And as my official papers, deemed sacred, are

hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in this respect.

"As the editor of the *Times* has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn the inference from this singular document that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention. I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time have I risked my life, my health, and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints, to execute plans and purposes not to my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me plans and policy (if any there be) and expect me to guess at them; for facts and events appear quite different from different stand-points. For four years I have been in camp dealing with soldiers; and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other conclusion; and they will learn with pain and sorrow that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in common sense; that I, who have labored day and night, winter and summer, for four years, and have brought an army of 70,000 men in magnificent condition across a country deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted almost on the day appointed, have brought discredit on the government.

"I do not wish to boast of this; but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the press to be let loose on me.

"It is true that non-combatants—men who sleep in comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines—are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardly can hear from our families, or stop long enough to get our pay. I envy not the task of reconstruction, and am delighted that the Secretary has relieved me of it.

"As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer that on personal inspection your mind arrived at a different conclusion from that of Mr. Secretary Stanton. I will therefore go on and execute your orders to the conclusion, and when done will, with intense satisfaction, leave to the civil authorities the execution of the task of which they seem to me so jealous; but as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to follow my path; for they may see some things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

"With sincere respect,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding.

"P.S.—As Mr. Stanton's singular paper has been published, I demand that this also be made public; though I am in no manner responsible to the press, but to the law and my proper superiors.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

Since my arrival at Washington I have learned from General Grant that this letter was received, but he preferred to withhold it until my ar-



rival, as he knew I was making toward Washington with my army. Upon my arrival I did not insist on its publication till it was drawn out by this inquiry. I also append here the copy of a letter from Colonel T. S. Bowers, A.A.G., asking me to modify my report as to the point of violating my truce, with my answer.

"Headquarters Armies of the United States,  
Washington, May 25th, 1865.

"Major General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Middle Division of the Mississippi:

"General Grant directed me to call your attention to the part of your report in which the necessity of maintaining your truce at the expense of many lives is spoken of. The General thinks that in making a truce the commander of an army can control only his own army, and that the hostile General must make his own arrangements with other armies acting against him.

"While independent generals acting against a common foe would naturally act in concert, the General claims that each must be the judge of his own duty and responsible for its execution.

"If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you deem best.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant General."

"Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,  
Washington, D. C., May 26th, 1865.

"Colonel T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.:

"COLONEL,—I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25th last evening, and I hasten to answer. I wish to precede it by renewing the assurance of my entire confidence and respect for the President and Lieutenant General Grant, and that in all matters I will be most willing to shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past is beyond my control, and the matters embraced in the official report to which you refer are finished. It is but just the reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand on record; but in all future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decisions of General Grant, though I think them wrong.

"Suppose a guard has prisoners in charge and officers of another command should aim to rescue or kill them, is it not clear the guard must defend the prisoners as a safeguard? So jealous is the military law to protect and maintain *good faith* when pledged, that the law adjudges death, and no alternative punishment, to one who violates a safeguard in foreign ports. (See Articles of War, No. 55.) For murder, arson, treason, and the highest military crimes, the punishment prescribed by law is death or some minor punishment, but for the violation of a 'safeguard' death, and death alone, is the prescribed penalty. I instance this to illustrate how, in military stipulations to an enemy, our government commands and enforces 'good faith.' In discussing this matter I would like to refer to many writers on military law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter, No. xxvii.)

"In the very first article he states that *good faith* should always be ob-

hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in this respect.

"As the editor of the *Times* has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn the inference from this singular document that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention. I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time have I risked my life, my health, and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints, to execute plans and purposes not to my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me plans and policy (if any there be) and expect me to guess at them; for facts and events appear quite different from different stand-points. For four years I have been in camp dealing with soldiers; and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other conclusion; and they will learn with pain and sorrow that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in common sense; that I, who have labored day and night, winter and summer, for four years, and have brought an army of 70,000 men in magnificent condition across a country deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted almost on the day appointed, have brought discredit on the government.

"I do not wish to boast of this; but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the press to be let loose on me.

"It is true that non-combatants—men who sleep in comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines—are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardly can hear from our families, or stop long enough to get our pay. I envy not the task of reconstruction, and am delighted that the Secretary has relieved me of it.

"As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer that on personal inspection your mind arrived at a different conclusion from that of Mr. Secretary Stanton. I will therefore go on and execute your orders to the conclusion, and when done will, with intense satisfaction, leave to the civil authorities the execution of the task of which they seem to me so jealous; but as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to follow my path; for they may see some things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

"With sincere respect,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding.

"P.S.—As Mr. Stanton's singular paper has been published, I demand that this also be made public; though I am in no manner responsible to the press, but to the law and my proper superiors.

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"While independent generals acting against a common foe would naturally act in concert, the General claims that each must be the judge of his own duty and responsible for its execution.

"If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you deem best.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant General."

"Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,  
Washington, D. C., May 26th, 1865."

"Colonel T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.:

"COLONEL,—I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25th last evening, and I hasten to answer. I wish to precede it by renewing the assurance of my entire confidence and respect for the President and Lieutenant General Grant, and that in all matters I will be most willing to shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past is beyond my control, and the matters embraced in the official report to which you refer are finished. It is but just the reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand on record; but in all future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decisions of General Grant, though I think them wrong.

"Suppose a guard has prisoners in charge and officers of another command should aim to rescue or kill them, is it not clear the guard must defend the prisoners as a safeguard? So jealous is the military law to protect and maintain *good faith* when pledged, that the law adjudges death, and no alternative punishment, to one who violates a safeguard in foreign ports. (See Articles of War, No. 55.) For murder, arson, treason, and the highest military crimes, the punishment prescribed by law is death or some minor punishment, but for the violation of a 'safeguard' death, and death alone, is the prescribed penalty. I instance this to illustrate how, in military stipulations to an enemy, our government commands and enforces 'good faith.' In discussing this matter I would like to refer to many writers on military law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter, No. xxvii.)

"In the very first article he states that *good faith* should always be ob-

served between enemies in war, because when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an enemy. He then defines the meaning of *compacts* and *conventions*, and says they are made sometimes for a general or a partial suspension of hostilities for the 'surrender of an army,' etc. They may be *special*, limited to particular places or to particular forces, but, of course, can only bind the armies subject to the General who makes the truce, and co-extensive only with the extent of his command. This is all I ever claimed, and it clearly covers the whole case: all of North Carolina was in my immediate command, with General Schofield, its department commander, and his army present with me. I never asked the truce to have effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck himself, in his Order No. 1, defines his own limits clearly enough, *viz.*, 'Such part of North Carolina as was not occupied by the command of Major General Sherman.' He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's retreat toward Salisbury and Charlotte without invading my command; and so patent was his purpose to defy and violate my truce, that Mr. Stanton's publication of the fact, not even yet recalled, modified, or explained, was headed, 'Sherman's Truce Disregarded,' that the whole world drew but one inference—it admits of no other. I never claimed that that truce bound Generals Halleck or Canby within the sphere of their respective commands as defined by themselves.

"It was a partial truce of very short duration, clearly within my limits and right, justified by events, and, as in the case of prisoners in my custody, or the violation of a safeguard given by me in my own territorial limits, I am bound to maintain good faith. I prefer not to change my report, but again repeat that in all future cases I am willing to be governed by the interpretation of General Grant, although I again invite his attention to the limits of my command, and those of General Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's dispatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered his Generals to pay no heed to *my orders* within the clearly defined area of my command. I am yours, W. T. SHERMAN, Major General U.S.A. Commanding."

I now add the two letters written to Mr. Stanton at Savannah, and the dispatch from Atlanta mentioned in the body of my testimony, with Mr. Lincoln's answer:

'Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Savannah, January 2d, 1865. }

"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

"SIR,—I have just received from Lieutenant General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of 26th December relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Eaton, my chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

"I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer has been that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war and belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of it with my con-



sent; and that as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should help pay its expenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility was committed against the United States, some time in December, 1860, and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.

"My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department U.S.A. might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales, marks, etc.; the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale; but since the receipt of your dispatch I have ordered General Eaton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.

"Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York—representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul, but absent since a long time—called on me in person with reference to cotton claims by English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, and that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens; and that, for my part, I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and munitions of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the general government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line of investment of Savannah, which of course is destroyed, and for which he expected me to give him some certificate entitling him to indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

"I have adopted, in Savannah, rules concerning property, severe but just, founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments; and of clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no child's play.

"I embrace in this a copy of a letter dated December 31st, 1864, in answer to one from Solomon Cohen, a rich lawyer, to General Blair, his personal friend, as follows:

"Major General F. P. Blair, Commanding 17th Army Corps:

"GENERAL,—Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, I received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

"1st. No one can practice law as an attorney in the United States without acknowledging the supremacy of our government. If I am not in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a court to administer law that denied the supremacy of the government itself.

"2d. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant; or, rath-

er, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

"3d. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed, unless its temporary use be necessary for the military authorities of the city. The title to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated by the Courts of the United States.

"4th. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order, No. 143, it is a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of the United States," and all his property becomes forfeited to the United States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, family, and servants, and will be transported within the enemy's lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

"These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception will be made.

"I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant,  
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General."

"This letter was in answer to specific inquiries. It is clear and specific, and covers all the points; and should I leave before my orders are executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

"I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties claiming cotton or other property without the strongest evidence of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless some other positive end is to be gained.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,  
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding.

"Headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi,  
in the Field, Savannah, January 19th, 1865."

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

"SIR,—When you left Savannah, a few days ago, you forgot the map which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by which his division entered the city of Savannah, being the first troops to occupy that city. I now send it to you. I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro settlements. Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come, and I am satisfied that a little judicious handling, and by a little respect being paid to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's dominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth that slavery, as an institution, is defunct, and the only questions that remain are, what disposition shall be made of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower operations of time. We have given the initiative, and can afford to wait the working of the experiment.



"As to trade matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to which they have been hitherto accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, I think, be able to manage this matter judiciously, and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in large quantities.

"But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on that score, for the Rebels would at once make use of it as a power against us. We should assume a tone of perfect contempt for cotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object of the war—the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and power. If the Rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play into our hands, by taking away the only product of value they now have to exchange in foreign ports for war ships and munitions. By such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of the large class of small farmers that look to their little parcels of cotton to exchange for food and clothing for their families. I hope the government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in large quantities, and, especially, that the President will not indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in such a form as to amount to an order for me to facilitate their execution.

"As to treasury trade agents and agents to take charge of confiscated and abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only say that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their powers and duties. I rather think the Quartermaster's Department of the army could better fulfill all their duties, and accomplish all that is aimed at by the law. Yet, on this subject, I will leave Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

"Headquarters of the Middle Division of the Mississippi, }  
in the Field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 15th, 1864. }

"Major General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :

"My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few more of the subordinate reports. I am awaiting a courier from General Grant. All well, and troops in fine healthy camps, and supplies coming forward finely. Governor Brown has disbanded his militia to gather the corn and sorghum of the state. I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, and I have sent them a hearty invitation. I will exchange two thousand prisoners with Hood, but no more.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

"Washington, D. C., September 17th, 1864—10 A.M.

"MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN,—I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch mentioning corn and sorghum, and contemplated a visit to you.  
A. LINCOLN, President U.S."

"I have not possession here of all my official records, most of which are out West, and I have selected the above from my more recent letter books, and I offer them to show how prompt and full have been my official reports, and how unnecessary was all the clamor made touching my action and opinions at the time the basis of agreement of April 18th was submitted to the President.

"All of which is most respectfully submitted,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General United States Army.

## VI.

### *Major General Barry's Report of the Campaign of the Carolinas.*

Artillery Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
Goldsboro', N. C., March 31st, 1865.

GENERAL,—I have the honor to report the operations of the artillery of the armies under your command during the Carolina campaign of February and March, 1865.

In consideration of the peculiarities of the campaign, involving long and rapid marches over bad roads, and at an inclement season of the year, the same precautions which were so advantageously taken for your Savannah campaign of last autumn were again observed. The number of guns was reduced to one per thousand effective bayonets, and each artillery carriage was provided with eight draught animals.

The whole number of field batteries was sixteen, comprising sixty-eight guns, which were distributed and of calibres as follows :

	20-pounder Parrots.	12-pounders	3-inch Rifles.	Total.
Right Wing { 15th Army Corps ....	4	10	4	18
{ 17th Army Corps ....		4	10	14
Left Wing { 14th Army Corps ....		8	8	16
{ 20th Army Corps ....		8	8	16
Cavalry Division .....			4	4
Total .....	4	30	34	68

Including the reserve supply, each gun was furnished with three hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition.

A careful and critical personal inspection, made a few days preceding our departure from Savannah, satisfied me that in all essentials the artillery was in excellent condition for any kind of work. The result fully justified these expectations. During the whole march the artillery supplied itself, unaided by infantry or cavalry, with provisions for its officers and men, forage for its animals, and, to a great extent, with fresh horses and mules captured in the country. A tabular statement is appended to this report, showing the extent to which this unusual artillery service was performed.

No gun or artillery carriage of any description was abandoned, dis-



abled, or at any time even a temporary impediment to the march of the infantry columns—a fact the more creditable to the artillery, since in many places the roads were of the worst possible description.

Although the nature of your operations did not, except at the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonville, call for any general use of artillery, yet in support of skirmish lines, brushing away cavalry, and covering the crossings of several difficult and important rivers, it was advantageously used at the following named times and places, namely :

- January 20th, 1865, Pocotaligo, 17th Army Corps.
- January 22d, 1865, Combahee, 15th Army Corps.
- January 29th, 1865, Robertsville, 20th Army Corps.
- February 1st, 1865, Hickory Hill, 15th Army Corps.
- February 2d, 1865, Lawtonville, 20th Army Corps.
- February 2d, 1865, Whippy Swamp, 17th Army Corps.
- February 3d, 1865, "Store" at Duck Creek, 15th Army Corps.
- February 6th, 1865, Little Salkahatchie, 15th Army Corps.
- February 9th, 1865, Binnaker's Bridge, 17th Army Corps.
- February 11th, 1865, North Edisto, 17th Army Corps.
- February 15th, 1865, Congaree Creek, 15th Army Corps.
- February 16th, 1865, Columbia, 15th and 17th Army Corps.
- February 17th, 1865, Columbia, 15th and 17th Army Corps.
- February 17th, 1865, Broad River, 15th Army Corps.
- March 16th, 1865, Little Rockfish Creek, 15th Army Corps.

At the battle of Averysboro', March 16th, the batteries of the 20th Corps were promptly and judiciously posted by Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of that corps, and by the precision and rapidity of their fire did most excellent service in dislodging the enemy from his intrenched line, and the consequent capture of three of his guns.

At the battle of Bentonville, March 19th, 20th, and 21st, it was the fortune of the artillery to play a more conspicuous part. The batteries of the 15th and 20th Corps were hotly engaged on the 19th, and after the first temporary advantage gained by the enemy, in which the 19th Indiana Battery, not by any fault of its own, lost three of its guns (one of which was recaptured next day), they poured in a fire so steady, rapid, and effective, that all of the enemy's frequently repeated assaults were successfully repulsed. On the 20th, and particularly on the 21st, the batteries of the 15th Corps lent most efficient aid in advancing our own lines, in repelling the enemy's assaults, and in inflicting heavy loss upon him. Both of these fields of battle give abundant proof of the precision of our artillery fire.

The following tabular statements will exhibit the amounts of provisions and forage, and the number of animals captured by the unaided labors of the artillery, the casualties among officers, enlisted men, and animals, the expenditure of ammunition, and the number of guns lost by us and captured by the enemy :

## PROVISIONS, ANIMALS, FORAGE, ETC.

By what Bat- teries procured.	Flour.	Corn Meal.	Bacon	Beef, etc.	Pota- toes	Corn.	Hay and Fodder.	Horses.	Mules
	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.		
20th Corps..	8,000	10,000	25,000	50,000	50,000	350,000	300,000	96	602
14th Corps..	3,000	5,200	4,360	8,065		217,920	91,800	53	85
15th Corps..	4,900	5,700	23,000	2,300	37,440	499,000	90,000	50	63
17th Corps..	2,000	3,200	18,000			218,000	106,000	50	33
Total.....	17,900	24,100	70,360	60,365	87,440	1,284,920	537,800	249	783

## CASUALTIES.

	Officers.				Enlisted Men.				Horses.		Mules.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
14th Corps....	1				4	6	1		25			
20th Corps....					1	14	1			3		
15th Corps....						5	3					
17th Corps....					1	1	1					
Cav. Div.....					1	1	13		10			
	1				7	27	19		35	3		

## EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION.

Command.	Number of Rounds.
14th Army Corps.....	1007
20th Army Corps.....	832
Army of Tennessee.....	1665
Total.....	3504

## GUNS CAPTURED AND LOST.

Place.	Number of Guns cap- tured from the Enemy	Number of Guns lost by us.
Columbia.....	43	
Cheraw.....	25	
Fayetteville.....	26	
Avery'sboro.....	3	
Bentons.....		2
Total.....	97	2

Of these all were serviceable, and about four fifths were field guns of recent and approved pattern.

If to the operations of your armies, the legitimate fruits of which they really are, be credited the guns captured at Charleston and Wilmington (excluding from the number of the latter those captured at Fort Fisher and the other forts at the mouth of Cape Fear River), the total artillery captured during the past ten months by troops under your immediate command will exceed 700 guns.

Throughout the campaign the ammunition, fuses, and primers proved unusually good and reliable, the only fault observed being sand cracks and insufficient bursting charges in a few of the twenty-pounder Parrott projectiles, want of care in the screwing of the Bohrmann fuse in twelve-pounder projectiles, and insufficient bursting charges in many of the Hotchkiss three-inch shell and case-shot. Ammunition and fuses re-



ceived from St. Louis Arsenal appear to be more complained of (especially the fuses) than that received from other places.

In conclusion, I am gratified to be able to commend the officers and men for attention to their duties in preparation for the field and for good conduct after entering it, for the details of which I respectfully invite attention to the sub-reports which will be laid before you.

The services of the following named officers give evidence of industry, intelligence, and gallant conduct, and entitle them to notice and reward, namely :

Major Osborn, 1st New York Artillery, Chief of Artillery Army of Tennessee; Major Reynolds, 1st New York Artillery, Chief of Artillery 20th Army Corps; Major Waterhouse, 1st Illinois Artillery, Chief of Artillery 17th Army Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Ross, 1st Michigan Artillery, Chief of Artillery 15th Army Corps; Major Houghtaling, 1st Illinois Artillery, Chief of Artillery 14th Army Corps.

I respectfully ask that each of these officers, who have also served faithfully and creditably through the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, be recommended for promotion by brevet.

The officers of my staff, Major Dickson, Inspector of Artillery; Captain Marshall, Assistant Adjutant General; Captain Merritt and Lieutenant Verplanck, Aides-de-Camp, at all times performed cheerfully and well the duties with which they were charged.

I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant,

WILLIAM F. BARRY, Brevet Major General, Chief of Artillery.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

## VII.

### *Report of Engineer's Department.*

The following reports are generously furnished me by Colonel Poe, chief engineer for the division, and are taken from reports made to his superior officers. They will indicate the nature and extent of the organization of the Engineer Corps, and the tools they had to work with. It will be understood by every one that this small body was utterly unequal to the amount of work required for so large an army; directed and guided by the engineers, the intelligence, patience, and energy of both officers and men of the body of the army, accomplished the rest.

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, }  
Chief Engineer's Office, Savannah, Ga., January 2d, 1865. }

GENERAL,—In accordance with your directions, I have the honor of submitting the following memoranda showing the engineer organization during the recent campaign from Atlanta, Ga., to Savannah, Ga. :

First, Engineer troops and troops of the line on engineer duty : 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, ten companies, 1500 men; 1st Missouri Engineers, five companies, 500 men; 58th Indiana Volunteers, (infantry) pontoniers, ten companies, 775 men : total, 2775 men.

Second, Pioneers: left wing, six divisions, each having a pioneer corps of the average strength of 100 men, 600 men; right wing, seven divisions, each having a pioneer corps of the average strength of 100 whites and 70 blacks, 1200 men: aggregate for engineer duty, 4575 men. Each of these pioneer corps carried a sufficient number of tools to work their full strength, and in the right wing they were supplied with a duplicate set, which was carried in wagons. In the left wing each brigade was provided with a tool wagon, loaded with about 350 intrenching tools. In addition to these, a good many tools were in the hands of the troops, but always within reach in case of emergency.

Third, Tool trains: the Michigan Engineers had a train of fifty wagons, of which twenty were loaded with tools, as follows: 1500 axes and helves, 1500 shovels, 700 picks and helves, 200 hatchets, and an ample supply of carpenters' and bridge-building tools, and extra saws and augers; also 100 hooks for twisting railroad iron, made upon a plan of my own. The remainder of the wagons carried subsistence and quartermaster's stores. The Missouri Engineers had a much smaller train, which was somewhat mixed up with the pontoon train, of which they had charge. They carried the following intrenching tools: 500 shovels, 500 axes; also an assortment of carpenters' and blacksmiths' tools.

Fourth, Pontoon trains: left wing pontoniers, 58th Indiana Volunteers (infantry), Colonel G. P. Buell commanding, strength, 775 men; materials, 51 pontoon boats (canvas) complete, 15 covers (extra), 10 anchors, 2000 lbs. rope, 37 horses, 505 mules, 54 government wagons, 3 ambulances, 2 tool wagons, 3 forges, 24 chess wagons, 16 balk wagons, 196 balk, 850 chess, and the necessary harness, etc., for the foraging teams. Length of bridge, by using small timber for balk, 850 feet. Right wing pontoniers, 1st Missouri Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel W. Tweeddale commanding, strength, 530 men; materials, 28 pontoon boats (canvas) complete, 28 boat wagons, 600 chess, 15 chess wagons, 196 balk (claw), 1 forge, 1 battery wagon, 2 tool wagons (a general assortment), 7 forage wagons, and a sufficient quantity of harness, rope, etc. Length of bridge, 580 feet. Total length of bridge, 1430 feet. About 3000 feet of bridge were built during the march. Respectfully submitted.

(Signed) O. M. POE, Capt. Eng'rs., Chief Eng'r. M.D.M.  
Major-General J. G. BARNARD, Chief Eng. Armies of the U.S. in the Field.

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## VIII.

### *Extracts from Colonel Poe's Report of Operations in the Campaign of the Carolinas.*

During the campaign from Atlanta to Savannah, our line of march was parallel to the water-courses; on this, it led at right angles to them all, and, as we expected, the difficulties encountered by us were much greater. It was chosen near the line of junction between the clay of the



uplands and the sand of the lower country. This line cuts the streams at the head of navigation on each. It was hoped and expected that along this line the best roads and the minimum amount of swamps and mud would be found. This supposition proved entirely correct, as we found whenever it was necessary to depart much from this line. Still, it involved an immense amount of bridging of every kind known in active campaigning, and some four hundred miles of corduroying. The latter was a very simple affair where there were plenty of fence-rails, but, in their absence, involved the severest labor. It was found that a fence on each side of the road furnished enough rails for corduroying it, so as to make it passable. I estimate the amount of corduroying at fully one hundred miles for each army corps. This is a moderate estimate, and would make, for the four corps, some four hundred miles of corduroying. The cavalry did very little of this kind of work, as their trains moved with the infantry columns.

The right wing built fifteen pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 3720 feet, the left wing built about 4000 feet; being a total of  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles. There were no measurements of the amount of trestle-bridge built, but it was not so great.

The corduroying and building trestle-bridges was all done by the Michigan Engineers, the pioneer corps of the several subdivisions of the army, and by the troops themselves. The pontoniering was all done by engineer troops—that for the right wing being done by the Missouri Engineers, and that of the left wing by the 58th Indiana. The engineer organization was as follows:

Captain C. B. Reese, United States Engineers, chief engineer right wing; Lieutenant Amos Stickney, United States Engineers, assistant engineer right wing; Captain Kloslerman, United States Volunteers, chief engineer 15th Army Corps; Captain Kassak, A.D.C., chief engineer 17th Army Corps; Lieutenant William Ludlow, United States Engineers, chief engineer left wing; unassigned, 1st Regiment Michigan Engineers and Mechanics; pontoniers of right wing, 1st Regiment Missouri Engineers; pontoniers of left wing, 58th Regiment Indiana Volunteers. The Michigan Engineers were commanded by Colonel J. B. Yates, the Missouri Engineers by Lieutenant Colonel Wm. Tweeddale, and the 58th Indiana by Lieutenant Colonel J. Moore (late by Brigadier General G. P. Buell). To one and all these officers I am under great obligations for efficient performance of duty, but far more than to any one else am I indebted to Captain Reese.

Pioneers were not organized with any system, as frequently an entire army corps was simply a body of pioneers.

The right wing was provided with 600 feet of canvas pontoon bridge, and the left wing with 850 feet, but lost 250 feet at the crossing of the Catawba, when the bridge was carried away by high water.

Surveys have been made of the entire line of march of each army corps, as well as the route pursued by headquarters military division. The latter was a very careful survey, made by Captain H. A. Ullfers, A.A.G.,

on duty in my office. The bearings were taken with prismatic compass, and the distances measured with an odometer. These surveys will be embodied in a map as soon as possible.

We found the maps of South Carolina tolerably accurate, but those of North Carolina were almost worthless. I have seen two state maps of North Carolina, one dated 1833, and the other 1857. They vie with each other in inaccuracy.

Messrs. Dorr, Rockwell, Harding, and Platt, of the Coast Survey, accompanied me on the campaign. They had but little opportunity to do plane-table work, owing to our rapid marching. They made a survey of Pocotaligo, and are now engaged upon one of this place.

This seems to be the proper time and place to urge upon the bureau the necessity of making a great effort to have the Engineer Department put upon the same footing with regard to rank and pay as the Quartermaster's Department, the Commissary's Department, and the Medical Department. It is only an act of simple justice, and certainly a bill authorizing it can be passed through Congress.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

O. M. POE, Capt. Eng'rs., Bt. Col. U.S.A., Chief Eng'r. M.D.M.

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## IX.

### *Quartermaster Reports.*

It has been impossible to obtain a complete list of the supplies furnished the army by the Quartermaster's Department. It should be considered that this department was not called upon to furnish horses, mules, and other needs of a large army, in the same proportion that other armies required. The thousands of animals used in artillery, cavalry, and for transportation and food for men and animals, were taken from plantations as we passed. It is not an overestimate to say that the army must have been entirely refitted three times in this way in the course of the two late campaigns.

The first memorandum below of supplies provided is gathered from official papers kindly furnished me by the quartermaster general of the army, Major General Meigs.

For the reason that the army supplied itself from the enemy, renewing and adding to its stock of horses, mules, cattle, forage, etc., it was a most difficult task for the quartermaster general to make just estimates for the needs of the army when it should arrive at its new base. Under date of November 18th, there was ordered from New York 30,000 rations of grain and 30,000 rations of hay, to be forwarded daily until farther orders. On the same date there was ordered clothing for 30,000 men, and a supply of harness, wagons, ambulances, forges, etc. November 28th 150 barrels of salt were sent for use of animals.

As it appeared at this time that General Sherman was making for the



Atlantic coast, the shipment of supplies to Pensacola, which was one of General Sherman's alternatives, was stopped. It was not known where he would come out, and provision had been made for several places.

To those who are not familiar with the large figures which it is necessary to use in stating the amount of supplies furnished in a given time to the army, the following memorandum will appear enormous.

The statement of supplies forwarded from New York is furnished me by General Van Vliet, who has been, and is, at the head of the Quartermaster's Department in that city. When it is known that two thirds, if not seven eighths, of the supplies forwarded to the armies all over the country have gone through the New York office, I am sure the public will wonder at the perfect system, order, and quiet, which has characterized the performance of General Van Vliet's duties. The truth is, that the soldiers and the public are altogether too contented in feeling assured that the work has been done, and well done, to stop to inquire about the *savoir faire*. And it has been one object of the writer of this story, in introducing these figures, to show to the people that praise and honor is due to others in the service besides those who are actually in the *melee* of battle.

December 6th, 1864, General Van Vliet, at New York, was ordered to estimate for supplies for Sherman's force of 60,000 men, 10,000 cavalry, 60 pieces artillery, and 30,000 horses and mules. He was also ordered to ship 30,000 sack coats, 30,000 blouses, 60,000 shirts, 60,000 pairs of drawers, 60,000 pairs of socks, 100,000 pairs of boots and shoes, 20,000 forage caps, 10,000 great-coats, 20,000 blankets, 10,000 waterproof blankets, 10,000 shelter tents, 100 hospital tents, 10,000 knapsacks, 20,000 haversacks, 10,000 canteens, 20,000 camp kettles, 5000 mess pans, 5000 felling axes (two handles each), 1000 hatchets (two handles each), 2000 spades, 2000 picks, wheel harness for 400 mules, head harness for 800 mules, 10,000 lbs. bar iron (assorted), 500 lbs. steel, 1000 lbs. harness leather, 40 sets shoeing tools, 40 extra harness, thread, wax, needles, and awls, 500 lbs. wrought nails, 20 buttresses, 200 horse-rasps, 100 large files (assorted), 50 shoeing knives (extra), 4000 lbs. manilla rope, 200 extra wagon wheels (assorted), 50 ambulance wheels, 100,000 lbs. horse and mule shoes, 10,000 lbs. nails.

December 6th there were forwarded 50 extra key bits, 500 tent-pins, 200 wagon tongues, 400 extra whistle-trees, 50 extra double trees, 100 coupling-poles, 200 front rounds for wagons, 100 hind rounds for wagons, 200 mule hames ironed for use, 200 mule collars, 500 wagon bows, 100 wagon whips, 1000 open links for repairing trace-chains, 500 open rings.

*Statement of Subsistence Stores furnished from New York by Colonel H. F. Clarke, A. D. C. and A. C. G. S., U. S. A., under Requisitions of Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief Commissary of Subsistence General Sherman's Army.*

Date of Departure.	Destination.	Rations of											
		Pork.	Bacon.	Ham.	Beef.	Flour.	Bread.	Beans.	Rice.	Hominy.	Corn Meal.	Coffee.	Tea.
1864. Oct. 31 1865.	Pensacola Harbor..	143,200	36,896	3,220	36,000	87,000	249,950	147,900	119,400		8,000	218,900	14,000
Feb'y 8	Savannah, Ga.....	2,113,067	589,446	142,400	1,060,083	1,233,478	4,664,800	2,532,326	59,810	418,420		3,533,624	732,623
" 25	Beaufort, N. C.....	954,136	181,754	52,400	354,500	131,149	987,200	1,059,868				1,298,613	
March 9	Beaufort, N. C.....	1,734,937	391,025	86,800	714,220	534,568	2,358,750	1,479,075				2,792,139	
" 14	Beaufort, N. C.....	1,941,871	495,231	86,800	846,380	671,158	3,014,500	1,595,775				3,639,202	
" 30	Beaufort, N. C.....	2,415,206	593,415	86,800	1,045,420	854,032	4,517,050	1,713,975				4,305,602	
April 15	Wilmington, N. C...	1,047,736	770,390		178,560	490,506	1,967,900	498,635		501,190		4,324,100	
" 21	Beaufort, N. C.....					499,602	1,397,550					2,045,605	
	Total Rations..	10,350,153	3,058,157	458,420	4,235,163	4,501,493	19,157,700	9,027,554	179,210	919,610	8,000	22,147,785	746,623
		Barrels.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Barrels.	Barrels.	Boxes.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.
	Total in Bulk..	38,813	2,293,575	343,800	26,456	25,900	383,154	1,354,125	17,920	91,960	10,000	1,771,816	105,700

Date of Departure.	Destination.	Rations of										Remarks.
		Sugar.	Vinegar.	Candles.	Soap.	Salt.	Pepper.	Mo-lasses.	Dess. Potatoes.	Dess. Mixed Vegetables.	Whisky.	
1864. Oct. 31 1865.	Pensacola Harbor..	252,000	264,000	272,000	250,000	261,300	250,000		8800	27,000		
Feb'y 8	Savannah, Ga.....	4,011,265	2,063,000	3,009,800	3,046,500	6,118,998	3,750,000	7307	6000	1,631,700	176,390	
" 25	Beaufort, N. C.....	1,331,000	829,400	1,007,900	910,000	999,000	900,000				143,488	
March 9	Beaufort, N. C.....	3,655,469	1,928,900	2,255,000	2,610,000	3,183,000	2,100,000				277,984	
" 14	Beaufort, N. C.....	4,300,963	2,273,500	3,280,700	3,450,000	3,761,700	3,200,000				325,224	
" 30	Beaufort, N. C.....	4,540,963	2,607,500	4,794,400	4,100,000	4,206,100	4,100,000				344,552	
April 15	Wilmington, N. C...	2,078,554	721,600	1,981,300	2,000,000	3,139,300	2,000,000					
" 21	Beaufort, N. C.....	2,089,600				1,835,400						
	Total Rations..	22,259,814	10,687,900	16,601,100	16,366,500	23,504,798	16,300,000	7307	9800	1,658,700	1,267,638	
		Pounds.	Gallons.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Galls.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Gallons.	
	Total in Bulk..	3,393,970	1,006,879	207,513	664,044	881,426	40,750	22	918	103,668	39,614	



*Abstract of Stores moved by Water from New York City by Brevet Brigadier General Stewart Van Vleet, Quartermaster U.S.A., for the use of the Army of Major General William T. Sherman, from November 6th, 1864, to April 30th, 1865, inclusive.*

Destination.	Cannon and Howitzers.	Barrels of Powder.	Gun-carriages and Carriages, Battery Wagons, Forges, and Limbers.	Garrison Gins and Sling Carts.	Shot and Shell in Boxes.	Shot and Shell loose.	Ammunition in Boxes.	Ordinance Stores.	Artillery and portable Forges.	Locomotive Engines and Tenders.	Railroad Cars.	Railroad Iron Bars.	Railroad Chains, Troughs, and Braces.	Anvils and Vices.	Coal in Bags.	Army Wagons and Carriages.	Extra Wheels and Wagon Poles.	Hospital Stores.	Ambulance and Medical Wagons.
Pensacola, Fla. ....	22	250	21			1299	71	76	13						300	50	100	336	50
Savannah, Ga. ....			1	{ 4 gins 10 carts }	1,158			47									16		
Wassaw Sound. ....																			
Port Royal, S.C. ....	5	1430	57		11,022	2993	2936	7689						23	26	81	2375	7,109	50
Wilmington, N.C. ....								77						33			1,886		
Beaufort, N.C. ....							3000	688		5	16	7,509	781			90			77
Morehead City, N.C. .			4		220			26		6	14	12,989	5700			60		123	57
Newbern, N.C. ....							3980	312			30							719	20
Total. ....	27	1680	83		12,409	4292	9987	8915	13	11	60	20,498	6481	61	326	281	2491	10,172	254

  

Destination.	Harness and Leather in Boxes and Rolls.	Pole-drivers, Engines, and Machinery.	Telegraph Material (Wire, etc.).	Iron and Steel in Bars, Bundles, and Sheets.	Horse and Mule Shoes in Kegs.	Nails, Spikes, Bolts, Nuts, and Washers (in Kegs).	Axes, Adzes, Hatchets, etc.	Zinc, Brass, etc., in Sheets.	Shovels, Spades, and Forks.	Pails and Buckets.	Hardware, etc.	Paints, Oils, etc.	Clothing in Boxes and Bales.	Camp and Garrison Equipage.	Oats in Bags.	Corn in Bags.	Lumber in Pieces.	Sundry Q. M. Stores in various Packages.
Pensacola, Fla. ....	184			184	504	23					22		3,492	210			546	
Savannah, Ga. ....	675					1004					50		4,243	979	13,962	9,202		5
Wassaw Sound. ....															15,980			
Port Royal, S.C. ....			50	2740	1474	2012	466	1	465	534	204	28	8,422	1499	31,702	14,705		245
Wilmington, N.C. ....	17					20					62	32		12				46
Beaufort, N.C. ....	53	{ 2 p. drivers 3 engines }	100			104	180		639		26	101	3,081	571	4,742		18,940	355
Morehead City, N.C. .	98			815		3620	3	3	4	40	86		2,322		3,102		5,046	338
Newbern, N.C. ....	17		22	391		476	41	25			31	90	820				7,046	103
Total. ....	1044		172	4080	1978	7259	690	29	1108	574	431	301	22,350	3271	69,488	23,907	81,578	1092

The above stores were transported in 70 steamers, 2 ships, 7 barks, 5 brigs, and 44 schooners.  
The above report was prepared by T. M. Hempstead, Transportation Clerk.

## X.

*Commissary Stores furnished the Army.*

The subjoined statement shows the amount of supplies actually distributed by the Commissary Department from the time of the arrival of the army before Savannah until it arrived at Richmond.

In the first days at Savannah supplies were brought up the Ogeechee River, a stream shallow and unreasonably crooked. After the occupation of Savannah, they were brought forward in the first instance *via* Thunderbolt, and subsequently, when the obstructions were in some measure removed, directly up the Savannah River.

When the army arrived at Goldsboro' supplies for present need and for the future campaign were forwarded over a single line of railroad from Morehead City and Newbern

It must be remembered that, in all the lines of communication mentioned above—by water at Savannah, and the single line of railroad to Goldsboro'—that these were used by all the departments for forwarding material, the Quartermaster, Commissary, Ordnance, Medical, and others. The Commissary Department alone employed 950 citizens, which included clerks, mechanics, and negro laborers. Extensive details of soldiers were also employed. At Morehead City a regular detail for fatigue duty alone was made, of 400 for the day and 200 for night duty.

This brief sketch will show the great labor performed, and the credit due the subordinate officers of these departments of the army, who are too often unappreciated. The work mentioned above was performed under the immediate direction of Captain Roots, a competent, untiring, energetic officer, acting under the orders of Colonel Beckwith.



*Statement of Subsistence Stores delivered to General Sherman's Army from the time of striking the Atlantic Coast (about the middle of December) until they reached Richmond.*

Where issued.	Pork.	Ham.	Bacon.	Salt Beef.	Hard Bread.	Flour.	Beans.	Corn Meal.	Rice.	Tea.	Coffee.	Candles.	Brown Sugar.	White Sugar.	Vinegar.
	Bbls.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Bbls.	Pounds.	Bbls.	Pounds.	Bbls.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pnds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Gallons.
Savannah, Ga., and vicinity .....	10,313	94,983	148,197	4363	4,735,100	7,972	348,002	460	115,312	10,086½	525,015	49,640	945,245	118,120	28,624½
Kingston, Neuse River, and Goldsboro' .....	4,360	131,700	404,175	1320	3,704,825	4,586	171,688			6,484	589,075	30,675	659,186		11,554
Raleigh .....	2,705	24,900	85,200	1214	1,164,950	1,485					118,434	640	124,589		
Total .....	17,378	251,583	637,572	6897	9,604,875	14,043	519,690	460	115,312	17,170½	1,232,524	80,955	1,729,020	118,120	40,378½
Where issued.	Soap.	Salt.	Pepper.	Whisky.	Molasses.	Desiccated		Hominy.	Dried Beef.	Dried Peaches.	Dried Apples.	Pig's Feet.	Pig's Tongues.	Peaches.	Tomatoes.
	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Galls.	Gallons.	Vegetables.	Potatoes.	Pounds.	Pnds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Half bbls.	Half bbls.	Cans.	Cans.
Savannah, Ga., and vicinity .....	154,074	281,730	7,980	30,795	12,459½	27,160	29,520	94,359	27,758	1784	2028	16	4	6981	216
Kingston, Neuse River, and Goldsboro' .....	118,419	130,295	7,190	11,323		49,780		11,095							
Raleigh .....		13,836		240											
Total .....	272,493	425,861	15,170	42,358	12,459½	76,940	29,520	105,454	27,758	1784	2028	16	4	6981	216
Where issued.	Raspberries.	Assorted Jellies.	Cherries.	Blackberries.	Pickles.	Onions.	Hops.	Smoked Herring.	Mackerel.	Codfish.	Beef Cattle.		Hay.	Corn.	Fresh Potatoes.
	Cans.	Cans.	Cans.	Cans.	Gallons.	Pounds.	Pnds.	Boxes.	Barrels.	Pounds.	No.	Pounds.	Pnds.	Pnds.	Pounds.
Savannah, Ga., and vicinity .....	192	72	240	107	500	15,610	1426	392	148	63,059	1197	767,868	18,623	10,580	52,035
Kingston, Neuse River, and Goldsboro' .....									58	74,400					3,795
Raleigh .....															
Total .....	192	72	240	107	500	15,610	1426	392	206	137,459	1197	767,868	18,623	10,580	55,830

LOGAN H. ROOTS,  
Capt. C. S. U. S. Vols., and C. C. S. Dépôts,  
Military Division of the Mississippi.

## XI.

*Staff of General Sherman.*

General Sherman's personal staff in the field consisted of Major McCoy, A.D.C.; Captain Audenried, A.D.C.; Major Hitchcock, A.A.G.; Captain Dayton, A.D.C., but performing faithfully the arduous duties of adjutant general; and Captain Nichols, A.A.D.C.

In addition to those already mentioned, as a part of the staff, there were the following officers who transacted the important duties of the office at Nashville: Brigadier General Webster, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Sawyer, A.A.G.; Captain Rochester, A.A.G.; Captain Warner, A.Q.M.; Captain Coverdale, A.Q.M.; and Captain Jenny, A.A.D.C., in charge of the Engineer Bureau at Nashville.