

NATIONAL HISTORY
OF THE
WAR FOR THE UNION,
Civil, Military and Naval.

FOUNDED ON
OFFICIAL AND OTHER AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS.

BY
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Author of "National Portrait Gallery of Eminent Americans," "Cyclopedia of American Literature," Etc.

Illustrated with Highly-Finished Steel Engravings.

INCLUDING
BATTLE SCENES BY SEA AND LAND, AND FULL-LENGTH PORTRAITS OF NAVAL AND
MILITARY HEROES, FROM ORIGINAL PAINTINGS,

BY ALONZO CHAPPEL AND THOMAS NAST.

IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOLUME III.

NEW YORK:
JOHNSON, FRY AND COMPANY,
27 BEEKMAN STREET.

must have suffered heavily. My own loss, including cavalry, will perhaps not exceed twelve or fifteen hundred, though this is surmise, as the command is not yet organized. Captain Brownson, of my staff, was mortally wounded during the night. Colonel Walker, A. A. G., is missing. This is acknowledged to have been one of the most determined and desperate fights of the war, resembling Spottsylvania in its character, though the number engaged gives less importance to it. A few more good troops would have given a victory of considerable importance. I forward this forenoon prisoners from the field, from Wilcox's and Heth's divisions. Major Angel, of my staff, saw and con-

versed with two prisoners of Mahone's division, last night. I do not find them this morning. They said Mahone's division, with the exception of one brigade, was there." This engagement was undoubtedly a heavy disaster to the Union forces engaged—the losses numbering, it is said, about 2,000 prisoners and about 1,000 killed and wounded, with nine cannon of necessity abandoned to the superior force of the enemy, who, however, in their turn suffered heavily. But it did not affect the main object of the movement of which it was but an incident—the occupation of the Weldon road below Petersburg, which continued to be firmly held by General Grant.

CHAPTER C.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S GEORGIA CAMPAIGN—CHATTANOOGA TO ATLANTA,
MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1864.

WHEN General Grant, in March, 1864, was called to the head of the army with the rank of Lieutenant-General, and removed his headquarters to the army of the Potomac, the important department in the South, the immediate command of which he necessarily relinquished, was assigned to a well-trying officer, of consummate military experience and resources, Major-General W. T. Sherman. The latter by the order of the War Department of the 12th of March, was placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas. Major-General J. B. McPherson, also an officer of rare merit, was assigned to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. Major-General Thomas was in command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, and Major-

General Schofield of the army of the Ohio at Knoxville. By a subsequent order in April, Major-General Hooker was placed in command of the Eleventh and Twelfth consolidated Corps; Major-General O. O. Howard was assigned to the Fourth Corps, relieving Major-General Granger; Major-General J. M. Schofield to the Twenty-third Corps. Major-General Frank P. Blair having withdrawn the resignation as an army officer which he had tendered on taking his seat in Congress in January, was permitted by the President to resume his rank, and was appointed to the command of the Seventeenth Army Corps. Major-General John M. Palmer now held the command of the Fourteenth Corps, and Major-General John A. Logan of the Fifteenth, General George Stoneman was assigned to the command of a special cavalry force. Major-General John Newton was ordered to report

to General Thomas at Chattanooga, to be assigned to duty. With such men as these, and with numerous division commanders of tried merit in the field, General Sherman, at the beginning of May, simultaneously with the advance of the army of the Potomac at the east, began a campaign destined after several months of arduous effort, of most heroic exertion, to attain the object in view from the beginning—the capture of Atlanta.

This, next to Richmond, was the most important position, as a centre of military operations now held by the Confederacy; and not without reason were the two great armies of the Union at this time directed against these points. With the captures already made, the possession of these cities would assure complete military control of the States in rebellion. In an article on Sherman's projected campaign, while it was still being carried out, a Northern journalist presented this striking view of its main object:—"In the first place, it is Atlanta itself—a modern, well-built city, now approaching its twenty-first year, but still sooner to reach its freedom birthday. Laid out in a circular form, with a radius of about a mile, it contains within its strongly intrenched circumference (now that the war has brought an accretion of a fourth to its numbers,) a population of 20,000 souls. From its protected situation, deep in the interior of the Confederacy, it was chosen at the outset as a great military depot of supplies and of material of war, and, furthermore, as a great military workshop. In this respect it has no equal in the central zone of the Confederacy. It is the Richmond of the West. Here are arsenals, foundries, furnaces, rolling-mills, machine-shops, laboratories, factories, which have been busily supplying the Confederacy with munitions of war for the past three years. Here the finest and largest rolling-mill in the South has been turn-

ing out iron rails for roads, and armor-plating for iron-clads, the latter in great abundance. Here are factories for shot and shell, for pistols, powder, cartridges and percussion caps, for gun-carriages, for small arms, for equipments, wagons and harnesses, shoes and clothing, and for many other purposes useful to the rebel commissariat. Here also are railroad repair-shops of incalculable value to the enemy. At least 2,000 people keep this valuable machinery in operation. We, with our surplus Springfields and Lowells, do not appreciate how illy the enemy can spare this single city. As a depot of supplies, also as well as a manufactory, Atlanta has played an important part. But doubtless most of its stores and its completed goods, have already been prudentially removed. Next, Atlanta is one of the chief railroad centres in the Confederacy. Northerly runs the Western and Atlantic road to Chattanooga. Southwesterly, the Atlanta, West Point and Montgomery road, connecting the former point with the capital of Alabama, thence with Mobile on the South, and with the whole Mississippi Valley on the West. Southeasterly runs the important road to Macon, and thence to Savannah. Easterly, the road to Augusta, and again to Savannah and to Charleston. Besides these advantages, there is a topographical one of great importance. The chief military point in all the mountain region of this vicinity is Chattanooga. That we must continue to hold in force at all hazards. Its chief value, however, is in its defensive relation to East Tennessee, because from that point a column can easily throw itself on the communications of any hostile force which has passed through the mountain gaps to ravage the interior of the State. Accordingly, it is the key of all that lies behind its back, or, rather, it is the gate which closes up all that region from assault. But for penetrating Central Georgia,

Atlanta is the true starting point. Atlanta is as essentially the door of Georgia as Chattanooga of Tennessee. Till it is seized, only cavalry can be used by us further South, and their raids must be hurried, temporary, often ineffective, and always hazardous. Even a movable infantry column, like that famous one of Sherman which traversed Mississippi from Vicksburg to Meridian at the opening of this year, would be marched in this quarter with great peril, as the army in Atlanta could harass its rear. Now, betwixt these two main points extend the Alleghanies, ridging the whole face of the country into a mountainous formation. Lookout Mountain, Mission Ridge, Taylor's Ridge, John's Mountain, Dug-Down Mountain, and other parallel ranges, break up the region lying between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochee. So long as our base remains at Chattanooga, the enemy can always force us, in a southward march, to expend a campaign of several months in pressing him to Atlanta. We should have to fight him at long odds in such eyries as Buzzard's Roost, or turn him, as Sherman does, by flanking marches of 150 or 200 miles. But once carried, Atlanta is the new advanced position, and that labor is done once for all. To the southwest the country is still broken with the Alleghany chain, and due south of Atlanta is the formidable ridge of Pine Mountain. But, in the main, the region on the south and southeast is less rugged than that which Sherman's legions have already surmounted, and is less defensible."*

With this view of the military value of Atlanta we can better appreciate the heroic persistency with which General Sherman over a track of more than 130 miles by the most direct railway route, interposing many natural obstacles, affording ready means of resistance, and defended by a resolute foe, sought and obtained the prize. He had opposed to

him the second army in the Confederacy, inferior only to that of General Lee in Virginia, commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, one of the most experienced of the rebel officers, and especially chosen by President Davis as best capable to resist the progress of the Union forces in the southwest. Associated with Johnston were the corps commanders Major-Generals Polk, Hardee, Hood, and other well-trying leaders of the war. Numerically, the force of General Sherman was superior. He had at his command, at the start, according to his own official report, a grand aggregate of 98,797 troops, with 254 guns. Of these, 60,773, with 130 guns, were in General Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, in the following proportions: infantry, 54,568; artillery, 2,377; cavalry, 3,828. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee numbered 24,465, with 96 guns, including 22,437 infantry; 1,404 artillery, and 624 cavalry. Schofield's Army of the Ohio numbered 13,559, with 28 guns, including 11,183 infantry, 679 artillery, 1,697 cavalry. This effective force, General Sherman tells us, was maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness. The enemy's force was estimated by General Sherman at about 55,000 or 60,000, including about 10,000 cavalry under Wheeler. But to compensate for any inequality, the enemy had the advantage of position, their thorough knowledge of an intricate field of operations, an interior line of communication for supplies and reinforcements, while Sherman, at every move departing farther from his base as Johnston approached his, risked every thing on the issue of the campaign. "It must," wrote a correspondent from the field, recording the advance to Resaca, "have been apparent to General Sherman, before throwing his columns through this mountain pass, that the campaign into

* *New York Times*, July 26th, 1864.

Georgia must be either a victory or a Moscow for the Union Army. Victorious, the rebel cause in Georgia and the whole South is collapsed. Defeated, the enemy would have it in their power to inflict a heavy blow upon us, such as we have never experienced in the history of the war.*

Under these circumstances, General Sherman, having visited the several commands and fully organized his forces, reduced the trains to the absolute necessities of an army in the field, and otherwise provided for an active, fighting campaign, on the 2d of May set his army in motion in the advance from Chattanooga. The army moved in three columns, General Thomas, in front, advancing upon the line of the enemy on the railroad at Ringgold, while General Schofield with his own and Howard's corps moved down on the left from Cleveland; and McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, was prepared to execute a flanking movement on the right. Upon Thomas' advance, little resistance was made by the enemy at their outposts at Ringgold and Tunnel Hill, as they fell back to the stronger position a few miles beyond at Buzzard's Roost. This was a narrow gap in the mountains closing on the south the small valley beyond Tunnel Hill, through which the railway ran to Dalton. On the west it was guarded by the northern extremity of Rocky Faced Ridge, a continuous height of several hundred feet, running for some twenty miles parallel with the railway beyond Resaca. The enemy had planted their works across the valley and occupied the declivities on either side, effectually guarding the passage to Dalton. Several days were passed following May 8 in a reconnaissance of this position, with frequent skirmishing and demonstrations on the enemy. The details of this mountain warfare will, when fully nar-

rated, supply some of the most picturesque incidents of the war. A correspondent who was with the portion of the army which sought to gain a position upon Rocky Faced Ridge, thus describes one of these scenes: "General Hooker," he writes, "had hard fighting on the 9th, on the mountain crest. After skirmishing heavily all the fore part of the day, with his men deployed on the steep hill-sides, among rocks and inaccessible cliffs, he finally assaulted the enemy's position under a murderous fire. The rebel line was carried, and held for a few minutes, but, finding themselves exposed to a raking, plunging fire from a new position, they were compelled to fall back. About fifty men were lost in the assault, the larger proportion wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel McIlvain of the Sixty-fourth Ohio was killed, and each of the other commanders of the regiments engaged were wounded. Major Rust of the Twenty-seventh Illinois had been wounded early in the day. The men and officers behaved with the greatest gallantry, and after the repulse maintained their old position, though subjected to a very heavy fire. Throughout there was continued skirmishing on the west front of Rocky Face, General J. D. Morgan's brigade, the first of the Second Division Fourteenth Corps being still engaged, where they were sent in on the 8th. This made two days and a night in the mountains. The Sixtieth Illinois Volunteers pushed upwards at a position toward the southern extremity of the mountain, and some portion of the troops reached within fifty yards of the rebel riflemen, who fell back to the two gaps or depressions in the crest as the Union troops advanced. They finally reached a perpendicular cliff, under which the rebel sharpshooters could not reach them with their rifles, so they began to throw stones and roll rocks down upon them. Here they remained for some time, within speaking distance, the rebels call-

* Army correspondence, *N. Y. Tribune*. Camp South-west of Resaca, Ga. May 13th, 1864.

ing out to them in the choice phraseology of the chivalry. A corporal of the Sixty-fourth halloed to the rebels, and told them if they would stop firing stones he would read to them the President's proclamation. The offer was at first received with derisive yells; but they soon became quiet, and the corporal read to them the amnesty proclamation. When he came to some part they did not approve, they would set up a fiendish yell, as if in defiance, and then send down an instalment of rocks by way of interlude. But the corporal kept on, in spite of these uncivil demonstrations, and finished the document, when there was another outburst of yells, mingled with laughter, and the old business of tumbling down the rocks, and firing was again resumed.*

The same correspondent, writing a few days later, on the 13th, from the summit, says: "I have just climbed to the top of this ridge, 500 feet high, following the track of Harker's brigade, and of General Judah, who came up last evening. The top of this ridge is nothing but a mass of rock and ledges, a sort of hog's back, not wider than a wagon-track, along which only three or four men can march abreast. At intervals are abrupt and rugged ledges, so broken that a horse cannot travel, and men can only pick their way with difficulty. Our troops, led by the Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, of General Harker's brigade, took the heights yesterday, and advanced to a point one-third of the way along the crest. A mile further on is the cleared knoll used by the rebels for a signal station. Of course, it is impossible to put many men in position in such a place. The enemy have a strong rocky promontory of triangular shape, with an inside earthwork, so elevated above the rocky ridge immediately in front as to render artillery useless. Even musketry fire is wasted against

these rocks. One advantage to us is, that much of the enemy's fire passes over the heads of our men. Generals McLean and Wagner of the Fourth Corps are also up here, with evidently more men than can, by any possibility, be well used, except to guard against a flank movement, which seems to be anticipated, up a spur of the mountain near the center of our position. To guard against this, a mile of stone-wall has been constructed along the east edge of the crest, and McLean's brigade is drawn along it in two lines to repel any such attack. Firing is brisk in the front, and some wounded are coming to the rear, among others, Major Rust of the Twenty-seventh Illinois Volunteers, not dangerously wounded in the head; some half a dozen privates have also been wounded. The rebel position is a rocky castle, with no room to approach it on the flanks, except by clinging to the rocky sides of the mountain, where they are exposed to the fire of sharpshooters stationed in the trees and in the fort. General Harker is pitching into the place with a desperate pertinacity, but, I should judge, with poor chances of dislodging the enemy. With the enemy on this crest, the southern end of which leads into Buzzard's Roost Gap, no effort to capture or hold the latter position would be practicable. Hence the necessity of driving them out. A line of rebel works is visible in and extending across the valley to the east, which connects with earthworks on the hither slope of the opposite ridge. A battle in the Alps could only equal the contest now going on here, half-way to the clouds, among rocks and stony gorges of the hills. From this eyrie the whole country lies like a map beneath the eye, now, however, obscured by a thick haze which overspreads the lower hills and valleys. Cannonading is going on toward Buzzard's Roost, but there is no general engagement. The troops perfectly line the crest, lying down

* War correspondent E. S. of the *New York Tribune*. Near Rocky Faced Ridge, May 11th, 1864.

among the rocks until called into action. Having advanced to within about 400 yards of the rebel works, vainly endeavouring to get a view of the position through the trees, and finding the place dangerous, by the frequent arrival of leaden missiles, which pass over singing, or drop among the soldiers, I fall back in good order, to witness what is passing in the valley below. General McLean is about withdrawing his brigade to co-operate with the Twenty-third Army Corps; and General Wagner is moving one of his regiments down upon the left spur of the mountain, to intercept any rebel approach from that direction. One cannot visit this place without feeling how almost hopeless the task must be to dislodge an enemy thus intrenched by nature. The position may be turned, but it seems as difficult to capture as it would to storm the Palisades from the Hudson. The Engineer corps has been busy felling the trees, which have been converted into abattis to protect the steep sides of the hill, and a space of half a mile is thus laid bare, from which the view is magnificent."

While this skirmishing was going on with a loss of some 800 killed and wounded, chiefly in Geary's and Wood's divisions of Hooker's and Palmer's corps,* General McPherson, according to General Sherman's original intention, was making his way by Snake Creek Gap below, through Rocky Faced Ridge to Sugar Valley on the east opening upon Resaca, a position on the railroad about eighteen miles south of Dalton. "The possession of this," wrote Secretary Stanton in a dispatch to General Dix, "will place a strong corps of veteran troops in the rear of the enemy, while Thomas advances upon the front and Schofield closes in on the flank from Cleveland." The result answered the Secretary's prediction. The rebel General Johnston in consequence of this

flanking movement, fell back upon his next strong position at Resaca, which, in consequence of his direct route by the railway, he reached in advance of McPherson's arrival, leaving Dalton open to occupation by Thomas' corps. McPherson having secured the passage through Snake Creek Gap without serious opposition, was followed by the remainder of the army which now took up a position along the Sugar Valley several miles in extent, facing the enemy's line of works at Resaca.

"On the 12th of May," says General Sherman, in his admirable official report of the campaign—the only authentic narrative of these important military movements, "we moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca and drove them within their fortified lines and occupied a ridge of 'bald' hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, partly from the topographi-

* *Army and Navy Journal*, May 21st, 1864.

cal nature of the country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on 14th of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the Sixteenth Corps, commanded by General Sweeney, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down towards Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad below Calhoun and above Kingston if possible, and with the main army I pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp Creek near its mouth, and made a lodgment close up to the enemy's works, on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek Valley, threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down to it close on Resaca. General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a 4-gun battery and many prisoners. That night, Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned. The whole army started in pursuit General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca another 4-gun battery and a good lot of stores.

General McPherson during the 16th, got across at Lay's Ferry, General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield

had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fae's and Field's Ferries across the Connasauga and Coosawatta rivers, which form the Oostanaula. On the 17th, all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders a division, General Jeff. C. Davis, along the west bank of Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division in the advance had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions. General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston, to be in close support. On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville, with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him, again he retreated in the night time across the Etowah river, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river. Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days' rest, and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the means of cross-

ing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the 23d put the army in motion for 'Dallas.'

"General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas *via* Van Wert. General Davis's division moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road *via* Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General Thomas' left. General Thomas' head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory, and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had detected the move and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads. On the 25th of May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance, until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north

of Dallas about four miles. It was near 4 o'clock p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and, by my order, made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the 'New Hope' Church, where three roads meet from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church; but, having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well intrenched substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed towards our left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear. Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work towards our left, and, when all things were ready, to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in the reports of subordinate commanders. On the 28th, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelope the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas. Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave

the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, I renewed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the 1st of June, and, by pushing our left well around, we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. Both of these commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass.

"Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Ackworth and reached the railroad on the 6th of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison, and as soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail. At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the 8th of June with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle and the detachment left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston and Allatoona. On the 9th of June

our communications in the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty. Kenesaw, the bold and striking Twin Mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain, and beyond it in the distance Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochie. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits and preparing for the grand struggle impending. The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war, but the Chattahoochie lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full two miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

"By the 11th of June our lines were close up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. Dur-

ing a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the 14th, and on the morning of 15th Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's Creek, covering his railroad back to the Chatahoochie. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly. From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town. During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villainously bad, and the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.

"General McPherson, watching the

enemy on Kenesaw, and working his left forward, General Thomas, swinging as it were on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown Road. On the 22d, General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, the enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Williams' division of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Haskall's divisions of General Schofield's army. The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish lines, an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception, yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the 'Kulp House.'" Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the 'Kulp House,' and upon studying the ground, I had no alternative in my turn but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to "outflank." An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left center; because, if I could thrust a strong

head of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and center from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either part, it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the 24th of June, I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw, on the 27th, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnoissance; one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and another about a mile further south by General Thomas' troops. The hour was fixed, and all details given in Field Orders No. 28, of June 24th. On the 27th of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded. Our aggregate loss being near 3,000, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them. It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strong on the enemy's left; and on the 1st of July, I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and to rapidly throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry, across the Chattahoochie, and I also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

"General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July 2d, and the effect was instantaneous. The next

morning, Kenesaw was abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top. General Thomas' whole line was then moved forward to the railroad, and turned south in pursuit toward the Chattahoochie. In person I entered Marietta at 8½ in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. General Logan's corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochie; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched strong *tete de pont* at the Chattahoochie, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta. Here General Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July we pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's Ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochie, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Paice's Ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve; the enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochie. Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the 5th demonstrated the strength of the enemy's

position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochie River, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords. To accomplish this result, I judged it would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence; and, accordingly, I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochie, near the mouth of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time, General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the factories which had supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woolen factory, the nominal owner displayed the French flag, which was not respected, of course. A neutral surely is no better than one of our own citizens, and we do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses. General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and as I contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest up to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General McPherson's whole army. About the same time, General Howard

had also built a bridge at Powers' Ferry, two miles below General Schofield, had crossed over and taken a position on his right. Thus, during the 9th, we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochie, above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta; and Johnston abandoned his *tete de pont*, burned his bridges, and left us undisputed masters, north and west, of the Chattahoochie, at daylight of the 10th of July.

"This was one, if not the chief object of the campaign, viz.: the advancement of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochie; but Atlanta lay before us only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed, with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, etc., and more especially its railroads, which converge there from the four great cardinal points. But the men had worked hard, and needed rest, and we accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency, I had collected a well appointed force of cavalry, about 2,000 strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge on the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika. There is but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of trade and travel between Georgia and Alabama and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to break it up effectually, and thereby cut off Johnston's army from that source of supply and reinforcement. General Rousseau, commanding the district of Tennessee, asked permission to command the expedition, and received it. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochie, and as I had begun to manoeuvre on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the 10th of July. He fulfilled his orders and in-

structions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General Clinton en route ; he passed through Talladega, and reached the railroad on the 16th, about 25 miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that place ; also three miles of the branch toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. He then turned north, and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the 22d, having sustained a trifling loss, not to exceed thirty men.

The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoochee until the 16th of July ; but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons, and improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. General Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance, I ordered it to commence on the 17th ; General Thomas to cross at Powers' and Paice's Ferry bridges, and to march by Buckhead ; General Schofield was already across at the mouth of Soap's Creek, and to march by Cross Keys ; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta Road, at some point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson ; and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railroad. On the 17th the whole army advanced from their camps, and formed a general line along the Old Peach Tree Road. Continuing on a general right wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railroad on the 18th, at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division of the Fifteenth Corps, broke up a section of about four miles, and General Schofield reached the town of Decatur. On the

19th, General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur, and General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery ; and General Thomas crossed Peach Tree Creek, in force, by numerous bridges in face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy in more or less force, and skirmished heavily.

"On the 20th, all the armies had closed in, converging toward Atlanta ; but, as a gap existed between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead Road. During the afternoon of the 20th, about 4 P. M., the enemy sallied from his works in force, and fell in line of battle against our right centre, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road ; of General Hooker's corps next south, and General Johnson's division of General Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden, and somewhat unexpected ; but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail piles, which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's whole corps was uncovered, and had to fight on comparatively open ground ; and it, too, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his intrenchments, and the action in front of General Johnston was comparatively light, that division being well intrenched. The enemy left on the field over 500 dead, about 1,000 wounded severely, 7 stands of colors, and many prisoners. His loss could not have fallen short of 5,000 ; whereas ours was covered by 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing. The greater loss fell on General Hooker's corps, from its exposed condition. On the 21st, we felt the enemy in his intrenched position, which

was found to crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of Peach Tree Creek, his right beyond the Augusta Road to the east, and his left well toward Turner's Ferry on the Chattahoochie, at a general distance from Atlanta of about four miles. On the morning of the 22d, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest; but General Johnston had been relieved of his command, and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept across the strong and well-finished parapet of the enemy, and closed in upon Atlanta until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle, of about two miles radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished redoubts, which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta; and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abattis, and chevaux-de-frise.

"General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the railroad, with the Fifteenth Corps; General Logan, the Seventeenth, General Blair on his left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge on its right; but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge, was thrown out of line by the Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield, near the Howard House. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the Seventeenth Corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position, within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it

in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position, and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the Decatur Road, in the direction of General Blair's left flank. About 10 A. M., I was in person with General Schofield, examining the appearance of the enemy's lines opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by, known as the Howard House, where General McPherson joined me. He described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. I explained to him, that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division of General Blair's corps, as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad; and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by General McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. The General remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated a movement of the enemy on that flank, he mounted and rode away with his staff. I must here also state, that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta Road, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments

to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ulocofauhatchee rivers, tributaries of Ocmulgee, and General McPherson had also left his wagon train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments commanded by Colonel, now General Sprague. Soon after General McPherson left me at the Howard House, as before described, I heard the sounds of musketry to our left rear, at first mere pattering shots, but they soon grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time, the sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could longer be entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior force on our left flank, while he held us with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily transmitted orders to all points of our centre and right to press forward and give full employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12½ m., of the 22d, his Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, rode up and reported that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless, having two wounds. The suddenness of this terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I instantly dispatched a staff officer to General John A. Logan, commanding

the Fifteenth Corps, to tell him what had happened; that he must assume command of the army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before.

"Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and by a wide circle to the east had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and his right had swung around until it hit General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of the rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outwards. A space of wooded ground of near half a mile, intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured; but the last order ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel Wangelin's) of the Fifteenth Corps across from the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across on the double quick and checked the enemy. While Hardee attacked in flank, Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but fortunately their attacks were not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, who was somewhat 'in air,' and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division which held the apex of the hill, which was the only part that was deemed essential to our future plans. General Dodge had caught and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely, capturing many prisoners. Smith (General Giles A.) had gradually given up the extremity of his line and

formed a new one, whose right connected with General Leggett, and his left refused, facing southeast. On this ground and in this order the men fought well and desperately for nearly four hours, checking and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by 4 P. M. had almost given up the attempt. In the meantime Wheeler's cavalry unopposed (for General Garrard was absent at Covington by my order) had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel (now General) Sprague, covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of six guns, with its horses (Murray's), of the regular army, as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow, wooded road in that unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above; but most of the men escaped to the bushes. He also got two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described. About 4 P. M. there was quite a lull, during which the enemy fell forward on the railroad and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the two guns; he then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at that point which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, sent by General Lo-

gan's order to the extreme left. The other brigade, General Lightburn, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which a 20-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General Woods' and General Harrow's divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, that were on the right and left of the railroad.

"Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, I ordered certain batteries of General Schofield to be moved to a position somewhat commanding, by a left flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight and the woods beyond, to prevent his re-enforcing. I also sent orders to General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the Fifteenth Corps regain its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. The whole was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet; but at last the enemy gave way, and the Fifteenth Corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of view, and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us 3,722 killed, wounded and prisoners. But among the dead was Major-General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had it sent in charge of his personal staff back to Marietta on its way to his northern home. He was a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart

abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the army of the Tennessee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his reputation and that of his veteran army, and avenged the death of his comrade and commander. The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded, and about 1,000 well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at 3,240, of which number 2,200 were from actual count, and of these he delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce, sent in by him (the enemy) 800 bodies. I entertain no doubt that in the battle of July 22d the enemy sustained an aggregate loss of full 8,000 men. The next day General Garrard returned from Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges at Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow rivers, besides burning a train of cars, a large quantity of cotton (2,000 bales), and the depots of stores at Covington and Conyer's Station, and bringing in 200 prisoners and some good horses, losing but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having therefore sufficiently crippled the Augusta Road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon Road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in Atlanta.

"Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner entrenchments. I first ordered the army of the Tennessee to prepare to vacate its line and to shift by the right below Proctor's Creek, and General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta Road. About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about 2,000 good cavalry, but of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sandtown,

I shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon Road, simultaneous with the movement of the army of the Tennessee towards East Point. To accomplish this I gave General Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an effective force of full 5,000 men, and to General McCook I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, in the aggregate about 4,000. These two well-appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz., July 28th, they were to meet on the Macon Road near Lovejoy's and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this joint cavalry could whip all Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise fully accomplish its task, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet me, and explained the movement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of perfect success. At the very moment almost of starting, General Stoneman addressed me a note asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and Anderson, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There was something most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road, he might attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its proper flank of the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is a prisoner of war at Macon; but I know that he dispatched General Garrard's cavalry

to Flat Rock for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but for some reason unknown to me he went off towards Covington and did not again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard remained there until the 29th, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's cavalry and occupying their attention, but hearing nothing from General Stoneman, he moved back to Conyer's, where, learning that General Stoneman had gone to Covington and south on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of Walnut Creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main force appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, or in approaching Andersonville, but retired in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave consent to two-thirds of his force to escape back whilst he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about 700 men, and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adams, came in almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered; many were captured and killed, and the balance got in mostly unarmed and afoot, and the General himself surrendered his small command, and is now a prisoner at Macon. His mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.

"General McCook, in the execution of his part, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochie to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with

which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto station of the West Point road, where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion towards Campbelltown, which regiment fulfilled its duty and returned to camp by way of, and escorting back the pontoon bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta. These he burned to the number of 500, killing 800 mules, and carrying along others, and taking 250 prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it at Lovejoy's station at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and finding his progress east too strongly opposed, he moved south and west, and reached Newman on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in, and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures and cut his way out, losing some 500 officers and men. Among them a most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skirmishers on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochie, crossed and got to Marietta without further loss. General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break the enemy's communica-

tions, which, though done, was on so limited a scale that I knew the damages would soon be repaired.

"Pursuant to the general plan the army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines near the Decatur road during the night of July 26, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's Creek, and south to prolong our line due south facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the United States, Major-General Howard assumed command of the army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made *en echelon*, General Dodge's corps, Sixteenth, on the left, nearest the enemy, General Blair's corps, Seventeenth, next to come up on its right, and General Logan's corps, Fifteenth, to come up on its right and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as much ground due south from the flank already established on Proctor's Creek as was consistent with a proper strength. General Dodge's men got into line in the evening of the 27th, and General Blair's came into line on his right early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting house called Ezra church, near some large open fields by the poor-house, on a road known as the Bell's Ferry, or Lickskillet road. Here the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About 10 a. m. all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after awhile assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men construct them is wonderful, and is something new in the art of war. I rode along his whole line about that time, and as I approached Ezra church there was considerable artillery firing enfilading the road in which I was riding, killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field to

where General Howard was standing in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and walked up to the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith to see if the battery which enfiladed the main road and line of rail piles could not be disposed of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned to where General Howard was, and remained there until 12 o'clock. During this time there was nothing to indicate serious battle save the shelling by one or at most two batteries from beyond the large field in front of the Fifteenth Corps.

"Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated his game of the 22d, I had, the night before, ordered General Davis's division of General Palmer's corps, which, by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee, had been left, as it were, in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and thence toward Whitehall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line, hoping that in case of an attack this division would in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear, at an unexpected moment. I explained it to General Howard, and bade him expect the arrival of such a force in case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon. General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier-General Morgan commanded the division which had marched early for Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on our maps did not exist at all, and General Morgan was delayed thereby. I rode back to make more particular inquiries as to this division, and had just reached General Davis's headquarters at Proctor's Creek when I heard musketry open heavily on the right. The enemy had come out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and formed his masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground,

and after the artillery firing I have described, advanced in parallel lines directly against the Fifteenth Corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. His advance was magnificent, but founded in an error that cost him sadly, for our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and spite of the efforts of the rebel officers, his ranks broke and fled. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail piles only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners. These assaults occurred from noon until about 4 p. m., when the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands; as many as 642 dead were counted and buried, and still others are known to have been buried which were not counted by the regularly detailed burial parties.

“General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous as on the 22d, his corps being chiefly engaged; but General Howard had drawn from the other Corps, Sixteenth and Seventeenth, certain reserves which were near at hand but not used. Our entire loss is reported less than 600, whereas that of the enemy in killed and wounded not less than 5,000. Had General Davis's division come up on the Bell's Ferry road as I calculated, at any time before 4 o'clock, what was simply a complete repulse would have been a disastrous rout to the enemy; but I cannot attribute the failure to want of energy or intelligence, and must charge it, like many other things in this campaign, to the peculiar tangled nature of the forests and absence of roads that would admit the rapid movement of troops. This affair terminated all efforts of the enemy to check our extensions by the flank, which afterwards proceeded with comparative ease, but he met our extensions to the south by rapid and well constructed forts and rifle pits built between us and the railroad to and below

East Point, remaining perfectly on the defensive. Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee did not reach, I was forced to shift General Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards General Palmer's corps of General Thomas' army. General Schofield moved from the left on the 1st of August, and General Palmer's corps followed at once, taking a line below Utoy Creek, and General Schofield prolonged it to a point near East Point. The enemy made no offensive opposition, but watched our movements and extended his lines and parapets accordingly. About this time several changes in important commands occurred, which should be noted. General Hooker, offended that General Howard was preferred to him as the successor of General McPherson, resigned his command of the Twentieth Corps, to which General Slocum was appointed; but he was at Vicksburg, and until he joined, the command of the corps devolved on General H. S. Williams, who handled it admirably. General Palmer also resigned the command of the Fourteenth Corps, and General Jeff. C. Davis was appointed to his place. Major-General D. S. Stanley had succeeded General Howard in the command of the Fourth Corps.

“From the 2d to the 5th we continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along our whole line. General Reilley's brigade of General Cox's division, General Schofield's army, on the 5th, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about 400 men, who were caught in the entanglements and abattis; but the next day the position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or Macon railroad. The enemy's line at that time must have

been near fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. This he was enabled to do by the use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of the ground that we were unable to discover the weak parts. I had become satisfied that, to reach the Macon road, and thereby control the supplies for Atlanta, I would have to move the whole army; but before beginning I ordered down from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifled guns, to try their effect. These arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires, and creating confusion, yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts, even if the city were destroyed. On the 16th of August I made my Orders, No. 57, prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, to the entrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point railroad, near Fairborn, and afterwards to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with our wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders I learned that Wheeler, with a large mounted force of the enemy, variously estimated from 6,000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north, and had made his appearance on our lines of communication near Adairsville, and had succeeded in capturing 900 of our beef cattle, and had made a break of the railroad near Calhoun. I could not have asked any thing better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, and this detachment left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my orders for the time being, and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about 5,000 cavalry, and to

move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point road, and break it good near Fairborn; then to proceed across to the Macon road, and tear it up thoroughly, to avoid as far as possible, the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me in better position to take full advantage of the result.

"General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, and broke the West Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross's cavalry and got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry which had been dispatched below Jonesboro' in cars was run back, and disembarked, and with Jackson's rebel cavalry made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east, and made a circuit, and struck the railroad about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of which he brought in seventy, and captured a 4-gun battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which he returned by a circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the 22d. After an interview with General Kilpatrick, I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of the whole army. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders were at once

notified to send their surplus wagons, incumbrances of all kinds, and sick back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on our extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's Creek. The Twentieth Corps, General Williams, moved back to the Chattahoochie. This movement was made without loss, save a few things left in our camps by thoughtless officers or men. The night of the 26th the movement continued, the army of the Tennessee drawing out and moving rapidly by a circuit well towards Sandtown and across Camp Creek, the army of the Cumberland below Utoy Creek, General Schofield remaining in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the army of the Tennessee wounded by a shell from the enemy. The third movement brought the army of the Tennessee on the West Point railroad, above Fairborn, the army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield closed in near Digs and Mins. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. Twelve and one-half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, with logs, rock, and earth intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move the next day eastward by several roads. General Howard on the right towards Jonesboro,' General Thomas, the centre, by Shoal Creek church to Couch's on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's mills. An inspection of the

map will show the strategic advantages of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge or 'divide' between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. Therefore the position I have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first 'objective.' It gave me 'interior lines,' something our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I was anxious for once to get the inside track, and therefore my haste and desire to secure it.

"The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th. General Thomas, on the centre, encountered little opposition or difficulty, save what resulted from the narrow roads, and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point, and came into position toward Rough-and-Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, had a greater distance to move. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal Creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short delay occurred, and some cannonading and skirmishing; but General Howard started them again, and kept them moving, passed the Renfro Place on the Decatur Road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day; but he wisely and well kept on, and pushed on toward Jonesboro', saved the bridges across Flint River, and did not halt until darkness compelled him within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the morning of August 31st, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth Corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act offensively or defensively, as the

case called for. I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as soon as I learned that General Howard had passed Renfro's, I directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis' corps, to move General Stanley's corps in connection with General Schofield's towards Rough-and-Ready, and then to send forward, due east, a strong detachment of General Davis' corps to feel for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough-and-Ready. These movements were progressing during the 31st, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesboro', and attacked General Howard in the position described. General Howard was admirably situated to receive him, and repulse the attack thoroughly. The enemy attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and, after a contest of over two hours, withdrew, leaving over 400 dead on the ground; and his wounded, of which about 300 were left in Jonesboro', could not have been much less than 2,500. Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesboro' about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about 4 P. M. the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro'; that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough-and-Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General Stanley of General Thomas' army had also got the road below General Schofield, and was destroying it, working south; and that General Baird of General Davis' corps had struck it still lower down, within four miles of Jonesboro'.

"Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesboro', General Howard to keep the enemy busy whilst General Thomas should move down from the north, with General

Schofield on his left. I also ordered the troops, as they moved down, to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because we had it then, and I did not know but that events might divert our attention. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear, the north. General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesboro'. I expected the whole army would close down on Jonesboro' by noon of the 1st of September. General Davis' corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was on time and deployed, facing south, his right in connection with General Howard, and his left on the railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the Rough-and-Ready Road, and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps on General Howard's left was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro', to act against that flank along with General Kilpatrick's cavalry. About 4 P. M. General Davis was all ready, and assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely and taking as prisoners the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Schofield and Stanley to hurry up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy was gone, and had retreated South. About 2 o'clock that night, the sound of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distance about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry.

These continued for about an hour, and again about 4 A. M. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer us and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless, at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at Jonesboro', I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's station, in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the right, and a confluent of the Flint River to his left. We pushed close up and reconnoitered the ground, and found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville Road.

"Rumors began to arrive through prisoners captured that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1st; that Hood had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us and which were yet unexplained, that Stewart's corps was then retreating toward McDonough, and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success already gained. Accordingly, I ordered the work of destroying railroad to cease, and the troops to be held in hand ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant. General Jeff. C. Davis had been left above Jonesboro', and General Garrard's cavalry was still further back, and the latter was ordered to send back to Atlanta and ascertain the exact truth and the real situation of affairs. But the same night, viz., of September 4th, a courier arrived from General Slocum,

reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and had retreated on the McDonough Road. General Slocum had entered and taken possession on 2d of September.

"The object of my movement against the railroad was, therefore, already reached and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the 4th for the Army to prepare to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where we remained a day. On the 7th we moved to Rough-and-Ready, seven miles, and the next to the camps selected, viz: the Army of the Cumberland grouped round about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean and healthy camps. I have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations to our rear, further than that he broke the road about Calhoun, and then made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laidbold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into East Tennessee, and made quite a stay at Athens; but, on the first show of pursuit, he kept on north across the Little Tennessee; and crossing the Holston near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over towards Sequatchee and McMinnville. Thence he seems to have gone to Murfreesboro' and Lebanon, and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the property of citizens, but has injured us but little, the railroads being repaired about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued towards Florence, and out of the State by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger; but what amount of execution they have done to him is not yet reported. Our roads and telegraph are

all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed. It is proper to remark in this place, that during the operation of this campaign, expeditions were sent out from Memphis and Vicksburgh to check any movements of the enemy's forces in Mississippi upon our communications. The manner in which this object was accomplished reflects credit upon Generals A. J. Smith, Washburne, Slocum, and Mower; and although General Sturgis' expedition was less successful than the others, it assisted us in the main object to be accomplished.

"I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges—those of the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and Chattahoochie—are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time almost out of material improvised on the spot. Colonel W. W. Wright, who has charge of the 'construction and repairs,' is not only a most skillful, but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the quartermasters and commissaries, bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind. Colonel L. C. Easton, Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief Commissary, have also succeeded, in a manner surprising to all of us, in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better sup-

plied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant-General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign. Captain T. G. Baylor, Chief Ordnance Officer, has in like manner kept the army well supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions. My own personal staff has been small but select. Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, has filled the office of Chief of Artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. Kittoc, Chief Medical Inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen the wounded removed from the fields of battle, cared for, and afterwards sent to proper hospitals in the rear, with more promptness, system, care, and success, than during this whole campaign, covering over one hundred days of actual battle and skirmish. My Aides-de-Camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. M. Dayton, and Captain J. C. Audenried, have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders day and night to distant points of our extended lines, with an intelligence and zeal that insured the perfect working of machinery, covering from ten to twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery and explanation of an order, would have produced confusion; whereas in great measure, owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each others tracks through a difficult

country of over a hundred and thirty-eight miles in length, without confusion or trouble. Captain Dayton has also fulfilled the duties of my Adjutant-General, making all orders and carrying on the official correspondence. Three Inspectors-General completed my staff. Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, who has since been assigned the command of a division of the Sixteenth Corps at the request of General Dodge. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Warner, of the Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ewing, Inspector-General of the Fifteenth Corps, and Captain Thirtieth United States Regulars. These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance

to me in handling these large armies. My three 'armies in the field' were commanded by able officers, my equal in rank and experience. Major-General George H. Thomas, Major-General J. M. Schofield, and Major-General O. O. Howard. With such commanders I had only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot over-estimate their services to the country, and must express my deep and heartfelt thanks that coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist."

CHAPTER CI.

OCCUPATION OF ATLANTA BY GENERAL SHERMAN, AND FINAL RAID OF GENERAL MORGAN.

THE victory at Atlanta came somewhat unexpectedly upon the public, who had now slowly learnt to make due allowance in their calculations for the proverbial delays of war, and was received with corresponding exhilaration. They had yet to wait for the capture of Richmond; but one of the two great objects of the year was attained, and the achievement gave a new impulse to the work yet to be performed. It came simultaneously, too, with the news of Admiral Farragut's success—to be narrated in a coming chapter—before Mobile, which also added at the time greatly to the popular conviction of the final result of the war. President Lincoln gave expression to this feeling in the issue of a proclamation on the 3d of September, recommending a day of Thanksgiving.

"The signal success," said he, "that

Divine Providence has recently vouchsafed to the operations of the United States fleet and army in the harbor of Mobile, and the reduction of Fort Powell, Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan, and the glorious achievements of the army under Major-General Sherman in the State of Georgia, resulting in the capture of the city of Atlanta, call for devout acknowledgment to the Supreme Being, in whose hands are the destinies of nations. It is, therefore, requested that on next Sunday, in all places of worship in the United States, thanksgiving be offered to Him for His mercy in preserving our national existence against the insurgent rebels who have been waging a cruel war against the Government of the United States for its overthrow; and also that prayer be made for Divine protection to our brave soldiers and their leaders in the field

who have so often and so gallantly periled their lives in battling with the enemy ; and for blessings and comfort from the Father of Mercies to the sick, wounded and prisoners, and to the orphans and widows of those who have fallen in the service of their country ; and that He will continue to uphold the Government of the United States against all the efforts of public enemies and secret foes."

President Lincoln also issued a special order tendering "the national thanks to General Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine power, resulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that have signalized this campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein, to the applause and thanks of the nation."

In a special Congratulatory Order addressed to his army from his headquarters "In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 8, 1864," General Sherman presented this striking summary of the leading incidents of his campaign. "The officers and soldiers," said he, "of the armies of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee, have already received the thanks of the nation, through its President and Commander-in-Chief ; and it now remains only for him who has been with you from the beginning, and who intends to stay all the time, to thank the officers and men for their intelligence, fidelity and courage displayed in the campaign of Atlanta. On the 1st of May our armies were lying in garrison, seemingly quiet from Knoxville, and our enemy lay behind his rocky-faced barrier at Dalton, proud, defiant and exulting. He had had time since Christmas to recover from his discomfiture on the Mission Ridge, with his ranks filled

and a new Commander-in-Chief, second to none of the Confederacy in reputation for skill, sagacity, and extreme popularity. All at once our armies assumed life and action and appeared before Dalton ; threatening Rocky Face, we threw ourselves upon Resaca, and the rebel army only escaped by the rapidity of its retreat, aided by the numerous roads with which he was familiar, and which were strange to us. Again, he took post in Allatoona, but we gave him no rest ; and by a circuit toward Dallas and subsequent movement to Ackworth, we gained the Allatoona Pass. Then followed the eventful battles about Kenesaw, and the escape of the enemy across Chattahoochie river. The crossing of the Chattahoochie and breaking of the Augusta road, was most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in the art of war. At this stage of our game, our enemies dissatisfied with their old and skillful commander, selected one more bold and rash. New tactics were adopted. Hood first boldly and rapidly, on the 20th of July, fell on our right at Peachtree creek, and lost. Again, on the 22d he struck our extreme left, and was severely punished ; and finally again, on the 28th he repeated the attempt on our right, and that time must have been satisfied, for since that date he has remained on the defensive. We slowly and gradually drew our lines from Atlanta, feeling for the railroads which supplied the rebel army and made Atlanta a place of importance. We must concede to our enemy that he met these efforts patiently and skillfully, but at last he made the mistake we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall. Instantly our cavalry was on his only remaining road, and we followed quickly with our principal army, and Atlanta fell into our possession as the fruit of well concerted measures, backed by a brave and confi-

dent army. This completed the grand task which had been assigned us by our Government, and your general again repeats his personal and official thanks to all the officers and men composing this army, for the indomitable courage and perseverance which alone could give success. We have beaten our enemy on every ground he has chosen, and have wrested from him *his own Gate City*, where were located his foundries, arsenals, and workshops, deemed secure on account of their distance from our base, and the seemingly impregnable obstacles supervening. Nothing is impossible to an army like this, determined to vindicate a Government which has rights wherever our flag has once floated, and is resolved to maintain them at any and all costs. In our campaign many, yes, very many of our noble and gallant comrades have preceded us to our common destination, the grave; but they have left the memory of deeds, on which a nation can build a proud history. McPherson, Harker, McCook, and others dear to us all, are now the binding links in our minds that should attach more closely together the living, who have to complete the task which still lays before us in the dim future. I ask all to continue as they have so well begun, the cultivation of the soldierly virtues that have ennobled our own and other countries. Courage, patience, obedience to the laws and constituted authorities of our Government; fidelity to our trusts and good feeling among each other; each trying to excel the other in the presence of those high qualities, and it will then require no prophet to foretell that our country will in time emerge from this war, purified by the fires of war, and worthy its great founder, Washington."

The allusion to the loss of general officers in the campaign, was simple and sincere, and made with a true soldier's instinct of the path of duty. We have seen the warmth with which General

Sherman in his official report records the animated youth and services of McPherson. A native of Ohio, a graduate at West Point in 1853 at the head of his class, at the age of twenty-five, he had then been appointed to the Corps of Engineers, and was engaged in its active duties, rising to the rank of Captain. In the first year of the war he was appointed Aide to General Halleck in the West, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He was Chief Engineer in the army of Tennessee, and conducted some of its most important operations. He was promoted to Major-General of Volunteers in reward for his services in the field. His purity and elevation of character secured him the warmest regard of those who knew him. "Frank, manly, generous, earnest, truthful, kind," writes a friend after his death, "these were his chief characteristics."* The following account of the manner of his death gathered from one of his staff officers appeared in the *Nashville Union* of July 26th: "General McPherson had ridden from left to right of his corps, in superintending the advance of his skirmish line, and was returning again to the right, when a party of rebel bushwackers, in ambush, ran from their covert, between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, and crying out: "There they come, give them hell," fired. A couple of staff officers and two orderlies accompanied the General, all of whom escaped except the General, who fell and expired almost instantly, the ball having cut the aorta. The enemy rushed forward to rifle the body. Officers and orderlies meeting Colonel Strong, Inspector-General, and Captain Buell, both of General McPherson's staff, accompanied by a few orderlies, related the circumstance. Colonel Strong instantly drew the party into line and ordered a charge. This handful of brave and impetuous men, regardless of the foemen in front, dashed gallantly

* Obituary in the *N. Y. Evening Post*, August 1, 1864.

ahead and drove off the thieving enemy, and, while Captain Buell with his revolver kept them at bay, Colonel Strong, assisted by the orderlies, lifted the nude body, stripped of every article of clothing save a glove and sock, to his own horse, and bore it safely from the field. Beneath the light glove covering the left hand was a diamond ring, which the vandals failed to discover, and which will be forwarded to the General's friends in Ohio."

A generous tribute was paid by Major-General Howard to the memory of his division commander, General Charles G. Harker. "Strict and exact," says he, "in the performance of his own duty, he obtained the most willing and hearty co-operation from all his officers without apparent effort. The only complaint I ever heard was, that if Harker got started against the enemy he could not be kept back. Yet I never found him other than cool and self-possessed. Whenever anything difficult was to be done, anything that required peculiar pluck and energy, we called on General Harker. At Rocky Face, where his division wrested one half of that wonderful wall of strength from the rebels; at Resaca, where he tenaciously held a line of works close under the rebel fire; at Dallas, where he held on for several days with their lines, in conjunction with his brother officers, and hammered the rebel works at a distance of less than 100 yards; at Mud Creek, where he reinforced the skirmishers and directed their movements with so much skill and vigor as to take and hold a strong line of the enemy's earthworks; in fact, in every place where the corps has been engaged, this noble young man earnestly and heartily performed his part. On the 27th of June he led the terrible assault on the enemy's breastworks. We did not carry them, but part of his command reached the works. A sergeant bearing the colors was bayoneted as he was climbing over.

Our beloved and trusted young General was close by, pressing forward his column, when the fatal wound was received." A native of New Jersey, General Harker graduated at West Point in 1858, where he was appointed to a lieutenancy in the Second Infantry, and subsequently became captain in the Fifteenth Regiment of Regulars. At the beginning of the war he had command of an Ohio regiment of volunteers, and became distinguished in the campaigns in Tennessee, being promoted to a brigade for his gallantry at Chickamauga.

Colonel Daniel McCook, acting Brigadier-General, one of the patriotic Ohio family, so distinguished in the volunteer service of the war, was mortally wounded while charging the enemy's works at the battle of Kenesaw Mountain. He was removed to Ohio, where he died at Steubenville on the 17th of July. He bore his father's Christian name, whose death at the hands of Morgan's men while defending his State against the incursion of that rebel leader in July, 1863, will be remembered by the reader. Of the seven sons of this devoted patriot who entered the field three had now fallen with their father.

Such, in the brief, condensed military narrative of the commanding general, is the history of this remarkable campaign, which, in the scene on which it was carried on—the heart of the enemy's country—the resistance to be met and physical difficulties to be overcome, the long line of communications to be guarded, the nice adaptation of means to ends, the patient endurance and persistent effort manifested will ever stand prominently forward in the annals of this heroic war. To pursue the details of this campaign in the reports of subordinate officers and in the stirring recitals of the various correspondents on the field would extend this chapter to a volume. Throughout these months of continuous toil, with their exactions of

life and health, we should find a great army, drawn from the Western States, the centre of the Union following their military leader firmly relying on his military genius, and steadily supported by a conviction of the justice of their cause and of its inherent strength and vitality. The story, with all its picturesque incidents, deserves to be, and doubtless will be, recorded in an imperishable form. It will constitute in itself the history of a great war ; but in relation to the gigantic conflict of which it was a part, it will be only one of numerous records, among other campaigns, animated by like motives, for equal courage and endurance.

The conduct of the campaign fastened the attention of the public upon General Sherman. His character, prompt, decided and energetic, was studied in his dispatches, and he at last gained credit for the prescience with which he had anticipated the difficulties of this arduous struggle. Born in Ohio in 1820, of a good family, the son of a judge of the Supreme Court of the State, he had been educated at West Point, graduating sixth in his class at the age of twenty. He then entered the service in the Artillery Corps, served in Florida and in California during the Mexican War ; in 1850 married the daughter of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, of Ohio, and in 1853 resigned his commission and took charge of a banking-house at San Francisco. In 1860 he became President of the State Military Academy of Louisiana, in the duties of which he was engaged at the outbreak of the rebellion. He promptly took sides with the Union, in January, 1861, addressing a letter to Governor Moore, of Louisiana, in which he reminded that personage, who became so active an agent in the revolt, that he had "accepted his position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of the seminary was inserted in marble over the main door— 'By the liberality of the General Government of the United States : the

Union, *Esto perpetua.*' Recent events," he added, "foreshadowed a great change, and it became all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer," he wrote, "to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives." The determination of the man was not to be mistaken, and his resignation was accepted. He then presented himself at Washington, warned the new Administration of the danger and magnitude of the impending conflict, in his estimate of which he was in advance of the day, and in June, 1861, was appointed colonel in the regular army. His employment in Virginia, and as successor to General Anderson in Kentucky, will be remembered by the reader, with his reply to Adjutant-General Thomas, after a survey of the condition of the Department, that 200,000 men would be needed to hold the State to its allegiance and maintain an aggressive movement in that quarter against the enemy. For this plain calculation he was considered visionary, and so little disposed to flatter the easy views taken of the rebellion that he was pronounced unpatriotic, and suspicions were even thrown out in the newspapers of his sanity. But the new leader of the West, General Grant, took better note of his abilities, and the stirring campaigns which followed in Tennessee and Mississippi soon established his military reputation.*

A letter which he wrote while in the field before Atlanta, on the 30th of July, exhibits something of his disposition. Under the revised conscription law of Congress permitting recruiting of white and black soldiers in the portion of the rebel States occupied by our forces, an agent from Massachusetts reported himself for this purpose on his line at Chattanooga, and applied to Gen-

* Biographical notice of General Sherman, by Colonel J. M. Bowman. *United States Service Magazine* for August, 1864.

eral Sherman for aid. After naming several appropriate stations in Alabama and elsewhere, General Sherman continued: "I do not see that the law restricts you to black recruits, but you are at liberty to collect white recruits also. It is waste of time and money to open rendezvous in Northwest Georgia, for I assure you I have not seen an able-bodied man, black or white, there, fit for a soldier, who was not in this army or the one opposed to it. You speak of the impression going abroad that I am opposed to the organization of colored regiments. My opinions are usually very positive, and there is no reason why you should not know them. Though entertaining profound reverence for our Congress, I do doubt their wisdom in the passage of this law. 1st. Because civilian agents about an army are a nuisance. 2d. The duty of citizens to fight for their country is too sacred a one to be peddled off by buying up the refuse of other States. 3d. It is unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers who are fighting, as those who compose this army do, to place them on a par with the class of recruits you are after. 4th. The negro is in a transition state, and is not the equal of the white man. 5th. He is liberated from his bondage by act of war; and the armies in the field are entitled to all his assistance in labor and fighting, in addition to the proper quotas of the States. 6th. This bidding and bartering for recruits, white and black, has delayed the reinforcement of our armies at the times when such reinforcements would have enabled us to make our successes permanent. 7th. The law is an experiment which, pending war, is unwise and unsafe, and has delayed the universal draft which I firmly believe will become necessary to overcome the widespread resistance offered us; and I also believe the universal draft will be wise and beneficial; for under the Providence of God it will separate the sheep from the goats, and

demonstrate what citizens will fight for their country, and what will only talk. No one will infer from this that I am not a friend of the negro as well as the white race; I contend that the treason and rebellion of the master freed the slave, and the armies I have commanded have conducted to safe points more negroes than those of any General officer in the army; but I prefer negroes for pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants, others gradually to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning with the duties of local garrisons, such as we had at Memphis, Vicksburgh, Natchez, Nashville, and Chattanooga; but I would not draw on the poor race for too large a proportion of its active, athletic young men, for some must remain to seek new homes and provide for the old and young, the feeble and helpless. These are some of my peculiar notions, but I assure you they are shared by a large proportion of our fighting men."

General Sherman had another opportunity to display his ability with the pen, in a correspondence which took place between him and the rebel General Hood, after the occupation of Atlanta. It was the settled resolution of General Sherman, in accordance with his views of the necessities of the situation, to remove the citizens from the town, and garrison it strictly as a military post. Situated in the heart of the enemy's country, and valuable only as a base of further operations, he could not consent that it should be occupied by a doubtful or disaffected population, composed largely of families many of whose members were in the rebel service. Such an evil might be tolerated and controlled within our lines in Virginia or on the Mississippi; but General Sherman determined to avoid it at Atlanta. He accordingly announced to General Hood his intention of removing the remaining inhabitants, offering to them the choice of going North or South, and to give them the opportu-

nity of doing so, proposed a cessation of hostilities for ten days. Servants or negro slaves were to be allowed, if they wish to do so, to accompany their masters or mistresses; otherwise to be sent away or employed by the quartermaster. General Hood accepted the proposition as a matter of necessity, but protested "in the name of the God of humanity against the expulsion of the people of Atlanta from their firesides," declaring, while he agreed to the truce, that General Sherman's purpose "transcends the studied and ungenerous cruelty of acts ever before brought to the attention of mankind, even in the darkest history of war."* To this remonstrance General Sherman replied in a letter dated Atlanta, Sept. 10: "General J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of the Tennessee Confederate Army. General—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal South of the people of Atlanta who prefer to go in that direction. I enclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied accomplish my purpose perfectly. You style the measures proposed 'unprecedented,' and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel as an act of 'studied and ungenerous cruelty.'" It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war when recent and modern examples are so handy. You, yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to the town that every

cannon-shot and many musket shots from our line of investments, that overshoot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, Miss. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these causes of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a 'brave people.' I say it is a kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now at once from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the brave people should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history. In the name of common sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner—you, who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into civil war, 'dark and cruel war,' who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance serjeant, seized and made prisoners of war the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you) hateful Lincoln Government, tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into the rebellion in spite of themselves, falsified the vote of Louisiana, turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships, expelled Union families by the thousand, burned their houses, and declared by act of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received. Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South, as the best born

* Richmond, *Examiner*, Sept. 19, 1864, cited in New York *Times*, Sept. 22.

Southerner among you. If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to-day, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a 'brave people' at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people."

A somewhat similar correspondence was held between General Sherman and James M. Calhoun, the mayor of Atlanta. The latter, with two members of the City Council, represented the inevitable hardships of the removal, the difficulty of finding shelter in the region to the south already crowded with refugees, and appealed for a withdrawal of the order. To this General Sherman replied on the 12th of September: "GENTLEMEN—I have your letter of the 11th in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have *peace*, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and

therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go *now*, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scene of the past month? Of course I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose that this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of *Union*. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I, and this army, become at once your pro-

tectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a Government and those who insist on war and its desolation. You might as well appeal against the thunder storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes or your horses, or your houses or your land, or any thing you have; but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of Government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg and Mississippi we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them

when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and molded shell and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success. But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for any thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now, you must go, and take with you the old and feeble: feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace to settle on your old homes at Atlanta."

A military order was issued by General Sherman on the 14th, declaring that "the city of Atlanta being exclusively for warlike purposes, will be at once vacated by all except the armies of the United States, and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government." By the same order traders, manufacturers and sutlers were strictly forbidden to settle in the limits of fortified places on the line from Chattanooga.

In pursuance of this order, as we learn from a letter of General Sherman, dated Atlanta, September 24, addressed "To the Louisville Agent of the New York Associated Press," in which he denounced as utterly false a statement which had been published that the exiles had been "robbed of everything before being sent into the rebel lines." During the time 446 families were moved South, making 705 adults, 860 children and 479 servants, with 1,651

pounds of furniture and household goods on the average for each family.

There were rumors during September of a peace conference in Georgia, of which the following account was transferred from the *Macon (Ga.) Telegraph* to the northern journals: "We have a pretty reliable report of the result of the informal deputation to Governor Brown, to invite him to a peace conference with General Sherman. The latter had this project much at heart, and sent as his messenger a gentleman well known, of high social position in Georgia, to whom he tendered written credentials, if desired. He professed great unwillingness to penetrate further into Georgia and inflict the same devastation and misery which were sown broadcast in his rear. He sent an invitation to Governor Brown and other prominent gentlemen to come up and talk the matter over with him, and see if some scheme could not be devised to withdraw Georgia from the war, and save her people from further suffering. He would like, if Governor Brown desired it, that the latter should ride over the State road to Chattanooga, see 'the condition of his people in the rear, and realize the strong claims upon his sympathy it presented.' The reply of Governor Brown, we understand, was very much to this effect: Tell General Sherman that I understand him only to be a general of one of the Federal armies, while I am merely a governor of one of the Confederate States. I don't see how we can negotiate; or, if we should undertake it, how our negotiations can lead to any practical results."

Governor Brown had issued an important proclamation in July, in answer to a call for reinforcements by General Johnston, in which he summoned into active military service, at Atlanta, all that part of the reserve militia of the State between the ages of fifty and fifty-five years, and all between the ages of sixteen and seventeen. He enforced

this call by the following appeal, in which the importance of Atlanta, as a military position, is fully set forth: "Georgians, you must reinforce General Johnston's army, and aid in driving back the enemy, or he will drive you back to the Atlantic, burn your cities and public buildings, destroy your property, and devastate the fair fields of your noble State. If the Confederate Government will not send the large cavalry force (now engaged in raiding and repelling raids) to destroy the long line of railroads over which General Sherman brings his supplies from Nashville, and thus compel him to retreat with the loss of most of his army, the people of Georgia, who have already been drawn upon more heavily in proportion to population than those of any other State in the Confederacy, must at all hazards, and at any sacrifice, rush to the front, and aid the great commander at the head of our glorious self-sacrificing army to drive them from the soil of the Empire State. I beg you, fellow-citizens, to reflect upon the magnitude of the issue. If General Johnston's army is destroyed, the Gulf States are thrown open to the enemy, and we are ruined. If General Sherman's army is cut off, the West is thrown open to us to the Ohio river, and all raids into Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama, will at once cease. If every citizen of Georgia will do his duty, and the President will permit Kentucky to remain free from raids for a time, and will send Morgan and Forrest to operate upon the railroad line of communication nearly 300 miles in Sherman's rear, which passes over many bridges, and through a country destitute of supplies, the grand army of invasion can be destroyed, and not only our own State, but the Confederacy, delivered from disaster by the triumphant success of our arms."

The raid of General Morgan into Kentucky, alluded to by Governor